

THE  
DISPATCHES

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

DURING

HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS

IN

INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW  
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE.

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COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND OTHER AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS

BY THE LATE

COLONEL GURWOOD, C.B., K.C.T.S.,

ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH, AND DEPUTY LIEUTENANT  
OF THE TOWER OF LONDON.

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IN EIGHT VOLUMES,—Vol. IV.


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


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THE

OFFICIAL AND OTHER DISPATCHES

OF

FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

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THE PENINSULA.

To Brig. Gen. R. Crauford.

Visen, 4th April, 1810.

I received last night your letter of the 1st, which ought to have reached me on the evening of the 2d.

The enemy's corps south of the Tagus have occupied Caceres, and extended themselves along the Salor in front of Hill's corps. I suspect that they have occupied this position only because Caceres is the part of Estremadura which has been least exhausted since the last harvest, and that they can find subsistence there; and they are in tolerable security, as it is not easy to attack them. It must be observed, however, that this is the position which they would take with the corps in Estremadura, if they intended to undertake any operation on this side, and were desirous of

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G. O.

Visen, 4th April, 1810.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests that the attention of the troops may be drawn to this additional example of the consequences of the bad conduct of the soldiers; the soldiers must see that it is impossible for them to commit these outrages without being discovered, and that conviction and punishment are the certain consequences of their crimes: indeed it has rarely happened that one of those who have conspired to commit these crimes (for they are all the result of conspiracy) has not offered himself as an evidence to convict the other criminals. The Commander of the Forces is obliged to observe that these crimes could not be so frequently committed, these conspiracies could not be formed, a robbery of the description of that for which these prisoners are now ordered for execution could not have been known to the soldiers of almost the whole company, if the non-commissioned officers did their duty, and remained at all times among the soldiers.

His Excellency also observes that the non-commissioned officers can do their duty, and can maintain the authority of their situation, only by having the support of the officers belonging to their company given to them upon all occasions, by constantly visiting the soldiers' quarters, and by invariable attendance upon the parade, from the moment the soldiers are under arms. The Commander of the Forces draws the attention of the General and superior officers of the army, and of all the other officers, to his Orders of the 29th May, 1809 (see vol. iii. p. 258), to which he desires a strict attention may be paid in future: it is impossible that the time of the officers of the army can be employed to so much advantage to the service, or with so much satisfaction to themselves, whilst the troops are in cantonments, as in giving their attention to support the authority of the non-commissioned officers, to instil into them a just sense of their situation and of their duties, and thus to prevent these conspiracies and crimes, of which the Commander of the Forces finds himself under the necessity of making such frequent examples.

preventing us from availing ourselves of the assistance of Hill's corps. However, I believe that they have very little communication between one of their corps and the others, less intelligence of our strength and situation, and no combination.

The Austrian marriage is a terrible event, and must prevent any great movement on the Continent for the present. Still, I do not despair of seeing at some time or other a check to the Buonaparte system. Recent transactions in Holland show that it is all hollow within, and that it is so inconsistent with the wishes, the interests, and the existence of civilised society, that he cannot trust even his brothers to carry it into execution. If the Spaniards had acted with common prudence, we should be in a very different situation in the Peninsula, but I fear there are now no hopes.

The government are terribly weak, and I think it probable will be beaten upon the Walcheren question. It is impossible to say what will be the consequence. I think the King may be able to form a government without having recourse to Lord Grenville; but there will be no strength in that government, and the members will have no satisfaction in conducting public affairs.

As Gen. Cox sends information to the Portuguese government, as well as to me, I beg you to send him Ruman's letters, and any others that may go through your hands addressed to him or to me. I write to him not to delay the departure of the dragoon with your communication.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Viseu, 5th April, 1810.

I informed you yesterday of the position the French had taken up on the Salor; I have now to inform you that they quitted it again on the 31st. These people are in motion perpetually! They marched towards Merida, probably because the Marques de la Romana had taken the position in the Conventual at Merida, which I recommended to him to seize, by which the communication between the French corps in Lower Estremadura was cut off with the corps on the other side of the Guadiana.

To Col. Peacocke.

Viseu, 5th April, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d April, and I am much obliged to you for the report which it contains. I beg that the 3d batt. of the Royals, the 1st batt. of the 9th, and 2d batt. of the 38th

G. O.

Viseu, 5th April, 1810.

The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the officers of the army to the G. O. 4th May, Nos. 5 and 6, and of the 7th Oct., Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11, also of the 8th Dec., No. 5; their inattention to these Orders is the greatest inconvenience to the service, increases the detail of business in the public departments, renders necessary references to themselves and to the Commander of the Forces, on every article which they receive from the magistrates of the country upon irregular vouchers: the whole of this might be avoided, if the officers would attend to the Orders which have been issued upon this subject.

Irregular receipts and vouchers given by [*the following officers*] are now before the Commander of the Forces.

It will give the Commander of the Forces much concern to be under the necessity of requiring officers who give irregular vouchers to the magistrates of the country, to pay for the articles which they have received; but the frequent occurrence of inattention to these Orders which can be obeyed with so much facility, and the extent of the business which so much inattention throws upon all the departments, will render this measure necessary.

regts., may be equipped in the usual manner, and prepared to march when orders shall be dispatched from head quarters for that purpose.

These corps are in the mean time to be quartered either in barracks or in convents, or encamped in the most healthy situations in the town or the neighbourhood of Lisbon; and the commanding and other officers of regiments must adopt all means to prevent irregularities, which will only tend to augment the number of sick, and aggravate the disorders of those already sick, or in a state of convalescence.

Great care must be taken to prevent the ophthalmia from spreading, from which disorder the army in Portugal has hitherto been quite free.

It is impossible for me to allow any men to join the army without arms and accoutrements. It is very proper that the officers commanding regiments should fix upon those men to be officers' servants and bāt men who are least capable of bearing the ordinary fatigues of the service; but they must all have their arms, and all obey the standing orders of the army upon this subject. After all, I believe it will be found, that if attention be paid by the officers to the food of the soldiers; if they prevented them from straggling from their corps on a march, or from their quarters or camp, in search of wine or plunder after the march is made; and if the soldiers are regularly organised and told off into the several parties to be sent for those articles of food, fuel, &c., which they require; and that the officers superintend the execution of these duties, it will be found that but few soldiers are so young, and still fewer so old and infirm, that they cannot make those marches and perform those duties which the service requires from them.

I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, one squadron of the 13th light dragoons, and 4 corporals belonging to the 3 other squadrons of the same regiment, with their horses, &c., may be embarked to go to Cadiz, as soon as the Agent of transports shall have prepared vessels to receive them. The 4 corporals must be good horsemen, and men well acquainted with the sword exercise; and these men, on their arrival at Cadiz, are to be put under the direction of Major Gen. Whittingham. The other 3 squadrons of the 13th light dragoons are to be equipped, and in readiness to take the field, but are to remain at Lisbon till further orders.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Visen, 5th April, 1810.

Having occasion to send to Cadiz one squadron of the 13th light dragoons, with their horses, and 4 corporals of the same regiment, with their horses, belonging to the other 3 squadrons of the same regiment, which will remain at Lisbon, I shall be much obliged to you if you will direct the Agent of transports to provide transports for their conveyance, and if you will send them to Cadiz under convoy as soon as they shall be embarked.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Visen, 5th April, 1810.

Although I have received intimation from England that Lieut. Gen. Graham has been appointed to command the troops at Cadiz, I continue to address myself to you, as I have not heard of his arrival; and you will of course deliver this letter to him, if he should have arrived. Accord-

ing to your desire, I have directed that one squadron of the 13th light dragoons may proceed to Cadiz. With this squadron, I have directed that 4 corporals, belonging to the other 3 squadrons of the same regiment remaining in Portugal, and selected for their skill in horsemanship and in the sword exercise, may be sent, with their horses, &c., according to the request of Major Gen. Whittingham, to assist him in forming the Spanish cavalry of the army of the Duque de Alburquerque.

I beg that these 4 men may be put under the direction of Major Gen. Whittingham.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 5th April, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 2d, and I am glad to find that the government intend to issue a proclamation, as well as circulate the letter which you before sent me; as the inhabitants and inferior order of magistrates and officers require to be reminded of their duties, as well as their superiors.

I do not believe the estimate of August, 1809, is the first estimate which was sent home to the British government, and which I saw in the Sec. of State's office. It was framed either in January or February, shortly after Mr. Villiers arrived in Portugal.

The 30,000 stand of arms and Picton's rifles, &c., are for the Portuguese troops, and I have given them over to Marshal Beresford. I only hope that we shall get them issued in time.

I enclose a letter from Mr. O'Meara to the Commissary Gen., regarding pay for the Portuguese troops in Cadiz. The best mode of settling for this pay would be for me to order the issue monthly to the commanding officer of the regiment, and the sum issued would be so much paid to you by the Commissary Gen., and to the Portuguese government by you; and so much subtracted from the amount of their subsidy, and from your demand upon the Commissary Gen. for the two sevenths. The commanding officer of the regiment would then settle his accounts for the sum he received in the usual manner with the Portuguese government.

Let me know if this mode of settlement will suit you and the Portuguese government, and I will give directions accordingly.

*The A.G. to Ensign —.*

5th April, 1810.

In acknowledging your letter of the 26th ult., I have to convey the Commander of the Forces' commands that you proceed without loss of time to join the 2d batt. of the 3d or Buffs, where his Excellency fully expects that the same accuracy of conduct which authorised your promotion will further secure the approbation and consequent attention of the Commanding officer of your corps.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

Viseu, 6th April, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 2d March, relative to the desertion in the 2d batt. —th regt., appearing on the return of that regiment, to the 25th Jan.; and I enclose the reports which I have received from Major Gen. Picton and Major Young upon that subject.

The desertion from nearly all the regiments in this army must have appeared extraordinary to the Commander in Chief, and must have given him as much concern as it has to me. Till lately, desertion from a British

army on service was a crime almost unknown; and I am concerned to add, that I have reason to believe that many of those who have deserted have been guilty of the worst description of that offence, and have gone over to the enemy. I attribute the prevalence of this crime in a great measure to the bad description of men, of which many of the regiments are composed almost entirely, and who have been received principally from the Irish militia. A sufficient time has not elapsed, since these men have entered the regiments of the line, to form their habits to regularity and discipline; the non-commissioned officers, in the 2d battalions principally, are very bad; and I am sorry to add that the subaltern officers are not of the best description; and that I do not think so much attention has been given by them as might have been expected, to form either the non-commissioned officers or the soldiers to those habits of regularity which a soldier ought to have.

I attribute the desertion from this army likewise, in some degree, to the irregular and predatory habits which those soldiers had acquired, who, having straggled from their regiments during the late service under the command of Sir J. Moore, were some of them taken prisoners by the French, and have since escaped from them; and others, after having wandered in different parts of Portugal and Spain, have returned to the army. All these men have shifted for themselves in the country, by rapine and plunder, since they quitted their regiments in 1808; and they have informed others of their modes of proceeding, and have instilled a desire in others to follow their example, and live in the same mode and by the same means, free from the restraints of discipline and regularity.

I can assure the Commander in Chief that I know of no cause for the desertion of the soldiers from this army, excepting those to which I have above referred. They have in general but little duty, and since the month of August no fatigue. Their quarters are, without exception, good; the inhabitants of the country are invariably kind to them; and not only has there been no distress for provisions since the month of August, but I really believe that there is not a soldier in the army who is not as well fed, and does not receive his food as regularly as he could in barracks in England. Their pay is also regularly given to them, and their accounts regularly settled, and the balances paid, although one month later than the period fixed by His Majesty's regulations, on account of the difficulty of procuring money in this country for the army.

While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should inform the Commander in Chief, that desertion is not the only crime of which the soldiers of this army have been guilty to an extraordinary degree. A detachment seldom marches, particularly if under the command of a non-commissioned officer only (which rarely happens), that a murder or a highway robbery, or some act of outrage, is not committed by the British soldiers composing it. They have killed 8 people since the army returned to Portugal in December; and I am sorry to add that a convoy has seldom arrived with money that the chests have not been broken open, and some of the money stolen by the soldiers in whose charge it was placed, although invariably under the command of an officer; and they have never brought up either shoes or other necessities which could be of use to them, or

which they could sell, that they have not stolen some of the articles committed to their charge.

The orders to the army, and the Provost's establishment, which is larger than was ever known with any British army, will show the pains which the General officers, the commanding officers of regiments, and I, have taken to prevent the commission of these crimes, which, indeed, are not very frequent at the regiments, although they are committed sometimes even there: and the General Courts Martial which have been assembled, and sitting almost constantly while the army has been halted, and sometimes as many as three sitting at the same time in the different cantonments of the army, will show the pains which have been taken to convict and punish those who have been guilty of these crimes. But the inhabitants of the country have such a respect and affection for the British nation, and particularly for the military qualities of the soldier, (who presumes upon his military reputation to commit many of the crimes of which he is guilty,) that it is most difficult to prevail upon the inhabitants to give testimony of the injuries they have received, and they will rarely point out the person who has committed the offence; and the soldiers themselves will rarely tell the truth before a Court Martial. The sentences of the Courts Martial are also carried into execution; so that every thing that precaution and discipline could do to prevent crimes, and that trial and execution of sentences could do to punish those who have been guilty of them, has been done, but hitherto without much success.

I am concerned to be obliged to make to the Commander in Chief so unfavorable a report of an army which has shown that it possesses many excellent qualities; but it contains facts which ought not to be concealed from his knowledge.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 6th April, 1810.

I enclose letters which I have received from the Commanding officers of the 3d batt. of the Royals, and of the 1st batt. of the 9th foot, relative to the subsistence of their regiments to the 25th April.

It is impossible for me either to order the issue of subsistence to those regiments for the months for which they have already received it, or to direct the Commissary Gen. to discount the private bills of the Paymasters of the regiments drawn upon the regimental agents; nor would it be convenient to encourage the negotiation of these bills in the market at Lisbon, by allowing the Paymasters of the regiments to charge the discount upon their bills upon the regimental agents in their accounts.

The only mode which occurs to me of settling this business is, that the agents should send out to these regiments respectively the balances of their bät and forage and subsistence to the 25th April, in cash, if possible; if not possible, that the balances should be sent out in bank notes, which I will then direct the Commissary Gen. to exchange for cash; or that the whole of the subsistence and bät and forage advanced to these regiments in England should be returned to the Pay office; and that it should be paid to them by the Paymaster Gen. in this country.

I beg that your Lordship will give the directions which you may think proper on this subject.



To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 6th April, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 6th Feb., in answer to mine of the 17th Dec., respecting the subsistence of officers and soldiers of this army who have been prisoners, and have made their escape from the French, from which I understand that His Majesty's government intend that the officers, as well as the soldiers, shall receive their subsistence during the period they were prisoners. A question has arisen respecting the latter, including the non-commissioned officers, which is founded on the letter from the late Sec. at War of the 5th Dec. 1798, to the Commanding officers of regiments, whether that which the non-commissioned officers and soldiers are to receive is the full subsistence allowed them by His Majesty's regulations, or their net subsistence, after deducting 6d. *per diem* for each man for his rations. I am inclined to believe that it was intended to give the soldiers their full subsistence, as I have not heard that any arrangement had been made with the French government during this war for the support of prisoners. But I am desirous of having the directions of His Majesty's government upon this point.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 6th April, 1810.

No material alteration has been made in the enemy's positions since I addressed you on the 28th March. The corps of Marshal Mortier was followed through the passes as far as Ronquillo, by the divisions of the Marques de la Romana's corps, under Gen. Ballesteros, which by the last accounts were still there. The corps of Soult, under Gen. Regnier, which had retired to Truxillo, advanced again in the end of March to Cáceres, and had their posts upon the Salor, in front of the left of the Marques de la Romana's corps, and of the troops under Lieut. Gen. Hill.

The Marques de la Romana moved a detachment on the 30th, from Badajoz to Merida, which however did not arrive in time to establish itself there; and Soult's corps again broke up from the Salor on the 31st, and marched to Merida, which place it reached on the 1st inst., and the Spanish detachment retired again to Badajoz. The delay in the occupation of Merida, and this movement by the French, have placed Gen. Ballesteros's corps in a state of risk, unless he should have moved out of the passes in the mountains in time.

A detachment from the corps of Ney also moved in the end of the month of March, by the pass of Baños into Estremadura, but returned again immediately. The object of this movement was probably to oblige Gen. Carrera's division to retire from Coria, and to confine Ciudad Rodrigo on that side.

Nothing of importance had occurred at Astorga as late as the 24th March. I have had no accounts from Cadiz since the 17th of last month.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Viseu, 7th April, 1810.

I am much obliged to you for fitting up the hospital ships. It will be a great convenience to us if you will be so kind as to send the smallest occasionally to Figueira. That which you sent there last got in and out of the Mondego with tolerable facility; and as we may soon expect settled weather, I should hope that we might use that harbour with certainty.

I have not yet returned you an answer respecting the distribution of the troops in the transports; there is no doubt a very material error, which shall be rectified, and I will take care that Lieut. Fleetwood shall get such a return as will answer pretty nearly for an embarkation state at any time, notwithstanding that the exact numbers of each regiment in the army are varying every day. We have very nearly as many rank and file fit for duty as have been stated to Lieut. Fleetwood as the whole number to be embarked. The troops are becoming again very healthy and very strong, and the army is more efficient than it has ever been yet.

The government are terribly afraid that I shall get them, and myself, into a scrape. But what can be expected from men who are beaten in the House of Commons three times a week? A great deal might be done now, if there existed in England less party, and more public sentiment, and if there was any government.

The Duke\* will like the command in Ireland, which I am sure has been given to him (as it was always intended), if Lord Harrington has relinquished it. But I should have thought that Lord Harrington, who has always kept clear of politics, would not have meddled with them in these troublesome times, and that the Duke would have gone to the Ordinance, which he would have liked also.

*The A.G. to Capt. Cotton, D.A.A.G.*

7th April, 1810.

On the purport of your communication of the 4th inst. I am commanded to refer you to the original order attaching the 60th companies to the different brigades of the army, and the recent orders of the 22d Feb. on the same subject. In transmitting this answer, which you will be pleased to make known to the senior officer of the 5th batt. 60th, with the 2d division, I am further required to observe that my Lord Wellington has ever manifested a good opinion, and has taken every opportunity of being of service to that corps.

His Lordship is willing to believe that Capt. — is equally deserving with many other of his brother officers; yet it is but due to add, that till lately he has done but little duty with the army, and that, in consequence, he is the last officer for whose benefit or suggestion his Lordship would feel inclined to commit an irregularity, or alter an arrangement and organization which has proved itself eminently beneficial to the service.

Be pleased to report to Lieut. Gen. Hill that Capt. — is only required to attend to the duties of his own company.

*The A.G. to the Officer commg. —th light dragoons.*

7th April, 1810.

I have to apprise you a Medical board has given an opinion that Paymaster —, of the corps under your command, is unequal to support the fatigues of active service. It is necessary, however, previous to that officer's departure for England, that you should recommend that indulgence, at the same time nominating an eligible officer to conduct the public duties in Mr. —'s absence, for whose accuracy Mr. — must, in an official letter, acknowledge the continuance of his responsibility, till his return, or the appointment of a successor.

On your forwarding these documents, I have no doubt the leave desired will be granted by his Excellency.

To Brig. Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Viseu, 8th April, 1810.

I sent you a warrant for £150, for bounty for your recruits, 3 or 4 days ago; but are you aware that your recruiting officer takes men (Frenchmen) from the prisons, who were made prisoners of war, some of them

\* The Duke of Richmond.

under a capitulation? No wonder that he has enlisted 150 men, and that Col. Peacocke has approved of them. This positively must not be done. I write by this post to Col. Peacocke upon the subject, and I beg you to lose no time in writing to the officer whom you employ.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Viseu, 8th April, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 21st and 26th March, for which I am much obliged to you. I had already received from Lord Liverpool a copy of his instructions to you of the 19th Feb.; from which I doubted whether the corps at Cadiz was intended to form part of this army. The instructions from the Commander in Chief, of the 21st Feb., would show that it was not so intended. If it is not so intended, you will of course put such officers as you think proper at the head of the several departments; if it is so intended, Col. Macdonald,\* and Major Cathcart,† and Mr. —, should be taken upon the strength of the departments of the Adj. Gen., and of the Q. M. Gen., and of the Commissary Gen. with this army, and shall be at the head of those departments with the corps under your command; and in either case I shall be happy to give you any other assistance of any description which this army can afford.

I am happy to find that you approve of the measures and arrangements of Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, with whom I have had every reason to be satisfied. At this distance from the scene of action, and having but a general knowledge of Cadiz and the Isla de-Leon, it is impossible for me to do more than to give you my opinion very generally upon the measures to be adopted. I beg leave to refer you to my several letters to Major Gen. Stewart, and those to Mr. Frere, to which he was referred for my sentiments on the several points to which they relate.

I am convinced that the enemy cannot at present make a serious attack upon Cadiz: indeed, their force is so much separated that, until it is concentrated, they cannot make an effectual effort any where; and I do not think it probable that they will begin by assembling in Andalusia such an army as they must have, in order to make any impression on your position at Cadiz.

I have no doubt, however, that they will take and secure possession of the peninsula of Trocadero, by which they will cut off the communication between the outer and inner harbour, and will probably affect, to a certain degree, the anchorage in the outer harbour, and a part of the town. I fear that this cannot be avoided; and the only measure to be adopted is to place at once in the inner harbour the boats and vessels which may be deemed necessary for the naval operations to be eventually carried on there; and to secure, as far as may be possible, the landing places between Puntales and the town; and to form a communication with the Isla, from the right of the Cortadura, and along the right of the existing road.

I observe that the Sec. of State has referred to your consideration the measures to be adopted for the supply of Cadiz with water and provisions: water will not be scarce, I believe, so long as the Isla can be held. When the French, however, have it in their power to direct all their

\* Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Macdonald, K.C.B., Adj. Gen.

† Lieut. Gen. Earl Cathcart, K.C.B.

efforts against Cadiz, the state of the provisions will be a subject of serious consideration.

Malta could supply all the grain that would be required for Cadiz; and the coast of Barbary, cattle. For the former, ready money will be required, and victuallers. His Majesty's minister at Cadiz will have to exert his influence with the Spanish government, to induce them to consider well the nature of their situation; to prepare beforehand for the serious attack which will be made upon them, and for the difficulties which will then exist; and to make the advances of money which will be necessary to purchase at Malta the grain which will be required. The King's minister at Cadiz should also apply to the ministers in England to have victuallers sent to Cadiz to import grain from Malta.

The influence of the King's minister, indeed, probably that of His Majesty's government, must be exerted to prevail upon the Barbary states to allow the purchase of cattle for the supply of Cadiz. For this purpose also, the Regency will have to advance and disburse large sums of money. If they should not have vessels fit to bring over the cattle which they have purchased, I believe that I shall be able to give them the use of some horse transports.

It does not occur to me that there is any other point in your instructions on which it can be of any use to you to be assisted with any further opinions from me, than what are contained in my letters to Gen. Stewart and Mr. Frere, to which I have referred you. You will always find me disposed to assist you with my opinions upon any subject which you may think proper to refer to me; and in any other manner that may be in my power.

I beg leave to refer you to my letter to my brother of this date for an account of the state of affairs in this part of the Peninsula.

P.S. Lord Liverpool has mentioned to me his apprehensions that the Spanish troops and people would not agree with the Portuguese regiment which I have sent to Cadiz. I entertain no such apprehensions; and so I have informed his Lordship. But if you should have reason to think that any inconvenience will result from their remaining at Cadiz, I beg you to send them back to Lisbon. I can easily reconcile their return to the Portuguese Regency, who had voluntarily offered them for this service.

To Charles Stuart, Esq. Viseu, 8th April, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 5th. I was aware that the Patriarch and Forjaz hated each other; but I did not think it possible that either of them could imagine that you, or I, or Villiers, had any thing to say to any of the intrigues of Sr de Sousa in London, or those of his brother at Brazil against them. I think that the line of conduct you have adopted is most judicious and proper.

The Patriarch and Forjaz have their faults as well as other men, but I am convinced that we cannot change either excepting for the worse; and if you should have any opportunity, I shall be obliged to you if you will assure either or both, not only that I will not be any party to the promotion of any change in the government, but that I shall do every thing in my power to prevent it, and to support their authority and the continu-

ance of the government in their hands. I think, nowever, for the reasons stated to you in my former letters, that the Marquez das Minas having withdrawn himself from the Regency, his place ought to be filled up by the appointment of another person by the Prince Regent.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Visen, 8th April, 1810.

I received this morning your letter of the 27th and 28th March.

You may depend upon it that your opinion of the ——— is a very correct one, and that the defence of Cadiz has sustained no loss by his appointment to the embassy in ———. I am apprehensive, however, that the credit he acquired by being the first to relieve the people of Cadiz from their fears, and his intrigues, have driven Venegas from his office, for which I believe him to be better qualified than any officer in the Spanish service.

I am sorry that Blake has been called from the command of his army, where he might be of great use. The Marques de la Romana is an honest, honorable man, and the ablest and most to be trusted of any that I have seen in Spain. His letter to Mr. Frere is a most curious instance of the propensity of the Spaniards to pervert the facts upon the events of the war; and he very cleverly lays the perversion to the door of the French. The fact is, that they did not lose 300, instead of 3000 men, and that they were in no manner distressed, and were not obliged to withdraw from Estremadura by any occurrence on this side of the Sierra Morena.

Ballesteros followed Mortier through the Sierra Morena to Ronquillo, and the French had their outposts on the Huelva by the last accounts. The 2d corps (called Soult's), under the command of Regnier, which retired from Merida to Truxillo when Mortier retired upon Seville, advanced again in the end of the month to Caceres, and occupied the right of the Salor, in front of the Spanish division at Albuquerque, and of Lieut. Gen. Hill's corps. They broke up again on the 31st, and marched to Merida, which town I had recommended to the Marques de la Romana to occupy, and fortify the Conventual, which commands the passage of the Guadiana; but he had not done it in time, and the Spanish troops were obliged to retire again to Badajoz. The French were in Merida the 1st and 2d April; and on the 3d, the last I heard of them, they marched to Villa Nueva de la Serena. I was apprehensive that they were going upon Ballesteros at Ronquillo, who would thus have been between two corps, and could have retired with difficulty; but it is now supposed there is some serious insurrection in La Mancha. I hear from all quarters that a corps of 5000 men, under Bassecourt, had surprised a French post of cavalry at Aranjuez, and had carried away a magazine of arms. It is impossible, however, to say whether any thing of this kind is true or false.

All is quiet in this part of Spain. Astorga has not been seriously attacked; and no movement of importance has been made by the troops in our front. I do not think the French are yet in a state to make a serious attack upon Cadiz, or indeed to do any thing of importance in any quarter. They have separated their forces in too great a degree, and they must unite them to oblige us to withdraw from the north bank of the Tagus, before they can effect any thing. In the mean time, the insurrection is

again in a state of organization, and the *partidas* are beginning again to be active.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Viseu, 9th April, 1810.

I have a letter from Ruman of the 4th, in which he says that the enemy have again occupied Baños and the neighbouring villages in strength. He supposes their detachment there may be 5000 men; and it is obvious that they may pass into Estremadura when they please. These rains, however, will have rendered it quite impossible to make any progress in your back, if that should be their intention. Do you communicate with Le Cor?

P.S. I am going to send Lieut. Col. Rooke\* of the Guards to you, to be at the head of the Adj. Gen.'s department. You will find him a most steady, serviceable man, and he will be very useful to you I don't doubt.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Viseu, 9th April, 1810.

I received your letter of the 5th, regarding the Portuguese battalions of caçadores, which it is obvious are not in the state in which I expected that you would find them, from what I saw of them in December last. Bad troops in the rear of the army may do well enough; but it will not answer, obviously, to put those in the front who are likely to do more harm than good.

Since you have joined the army, I have always wished that you should command our outposts, for many reasons into which it is unnecessary to enter; and I was in hopes that I had made up for you a corps which would answer tolerably well, of which I could give you the command without interfering with the claims of others. But the state of these corps disappoints me much; and I can devise no means of accomplishing what I wish. Elder's† corps, which is better than the others, was kept in the rear to be an example to others, and to assist in their formation; for in the happy situation in which I am placed, I am obliged to be ready to meet the enemy in front, at the same time that the formation and organization of the young troops, and all the elementary arrangements, are to be provided for in the rear. I have ordered forward Elder's battalion, and when that arrives, the 2 others must return. But still Elder's battalion does not add sufficiently to your strength; and I doubt whether its services in front will compensate for the disadvantages of its advance from the rear, and the want of its example in the formation of the others.

I received last night your letter of the 7th, so that I hope the communication is now tolerably certain.

It appears to me that the enemy are in a better state of preparation at Salamanca than they were; but if the rain of the last 2 days has been general, they will not be able to move for some days. The corps which left Cáceres on the 31st went to Mérida, and from thence on the night of the 2d to Villa Nueva de la Serena. It is supposed they are going into

\* Col. Rooke was afterwards killed in the south of France, at the battle of the Nivelle in November, 1813.

† The late Major Gen. Sir G. Elder, K.C.B.

Lower La Mancha, where it is said that the people are in a state of insurrection.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Viseu, 9th April, 1810.

Twenty seamen, who had belonged to an Irish regiment in the French service, and had deserted, have lately come in here, and I shall forward them to Lisbon, to be delivered over to your orders, as soon as the weather shall clear up a little. They all wish to enter the navy.

Marshal Beresford wishes to send 10,000 of the 30,000 stand of arms, recently arrived from England, to Oporto by sea, and will apply to you to send up a ship of war with them. I shall be very much obliged to you if you can make it convenient to comply with his request.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 9th April, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Col. Trant, and its enclosures, regarding certain Danish vessels which were at Oporto at the time the enemy were driven from that town in the month of May last. I have to request that the government will signify their orders to me, for Col. Trant's information, upon this subject; and if they should not think proper to allow the vessels to be taken away by the Admiral commanding His Majesty's ships, I recommend to them to signify the same to him through His Majesty's minister resident at Lisbon.

I write to you, and forward these letters in English, for Dom M. Forjaz, as my Portuguese translator is at present absent from head quarters.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Viseu, 10th April, 1810.

I received last night your letter of the 8th, for which I am much obliged to you.

I now enclose a letter for Col. Le Cor at Castello Branco, which I request you to forward.

The enemy have certainly a large force in Old Castille. No individual who sends intelligence *knows* of more than those of whom he sends an account. But those who see all the accounts must see clearly that the whole force is very large. At the same time, some of these last, forgetting what they have read, and what has certainly at times made an impression upon them, are of opinion upon some occasions that the enemy are not in strength in Castille. I cannot state their number exactly; but from Astorga to Valladolid, and thence to Baños, they have 4 *corps d'armée*. This is no inconsiderable force at any time; and I believe they are not very incomplete in numbers, as we know that every town and village in the country is full.

Capt. Grant must be paid, while employed by you, 3 dollars *per diem*.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Viseu, 11th April, 1810.

The enemy appear to be getting on with their preparations for the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo, or of Almeida, which I intend to endeavor to prevent, if it should be in my power. It would add considerably to my means if I could have the assistance of some of your cavalry, viz., Gen. Slade's brigade; and I request you either to place that brigade at and in

the neighbourhood of Abrantes, or the whole of it in different cantonments within one march of Villa Velha, according as you may find it most convenient for forage for them, as long as the enemy's position in Estremadura does not render their services necessary any nearer to your own corps.

If you should fix upon the cantonments within one march of Villa Velha for these corps, it will be necessary that they should have in their cantonments, at all times, 3 or 4 days' corn, and as much bread, which the regiments might carry with them when they should march to join me; as by the route they would come they would find nothing but green forage. If you should send them to Abrantes they will come by a more plentiful country, and one better prepared.

P.S. I am about to move my head quarters to Cea, in the valley of the Mondego, where I shall be nearer the head of the army; and not farther removed from you.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 11th April, 1810.

I am about to move my head quarters to Cea, in the valley of the Mondego, in order to be nearer the head of the army; at the same time that I shall not be more distant from the rear.

If you will direct your letters, which you will send by the post, to the care of the postmaster at Thomar or at Coimbra, I shall get them by the daily communications which I have with those places. I request you to let the Admiral know of this alteration of my head quarters, and of the manner in which he is to direct to me.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 11th April, 1810.

I enclose letters which I have received from Mr. Pratt, in answer to inquiries made of him on the subject of the complaints from the superintendent of transport at Elvas, which you had received from the minister. You will observe that there is no foundation whatever for these complaints; and that the officers of the government had conducted themselves very improperly. I request you particularly to draw the notice of the minister to the demand of money by the superintendent of transport for the performance of the duties imposed upon him and his officers; and to request that the Governors of the Kingdom will signify to the officers of the government their pleasure upon this subject.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 11th April, 1810.

I enclose the state of the army on the 1st inst., and likewise the distribution of the sick, absent on the same day. From this paper you will see that the hospital at Talavera and the men at Plasencia amount now to only 852. I have always reckoned them 1500, and some have certainly escaped from the enemy. But that number was not originally

G. O.

Viseu, 11th April, 1810.

1. Whenever articles of any description are supplied by the Commissary General to the troops, for which the troops are to pay, the Paymaster General must be furnished by the Commissary General with an account of the articles delivered to each regiment, and their price, if possible before the 24th of the month in which the articles will have been delivered, but at all events in the course of the succeeding month.



left, and so I thought; although I stated them as 1500, as the reports which were the nearest, and official, so stated them.

It is difficult to make the military return of sick agree with that received from the medical department, because in the former are included all men absent from the regiment at the hospital stations, whether convalescents or others; whereas the medical return includes only those on the books of the hospitals.

I enclose the Inspector General's returns of the 1st April, from which you will see the number actually sick, of those on the military returns 'sick absent.' The others are either convalescent, out of the hospitals, or on the road to join, and your Lordship will be glad to observe how efficient and healthy the army is becoming. Indeed, it would now be an excellent army, if the soldiers did not plunder. Several have lately been convicted before General Courts Martial, and have been executed, an example which I hope will have effect, as well upon the officers as the men. Upon the former I hope it will operate to induce them to take more pains to keep their men in order, and support the authority of the non-commissioned officers, and to instil into them a proper sense of their situation and duty; and I hope it will convince the latter that I possess the power, and am determined to exert it, to punish those who are guilty of those disgraceful outrages. I am still apprehensive of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation before the enemy, for they really forget every thing when plunder or wine is within their reach.

We are still much distressed for money, and I shall not be able to pay the troops on the 24th of this month. We owe for every thing we have had lately from the country, as well as for the means of transport employed in moving our supplies from our own magazines. The disorders committed by the troops aggravate these inconveniences, for we are obliged to employ them in pressing provisions and carriages; and they never go out without an officer, and seldom under the command of an officer, that they do not commit some outrage. I do not know what we are to do if we cannot get some money.

By the orders from the Commander in Chief to Gen. Graham, and by those from the Commissary Gen. in Chief to Dep. Commissary —, I see that it was not intended that the corps at Cadiz should form part of this army. However, I have stated my doubts upon the subject to Gen. Graham, and left him to decide it as he may think best.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 11th April, 1810.

The enemy appear by the last accounts to have collected some heavy ordnance and stores at Salamanca; and the corps of Ney is concentrated in that neighbourhood and at Ledesma. The enemy have likewise moved a detachment of 4000 or 5000 men to the neighbourhood of Bejar and Baños. Although these circumstances would show an intention of attacking either Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida at an early period, it does not appear that the enemy have withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Astorga; and by the last accounts which I have from Chaves, of the 3d of this month, the Spanish troops in Galicia, and the parties which have always remained upon the frontier, were to make an effort to relieve Astorga in

the last days of March. The corps of Soult, commanded by Regnier, moved from Merida on the night of the 2d to Medellin, and occupied Don Benito, Villa Nueva de la Serena, and the villages in that neighbourhood. Gen. O'Donnell, with the left of the Marques de la Romana's corps, had his advanced guard at Merida; and Gen. Ballesteros, who had been at Ronquillo, quitted the high road from Merida to Seville as soon as he heard that Gen. Regnier had crossed the Guadiana at Merida, and went to Talavera Real; by which town there is another communication between the provinces of Estremadura and Andalusia, through the Sierra Morena.

I have received accounts from Cadiz to as late a date as the 28th of last month. Lieut. Gen. Graham had arrived on the 24th, and had taken the command of His Majesty's troops. Nothing of any importance had occurred there, and the enemy were occupied in endeavoring to establish and secure their positions on the peninsula, and the island of Trocadero. The accounts which I receive from all quarters mention the great activity of the parties of guerrillas throughout the country. Some of these accounts are certainly exaggerated, but I have no doubt that there is some foundation for them, as I observe that the enemy mention the operations of these parties in the gazettes published at Madrid, and in other places under their authority.

*The A. G. to Major Gen. —.*

11th April, 1810.

In consequence of the certificate you have been pleased to forward, that change of climate is esteemed necessary to the reestablishment of your health, in medical opinion, I am to convey his Excellency's sanction to your return to England for that object; and I have to request you will be pleased to inform me the probable time of embarkation, and the period you desire to be absent, that I may be enabled accordingly to insert your leave in General Orders.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Viseu, 13th April, 1810.

I request you to give directions to the officer commanding the 20th Portuguese regt., to draw from time to time from the Assist. Commissary in charge of the Commissariat at Cadiz, for such sums as may be necessary for the monthly pay of the officers and soldiers under his command; and to inform him that he is to give credit for the sums which he will thus receive in his accounts with the Paymaster Gen. of the Portuguese army.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

Viseu, 13th April, 1810.

I request you to give directions to the Assist. Commissary in charge of the department in Cadiz, to pay to the officer commanding the 20th Portuguese regt. such sums as he may require monthly for the pay of the officers and soldiers under his command; for which such officer is to give his receipts. These receipts are to be transmitted to you, and you will be so kind as to transmit them to His Majesty's minister at Lisbon, and to settle with him for the amount thus advanced to the Portuguese regiment at Cadiz, in the same manner as for sums paid into the hands of Mr. Bell, from time to time, for Portuguese services.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 13th April, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th inst., containing

copies of two notes received from the Portuguese minister, one relating to provisions for the garrison of Almeida, the other relating to the want of forage for the Portuguese army.

I have given directions to the Commissary Gen. of this army, to carry into execution, without loss of time, the 2d article of the Commissariat arrangement of the 10th June, 1809, in all parts of the country in which the Portuguese and British troops may both be stationed, particularly in the neighbourhood of Almeida. I have also desired him to hand over to the *Junta de Viveres* 50,000 rations, of 10 lbs. each, of forage corn at Lisbon, of which two thirds will be Indian corn, and one third barley. They will pay for this magazine according to the stipulation in the 6th article of the Commissariat arrangement.

The Portuguese government having some time ago stated the supply of provisions to the British troops at Barquinha as the excuse for the want by the Portuguese troops in the Alentejo, I have the honor to enclose a return of the total quantity of provisions supplied by the agents of the *Junta de Viveres* at Barquinha to the British troops between the 1st Dec. 1809, and the 24th March, 1810.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Cea, 15th April, 1810.

I have moved the head quarters here, principally with a view to the communication with the advanced divisions; but I am much afraid that there is such want of stabling, that I shall be obliged to move them back again. The Adj. Gen. will send you an order, by this occasion, regarding our communications in future; and I shall be obliged to you if you will have your letters for me at Almeida, either before the gates shall be shut at night, or at 5 in the morning, when they will open, so that the *parté* may bring them off.

Your feeling respecting your command is exactly what it ought to be, and what might be expected from you. As long as I could make up a division of the proper strength for the service, with your brigade, and Portuguese troops and cavalry, nobody would have had reason to complain; but a Lieut. General, and the senior Major General of the army, recently arrived, are without commands, and it would not answer to throw more English troops into your division, leaving them unemployed. You may depend upon it, however, that whatever may be the arrangement which I shall make, I wish your brigade to be in the advanced guard.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Cea, 15th April, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 31st March and the 4th inst. (Nos. 2 and 3).

I am desirous of adhering to the conditions on which I first detached the troops to Cadiz, for reasons, some of which are stated in my letter to Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart of the 27th Feb. At the same time I must inform you that it is impossible to maintain an army in the Peninsula, and to perform the engagements into which the King has entered with the Portuguese government, without the assistance of the money to be procured at Cadiz and Gibraltar for bills upon England. If this money is to be employed either in forming a magazine for the British

troops in Cadiz, or, under the instructions of the Sec. of State to yourself, in the purchase of provisions for the general consumption at Cadiz, it is obvious that other means must be devised for providing for the other services to which that money is now applied; and I apprehend that the scarcity of specie is so great in England, that the government cannot provide for these services by any export from thence. Indeed, they have not been able to send the money which I informed them 6 months ago would be necessary, in addition to the supplies which could be procured at all places within my reach for bills upon England; and we are consequently in considerable distress for want of money. The instructions of the Sec. of State were written before he had received my report that the troops had been detached to Cadiz, and the copy of my letter to Mr. Frere of the 5th Feb., containing the conditions on which I had detached them. I had already adverted to the variation between his instructions to you and those conditions, and I have requested an explanation, which I conclude he will give immediately.

In the mean time you will observe from my letter to Major Gen. Stewart, of the 27th Feb., that I contemplated the probable necessity that he would be obliged to purchase fresh meat, and gave him authority for so doing; and you will, of course, give directions for the purchase of fresh meat for the British and Portuguese troops, if you should find it necessary. You are acquainted with the political and financial grounds on which I am desirous that that condition should be adhered to. You, however, must be the best judge of its operation at Cadiz; and if you should find it prejudicial or inconvenient to the British interests, you have my full consent to depart from it. If you should depart from it, I will send you from Portugal a large proportion of the magazine of salt provisions which we have here.

I have read with great interest your dispatch to the Sec. of State, of the 30th March, and your letter to me of the 4th inst., No. 3; and I am happy to find that the opinions regarding the defence of the Isla, which I had given generally to Major Gen. Stewart, are confirmed by such good authority.

My notion of the defences required for the Isla is founded upon the species of attack which the enemy will probably make upon it. My opinion is that they will make roads across, and establish themselves upon the salt marsh, in order to force the passage of the river. I had not sufficient information to be certain whether there were not some points in which they could attempt to effect this object with greater advantage than in others; but my idea was generally that the line of the river, with the Caracacs on its left (which is a point of separate and distinct consideration), was the best for defence. I considered that this line ought to be taken up generally by a chain of works, closed in the rear by a weak profile connected by a line; and strengthened in those parts in which it might be deemed that the enemy might make his attack with the greatest advantage. Within that interior line, I considered that it might be advantageous to intrench one or more positions, and other points for the preservation of the communication between the Isla and the Cortadura, and the body of the place of Cadiz. The Torre Gorda, in particular, mentioned by you, occurred to me as an advantageous point to take

up for the last mentioned object, in the cursory view which I was enabled to take of the Isla.

I mention these ideas only in confirmation of your own. I had but little opportunity of forming a correct judgment upon the subject; and if you should entertain an opinion different from mine in any part of this general outline, I am convinced that you must be right.

I have given directions that camp equipage complete for 5000 men may be sent to Cadiz, of which, as well as of that already at Cadiz, you will give the use to the Spanish troops, if you think proper. I entirely agree with you that it is best to keep the British troops in barracks or quarters; and I will increase still further the quantity of camp equipage at Cadiz, if you should desire it. I have already sent to Cadiz one brigade of field ordnance, which is, I hope, arrived, and I will send another brigade. I beg to know from you if you should want more, or of smaller calibres than a 6 pounder.

I beg to refer you to my letter to Mr. Wellesley, for an account of the state of affairs here.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cea, 15th April, 1810.

I am desirous of sending to Cadiz camp equipage for 5000 men, which the A. Q. M. G. at Lisbon has directions to embark in such vessel as the Agent of transports may allot to receive it, and to request you to give directions that a vessel may be appointed to receive this camp equipage, and may sail with it with convoy by the first favorable opportunity.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cea, 15th April, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 2d, for which I am much obliged to you; and I am delighted to find that we had agreed so far in the measures to be adopted, as that you had adopted them at Cadiz, before you had received my suggestions upon them. I am glad that you have sent the prisoners home. Send them all home if you have the means, making a strong representation of the danger of keeping them at Cadiz, at the Balearic islands, or in the Canaries, and say that I advised you to send them to England. I think we shall secure Minorca; and I see that you and I concur exactly in the measures to be adopted for the security of those islands, and the advantage to be derived from that possession. I have written to the Marques de la Romana upon this subject; but he has given me no answer, and has requested me to meet him at Niza, which I cannot do at present.

Since I wrote to you on the 8th, the French corps commanded by Regnier has broken up from Villa Nueva de la Serena, &c., and moved towards Cabeza del Buey, with an intention of entering Andalusia by Cordova, or of passing into La Mancha by the road along the bottom of the hills which goes to Ciudad Real. Either they found it impossible to move by that road at present, on account of the swelling of the torrents, or they are not wanted in Andalusia, for they returned to Villa Nueva, Medellin, &c., on the night of the 9th inst. Nothing of importance has occurred elsewhere. Ney has got together at Salamanca a large quantity of heavy ordnance, and the greater part of his troops. Astorga

is invested, but has not been vigorously attacked; and Gen. Mahy was about to attempt to relieve the place in the beginning of this month with all the troops he could collect in Galicia, in concert with the *partidas* and others under Echevarria on this side of Alcañices and Puebla de Sanabria. I think, however, that the French are not in earnest in this plan; they have dismantled and evacuated Zamora, by which they risk the communication between the troops at Astorga and those at Salamanca; and it is reported that Gen. — has withdrawn from Oviedo and the Asturias. If this be the case, the corps in Leon will soon cross the Duero again and join Ney. Indeed, without this reinforcement, he is scarcely strong enough for his object.

I have written fully both to you and to Gen. Graham about provisions for the town of Cadiz. They may get any quantity of cattle they please from the coast of Africa: but you must use the influence of the British government, and probably the government must bribe a little, and the Admiral must threaten, to induce the Barbaresque powers to allow the export: they, like others, are confoundedly afraid of the French; and their fears have not been lessened since the successes of the French in Spain have made the parties such near neighbours. The best mode of transporting the cattle will be in the boats of the country; but if the Spanish government cannot command any, I will lend them some horse transports. Grain of all kinds can be procured at Malta. I do not think that Portugal can supply you with any quantity of provisions. I am very desirous that the Spanish government should not only defray the expense of these provisions, but that they should continue to supply our troops with provisions, under the conditions which I made when I detached them from Portugal.

You are aware of the great difficulties existing in England in procuring specie. We are in the greatest distress for money in this country; and if we should lose the supplies of money which we receive from Gibraltar and Cadiz, we should very soon be obliged to quit the Peninsula for want of money to subsist in it. If we are to pay the expense of these provisions from Cadiz, or even if the conditions are departed from, and we are to defray the expense of forming magazines for our own troops, a great part, if not the whole of the money procured at Cadiz and Gibraltar for bills upon England, must be diverted from the purpose to which it is at present applied.

I am also of opinion, that we should endeavor to make the Spaniards believe we feel it to be their interest that our troops should remain at Cadiz, and that we consider we have conferred an obligation upon them by going there. As long as they entertain this belief, they will treat us well; as soon as they lose it, I know them well enough to be certain that there is no enormity that they will not commit in order to get rid of us. They are much more likely to continue in this belief, if we insist upon the performance of the conditions on which I allowed the troops to go to Cadiz at all; and indeed I drew those conditions with that view. I can easily conceive, however, that the health of our troops and other circumstances may occur, which may require the expenditure of money by us, for the supply, particularly of fresh meat. I had given authority to Gen. Stewart for this purpose, which Gen. Graham has equally; but even

in this case I wish the conditions should be adhered to as far as may be possible, and that payment may be demanded for the provisions purchased.

I had written to Mr. Duff respecting Mr. Reid's money. I shall be glad if he is allowed to bring it away.

*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

16th April, 1810.

In reference to your letter of the 11th inst., relative to deserters from the enemy, who decline entering His Majesty's service, which has been submitted to the Commander of the Forces, I am to communicate my Lord Wellington's pleasure that you cause such men to be fed, clothed with such articles as may be absolutely necessary, and otherwise well treated. They are to be sent home to the Isle of Wight by the first opportunity, with an accompanying letter to the Commandant at the dépôt, stating that his Excellency has promised to forward, and consequently applied for means to facilitate the return of men of this description from England to their native homes or services.

*The A.G. to Capt. Meacham, Coimbra.*

16th April, 1810.

You will cause the property of deceased soldiers, or such as may hereafter die at the hospital station under your command, to be sold by public auction under the superintendence of the officer of the same division, brigade, or regiment in whose charge the men may have been considered, which officer will report to you the amount arising from the sale of each article, placing the sum total in your hands, which you will take the earliest opportunity of returning to the regiments by the officer commanding detachments who may join the army.

The arms and accoutrements you will send down the river the first opportunity for embarkation, and pass them in the transports from Figueira to Lisbon. The officer in charge will deliver the arms into the Ordnance stores at that station, taking the receipt of the officer in charge of His Majesty's stores, who will have received previous instructions to give that voucher for the arms received by him. The accoutrements are to be given over in the same manner, with a regimental register of them, to the Q. M. G. at Lisbon, who will be directed to send those belonging to each battalion on board the ship in which the baggage of the corps has been embarked, with a copy of the directed register.

*The A.G. to the Inspector of Hospitals and the Q. M. G.*

16th April, 1810.

In answer to your letter of the 7th inst., which I have had the honor to receive and submit to Lord Wellington, I have by authority forwarded instructions to the Commandant at Coimbra station to direct the public sale of deceased soldiers' necessities under the superintendence of the officer of the division, brigade, or regiment to which the man may have belonged and been in charge. The arms and accoutrements are to be embarked the first occasion, and sent round to Lisbon; the first to be directed to the Ordnance storekeeper at that station, the latter to the care of the A. Q. M. G.; directions being sent to that officer to have the Colonels' property embarked on board the transports allotted to corps respectively.

*The A.G. to Col. Framingham, R.A., and the Q. M. G.*

16th April, 1810.

I do myself the honor to forward for your perusal a letter of instruction I have been commanded to transmit to the Commandant of the hospital station at Coimbra, relative to the disposal of deceased soldiers' property, arms, and accoutrements. I have to request you will be pleased to give the officer in charge of His Majesty's Ordnance stores at Lisbon authority accordingly to receive into store arms so presented, giving an acknowledgment for the same, to answer for a regimental voucher.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Cea, 17th April, 1810.

This place is so inconvenient that I am obliged to move the head quarters back to Visau. I propose, however, to order the *parté* to leave Almeida every evening, at as late an hour as Gen. Cox can leave the gates

open, and I shall get the reports on the following morning at Viseu. I shall be obliged to you if you will have your letters at Almeida at 7 in the evening, so as to come off with the *parté*. Carrera mentions in his letter of the 11th, 'des documens qui pourront intéresser, &c.,' and I shall be obliged to you if you will send them.

To Col. Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

Cea, 17th April, 1810.

I am afraid that Mr. B——, who is gone to Cadiz at the head of the Commissariat, is a man very little to be trusted. If I am not mistaken, he was in the military service of the East India Company, on the establishment of Fort St. George. If he was, he was dismissed from the service under the following circumstances: An officer of the army accused him of having robbed him; that is to say, he literally stole his purse from him. The officer in question (whose name I do not recollect) was brought to trial before a General Court Martial for defamation, and was acquitted.

I understand that the Commander in Chief, Gen. Stuart, wanted to bring Mr. B—— to trial, on a charge to be framed against him, on the accusation of the officer who had been acquitted of defamation; but Mr. B—— declined to stand his trial, and was dismissed from the service. When he was dismissed from the service, other persons recollected having lost their purses when in company with him; and I understood that he had once been accused of taking a purse out of an officer's writing box, but that the accusation was deemed so improbable that it was scouted.

Although I think that a person who has an itch for taking purses is not a fit person to be a Dep. Commissary Gen., in charge of the department, I should not have mentioned this subject to you upon my own recollection of these facts, if I could not point out to you the means of ascertaining them precisely. Lieut. Gen. Stuart, who was the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George at the time to which I refer, and Col. Agnew, who was the Adj. Gen., are both in London. The former lives in Charles St., and the latter in Harley St.; and either, but particularly the latter, will be able to give you an accurate and authentic account of the causes and manner of Mr. B——'s quitting the service of the East India Company.

If Mr. Commissary B—— is the *cut purse*, it is difficult to account for his becoming an officer of the Commissariat; but being one, I can easily account for his being promoted, and for his having given satisfaction to his superiors, as I recollect having him under my command in charge of a post, as an officer, and I never knew one more active, or more intelligent.

P.S. I have thought it proper to put the Commissary Gen. and Gen. Graham on their guard respecting Mr. B——, till your answer shall be received to this letter.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Cea, 17th April, 1810.

Lieut. Gen. Payne has expressed a desire to have the services of Lieut. Col. the Hon. F. Ponsonby,\* as A. A. G. with the cavalry in this country, as he is no longer at the head of the department at Cadiz; and if you can spare his services I shall be obliged to you if you will allow him to come to Portugal. I beg you to let me know if you should wish to have any

\* The late Major Gen. the Hon. Sir F. Ponsonby, K.C.B.



additional assistance in the Adj. Gen.'s department at Cadiz, whether you retain Lieut. Col. Ponsonby, or send him to this country.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cea, 17th April, 1810.

There is a man, by the name of ———, who had deserted from the 4th dragoons, now in charge of the Provost Marshal at Lisbon, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether you will receive him into one of His Majesty's ships, if he should be discharged from the service. He is a stout man, and has not been guilty of any crime which renders him infamous.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will send to England, by the first opportunity, one officer, 4 serjeants, and 50 privates of the 23d light dragoons, respecting whose passage the A. Q. M. G. will apply to the Agent of transports.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cea, 17th April, 1810.

I enclose you a letter which I have received from Gen. O'Donju, and I shall be obliged if you will show him any civility in your power on his arrival at Cadiz, and if you will recommend him to Gen. Castaños. I know nothing of the crimes with which he is charged. From his former conduct in the Spanish army, and from what I saw of him, I should not suppose that he was guilty of them. However, whether guilty or not, it is only fair that he should be tried at an early period. Gen. Castaños himself is an instance of the injustice which can be done to officers by these protracted trials; and I hope that he will see justice done to Gen. O'Donju, who, I must say, is one of the most intelligent I have seen of the officers of the Spanish army. Nothing new since I wrote to you the other day. It is said that something has happened at Madrid.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Viseu, 19th April, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 13th, and I will send you immediately our probable embarkation return, made out as you suggest.

I enclose you the conditions on which I detached the troops originally to Cadiz, to which I still adhere; although the Sec. of State has, in a very unguarded manner, authorised a departure from them, so far as to allow of the purchase of provisions not for the British troops, but for the garrison. From these conditions you will observe, that all provisions sent to Cadiz ought to be paid for by the Spanish government; and accordingly, although I have authorised the purchase of bullocks in Africa, in order to give the British troops fresh meat occasionally, I have ordered that payment for the meat imported may be demanded. Portugal can certainly supply nothing in the way of provisions without great inconvenience, but I have told Mr. Wellesley and Gen. Graham where every thing they require can be got.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 19th April, 1810.

I think it would be desirable to define with precision our ideas respecting the establishment of military law, before we determine to alter the established law of the country in any case.

The following questions are worth consideration and decision on this topic. What is military law? Military law as applied to any persons, excepting the officers, soldiers, and followers of the army, for whose government there are particular provisions of law in all well regulated countries, is neither more nor less than the will of the General of the army. He punishes, either with or without trial, for crimes either declared to be so, or not so declared by any existing law, or by his own orders. This is the plain and common meaning of the term military law. Besides the mode of proceeding above described, laws have been made in different countries at different times to establish and legalize a description of military constitution.

The Commander in Chief, or the government, has been authorised to proceed by military process, that is, by Court Martial or Council of War, to try persons offending against certain laws, or against their own orders, issued generally, for the security of the army, or for the establishment of a certain government or constitution odious to the people among whom it is established. Of both descriptions of military law there are numerous instances in the history of the operations of the French army during the Revolution; and there is an instance of the existence both of the first mentioned description and of the last mentioned, in Ireland during the rebellion of 1798, when the people were in insurrection against the government, and were to be restrained by force.

The next question which is worth our consideration, is, for what object is military law of either description to be established in Portugal? Upon this point I would observe, that I believe there is no instance in history of the establishment of military law, excepting with a view to restrain the people. We have no such object in Portugal. What we want is:

1st; To make the magistrates do their duty. We may try them by Court Martial or Council of War for neglect of duty; but what punishment would a Court Martial inflict upon them for neglect of duty, however criminal, except dismissal from office? and that punishment can be inflicted by the government at any time without trial.

2dly; We want to induce the people to perform the duties, and to supply the articles required from them by the law, and by the orders of government. The law which imposes these duties, and requires these supplies and assistance for the armies, furnishes the means of its own execution, and imposes the penalties of non-performance of its provisions; and it is the duty of the inferior magistrate to inflict the penalty of the law for its breach.

We are mistaken if we suppose that a peasant, who has deserted from the militia or the line, or who has avoided to give his grain, or his straw, or his bullocks, or to supply his cart when called for, will attend the General to receive the notification of his will regarding his punishment, or the sentence of a council of war. Inferior officers and persons must seek for him. If military law is to supersede every other authority, the troops must be the executive officers of the law; they must be employed to seek and bring forward the criminal; and probably at the period when the enemy may be in the province governed by this law, the troops may be employed in the civil government, instead of in opposing the enemy.

I wish these points to be maturely considered before we go farther. Let us define our notions; and, depend upon it, we shall find that the establishment of military law will only increase our difficulties.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 19th April, 1810.

No change of any importance has been made in the positions of the enemy in Leon and Old Castille since I addressed you on the 11th inst.; excepting that it has been reported that a division of infantry has been moved from the eastern side of that province to Madrid, as it is supposed that that capital was in a state of insurrection against the French authority. I have received no authentic accounts of this circumstance; but I have no doubt that the spirit of resistance to the French is general throughout all the provinces; that it breaks out into open acts of violence whenever an opportunity offers; that instances of its existence have been frequent lately; and that the confidence of the Spaniards, and of the people of Portugal, in the final success of their exertions, has lately become greater than it had been. This effect is partly to be attributed to the recent failure of the French corps under Gen. Suchet before Valencia (of which His Majesty's government will have received the accounts from His Majesty's minister at Cadiz); to the active continuance of the contest in Catalonia; to the continued, and in some instances renewed, active existence of the war of the partisans throughout all the provinces of Spain; and to the failure of the French in every operation they have undertaken, since they passed the Sierra Morena, in Jan. last.

The corps under the command of Gen. Regnier, which, when I wrote last, I reported to be in the neighbourhood of Medellin, made a movement on the 5th inst. to Cabeza del Buey, with an intention to pass the Sierra to Cordova, or to move along the foot of the mountains to Ciudad Real, in La Mancha. It returned, however, to Medellin on the 9th, and on the 14th a small body of dragoons belonging to this corps entered Merida.

Gen. Ballesteros was attacked at Talavera Real on the 13th; and Gen. Contreras, whom he had left on the high road from Seville into Estremadura with a brigade of infantry, was attacked near Ronquillo on the same day. Gen. Ballesteros maintained his ground, but Gen. Contreras was obliged to retreat, and a part of his corps and the *Escopeteros* (a description of armed peasantry of the Sierra Morena), some of whom were attached to Gen. Contreras' brigade, dispersed.

The last accounts which I received from Cadiz were of the 4th inst., at which time nothing of importance had occurred, and all the reinforcements expected from England had arrived. I have sent there one squadron of the 13th light dragoons, for which Major Gen. Stewart had called, to which I will add still further when I shall think it necessary, and that the horses can be fed there. I have also sent to Cadiz a brigade of 6 pounder field ordnance, and I propose to send another brigade, which I observe that Lieut. Gen. Graham requires.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 19th April, 1810.

In consequence of a regulation of the War office, dated 7th Sept. 1809,

directing that the water decks of the cavalry be furnished in future by the public, in the same manner with other articles of camp necessaries, I have to request that 4000 water decks may be sent out from England for the use of the cavalry in this country.

To Brig. Gen. R. Crauford.

Viseu, 20th April, 1810.

I received yesterday your letter of the 18th, which I would not answer immediately, that I might give to your proposition all the attention which it deserves.

The consequence of the attack which you propose would be to commence a description of warfare upon our outposts, in which we should certainly sustain some loss of men; and I should be obliged to bring up the army to the front, than which nothing can be more inconvenient, and eventually injurious to us.

I do not know whether the state of tranquillity in which affairs have been for some time is advantageous to the French, but I know that it is highly so to us. The British army is increasing in strength daily, and a continuance of the tranquillity in which we have been, for a short time longer, will add considerably to our numbers. The discipline and equipment of the Portuguese troops is improving daily. The equipment in particular, which is not very defective, will in a short time be complete, as all the articles for it are arrived from England. The sick of this army are also coming out of hospital fast. The arms for the militia have lately arrived, but some time must elapse before they can be transported to the points at which they can be issued to the different corps. All these services must necessarily be impeded, if not entirely stopped, by the necessity of being in a state of preparation in front, which the existence of *la petite guerre* would undoubtedly occasion, and these objects are most essential to this country if we are to be attacked, and to the perfection of our army, if circumstances should enable us to make a forward movement.

I am not insensible of the advantages which we should derive from the successful issue of an expedition, such as you have proposed, particularly on the state of the war in Spain. But I think that the Spaniards begin to be sensible of the advantages which they derive from our position in this country, and are aware that circumstances do not allow us to interfere with more activity, at present, in the operations of the war. Upon the whole, I prefer not to undertake this expedition.

In answer to your letter of the 17th, I will only tell you that it has excited any feeling in my mind excepting anger. I have already told you that I shall regret exceedingly the existence of a necessity to place in other hands the command of our advanced guard; and I shall regret it particularly if it should deprive me of your assistance altogether. I expect Marshal Beresford here in a day or two, when I shall be able to make arrangements that may enable me to leave you in the command of your division, which I am very anxious to do. In the mean time, you have the 3 battalions of caçadores, as I do not mean to withdraw the 1st and 2d till I shall see the Marshal.

P.S. I have omitted to tell you that, if you have any thing to communicate which would require greater certainty and celerity than your

hussars or the *parté* could give, there are post mules on the road between this and Almeida.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 21st April, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 16th, and return your Proclamation, which I think very good. I have made an addition of one paragraph, just to point out that every individual in the country has duties to perform, and that he will be punished if he omits to perform them. However, omit it, if you think it will make the Proclamation too long, or alter it if you think proper.

The state of opinion in England is very unfavorable to the Peninsula. The ministers are as much alarmed as the public, or as the opposition pretend to be; and they appear to be of opinion that I am inclined to fight a desperate battle which is to answer no purpose.

Their private letters are in some degree at variance with their public instructions, and I have called for an explanation of the former, which, when it arrives, will show me more clearly what they intend. The instructions are clear enough, and I am willing to act under them; although they throw upon me the whole responsibility of bringing away the army in safety, after staying in the Peninsula till it shall be necessary to evacuate it. But it will not answer in these times to receive private hints and opinions from ministers, which, if attended to, would lead to an act directly contrary to the spirit, and even to the letter, of the public instructions; at the same time that, if not attended to, the danger of the responsibility imposed by the public instructions is increased tenfold.

I have for some time turned over in my mind the expediency of making an attempt upon the magazine at Salamanca at least, with a most anxious desire to carry it into execution. The fact is, however, that, according to the accounts we have of the enemy's strength, it is probable that I should not be able to accomplish any thing, excepting probably the relief of Astorga, which I do not conceive of such importance as to induce me to incur the risk and inconvenience of moving my troops out of the strong country into the plains. We have immediately in our front, at Salamanca and Ledesma, and on the Tormes, the corps of Ney and of

G. O.

Viseu, 21st April, 1810.

1. The communication with head quarters is to be carried on as follows in future, instead of in the mode pointed out by the G. O. of the 15th inst. The *parté* for head quarters will leave Almeida every morning at 7 o'clock, Freixedas half past 10, Celorico half past 2 in the morning, Mangualde 9 in the morning, and will arrive at Viseu at 11 in the forenoon. The *parté* from head quarters will leave Viseu every afternoon at 4, will be at Mangualde at 6, at Celorico at 12, at Freixedas at half past 3 in the morning, and at Almeida at 7 in the morning. The letters to and from Pinhel and Alverca are to be left at and taken up at Freixedas. Those to and from Guarda and Trancoso are to be left at and taken up from Celorico. And the officers commanding at the several stations will take care to have persons stationed to bring their letters to them from the places where they will be left.

2. The hussars and guides are still to remain stationed upon the road, notwithstanding that the *parté* will pass daily.

3. The *parté* for Thomar, Abrantes, Portalegre, Elvas, and Badajoz, will leave Viseu at 4 o'clock every afternoon. He will leave at Sta Comba Daõ letters for the 16th light dragoons, and at Foz d'Arouce those for Coimbra. He will take up at those places respectively the letters from them for head quarters.

The communication between head quarters and Lisbon will be carried on by the ordinary post.

Loison, which I do not think can be reckoned less than 30,000. Without breaking up my arrangements on the Tagus and south of the Tagus, I could not collect so many men in this quarter. I will suppose, however, that I should be able to oblige Ney to withdraw across the Tormes; there is no doubt that, with a force much inferior to mine, he would be able to prevent me from crossing that river to obtain possession of Salamanca, at least for the number of days which would be necessary to bring to his support the corps commanded by Kellermann, which is in the eastern parts of Castille; and, if necessary, that commanded by Junot, engaged in the blockade of Astorga. I should then be obliged to retire again into Portugal, having effected nothing excepting the momentary relief of Astorga, which place, if Ney should find himself sufficiently strong without the assistance of Junot's corps, would not be relieved by this operation.

I do not think the possession of Astorga, by the enemy, to be an object of very great importance in the existing situation of affairs. It is better they should not have it, undoubtedly; but it is not an object of such importance as to induce me to incur the risks and submit to the inconveniences of a forward movement at present. Those risks are obvious. The inconveniences are the delay in the complete equipment of the Portuguese troops, and the interruption in their discipline which must be the consequence of any forward movement. Both armies are becoming stronger and more efficient every day, and more likely to be able to effect the great object for which they are kept in this country; and I do not think I should be justified in interrupting the course of measures which are tending to their improvement and perfection, by an operation of doubtful result; and which, even if successful, would not accomplish an object of any great importance to the war.

To these objections, add those to which you have adverted; viz., the complaints which would be made in England, when it should be known that the army had retired, even after it should have accomplished that which is certainly an object, the destruction of the enemy's magazines, which are evidently formed for an attack upon this country and its defences; and it will appear that it is not advisable to undertake the operation at present. I have my attention, however, steadily fixed upon that object; and if I find that the operations in the war, in other parts of Spain, should induce the enemy to weaken himself to such a degree in Castille, as to render it probable that I should succeed in destroying the magazines at Salamanca, I shall attempt it, whatever may be the inconvenience of moving the troops, or whatever may be the consequences in England.

It would be very desirable to establish the channel of information which you propose, and I strongly recommend you to establish it. We are sadly deficient in good information, and all the efforts which I have made to obtain it have failed; and all that we know is the movement of the troops at the moment, or probably after it is made. The French, however, keep their plans and designs, if they have any formed, so secret, that it would be almost impossible to obtain intelligence of them, even though there were not the difficulties in the way which at present exist.

P.S. I have written a letter to the Prince Regent, which I propose to send to the Regency to be forwarded. I shall send you a copy of it. I have praised the existing government, and held up all they have done.

*The A.G. to Capt. Donellan, 58th regt.*

21st April, 1810.

In acknowledging the honor of your letter of the 18th inst., I am to apprise you his Excellency has been made acquainted with its purport. My Lord Wellington has, in answer, desired me to state that it at all times affords his Lordship satisfaction to be enabled to forward the claims of deserving officers for promotion, and that nothing could give him more pleasure than presenting the claims of the nephew of the late Col. Donellan. But his Lordship is by no means certain, neither would it be justifiable to give any thing like an assurance, that the Commander in Chief can attend to your pretensions.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Viseu, 22d April, 1809.

I enclose the most accurate account that we can at present make out of our strength for embarkation, and a letter from the Q. M. Gen. to Capt. Mackenzie explanatory of it. This return will show how erroneous the last was. Indeed it did not include some of the corps lately arrived, nor many of the sick absent, who it is understood will be able to embark with their corps. I should recommend that, if it should be possible, arrangements should be made for the reception in hospital ships of more than the number of men stated in the enclosed paper. If we should come to blows with the French, we shall certainly have some wounded, whom it will be necessary to put in hospital ships. It might be expedient therefore most probably that all the spare tonnage, not required for the 35,000 men, should be fitted up in this manner.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Viseu, 23d April, 1810.

I have just received your 2 letters of the 22d. I am concerned to find that mine of the 20th had not reached you, which contained an answer to yours of the 18th; I now enclose a duplicate of it. If Ruman's report of the 20th turns out to be correct, I shall attempt something on a larger scale, if I can. I wrote my letter to Ciudad Rodrigo merely to draw from the Junta the explanation which they are about to give. The Spaniards I believe think it necessary to our existence to assist and protect them; and I have more than once been obliged to remind different authorities with which I have been in communication, that their protection is their own concern; and that if they expect that we should assist them, they must give us every assistance of provisions and supplies which the country can afford.

The letter, to which the deputation from Ciudad Rodrigo is bringing the answer, was written in consequence of an intimation, in not very civil terms, that the small supplies which you receive from the country in which you are stationed, and for which I believe you pay ready money, could no longer be afforded.

To Messrs. Bulkeley and Son.

Viseu, 23d April, 1810.

I received only last night your letter of the 14th inst., which I imagine that you had transmitted by some private hand.

I am much concerned that Mr. Livingstone has suffered by his connexion with Mr. Phillips. All that is known here of that gentleman is, that he was encouraged by the late Sec. of State, and by the present Commissary in Chief, to purchase in the ports in the Mediterranean grain for the use of the armies in the Peninsula; and I authorised the purchase by the Commissary Gen. of this army of that which was brought to Portugal, at the cheapest rate at which the same kind of grain was to be sold at Lisbon. It was not in my power to authorise the purchase of the grain at any other than the cheapest rate; nor is it now in my power to authorise the Commissary Gen. to give any advance of price for the last cargoes of grain beyond that which was settled; although I should be happy to do any thing in my power for the relief of Mr. Livingstone. The purchase from Mr. Phillips was further recommended by his taking payment for the grain in bills upon the Lords of the Treasury, which was a convenience in the great scarcity of specie in Portugal.

If you wish it, I will forward your letter of the 14th April to be laid before the Lords of the Treasury, to endeavor to prevail upon their Lordships to make some allowance to Mr. Livingstone for the losses he has sustained, in consequence of his connexion with Mr. Phillips, and his perseverance to serve the public, notwithstanding the loss which he had first sustained. This representation in favor of Mr. Livingstone will come in aid of one which I had already made to their Lordships in favor of Mr. Phillips, when I conceived that the grain imported really belonged to him, to induce their Lordships to consent to an abatement of the amount of the demand on account of the public for the freight of the grain. Mr. Livingstone will be entitled to the full amount of the benefit which may be derived from this application, in respect of the freight for the cargoes last arrived in Portugal.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Viseu, 24th April, 1810.

I received yesterday evening your letter of the 20th. It is very desirable that your cavalry should be kept complete. But as long as the enemy will allow us to remain in a state of tranquillity, which at present they do not seem disposed to interrupt, it is desirable that we should keep the Portuguese troops in those stations in which they will be disciplined, and can be equipped. It is desirable therefore that the brigade in question should be allowed to remain at Salvaterra; and I shall take care to order it forward in time. It is also desirable that the 4 squadrons of different regiments which you have had with you hitherto, instead of the brigade to which I have above referred, should be allowed to go to the stations which Marshal Beresford will have appointed for them, in order that they likewise may be equipped and got into order. I shall take care that you shall have a due proportion of British and Portuguese cavalry, when you shall be likely to come in contact with the enemy.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Viseu, 24th April, 1810.

Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Sherbrooke, being disabled by bad health from continuing to serve with the army in the Peninsula, is about to return to England, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will make arrangements to have him, and the officers of his suite, conveyed to England in a



ship of war. He is desirous, if possible, to be landed at Portsmouth, in order to avoid the long journey to London from the western ports, to which he is not equal in his present state of health. Sir J. Sherbrooke will be at Lisbon about the 5th or 6th May.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Viseu, 24th April, 1810.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 21st, and I anxiously hope that the news of the desertion of the Italian troops at Cadiz may be confirmed.

The embarkation returns sent do not include General, or Commissariat, or Medical staff. But Capt. Mackenzie has a list of the whole, and has been directed to give the Agent of transports an accurate return of them.

I am much obliged to you for the telegraph books.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 24th April, 1810.

I am sorry to inform you that Lieut. —, of the 2d batt. 66th regt., was shot in a duel a few days ago, as is supposed, by Lieut. — of the same regiment.

I enclose letters from Lieut. Gen. Hill, Lieut. Col. Colborne, and from 3 officers of the 66th regt., and the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry into the circumstances which occasioned the duel. Lieut. — is under arrest, and if the government of the country think proper to order that he and the other officers concerned should be tried by the tribunal of the country, they shall be given up; if not, I shall give directions that they be tried by a General Court Martial.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 24th April, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 21st inst. regarding the Danish ships at Oporto.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote to the Sec. of State of the Portuguese government upon this subject, when I transmitted the report of the Commandant of Oporto regarding the conduct of the Captain of H. M. S. *Growler*.

As I was the commander of the army by which Oporto was liberated from the enemy, I have always refrained from interfering, in any manner, respecting the disposal of those Danish vessels, and have only pointed out to the Portuguese government the steps which they ought to take, if they did not think proper that these vessels should be removed by order of Vice Adm. Berkeley from Oporto.

I never saw the orders given by His Majesty respecting the Danish ships found in the Tagus when the French were removed from Portugal in Sept. 1808; but I can easily conceive that the principle of those orders would not apply to the Danish vessels found in the Douro when the French were removed from Oporto in May, 1809.

*The A.G. to Major Newman, 11th regt.*

24th April, 1810.

In compliance with instructions, I am obliged to return you the within memorial contained in your letter of the 22d inst., to request you will erase the word 'transportation' and substitute 'general service' in that document, as in my Lord Wellington's instructions it is particularly specified that transportation under similar circumstances is illegal.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Viseu, 26th April, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a letter, and its enclosure, received from Lieut. Gen. Payne; and I beg leave to recommend that you will give such directions as you may think proper, regarding the cleansing of all the horse transports at Lisbon.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 26th April, 1810.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Prince Regent, which I trust may have the effect of strengthening the hands of government here, and of aiding any representations you may make upon the subject through Lord Strangford.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Viseu, 26th April, 1810.

The head quarters of the corps of Regnier were moved on the 16th from Villa Nueva de la Serena to Merida; and after sending detachments on the left of the Guadiana as far as Los Santos and Zafrá, probably to embarrass the movements of the Spanish troops under the command of Gens. Ballesteros and Contreras, they collected their troops at Merida on the 20th. They attacked the advanced guard of O'Donnell's division at La Roca, on the right of the Guadiana, on the 21st, and destroyed some companies of his light infantry; and on the 22d manifested an intention of attacking his position at Albuquerque. Gen. O'Donnell had, however, been joined by Gen. Mendizabal's division from Campo Maior; and Lieut. Gen. Hill informs me, on the 23d, that he intended to move his corps through the Sierra de San Mamed and across the frontier, which movement was likely to relieve Gen. O'Donnell effectually, and it is probable that the enemy will have retired.

Gen. Contreras was with his brigade at Xerez de los Caballeros, and Gen. Ballesteros with his division at Aroche, by the last accounts. The communication of both with Badajoz appeared to be secure. Marshal Mortier had the advanced guard of his corps in the Sierra Morena, since the Spanish troops of Ballesteros and Contreras had been obliged to retire; and the main body of the corps is on the right of the Guadalquivir, not far from Seville. There has been no movement of any consequence in Leon or Old Castille; and I have had no accounts from Cadiz of a later date than the 4th inst.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Viseu, 27th April, 1810, 6 A.M.

The enemy are in motion on this part of the frontier, and apparently intend to invest Ciudad Rodrigo; near which place some of their troops were on the evening of the 25th. I have put our troops in motion; and I am just setting out for Celorico, where I shall be this afternoon. I wish that you would put Gen. Slade's brigade in motion, by Villa Velha, Castello Branco, &c., Belmonte to Guarda. Let them move by regiments if possible; if not, by 3, or 2 squadrons. Let the Portuguese brigade of cavalry at Salvaterra be moved up to their situation.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Viseu, 27th April, 1810, 6 A.M.

Since I sent off the courier yesterday, I have received accounts of the

enemy being in motion on the frontier, apparently with an intention of investing Ciudad Rodrigo; near to which place some of their troops were on the evening of the 25th. I have not heard of their having raised the siege of Astorga, and I do not think they have force for both operations; but as they have for some time been preparing for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and as their movements certainly demonstrate an intention to invest that place, I have put our troops in motion, and am just setting out for Celorico, where I shall be this evening.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 27th April, 1810, 9 P.M.

Your letter of the 25th at night, which I received last night, coupled with the accounts which I before received of the preparations of the enemy at Salamanca for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, induced me to put the army in motion for this point, and I arrived here this afternoon. The first division will be here, and in this neighbourhood, to-morrow, and the cavalry and the Portuguese troops on the succeeding days. I still doubt, however, the intention to make a serious attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo. I don't think the enemy is sufficiently strong for that operation without calling in Junot's corps; and I understand that the attack upon Astorga still continues. However, interested as we are to preserve Ciudad Rodrigo, and particularly not to allow that place to fall into the enemy's hands, without making an effort to save it, I should not have been justified if I had taken no notice of the movements made since the 23d, connected with other recent preparations, notwithstanding the inconvenience which this movement is to us.

I shall stay here to-morrow to arrange the stations of the troops, and to look about me a little, unless I should receive this night any intelligence which may make it desirable that I should be nearer to you.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 28th April, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 23d, and I shall communicate my opinion on the plan for establishing martial law in the country when you send it to me.

The courier to whom you refer as having been too late for the packet, left Viseu on Thursday the 19th, at about 4½ in the afternoon: he did not arrive in Coimbra, 13 leagues distant, till Friday the 20th, at 3¼ in the afternoon. Beresford did not detain him one minute: he had no letters to send by him, but finding him so late, he had the courier warned of the danger of longer delay, and the hour of his departure from Coimbra, 3½, was marked upon his passport, with a warning by the Adj. Gen. of the Portuguese army not to delay. Coimbra being 33 leagues from Lisbon, he ought still to have been at Lisbon in 36 hours, which would have brought him to 9½ on Saturday night, and he would then have been in time for the packet. If this courier, whose name is José Gregorio, is not punished, it is in vain to expect the Portuguese government will punish any body, or will ever be well served.

The packet ought to sail, according to the former rule, by the earliest tide on Sunday morning. I don't wish it at any time to be delayed for my letters beyond the afternoon's tide of Sunday.

The enemy have given no further indication of their intentions since I wrote to you yesterday. They are not in any very great numbers before Ciudad Rodrigo. Our movement continues. Direct to me in future to the care of the Postmaster at Coimbra or of Thomar. I think I shall get your letters soonest by Thomar.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 28th April, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23d inst., relative to the removal of the Conde de Redondo from his office. I have already given you my opinion upon that subject, and I have written upon it this day a letter to Dom M. Forjaz, which it is probable that the government will communicate to you.

I should recommend that the Regency should not make any arrangement for filling the vacancy in their body, occasioned by the secession of the Marquez das Minas. The principal strength of the Regency consists in the regularity and legality of their appointment by the Prince Regent; and I know of no person in Portugal whose assistance, as a colleague in the government, would compensate for the loss of this advantage, by their making any addition or alteration in their body by their own assumed and illegal authority.

As the secession of the Marquez das Minas from the deliberations of the Regency may be attributed to an intrigue among the *Fidalgos*, it is certain that the whole of that body would object to the new appointment, and would thereby increase the difficulties of government. The party of the *Fidalgos*, and of the Marquez das Minas at the Court of Brazil, would most probably also succeed in prevailing upon the Prince Regent to disapprove of and annul this new appointment; and thus a fresh blow would be given to the authority and credit of the government, on a point on which they would have exceeded their powers, and would have acted illegally. I recommend, therefore, that the government should not appoint a new member to the Regency.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

I received in the night your letter of yesterday. I wish that Carrera had mentioned his reasons for doubting the enemy's intention to attack Ciudad Rodrigo. I have doubted it, because I don't think they have sufficient force for all they are undertaking at present, even allowing Ney's force, with Loison's, to be 30,000 men, which nobody but myself has ever estimated it. I have a report which states that King Joseph has returned to Seville. If this be true, it is not likely that the enemy will undertake any thing serious in this quarter. Did the muleteers, who mentioned the heavy artillery to Cornet Tuite, see it in motion, or at Salamanca? I have accounts from Cadiz to the 16th inst.; nothing extraordinary.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 25th, and the arrangement for the embarkation of the army, which I received this morning.

I am concerned to learn that ——— has given you cause to be dis-

satisfied with him. I know nothing of him excepting upon the service, in which he was very active, and gave great satisfaction to Capt. Malcolm, as well as to the officers of the Navy.

Mr. Stuart will have informed you of our movement, and its causes. I still doubt, however, the intentions of the French to attack Ciudad Rodrigo at present.

I have given directions that 400,000 lbs. of salt provisions may be sent from the Tagus to Cadiz, and shall be obliged to you if you will allow them to sail. I am also anxious to have in the Mondego 4 of the heavy guns, with their travelling carriages and ammunition, in case circumstances should enable me to make a dash at the magazine at Salamanca, that I may not be disappointed in my object, by the want of ordnance, to breach a convent which the French have fortified there. The commanding officer of the artillery has given his directions to Col. Fisher. The whole that is required will be in one ship, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send her to the Mondego.

P.S. I conclude that your son has set off.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

I received only yesterday your letter of the 6th inst.; and I have given orders that 400,000 lbs. of salt provisions may be sent from the Tagus to Cadiz without loss of time. I consider you fully justified by our instructions in granting warrants on the officer at the head of the Commissariat at Cadiz, for the issue of money to the officer at the head of the Pay department.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

I received yesterday your letter of the 16th inst. All questions relating to b<sup>at</sup> and forage are decided according to the Regulations suggested by a Board, of which Gen. Sir T. Trigge was President; which Regulations have been adopted by the Commander in Chief; and orders have been given that they should be invariably adhered to.

I enclose a letter which I wrote to the Commander in Chief in June last, and his answer, relative to the rank of British officers holding Portuguese commissions; which you will observe contains a positive decision on the question which you have referred for my consideration in regard to Col. Bushe. The principle of the decision of the Commander in Chief on the relative rank between officers of the British army and British officers serving with Portuguese troops, would apply to British officers receiving rank from the Spanish government; and when British officers serving with the Spanish troops, meet with British officers serving with the British troops, they must rank according to the seniority of their respective Spanish and British commissions. When British officers are serving with British troops only, there can be no doubt that they must rank according to the seniority of their several commissions from His Majesty.

Being sensible, as you will observe from my letter of the 7th June to the Commander in Chief, of the inconvenience and complaints which would be occasioned by the grant of this advanced rank to British officers by

foreign powers, while His Majesty's troops might be serving with the armies of those powers, I have repeatedly requested the Spanish government not to grant these commissions without reference to His Majesty's minister; by whom applications for rank in the Spanish army made by officers holding His Majesty's commission have been occasionally referred to me. It is advisable that you should urge His Majesty's minister to communicate with the Spanish government upon this subject.

No officer ought to accept a commission from any foreign power without His Majesty's permission; I received his permission to accept the commissions which I hold in the Spanish and Portuguese services; and I have been the channel of applying for the permission of His Majesty for several officers to accept this distinction from the Spanish government. I conclude that Major Gen. Stewart has applied to His Majesty for leave to accept the rank conferred upon him by the Regency. When British officers have received His Majesty's permission to accept rank from the Spanish government, and have accepted it, I conceive that there is no objection to their wearing, particularly in a Spanish garrison, the distinctive marks of the rank which has been conferred upon them; although it would undoubtedly be more regular to wear with His Majesty's uniform only what is prescribed by His Majesty's Regulations.

I refer you to my letter of this date to Mr. Wellesley, for an account of the state of affairs in this part of the Peninsula.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 5th and 16th inst. In answer to the first, relating to the supply of provisions, you and Gen. Graham are aware of the motives which induced me to desire that the British troops at Cadiz should be fed by the Spanish government, as one of the conditions on which I consented to detach them; and you and he must decide upon the propriety or necessity of departing from that condition. I trust that the government at home will have it in their power to supply the money which will be deficient for the support of the army, and for the performance of the King's engagements in this country, in consequence of the diversion of the money raised at Cadiz from those objects, to the payment for supplies, and for the formation of British magazines at that place.

I have long known of the dissatisfaction existing in the French army, but they still continue to march and to fight. It would be advisable for the Regency to offer a reward for every Frenchman, or soldier in the French service, brought in alive to any post occupied by any of the allied troops. This measure was adopted with some success by Gen. Cuesta. The peasants refrained from the murder of the French soldiers, and many consequently deserted.

I have perused your dispatch of the 15th (No. 19) to the Sec. of State with great interest. S<sup>r</sup> de Sousa's conduct is extraordinary; for if I recollect rightly, I recommended to him not to urge the claim of his government to Olivença at the present moment. I know that I had a conversation with Lord Wellesley upon that subject, and we agreed that it was best for the Portuguese government to refrain from urging the claim, and I think I communicated this opinion to S<sup>r</sup> de Sousa. Although

the war which ended in the cession of Olivença was unjust, and the Spanish Regency, and all those seriously opposed to the French and their political system, may be disposed to acknowledge it, I doubt whether the Regency, or any other Spanish ministers, would or could cede that possession, merely as an act of grace and justice to the Portuguese government, or to induce the Portuguese government to agree to carry into execution an article of an old treaty regarding disputed boundaries in America.

The acknowledgment of the right of succession in the Princess of Brazil is stated to be an object to both governments, and I shall state presently where I conceive our interest is involved in this article of the proposed treaty. I suspect, however, that the first article of the treaty is the motive for its execution, at least by the Spanish ministers.

I don't know whether you have observed the difference in the statements made by Don E. de Bardaxi and S<sup>r</sup> de Sousa, of the nature of this proposed treaty. The former states it to be a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance; the latter of defensive alliance. Both powers being engaged in a war with France for their existence, this difference would not much signify, if it were not connected with opinions regarding the conduct and operations of the war, which are very important. The fact is, that the Spanish government and officers have always entertained, or have pretended to entertain, an opinion, that the Portuguese nation have not done their duty in the war; and they have wished to involve the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, more actively in its operations, as they term it, but, as I should say, to induce them to carry it on in their manner, which would have put the French in possession of the Peninsula about 6 months ago.

I don't know whether the Portuguese ministers have entertained the same opinions, or have really participated in these wishes of the Spanish government, regarding the operations of the war; but I have, upon more than one occasion, been obliged to refuse my consent to carry on certain operations with the Portuguese troops, proposed, and even urged, by the Portuguese government, at the suggestion of the Spanish ministers. The conduct of the Portuguese government, in these instances, was possibly occasioned by their desire to conciliate the Spanish government, and thus to procure a decision in favor of the right of the Princess of Brazil to the succession; or they might seriously believe that what was proposed to them was really an advisable measure.

The Spanish government, now seeing the total destruction of their own army, and means of carrying on the contest with activity, are desirous, by means of this treaty, of bringing the Portuguese army forward; or of persuading people that the Portuguese army will be more active in future, in consideration of the sacrifices which have been made to the Portuguese nation; and thus gain for themselves a momentary popularity.

The truth is that the Portuguese army, which is hardly made yet, has been active in proportion to its means. Portugal has done as much, and will do more, in the contest than any province in Spain of the same extent and population. It has defended itself; and with our assistance will continue to defend itself, unless attacked by very superior forces; and in this

manner its defence must be an useful diversion to Spain. What province of Spain, with all the assistance of money from America, and of arms and clothing from England, has been able to send and maintain an army beyond its limits, or even to defend itself, if attacked by 20,000 men? Three times that number will not obtain possession of Portugal, or possibly four times. But then, it will be asked, cannot Portugal and Great Britain do more? I answer, certainly not, as long as there is no army on foot in Spain.

In drawing this first article of the treaty, therefore, I conceive that it will be very desirable to avoid giving the Spanish government any more influence than they have at present upon the operations of the Portuguese army. If this point is provided for, I doubt whether the Spanish ministers will execute the treaty; and it remains to be considered whether any thing of importance will in consequence be lost. Olivença is an object of vanity to the Portuguese, for, strange to say, it is the only territory their government has ever ceded. The settlement of boundaries in America is of no importance to either party.

The acknowledgment of the right of succession in the Princess of Brazil is, I think, an object to us, if we should fail in the contest in the Peninsula, greater than it would be if we should succeed. If it should suit Buonaparte's purpose to murder Ferdinand, he will not be prevented from executing it, by knowing that the right of the Princess of Brazil to succeed to the crown is acknowledged. The object of the treaty in recognising the succession of La Carlota is nugatory, unless Buonaparte should put Ferdinand to death. As I believe there is no doubt but that, by law, Carlota cannot be Regent, if she is the declared successor to the crown, the object of the Portuguese government, in acceding to this article of the treaty, will be equally disappointed. I do not believe that either party looks farther than the Peninsula in this arrangement, but we ought to view it in another light.

1st; If the allies should succeed in obliging the French to evacuate the Peninsula, which is not a very probable event at present; and, 2dly; if the allies should fail, and the French should obtain possession of the Peninsula. In either case, but particularly in the last, it is most probable that Ferdinand and his brother would be murdered. I do not conceive that it would be a desirable arrangement for Great Britain, that the whole Peninsula and South America should be in the hands of one Sovereign. However, that is not a very probable event at present; and even if we could succeed in obliging the French to evacuate the Peninsula, I think that the Portuguese would take care that the King of Spain should never be King of Portugal.

The second hypothesis is, I am sorry to say, the most probable; and in the view of this event, I do consider the acknowledgment of the right of Carlota to be very important to us. It provides a legal government for all the colonies of Spain; and if our government should manage the evacuation of Portugal, as they ought, when we shall be obliged to evacuate this country, we shall carry away an army capable of establishing and maintaining her authority and that of her race in those countries. The interests of the Spanish and Portuguese governments are equally in-



volved with those of Great Britain in this view of the question; and I acknowledge that I think it very important that this article of the treaty should be executed in some formal manner or other.

You have now got my opinion upon this subject, which I will communicate to the King's ministers in some shape or other, or you may send it to Lord Wellesley if you choose.

Since I wrote last, Ballesteros and Contreras have both been attacked in the Sierra Morena, and have both been obliged to retire with some loss. Contreras' brigade was at Xerez de los Caballeros, and the division of Ballesteros at Aroche, when I received the last accounts from Badajoz of the 25th. Regnier's corps has again crossed the Guadiana at Merida, and attacked the advanced guard of the left division of the Marques de la Romana's corps at La Roca on the 21st, when they destroyed some light infantry. Gen. O'Donnell, who commanded this division, was joined at Albuquerque by Gen. Mendizabal from Campo Maior; and Regnier was moving to attack them, when he heard of a movement made by Gen. Hill with his corps through the Sierra de San Mamed, when he retired again to Merida.

By the last accounts of the 16th, the French had not made any impression upon Astorga; nor had the Spaniards under Gen. Mahy, &c., made any effort to relieve the place. The French have received considerable reinforcements in the Asturias, and are again in possession of Oviedo.

On the 24th, the enemy made a general movement on the Tormes towards Ciudad Rodrigo; and since the 25th, they have had a small corps of infantry near that place, and have invested it, with their cavalry on the right of the Agueda. I doubt their intention to attack the place at present, as I do not think them sufficiently strong. But the British and Portuguese armies are in motion, to attempt its relief if they should.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

I am much obliged to you for the perusal of your dispatch (No. 50) to Lord Wellesley, regarding the right of the Princess of Brazil to succeed Ferdinand. I enclose the extract of a letter which I have written to my brother Henry upon that subject, which you may send to Lord Wellesley if you think proper.

The accounts of yesterday do not make the enemy's designs more clear than they were. If it is true, as they say from Badajoz, that Joseph has returned to Seville, it is almost certain that they have no serious intention upon Ciudad Rodrigo.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 29th April, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 15th inst., relative to the claim of the merchants of the factory at Lisbon to be exempt from military billets and other burthens thrown upon all the inhabitants of Portugal, in the existing circumstances of the country. I have not by me copies of the treaties under which these gentlemen claim their exemptions; but I should conclude that all that was intended by the treaties was to place the British merchants, residing at Lisbon for the purposes of their trade, in the same situation with the other inhabitants of that city. I know that till the late

invasion and usurpation by the French it was not the practice to billet the officers and soldiers of the army upon the inhabitants of Lisbon; and many persons, whose property consisted in the rent of houses, have been seriously injured in their circumstances by the continuance of the practice, first adopted by the French and continued since the restoration, of quartering the officers by billets upon the inhabitants.

If my notion is correct that British subjects resident at Lisbon cannot claim exemptions of this description, under existing treaties, not enjoyed by the inhabitants of the country, it follows that as long as the system of billeting the army upon the inhabitants of Lisbon continues, the gentlemen of the factory must be equally liable to them. If, however, it should be decided that these gentlemen are to enjoy this privilege, I do not see on what grounds I can object to the abolition of the system of granting billets upon the native inhabitants of Lisbon. The officers of the army will thus be put to considerable inconvenience, and the public to some expense for lodging-money. While writing upon this subject, I cannot but observe that the moment for claiming this privilege is not happily chosen by the gentlemen of the factory.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 30th April, 1810.

I received yesterday evening your letter of yesterday morning from Gallegos. You have done quite right to keep the caçadores. The order for their return was given before we knew of the enemy's movements upon the frontier.

It is impossible to draft men from one regiment to another, or from a regiment to another branch of the service in Portugal. The men are all raised by requisition on the provinces, and each province has a certain number of battalions allotted to it, to be kept complete. A province whose regiment should be drafted would have reason to complain although none of the men were discharged as being unfit for service. Mr. Downie's sickness is unfortunate at this moment, but I will desire the Commissary Gen. to send you somebody else.

P.S. I have a report from Col. Grant at Serradilla in Estremadura, that the enemy are reinforcing Regnier's corps with about 7000 men drawn from Castille, from Madrid, and Toledo. There is also a report from Lamego that the siege of Astorga is raised, but I doubt its truth.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 30th April. Senhor — has returned the horse he stole. I have not yet seen Senhor —, but he shall likewise make a restitution.

Alas! Astorga surrendered on the 22d April, and it is obvious that the enemy knew of its fall before they marched on the 24th from the Tormes. The question is, what they will now do, and what we ought to do. I don't think that Junot will push into Galicia. If he does, they are not equal to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; if he does not, we are not equal to its relief. They have not yet moved the heavy guns from Salamanca, and the rain must, for the present, stop their operations, as well as ours. All the troops are halted in the situations with which you are acquainted.

You had better not move to Foz Daõ more than 500,000 rations, keeping up that quantity. We have great difficulties about the carts to move forward the magazines only 14 leagues. We have on the Douro and Mondego not less than 1,000,000 of rations. I shall settle about the deserters.

I enclose a letter which I received last night from the Duke of Cambridge. Have you any inclination to receive these gentlemen?

Charles Stewart is arrived: he left London on the 13th: all in great tranquillity: Burdett safe in the Tower. They are terribly alarmed in England about our situation, and I am advised on all hands to risk nothing. How do you find yourself?

I have not answered you about your Colonels on the Staff, because I want to talk to you upon that subject. I like to adhere to principles and general rules, whatever may be the consequences.

To Brig. Gen. Cox.

Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

I received last night your letter, announcing the fall of Astorga, and, during the night, that enclosing the letter of yesterday from the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo. The fall of Astorga is an event of great consequence at the present moment, and it is obvious that it is the cause of all the late movements of the enemy.

They are increasing their force also in Estremadura. However, we are in a state of preparation for all events, and I shall act according to circumstances.

If the force near Ciudad Rodrigo is only 4000 men, and the Governor wishes to remove them, he is surely able to effect that operation himself. Why are the English to undertake it? If he is not able to effect that object, I am sure it will answer no purpose for us to relieve him, when he shall be more seriously pressed.

Gen. C. Stewart is arrived at Lisbon, having left London on the 13th April. Tranquillity was re-established in London, Sir F. Burdett being safely lodged in the Tower.

I beg you to communicate this letter to Gen. Craufurd, as I have not time to write to him before the *parté* sets out.

To Lieut. Col. Fletcher, R. E.

Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

I enclose you the copy of a dispatch which I have received from the Sec. of State, relative to Peniche. The reports which you have already made to the late Commander of the Forces and me, and the directions which I gave you in my letter of the 3d April, show the existing and probable early state of Peniche as a place of embarkation for the army; and I have transmitted copies of these papers to the Sec. of State by this opportunity. I request you now to consider of Peniche in the view mentioned in the second instance by the Sec. of State in the enclosed dispatch, viz., as a post to be permanently occupied by His Majesty's troops; and I request you to report to me your opinion what improvements and additions it would be desirable, and would be practicable, to make to the existing works, and their expense; and what ordnance and stores the place would require in its improved state.

I conceive that a garrison of 5000 men, of which 2000, including artillery, should be British troops, would be fully sufficient for this place. I beg you to let me know whether you concur in this opinion. It will be desirable that these troops should be in barracks, the expense and means of constructing which, in a permanent and a temporary way, I request you likewise to consider.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch which I have received from the Sec. of State, relative to Peniche. Your letter to me of the 26th Oct. 1809, of which His Majesty's government have a copy, contains your opinion of Peniche as a place of embarkation for the army; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will communicate your opinion to me, or to the Sec. of State, in respect to the permanent occupation of that post, in the view stated by the Earl of Liverpool. There appears no doubt that communication could at all times be held with the shipping from the north or the south side of the Peninsula, excepting during the prevalence of the gales from the westward; and the points for consideration would appear to be the anchorage; the influence of the Berlingas upon the anchorage; or the protection which these islands could afford in the event of a gale from the westward; the possibility of anchoring under the shelter of the Peninsula, either north or south of it, out of reach of the enemy's fire.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 1st May, 1810.

I am concerned to be obliged to make complaints of the magistrates and people of this part of the country, of whose loyalty to their Prince, and zeal for his cause, I have no doubt; but the contest has now come to that state, and the frontiers of the country are so seriously menaced, that something more than mere professions and goodwill are required on the part of the magistrates and people; and either the government must come forward and punish with rigor those who withhold the assistance they have it in their power to give to the armies, or my duty to the King will oblige me to withdraw his troops from the country, stating to the world my reasons for adopting this measure.

The enemy's movements upon the frontier have induced me to concentrate the allied armies in a greater degree than they had been hitherto; and of course the subsistence of the troops, in a country already in some degree exhausted, becomes a subject of some difficulty and arrangement. This difficulty is easily to be overcome, in consequence of the measures which had been previously adopted. There are not less than 1,000,000 of rations belonging to the British army, and 300,000 belonging to the Portuguese army, on the Douro and the Mondego, within 14 leagues of the army. There are not less than 40,000 carts, with bullocks, in the different districts of this part of Beira; and yet a sufficient number cannot be got for the public service upon this emergency, to move up the magazines to the army. I enclose a letter which the Commissary Gen. has received from the magistrate at Lamego upon this subject. The magistrate at Trancoso, mentioned in this letter, has

already given me cause of dissatisfaction with him. I beg you to communicate this letter to the Portuguese government, and to inform them that if the troops cannot be subsisted in advance, I shall withdraw them to the magazines, and that eventually I shall withdraw them from the country altogether.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorigo, 1st May, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 6th April; and I now enclose a report made by Lieut. Col. Fletcher, the chief engineer, to the late Commander of the Forces, and a plan of Peniche. I likewise enclose an extract of a letter which I had written on the 3d April to Lieut. Col. Fletcher, directing him to proceed to put that place in a state of defence; and his report to me of the 16th April, in answer to that communication. These papers will show your Lordship the state in which that place is at present, and in which it will be as a place of embarkation for the army; and the letter from Adm. Berkeley to me, of the 26th Oct. 1809, enclosed in my dispatch to your Lordship of the 14th Nov. 1809, will show the Admiral's opinion upon Peniche in the same point of view.

Lieut. Col. Fletcher's report to Sir J. Cradock states the number of men that would be required, as a rear guard to an army embarking at Peniche, to be 2000. It also states the common resources of the place; in addition to which I have directed that 100,000 rations of provisions might be deposited there, as a resource for the garrison which it might be deemed expedient to fix at Peniche, and for the inhabitants and troops of Portugal whom it might be expedient to place there, till means could be provided for their removal. From the perusal of these papers, His Majesty's government will be able to form some judgment of the existing and probable state of Peniche as a place of embarkation.

If this place is to be occupied permanently, it is probable that it would require and might be capable of receiving some further improvements than those which I have directed should be made to it. Upon this point I have called for a further report from Lieut. Col. Fletcher, as well as for the accounts of the ordnance and stores which will be required for the permanent occupation of this post. The garrison for this post ought to be 5000 men, of which it would be advantageous that 2000, including artillery and engineers, should be British troops; and there ought to be a store of 3 months' provisions, at least, for 5000 men, in the place, adverting to the impossibility of approaching the coast of Portugal with victuallers during the prevalence of the westerly winds.

Your Lordship will observe, from Lieut. Col. Fletcher's report, that if ships can approach the coast at all, they could always communicate with the land, on the north or on the south side of the Peninsula, according to the state of the wind, which communication might probably be deemed sufficient for the ordinary purposes of the garrison. I propose, however, to request the Admiral to give a further opinion upon Peniche, in reference to the anchorage off the Peninsula or the Berlingas.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorigo, 1st May, 1810.

I have received your Lordship's dispatch of the 5th April.

I enclose a copy of the letter which I wrote on the 1st April to Brig. Gen. Cox, containing the terms on which I was disposed to receive deserters from the French army. I have been particularly cautious respecting the enlistment of persons of this description in the corps of this army; and none are taken who, or their families, are not known to some of the officers, non-commissioned officers, or privates already in the different corps. The others of the German nation are sent to the dépôt of the Hanoverian legion at Lymington; and the Italians, Swiss, Russians, Poles, &c., have been allowed to enlist into the York light infantry volunteers, at the request of Brig. Gen. Alex. Campbell, he being Colonel of that corps. Some deserters, Germans as well as of other nations, have declined altogether to enlist into the King's service; and these have been sent to England, with a letter to the Commandant of the dépôt, stating that I had promised that means should be facilitated to them for their return to their own countries. In the mean time, till these means shall be found, your Lordship will observe that they are to be paid, and in every respect treated as British soldiers.

The great impediment to desertion is the danger of being murdered, which all soldiers of the French army incur in Spain, when they wander from their quarters, and are found singly, or in small bodies, by the inhabitants of the country. This impediment was in some degree removed in the last year, by the offer of a reward, by Gen. Cuesta, for every soldier of the French army brought in by the peasantry; and it is probable that the same measure would produce the same effects at present. The reward, however, must be offered by some person whose character is known in the country, and in whom the people have confidence; but unfortunately there are none of that description in this part of Spain. The desertion, however, from the foreign corps in the French army is considerable at present; and I understand that many join the guerrillas in the country, and therefore that we cannot be aware of its exact amount. The loss of the enemy in this manner might certainly be increased by judicious measures adopted by active agents, belonging to the same countries with these soldiers, in the way of communication with them, and conveying to them information of the terms on which they will be received, and of the different routes by which they might move to a place of safety, when they could escape from the French.

But this is a service of serious danger to the person who undertakes it. I don't think the employment of officers in the manner proposed by your Lordship would answer, as the enemy would immediately discover their stations, and would cut off all communication between their foreign corps and the stations in which these agents should have fixed themselves. It is best that the deserters should be received wherever they can reach a post of the allied armies, and be conveyed from thence to the sea coast, which is the mode at present arranged for the conduct of this business.

I have requested Adm. Berkeley to forward to your Lordship an account of the vessels in the Tagus, as required by your Lordship's dispatch of the 5th inst., as I have not the information to enable me to forward it. I understand, however, that there is transport tonnage sufficient to embark the whole British army, with its ordnance and stores, and 2000 horses, besides the men of war in the river.

I have already informed your Lordship that there are several Portuguese vessels in the Tagus which might be employed in the embarkation either of individuals of the Portuguese nation, if His Majesty's government should think it proper to encourage a general emigration, or the Portuguese army. It is necessary, however, that these vessels should be previously prepared, in whatever way it may be deemed proper to employ them; and it is desirable that His Majesty's minister at Lisbon should be instructed upon this subject.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 2d May, 1810.

I received in the night your letter of the 1st. There is no doubt that we might now raise the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo; but the success of the operation would answer no purpose. The enemy's artillery and means for the siege are still at Salamanca, and the question whether we should be able to get possession of them is the same as it was a fortnight ago. I am convinced that we should not be able to pass the Tormes before Ney could bring upon us a much larger force than I have; particularly now that the siege of Astorga is finished.

I send you the return of Victor's corps of last year, in which you will see the organization of a French corps. It is, in fact, an army composed of divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions, with its cavalry, staff, commissariat, artillery, engineers, &c., complete. You will also observe that the cavalry forms a complete division in the corps; and although, for purposes of operation, parts of the cavalry may be attached at times to divisions of infantry, the division of infantry has no cavalry belonging to it. Of these corps there are in our front Ney's, which was the 3d corps of the army in Spain; Loison's, which consists, with very few exceptions, of foreign troops; Kellermann's, which is the old 6th corps of the army in Spain, and was Bessières': this had in it in 1808 and the beginning of 1809, the Imperial Guards; these were withdrawn early last year, and it had not been reinforced in infantry, unless by some of the conscripts lately arrived; and Junot's, or the 8th corps of the army in Spain, in Leon, and part of it at Valladolid. This corps has arrived since the beginning of the year. The corps complete is nearly 40,000 men. I should think that if these corps are averaged at about 15,000 or 16,000, it is the most they have. I should think Ney has 20,000, Loison had 14,000: I reckon these 2 about 30,000. Junot brought into Spain 23,000, and I reckon his corps and Kellermann's about 30,000 more.

I have heard from Cadiz to the 23d; we have lost the Matagorda Fort, but the French have certainly weakened their force in front of Cadiz, and have reinforced their corps in Estremadura. Is the Agueda filled again by the rains?

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 2d May, 1810.

The movement which I informed your Lordship in my last dispatch of the 26th April, that Lieut. Gen. Hill intended to make through the Sierra de San Mamed, had the desired effect of relieving Gen. O'Donell from the attack with which his position at Albuquerque was threatened. The enemy retired to his position at Merida, and Gen. Hill returned on the 25th and 26th to Portalegre. It appears that since that time Gen. Reg-

nier has received a reinforcement, said to be 4000 men, from Toledo, by the bridge of Arzobispo; and 4000 men arrived at Merida on the 26th April, detached from Mortier's corps in Andalusia. They reconnoitred Badajoz, on the right of the Guadiana, on the 27th. The divisions of Gens. Ballesteros and Contreras, of the Marques de la Romana's corps, are in the same positions at Aroche, and near Xerez de los Caballeros.

By the accounts which I have received from Cadiz, it appears that the enemy have obtained possession of Fort Matagorda, having been able to bring upon that post a very heavy fire. I conclude that your Lordship will have received the detailed account of this event from Lieut. Gen. Graham. I understand that the loss sustained in the attack of the enemy made upon this post was 15 R. and F. killed, and 45 wounded. Major Lefebure was unfortunately killed by a cannon shot at the moment the post was evacuated.\*

The accounts from Cadiz tend to confirm the reports that the enemy have detached troops from Andalusia into Estremadura.

I received accounts on the night of the 26th April, some hours after I had dispatched the courier with my last letter to your Lordship, that the enemy had broken up from the Tormes, and had approached Ciudad Rodrigo on the 25th, which place has been since invested on the right of the Agueda. As soon as I received those accounts, I gave directions for the

\* Lieut. Gen. Graham to Lord Liverpool.

Isia, 22d April, 1810.

From the information your Lordship already had of the miserable state of the fort of Matagorda (never to be considered free from the danger of assault), it will not be matter of surprise that after holding it 2 months it should now be abandoned.\*

I have the honor to enclose Capt. MacLaine's† (of the 94th) report to me. It would be an injustice to the service not to recommend him in the warmest manner to your Lordship's notice, as well as the officers who continued with him to the last of this arduous duty: Lieut. Brereton, of the Royal artillery; Ensigns Cannon and Scott, of the 94th; and Mr. Dobson, midshipman of H.M.S. *Invisible*. The defence of Matagorda has been witnessed by every body with admiration, and I should not have been justified in allowing it to be continued so long but from the expectation of the possibility of some diversion being made in its favor, which, however, was found to be impracticable.

It is impossible that I should not endeavor to express to your Lordship the feelings of universal and deep regret excited by the untimely fall of that distinguished officer Major Lefebure, of the Royal engineers, whose zeal carried him from the Admiral's ship to be the bearer of my orders for the evacuation of the fort, that he might be satisfied that it was no longer tenable. The chief direction of that important department now devolves on Capt. Birch. Your Lordship is well acquainted with my opinion of his merit and talents, so well calculated to inspire confidence under this misfortune.

P.S. The original garrison of the fort of Matagorda consisted of Capt. MacLaine and Ensigns Cannon and Scott, 94th regt.; 25 Royal artillery, under Lieut. Brereton; 25 Royal marines; 25 seamen, under Mr. Dobson; and 67 non-commissioned officers and privates of the 94th regt. Reinforcements were sent in the evening of the 21st, and reliefs of the whole were offered, but declined.

Capt. MacLaine, 94th regt., to Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Cadiz, 23d April, 1810.

I have the honor to inform you, that at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21st, the enemy opened upon the 74 gun ship S. Pablo, and gun boats stationed near Fort Matagorda, with hot shot, and succeeded in forcing them to abandon their position.

Immediately after this they opened upon Fort Matagorda a very heavy cannonade of guns and mortars; but as it would have been impossible to direct our fire with a certainty, I ordered Lieut. Brereton, of the Royal artillery, to delay our fire until daybreak.

The morning discovered 3 batteries opposed to us, in the Trocadero, of 21 guns, and from the flight of their shells we judged they had 8 mortars in other 3 batteries. From the time they commenced firing at the fort, they kept up a most tremendous cannonade of shot and shells with great effect until night, when the enemy and the fort both discontinued. That



movement of that part of the army which was in the rear to this place, and I arrived here on the 27th. Gen. Slade's brigade of cavalry, which was on the south of the Tagus, has also been moved to Belmonte. The object of these movements is to enable me to collect a sufficient force in this quarter to attempt the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, if I should deem it expedient. The enemy, probably prevented by the rain which has fallen since the 26th, has not made any movement of importance since that day. They have not invested Ciudad Rodrigo on the left of the Agueda, nor have they moved from Salamanca any of the ordnance or other equipments which they had been for some time collecting at that place for this siege.

Since my arrival here I have learnt that Astorga had surrendered on the 22d; and this event, which renders disposable the corps which had been employed in the attack of Astorga, was probably the immediate cause of the movement of the enemy to Ciudad Rodrigo.

His Majesty's government will have received from the King's minister at Cadiz the accounts of the successes of the Spaniards on the eastern side of the Peninsula, which have ended in the relief of Tarragona, and the retreat of Augereau's corps, with the loss of some detachments, upon Barcelona.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Calorico, 2d May, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 27th and 28th ult. I agree entirely

day's fire made a very large breach in the escarp of the rampart, on which was the principal part of our guns, and completely laying open our magazine.

We were, from the manner the enemy placed his batteries, and which they had contrived to do under mask of the houses in the village of Trocadero (distant from the fort about 900 yards), only able to bring 7 guns to bear on them; yet with these we contrived to silence, and, as I conceive, dismount the guns of one of their batteries, in which were six 32 pounders.

The whole of the night of the 21st, and morning of the 22d, I employed in endeavoring to repair the parapet of the south-east face, composed of sand bags, and which, from the very heavy fire of 21 pieces of cannon (most of them 32 pounders), the enemy had totally demolished, so that the men at the guns were perfectly exposed. We continued to replace the sand bags and fill up the breach, so as to put ourselves in a tolerable state of defence, and at daybreak in the morning the enemy opened with a salvo from all his batteries. We returned the fire with the same spirit and success as yesterday, but the fort soon became a complete ruin, and no where afforded any shelter for the reliefs. The evacuation, however, only took place in consequence of your order. We left the fort at 10 A.M., Capt. Stackpole, of the Royal navy, having been sent by the Admiral to complete its destruction.

I cannot sufficiently express to you the gallantry and coolness with which every individual officer, seaman, marine, and soldier conducted himself during the 2 months we maintained this post, particularly during the 2 last days.

I beg, in a particular manner, to mention the services of that most excellent officer Lieut. Brereton, of the Royal artillery, for his unremitting attention to his duty, and the masterly style in which he kept up his fire on the enemy; as likewise Ensigns Cannon and Scott, of the 94th grenadiers: and I request, Sir, you will state to the Admiral how highly sensible I am of the handsome manner in which Lieuts. Chapman and M'Pherson, of the Royal navy, and one or two others, whose names I cannot now recollect, volunteered their services during the heaviest of the fire. Mr. G. Dobson, midshipman of the *Invincible*, had charge of the seamen under my command during the whole time, and I beg you, Sir, to recommend him to the Admiral as a very excellent and brave officer.

Herewith I send a list of killed and wounded; and among the former I am sorry to return Major Lefebvre, of the Royal engineers; he was killed close to me by a cannon ball: the loss of such an excellent officer is deeply to be lamented.

N.B. Hospital mate Bennet, attached to the 94th regt., and who was the surgeon attending the garrison, I beg to recommend to your notice, as a most attentive and excellent professional man; he wishes much to be appointed assistant surgeon of the 94th regt. I have omitted to mention Lieut. Wright, of the Royal artillery, who succeeded to the command of the artillery in the batteries on the morning of the 22d, after Lieut. Brereton was wounded.

with you about the alterations in the Proclamation. Let us have it out soon. I hope it will be of use to us. You see that the plot is thickening about us; and if the affairs on the eastern side of the Peninsula do not excite a diversion in our favor, we shall soon have much upon our hands. You will see how matters stand in my dispatch to the Sec. of State of this date.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 2d May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 28th April, and I am much concerned that ———— should have displeased you. He has not made any application to me, but has written to me a letter stating what had happened to him, to which I have written him a short answer, to express my regret that he should have incurred your displeasure. If he had applied to me I should have told him what is perfectly true, that I have nothing to do with him. I recommended him on public grounds only, because he was very active and useful, and gave great satisfaction to Capt. Malcolm and Capt. Bligh, as well as to the officers of the army when it landed in Portugal. But he can be of no use now if he does not give you satisfaction.

The loss of Matagorda is certainly a misfortune in a variety of ways. If, however, care has been taken to assemble within the inner harbour a sufficient quantity of craft to establish and secure the naval superiority there, it will not be of so much importance. If that has not been done, the Isla de Leon may be attacked in the rear as well as the front, and the whole line of communication will be open to attack, and I am afraid they will not be able to hold it.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 3d May, 1810.

I have received your letters to the 30th April. The plot seems to thicken on us in some degree, but, with prudent management and decision, I don't doubt that we shall get through our difficulties.

I have read over all my letters to you, and it does not occur to me that it is necessary to give you any further instructions. If any point occurs to you on which you think you are not fully instructed, or you entertain any doubts, let me know it, and I will communicate to you my opinion immediately; and if you are obliged to act in any manner without waiting for my opinion, do so with confidence that I have every disposition to approve of every thing you do. I consider all the letters which I have written to you, although in a private form, to convey official instructions and authority upon every point to which they relate.

I think that you will have Mortier's corps in Estremadura immediately. Even with this reinforcement they cannot take any of the strong places, nor touch you, till they shall have destroyed the Marques de la Romana; nor do I think they can turn your right flank. I entirely approve of your movement to aid Gen. O'Donnell, and I shall approve of any thing of the same kind upon a future occasion. Recollect, however, that your cavalry is not the best, and don't adventure too much in the plains. I shall order the 13th light dragoons, however, to join you.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorigo, 3d May, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23d April, enclosing the copy of that which you had written on the 20th to the Sec. of State.

My opinion is, that the government and the Commander in Chief did not intend that the corps stationed at Cadiz should be considered as an integral part of this army, although it was placed under my general directions by the Sec. of State. This is probable from several articles in the instructions you received from the Sec. of State; and quite clear from those which you received from the Commander in Chief. I also think it probable that government intended to leave to your discretion to act according to the instructions I had given to Major Gen. Stewart, and to adhere to the conditions which I had made when I detached a British corps to Cadiz, or not, as you might think proper; as, although they must have received copies of all those papers before you left England, the instructions to you were not altered, nor, I believe, were copies of the papers received from me transmitted to you.

From all this I conclude that government intended to leave to the decision of the General officer on the spot all those matters referred to in your instructions. Under these circumstances, and particularly having made known to the Sec. of State my doubts whether the corps at Cadiz was to be considered part of this army, before I had seen the instructions you received from the Commander in Chief, I cannot take upon me to decide that it is a part of this army, and that its details are to be conducted in a particular manner, different from that in which it appears it was intended in England that they should be conducted. After all, I do not think it signifies much in what way they are conducted, excepting as the decision on this question involves another point to which I shall refer presently, viz., your own situation in this army.

Whatever might be the degree of the control and responsibility which the government and Commander in Chief might think it proper I should have in the affairs at Cadiz, I should always have thought it proper to give you my opinion upon any thing on which I thought it desirable you should have it; and, on the other hand, if the corps at Cadiz had been part of this army, I should have hesitated long, before I should have adopted my own opinion in preference to yours.

The question then comes to be a mere matter of form, upon which an early decision is not necessary; and it is as well that the authorities in England should decide as that I should. The decision is important only in view to your own situation in this army. I have certainly long wished that you should be employed with this army; at the same time that a regard to the feelings of Sir J. Sherbrooke, whose situation you would fill, and a sense of justice to that officer, with whose conduct I had every reason to be satisfied, induced me to wish that you should not arrive in Portugal till the time beyond which he had stated that his health would not allow him to remain, and at which he had settled to go home. Your appointment to Cadiz has interfered with this arrangement; and the decision which separates the corps at Cadiz from the army in Portugal separates you from it likewise, and would prevent you from taking your station in this army if the service should offer prospects more agreeable

to you, or opportunities in which you could serve the public of greater moment than those which the situation of affairs at Cadiz should offer. That is the only reason for which I think it desirable that the corps at Cadiz should be an integral part of this army.

In respect to the other point adverted to in your letter to the Sec. of State, viz., whether you should continue at Cadiz or join the army in Portugal, supposing the corps at Cadiz were considered part of the army in Portugal, I think it depends much upon your own feelings, and upon the situation of affairs at Cadiz. I do not think the service in this country is likely to hold out a prospect of any thing very brilliant: I must maintain myself on the Peninsula till it is necessary to withdraw from it; and when it is necessary to withdraw, I must carry off the army without disgrace, and without loss, if possible.

In the war in which we are engaged, no man can pretend to say how long it will last, or what may be its events and circumstances; or in what manner they may influence the share and interest which Great Britain has in the contest. On the other hand, the state of affairs at Cadiz is highly interesting, not only to the Peninsula, but to Great Britain and to the world. You may render the most important services there; and to withdraw you from that place might shake the confidence and damp the spirits of the Spanish government and of the people of the town, upon whose exertions the defence and ultimate safety of the place must in a great measure depend. However desirable, therefore, it might be to me that you should be in Portugal, I cannot but think that it would be most advantageous to the public interests that you should remain at Cadiz, at least as long as that place is seriously threatened by the enemy.

I beg to refer you to my letter to Mr. Wellesley for an account of the state of affairs in this quarter.

To Major Gen. Doyle.\*

Celorico, 3d May, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 24th Feb., 1st and 3d March, and Mr. Wellesley has also sent me a copy of your letter of the 12th April. I hope you have received Lord FitzRoy Somerset's letter of the 27th Feb., regarding deserters from the enemy, and I beg to know how many you have sent, and to what places you have sent them, under the directions contained in that letter.

I have received an answer to the reference which I had made to the Sec. of State on the subject of your raising a regiment from the deserters of the French army; and his Lordship not only objects to your proposal, but objects to admitting deserters into the British service in any manner or upon any terms. However, any engagements into which you may have entered, under any former orders, shall be carried into execution, and the men shall be treated as British soldiers, shall be sent to England, and, if then discharged from the service, they shall have the means facilitated to them of returning to their own countries. I enclose the copy of my letter to Gen. Cox, on the terms to be held out to deserters; and I desire that you will in future hold out the same terms. You may

\* The late Lieut. Gen. Sir C. Doyle, K.C.H., having the rank of Mariscal de campo in the Spanish army.

provide clothing and necessaries to any that may require these articles for their voyage to Gibraltar, Lisbon, or England; and I request that you will send me an account of all the expenses you may incur on this account, which shall be paid.

Astorga surrendered on the 22d, for want of ammunition, and the enemy are in possession of the Asturias. They have collected a train of artillery at Salamanca for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; and since the fall of Astorga they have invested Ciudad Rodrigo on the right of the Agueda, but the place is still open on the left of that river. I have collected the British army in this quarter, in order to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, if it should be possible.

The corps of Ney, Loison, and Kellermann, are in Old Castille, and that of Junot in Leon. Mortier and Regnier (who commands Soult's corps) are in Estremadura. The Marques de la Romana has his head quarters at Badajoz, and his army, about 14,000 men, has its right in the Sierra Morena, at Aroche, and its left at Alburquerque; and Lieut. Gen. Hill, with a British and Portuguese corps, is at Portalegre.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorigo, 3d May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 23d inst., and I now return those which you had received from Col. Doyle, and were desirous of having again. One fact appears tolerably certain, and that is, the retreat of the enemy on Barcelona. It is to be hoped that this event may induce them to detach from this quarter, where they are collecting an enormous force.

Since I wrote to you on the 29th I have heard of the surrender of Astorga on the 22d, for want of ammunition. This event was obviously the immediate cause of the movement of the 24th and 25th on Ciudad Rodrigo, and it is probable that Junot's corps, as well as Ney's, and Loison's, and Kellermann's, will be upon our hands. The enemy had not collected any larger force near Ciudad Rodrigo as late as yesterday, and the heavy artillery had not been moved from Salamanca. The enemy have received reinforcements in Estremadura. A corps of about 4000 men have entered that province by the bridge of Arzobispo from Toledo, and 4000 men of Mortier's corps have come through the Sierra Morena from Seville.

G. O.

Celorigo, 4th May, 1810.

1. The frequent loss of money on its progress from one station to another, renders necessary the following regulations:

2. When any officer of the Commissariat or Paymaster General's department takes charge of money to be transmitted from one station to another, they are to count it and place it in the different boxes or packages in which it is to be carried, and to see that those boxes or packages are well closed and secured.

3. When the money is to be removed, the officer of the commissariat or pay department in charge is to see that all the boxes and packages are secured, and he will give them over in this state to the officer or non-commissioned officer commanding the military escort; he will himself accompany the escort, and at the end of the march he will again inspect the boxes, have them all placed in his own quarters, and apply for a sentry over the treasure.

4. The same practice must be repeated daily on the march till the arrival of the money at the place of its destination.

5. The money is to be counted and delivered over to the person to whom it had been consigned, in presence of the officer of the commissariat or pay department in whose charge it had been sent; and he is to be responsible for all deficiencies from the hour from which he originally receives charge.

6. Whenever money is sent from one station to another, the officer of the commissariat or pay department in charge must have with him a copy of these orders.

As the corps before Cadiz is weakened, I conclude that the whole of Mortier's corps will be in Estremadura, and that part of the corps hitherto before Cadiz will be stationed at Seville. I have had accounts from the Marques de la Romana of the state of the garrisons in Estremadura, and of his own army. He also tells me that the siege of Cadiz was raised on the 23d, which cannot be true.

P.S. I am not certain that ——— will not make a good Governor of the Balearic Islands, only that he will keep us out of them entirely. He is not unlikely to make them an independent sovereignty for himself.

To Brig. Gen. R. Crauford.

Celorigo, 5th May, 1810.

I delayed answering your letter of the 2d, till I should have an opportunity of communicating with Marshal Beresford, upon the proposition which it contains for an augmentation of the ration to the Portuguese troops. You have been misinformed regarding the price paid for meat by the Portuguese government. Their contract price is 120 *reis* per lb., instead of 40 *reis*, as you suppose it is; and of course the soldier will be unable to pay 60 *reis* a day for an extra  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of meat, even on those days on which he receives 20 *reis* from the government instead of wine.

Knowing, as I do, the distresses of the Portuguese government, and the difficulties under which they have labored in forming this meat contract, at a price so much exceeding the natural price of the country, and that which we pay, I cannot think of urging them to incur any additional expense on this head. I know, likewise, that, whatever we may think of their ration, the people of this country deem  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of meat as much as a man ought to eat; and the majority of the people of the country, even of those who do eat meat, do not eat so much. However, the situation of the Portuguese troops may be such at times as to require a larger allowance than their ration, to which it is certainly understood that an addition is to be made by the soldier, by purchases of his own in the market; and Marshal Beresford and I have settled an arrangement which will give the soldier this additional allowance, at an expense which he can afford to pay, without any increase of expense to the government.

It is the Marshal's opinion, in which I concur, that when the Portuguese troops receive their wine, in any situation,  $\frac{3}{4}$  lb. of meat are sufficient for each man; when they do not receive their wine, they may require, and may have, 1 lb. of meat; and in that case they will be able to pay for the additional  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. They will have to pay for  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of meat 1½*d.*, or something more than 20 *reis*, and for  $\frac{3}{4}$  lb. of meat 3*d.* The sum they will pay for the  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. may be supposed to be about equal to what they would lay out in the market, if they had a market to resort to; and when they do not receive wine, they have an allowance nearly equal to what they will have to pay for the second  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of meat. Thus this object will be accomplished: Marshal Beresford will send directions to the Commissaries and the Commanding officers of the corps upon this subject.

Mr. Murray has communicated to me a letter of the 1st inst. from Mr. Shaw,\* your aide de camp, to Mr. Downie, directing that the Portuguese Commissaries attached to the Portuguese battalions should no

\* Col. Shaw Kennedy, then Lieut. of the 43d Light Infantry.

longer be employed with the battalions to which they are attached, but in the general Commissariat business of the division.

I have no doubt whatever that the whole of the Commissariat arrangements of both the British and the Portuguese army might be very much improved; and one of the improvements would doubtless be to place the whole under one regulation, and an unity of superintendence. Unfortunately, however, the orders of our own government, and various other considerations, some political, others military, and others financial, do not allow of this amalgamation. All that can be done is, that we should assist each other as much, and clash as little, as possible: and arrangements have been made by me to provide for those objects, and directions have been given by the Commissary Gen. to his deputies and assistants to carry those arrangements into execution.

Nothing can be more advantageous to me, or can give me more satisfaction, than to receive the assistance of your opinion upon any subject; but you may depend upon it there are few of the general arrangements of the army which have not been maturely considered by me; and that, although some inconveniences may attend some of them, they are the smallest that, after full consideration, it was found would attend any arrangement of the subjects to which those arrangements relate. I request, therefore, that whenever you see reason to wish to make any alteration, you will let me know it; but do not make the alteration without reference to me.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 5th May, 1810.

I enclose the letter which I have written to Gen. Craufurd, and which I beg of you to return to me, so that it may go off to Almeida by the *parté* to-morrow. The way in which this will be arranged will be as follows: You will direct your Commissaries to make requisitions upon ours for as many half pounds or pounds as they will require to make this extra issue of meat, for which the Portuguese government will have to pay at the rate of 6d. per lb.

You will settle the mode in which the government are to recover from the troops the sums which they will have to pay for their  $\frac{1}{4}$  lb. of meat. I think that you should not give this allowance to all the troops. 1st, those ought to have it who have no market to resort to: 2dly, on days of march: 3dly, on days of action, or of active employment against the enemy. Those in their quarters, who have a market to resort to, ought not to receive an extra allowance, whether they receive wine or not.

P.S. I send the copy instead of the original letter, which you can return at any time to-morrow.

To the Secretary of the Treasury.

Celorico, 5th May, 1810.

I enclose the copies of a correspondence which I have had with Messrs. J. Bulkeley and Son, regarding some transactions between Mr. F. C. Phillips, a person in whose favor I addressed you on the 12th March, and a Mr. Livingstone, of Malta, relating to certain quantities of grain purchased for the use of the army. In case their Lordships should have complied with the recommendation contained in my letter of the 12th March,

in favor of Mr. Phillips, and should have answered me accordingly, I shall defer taking any steps regarding it till I shall have received their decision upon the papers now enclosed.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 6th May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 2d. I concur entirely in the idea of your paper, on the embarkation of those who are to embark. It is well calculated to give order to what would naturally be very confused. I think, however, that the arrangements which it proposes should be carried into execution at different periods. 1st; the ships in the river should be prepared for the reception of passengers, with water, provisions, &c. 2dly; the stations for each of them in the river should be fixed. 3dly; the number of boats attached to each ship should be fixed, and what boats. All the boats in the river are already numbered and registered for other objects. All these arrangements are preparatory, and their object might be kept secret. Then comes the execution. 1st; to order the vessels to their stations: 2dly; to give the orders for passage to those obliged or inclined to depart from the country.

The other objects of your paper are relative to police, and are highly desirable.

I doubt the communication with the Berlingas; but this is a naval point, upon which we shall have more light soon, in consequence of some communication which I have lately had with the Admiral. When I went to Setuval, it was a dark and foggy day, and the reconnaissance which I was able to make of the place was very imperfect. Fletcher has since looked at it, and he does not think he could make it a secure place of embarkation without much work, which it would require 10,000 men to occupy. These could not be spared. Setuval is the best harbour in Portugal for small vessels, and for an unmolested embarkation; but the difficulty of protecting the embarkation, and the subsequent egress of the ships, would render it impossible to use this harbour as I had proposed.

In respect to military law, the subjection of the country to that system of rule is a consideration of a very different description from that of the improvements suggested by Beresford for the proceedings for the military jurisprudence of the country. There is no doubt of the evil of which he complains. The remedy is not quite so clear. I am not well acquainted with the subject; but it appears to me that the proceedings of the Courts Martial are conducted on the principles of the civil law Courts; that the documents are very voluminous; there is seldom any oral testimony in Court; and the Court decide upon a perusal of the documents and of the testimony which has generally been taken, not before the Court, but by the Judge Advocate.

It is difficult to point out a remedy for these defects. The proceedings of a Court Martial must be founded on, in a great measure, and analogous to, the proceedings of the other Courts of law; and I certainly do not understand the subject sufficiently, nor have I leisure to give my attention to understand it sufficiently, to suggest a remedy for the evil which certainly exists.



There is no news. The French have made no movements, and have certainly been prevented by the rains. Part of Junot's corps, it is said, is gone towards Valladolid.

I am much afraid that we shall be in serious distress for provisions. The carts are not yet come forward; and we have nearly eat up what we brought up with us.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorigo, 6th May, 1810.

I think it will be very desirable to send some person to Algiers; but it ought to be a Portuguese, and I do not know any one whom I could recommend to you. It will also be well to send Mr. Casamajor with a letter from you, and both in a King's ship. The government at home must, however, interfere in this business with a very strong hand.

To Don Andres Herrasti, Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo. (Extract.\*)

Celorigo, 7th May, 1810.

I shall always be happy to have it in my power to render your Excellency and the city of Ciudad Rodrigo assistance; and the allied army under my command is at present in a situation from which it can move to the aid of Ciudad Rodrigo, if circumstances should permit me to do so. Your Excellency must, however, be aware that the protection of that place is not the only object intrusted to me, and that I must use the means which I have in my power with that prudence and circumspection which the situation of affairs requires.

To H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge.

Celorigo, 7th May, 1810.

I had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' letter of the 30th March; and although I had not heard of the arrival in the Peninsula of Major —, Capt. —, and —, I immediately endeavored to find the means of giving them employment when they should arrive.

A very general prejudice against German officers and troops prevails throughout the Peninsula; and I think it very doubtful whether I shall be able to prevail upon any of the Spanish authorities to employ these officers; and if I should, I fear that the officers will have but too much reason to complain of the treatment which they will receive. I therefore considered it advisable to endeavor in the first instance to employ them in the Portuguese service, and I communicated with Marshal Beresford upon the subject, and I now enclose his answer. I must add to it, that I am perfectly aware of the objections to which he refers, in giving employment to any foreign officers in the Portuguese service; and I have already been obliged to send some back to England. Your Royal Highness may depend upon my doing every thing in my power to prevail upon the Spanish government to employ these officers, and to make their situation as advantageous and agreeable to them as circumstances will admit.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorigo, 8th May, 1810.

I have received your letter of yesterday's date, to which I will send an answer as soon as I shall have seen the Commissary Gen. Regnier has

\* The original draft of this letter is missing from the Duke of Wellington's papers: this extract was sent to the Sec. of State, from whose office it has been copied.

again withdrawn towards Truxillo, and Mortier's corps has fallen back upon Monasterio and the Sierra Morena.

P.S. I beg you to send the enclosed to Capt. Jenkinson.

To Brig. Gen. R. Cranford.

Celorico, 8th May, 1810.

Since I wrote to you this morning I have seen the Commissary Gen., who will be glad to see and will consider the regulations which you had proposed to adopt for the commissariat duties with the British troops under your command.

The commissariat duties of the Portuguese troops must be conducted by the Portuguese commissaries; and if you employ these gentlemen upon other more extensive duties, it is obvious that their duty with the Portuguese troops must be done by British commissaries or others.

An arrangement has been made under which all clashing of the two commissariats can be avoided, and we can give them the assistance of our magazines, which they must from time to time require; and the Commissary Gen. has directed his commissaries to carry this arrangement into execution. I believe there will be no difficulty in executing this arrangement, if the orders given are strictly obeyed; and none in providing the troops, if there is money on the spot to pay for their provisions. No regulation or activity can make up for the deficiency of money.

I am perfectly aware of the quantities of papers and vouchers required by the Auditors of accounts. This difficulty comes in my way at every step; and I declare it to be my opinion that no one department of the service is formed for an extended system of operations abroad. But unfortunately I must adhere to rules and regulations formed by my superiors, and a great part of my time is spent in endeavors to discover expedients for carrying on the service in a manner that is consistent with the rules and regulations.

I have no doubt also that there is great inexperience, and many faults in the execution of the detail of their duty by the officers of the commissariat: it cannot be otherwise. But adverting to the mode in which it is necessary at times to divide the component parts of a division, I should doubt the expediency of the division of the duties among the officers of the commissariat, attached to such a body of troops, in the manner proposed by you, in every instance. However, I shall peruse what you propose with all the attention it deserves, and you may depend upon it that I am not prejudiced on the subject.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 8th May, 1810.

I enclose a paper which I have just received from Col. Framingham. Of course I can have no objection to any increase of ammunition with

G. A. O.

Celorico, 8th May, 1810.

3. The General officers commanding brigades, and officers commanding regiments of cavalry, are requested to adopt efficient measures to prevent the sale by the soldiers of the cavalry of the grain intended for the horses; this object can be effected only by the constant attention of the officers to their stable duties.

The Commander of the Forces likewise requests the officers commanding brigades and regiments of cavalry will communicate with the magistrates in the several districts and villages in which the cavalry are cantoned, to prevent the purchase by the inhabitants of the country of any article whatsoever from the soldiers, most particularly those destined for the food of the horses.

your division which you may think necessary; but I am afraid that you will find yourself crippled for provisions, if you employ so many mules in the carriage of ammunition. The principle on which I have regulated this branch of the service lately has been to move with the brigade of artillery attached to each division a certain proportion; and to have a reserve in some fixed depôt. I considered the depôt at Elvas and the Portuguese ammunition at Abrantes as the reserves for your corps; and of course, if you were likely to have occasion to consume any ammunition, you would order a part of the reserve from one of those places to be put in motion, and you would communicate with it by means of your mules, which would go quicker than the cars. If you do not think the Portuguese ammunition in Abrantes sufficient for you, I can easily have a reserve of British ammunition placed there for you.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Calorico, 8th May, 1810.

I received only this morning your letter of the 2d May, and I am very sensible of the confidence you have reposed in me, in communicating to me the offer made to you of the command at Plymouth, and of the kindness towards me, which has induced you to decline to accept of it. I only hope that it may not prove injurious to your interests. I assure you that I am perfectly satisfied with all the arrangements for the embarkation of the army. Every thing is prepared for us either to go or stay; and I have no doubt that if we should be obliged or ordered to quit, the embarkation will be made with the utmost order, and with requisite celerity.

I am obliged to you for placing the *Herring* at Figueira. I do not see any immediate prospect of having to send an officer to England. The French are in the same positions. But I imagine that their inactivity is to be attributed to the rains, which have fallen very generally, and swelled the rivers and destroyed the roads in Castille.

To Lieut. Col. Bunbury, Under Sec. of State.

Calorico, 9th May, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of articles applied for by the Q. M. G. at the periods therein stated, and I request that they may be sent out to this country with as little delay as possible.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Calorico, 9th May, 1810.

The enemy have continued in their position in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo without any material alteration till yesterday morning, when they moved from thence to the northward, to Val de Carros. I have not heard yet whether they continued their movement to the northward, or resumed their position near Ciudad Rodrigo. The rain continued till within the last 2 days, and the rivers were still full by the last accounts; and the enemy had not moved the heavy cannon from Salamanca.

The French destroyed the works of Astorga after that place had surrendered; and it does not appear that they have endeavoured to make any further progress in Galicia. A part of the corps of Junot, which was employed in the siege of Astorga, has moved into the Asturias, and it is reported that the larger part have returned into Old Castille.

The enemy's corps which had arrived in Estremadura from Andalusia,

have again retired upon Monasterio and to the Sierra Morena, in the beginning of this month; and Gen. Regnier remained, with that part of the troops which were under his immediate command, in the neighbourhood of Merida. Some of the cavalry had been thrown back upon Truxillo. The allied troops on both sides of the Tagus are in the same positions as when I addressed you on the 2d.

I have not heard from Cadiz since the 23d of last month.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 9th May, 1810.

I addressed you on the 20th Oct. 1809, regarding Col. Trant, and received a letter from your Lordship in reply to mine above referred to, dated the 14th Nov. 1809, from which I had understood that it was the intention of the Commander in Chief that this officer should continue to hold his situation on the Staff, while employed in Portugal. He is a permanent Assistant in the office of the Q. M. G., from which situation I am informed that it is the intention of the Q. M. G. to remove him, if he should not relinquish his situation in Portugal.

I beg to refer your Lordship to my former letters in favor of Col. Trant. Since that time, having been nearer the place at which Col. Trant is stationed, I must add that there is no officer the loss of whose services in this country would be more sensibly felt by the government and the people, and Marshal Beresford and myself, than those of Col. Trant. Your Lordship is aware of the uncertainty of the tenure of his employment here, and you must be sensible how severe it would be upon him to require that he alone, of all the British officers allowed by His Majesty to serve the Prince Regent, should be called upon now to make an option between his employment in England, and the situation which he holds in Portugal.

I therefore request your Lordship's further protection of Col. Trant, that he may not lose his commission of permanent Assistant in the Q. M. G.'s department.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 11th May, 1810.

On my return from Pinhel last night, I received your letter of the 10th, and I shall be glad to see you, as there are two or three points upon which I wish to speak to you.

Bring over my letter regarding the increase of pay, and it shall be altered as you desire.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 11th May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 6th. I write to let you know that I have desired Fane to go into the Alentejo to take the command of the English and Portuguese cavalry in that province, which arrangement will, I hope, be agreeable to you.

P. S. There is nothing new in this quarter.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 11th May, 1810.

I have received your dispatch (No. 7) of the 25th, and those marked Nos. 8, 9, and separate, of the 28th April.

The existence of the difficulties in making any exertion or arrange-

ment at Cadiz, for the security of the place to which you refer, is very distressing; and I am concerned that you meet with them. But the character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout the war: they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid plan, or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to the enemy, by which their situation might be gradually improved. The leading people among them have invariably deceived the lower orders; and, instead of making them acquainted with their real situation, and calling upon them to make the exertions and sacrifices which were necessary even for their defence, they have amused them with idle stories of imaginary successes, with visionary plans of offensive operations, which those who offer them for consideration know that they have not the means of executing, and with hopes of driving the French out of the Peninsula by some unlooked for good. The consequence is, that no event is provided for in time, every misfortune is doubly felt, and the people will, at last, become fatigued with the succession of their disasters, which common prudence and foresight in their leaders would have prevented.

It is a curious circumstance, that the same post which brought your letters (which I am now acknowledging) brought one from Gen. Castaños to a gentleman here, in which he states that he has no doubt that the enemy will soon retire from the Peninsula! I am convinced that the enemy will, by this time, have tried the effect of the bombardment of Cadiz from the Trocadero, or that he will try that measure very shortly; and unless the government should be very firm, the surprise which it will occasion among the people, who have not been taught to expect it, may have the worst effects.

I concur entirely in your detaining Lieut. Col. Ponsonby. I was sorry to be obliged to call away so many officers and men of the 87th regt.; but it was upon the trial of an officer upon a charge of forcing a sentry, and I could not refuse to call those as evidences whom he thought necessary for his defence. He has certainly availed himself of the indulgence which I might be disposed to extend to a person in his unfortunate situation, by calling persons from England, as well as from all parts of the Peninsula, including Mr. Villiers, the King's late minister at Lisbon, and myself, who could have no knowledge of any facts connected with his alleged offence. He is now sick; but if he should not recover at an early period, so as to enable the Court Martial to proceed with the trial, I shall send the witnesses back, and defer the trial to some future opportunity. I beg leave to refer you to my letter to Mr. Wellesley for an account of the situation of affairs here.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 11th May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 7th. I observe that the minister, Dom M. Forjaz, considers the inconveniences on which I had the honor of addressing you as of ordinary occurrence; and he entertains no doubt that inconveniences of this description will not induce me to desist from making the movements which I might think the defence of the country would require. It frequently happens that an army in operation cannot procure the number of carriages which it requires, either from the

unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply them, or from the deficiency of the number of carriages in the country. But it has rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided with carriages, has been obliged to carry on its operations in a country in which there is literally no food; and in which, if there was food, there is no money to purchase it; and whenever that has been the case, the army has been obliged to withdraw to the magazines which the country had refused, or been unable to remove to the army. This is precisely the case of the allied armies in this part of the country; and however trifling the difficulty may be deemed by the Regency and the ministers, I conceive a starving army to be so useless in any situation, that I shall certainly not pretend to hold a position, or to make any movement, in which the food of the troops is not secured.

I have no doubt of the ability or of the willingness of the country to do all that can be required of them, if the authority of the government is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to their public duties, rather than to their private interests, in this time of trial. I have written this same sentiment to the government so frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am of writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests and business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher classes of society. These must be forced to perform their duty; and no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however powerful, should shield from punishment those who neglect the performance of their duty to the public in these times. Unless these measures are strictly and invariably followed, it is in vain to expect any serious or continued exertions in the country; and the Regency ought to be aware, from the sentiments of His Majesty's government, which I have communicated to them, that the continuance of His Majesty's assistance depends not on the ability or the inclination, but on the actual effectual exertions of the people of Portugal in their own cause.

I have thought it proper to trouble you so much at length upon this subject, in consequence of the light manner in which the difficulties that I had stated to exist were noticed by Dom M. Forjaz. I have to mention, however, that since I wrote to you, although there exist several causes of complaint of different kinds, and that some examples must be made, we have received such assistance as has enabled me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to be able to continue as long as may be necessary.

I concur entirely in the measure of appointing a Special Commission to attend the head quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be adopted without delay.

I enclose a Proclamation I have issued, which I hope will have some effect. It describes merely the crimes, or rather the omissions, of which the people may be guilty in respect to the transport of the army: these may be classed as follows:

1st; Refusing to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen when required.

2dly; Refusing to remove their articles or animals out of the reach of the enemy.

3dly; Disobedience of the orders of the magistrates, to proceed to and remain at any station, with carriages, boats, &c.

4thly; Desertion from the service, either with or without carriages, &c.

5thly; Embezzlement of provisions or stores which they may be employed to transport.

The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates may be classed as follows:

1st; Disobedience of the orders of their superiors.

2dly; Inactivity in the execution of them.

3dly; Receiving bribes to excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions upon them.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 11th May, 1810.

I received yesterday your letter of the 24th April, which I imagine came by the *Comus*. I believe that there was no truth in the stories of the insurrection at Madrid. The French have, however, certainly met with a check on the eastern side of the Peninsula. On this side, affairs remain nearly in the same situation since I wrote to you last. The weather has been very bad, and the French have been unable either to move their guns from Salamauca, to Ciudad Rodrigo, or to cross the Agueda so as to invest the place, and they have rather weakened their force in front of it than otherwise.

A great part of Junot's corps, it is said, is gone to Valladolid. It is reported at Valladolid that Massena\* is coming to command the army to be employed against this country, and that a Gen. Lamartinière is coming with 20,000 more men. The same desultory operations are going on in Estremadura; and I think that the French intend to make an attack upon the right divisions of the Marques de la Romana's corps at Xerez de los Caballeros, &c.

I should be very glad, at any time, to see Alava, who is a very good fellow. I do not know, however, in what manner I could employ him. Gen. Castaños might wish to have him here to send intelligence to the Spanish government, to which I could have no objection, though we have an officer here still (Col. O'Lawlor) who was employed by Cuesta, I believe, for the same purpose.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.*

11th May, 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint you, the Commander of the Forces has, in compliance with your request, granted you unlimited leave of absence to return to England. His Excellency, from a just estimate of merit, declines accepting your resignation; on the contrary, please to understand, in the event of duty permitting your return to the Peninsula, his Lordship looks with satisfaction to the renewal of your service on the staff of this army.

To Brig. Gen. Cox.

Celorico, 12th May, 1810.

I am much concerned that the post does not arrive in proper time at Almeida, which is entirely owing to the negligence of the boys who carry it. It leaves this place at 11 precisely; the distance is not 8 leagues, and it might reasonably be expected that it would reach Almeida before 8 in

\* See Appendix, No. I., at the end of this volume.

the evening. I have desired the Postmaster to give positive directions upon this subject, which shall be enforced by punishment, if necessary. It would be inconvenient to alter the hour of departure from hence, as the *parté* now carries to Gen. Picton and Gen. Craufurd all the orders of the day, which he could not do if he were to go at an earlier hour. If he cannot arrive in time by starting at 11, it is better that he should leave this at night, and arrive at Almeida early in the morning.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 12th May, 1810.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Sec. of State, directing that certain horse transports may be sent to Falmouth, and certain infantry transports to Portsmouth; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will direct that the orders of the Sec. of State may be carried into execution. It is desirable that the agent, in selecting the ships to be sent on this service, may send those in which none of the baggage belonging to the troops is embarked.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 12th May, 1810.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received this day from the Sec. of State, and I beg to be favored with your opinion, whether the retention of the Bugio, supposing that it should be practicable to put that fort in a state to be retained by a British force, would be useful to the British navy, or detrimental to the enemy in the event of his obtaining possession of the Tagus. In view to a retention and relief of the fort, it would be desirable to have your opinion on the practicability of communicating with it from the vessels, which, it is supposed, would be employed in the blockade of the Tagus.

You will observe that His Majesty's government have adverted to the occupation of the Bayona islands, and I propose to forward, by the first opportunity, to the Sec. of State, the letters which I have received from you on that subject. I also write to the chief engineer, to ascertain whether he has any officer who could be spared from other services to examine those islands, and to determine upon their capacity for defence. If he should be able to detach one upon this service, I shall request you to send him to Vigo in a ship of war, accompanied by any officer of the navy whom you might think proper to select to co-operate in his labors. I also request to know from you, whether you have any information on any of the islands off Faro.

*The A.G. to Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.*

12th May, 1810.

In reply to your letter of the 11th inst., I have the honor to acquaint you that the whole of the absent sick of the army are now assembled at the Coimbra and Lisbon stations. The first of those establishments, though permanent, is only intended for the temporary residence of patients, those who amend returning to the army: the cases of more serious nature being embarked on the Mondego, and sent by transport round to Lisbon.

The difficulty of preventing abuse in such establishments as the general hospitals of an army is so evident, that I have attempted to organise every reasonable check. I rather think that deficiency of system will not be found which you seem to apprehend; but I am perfectly satisfied that both Major Lindsay at Elvas, Capt. Meacham at Coimbra, and Col. Peacocke at Lisbon, will attempt



to afford you every satisfactory information. Lieuts. —, 43d regt., and —, 52d regt., are charged with the management of the men of your command at the Lisbon station.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of Hospitals.*

12th May, 1810.

In returning you the annexed detailed account of funeral expenses of soldiers who have died in the general hospital, Lisbon, I am to convey his Excellency's consequent opinion that such an extent of charge cannot in justice be authorised against the credit of the deceased, or, in failure of such means, against the several captains of companies. Under these circumstances you will be pleased to arrange for the casualties that may hereafter occur in the service of the general hospitals under your superintendence, that mode of interment admitted on all other foreign stations, viz., by shell coffin; requiring that every decent attention should be given, to avoid affording disgust in the soldiers, from an alteration in the last office towards a comrade which custom has made respectful, and that every precaution be taken to guard against communication of contagious disease.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.*

12th May, 1810.

I have to request you will be pleased to convey his Excellency's orders to Capt. —, of the 11th regt., to repair without delay to head quarters, reporting himself at this office, preparative to that officer's proceeding to Coimbra to command that station, for which arrangement he will accordingly prepare. I have made his Lordship aware of Capt. —'s reluctance to take this charge, which, under present circumstances of the army, has not afforded any dissatisfaction to my Lord Wellington, who at the same time is obliged to require that officer's service as stated.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 13th May, 1810.

I enclose a return of the provisions and stores in Ciudad Rodrigo, and a letter from the Junta. What they want principally is lead for musket balls; and I believe that there is a great quantity which is useless at Almeida, and it might as well be sent to them. Will you send orders on the subject?

To Brig. Gen. Sir N. Trant.

Celorico, 13th May, 1810.

We are likely to suffer the greatest inconvenience from your having seized Mr. Patton at Agueda, who was making purchases there for the Commissary Gen. As I was so near, I think that it might have been as well if I had been informed of the cause of complaint against Mr. Patton before he was seized. I beg that you will release this person, unless you have some very good cause to justify his detention, which you will state.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 13th May, 1810.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received letters and dispatches from England, which declare the intention of the King's government that the force at Cadiz should be considered as part of this army; and I request you to give directions to the heads of the several departments there, to report their proceedings to the heads of the departments in Portugal, and to correspond with them constantly. It will also be necessary that the warrants for the extraordinaries incurred at Cadiz should be signed by me; but in all other respects I request you to continue to carry on all matters as you have done hitherto, and to proceed with your arrangements in the same manner as if I had nothing to say to Cadiz, in the perfect confidence that I shall concur in them all.

I enclose you an extract of a private letter from Lord Liverpool, in reference to your situation in this army; and I am happy to find that I had anticipated the wishes of government in the consideration which I gave to this subject in my letter to you of the 3d inst. I likewise enclose copies of letters received by Dr. Franck. I apprehend that when the hot weather shall set in, and in the crowded state of Cadiz and the Isla, you will find the troops unhealthy, and possibly you may experience some difficulty in fixing upon a healthy situation for an hospital. I beg, therefore, to suggest for your consideration the expediency of fixing your principal hospital at Ceuta, which I am informed is a very healthy station, particularly during the great heats of the summer at Cadiz. If you should, upon consideration, adopt this suggestion, I can send you from the Tagus some hospital ships, to enable you to transport the sick and wounded from Cadiz to Ceuta.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 13th May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 9th.

I shall urge the early publication of the Proclamation, when I shall receive Dom M. Forjaz's letter upon that subject.

It is very distressing to be obliged to give harsh answers to a person so highly respectable in himself, and for whom I entertain so much respect as I do for Dom M. Forjaz. But I must say that his note of the 8th, contained in your letter of the 9th, is neither more nor less than a falsehood. It is not true that the British troops in the neighbourhood of Almeida have drawn provisions from any Portuguese magazines. Let the *Junta de Viveres* name the magazine from which the provisions have been drawn. Nay, more, it is not true that Almeida is in want of provisions. By a return given to me no longer ago than yesterday, by Marshal Beresford, it appears there are provisions in that garrison (besides my magazine) for 3 months; and these provisions have been thrown in, in consequence of arrangements made by the Commissary Gen. by my directions. The Portuguese Commissaries have experienced the same difficulty as we have experienced in the removal of their magazines upon the Mondego; but as the carts have now begun to come in, an arrangement has been made to give them their first share of them; and till the Portuguese troops can be supplied by their own Commissaries, they are to be supplied by ours.

I have frequently represented to the government the insufficiency of the *Junta de Viveres*. I suspect that they are not honest; and I have never yet seen a statement from them which did not contain a direct falsehood or a subterfuge. It is really distressing, that in addition to other difficulties we should have to contend with and refute the false reports of their useless establishments, which the government will support, notwithstanding every thing that has been urged against them.

By a letter received from the Sec. of State of the 24th, it appears that it is intended to give the Portuguese government £40,000 *per mensem* in addition to the £80,000. However, I conclude that you will hear from England upon this subject.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Calorico, 13th May, 1810.

I enclose the letter and copy of the Proclamation which I have received from Dom M. Forjaz, which is certainly very different from that which you had drawn and recommended to his consideration. I do not think it signifies much at what period that paper is published, as I am convinced it will have no effect.

In my opinion, the fault of all these proclamations in the Peninsula has been, that the writers of them have followed the example of those published by the French during the revolution; and they have invariably flattered and deceived the people. What we want is: 1st; an exposition of their danger. 2dly; a reference to the existing means of resistance. 3dly; an exposition of their own duties. 4thly; an exhortation to perform them: and lastly, a declaration by the government, that those who should not perform their duty would be punished without distinction of persons.

This ought to be stated in plain language, without bombast, and ought, above all, to be short. But these '*Corir sobre os nossos inimigos*' will only tend to increase the existing evils. Every man in Portugal is sufficiently alive to the danger, and is very anxious to avert it: there is plenty of enthusiasm; there are cries of '*Viva*' and illuminations, and patriotic songs and feasts every where: but that which is wanting, is the plain simple performance of his duty, each in his station, and obedience to order.

These are my general objections to this paper. But besides these, I entertain objections to some of the phrases. In the first place, the abuse of the French in the first paragraph is unbecoming in a Proclamation published by a regular authority, such as the Regency, although it would do well enough for a Spanish Junta. Indeed, the whole paper is too much in imitation of those of the Junta. Then the term '*sistema continental*' is ambiguous, and a term of that kind ought never to be used in a paper of this description. The continental system as contra-distinguished from the insular system, that is, preventing England from interfering in the continental politics, may be a very fit system of politics to be followed by the Portuguese nation; at all events, it may be a question. The continental system, as meant by Buonaparte, and as forced upon all Europe, means the destruction of all commerce excepting that which is carried on for the benefit of France. That cannot be a fit system for Portugal. But my objection to the expression is, that the meaning assigned to it by the writer of the Proclamation may be misconstrued wilfully or otherwise, and misunderstood by those who shall read it.

I send you these papers because I think you have not seen them before; and it may be desirable that you should have some discussion upon them with Dom M. Forjaz. If you have seen them, and think the Proclamation is the best that they can produce, I shall answer the letter, stating that I think they ought to publish something of this description as soon as possible.

13th May, 1810.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Nixon, 2d caçadores.

Your letter of the 10th May, and enclosure from Lieut. Col. Abercromby, I have laid before the Commander of the Forces. In reply, I have the honor to

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convey to you his Excellency's determination not to interfere in any manner with the orders of the 28th regt., or those of Lieut. Gen. Hill's division, in reference to servants allowed from the ranks.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

The officer to be exchanged for Lieut. Gaynor is arrived here, but I acknowledge that unless you are very anxious for Gaynor's exchange, I think it very doubtful whether it is expedient to allow of his going into the French posts just at present. He will certainly be able to report the exact state of affairs between the Agueda and the Coa, and in respect to other matters his reports may be favorable or otherwise to us, according to what he has seen. I am rather inclined therefore to send him back, unless you are very anxious to have Gaynor exchanged; and to say the truth I think it very doubtful whether sending him in here will get Gaynor released; it would be still worse to send him in from any post in which we should not be strong, and I am sure the Marques de la Romana will not allow him to go in by Badajoz.

P.S. Let me have your answer to this as soon as possible, as, if he does go, he must go to-morrow morning.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

I have just received your letter of the 13th. It is difficult to manage ——— in any respect, but particularly so in respect to the means of supplying his troops with provisions on the spot, where we cannot for the want of carriages supply him sufficiently from the rear. However, I shall write to him upon the subject of ———'s letter.

I shall inquire respecting the complaints of the corregidor of Viseu. I dare say that they are exaggerated. It is not impossible but that some money may be due at Viseu, but there cannot be much due. Indeed, considering all the calls upon us, I do not see how we can get on in respect to money.

I enclose to you a report\* received from Guimaraens, from which it appears not only that every thing in the neighbourhood is embargoed for the use of the Portuguese army, but that an arrangement which I had declined to adopt has been circulated throughout the country as ordered; and the consequence is that my Commissaries can get nothing. I shall be obliged to you if you can set this matter right.

I also enclose to you a letter from Gen. Cox, received this morning,

G. A. O.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

The officers of the Commissariat have been frequently urged to attend to the orders of the Commissary General; and the Commander of the Forces is concerned to have to observe that many of them have neglected to obey his orders in very important instances in which obedience was undoubtedly in their power.

He now publishes the names of officers of the Commissariat from whom reports ought to have been received at stated periods of the state of the magazines and supplies in their charge, with the dates of the last reports received from each, showing a neglect of an important duty, and a disobedience of a positive order.

The Commander of the Forces will take no further notice of this neglect, but to warn these gentlemen and others of the necessity of paying strict obedience to the orders of their superiors; and he assures them that the publication of their names to the army as persons guilty of disobedience and neglect will not be the only notice taken of such conduct in future.

with its enclosure, which I beg you to return. If the contents of this paper be true, the enemy have plenty of men for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and every thing else. I have, however, sent for this Mr. Jackson, to see him, and hear his story myself.

P.S. All the ammunition and balls in Ciudad Rodrigo would scarcely give the inhabitants and garrison 100 rounds per man, which is not sufficient for any, much less a Spanish garrison in a state of siege.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you would send me a nominal list of the British officers serving with the Portuguese army, specifying the regiments to which they belong, and the periods from which they have been respectively paid from the chest of the 'Aids.' Upon referring again to Gen. Cox's complaint in favor of the districts of Castello Bom, &c., I observe that it contains some most unfair and unwarrantable expressions, which I must observe upon in the notice I am about to take of the complaint itself.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

I enclose you a letter to Brig. Gen. Cox from the magistrates of Castello Bom, &c. &c., and I request that if you should have reason to believe that the complaints are well founded, and the people cannot supply Mr. Downie's requisitions, you will refrain from enforcing them, and rather draw from Almeida.

To Brig. Gen. Cox.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

I enclose a letter which I request you to forward to ———; and I likewise enclose a copy or extract of the letter which you wrote to Marshal Beresford, when you forwarded the complaint which I have enclosed to ———. I can have no objection to an officer in your situation forwarding any complaint which comes into his hands; but I think if he takes any view of the subject, particularly in an official paper which may become a public document, it ought to be liberal towards others.

I wish that before you had stated 'these complaints to be founded upon justice and reason' you had adverted to the difficulties of subsisting the army in advance of the magazines, owing to the unwillingness of these same people, and their countrymen, to supply the carts they have at command to move forward the magazines; and that before you had termed the requisitions of ——— for the British troops 'the adoption of an unnecessary system of vexation and terror amongst a willing and obedient people,' you had adverted more pointedly to the fact, that these last requisitions are not the only cause of these 'reasonable and just complaints;' but those heretofore made and enforced by the same system for provisions and supplies to the Portuguese and Spanish troops, which have not been and probably never will be paid for; whereas it is certain that those supplied to the British troops will be paid for, probably immediately; and undoubtedly at no very remote period.

War is a terrible evil, particularly to those who reside in those parts of the country which are the seat of the operations of hostile armies; but I believe it will be found upon inquiry, and will be acknowledged by the people of Portugal, that it is inflicted in a less degree by the British

troops than by the others ; and that eventually all they get from the country is paid for, and that they require only what is necessary. In our present situation it is necessary that the people of Portugal should furnish the troops with carriages to move our magazines, or that they should feed the troops in the advanced stations, or the troops must be withdrawn. This may be a disagreeable alternative, but it cannot be avoided ; and I am convinced that if you had taken this, which is the fair and true view of the subject, your regard for these same people would have induced you to urge them to make an effort to supply what was required, rather than to give harsh terms to requisitions, made upon them by necessity rather than by choice.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 11th, and you will see by my letter of yesterday, that I concur entirely in your opinion of the Proclamation sent to me by Dom M. Forjaz. I beg you to communicate to him or not, as you may think proper, my sentiments on the Proclamation as communicated to you yesterday.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 4th. I doubt the existence of open insurrection in La Mancha and Andalusia to the degree stated in your accounts, but I have no doubt of general discontent ready to break forth into open insurrection whenever the weakness of the French should offer opportunities, and there should exist in the country means of resistance, such as arms, &c. &c. There is so far a foundation for the report of O'Donnell's action, as that it appears that Suchet's advanced guard was at Lerida on the 11th April. It is doubtful, however, according to my experience in Spanish reports, whether O'Donnell was beaten or gained a victory.

Affairs remain in this quarter nearly in the same situation in which they have been for the last fortnight. The bad weather still renders any more active preparation for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo impracticable. The place was summoned by Mermet on the 12th, with a declaration that if not surrendered immediately the whole garrison should be put to the sword. The Governor answered that his determination had been already communicated to Ney, and that he should fire upon all flags in future.

I have a report that a reinforcement of 21 battalions of infantry and 3 regiments of cavalry arrived at Valladolid from the neighbourhood of Vitoria, on the 27th and 28th April, under Gen. Lamartinière.

To H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' letter of the 9th April, and I assure your Royal Highness that I shall be happy to do every thing in my power to add to the numbers and efficiency of the corps composing the King's German Legion.

I propose to call upon Brig. Gen. *Baron* Low to state what are the contingent expenses attending the recruiting from deserters from the French army ; and I shall adopt measures to provide for the payment of

those which ought to be a charge upon the public, in addition to the bounty to the men enlisted.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

I enclose an extract of a letter of the 29th April, which I have received from Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, in which he has informed me that the Regency of Spain had offered him the rank of Lieut. General in the Spanish army, and to Capts. Owen and Landmann the rank of Colonel in the Spanish army, in testimony of their satisfaction with the conduct of the Major General while he commanded the British troops at Cadiz, and with that of Capts. Owen and Landmann while in command of the royal artillery and engineers of the same place.

I beg your Lordship to lay this letter before the King, and to request His Majesty's permission for Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, Capts. Owen and Landmann, to accept the rank in the Spanish army offered to them by the Regency of Spain.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

I hope that you will have written to Lieut. Gen. Payne, which will be the best means of reconciling his feelings to his recall; and I shall not say any thing to him upon the subject, till the last moment, in order to give you time to do so after you shall have received this letter if you should not have written to him before.

I am convinced that Gen. Brownrigg is mistaken respecting Gen. Payne's inclination to return to England. However, that is a point into which it is not necessary to enter. You may depend upon it that I shall do every thing in my power to reconcile him to his recall, if he should not receive a letter from you before it will be necessary for me to announce it to him.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 14th May, 1810.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 25th April, and I assure you that nothing can be more satisfactory to me than the King's approbation, which I labor incessantly to deserve. I am obliged to your Lordship for your account of Lady Wellington and my children.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.*

14th May, 1810.

There having occurred lately some instances, in the division under your command, of applications to permit the commutation of corporal punishment, awarded by Court Martial in support of discipline: as a general reply and instruction on this head, I have the honor to enclose the Commander in Chief's decision, received through the Dep. Adj. Gen. of the Forces, to the strongest case of similar nature which presented itself in this army, and was accordingly referred to the Horse Guards by his Excellency's command.

In understanding that the system of commutation is discouraged by the Commander in Chief, I beg you will inform Major Newman, that his intentions as relating to private — of the 11th regt. cannot in consequence be further noticed by the Commander of the Forces.

To the Rt. Hon. G. Canning.

Celorico, 15th May, 1810.

Your relation arrived here about 3 weeks ago, and Col. Stopford having required that he should be allowed to do duty with the 3d regt. of Guards,

in consequence of an intimation from the Duke of Gloucester that if he wanted officers he was to call upon me to allow those on the staff to return to do their duty with the regiment, I have not thought it proper to refuse my consent to allow him to join.

The Duke of Gloucester might prevent Capt. Canning\* from being on the staff, if he should think it proper. I don't think that I should do him any good by contesting this point with the Duke of Gloucester. I have, however, still kept him in my family, and he will continue to receive his pay and allowances as usual, in the same manner as another officer did during the whole campaign who was doing duty with the Coldstream. I have a perfect right to do this, and there is no increase of expense to the public, as the aides de camp are paid by myself: there are always some supernumeraries, and I can give the pay to which of them I please.

I mention this to you because I don't think that Capt. Canning is convinced that I have decided for the best on this occasion. He thinks himself aggrieved by the Duke of Gloucester, and would have the point contested, which I don't think desirable.

*The D.A.G. to Brig. Gen. R. Crauford.*

15th May, 1810.

It appearing, by a return of deserters from the enemy, that one of them, named ———, has been detained by the surgeon of the hussars as a bñtman, in the absence of the Adj. Gen., I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to request you will give directions, that no deserter from the enemy should be detained by any officer for the purpose of being employed as a servant, bñtman, or otherwise, and that the man who has been thus detained should be forwarded to head quarters, by the first opportunity. His Excellency's reasons for wishing all deserters to be forwarded are, that a deserter was detained in a similar manner as a servant, and was afterwards sent to head quarters prisoner, as being a suspicious character.

To the Officer commanding at Gibraltar.

Celario, 16th May, 1810.

I enclose copies of some letters which I have received from Col. Doyle, stating that he had sent to Gibraltar certain deserters from the French service whom he had enlisted into His Majesty's service under instructions from me. I request that if possible you will send these men to the Foreign dépôt in England: if you shall not be able to send them to England, I request you to send them to Lisbon, from whence I shall endeavor to find means of sending them to England. I beg you to send with these men all papers, rolls, &c., which Col. Doyle may transmit to Gibraltar.

To Brig. Gen. Cox.

Celario, 16th May, 1810.

I received this morning your letter of the 15th. I concur very much in opinion with you respecting Mr. Jackson's reports. He says that these troops of Gen. Lamartinière belonged to the 2d corps. This is Soult's, now commanded by Regnier, and on the Guadiana; and I suspect that they are dépôts of corps, convalescents, &c., about to join the 2d corps d'armée.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celario, 16th May, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 6th and 9th inst.,

\* Afterwards killed at Waterloo.



marked Nos. 10 and 11. I beg to refer you to my letters to Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, of the 27th Feb., and request you to adopt the mode therein pointed out for the purchase and payment for beef, and in respect to the demand for repayment from the Spanish government, in the purchase of any other articles which you may think it desirable should be supplied by the British Commissaries for the British troops, and in the payment of any demands for supplies furnished, or services performed for them.

It is most desirable that all discussions respecting money in particular should be avoided between the subordinate officers of the army and the inferior Spanish authorities. His Majesty's instructions upon this subject are well calculated to preserve harmony; and His Majesty's minister at Cadiz will be the best judge of the expediency of enforcing payment of His Majesty's demands upon the Spanish government for the supplies for his troops, which they ought to furnish under the conditions on which the troops were detached.

Notwithstanding that the wants of the troops at Cadiz induce me to consent to the disbursement of money at that place for the supplies required, the letters recently received from England leave no doubt in my mind that we shall be obliged to evacuate the Peninsula for the want of money to defray the expenses of the army, and to perform the King's engagements. There is nothing new in this quarter. Affairs remain exactly as they were when I wrote last.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 16th May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 9th inst., relative to the desire of Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart to be removed to this army.

I had already received a private letter from Major Gen. Stewart of the 29th April, expressing his wish to be employed in Portugal, to which I wrote an answer, of which I enclose the extract upon that subject;\* and you may depend upon it that I shall not make any alteration in the Staff at Cadiz without your concurrence. I wrote to you on the 3d inst., and on the 13th, respecting your situation in this army.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 16th May, 1810.

The enemy have continued nearly in the same positions in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo since I last addressed you on the 9th inst., and the rain has continued, and the Agueda is still impassable. Gen. Mermet summoned the place on the 12th, and received an answer from the Governor stating his determination not to surrender it, and his intention to fire upon any flags of truce which might be sent in in future.

The enemy have not made any movements of importance on the side of Astorga; but it appears that the troops which they have left in that quarter are more numerous than was at first reported. I have reports

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\* Extract of a letter to Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, 14th May, 1810.

'I am much flattered by your desire to be removed to this army, which I shall certainly bear in mind; but, under present circumstances, I don't think that it would be proper to remove you from Cadiz, or indeed that the service in Portugal would offer you better opportunities of distinguishing yourself.'

from Valladolid, that Massena is expected there to take the command of the army in this quarter; and that a reinforcement of about 11,000 men was on its march to that town, which had been drawn from the neighbourhood of Vitoria: both these reports, however, require confirmation.

The enemy reconnoitred Badajoz, on the left of the Guadiana, on the 12th inst., the day on which they summoned Ciudad Rodrigo.

The allied troops on both sides the Tagus continue in the same positions.

The last accounts from Cadiz are of the 9th inst.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 16th May, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatches of the 12th and 24th April (marked B), regarding the supplies of money for this army, and I am concerned to observe that your Lordship relies upon the hopes of being able to procure specie in the Peninsula for bills upon England, to support an expenditure estimated to amount to £300,000 *per mensem*. Your Lordship may rely upon it, that if a vessel is sent with a bill to get together every sum of money that is to be procured in that manner, in any part of the Peninsula, which has been the practice lately, you will not get more than half the sum, and the remainder must be made good by remittances from England.

The government is mistaken in supposing that large sums can be procured at Cadiz for bills upon England, when bullion arrives in large quantities from South America. The bullion which arrives is generally on account of the Spanish government, none of which can be got; and the average monthly sum procured for bills at Cadiz and Gibraltar has been £55,000. In this period, many millions of dollars have been imported from South America, but, with but small exceptions, on account of the government. If circumstances do not permit the government to make the remittances required regularly from England, it is my duty to inform your Lordship that it is impossible for the army to continue in this country, on the scale on which we have been hitherto, or on which we ought to be, to have it in our power to do any good. Every day's experience proves that the army cannot be maintained in the Peninsula without money to pay for every thing that is received; and the result of an attempt to remain with inadequate funds would probably be a failure in some important branch of the service at a critical moment. Deficiency in the funds to pay and support the Portuguese army, which must be the consequence of the continued delays in the performance of His Majesty's engagements to the Portuguese government, and of the growing accumulation of the debt due to that government on account of the subsidy, will be attended by the same bad consequences. By the next packet, I hope to be able to transmit to your Lordship an estimate of the expenses in this country, which will show the adequacy of the sum of £300,000 to defray the charges of the army in Portugal, of the troops at Cadiz, and to provide for a subsidy to Portugal of £120,000 *per mensem*.

I shall also be able by that time to send your Lordship a more detailed reply to the observations contained in Mr. Harrison's letter to Lieut. Col. Bunbury of the 24th April. I must now observe upon this letter, that Mr. Harrison has referred to a document transmitted in a private letter to

Lord Castlereagh, instead of to the official estimate from which that document was extracted. If he had referred to that official estimate, he would have seen that it was of the expenses of the army for the months of September, October, and November; and I believe I shall be able to show that it was as accurate an estimate, both of the expenses and of the existing means of defraying them for those 3 months, as could be framed. Your Lordship is aware that these estimates are framed by the officers at the head of the several departments, to the best of their judgment, according to the information which they possess. Neither they nor I can be responsible that the expenditure shall correspond exactly with the sum which it had been estimated each head should cost. A small variation in price, or alteration in the system, or the seat of the operations, or the necessity of sending to a greater distance for any necessary article, would occasion an alteration of expense under one or all the heads of charge in the extraordinary; and neither the officers who frame the estimates, nor I, could be deemed responsible, or could control, in any manner, the alteration. All that we can do is, to keep down all expenses as much as possible; and upon that subject every thing is done that is in our power.

In the month of December a material alteration was made in the position of the army, which occasioned some increase of expense under the heads of transports and forage. There was an increase in the ordinaries beyond the estimate of September, 1809, and in the hospitals; and your Lordship will recollect that I stated in my letter of the 13th Dec., that money would be required from England to cover the deficiency of the funds to be found in the Peninsula to defray the expenses of the army.

The reasoning in Mr. Harrison's letter, to show that the army could not be in want of money, notwithstanding my letter of the 13th Dec., founded on the amount of the bills drawn, and the sums supplied from England since the date of the estimate of September, 1809, must be erroneous. He has omitted to subtract from the amount paid for bills at the Treasury, above 10 *per cent.*, which specie procured by bills costs in the Peninsula; and he has included in the amount of supplies received in this country, two sums of 164,000 and 400,000 dollars, neither of which had arrived at Lisbon, and the latter of which had not sailed from England at the date of his letter. There are also some erroneous statements and conclusions respecting the expenditure, particularly on the amount of old debts paid, and sums supplied to the Portuguese government in the period under discussion, all of which are to be attributed to Mr. Harrison's having considered the estimate of September, 1809, as one to answer for all times and all circumstances, instead of being one for the 3 months specified.

I have now directed the Commissary Gen. to furnish me with an estimate of the expenditure every month, which shall be transmitted to your Lordship; and by the next packet I hope to be able to transmit to your Lordship an accurate account of the sums received in each month at Lisbon, Oporto, Coruña, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, for bills upon the Treasury.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorigo, 17th May, 1810.

I received this morning your letter of the 14th, and I am convinced that whatever you decide upon will be right.

I recommend to you, however, to proceed with great caution in respect to intelligence transmitted to you by the Marques de la Romana and all the Spanish officers. It is obvious that there is nothing they wish for so much as to involve our troops in their operations, which could lead to no advantage, and might end in the loss of every thing. This is evident, both from the letters of the Marques himself, and from the false reports made to Lieut. Heathcote of the firing heard from Badajoz at Albuquerque.

I don't understand either the nature or the objects of the position taken up by the Marques de la Romana with his right, or the movements by which he proposes to protect it, or those by which you are to assist him in protecting it. If we are to be involved in these operations, we must not only thoroughly understand them, but we must direct them. You will of course proceed with great caution; and recollect that, if you are once involved in this desultory system of operations, you cannot withdraw from them without doing those whom you intend to assist more injury, when you leave them to return to your position, than you can do them good by involving yourself in them. The assistance which you give them should be instantaneous, should have a precise object, and should be decisive; and you should then return to your position at Portalegre.

I have heard that Gen. Lamartinière arrived at Valladolid in the end of last month and beginning of this, in command of a division of troops, of which I enclose the list, which are said to belong to the 2d corps, that now commanded by Regnier. I have not yet heard of their passing Valladolid, and it is possible that these troops may be destined for this quarter; but I beg you to desire Col. Grant, who is on the Tagus, and any body you may have in your front, to watch all movements from the Puerto de Baños, or the Puerto del Pico, towards Arzobispo or Almaraz. I shall take care to apprise you of any further movements I may hear of this division.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 17th May, 1810.

I wish to mention to you that neither I, nor any other officer of the British army, have the power of confining or punishing the magistrates or others in authority in Portugal. All that can be done, in case they do not exert themselves to comply with your requisitions, is to report them to me, stating specifically their offence, which is, I imagine, generally, one of omission of duty; and I shall order them to head quarters, and thence to Lisbon, to be punished by the government.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 17th May, 1810.

I have had some conversation with Mr. Jackson, and I think his account is very loose and unsatisfactory. He says that the troops in Lamartinière's division belong to the 2d *corps d'armée*; and he says that the 1st, 2d, 6th, and 8th corps are in Castille and Leon; and that these troops are on their way to join the 2d corps, which he supposes in Castille. The 2d corps is certainly on the Guadiana, and the 1st at Cadiz; the 6th and 8th in Castille and Leon. From all this I think it most probable that this division is on its march into Estremadura, and that it will pass by Congosto, &c., and to Arzobispo or Almaraz.

The enemy reconnoitred Badajoz on the left of the Guadiana on the 12th, and it was supposed that they intended to attempt to assault the place. This is not very probable. But Hill moved on the 15th towards Elvas.

To Brig. Gen. Cox.

Celorico, 17th May, 1810.

I have received your letter of yesterday's date. The statement of a fact is very different, and has an effect more powerful, than a general reflection. Neither I, nor any other officer in the British service, has the power of confining and punishing a magistrate, whatever may be the nature of his crime; and I certainly shall not permit such a practice. I beg to know the office of the civil magistrate of Castello Bom, who received corporal punishment.

To Brig. Gen. Cox.

Celorico, 17th May, 1810.

I don't recollect whether you ever informed me of the size and capacity of the mortars which the Junta of Ciudad Rodrigo have desired to have, and I have not time to look over my papers before the post goes out. If they are of very large size, and capable of throwing shells to a great distance, I should think it advisable not to send them, as they may eventually be used against yourself. Let me know by the *parté* of this night.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Payne.

17th May, 1810.

In reply to your letter of the 14th inst. addressed to the Dep. Adj. Gen., I have the honor to send an extract from the G. O. relative to ammunition lost. No mitigation can be allowed in favor of ammunition stolen, as it would be extremely easy to state that all deficiencies had been so made away with.

I received this morning your letter enclosing the proceedings of the Board of Survey, &c., which papers are referred to the Commissary Gen. by order of the Commander of the Forces, that a strict inquiry may be made concerning the circumstances therein alluded to.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 18th May, 1810.

There is a report here that Capt. Cotton, who is employed by you at Badajoz, has been ill treated by the people of the town; I conclude, because you did not move to protect their cattle, &c., from the enemy: as if that was not their business, instead of ours.

This is a part of the system on which all the Spanish authorities have been acting to induce us to take a part in the desultory operations which they are carrying on. False reports and deceptions of every description are tried, and then popular insults, to show us what the general opinion is of our conduct. However, nothing of this kind shall make me take one step either way, which is not dictated by my sense of what is best for the cause. I shall not, however, allow any officer under my command to be insulted; and, if this report be founded, I beg you to recall Capt. Cotton from Badajoz, and not allow any British officer to return there.

Col. Carroll is employed by government at the head quarters of the Marques de la Romana; and he, I dare say, will give you all the intelligence, &c., which you might expect to receive from the employment of Capt. Cotton at Badajoz; and I conclude that the Marques de la Romana's respect for the British government, and his regard for Col. Carroll, will

induce him to protect him from the insults which it is said that the people were allowed to show to Capt. Cotton, supposing the people to be equally inclined to insult Col. Carroll.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorigo, 18th May, 1810.

I enclose you all the correspondence which has passed between Lieut. Gen. Payne and me regarding your bätman, which at last has come to this point, that I must decide whether an order given by Lieut. Gen. Payne, which has been carried into execution in respect to every body, should be carried into execution in respect to you. It appears to me that there is one very easy mode of settling the business, which is for you to communicate with Gen. Payne, and state that you understood he had given an order upon the subject, and request to know whether there is any inconvenience in your retention of the man. If you have any reason for wishing not to take this step, I must take up the question on its public grounds only, and decide upon it.

There is no news this morning. Have you adopted any measures to have the 4 old women removed from the convent at Gouvea?

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

18th May, 1810.

I have laid your letter and enclosure herewith returned before the Commander of the Forces, and am directed to acquaint you, for the information of Mr. —, that the regulations of the service do not allow an officer on the Medical Staff to have orderlies or bätmen; and the Commander of the Forces has observed that Mr. — has kept — a considerable time from his duty when not actually employed as an orderly in the hospital. As this, therefore, is contrary to the rules of the service, you will be pleased to acquaint Mr. — of his Excellency's sentiments, apprising him that — is to join his regiment without delay.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorigo, 19th May, 1810.

The enemy have within these few days again threatened Badajoz, and the right of the Marques de la Romana's corps stationed on the left of the Guadiana. But they had retired again, according to the last accounts of the 16th, and Gen. Hill, who had moved, has resumed his positions at Portalegre.

To Brig. Gen. Cox.

Celorigo, 19th May, 1810.

I think it advisable not to send the mortars to Ciudad Rodrigo. You had best write, that I have given no positive answer on the subject, and refer the Governor to me. You did not enclose the letter from the Capitão Mór of Castello Bom.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorigo, 19th May, 1810.

I enclose the intelligence received this morning from both front and right. I doubt that it is so certain that Massena has arrived at Salamanca, as that he is appointed to the command. If he had arrived at Salamanca, I think we should have heard of it from our intelligence people.

I don't understand this 2d corps. Ney's was always the 3d, and Kellermann's the 6th, and the 2d was Soult's, and is now commanded by Regnier, on the Guadiana.

P.S. Return the enclosed papers.

To Lieut. Col. Carroll.

Celorigo, 20th May, 1810.

I have seen in the Badajoz papers a copy of a letter from Madame Bonet to her husband, which it is supposed has been intercepted, and which letter I consider to be highly interesting. I recommend you to ask the Marques de la Romana to allow you to see and take a copy of the original letter, and that you should transmit it to the King's minister at Lisbon, to be forwarded to His Majesty's government.

I understand that the deserters who were sent from Badajoz to Elvas have never arrived at Lisbon.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorigo, 20th May, 1810.

I enclose returns and letters which I have received from Gen. Cole, regarding the equipments in Col. Harvey's brigade.

Send back the correspondence. I intended it only as a private communication. I shall take up the business and decide upon it on public grounds. Nothing new this day.

P.S. I have just received the correspondence.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorigo, 20th May, 1810.

I have perused with great attention, and have considered the proposed regulations for the conduct of the Commissariat department with the Light division, and I return them, together with a memorandum upon them.

What is stated in that memorandum will show you how difficult it is for any General officer to frame a code of regulations for the conduct of this, or indeed any other department, connected with the particular body of troops under his command. In respect to this particular department, the duties of the officers employed in it are so various, and must be performed in a manner so different in different parts of the country, and depend so much upon the regular supply of money, and other circumstances, that I consider it a more difficult task to frame a code of regulations for the performance of active duties, which shall be applicable to this department, than I should find it for any other branch of the service. After all, the regulations would be confined almost exclusively to the information to be transmitted periodically to the Commissary Gen., in order that he might provide for the deficiencies in the country to supply the troops. Every thing else must depend upon the intelligent activity of the Commissary upon the spot, which no general regulation can provide for, and upon money.

While writing upon this subject, I beg to draw your attention to the enclosed copy of a Division Order, put into my hands by the Commissary Gen., which I request you to reconsider. I don't think that the return, which is therein directed to be made, is calculated to give the officers of the Commissariat additional leisure for the performance of their duties; nor do I think that, supposing the officers of the Commissariat require some check upon the misuse of their time, this order is calculated to produce that reform of this abuse which you would wish. I am therefore very desirous that you should countermand it; and if you have reason to believe that these persons do misspend their time, let me know it, and I will take care that it shall be properly noticed.

Memorandum on Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd's proposed Commissariat Regulations.  
Celorico, 20th May, 1810.

It would be highly desirable to effect the principal object of the Regulations for the conduct of the Commissariat, proposed by Gen. Craufurd, viz., a separation of the duties among the Commissaries attached to each division of the troops. It is apprehended, however, that this object cannot be effected in any division of the army, excepting in that under the immediate command of Gen. Craufurd, and probably not in that division for any great length of time.

The establishment of the Commissariat, as settled by the Treasury, usually allowed, is one Assist. Commissary to each brigade of infantry; and in this army there has been one allowed to each regiment of cavalry, one to the artillery, and one to head quarters. It might be convenient to attach a Dep. Commissary to each division of troops, to superintend the duties, and perform those of a higher description which would fall to him in a separation of the duties; but unfortunately the state of the establishment, owing to the sickness of many, and the variety of employment for the officers in the higher ranks of the commissariat, have never enabled me to carry that arrangement into execution.

But even if I had been able to execute that arrangement, the separation of duties would have been impracticable in any division of the army since it has gone into cantonments, excepting, probably, the Light division. In Portugal troops cannot find cantonments or food for more than one brigade in one place. The nearest brigade will generally be at the distance of 3 or 4 leagues, and it would be impossible for any Commissary to perform either the duties of the senior or the duties of the junior Commissary to two brigades, as laid down in these regulations. In the same manner on a march in ordinary circumstances only one brigade can find cover and food in a place, and in this case also the separation of duties could not be carried into execution.

When the army is assembled for a general operation, the supplies must be received generally from the magazine, and then the duty of the Commissary with each brigade would be that of the junior, as stated in these regulations; but even in this case the separation of the duties might be inconvenient, as one or two brigades might be stationed in places where articles of supply might be purchased with advantage, of which the commissaries might not be able to take advantage, if the purchasing Commissary attached to the division to which the brigade should belong did not happen to be on the spot.

I should consider any arrangement to be desirable which relieved the officers of the Commissariat from the enormous weight of responsibility by which they are borne down, and which would give them more time for the performance of the active duties of their employment. But I should doubt whether the separation of the duties, as proposed, would have this effect. It would relieve the senior Commissary of the division from the most complicated and embarrassing of the accounts, viz., the store account, and would throw an increased proportion of it upon the junior. It is this account alone which embarrasses any of the Commissaries; they find no difficulty in settling their money account, but the store account cannot be



settled. Upon the whole, therefore, this part of the regulations cannot generally be adopted in the army.

In order to render more clear the observations which I have to make upon the remaining parts of the regulations, it is necessary that I should advert generally to the state of the Commissariat service of Great Britain. A regular Commissariat establishment is quite new in the British service. It is not required within Great Britain, and when an army serves abroad, the particular services to be performed by the officers of the Commissariat are as little known to the military officers of the army, as the mode of performing them is to the officers of the Commissariat. Even the little experience which some of those officers have of service, on little maritime expeditions to some foreign colony or island, is entirely inapplicable to the larger scale of operations to be carried on upon a continent by a large army in the field. I have also to observe that the mode of performing these duties, and the different objects to be attended to in supplying the troops, vary, not only in the different countries in which the British troops may be employed, but vary very materially in the different parts in which they may be employed in the same country. From these circumstances, particularly from that first mentioned, the regulations for the conduct of the Commissariat in the instructions from the Treasury are very inadequate to the duties required from the Commissaries; and from the jealousy of all persons in England regarding every description of military expenditure, they are confined principally to the mode of settling the accounts.

Under these regulations the Commissary Gen. is responsible for every article of store in his charge; that it is not issued excepting under due authority, or without the required vouchers, the nature of which is stated in the instructions. In regard to purchases, he must be able to prove in every instance that the article has been purchased at the lowest price; that the purchase money has been paid, &c. And in respect to contracts, besides many other formalities of advertisement, &c., they must in every instance have the approbation of the Commander in Chief of the army. The Commissary Gen. is forbidden to give money in lieu of rations, to give back rations, &c. &c. This is the general tenor of the instructions to the Commissary Gen.; and the great business of the Commander in Chief of the army is to discover a mode of carrying on the business of this important department, as much in conformity with the instructions to the Commissary Gen. as is possible. I fear that many of the regulations now before me are entirely inconsistent with these instructions, and therefore cannot be adopted in any part of the army; others of them are inconsistent with the General Orders issued for the general conduct of this department; others enter into details, which are either already the subject of regulation by the Commissary Gen. or are the common practice, or would be more properly the subject of regulation by the Commissary Gen. Regulation upon many of these points is very difficult, and might be attended by many inconveniences to the troops.

I shall now consider these regulations, article by article, as I find them before me.

*ART. 1. Separation of duties.* I have already pointed out the inconvenience of the general application of the regulation in this article.

*ART. 2. Nos. 1 and 2, regarding communications with Commissary Gen. on supplies.* Nos. 1 and 2 prescribe the duties which are now, or ought to be, performed by every Commissary attached to a brigade or regiment in the army.

*No. 3 Commissaries to submit contracts to Commanding officer of division.* No. 3 is contrary to the instructions from the Treasury: no junior Commissary can enter into a contract without orders from the Commissary Gen., and every contract must be approved by the Commander in Chief.

*No. 4. To pay for supplies in cash or bills.* No. 4 is already directed by the G. O.

*No. 5. To take charge of distant dépôts.* No. 5 is referrible to the division of duties. There must be a storekeeper of course to every dépôt, whether formed for a division or a brigade, or the whole army.

*No. 6. To make reports to Commanding officer of division.* No. 6. The officer commanding a division can have this information from any Commissary attached to any body of troops in his division.

*No. 7. To regulate duties of Commissariat.* No. 7 depends principally upon the adoption of the division of duties; but in ordinary cases it is the duty of the Commissary Gen. to give such directions, from time to time, as will provide for the performance of the duties of the Commissariat, and will prevent the clashing of the several Commissaries.

*ART. 3. Nos. 1 and 2. The duties of Commissaries and their clerks.* Nos. 1 and 2 prescribe duties either already performed, or which ought to be performed by the Commissaries of brigades or their clerks.

*No. 3. The Commissary or his clerk to attend the delivery of each article of supply.* No. 3. The principle of this regulation is already the order of the army. The order referred to in this article is perfectly proper, when there is not a clerk or officer of the Commissariat to superintend the issue of each article of provisions.

*No. 4. The Commissary to be informed by the Q.M.G. of the cantonments of the troops.* No. 4. This regulation is the ordinary practice.

*No. 5. Commissary to ascertain supplies in each village.* No. 5. This regulation is the duty of every Commissary of a brigade.

*No. 6. To ascertain whether deficiency can be made up from neighbouring villages.* No. 6 prescribes conduct practised by every Commissary of a brigade.

*No. 7 directs a state of supplies in the district to be made by the Assist. Commissary.* No. 7 prescribes a duty which I fear it would be difficult, if not impossible, to perform. 1st; it would take up a great length of time to make up the return: 2dly; when the return would be made up the whole state of the supplies in the district would probably have altered. The state of the supplies in one village depends upon a store, and the supplies to be drawn from that store depend upon its contents, and the common consumption of the village. The supplies of other villages would depend upon a market. It would not be easy for a commissary to make a statement which would be true for one week, of the state of the supplies in

any village, much less in a district. The fact is, that the state of the supplies in any district where supplies are found in markets depends upon money.

*No. 8 directs 2 days' supply for the troops in each of the villages in which they are cantoned.* The directions contained in No. 8 are provided for by the orders to the Commissary Gen., requiring that 6 days' bread and as much meat, and 3 days' forage, should be at all times in the cantonments of all the troops.

*No. 9 directs that the Commissary shall have a return of supplies from other villages occupied by the troops.* No. 9. The Commissary with each brigade must of course have a return at stated periods, from each of the persons employed in the supply of and delivery to any portions of the brigade detached in any neighbouring villages. The form of the return is of course fixed by the Commissary Gen.

*No. 10. Receipts for supplies at head quarters to be signed by quarter masters.* No. 10. I apprehend that the directions in this number are not consistent with the instructions from the Treasury to the Commissary Gen. Whatever these instructions direct must be done in respect to the signing officer of requisition upon the Commissary, and of receipts for articles delivered.

*Nos. 11, 12, 13, and 14 contain regulations for the grant of receipts by officers to magistrates for supplies.* The directions in Nos. 11, 12, 13, and 14 are referrible to receipts for supplies delivered to the troops without the intervention of an officer of the Commissariat. The instructions from the Treasury do not allow of any money being paid for articles furnished to any but an officer of the Commissariat, and that only upon regular vouchers and certificates. Whenever, therefore, the service requires that supplies should be taken for the troops from the country, without the intervention of an officer of the Commissariat, the Commander of the Forces is obliged to give a special authority for the payment for those supplies. When I was at Badajoz, I considered and passed an authority on each of nearly 4000 irregular receipts of this description, given by officers for supplies in the preceding part of the campaign in Portugal. This circumstance shows how necessary it is that officers should attend to the G. O. upon this subject. These forbid any officers to give a receipt to a magistrate, or person furnishing supplies, excepting in a case of necessity, and those only in the regular form; and the granting of this receipt, and the necessity for it to be reported to the officer commanding the division, who will communicate the existence of this receipt to the Commissary, in order that it may be taken up. I do not think the regulations in these numbers can be substituted for the G. O.

*No. 15 directs that a contractor who is to deliver supplies shall have a note of introduction.* The regulations in No. 15 must of course be practised by every Commissary.

*No. 16 directs that one receipt only for all the articles supplied in each village shall be given on each day.* No. 16. This regulation appears conformable to the G. O., if all articles of supply in the same village are received from the same person, and that person the magistrate. But if

they are not, particularly if any are received from contractors, it would expose proprietors of supplies to great injustice from magistrates.

*No. 17 directs that the Assist. Commissary shall, once a week, take up all receipts given by regimental quarter masters, and give one general receipt for all articles received.* No. 17. I doubt whether this regulation is consistent with the instructions from the Treasury. It would be impossible to execute it without authority from the Commander of the Forces; and unless the receipts passed by the troops are strictly in conformity to form, &c., for the exact quantities of articles to which they are entitled by the regulations.

*Art. 5. Prescribes a form in which quarter masters of regiments and Commissaries are to keep accounts of issues to the troops.* The whole of the regulations in article 5 are inconsistent with the instructions of the Treasury, and cannot be carried into execution.

*Art. 6. Refers to supplies for General officers and staff.* The instructions from the Treasury, and the G. O., are applicable to the supplies for General and Staff officers, as well as for the rest of the army.

*No. 1. They are to receive supplies from Commissary.* No. 1 is the order of the army.

*No. 2. The aide de camp to draw for them.* No. 2 is the general practice.

*No. 3. Staff officers draw for themselves.* No. 3 is the general practice.

*Nos. 4 and 5. General officers and Staff officers may pay for their rations, and are to receive the amount of their bills.* Nos. 4 and 5 are inconsistent with the instructions from the Treasury. The Commissary Gen. cannot pay bills of any officers for supplies paid for by those officers, without the authority of the Commander of the Forces.

*No. 6 directs that a clerk may keep an account of issues to General and Staff officers, as under article 5.* No. 6 refers to the regulations of article 5, which are entirely inconsistent with the instructions of the Treasury.

*Art. 7. Goes to give the commanding officer of division information of supplies, prices, &c., through other channels besides the Commissary.* The first five numbers of article 7 tend to establish a control over the officers of the Commissariat, in the commanding officers of regiments. This is a question of military policy and propriety, rather than of Commissariat regulation. These orders may do very well, and may be well executed by the officers commanding regiments in the Light division; but I am very certain that they cannot become a general regulation for this or any other army.

*No. 6 directs prices to be reported and sanctioned by General officer commanding division.* No. 6. The commanding officer of the division cannot sanction any price, under the instructions of the Treasury, although his sanction of it would certainly guide the judgment of the Commander of the Forces upon the subject. The price paid for every article must be certified by the magistrate of the village to be the lowest, and this is sufficient to pass the accounts. I should apprehend that making officers the judges and reporters on prices would embarrass, if not render impossible, the settlement of any account.

*No. 7 directs a loaf to be sent to General officer of division.* No. 7. I imagine the Commissary and all officers have the same ration loaf with the soldiers.

*No. 8 directs that weight of corn, by alquier, shall be published in orders.* No. 8. This I believe is a fit subject for regulation and occasional order by commanding officers of divisions.

*No. 9 directs information to be furnished of weight of an alquier of corn.* No. 9 is desirable to enable the commanding officer to issue the order of No. 8.

*No. 10 directs reports to Commissary of receipts.* No. 10. Not exactly consistent with the G. O.

*Nos. 11 and 12 authorise officers to purchase supplies.* Nos. 11 and 12. Contrary to the instructions of the Treasury.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 20th May, 1810.

I have received your several letters of the 16th.

Beresford spoke to me the other day about Gen. Clarke's nephew.\* I rather wish that he should be sent to England by sea. He must have a letter for the Commissioners of transports, to inform them that he has been liberated by the Spanish government, and that he is to be sent to Morlaix by the first opportunity. They will send him without fail. I cannot well allow him to pass through our posts.

I shall speak to Marshal Beresford respecting his objections to the Special commission. I believe they are founded on the slowness and voluminous nature of all law proceedings in Portugal.

*The A.G. to Capt. Meacham, Coimbra.*

20th May, 1810.

In reply to that part of your letter wherein you state that Col. —, Portuguese service, had called on you to furnish him with a weekly state of the hospital at Coimbra, I am to acquaint you that you are not to send such report to that officer, it being quite unnecessary; he having no charge whatever over the British hospital under your superintendence.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 21st May, 1810.

I have received your two letters of the 20th. Whenever you name to me the corps and their stations to which you wish the beef should be issued by our Commissaries, I will order the issue in any quantities you please. You will, however, advert to the necessity of the regiments which receive this meat being stationed near our troops.

I am concerned to see the state of your magazines. Rice, however, is not a bad substitute for bread, and whenever you are distressed I must supply you.

There is nothing new this morning. Have you seen the enclosed paper? I have desired Col. Carroll to see and send home a true copy of the original, for I suspect that the parts which I have marked have been altered.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 21st May, 1810.

We have at last got a fine day, and we may expect that the weather will settle and that the rivers will fall. I think that it would be advisable to

\* The nephew of Gen. Clarke, Duc de Feltre, in the service of France, had been taken prisoner.

desire Bacellar to direct the Ordenanza who are destined to guard the fords of the Coa below Pinhel, to repair to their posts. I enclose the letter on the French government.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 22d May, 1810.

There are two or three subjects upon which I want to have a little conversation with you. The mail goes to England to-morrow, and I am afraid that I shall not be able to go to Fornos. Could you come over here? Come by the high road, and, if I can, I will meet you.

To the Paymasters General.

Celorico, 22d May, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st May; and I will endeavor to have the duty of the pay department performed with the assistance which, you informed me, has been added to it, in consequence of the late representations of the Dep. Paymaster Gen. Although the department appears larger than has been usually attached to a body of troops, of the numbers at present under my command, I have to observe to you that it is not larger than the service requires. The troops at Cadiz being a part of this army, it is divided into 3 corps, one north, the other south of the Tagus, and the detachment at Cadiz. A considerable portion of the pay department is necessarily attached to each of these corps; and a great part of it is stationed at Lisbon, for the conduct of the extensive business which is transacted there. It is also frequently necessary to send officers of the pay department to distant parts of the country, to pay the troops stationed at a distance from the head quarters of the army.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 22d May, 1810.

The government are desirous that we should occupy the Bayona islands, off Vigo, in case it should be necessary for us to evacuate Portugal; but it will be desirable at an early period to send officers of the engineers, and the navy, to survey those islands, and to form some notion of their

#### G. O.

Celorico, 21st May, 1810.

1. The officers commanding regiments of infantry are requested to direct the officers commanding companies, the surgeons, and paymasters, to prepare for the Commissary General bills for the allowance of one dollar per month for the shoeing of each mule employed in the carriage of camp kettles, paymasters' books, and surgeons' chests, since the 1st May, 1809.

2. The officers commanding regiments of cavalry will give the same directions to officers commanding troops, paymasters, and surgeons.

3. These bills are to be made out for the whole regiment for each month, and must be countersigned by the officer commanding the regiment, who must certify that the whole number of mules for which the allowance is demanded have been kept for public service during the month.

4. The quarter masters of regiments of infantry, who have each a mule belonging to the public in his charge for the carriage of intrenching tools, are to send in their bills for the same allowance for the expense of shoeing this mule, to be countersigned and certified in the same manner by the commanding officer of the regiment.

5. Similar bills are to be sent in by the regiments of cavalry by those persons in charge, under the Orders of the 19th June, of the public mules attached to regiments of cavalry, for the veterinary surgeon, serjeant armorer, serjeant saddler, and for the intrenching tools.

6. These bills are hereafter to be sent in at the end of every month.

7. The Commissary General will pay these bills, thus signed and certified, deducting from the amount of each those sums already paid on this account.

defence, and of their capacity in other respects. These officers cannot be sent to those islands, to any useful purpose, without the consent of the Regency, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will apply for it. Affairs remain here in the same state in which they were when I wrote to you last. Massena has arrived at Salamanca, to command the army in our front. The French troops in Estremadura reconnoitred Badajoz on the left of the Guadiana on the 12th, the same day they summoned Ciudad Rodrigo. This reconnaissance was connected with other movements which indicated an intention to attack Ballesteros; but Gen. Hill moved, and their plan was frustrated; and by the last accounts from Badajoz of the 18th, the French were on the defensive at Almendralejo. Gen. Hill has resumed his position.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 22d May, 1810.

I enclose a letter received from Assist. Commissary — at Cadiz, from which it appears that the connexion of that department at Cadiz with the Commissariat of this army is not yet understood.

I also enclose a letter from the Paymasters Gen. in England, to their Deputy Mr. Boys, in this country, from which it appears that the Paymasters Gen. do not understand that the troops at Cadiz are a part of this army, and that all the departments at Cadiz are branches of the departments with this army.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 22d May, 1810.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 4th inst., regarding the wish of Col. — to return to the service of Portugal. I beg to refer your Lordship to my dispatch of the 20th Oct., with its enclosures, and to your Lordship's reply of the 7th Nov.; and the enclosed extract of a letter from Marshal Beresford to me of the 8th Sept., and the enclosed copy of a letter from me to the Marquis Wellesley of the 12th Sept., for an account of the conduct of this gentleman, and of the opinions entertained here of him; and to show your Lordship how impossible it is that Marshal Beresford or I should ever recommend that he should be sent to Portugal again.

I wait only for the report of the Commissary of Accounts on the accounts of the —, to reply to your Lordship's dispatch of the 5th Jan.; but I cannot avoid expressing my astonishment that — should so far have forgotten his former complaints of —, as to recommend that he should be re-admitted into the service of Portugal.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 23d May, 1810.

I have received your several letters of the 12th, 16th, and 17th inst., for which I am much obliged to you.

I am convinced that the sea voyage from Figueira to Lisbon is of service to the sick; and although the army is very healthy, and we have but few to send from Coimbra, I am desirous of having at all times the means of sending them by sea rather than by land. I shall be obliged to you, therefore, if you will keep the hospital ships plying between Figueira and Lisbon, particularly the small ones, which can pass the bar of the

Mondego without waiting for the spring tides. It is necessary to attend to this circumstance, as the enemy's operations on our right flank might oblige us to quit the Mondego, in which case we should incur the risk of losing those ships which could not pass the bar at the usual high water. It would be very desirable to have stationed at the mouth of the Mondego an intelligent officer with whom I could communicate from time to time. The use of the Mondego also for the conveyance of recruits and convalescents to join the army, will be a great convenience in many respects. But before I fully adopt this plan I must make some arrangements for the supply of those people on their march, without which these gentry will destroy the country; indeed their passage through it, under the best arrangements, cannot be deemed an advantage. It will be, however, a relief to the other road. I shall write to Col. Peacocke as soon as I shall be prepared for them.

I don't believe that government have written to my brother respecting the Bayona islands. I have, however. Capt. Goldfinch is the officer fixed upon by Col. Fletcher to be sent there, and if you should be of opinion that he might go without having an order from the Spanish government, to be permitted to look at the islands, I will instruct him and he shall go directly; but if you should think the order from the Spanish government necessary, he must wait for it.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 23d May, 1810.

Upon the receipt of your Lordship's dispatch of the 24th April (C), I wrote to Adm. Berkeley, to request that transports might be sent to England according to your Lordship's orders; and I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from the Admiral, in which he states the manner in which he has carried those orders into execution.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 23d May, 1810.

Marshal Massena arrived at Salamanca on the 15th inst., and took the command of the troops composing what is called the 'Army of Portugal,' in which are included, I conclude, the troops in Leon, Old Castille, and Estremadura. The enemy have, however, made no movement of any importance in this quarter or in Leon, since I addressed you on the 16th inst.

The reconnaissance of Badajoz on the 12th, which I reported to you in that letter, appears to have been connected with a plan for attacking Gen. Ballesteros and the right of the Marques de la Romana's corps, in the neighbourhood of Xerez de los Caballeros. Lieut. Gen. Hill moved, however, from his cantonments on the 15th, by which he disengaged not only Gen. Ballesteros, but the town of Badajoz; and he has since returned to his cantonments. The enemy now occupy the high road from Merida towards Seville, as far as the Sierra; still keeping possession of Merida. I have no news from Cadiz of a later date than the 9th.

I understand that the enemy have lately levied a very heavy contribution in all parts of the country occupied by their troops; and that the complaints of the people of their oppression are louder than usual. The guerrillas likewise continue their depredations upon their communications, &c.; but I have to add that I have received an account that a detachment



\*  
consisting of 2000 men, raised in Andalusia, called *Juramentados*, from their having taken the oath of allegiance to King Joseph, are employed against the guerrillas in La Mancha.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorigo, 23d May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 4th, and I assure you that the appointment of Gen. Spencer to this army is very satisfactory to me. I shall persevere in the plan which I communicated to you in my last letter, of not making known this arrangement to Lieut. Gen. Payne till he shall have heard from you, or till I shall find it necessary from other circumstances. I have always been upon the best terms with Gen. Payne, and indeed with every officer of the army; but I am sorry to say that I understand that I have not given him satisfaction. However, I should not have desired his removal on that or any other account; and I am desirous of making it as little hurtful to Lieut. Gen. Payne as possible.

I enclose the last weekly state. I likewise enclose some copies of a curious paper which has been printed at Badajoz. I have desired Col. Carroll to see and take correct copies of the originals in the possession of the Marques de la Romana, and to forward them to the King's government. I am not yet able to send you our financial statement, on account of the necessity of a reference to Lisbon for some information. But you may depend upon it the result is what I stated in my last dispatch. If you cannot supply us with money, you ought to withdraw us. We are reduced to the greatest distress. To-morrow is the day for paying the troops one month in arrears, and we have nothing to give them, and what is worse, there is no money on the road, and none at Lisbon, and it takes at least 20 days in this weather for a convoy with money to travel from Lisbon. We owe the Portuguese government a large sum: they are in the greatest distress, and we cannot relieve them.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Graham, Cadiz.*

23d May, 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint you, by direction of the Commander of the Forces, that in order to enable this office to make up its general returns for the Adj. Gen. in England, in the most satisfactory manner, it will be necessary for the A. A. G. of your force to comply with the form and instructions hereunto annexed, in transmitting the returns and states from Cadiz to the head quarters of this army.

*The A.G. to the Q. M. G.*

23d May, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum by directions of the Commander of the Forces, containing an arrangement for the future transport of men from Lisbon to the army.

Memorandum for the Adj. Gen., Q. M. Gen., Commissary Gen., Commandant at Lisbon, and officer commanding detachments at Lisbon.

The convalescents and recruits, &c., destined for the army from Lisbon, who are not required as escorts, are to come in future by sea from Lisbon to the mouth of the Mondego. Before they embark, the officer in command of detachments at Lisbon is to give the officer in charge of them a list of their names, necessities, regiments, &c.

The Commandant at Lisbon is to give notice of their departure, by post, to the A. Q. M. G. at Coimbra, and to the Commissary at Figueira, and of their numbers, &c. He is to furnish the officer in command of the detachment with a copy of the G. O. in respect to the march of detachments, and to give him positive orders not to march from Figueira without a route from the A. Q. M. G. at Coimbra.

The Commissary at Figueira must be prepared to supply the detachment with food while it will remain at Figueira, and on the march to Coimbra. The A. Q. M. G. at Coimbra will, on receiving notice of the intended embarkation of the detachment, send a route to Figueira, for their proceeding to the army either by land or by water, as may be most expedient, settling with the Commissaries at Figueira and Coimbra where they are to be fed on each day.

An Assistant Provost must be stationed at Figueira, whose duty it will be to attend each of the detachments on their march, till they shall join any division of the army to which a Provost will be attached, when the first mentioned will be relieved and return to Figueira.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 24th May, 1810.

If this evening should be fair, I shall go to Almeida to-morrow. I shall send a horse off early in the morning to Alverca, and I shall stay at Almeida and forward, one day, and return here the next. I shall take with me only one aide de camp. You had better send your horse here this day, and I will send him off with mine in the morning, if I should go, which I will let you know this evening.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 24th May, 1810.

Upon conversing with the Commissary Gen. regarding the beef arrangement, he finds that he cannot carry it into execution for 5 or 6 days. In the mean time I enclose a letter which I had written to you, of which the Commissary Gen. shall have a copy, specifying the several places at which the beef for each body of troops would be received according to the existing distribution of the army, and the arrangement according to which the plan would be executed.

Upon referring to your numbers and your letter, it would appear that you intend we should give you 1 lb. of meat a day for your full numbers. I do not think that was our original idea. However, it is only necessary that we should know how many pounds a week, upon an average, you will require in the whole; and the detail can easily be arranged.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 24th May, 1810.

Such numbers of rations of beef as may be required on any day will be supplied on the following day, as stated hereafter; not exceeding at any place the number of pounds stated opposite the name of each place on any one day.

	lbs.	
For the troops at Gouvea . . .	2814	at Linhares.
Freixedas . . .	1330	Pinhel.
Alverca . . .	1330	Celorico.
Sandomil . . .	2057	Cea and St. Iago.
Açores . . .	2728	Pinou; the Commissary of Gen. Campbell's brigade.
In front of Almeida	1734	Commissary of Gen. Crauford's division.
S <sup>ra</sup> Marinha, &c. . .	1146	Cea and St. Iago.
Sampayo . . .	237	Cea and St. Iago.
Alverca and Baraçal	390	Celorico.

The Portuguese Commissaries are to send to the quarters above stated for the beef on the day following that on which they make the requisition for it, and they are to give a receipt for the number of pounds which will be delivered to them.

Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Cox, Governor of Almeida, for Fort Concepcion.  
Celorico, 27th May, 1810.

4 Portuguese 6 pounders, ready to go from Almeida immediately.

4 Spanish 8 pounders, }  
8 Spanish 4 pounders, } carriages to be prepared.

2 howitzers, ready to go from Almeida immediately.

All to have ammunition for 100 rounds per gun.

The engineers of Almeida to be employed as soon as possible in building up the breach; 1st, in the body of the place; 2dly, in the ravelin at Concepcion.

Nothing more will be required than to build up the wall in any masonry with the materials on the spot; to clear away the rubbish from the ditches; and to stockade the ditches in front of the parts breached and to be built up. The gates of the covered ways and communications to be likewise repaired. The magistrates in Spain and Portugal to be required to give the assistance of labourers for this and other works; and they are to be regularly paid. A sum of money for this purpose will be sent to Almeida.

The A. Q. M. G. of Gen. Picton's division will be sent to Concepcion to have the casemates cleaned out, aired, &c., for the reception of the troops, and he will require the assistance of some labourers for this purpose; and orders will be given to the Commissary Gen. to provide for the subsistence of the troops when stationed there.

Memorandum for Major Gens. Picton and Cole, and Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.  
Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

Brig. Gen. Craufurd is requested to direct his posts of hussars at Barba de Puercos, Villar de Ciervo, Villar de la Yegua, and any others he may have on the lower parts of the Agueda, to communicate with the officer in command of the troops belonging to the 3d division at Aldea del Obispo and Val de la Mula, destined for the occupation of the fort of La Concepcion, and he will communicate with that officer himself.

In case the enemy should cross the Agueda in force, Major Gen. Picton's division, with the exception of the troops at La Concepcion, are to be collected at Pinhel; and Major Gen. Picton will observe the ford of Porto de Vide, as well as the bridge over the Coa, under Pinhel; and Major Gen. Cole will move his division forward from Guarda, and occupy the villages behind the Coa, towards Ponte de Sequeiros, Castello Mendo, and Castello Bom, so as to be able to observe and guard those passages over the river.

If the enemy should cross the Agueda in superior force, it will be necessary that Brig. Gen. Craufurd should retire, and I wish that he should retire upon La Concepcion and Almeida, if it should be possible. This must, however, depend in a great measure upon the strength and disposition of the enemy; and if he should retire upon any of the upper passages of the Coa, he will apprise Major Gen. Cole of his doing so, who will in that case detach a brigade from the left of his division to Almeida.

To the officer commanding the troops at La Concepcion. Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

You are to communicate with the posts of hussars placed by Brig. Gen.

Craufurd at Barba de Puerco, Villar de la Yegua, and Villar de Ciervo, and with the General himself; and as soon as you shall find that the enemy have crossed the Agueda, you will move the troops under your command from the villages of Aldea del Obispo and Val de la Mula, into the fort of La Concepcion.

The engineer at Almeida has orders to repair the breaches in the fort, and the A. Q. M. G. of the 3d division has directions to have the casemates cleaned out and aired. You will give them every assistance in your power in effecting these objects.

The Governor of Almeida has directions to send to Concepcion 4 Spanish 8 pounders, 8 Spanish 4 pounders, four 6 pounders, and 2 howitzers, with ammunition; and you will give him the assistance of the mules attached to the brigade of artillery with you, to remove these guns and stores to Concepcion. As soon as these guns shall have arrived there, the brigade of artillery with you is to be sent back to Almeida with its mules, &c.

The Commissary Gen. of the British army has orders to place in store at La Concepcion 12,000 rations of bread, meat, rum, and wood, for the use of the troops under your command, in case they should remove into the fort; and the Commissary of the Ordnance at Almeida has orders to lodge in the fort 100,000 rounds of musket ammunition.

In case you should be attacked, you will defend the place to the last extremity, and you may be certain that you will be relieved.

To Brig. Gen. Cox.

Celerico, 28th May, 1810.

I shall send off to you, to-morrow morning, £500 to discharge our expenses at La Concepcion, and to cover any others that you may incur. Let the engineer employed there keep an accurate account of his disbursements, and send it to me.

Be so kind as to supply the A. Q. M. G. of the 3d division with any money he may require to defray the expenses of clearing out and airing the casemates, with which he is charged.

I have ordered the brigade of artillery in the first instance to La Concepcion, in case they should be attacked there before you can send in the artillery.

As soon as the ordnance, &c., shall come from Almeida, the brigade of artillery, with its mules, &c., are to be sent back to Almeida.

I have desired the Commissary Gen. to send to La Concepcion 12,000 rations from our store at Almeida, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire the person in charge of our ordnance stores to send to La Concepcion 100,000 rounds of musket ammunition.

P.S. 29th May. The letter to the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo goes to you this day. I wish your 6 pounders and howitzers to go, as well as the Spanish ordnance, according to the memorandum. Let the howitzers have 100 shells for each, and let there be 20 rounds of case for each gun. The sooner the ordnance goes the better. The troops will be moved as soon as the weather holds up; probably, this day.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celerico, 28th May, 1810.

We hear of many troops moving to Madrid from Old Castille, which,

if it be true, may be to reinforce Regnier's corps in Estremadura. It is possible that they may be to reinforce the enemy's corps on the other side of the Peninsula; but I mention these reports that you may attend particularly to what is going on in your front.

I am sorry to find that Gen. O'Donell and his staff, and the officers of his corps, are so much dissatisfied with us. Lieut. Heathcote, however, should not allow these reproaches to pass unnoticed. He might observe to them, that Gen. O'Donell himself, upon one occasion, and Gen. Ballesteros again, lately, had the advantage of your assistance, and were thereby saved from being destroyed by the enemy. He might ask whether, in case you were to move forward into Estremadura, the General, or the Junta of Estremadura, would insure for you even one day's subsistence, or forage, or any means of transport to communicate with your magazines. He might also call upon those who criticise your operations, to state what advantage the common cause would derive from your obliging Regnier to withdraw from Estremadura. If Regnier should be reinforced, you would be obliged to withdraw in your turn; and then Badajoz and the province would be lost; at the same time, that the diversion which would thus be made in favor of that part of the country, from which the reinforcement would be drawn, would not produce any good for the general cause. We must not allow the Spanish officers in any case to reproach us, without showing them the real situation of their affairs; and that their cause is lost from their own inability to manage it.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

I enclose a letter from your Commissary Gen. Surely you do not allow carts to carry baggage for the troops? There is as little precision in this paper as I have ever seen. Pray let him write something more precise and in the way of business. I shall speak to the Commissary Gen. about supplying you with forage corn.

I enclose Gen. Cole's report on the 12th regt., which I request you to let me have again. Could not the deficiencies of this corps be made good, so as to allow us to make use of it?

I have ordered the brigade of artillery to return to Almeida from Concepcion, as soon as the ordnance shall have been brought from Almeida to that place. It will be necessary, however, that Cox should send from Almeida to Concepcion, at the same time, about 120 artillerymen, upon which subject I request you to write to him.

To Lieut. Gen. Payne.

Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

I enclose a letter and its enclosure, which I received the day before yesterday from the Commander in Chief. The arrangement contained in these letters had some days before been communicated to me in a private form by Lord Liverpool, as one likely to be carried into execution; but as it was not determined upon, and as I thought it probable his Lordship would write to you upon it, I did not think it necessary to mention it, till I should hear that you had received intimation of it from Lord Liverpool, or that Sir Brent Spencer had arrived in Portugal.

When Sir J. Sherbrooke first declared that his state of health would

not allow him to remain in Portugal beyond the beginning of May, it had been settled that Gen. Graham was to succeed to his situation in this army. This arrangement was destroyed by his appointment to Cadiz; and when Lord Liverpool received a letter from me written in the middle of March, in which I requested that Gen. Graham should be sent to Portugal, so as to arrive at Lisbon in the beginning of May, he made the arrangement which I now announce to you. From communications that Lord Liverpool has had with some friends of yours in England, he appears to think that you are not disinclined to return home; and at all events, he has expressed the greatest anxiety that the arrangement should be reconciled to your feelings as much as possible. The ground of the preference of Sir B. Spencer to yourself to fill the situation of Sir J. Sherbrooke in this army during the absence of Gen. Graham, appears to have been that your service has been generally confined to the cavalry, which arm it was probable would not have the prominent part in the operations to be carried on in this country. Whether you will be disinclined, or otherwise, to return to England, or whether you will consider what I have just stated as a sufficient reason for this arrangement, I can only assure you, from all that Lord Liverpool has written to me, that it has not proceeded from any diminution of his regard for you. I shall be obliged to you if you will apprise me of your motions, that I may make my arrangements accordingly.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

I have received Mr. Dunmore's communication of the 23d inst., and I have to inform you, that if Mr. — should have been one week counting 200,000 dollars in his office to the person appointed to take charge of that sum, I shall recommend to the Paymaster Gen. that he may be dismissed from his office, as a person incapable of performing its duties on occasions of emergency, or desirous of throwing impediments in the way of the execution of the service.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 28th May, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 23d and 25th.

The objects of the jurisdiction of the Commission should be much more numerous than are stated in the decree. However, it is well to make a beginning, and we can soon extend the jurisdiction. I am only afraid that Leite, who is appointed to be the head of the Commission, has already more to do than he can perform. It is impossible for Portugal to aid in feeding Cadiz. We have neither money nor provisions in this country; and the measures which they are adopting to feed the people there, will positively oblige us to evacuate this country for want of money to support the army, and to perform the King's engagements, unless the government in England should enable us to remain by sending out large and regular supplies of specie. I have written fully to government on this subject.

*The A.G. to Major Lindsay, Belem.*

28th May, 1810.

I have had the honor of laying your letter addressed to the D. A. G., as well as that to Lord Wellington, before the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed to acquaint you that his Excellency feels the force of the wishes contained in your letters, and he will take an early opportunity of making such arrangement as may promote your views.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 29th May, 1810.

I am really concerned that you should believe I had any such feeling as disapprobation towards you in consequence of our late discussions upon Commissariat concerns. You and I necessarily take a different view of these questions; I must view them in all their relations, with all the different parts of the army, with the persons concerned in carrying them on, and with the government and departments at home; your view of them is naturally confined to their relation with your own immediate command. In discussing them with you, in the manner and form in which I did discuss them, I considered that the subject was fairly before us, and that the discussion was to be carried on as if neither had any concern in the situation of things as they stood. I therefore made my remarks with perfect freedom on the different regulations as they came before me, without taking much trouble to choose the terms in which I was to make them; but there was no feeling of disapprobation during the discussion, and none has been felt since.

I conceive that a part of my business, and perhaps not the most easy part, is to prevent discussions and disputes between the officers who may happen to serve under my command; and I therefore did not send you the extract of a letter from Gen. Cox to Gen. Beresford, to which you refer; nor do I now know the reason for which he sent it. The observations which I made upon the letter would show you what I felt upon the case in question. But it is really better to drop the whole of this subject; and I hope that this letter may reach you in time to induce you to refrain from sending me the paper which you inform me you have written. I am convinced that in all that you have done you have been actuated solely by a desire to forward the service; and to force those, who are more interested than we in the success of our operations, to do their duty by their country and by us.

I enclose a memorandum, and a copy of the instructions which I have given to the commanding officer at La Concepcion.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 29th May, 1810.

By the enclosed return I see that Gen. Cox has taken nearly the whole of our salt provisions at Almeida, leaving us only 5 barrels out of 263. That which I promised the government was to give them 1,000,000 lbs., being two thirds of all that we had in all parts of Portugal. Will you give orders that he may return one third of 263 barrels, or that he may feed the troops to be stationed at Concepcion?

Mr. Murray will be prepared to issue beef to the Portuguese troops on the 1st June.

To the Secretary to the Treasury.

Celorico, 29th May, 1810.

I have received a letter from Capt. Sir G. Collier, of H. M. S. *Surveillante*, in which he has requested that I will endeavor to prevail upon their Lordships to grant him the usual per centage on carrying a sum of money between Lisbon and Cadiz, for the service of the army under my command.

I have no hesitation in declaring that Capt. Sir G. Collier gave all the

care in his power to this sum of the public money; and that I have no doubt that, if the ships of war were not employed on the service of transporting money from one part to the other of the Peninsula, and if the officers of the Navy are deprived of the advantage which they have always derived from their ships being employed in this manner, this service, upon which so much depends, will be but ill performed, and the public interests will be exposed to great loss.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 29th May, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 4th inst. (marked A).

Your Lordship will observe, from Marshal Beresford's letter to me of the 24th March, and its enclosure, transmitted in mine of the 28th March, that the Portuguese troops are entitled to certain articles of clothing and necessaries, as therein specified, at certain stated periods. The troops are not to pay for these articles any more than the British troops are to pay for the clothing issued to them, or the necessaries supplied to them by the Colonel, under His Majesty's regulations. If the Portuguese troops should require at any time any of these articles, not allowed, or beyond the quantity allowed, by the regulations of the Portuguese government, they would have to pay for them in the same manner as His Majesty's troops pay for the necessaries which they require, beyond the quantities supplied by the Colonel, by stoppages from their daily subsistence.

The arrangement under which His Majesty engaged to subsidize a body of Portuguese troops was made before I was appointed to command in this country, and I have not got the particulars of it, which I conclude are contained in the dispatches from the minister at Lisbon, or from the Sec. of State for Foreign affairs. I understand, however, that it was settled that the clothing, arms, and accoutrements for that portion of the army subsidized by His Majesty should be furnished by Great Britain; and I enclose a statement of the clothing and necessaries which His Majesty is bound to furnish to the body of troops subsidized by him, according to the Portuguese regulations. All the clothing and necessaries supplied to Portugal, beyond that quantity, ought to be a charge against the government of Portugal. These articles are either issued to the troops maintained by Portugal, beyond the number subsidized by His Majesty, or are issued to the troops subsidized by His Majesty beyond the quantities to which they are entitled under the regulations of the government, and must become a charge against their subsistence.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Picton.*

29th May, 1810.

I am directed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you, that in consideration of the good character given to — by his commanding officer; and also being thoroughly convinced that he was led to the commission of the offence of which he has been convicted by the other criminals, — and —, his Excellency is pleased to direct that he may be pardoned when brought out for punishment. The Commander of the Forces, however, trusts that he and other soldiers will take warning from what has occurred of the danger of associating with such characters as — and —, and of the commission of any offences against discipline and good conduct into which they are invariably led by keeping company with such characters. The commission of these offences almost



uniformly ends in the temptations of those of a deeper description, which must produce the disgraceful and shocking consequences the melancholy example before them points out.

You will be pleased to direct that this letter may be entered in the orderly books of your division, and read at the time the sentences of the Court Martial are carried into execution.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Langley, R. W. Train.*

29th May, 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that he highly approves of your having tried the men of the — regt., and that he desires you will continue to try and punish any men that behave ill on the road, and make inquiries from officers and non-commissioned officers, commanding detachments on their march, if they are desirous of having any soldiers tried, which may be done, and the sentences carried into execution on the spot, except for heinous offences, such as murder and plunder, which demand a General Court Martial; for example to the army at large.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 30th May, 1810.

I think the 12th regt. in a very fair state for service, but it is impossible to connect it in operations with British troops, till the men shall have their blankets, and shall be properly clothed. It is therefore better that it should remain under the command of Le Cor. If you wish it, you shall have back the 2d regt. of caçadores.

Am I to understand that the Commissary Gen. of the Portuguese army does not require one third of the carts supplied by the magistrates south of the Mondego? He can surely state, with some degree of precision, what number of carriages will be required to move the sick of the different regiments. We must have something better than the truly Portuguese letter which he wrote to Mr. Murray: I mean that which I enclosed to you.

There is no news, excepting that the cavalry were trying the fords of the Agueda yesterday, which were quite impassable.

P.S. I have ordered provisions for 10 days for the troops to be lodged at Concepcion.

To the Officer commanding at Gibraltar.

Celorico, 30th May, 1810.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I received yesterday from the Sec. of State, on the subject of the deserters from the French service, enlisted by Col. Doyle, under instructions from me. It will be proper that these men should be detained at Gibraltar till you shall receive further instructions respecting them from the Sec. of State.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 30th May, 1810.

I have just received your letter of the 25th, and I am very happy to find that you were able to send a supply of provisions to Cadiz. I cannot afford them any from my stores.

I am much obliged to you for apprising me of your plans for the *Tulbot*. Gen. Payne is going to England, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give him a passage in her. He quits the army on Saturday.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 30th May, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose some observations drawn up by the Com-

missary Gen., Mr. Murray, on the statement contained in Mr. Harrison's letter of the 24th April, transmitted in your Lordship's dispatch of the same date. From this paper your Lordship will be enabled to see our financial state at the date to which Mr. Harrison's letter refers.

I likewise enclose your Lordship a statement drawn up by Mr. Murray, of the receipt and expenditure from the 25th Aug. to the 24th Nov. 1809, from which your Lordship will observe, that as far as it has been possible to ascertain the point, the expenditure in those months exceeded the estimate but very little; and that the excess of expense was principally in the ordinaries, and in the hospitals, which could not be controlled. Your Lordship will also, by a reference to the first mentioned paper, observe how erroneous the statements in Mr. Harrison's letter have been, in consequence of his applying to an expenditure for 8 months, an estimate framed for an expenditure for 3 months. The excess of the rate for the ordinaries in the 8 months, over the rate of that estimate, has been £209,000; and for the hospitals, £46,000; and debts have been paid beyond the amount stated by Mr. Harrison, to the amount of £100,000.

The alteration of the position of the army, which was made in December; the improvement in its equipments; the increase which it has been necessary to make to its means of transport; the increase of the cavalry, and the increase in price of all articles of provision and forage; and the necessity of sending to a greater distance for all that is required, are the causes of the increase of the expenditure under the other heads of the estimate in the last 5 months. I can assure your Lordship that the utmost attention is paid to prevent an unnecessary expenditure by all the officers at the heads of the several departments; and by those in whose power it may be to check the increase of expense.

It has been impossible for the Commissary Gen. to frame an estimate of the monthly expenses of the army, which will be satisfactory to himself, since I received your Lordship's dispatch of the 24th April; but as I consider it desirable that your Lordship should, at an early period, have some notion of the expenditure in Portugal and Spain, I enclose a probable estimate which I have drawn from the receipt and expenditure of the last 8 months; which I also enclose. From this, your Lordship will observe that the monthly expenditure will be £376,120; and that the monthly produce of bills drawn upon the Treasury, calculated upon the average produce of the last 8 months, from August to April, will be £219,528; leaving a monthly deficiency of £156,592, which must be made good by the remittance of specie from Great Britain.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorigo, 30th May, 1810.

The weather has continued so unfavorable, since I had the honor of addressing you on the 20th inst., that the enemy have been unable to make any movements, and they remain nearly in the same situation as at that time. Marshal Massena returned to Valladolid after having been at Salamanca; and I have not yet heard of his return to Salamanca. King Joseph arrived at Madrid on the 13th inst.

During the time that Gen. Regnier was employed in his operations against Gen. Ballesteros's division on the south of the Guadiana, Gen.

O'Doneil, who had advanced from Albuquerque to Caceres, made an attempt to surprise Truxillo, where the French hospital was stationed, but he failed in the attempt. He has since returned to Albuquerque. I have no late accounts of the operations at Cadiz.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, May 30th, 1810.

I sent a reply on the 1st inst. to your Lordship's dispatch of the 6th April, as far as the means in my power enabled me; and I now enclose No. 1, a correspondence which I have had with Adm. Berkeley; and No. 2, a correspondence with Lieut. Col. Fletcher, upon the subject of Peniche. From the opinion delivered by the latter in his report of the 23d May, it would not appear desirable to undertake to construct any permanent works at Peniche; but I would still recommend to government to occupy that place for a time after Portugal shall be evacuated by the army; and it appears by the letters from Adm. Berkeley, that it is his opinion that such a communication can be kept up with the garrison as will facilitate its being carried off. At all events Peniche might be occupied in safety till the winter.

Your Lordship will observe that Lieut. Col. Fletcher's letter of the 23d inst. contains a report on the Berlingas, and a survey of the great island. I have no doubt that that island can be held as a military post; but from recollection of the discussion upon the Berlingas in the year 1808, I am apprehensive that the anchorage near them will be found rocky and bad; and that they will not afford water to the troops, whom it might be necessary to station on them. The marines belonging to Sir C. Cotton's fleet, who then occupied them, were supplied with water from the fleet off the Tagus.

I have likewise received your Lordship's dispatch of the 12th April, regarding the occupation of the Bayona islands off Vigo, and of the fort of Bugio. Your Lordship will observe from the enclosures in the Admiral's letter of the 6th May, that this subject had already had his attention. I have written to Mr. Wellesley, to request that he will obtain the permission of the Spanish government to have these islands examined by an engineer and an officer of the navy; and these officers will be sent to survey them, as soon as I shall receive the permission of the government, and the report shall be transmitted to your Lordship.

I enclose No. 3, the opinion received from Adm. Berkeley regarding the occupation of the Bugio; and No. 4, the report of Capt. Squire, of the Royal Engineers, upon this fort.

Your Lordship will observe that the Admiral differs in opinion with the engineers, regarding the advantage which British ships would derive from the occupation of the Bugio, as well as upon the inconvenience which the enemy would suffer from this measure, and I conclude that His Majesty's government will consider his opinion decisive upon these points. The capability of defence of the Bugio may be more properly the subject for consideration for the Engineers, upon which the report of Capt. Squire is conclusive. I have been so little at Lisbon, and always in bad weather, that I have never had an opportunity of acquiring a personal knowledge of the Bugio; but it has always appeared to me so small, that it could not

be held against a bombardment, for which it appears that there is favorable ground sufficiently near. I have not yet received any further communication from the Admiral regarding the Faro islands.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 30th May, 1810.

Upon reference to your Lordship's instructions of the 27th Feb., directing me to remove the army to Cadiz, in case I should evacuate Portugal, I wish your Lordship to consider whether it would not be more advisable that we should go to Gibraltar or Ceuta, than to Cadiz.

It may be depended upon that when the British troops shall have evacuated Portugal, and more particularly if we should not make an effort to maintain our position, whatever may be the numbers opposed to us, we shall not be very popular in the Peninsula. It may be expected that the people of Cadiz, and possibly even the Spanish government, would refuse us admission, which would be an awkward occurrence; and might render uncomfortable the situation of those already in the place. Would it not be better, after the evacuation of Portugal, to wait till a further reinforcement should be called for by the people of Cadiz, or by the government? Or, at all events, to confine the numbers of additional troops to be sent to Cadiz, to those really required for the defence of the place and its dependencies?

Another point to which I wish to give further consideration, is my own situation after Portugal shall have been evacuated. I will do whatever the King's government think proper to order me to do; but I wish you to consider whether it may not be deemed a hardship upon Gen. Graham that I should go there, and supersede him in the command of the operations for the defence of Cadiz, at the moment when the measures for the defence will be completed, and the serious attack is about to commence. All these difficulties will be avoided by ordering the army to Gibraltar, if you should still wish to keep it in the south of Spain.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.\*

Celorico, 31st May, 1810.

Since you left me, I have received intelligence that the enemy were in motion yesterday on the Agueda, so that you had better have your division in readiness to move in the morning, in case you should receive intelligence of the occurrence referred to in the memorandum sent to you on the 29th.

P.S. I beg you to send notice to Major Gen. Slade, that I may have occasion to move his brigade in the morning, and that, should I find it necessary, I shall send him a route in the night.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 31st May, 1810.

I enclose some papers just received, which look like doing things in earnest. I have sent orders to all the troops to be in readiness to march in the morning; and I shall move them forward, if I should receive any further information of the reports which these papers contain.

P.S. Send on to the 1st and 16th, and let them know that they may receive orders to move and to be prepared. I shall send to the troops in the valley.

\* Letters of the same tenor were sent to other General officers commanding Divisions and Corps.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 31st May, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 18th, and I am concerned to find that the Junta have taken so little pains to supply Cadiz with provisions. The truth is, that the Spaniards are incapable of making an effort to provide for a want, however certain its occurrence, if not provided for, which they are not likely to feel in a very short space of time. This fatal disposition of their minds is the cause of all their misfortunes. I am afraid that we cannot assist them.

I shall be very glad to see Alava. There is nothing new here. I have heard that the French were in movement yesterday on the Agueda, and I shall move in the morning if I find the report to be true, and that they have any serious intention in this movement. Nothing has occurred in Estremadura. Don Carlos de España, belonging to O'Donell's division, endeavored to surprise Truxillo, while Regnier was employed on the left of the Guadiana, but he failed. O'Donell is now at Alburquerque.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Celorico, 1st June, 1810, 11 A.M.

Nothing occurred of any importance yesterday. In the morning the enemy apparently threatened to extend to their left, but they had not carried that intention into execution in the afternoon. They are strengthening themselves from Leon and other quarters. When you move forward, I request you to send orders to Gen. Slade to move with his brigade to Guarda. I enclose a letter which I beg you to forward to Col. Le Cor.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 1st June, 1810.

Since my private communication to you on the 29th ult., I have had an opportunity of conversing with Gen. Payne, who intends to proceed in the first instance to Caldas, and to remain there till about the 20th inst., and I shall be much obliged to you, if you can find it convenient to provide him a passage in a man of war about that time. I have requested him to inform you of the exact period of his arrival at Lisbon. I have also to request that you will give directions that a passage may be furnished to certain men belonging to the depôt squadrons of the cavalry in this country, and to the officers and men of the detachment of the 23d dragoons, as well as a horse transport to convey to England the horses belonging to the officers of the 23d dragoons. The A. Q. M. G. will furnish the Agent of transports with the detail.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 1st June, 1810.

I have communicated to Lieut. Gen. Payne His Majesty's desire that he should return to England; and he will proceed there in a short time. In the course of the more active operations of the army, I have had opportunities of reporting my sense of his conduct. I am perfectly sensible

G. O.

Celorico, 1st June, 1810.

3. The Commander of the Forces republishes an order given out by the late Commander of the Forces; and it is to be understood that the stoppage from the soldier, on account of cartridges lost or made away with, ought always to have been, and must in future be, 4d. for each cartridge, and 1d. for each flint. It is not intended, however, to open again old accounts for those losses.

that the arrangement which has placed Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer in the situation of second in command in Portugal has no reference whatever to the military conduct or character of Lieut. Gen. Payne. But I think it proper to take this opportunity of assuring your Lordship, that since the more active operations of the army have been discontinued, I have had great reason to be satisfied with the conduct of this officer. His attention to the cavalry has been unremitting; and I attribute to the care he has taken of that useful arm the high state in which it is for service at the present moment.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorio, 1st June, 1810.

I enclose the copy of the letter which I wrote to Gen. Payne, when I communicated to him the King's pleasure that he should return to England. I have since seen him; and although he appeared to think that it was fit and proper that an officer should be appointed to be second in command of this army in whom the government could have confidence, and that no man deserved this confidence more than Sir B. Spencer, he felt that the supercession of himself, under the circumstances which have attended it, and at the moment it took place, was likely to be injurious to his character.

I have written your Lordship an official letter upon this subject; and I have reserved for this private communication to state to you that Gen. Payne is anxious to receive some mark of the King's approbation under these circumstances. He mentioned to me a government as a desirable object to him, and he said that though it should be one of the smallest value, it was an object to him to obtain it, in order to remove the impression which he was afraid would prevail, that he had been recalled on grounds unfavorable to his military character.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Lord Aylmer, A.A.G., 1st division.*

1st June, 1810.

I have stated to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces your anxious desire to join your battalion; and his Excellency has directed me to acquaint you that from your long experience and active services on the staff, especially with the 1st division of the army with which you have so long served, it is impossible, consistent with the general advantage of the service, to permit you to retire from the Adj. Gen.'s department, especially at a juncture like the present, when the division is passing into new hands, and when your efficient services will be so much required.

*The A.G. to the A.A. Gs. and D.A.A.Gs. of divisions. (Circular.)*

1st June, 1810.

In transmitting the new forms of monthly returns, which you will deliver out to the regiments in your division, you will please to direct that the men left sick at Talavera, Oropesa, Plasencia, &c., and who, it is supposed, *actually* fell into the hands of the enemy, are to be returned in the new form of returns under the head of 'prisoners of war;' those who have straggled and staid behind in the different marches of the army, and are *missing*, are to be returned under the separate head of '*missing*' immediately annexed to the column of 'prisoners of war.' The actual sick with the army will thus alone be returned in the column of 'sick present and absent.' In the weekly states the prisoners of war and missing are to be returned, both blended together, in the column '*missing* and prisoners of war.'

Any alterations which may be reported as having taken place among the sergeants, drummers, and R. and F., returned as prisoners of war and missing, not included in the alterations, are to be returned under a separate head, agreeable to the form of the other alterations. One copy of a monthly return and weekly state, made out according to these directions, is herewith transmitted, and you will be

responsible that the returns of your division are all forwarded as now directed. These regulations to take place from the 8th and 25th of this month.

[*This Memorandum only sent to the cavalry.*] The new forms of monthly returns for the cavalry have not yet been received from England, but are expected every day, when they will be forwarded: they will in the mean time conform to the above instructions in their weekly states.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Celorico, 2d June, 1810.

There was nothing extraordinary yesterday. Some of the guns which left Salamanca on the 28th appear to have arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo. I do not see any necessity for your moving your troops up the hill. Indeed, in marching forwards, you will find it a convenience to have your column rather open.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 2d June, 1810.

I have received your Lordship's dispatch of the 15th May, upon the subject of the bounty to be given to the deserters from the enemy's army, who should enlist into the British service. The evident utility to the general cause of enticing Germans and other foreigners in the enemy's service to desert had drawn my attention to this subject, before I received your Lordship's dispatch of the 2d Nov.; by which I considered myself authorised to adopt such measures as I might think expedient in order to accomplish or forward this desirable object. Your Lordship's dispatch of the 5th April likewise went to authorise the grant of such moderate bounties, as I might deem it expedient to give to deserters from the enemy's army.

Before I had received the last mentioned dispatch, I had authorised Col. Doyle to give bounties of 20 dollars to each man who should have deserted, and should have enlisted into His Majesty's service, under certain terms which were transmitted to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 1st March. I considered myself authorised to give these instructions by your Lordship's dispatch of the 2d Nov.; and in your dispatch of the 5th April you did not disapprove of that part of them which directed the amount of the bounty to be given.

In the consideration of this subject there are two objects: the one, to entice the soldier to desert from the enemy; the other, to enlist him into His Majesty's service. I should think it desirable to leave to the consideration of the General officer on the spot, whether any or what bounty should be given to soldiers who should desert; and your Lordship will find in my instructions to Gen. Cox and others upon this subject, transmitted

G. A. O.

Celorico, 2d June, 1810.

1. The officers commanding regiments of infantry are requested, as soon as possible, to make the following arrangement for sending into store the great coats or the blankets belonging to the regiments under their command respectively, according to the returns they before made upon this subject.

2. The blankets to be sent in are to be made up in bales, each containing 50 blankets; and if the bales which brought the blankets to the army should be lost or mislaid, a blanket may be used as the bale to hold the others.

3. The great coats must each be marked with the name of the soldier to whom it belongs, and his company and his regiment. The great coats must likewise be made up into bales, each containing 50 great coats; and each bale must be marked, viz. *Great coats belonging to — regt.*

in my dispatch of the 1st May, and which I have given to Col. Doyle since I have received your dispatch of the 5th April, that I have not held out any bounty as the premium of desertion. I have acted in this manner because I believe that the soldiers were sufficiently inclined to desert, without that additional encouragement. Upon further information I might have reason to believe that additional encouragement would be desirable; and indeed at present it has been in many instances necessary to allow of the expenditure of money to clothe deserters, before they have had an offer of bounty, as they are generally plundered of every article of clothing and necessities, by the Spanish or Portuguese peasantry, or soldiers, before they reach our hands.

The enlistment of deserters into His Majesty's service is a subject for consideration, entirely different from the encouragement to be given to soldiers to desert from the enemy.

In respect to enlistment, the orders which I have received from the Adj. Gen. are distinct, and they have been conveyed to the different officers allowed to enlist deserters for His Majesty's service; and contain directions respecting the application of a part of the bounty to the provision of necessities. I beg that your Lordship will inform me, however, whether I am authorised to incur any expense for the object of encouraging desertion, or for deserters before they shall have enlisted into His Majesty's service, and whether any expense so incurred is to be carried to account against the bounty to which such deserters would be entitled on enlistment.

I have conveyed to Gen. Campbell, at Gibraltar, your Lordship's directions, that the deserters who have enlisted and have arrived at that place should be detained there. I had before requested that they might be sent to England, in obedience to orders which I had received from the Commander in Chief; which orders will, I fear, have been carried into execution before those from your Lordship can be received. It is desirable that the wishes of government upon this subject should be conveyed by only one authority; as in more than one instance the instructions which I have received from the Commander in Chief respecting these deserters have not been consistent with those which I have received from your Lordship.

*The A. G. to Officers commanding hospital stations. (Circular.)*

2d June, 1810.

In order, as much as possible, to apprise officers commanding regiments of the situation of all men who are absent from their corps, either in hospital or convalescents, on escorts, &c., with a view to their making out their monthly returns with greater correctness, I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to request that you will cause all officers under your command to transmit monthly to the head quarters of their regiments, so as to arrive on the 24th of each month, a nominal list of all men under their charge, stating whether they are in hospital, convalescent, on escort or other duty. In the event of officers not knowing where the head quarters of their regiments are, by addressing these lists to the Adj. Gen.'s Office, head quarters, or the A. A. G. of any division, the same will be forwarded to the corps.

*The A. G. to Major Gen. Slade, Belmonte.*

4th June, 1810.

I have had the honor to receive and submit your letter of the 2d inst. to the



Commander of the Forces, and its enclosure. In answer I am commanded to acquaint you it is impossible for his Excellency to allow any corps of officers, however respectable, to decide that His Majesty shall lose the services of any officer, without being previously informed what the charges are that have been alleged against that officer, and all the attendant circumstances.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 5th June, 1810.

The enemy have been collecting in our front for some days, but they have hitherto not crossed the Agueda, nor increased their numbers to any extent in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, prevented, I conclude, from bringing up their heavy artillery by the badness of the roads. I have ordered Le Cor to collect his troops, in case the enemy should make a dash that way; and I shall keep you informed of all occurrences.

To the Rt. Hon. J. Villiers.

Celorico, 5th June, 1810.

I enclose the copy of an order which you gave for a sum of money to be advanced to Capt. Elliott, of the artillery, upon which I am obliged to trouble you, as Capt. Elliott has left Portugal. I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know upon what occasion and upon what service Capt. Elliott was sent, as that must be stated in the warrant which I must give for the money; and if you will desire Capt. Elliott to send his account of the expenditure in triplicate, according to the forms required by the Auditors. It would save some trouble if you were to charge this sum in your own accounts, and were to direct Mr. Bell or Mr. Stuart to repay it to the Commissary Gen.

I have but little to tell you from hence. Massena is in my front, and is collecting all he can for an attack upon this country; but I do not think that he will be able to make much progress till the French shall abandon their southern projects. They have been 6 weeks before Ciudad Rodrigo, and have not yet passed the Agueda; and they are proceeding with the utmost caution and circumspection. I hope their progress will not turn out to be as sure as it has been slow.

The Portuguese army are in a good state. We have arms for the

G. O.

Celorico, 4th June, 1810.

3. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be obliged to bring before the troops another example of the consequence of their irregularities, breach of discipline, and crimes. In order to get liquor, these soldiers formed a conspiracy to commit a robbery; in the course of the commission of this crime, one of a greater enormity, a murder, is committed, which is soon discovered. Then the parties to the commission of these crimes are eager to give information against each other, and the result is an example, such as that which will be brought before the troops upon this occasion.

If such frequent instances had not occurred of the same circumstances produced by the same unvaried course of events, it would not be credible that British soldiers should so far forget their duty as to conspire to commit a robbery on a people they are sent to protect, and by whom they have been invariably well treated, and should murder in cool blood a fellow creature who had done them no injury; more particularly having a knowledge that those guilty of these crimes are invariably discovered, that the conspirators invariably inform against each other, and that the result of the trial must be the execution of the criminal.

The Commander of the Forces repeats his determination to persevere in carrying into execution the sentence of every General Court Martial on crimes of this description, in the fervent hope that each of them, which he will confirm, will be the last which he will have to consider.

militia, and upon the whole we have an enormous military establishment at our command. We only want money to put it in operation and to keep it up. There are also the remains of several Spanish corps hanging about these frontiers and in other parts of Spain, which, if I had money, means, and power, I would put in operation upon the enemy. I wish that the ministers could strengthen their government; and that somebody would take pains to inform the public and guide their opinion, and not allow every newswriter to run away with the public mind, upon points essential to the interests of the country. Pray remember me most kindly to Mrs. Villiers.

*The A. G. to Lieut. Col. Lord Aylmer, A. A. G., 1st division.*

5th June, 1810.

I herewith return the weekly state, 2d batt. — regt., for the insertion of the 2 men stated in the memorandum 'to be sent home invalided' in the column 'transferred;' and as you have reported the refusal of the officer commanding the — regt. to comply with your directions already stated upon that head, I am directed to desire you will be pleased to acquaint Major —, whose signature appears on the face of the return, that I do not conceive it to be optional with the commanding officer of a regiment to refuse to make an alteration in his return evidently incorrect, when so ordered from the A. A. G. of the division, who alone is answerable to the Adj. Gen. for the correctness of the returns of the regiments in his division, and transmitted through him. You will, therefore, send this return back to Major — to be corrected accordingly.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 6th June, 1810.

I have received your 2 letters of the 5th. I think we have a tolerable notion of the strength of Ney's corps; and I yesterday received a letter from Gen. Mahy, who has a return of Junot's corps of the end of April, I believe intercepted near Irun, which makes the numbers 34,389 infantry, and 8836 cavalry, including men at depôts in France and Spain, and in hospitals. I have sent for the return itself; but considering that this corps has but lately arrived from France, and has not sustained any loss of consequence, it would be a large allowance to strike off one third for men in depôts and hospitals; and yet, according to this calculation, Junot's corps would have about 23,000 infantry and above 6000 cavalry, besides artillery. This corps has been reckoned 20,000 men in more than one report which I have received, and indeed Gen. Mahy states in a letter that 20,000 had marched from Leon towards Castille; and this is besides other detachments of whose march we had heard upon former occasions.

In one of the intercepted letters of which Mahy gives the extract, 3 Generals of division of infantry are named, viz.: Solignac, La Grange, and Clausel. They are all Generals of division, as appears by the French army list.

There are no troops left at Astorga, excepting one battalion of Swiss, of whom 24 deserted in one day; and none in Leon. The whole have come to Castille. I have requested Gen. Mahy to put in motion his division and all the Spanish corps in that quarter, and I have ordered the Portuguese militia in Minho and Tras os Montes to move towards the Douro.

To Don Andres Herrasti, Ciudad Rodrigo. (Extract.\*) Celorico, 6th June, 1810.

The army under my command is also in readiness to move to your assistance, if I should find it practicable to afford it to you. I do not propose to move till I shall find that the enemy shall have brought forward the whole of his means, and that my movement may be of the utmost possible benefit to you.

I assure you that I am sincerely interested in the fate of Ciudad Rodrigo, not only on account of your Excellency, the garrison, and inhabitants, but from a strong sense of the importance of the preservation of that place for the general cause; and I hope you will believe, that if I should not be able to attempt your relief, it will be owing to the superior strength of the enemy, and to the necessity of my attending to other important objects.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 6th June, 1810.

Since I had last the honor of addressing you, the enemy have increased in numbers in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, where I have reason to believe that the whole of the corps of Marshal Ney is now assembled. They have also constructed a bridge over the Agueda, under the Convent of La Caridad, immediately above the town; and have commenced constructing another under Los Carboneros, below it. The heavy cannon moved from Salamanca on the 28th of last month, but halted at Matilla, owing, it is supposed, to the badness of the roads in Castille; and they had not arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday. Marshal Massena has returned from Valladolid; and the whole of the enemy's troops in Leon, and, it appears, some of those which have been detached to the Asturias, have been collected in Castille, with a view to the operations to be carried on upon the frontiers of Portugal.

I have not thought it proper to make any alteration in the position of the British army in consequence of these movements: I wait to see the disposition and real strength of the enemy; and any assistance which I may have in my power to give to Ciudad Rodrigo will be more effectual if given after the enemy shall have brought forward all his means of attack.

I have written to the Spanish General Mahy to request him to put in motion his division, and any other Spanish divisions which there may be on the frontiers of Galicia and Leon, in order to annoy the enemy's rear; but I doubt whether these troops are in a state of equipment and efficiency, or whether their commanding officers have in their power the means to enable them to move. I have likewise altered the disposition of the militia, which had been allotted for the defence of the Portuguese provinces north of the Douro, in consequence of the evacuation of Leon by the enemy; and if the Portuguese government should possess the means of putting these troops in movement, or of subsisting them when collected, they will be upon the enemy's flank.

In Estremadura Gen. Regnier has again brought a part of his corps to Merida, and a small detachment of cavalry and infantry approached Badajoz, by the road of Montijo, on the 31st May, as it is supposed with an

\* See note at p. 55.

intention of driving off the cattle which were pasturing on the banks of the Caya and Guadiana.

Gen. Ballesteros attacked, on the 25th, the advanced guard of Mortier's corps in the Sierra Morena, and drove them in upon Seville. A detachment of about 6000 or 7000 French troops advanced upon Seville, and attacked Gen. Ballesteros at Aracena, on the 27th ult. The action lasted till night, when Gen. Ballesteros retired, leaving 300 killed upon the field of battle, and having some wounded. He was not followed by the French, who returned to Seville on the following day; and then Gen. Ballesteros resumed his position at Aracena. It is said that the French lost 1500 men in this affair.

It is reported that the French withdrew their troops from the Trocadero on the 19th May, in order to reinforce their position at La Chiclana, which was threatened by the patriots of the Sierra de Ronda. I have a letter from Mr. Wellesley, of the 19th, which does not mention this circumstance. I have not heard from Lieut. Gen. Graham since the 9th of last month.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 6th June, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose an estimate of the expenses of the British army in Portugal, from the 25th May to the 24th June, which has been given to me by the Commissary Gen. Your Lordship will observe from this paper the large sum now due from the military chest to the chest of the 'Aids' for the payment of the Portuguese subsidy. Your Lordship will also observe that the British expense in the Peninsula, according to this estimate, and your Lordship's letter, will be as follows:

British army in Portugal . . . . .	£272,565	5	2
Portuguese subsidy . . . . .	80,000	0	0
Proposed addition . . . . .	40,000	0	0
Troops at Cadiz . . . . .	29,000	0	0
Total . . . . .	£421,565	5	2

The estimated means of defraying this expense, supposing all debts paid, is £218,352 14s. 2d.; leaving a deficiency of £204,212 9s. 6d.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

Celorico, 7th June, 1810.

I have received from Mr. Dickens a copy of certain instructions which he has received from the Commissary in Chief.

As I observe that these instructions vary in some important points from those received from the Treasury, particularly in reference to the nature and number of vouchers required to support charges for expenses incurred for the public service, I beg to know whether these instructions have received the sanction of the Treasury. If they have not, as it is very obvious that the Auditors will not allow of charges against the public which are not supported by the vouchers which have been required by the authority of the Treasury, I recommend that these instructions should not be acted upon as far as they differ from those received from the Treasury.

G. O.

Celorico, 7th June, 1810.

2. The Commander of the Forces publishes this sentence to the army in order to show his determination to bring to trial those non-commissioned officers who disgrace themselves, and prove that they are not fit for their situations.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

Celorico, 7th June, 1810.

I beg that you will direct the Commissary of Accounts to discontinue his inquiries into the accounts of the Lusitanian Legion, which are referred to Marshal Beresford, by direction of the Sec of State.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 7th June, 1810.

I delayed replying to your Lordship's dispatch of the 5th Jan., respecting the Lusitanian Legion, till I should receive the report of the Commissary of Accounts. Your Lordship has, however, by your letter of the 23d April, decided the point which had been referred for my consideration, and I have transmitted to Marshal Beresford a copy of your dispatch of that date, and of the enclosed report from the Commissary of Accounts, which I received this day, in answer to a letter which had been written to him to know what progress had been made in the settlement of these accounts. I have no doubt whatever that the Lusitanian Legion never could have been completed in Portugal on the system of recruiting by volunteers or upon bounty. The men must have been recruited in the mode in which the whole army in Portugal is raised, viz., by requisition; and, in point of fact, the battalions of the Lusitanian Legion have been kept up by requisition only, in the same manner with the rest of the army. This fact is decisive upon the question referred for consideration. His Majesty could not have in his service a body of troops raised by requisition in Portugal; and whatever might have been originally intended, the mode of recruiting the corps subsequently adopted would necessarily have transferred it to the service of Portugal.

I conceive that Marshal Beresford had the power to organise the Lusitanian Legion as he thought proper; and I certainly did not disapprove of his measures upon that occasion, and did not interfere with those measures any more than I have with others adopted respecting the Portuguese army, under Marshal Beresford's directions.

In justice to Marshal Beresford, however, I enclose his letter to me of the 15th Feb., in answer to a reference which I had made to him of your Lordship's dispatch of the 5th Jan.; from which, and from the reports of Gen. Hamilton of the state of the Legion, and from the state of the accounts of that corps, your Lordship will be able to form your own opinion upon the whole of this subject.

I have referred to Marshal Beresford your Lordship's letter of the 27th April, containing the statement of the claims of Mr. ——. Without adverting to the nature of those claims, which are, in my opinion, very questionable, I have to inform your Lordship, that I consider Mr. — to be a deserter from the service of the Prince Regent, and a debtor to the state to a considerable amount. As a deserter, he has forfeited his claim to all arrears of pay, allowances, &c.

I have already taken occasion to draw the attention of your Lordship to the necessity that the officers, employed by His Majesty to serve with the Portuguese troops, should be obliged to perform the engagement into which they voluntarily entered when they accepted this employment, and should not be allowed to resign when it should suit their convenience or their inclinations, in which principle your Lordship concurred by your

letter of the 7th Nov. 1809. I have also taken the liberty of drawing your Lordship's attention to the state of discipline of the army in general, which I have stated to be attributed, in some degree, to the want of the power of reward in the hands of those who are honored with the charge of commanding His Majesty's troops on foreign and active service; and it would be desirable if the applications of officers for the restoration of their pay and allowances, forfeited under His Majesty's regulations, on account of their absence from their duty without leave, were referred to their Commanding officers abroad.

*The A.G. to Major Archer, 16th light dragoons.*

7th June, 1810.

Two horses having been purchased by officers, 16th light dragoons, from French deserters, in direct violation of the G. O. 19th May, 1809, I am commanded to desire that you will please to have those horses sent forthwith to head quarters, to be disposed of by auction by the Commissary Gen. if unfit for his purposes, as directed in the G. O. above alluded to, and you will be pleased to report the execution of the same to me for his Excellency's information.

*The A.G. to Brig. Major —.*

7th June, 1810.

It having been reported to the Commander of the Forces that you have purchased a horse from a French deserter, I enclose herewith, by his orders, extracts from the G. O., dated 19th May, 1809, for your information upon that head. I am further to acquaint you that his Excellency cannot but desire, in justice to the deserter, that he may at least have the fair chance given him of selling his horse for the full value, according to the order above alluded to. You will, therefore, be pleased to send in the horse thus purchased by you from the French deserter to the Commissary Gen., to be disposed of according to that order.

To Brig. Gen. R. Crauford.

Celorico, 8th June, 1810.

If the rain is as heavy in your quarter as it is with us, the Agueda must have swelled again. Could not Carrera, by floating large trees down the river, destroy the bridge above the town; and the people of the town do something of the same kind by the lower bridge? A bridge upon chevalets cannot be very strong. Silveira writes me on the 5th, that the enemy's parties were approaching the Douro, opposite Freixo de Espadacinta.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 8th June, 1810.

I have just received your letter of the 4th. The government ought immediately to compose the Commission, at Beresford's head quarters, of respectable and efficient people. I have sent some persons to be tried by them, and shall soon send others. I don't understand the nature of the objections of the Regency to publish their Proclamation. I hope that they are not afraid to inform the country of their danger; or do they really believe that it does not exist?

I conclude that Silveira sends all his intelligence, from which you will see that I cannot have less than 50,000 men in my front.

It would be very desirable to bring to a conclusion the police arrangement which I suggested some time ago. I am convinced that the French now see the necessity of getting us out of the Peninsula as the first object of their attention, and that they will risk every thing for that object, and the trial will be made in a short time.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 9th June, 1810.

I received last night your first, and this morning your second letter of yesterday. I scarcely think that the enemy intend to draw the 2d corps out of Estremadura; I should rather suppose the preparation of boats to be intended to reinforce it. If our accounts of the strength of the 6th and 8th corps be correct, they have as many men as they can require for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and for ulterior objects. Their other corps would be better situated in Estremadura.

I have a letter from Gen. Hill this morning, of as late a date as the 6th, and he does not mention any alteration in that quarter; and on the 5th, the enemy's head quarters were still at Merida, and his troops on both sides of the Guadiana.

I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate these circumstances to Gen. Carrera, particularly the strength of Junot's corps; and desire him to tell his friend in the Vera to have a look out towards the Puerto de Congosto, and the high road from Talavera to Almaraz, for reinforcements for the 2d corps, of which it is very interesting to have early intelligence. I apprehend that Ciudad Rodrigo will have been completely invested last night before the ammunition can have got in. Is it certain that the heavy artillery has reached the place? I should think that Ruman would have had intelligence of their movement from Matilla.

P. S. I do not know for what purpose the ammunition stated to have been destroyed at Talavera, or the magazine of provisions at Truxillo, are required, if the 2d corps is to be withdrawn from Estremadura.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 9th June, 1810.

I enclose a paper containing intelligence of preparations at Almaraz for the passage of troops over the Tagus. The writer of this paper appears to think that Massena intends to draw the 2d corps out of Estremadura, which I acknowledge that I do not think very probable; for, if our accounts be correct, he has a sufficient number of men for the object of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; and for ulterior objects, the 2d corps is better situated in Estremadura. The 6th corps (Ney's) has 18,000 infantry, and 8 regiments of dragoons; and from the returns, I judge that the 8th corps (Junot's) cannot have less than 22,000 infantry and 3000 or 4000 cavalry. They must be in the whole 50,000 men at least. They can scarcely require more to prevent us from interfering in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

I think it most probable, therefore, that the preparation of boats has been for the passage of reinforcements to the 2d corps; more particularly, as it appears that the 2d corps had not moved, when you wrote on the 6th. Besides, I do not exactly understand for what purpose the ammunition stated to have been destroyed at Talavera de la Reyna was required, if the troops were to be withdrawn from Estremadura; nor for what purpose the magazine of provisions was collected at Truxillo. However, it is desirable that you should be instructed how to act in case the 2d corps should be withdrawn from Estremadura. If the enemy should adopt that plan, it is evident that they intend to concentrate their force for an attack

upon Portugal, north of the Tagus. This attack may be connected with other operations to be carried on by other corps from the Guadiana; or it may be insulated; of which I cannot judge without knowing, more correctly than I do, the precise situation of affairs to the southward of the Sierra Morena. I think it desirable that you should pass the Tagus at Villa Velha, when you find that Regnier does so at Almaraz; unless you should find that his corps is replaced in Estremadura by one sufficiently strong to overpower that of the Marques de la Romana. In that case you must remain in Alentejo; observing well, however, the movements of Regnier on the north of the Tagus; and if you should find that he endeavors to drive in Le Cor, and to pass between the Serra d'Estrella and the Tagus, turning the right of this army, you will act as directed by my letter of the 18th Feb.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Slade.*

9th June, 1810.

In returning the annexed papers, I am commanded to observe it appears to my Lord Wellington, that the officers of the — are placed in a very delicate situation by the transmission of those documents by Major —. The officers of the — may decline to associate with Capt. — for the reasons which appear on the face of those papers, or they may inform Capt. — that they think his conduct requires to be submitted to an inquiry; but they cannot object to his being allowed to join the regiment in which he bears His Majesty's commission, or prevent him from doing duty if he should join, unless charges be regularly brought against that officer, for which he should be put in arrest.

His Lordship has thought it proper to be thus explicit in answer to the proposal from the corps, that Capt. — should have leave of absence. In respect to that particular proposal, divested of the right of submitting such a request on such grounds, from the number of captains doing duty with the —, his Excellency can have no objection to allow Capt. — to have leave of absence, if the desire to obtain that leave should proceed from himself.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 10th June, 1810.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have had a report from Badajoz of the 7th. The French have spread themselves still more towards the Sierra Morena, having their left at Zafra. They have detached La Housaye's brigade of dragoons into La Mancha, by the road south of the Guadiana, as well to keep in order the guerrillas as to prevent the Germans, of whom it is composed, deserting.

I see that Ruman says that the heavy artillery had not arrived at Tamames on the 6th. He also says that Massena's force cannot altogether exceed from 25,000 to 30,000 men, in which I observe that he agrees with the report at Salamanca; and yet I think that all reports received by you concur in giving Ney's corps 3 divisions of infantry of 18,000 effectives, and 8 regiments of cavalry and artillery, which altogether cannot amount to less than 25,000 men; and it can scarcely be believed that Junot's corps, of which the gross return is 34,400 infantry, and 8800 cavalry, with artillery, should not have 25,000 more effectives. There is no doubt that the whole of Junot's corps is in Castilla. I had a letter yesterday from Silveira, of the 7th; in which he says that Gen. Bonet has evacuated the Asturias, and occupies in Leon some of the points before held by Junot. Have you been able to do any thing with the enemy's bridges, in the way which I suggested to your consideration?



P. S. There is a report of the French having sustained a very heavy loss by the attack of guerrillas at Guadalaxara.

To the Secretary at War.

Celorico, 10th June, 1810.

I have the honor to transmit a statement of funeral expenses of men who have died in general hospital in this country, and which cannot be recovered, from the circumstance of the regiments having left the country, or from the accounts of the men having been closed and sent to England previous to the charge having been received by the regiments. I have authorised the Purveyor to enter these expenses in his accounts until he shall receive orders respecting them from England, and I request that your Lordship will be pleased to give directions accordingly.

*The A.G. to the Commissary General.*

10th June, 1810.

Capt. —, D. A. A. G., having satisfactorily accounted to the Commander of the Forces for his prolonged absence from the army, I have his Excellency's authority to communicate to you that the G. O., 18th Dec. 1809, is dispensed with, in reference to that officer's late absence and case, and that you will in consequence warrant the issue of Capt. —'s staff pay, and for the period of his absence alluded to, being from the 24th Feb. to the 24th May.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 11th June, 1810.

I have received your letters of yesterday and the day before. I had letters from Cadiz yesterday to the 2d. The enemy had not abandoned the Trocadero, as was reported at Lisbon, and there was nothing extraordinary there. My brother says that the French were in great alarm at Seville, and at Madrid, &c., on account of their distress for the want of men. It may be hoped, therefore, that the large numbers which they have been induced to collect for their enterprise in this quarter may yet lead to some advantage elsewhere.

P. S. I have received a letter from Silveira of the 9th, from which it would appear that the enemy are bringing every thing from Leon into Castille. I do not know whether Bonet's division is included in Junot's 34,400; some of it, I believe, certainly was.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 11th June, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 22d May, regarding the regimental hospital of the brigade of Guards at Cadiz. The regimental hospital of the Guards is managed upon a different principle from those of regiments of the line; but, I imagine, only as far as concerns their finance. In the Guards, the expense of hiring a regimental hospital and all the expenses attending it, beyond the sum defrayed by the stoppage from the pay of the soldiers, fall upon the superior officers of the regiment; but I apprehend that at the time the regimental hospitals of the whole army were managed upon the same system, the principal medical officer of the army had a right, and it was his duty, to visit and inspect them; and I don't believe that what are called the privileges of the Guards extended to an exemption from this inspection.

The alteration of the system of the regimental hospitals of regiments of the line, or of the title of the principal medical officer of the army,

cannot exempt the Guards from an inspection to which, in common with the rest of the army, they must have been liable. It is not necessary to point out the inconveniences and evils which might be the result of an establishment of this description being exempt from any inspection and control, excepting that of its own officers. We have been obliged in this army to adopt the system of general hospitals in preference to regimental hospitals; and it would be impossible for the principal medical officer to perform the duty which is imposed upon him under this system, without having a constant and perfect knowledge of all that is passing in the regimental hospitals, to which the patients are in the first instance admitted, and making frequent inspections: and in point of fact, the Inspector Gen. with this army does inspect the hospitals of the regiments of Guards with this army when he pleases. I conceive, therefore, that Brig. Gen. Dilkes and the officers commanding the battalions of Guards at Cadiz are mistaken upon this subject; but if, after the receipt of this letter, there should be any further doubt, I should recommend to you to refer it to the consideration of H. R. H. the Duke of York, as a question upon the privileges of the Guards.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 11th June, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 31st May (No. 15). Lieut. Col. Fletcher being in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, I have not yet received the papers which Capt. Birch has transmitted to him.

Lieut. Col. Pensonby being upon the staff at Cadiz, it rests with you to dispose of his services as you may think best; and I beg you to make any arrangements you may prefer for the command of the cavalry at Cadiz, which shall have my full concurrence.

I beg to refer you to my letter of this date to Mr. Wellesley, for an account of the state of affairs here.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 11th June, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th May (No. 14). My former letters will have conveyed to you my concurrence in your directing the purchase, by the British Commissary, of any articles which you might think necessary for the British troops, which the Spanish magazines could not afford; and my letter of the 16th May pointed out the mode in which I was desirous that an endeavor should be made to obtain repayment from the Spanish government of the money thus expended. You will give your own directions to the British Commissary at Cadiz to purchase such articles for the troops, and in such quantities, as you may think it necessary to have; and you will direct the Commissary either to purchase these articles wherever they can be got, or to contract for them, as may be found most beneficial for the service, adverting in every case to the instructions of the Treasury, and of the Commissary in Chief.

It would be very desirable that the payment for these supplies should be made by bills upon the Treasury, which the receivers should be bound not to negotiate at Cadiz, at Lisbon, or Gibraltar; and Mr. Kennedy,\* who is now the Commissary Gen. with the army, will instruct the Com-

\* The late Sir R. Kennedy, K.T.S.

missary at Cadiz upon this subject. But if the persons who furnish supplies are unwilling to take bills in payment on these terms, they must be paid in cash, which Mr. Duff will furnish in the usual manner.

As the Spanish government have agreed to supply the British troops from the Spanish magazines, as one of the conditions on which they were detached to Cadiz, and I have reported to His Majesty's government that I had made this condition, I cannot consent to depart from it without their orders to that purpose. I therefore request that the bills for these supplies may be given to His Majesty's minister at Cadiz, as suggested to Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, in my letter of the 27th Feb., and to you of the 16th of last month.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 11th June, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 6th. The enemy have certainly not abandoned the Trocadero.

So much inconvenience results from the publication of two official statements of the same transactions, even where two individuals mean most fairly by each other, that I think it better that I should make the reports of the operations of the army to the Portuguese government. I shall send them a copy of my weekly report to the Sec. of State; and I shall only request them not to publish them in ordinary cases, and not to publish them, in any case, till after the packet shall have sailed for England. I have repeatedly desired that the Portuguese government might have half of all the money received into the military chest, till the debt from the military to the chest of the 'Aids,' on account of the two sevenths of the receipts, should be reduced. I see no objection to their having all the French money, and as much paper money immediately; but I should wish to speak to the Commissary Gen. upon that subject and the wheat, which I shall do to-morrow.

The conduct of the government, in respect to the Corregidor of Lamego, conveys to my mind a clear proof of their reluctance to punish; and in some degree of their desire to screen a person of this description from all punishment. The letter from me, enclosed in Dom M. Forjaz's note to you of the 6th, is circular, and a mere form, to enforce the requisition of a Commissary; and you will observe that it refers in terms to a requisition which was to accompany it. Now the requisition from the Commissary, which accompanied this circular letter, was dated the 22d March, and it appears that the letter from the magistrate of Celorico was dated the 30th March. My complaint of want of carriages was in the end of April or beginning of May. But how is the fact regarding this very requisition for wine, which is stated to be the cause of the failure in supplying carriages? 12 carts loaded with wine were all that were sent.

We are now in the greatest distress for carriages, and I have consequently no forge for the cavalry. I have forwarded many complaints to the Special commission, but have not yet heard of the result; and I only request you to tell Dom M. Forjaz that, notwithstanding my good opinion and respect, and regard for the government, I am determined to proclaim to the people of this country, and to the world, my reasons for withdrawing from my position in this country, if I should be obliged to withdraw

by want; and to make known my earnest and repeated, but fruitless, entreaties since last November, that the government would exert themselves to enforce obedience from the magistrates and people of the country.

I fear now that, for want of assistance to poor Leite, the Commission will be useless.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorigo, 11th June, 1810.

I received yesterday your letter of the 2d; that of the 22d May has never reached me, nor has Alava arrived; and you either gave it to him or to a Spanish messenger who passed through to Ciudad Rodrigo some days ago, and who, I conclude, gave my letters to the Governor, and I shall never see them. I have more than once observed that letters are not safe in private hands. Some from Gen. Graham are likewise missing. The movements to which you refer, as likely to be made by Mortier, were made towards the end of last month. Ballesteros drove in the French posts in the Sierra Morena towards Seville; and Mortier afterwards attacked him with 6000 or 7000 men at Aracena, in the Sierra, on the 27th May. The action lasted till night, when Ballesteros retired, having had 300 men killed and many wounded. The French returned towards Seville next day, and Ballesteros resumed his position at Aracena. It is said that the French left 1500 men dead upon the field of battle; for which part of the story I cannot answer. Since that time all has been quiet in Estremadura. Regnier has his head quarters at Merida, with his troops cantoned on both sides of the Guadiana.

Since I wrote last the enemy have been collecting troops from all quarters for their enterprise in this country; and they have now in our front Ney's corps, which we know consists of 18,000 effective infantry, and 8 regiments of cavalry, besides artillery; and Junot's corps, of which the return has been intercepted, being 34,400 infantry, and 8800 cavalry, besides artillery, including hospitals and depôts in France and Spain; but I should think that we cannot reckon Junot's corps less than 25,000, and Ney's as many. They have brought Bonet out of Asturias, and a part of his division, at least, must be added to these numbers. They have but very few or no troops left in Asturias and Leon. The heavy guns left Salamanca on the 28th of last month, but had not arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo by the last accounts which I have: the enemy had constructed 2 bridges upon the Agueda, one above, the other below, the town, and had passed some people over yesterday, and the communication with it had become difficult, but, as I understand from Gen. Craufurd, not impossible.

This *bicouque* has been in part invested for nearly 2 months; and a fortnight has elapsed since the guns moved from Salamanca; and the French are not yet in possession of the ground they must have for the siege. This is not the way in which they have conquered Europe! Having obliged the French to collect an army for this enterprise, that is, to make the attack of the worst fortified place in the world, I fear that I can do no more for it. I think that I might have delayed still longer the complete investment of the place, and the chances of war and chapter of accidents, which in these days are not allowed to be counted for any thing, might have enabled me to prevent the siege altogether, if the government pos-

sessed any strength, or desired to have any thing done but what is *safe and cheap*. But, with an army considerably inferior in numbers, consisting of a large proportion of troops of a doubtful description, which are scarcely formed, and the enemy being infinitely (three times) superior in cavalry, I think I ought not now to risk a general action in the plains to relieve the place. However, I do not yet give the matter up. The defence of a Spanish place must not be reckoned upon according to the ordinary rules. If they will defend themselves as others have, the French must feel the consequences of Massena having weakened every other point to collect this large army; and if he should be induced to reduce it at all, I shall be at hand to assist and relieve them.

I have no doubt whatever but that the French feel, throughout the Peninsula, the inadequacy even of the large force they have in it, to complete the conquest and to establish and support the government; and the continued hostility of the people must distress them much. All the intercepted correspondence tends to show their misery and despondence. Although they may succeed in taking Ciudad Rodrigo, it does not follow that even the force which they have collected will be sufficient to oblige us to evacuate the Peninsula; and as long as we shall not shrink, the cause will not be lost.

I have heard the reports to which Gen. Castaños refers, respecting Massena. It was supposed that an insurrection in the south of France was organised, of which he was the head: indeed, I believe some persons had communications upon the subject with the late Lord Collingwood: and I was induced to believe that there was some foundation for these reports, as they were in circulation in Spain at the same time that they came from the fleet in the Mediterranean, and could not have originated as false reports from the same source. However, it is evident that there was no foundation for them. I think, however, there is something discordant in all the French arrangements for Spain. Joseph divides his Kingdom into *préfectures*, while Napoleon parcels it out into governments. Joseph makes a great military expedition into the south of Spain, and undertakes the siege of Cadiz, while Napoleon places all the troops and half the Kingdom under the command of Massena, and calls it the *Armée de Portugal*. It is impossible that these measures can be adopted in concert; and I should suspect that the impatience of Napoleon's temper will not bear the delay of the completion of the conquest of Spain; and that he is desirous of making one great effort to remove us by the means of Massena.

The neglect of the work at S<sup>t</sup> Petri is truly consistent with the Spanish character.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 12th June, 1810.

The state of the musket ammunition in Ciudad Rodrigo is not so bad as to render it necessary that you should incur the risk of any loss, in order to throw in an additional quantity. It is what they are most deficient in, and it would have been better if their wants had been fully supplied in time. But they are not in such want as to induce me to recommend that you should incur the risk of losing part of your cavalry to supply them,

or to make a larger arrangement to cover a communication with the place. I am apprehensive that I shall not be able to do more for them than oblige the enemy to keep a large force collected in this quarter for the purpose of this enterprise.

With an army one-fourth inferior in numbers, a part of it being of a doubtful description, and at all events but just made, and not more than one-third of the numbers of the enemy's cavalry, it would be an operation of some risk to leave our mountains, and bring on a general action in the plains, and would, most probably, accelerate the period of our evacuation of the Peninsula. However, I do not give over all thoughts of attempting their relief, at least by throwing in supplies, which possibly might be done without a general action. This must depend upon the position which Massena continues to hold with the right of the army.

You will be concerned to hear of the illness of Mr. Windham. I send you what Lady Liverpool writes to me of him on the 26th. It appears that on the 30th he was still very ill.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

Celorico, 12th June, 1810.

I enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from Lieut. Gen. Graham, relative to supplies for the troops at Cadiz, and the copy of my answer; and request you to give corresponding instructions to the Commissary at Cadiz.

When I detached troops to Cadiz from this army, I stipulated with the Spanish government that they should be fed from the Spanish magazines, which was agreed to. The Commanding officers there having subsequently represented that it was necessary for the troops that certain articles should be purchased by the British Commissary, I enclose copies of the instructions which I gave to Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart on the 27th Feb., and Lieut. Gen. Graham on the 16th May, regarding the mode of procuring payment for these articles. The same measures must be adopted regarding any supplies purchased, or any extraordinary expense incurred at Cadiz.

It will be desirable that you should furnish the Commissary at Cadiz with blank bills upon the Treasury, or authorise Mr. Duff to supply him with such as he may require to make the payments in bills, adverted to in the enclosed copy of a letter to Lieut. Gen. Graham.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 13th June, 1810.

I have received your letter of yesterday, with one from Gen. Loison, enclosing letters from officers prisoners of war, and their receipt for the last sum of money sent to them.

You did not send me the letter from Carrera, mentioned in your postscript. I have a letter from Badajoz of the 10th, stating that the enemy's cavalry had appeared there on the preceding evening, and carried off some cattle, &c. About 3000 infantry entered Lobon from Almendralejo on the 10th.

P.S. Let me hear if a heavy fire should be opened on Ciudad Rodrigo. I believe the letter from Carrera to which you referred was for Col. O'Lawlor, and he has received it.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 13th June, 1810.

From a late letter from the Sec. of State, I learn that the 1st batt. 21st regt., and the Chasseurs Britanniques, and the 31st and 39th regts., expected from the Mediterranean to reinforce this army, are to go to Cadiz for orders; and I request you to give orders to those regiments to proceed without loss of time on their passage to Lisbon. Adverting to the possibility that we may be obliged to evacuate Portugal, and to the small quantity of tonnage for horses which I have in the Tagus, compared with the number of horses with the army, and to the expediency of endeavoring to save as many horses for the service as possible, and that I might have it in my power to save the whole by sending some to Cadiz, I request you to give directions to the Commissary at Cadiz, to endeavor to collect at that place a magazine of 30,000 rations of straw, and 30,000 rations of forage corn. This magazine may eventually be of use to you, even if I should not have occasion to send any horses to Cadiz.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 13th June, 1810.

Since I wrote to you on the 11th, I have received your letter which you had written on the 22d May, and had given to Alava, but I have heard nothing of Alava himself.

The King arrived at Madrid on the 13th of last month, and I hear that he has since been at Valladolid. Nothing has occurred of importance since I wrote to you, excepting that Ciudad Rodrigo is completely invested; but not with any great force on this side of the river Agueda.

The enemy's cavalry approached Badajoz again on the evening of the 9th, and carried off some cattle, &c.

I return Gen. Graham's letter. Sir Brent Spencer is come here instead of Lord W. Bentinck. I could not spare the Commissary Gen. to go to Cadiz, as proposed by Gen. Graham. I have a very good opinion of Mr. O'Meara, but I am apprehensive that Lieut. Col. Gordon will send somebody to Cadiz to supersede him. I shall keep him at the head of the department at Cadiz, if a superior officer should not be sent from England to take charge of it.

I am apprehensive that it would not answer to employ more persons than one to negotiate bills upon the Treasury at Cadiz. One consequence would certainly be to raise the rate of exchange, and I should doubt that two or three shops would sell more bills than one. Duff's opinion is decidedly against the employment of any other channel for these negotiations besides himself.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 13th June, 1810.

I have received your 2 letters of the 9th. The government police regulation is quite inefficient. The object of the plan I proposed was to have a force capable of preventing the collection of mobs, and their mischief when collected; which mobs are the troops of the conspirators. The object of the decree of the government is to discover conspirators and prevent conspiracies; but if one should by chance escape them, or if the mob should collect of its own accord, their plan gives them no force to get the better of it. It is therefore essentially deficient, and ought to be

amended without loss of time. I am obliged to you for the intelligence from San Sebastian, &c.

I had directed that Le Cor should be supplied from our magazines at Abrantes. The difficulty in establishing the 2d line on the Zezere consists not only in provisions for the militia, but in money to pay them; as I understand that they are more expensive when drawn from their homes, than they are when left at them. However, *coûte que coûte*, we must draw them out soon.

I received from the Sec. of State a copy of Mr. Harrison's letter to Col. Bunbury, and we have completely refuted him. I will send you all the papers upon this subject. He took an estimate made for September, October, and November, as the scale of the expense for 8 months, without adverting to the alteration of circumstances occasioned by change of position, increase of prices, of numbers, &c., and concluded upon his own statement that we ought to have money in hand, (having included in it, by the bye, some sums which we had not received,) notwithstanding that our distress had been complained of by every post, and I had particularly desired in December that £200,000 might be sent out, and a sum monthly, equal in amount to the increased Portuguese subsidy. The amount of our estimate now is above £400,000 *per mensem*. I have heard no more of the additional £40,000 Portuguese subsidy.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorigo, 13th June, 1810.

I have spoken to the Commissary Gen. on the subject of the proposition contained in your letter of the 6th, for the relief of the Portuguese government. The order that they shall have half of all the money that arrives, still continues in force, and will be obeyed to as great an extent as may be possible consistently with the urgent calls upon the military chest. Besides this, they may have immediately all the money which we have in French coins, and any sum in paper money which it may be thought proper to give them, consistently with the attention which it is necessary to give to the state of the market for the sale of paper.

In respect to the wheat, Mr. Kennedy was desirous of considering your proposition upon that subject till the next post shall leave this place before he should give an answer to it.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorigo, 13th June, 1810.

As soon as the enemy had completed their bridge under Los Carboncros, they passed some troops over the Agueda, and they occupied with their piquets, on the 11th, all the roads leading to Ciudad Rodrigo on this side of the Agueda; and the communication with the place is at an end. The heavy guns are, however, not yet brought up; and by the last letter which I had from the Governor, of the 10th, it appeared that he still possessed the ground from which the enemy could make their attack with most advantage.

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 6th inst., the enemy have shown some troops, principally cavalry, in the neighbourhood of Puebla de Sanabria and Mombuey; and on the night of the 7th inst. they attacked Gen. Echavarri at Alcañices, and dispersed his troops, and plundered the



place. I imagine these troops were the division of Gen. Bonet on their march from the northern provinces of Asturias and Leon into Castille, to join the main body of the army assembled under the command of Marshal Massena. The enemy have likewise shown some troops on the left bank of the Douro, between the Tormes and the Agueda, which are probably the rear of the corps of the Duc d'Abrantes, or the head of the division of Bonet on their march for the same object. Nothing of any importance has occurred in Estremadura. On the 9th a body of about 3000 infantry, with some artillery, went to Lobon, between Merida and Badajoz; and on the same evening a body of about 400 cavalry drove off some cattle from the neighbourhood of Badajoz. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 2d inst., when nothing of importance had occurred. The enemy had not evacuated the Trocadero.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorigo, 14th June, 1810.

I have received your letter of yesterday. It is very desirable that we should keep our advanced posts, and the piquets from them, in a forward situation, as long as possible; at the same time I am convinced that when the rivers shall fall, the enemy will pass the Agueda upon your left with the right of his army, as soon as he shall have brought up the ordnance and materials for the siege. The reasons which induce us to wish to maintain our advanced posts in a forward situation, would induce them to desire to force us in, and with their strength they can have no difficulty in effecting their object. I beg you to advert to this circumstance, and be in readiness to withdraw, when you shall find that the enemy pass the Agueda in strength.

P.S. I have no news this day from Badajoz. I had yesterday a letter of the 11th from Silveira. The detachment which had attacked Alcañices retired towards Benavente.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorigo, 15th June, 1810.

I received last night letters from Gen. Silveira to the 13th. The Spanish division under Gen. Mahy had made an attack upon the French at Astorga, but had been repulsed, and had returned to Villa Franca. The French cavalry, which had been at Alcañices, &c., had returned to Benavente, and towards Astorga.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorigo, 15th June, 1810.

Nothing of any importance has occurred since I wrote to you last. The enemy have not yet brought the heavy guns to Ciudad Rodrigo; nor have they passed the Agueda in force, excepting by the bridges near Ciudad Rodrigo, for the purpose of investing the place.

It is desirable that you should have a communication with Col. Le Cor, upon the certainty and speed of which you can depend, and let it go every day, as our *parté* does.

I do not feel very confident in the capacity or inclination of the people at Ciudad Rodrigo to hold out, notwithstanding all their boasting; and when the enemy shall get possession of that place, he will have it in his power to choose his point of attack; and I think it probable that he will

attack Le Cor, so as to get between you and me. You have instructions applicable to that movement; and you will derive great advantage from an early knowledge of what is passing on this side of the Tagus.

As the weather is becoming hot, it is necessary that we should advert to the possibility of our troops becoming sickly in Alentejo. I wish that you would make inquiries which are the most healthy stations, and occupy them preferably to others. I have always heard that Portalegre is very healthy, which is fortunate; but Arronches is not so. However, your own inquiries will give you the best information. I would recommend that the troops should not go into huts, as long as it is possible to avoid it; and do not allow them to turn out before daylight, or to be out after nightfall, particularly if you should be obliged to keep any of them in stations reported to be unhealthy.

P.S. Beresford tells me that he has placed the 5th caçadores, now in Elvas, at your disposal. I have omitted to mention to you that I propose to attach Gen. Leith\* to your division. I should give him the command of Gen. Tilson's brigade, and of the 2d division; freeing you, for the present, from the details of that division, and leaving you in command of the whole force in Alentejo.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorio, 15th June, 1810.

Col. Fletcher has repeatedly informed me of the assistance which you have uniformly given him, in the great work which he has undertaken and has now nearly executed, for which I beg leave to return you my best thanks. There are, however, two or three points in which I think you could render us very essential service, upon which I am now about to trouble you. One is to give us some of Popham's telegraph vocabularies. I am very desirous that the naval code of signals and cyphers should be cut out of these books, in order that no evil should result from their falling into bad hands. I should also be very much obliged to you if you could give us some assistance in forming an establishment for each of these stations. I cannot well spare officers to go down and learn how to use a telegraph; and I am afraid of the mistakes and blunders which will result from using them by their agency, without previous instruction. Officers of marines, or steady midshipmen, or even non-commissioned officers of marines who know something of signals, or sober signal men, one at each station, with one seaman at each, would be a sufficient establishment for the present, and I would add to it what would be necessary hereafter. I would also request you to consider of the assistance which you will have it in your power to give us in the way of armed vessels. The right of our position will be at Alhandra, where the Tagus begins to open, where you could give us great assistance and security. I should think also that a gun boat or two, stationed on the coast between Mafra and Maceira, would be of service, in case the enemy should attempt to push a column along the beach.

You will have heard from Mr. Stuart the state of affairs here. Notwithstanding all their boasting, I doubt whether the people of Ciudad Rodrigo will make a vigorous defence. The enemy have not yet attacked them,

\* Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Leith, K.B., &c.

nor have they brought up the heavy guns, and yet they are already crying out. They have a formidable army in our front, but not enough yet to venture upon a serious attack of this country.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorigo, 15th June, 1810.

I was in hopes that I should be able to send you an answer this day, respecting the delivery to the Portuguese government of the wheat contracted for by the Commissary Gen.; but I find from Mr. Kennedy, that he was obliged to wait for an answer from Mr. Dunmore, before he could venture to decide upon your proposition. In the mean time, as the wheat is most probably not arrived, no inconvenience will be felt from the delay in giving the answer.

I have received your letter of the 11th, for which I am much obliged to you. Beresford will be here to-day, and I shall have some further conversation with him about the Special commission. I have sent many people to be tried by it, but it has not yet produced any effect. The want of carriages, and the desertion of drivers, become more grievous every day; and I am obliged to order an increase of our mule establishment, and of course of our expense, in order to make good this deficiency. I fear that all these carriages will fall into the hands of the enemy, who will work them as they ought to be worked. It is grievous to think, that the want of habits of subordination and obedience in this good and loyal people, and of confidence and vigor in the government, should tend so manifestly as it does to the loss of the country.

I have accounts this morning from Ciudad Rodrigo. The French have not yet fired a shot at the place, nor have they brought up the heavy ordnance; but the people begin to cry out. I fear that, after all their boasting, they will not hold out. I have no doubt that Massena has got together 50,000 men for this enterprise. This number, however, will not do his business for him in Portugal, whatever may be the result of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

I am going to write to the Regency respecting their issuing a proclamation to have the harvest beat out as soon as possible after it is reaped; also respecting their taking pains to collect at Lisbon as large a quantity of provisions, particularly grain, as possible. We shall have a great consumption there if we should be shut up in our positions for any time; which certainly will be the case, unless the enemy should introduce such a force into the country as to oblige me to withdraw. It is desirable that you should press Lord Wellesley to encourage the exportation, as soon as possible, of cargoes of flour particularly, but if not to be got, of wheat, or barley, or oats from Ireland; I shall not be in want for my troops, but the supply of the inhabitants may be a matter of difficulty, and should be looked to by the government. I am afraid also that they are forming magazines of too great an extent in the Mondego, and even in the Douro: mine are limited, and so placed and circumstanced, that I can remove them or destroy them when I please; and in case of our removal from hence, the enemy would get nothing: I shall speak to Beresford upon this subject. There is really no use in having 800,000 rations of rice at Figueira, which I fear cannot be consumed; its removal is almost impos-

sible, and its destruction very doubtful. Their great store should be at Lisbon, from whence they should feed periodically the Douro, the Mondego, and Abrantes. If the enemy should get possession of Ciudad Rodrigo, their next operation will most probably be upon Le Cor, if they are strong enough. This will necessarily remove us from the valley of the Mondego, and all these great magazines here will at least be useless.

*The A.G. to Major Lindsay, Belem.*

15th June, 1810.

In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 11th inst, I am directed to inform you that it will only be necessary for officers commanding detachments to send in nominal returns of the men under their charge to their several regiments as near to the 24th of each month as possible; and, allowing these returns reach the different regiments on that day, the periods must of course differ according to the distance the regiment may be from the detachment. In addition to this, you will please to forward to this office a general nominal return of the whole of the detachments under your command together, so as to arrive as soon after the 25th of each month as possible.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Macdonald, A.A.G., Cadiz.*

15th June, 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22d inst. You will already have received a memorandum relative to returns required by this office; but, for the purpose of being more accurate and explanatory, I now enclose you a list of the different returns, &c. that will be required.

In addition to the individual monthly returns, the correctness of which you will have the goodness to superintend very narrowly, a general monthly return will be required; and it will be of the utmost moment to us that these be dispatched from Cadiz the very first opportunity after the 25th of each month, in order that they may arrive in time at the head quarters to be included in our general monthly return. Should unforeseen circumstances, however, prevent this, I shall always forward our return, and send a separate monthly return of the troops at Cadiz when it arrives.

In adverting to the new form of monthly returns, I herewith enclose a copy of a letter I have addressed to the A. A. Gs. of divisions, explanatory of the mode in which the Commander of the Forces wishes the prisoners of war and missing to be accounted for; and by the form I send, you will see the addition that is to be made to the monthly return, general as well as regimental.

So soon as the orderly books sent to Cadiz some time back are copied, you will please to return them. I transmit the G. O. that have been issued of late, which it is necessary you should be in possession of.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorigo, 16th June, 1810.

I received last night a letter from Silveira of the 14th. He mentions a vague report of infantry having arrived at Zamora, from Salamanca and Valladolid. I have also a letter from Gen. Mahy of the 11th, giving an account of his operations, which appear to have deprived the French of Leon. While he was engaged in this operation, the French attacked his advanced guard from Astorga. Let me know if the rain which is now falling extends to you, and makes any impression on the Agueda.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorigo, 17th June, 1810.

By letters of the 13th and 14th, received this morning from Badajoz, it appears that Regnier has collected his corps in the neighbourhood of Merida, probably with the intention of drawing Gen. Hill's attention that way.

I have nothing of any consequence from Silveira. Gen. Beresford has

frequently expressed a wish that I should send back the 2d regt. of caçadores, in order that they may receive their recruits, &c.; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will make arrangements for sending them back, letting me know by what route.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 17th June, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 13th inst. I hope that Mr. Dunmore may have been able to give you some money within these last few days, as I understand that they have lately raised a large sum by bills on the Treasury. However, I shall speak to Mr. Kennedy on the subject this day. The troops in this army have not yet received their pay to the 24th May, which they ought to have received, according to the King's regulations, on the 25th April. I have spoken to Beresford, as I told you I should, respecting the extent of the magazines to be placed in the Douro and the Mondego for the Portuguese troops; and he wishes them to be confined to the amount stated in the arrangement which he settled with Dom M. Forjaz.

I do not think that any measure can be adopted, with propriety, to prevent the circulation of false reports, or to remedy the evil which results from them. I believe that false reports respecting the operations of armies are always circulated, particularly where British armies and officers are concerned. These reports are circulated even in this town, where there is no reserve upon any subject, and every person who chooses to call at head quarters sees the reports of intelligence received. Then we are the most indefatigable writers of letters and of news that exist in the world, and the fashion and spirit of the times give encouragement to lies. I know no mode of getting the better of the inconvenience, which is certainly the consequence of the circulation of these false reports, excepting to have no reserve on the subject of the real and well founded intelligence from the armies. I would not recommend publication, as it might lead to inconveniences of another description, and is beneath the dignity of every government; nor would I, as Col. Peacocke very innocently but indiscreetly did last year, check by any public order or proclamation the circulation of any description of report.

The enemy broke ground before Ciudad Rodrigo on the night before last, but they have not yet brought up their heavy ordnance.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 18th June, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 15th with my brother's dispatch.

The return of Regnier's corps agrees nearly exactly with what I have always supposed it to be; and I think that you have nothing to apprehend from it. It is probable, from the collection of his troops at and about Merida, that he is going to strike a blow at O'Donell, or to annoy Badajoz by another reconnaissance. You know how to act.

P.S. Nothing new here. The enemy broke ground on the 15th at Ciudad Rodrigo.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 18th June, 1810, 6 A.M.

I have received this morning the substance of some dispatches and

returns of the 1st May, from Ney, intercepted in Biscay, which makes his infantry, in effectives, 23,105; cavalry, effectives, 4856, 4993 horses; field artillery, 1229; siege artillery, 1415; miners, &c., 1006: total, 31,611. Besides these there are 5023 men of this corps in hospital.

I have just received your letter of the 17th, and I shall send an answer to the government to-morrow.

I received yesterday an English newspaper of the 1st; Mr. Windham was still very ill. The bulletin says that he had passed a restless night and was not better. An Italian servant of the Duke of Cumberland has made an attempt to assassinate the Duke in his sleep, in the night, with his own sabre. He had wounded the Duke desperately, but he was alive and not supposed to be in danger. The man had cut his own throat afterwards, and was supposed to have been mad or jealous.

Mr. Banks had carried two questions against government by majorities of 10, in favor of the abolition of sinecure offices.

Silveira, in a letter of the 17th, received last night, tells me that he had received reports that the French had 10,000 infantry at Zamora.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

The intercepted letters, of which I told you yesterday that I had received the abstracts, contain accounts of the march of several small detachments of 2000, 3000, and 4000 men, towards Castille, certainly to join Massena. There is also a return of Sera's division, amounting to 7223 men. This division is called the rear guard. It was on the 1st May at Vitoria, Tolosa, &c.: but we have heard of it so often that I should imagine it has come forward also. I am also certain, from a paragraph in one of the Duc d'Abrantes' letters, that Bonet's division which has come from Asturias is distinct from the 8th corps; so that altogether we have in our front a tolerable mass of men.

The letter from Gen. Silveira of the 17th, which I received last night, states that Kellermann (who was Governor General *de la haute Espagne*, and commanded for some time at Valladolid) and Bessières (who commanded either the whole or a part of the cavalry of the 8th corps during the siege of Astorga) had moved with the cavalry from Benavente, and the infantry which he had reported the day before to be at Zamora, to Astorga. This infantry was reported to Gen. Silveira to be 10,000 men; and this report is confirmed by a letter of the 11th and 12th from Salamanca, stating that there were 8000 or 9000 troops at that place. It is probable, therefore, either that the enemy have been alarmed by the movements of Mahy upon Leon, or that, as their reinforcements have come up, they have resumed their original project of an attack upon our left, at the same time with one upon our centre and right.

I received yesterday an account from Serradilla on the Tagus, that the French had ordered rations for 15,000 men at Plasencia on the 15th. There is certainly no want of food at Ciudad Rodrigo. I fear there is much more food than the garrison and inhabitants can consume. They had provisions for 40 days for the whole population when invested. To the last moment the markets of the place were well supplied. Under these circumstances, and at this period of the operations, I do not think

it would be proper to make an attempt to give them relief. From the numbers which it is now evident we have in our front, we may find it impossible to make the attempt at any period of the siege; but I do not think that any peculiar advantage would result from making the attempt at present; and not only would any relief given hereafter have much more effect, but it would be much more justifiable to incur a risk to make the attempt, after the garrison shall have shown their determination to resist, by standing a serious attack. We must, however, look to what, I fear, is the more probable event, that the place will be lost, and that we shall not be able to make any attempt to relieve it.

I have occupied Concepcion with a view to be enabled to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, and to cover your retreat upon Almeida, if you should be obliged to withdraw; at the same time that we are prepared for the evacuation and effectual destruction of that fort, if we should be obliged to withdraw entirely from the frontier. From the enemy's strength in our front, of which we have now a positive knowledge, it is almost certain that if you are obliged to withdraw from your position at Gallegos, it will be useless to hold Concepcion. All the preparations are made for destroying the fort; and I write to Gen. Cox to have in readiness the means for drawing off the guns and stores from that place at a short notice.

P.S. I enclose a letter for the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.

To Don Andres Herrasti, Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo. Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th, and from the information which it contains, and from circumstances which have come to my knowledge of the operations which the enemy are carrying on, I am perfectly aware of your situation.

I refer you to my former letters and to my communications by Col. O'Lawlor, and you may depend upon it, that I have not altered my intentions as therein communicated.\* I have made every effort to have a diversion created in favor of Ciudad Rodrigo with some success; and I will not fail to do every thing in my power to assist the place, but I refer you to my former communications.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

Since I wrote to you on the 11th, I have received your letters, Nos. 11 and 12, of the 20th and 21st May, one marked separate of the 19th May, and one marked separate of the 22d May.

I beg that you will direct the officer at the head of the Commissariat department at Cadiz to make such advances as you may think necessary, from time to time, to any of the heads of departments or other officers at Cadiz, upon estimates to be furnished by such officers; and these advances will be covered by warrants from me, when those officers shall send in their accounts of expenditures.

I request you also to continue to make such temporary arrangements as you may think proper for the conduct of the duty of the several departments at Cadiz. I beg that you will detain Major MacGregor Murray,

\* See extracts of letters dated 7th May and 6th June, 1810, pp. 55 and 105.

as an A.A.G. at Cadiz, and I shall put him in orders as an Assistant, to do duty at Cadiz, till His Majesty's pleasure shall be known.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

I enclose a letter from Lieut. Col. Beckwith regarding the allowed practice in the 95th, respecting the appointments of staff to detachments from that corps employed on service; and I request you to allow of the employment and payment of staff accordingly, to the detachments of the battalions of the 95th, at Cadiz.

To J. Murray, Esq., Commissary General.

Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 16th, and I am happy to find that you are sensible that I have always done every thing in my power to support and aid your exertions, and to facilitate, as far as was in my power, the performance of the arduous duties of your situation.

Notwithstanding the various difficulties with which you have had to contend, of the nature of which those can have no idea who have no experience of the difficulty of supplying an army in a country but ill provided with food; in which the roads and communications are bad; and the means of conveyance bad of their kind, slow in their motions, and difficult to be procured, you have been very successful, as the state of the army, at the present moment in all its branches, shows; and this effect could not have been produced without great and well directed exertion and arrangement by yourself.

It was impossible for me to resist a compliance with the desire which I was sensible you must have felt even when you arrived in this country, to be relieved from your situation; notwithstanding that I was convinced that you would bring to a close, with advantage, a service, the progress of which you had conducted with so much success, and I felt the inconvenience which was likely to result from the change at the moment it was made. I therefore consented to your being relieved; but I assure you I regret the loss of your assistance.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

I received yesterday morning from Gen. Hill your letter of the 9th, with its enclosure, for which I am much obliged to you. The abstracts of the dispatches and returns which you have sent me are very interesting; but it would be most desirable to have the originals, or copies of those relating to the enemy's corps on this frontier.

Nothing has occurred of any consequence since I wrote to you on the 13th. The enemy broke ground before Ciudad Rodrigo on the 15th, but had not brought up the heavy ordnance. I have a letter from the Governor, of the 13th, in which he holds stout language. Gen. Mahy moved upon Leon from Villa Franca, twice between the 4th and 9th inst., and I believe obtained possession of that city: but the enemy attacked his advanced guard from Astorga; and he was consequently obliged to retire. They had before dispersed Echavarri's small corps which had long been at Alcañices, by an attack by surprise on the night of the 7th. Since they heard of Mahy's movements, they have reinforced Astorga with cavalry



and infantry; of the latter, it is said, 10,000 men; and they have either been alarmed by Mahy's movements, or they have resumed their plan of attacking us by our left, as well as by our centre and right, since they have been joined by the several reinforcements, whose march is reported in the letters of which you have sent me the abstracts.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 19th June, 1810.

I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford of the 14th inst., regarding the accounts of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion. Although His Majesty's government engaged to pay a certain sum for 20,000 Portuguese troops to the 31st Dec. 1809, and the Portuguese government had actually in their service a larger number than 20,000 men, the regiments which were returned by Marshal Beresford to the late minister, Mr. Villiers, as the subsidised troops, not having been complete, and not having amounted to the number His Majesty engaged to pay, the Portuguese government did not receive up to the 31st Dec. 1809, the full amount of the subsidy. His Majesty's government will have learnt from the King's minister at Lisbon, the exact amount which they did receive, and for what number of men in each month.

The Loyal Lusitanian Legion was not among the number of the subsidised regiments during the year 1809, for the reasons stated by Marshal Beresford; but if this corps had been among the subsidised regiments, it would make no difference in the settlement of their regimental accounts, which would equally have been settled by the Portuguese authorities. All that appears wanting to effect this settlement is regular accounts and vouchers on the part of the corps; and it does not appear necessary, nor would it facilitate the settlement, to include the corps among the subsidised regiments for the year 1809. But if the government should determine that the Lusitanian Legion should be one of the subsidised regiments for that year, it will be necessary to allow to the Portuguese government the subsidy for that corps for the year 1809, in addition to the sum already paid. Even in that case I imagine that the Portuguese government will not have received the full subsidy for 20,000 men in any one month of 1809. In respect to the claims of the English officers of the Lusitanian Legion, they are chargeable upon the separate fund of £100,000 *per annum*, of the subsidy allotted to defray the expense of all the English officers in the Portuguese army. There will be no difficulty in settling these claims, when regular accounts and vouchers shall be sent in.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

I have nothing this morning either from Estremadura or *Tras os Montes* of any importance. There is a report that Mortier had moved across the Guadalquivir from Seville.

I find that there are some thoughts of making a sortie from Cadiz,

G. O.

Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

7. The Commander of the Forces requests that the order of the 19th May, 1809, may be understood as applying to the horses, &c. brought in by deserters from the enemy; it is desirable, and it must be the wish of every officer in the army, that these men should have the full benefit which may result from the sales of what they may bring off with them, and therefore their horses, &c., should be allowed to be sold by public auction.

which I think must fail. Whether it fails or succeeds, it will affect our situation in this country, I fear, injuriously.

Whatever may be the fate of Ciudad Rodrigo, I think the French will soon discover that they have not a force sufficiently large to blockade Cadiz, and attack us in Portugal at the same time; and if we begin to make sorties from Cadiz, they will remove their force from thence to throw it upon this country: at the same time that the force at Cadiz, for want of cavalry, cannot be of any use to us as an army in the field acting on the rear or flanks of the enemy.

P.S. As the hussars want refitting a little, and it will give Col. Arents-childt an opportunity of bringing the foreigners to the rear, I propose to send you 2 squadrons of the 16th light dragoons, to relieve 2 of the hussars. The 16th are very strong; when I saw them the other day they were 59 file a squadron.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

I had last night the honor of receiving your letters. The proposition contained in my letter of the 13th May, to fix your hospital at Ceuta, was only for your consideration. You must be the best judge of the propriety of adopting the measure; and I am perfectly satisfied that it should not be adopted, if you do not consider it advisable. I have directed Dr. Franck to send to Cadiz all the medical assistance which can be spared from the service of this army, and the stores which Sir J. Fellowes has required.

The case of the bill of the 94th regt. for £1000, is entirely distinct from other transactions of the same kind which have come before me; and if Mr. Murray had mentioned it to me, I should have authorised him to give cash for the bill at *par*. This bill is drawn by the public officer at Jersey, on the Paymaster Gen., and would be credited, as cash, to the Commissary Gen. in his accounts. I shall accordingly give directions that the demand of Mr. Dunmore, on the committee of Paymastership of the 94th regt., should not be enforced.

I hope that my letter to you of the 11th June (marked A), respecting the hospitals of the Guards, will have induced Brig. Gen. Dilkes to desire that his letter of the 6th June to you might not be transmitted to England. I entirely concur in the arrangement which you have made for the working parties on the Isla, and their payment, as stated in your dispatch (No. 16). I conclude that you have reported to the Commander in Chief all the appointments which you have made, and I have no objection to them till his pleasure shall be known.

I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will desire Mr. O'Meara to send to the Commissary Gen. a return of the Commissariat establishment at Cadiz, including Mr. Horne and Mr. Stoneman, appointed to act as Assist. Commissaries by yourself. I have desired Mr. Kennedy to comply with your requisition for further assistance, if it should be in his power; but I am apprehensive that he will find it impossible to do so. Dr. Franck is at present indisposed, and I cannot refer to him Sir J. Fellowes's letter of the 16th May, enclosed in your dispatch (No. 16); but I have no recollection of the detention in Portugal of any gentlemen in the medical department destined for the service at Cadiz.

I shall write to England for a supply of arms for the British troops at Cadiz. I am much obliged to you for the information contained in your dispatch (No. 17). My letter of the 11th inst. (marked B) contains an answer to that part of this dispatch which refers to contracts for supplies, and to the payment for them by bills on the Treasury. There is no intention whatever, here, of sending from hence a person to supersede Mr. O'Meara in the charge of the Commissariat department at Cadiz, and I hope that his appointment as a Dep. Commissary Gen. will be confirmed by the proper authorities in England. It will be impossible for the Commissary Gen. to go to Cadiz.

My letter of yesterday's date conveyed to you my opinion on the reference which you had made to me in your letter (No. 13) of the 22d May; and I am concerned to find, by your dispatch (No. 18), that it does not agree with the decision of the Commander in Chief upon the same subject. The decision of the Commander in Chief, till altered upon a further representation of the case, must be considered final; but generally, it would be desirable that those points which you refer to me for an opinion should not be referred to the authorities in England, unless my opinion should not be satisfactory. With the best intentions on my part to decide on every point according to the regulations of the service, and the wishes of the Commander in Chief, I may, as in the case of the staff of the 95th regt., differ from him, and this difference will only embarrass you.

I beg that you will send Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart to Portugal when you think proper. I think it probable from the opinion which your dispatch (No. 20) contains of the intended operation proposed to you by Gen. Blake, that you will have exerted your influence to prevent its adoption, and I have no hesitation in giving my opinion of it. I have no doubt whatever that the enemy's force in front of Cadiz is much underrated. When the French passed the Sierra Morena in January, the corps now before Cadiz (the 1st, or Victor's) was stated to be from 20,000 to 25,000 men; and I should think that it consisted of that number. I have a return of it of April, 1809, which makes it 43,000 R. and F., including sick: it was in the battle of Talavera, where its loss was great, but it is not probable that it consists of fewer men now, than it did when it passed the Sierra. The reserve also was at Cadiz; but that corps has, I believe, returned to Madrid with the King. However, taking the strength of the enemy before Cadiz, according to the accounts of deserters, as stated in Gen. Blake's paper, it must be observed, that this general attack upon them will be made by a smaller body than that which it is supposed he has, according to this account, after making allowance for the guards to be left on the Isla, and for the reserve. The success, in this view of the case, is not promising. But there is another view of the case in which, whether successful or otherwise, the operation appears to be but little desirable. Mr. Wellesley will have informed you of the immense preparations which the enemy is making, and of the force which he is collecting to attack us in this country, to which object it would appear that every other has for the present been sacrificed.

Notwithstanding all that has been done, the enemy has not yet collected a sufficient force for his purpose. He may be able to take Ciudad Rod-

rito, but I doubt the sufficiency of his force to oblige the British army to evacuate the Peninsula. On the other hand, it is probable, from all accounts that have been received, that, unless reinforced very largely, the French army in Andalusia will be in a dangerous situation.

If these facts are applied to this intended operation, it will appear, that whether successful or otherwise, it will probably have the effect of increasing the force to be employed against us. If it should be successful, the force now employed in the useless blockade of Cadiz will be thrown upon our right through Estremadura. The French will evacuate Andalusia probably, and hold the left of their army in the Sierra Morena, covering their operations upon us. But the raising the siege or blockade of Cadiz, which would set at liberty a certain force of the allies now in garrison, would not give us the advantage of the operations of this force, as an army in the field, on account of the total want of cavalry, and deficiency of field artillery; and I much doubt whether the force could leave Cadiz at all, until I could reinforce them with cavalry. The failure of the operation might, according to the circumstances attending it, either endanger the safety of the place itself, from the loss sustained, and the want of confidence which it would create, or it might produce the same consequences as its success.

The French officers, who are by no means satisfied with their situation in Andalusia, would probably call out for reinforcements, when they should find that the allies had begun to make sorties from Cadiz, and the danger to which the French force in that quarter would be exposed would probably occasion its being withdrawn, owing to the difficulty, or rather impossibility, of reinforcing it, and of carrying on, at the same time, the other, and, at this moment, evidently more favorite operation. In every view, therefore, the operation proposed by Gen. Blake appears to me likely to be injurious to the general cause. I can easily conceive the difficulty under which you labor in opposing yourself to the execution of this, or any similar project; but I would suggest to you to make use, upon any similar occasion, of the 4th article of the conditions on which I consented to detach any troops to Cadiz. This will relieve you from all difficulties, which you might otherwise feel, in discussing with Gen. Blake the merits of the plan which he might propose.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

I should be very much obliged to you if you can make it convenient to give the late Commissary Gen. of the army, Mr. Murray, who is going home upon being relieved, a passage to England in one of His Majesty's ships.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 9th, which you sent by sea. I think you are mistaken respecting the additional supplies of money to be procured at Cadiz for bills upon England; and that the increase of the rate of exchange, which would be the infallible result of the employment of any other person to negotiate our bills besides Mr. Duff, would not, after the first month or two, produce any increase of supply. The exchange at

Lisbon is, at this moment, 20 *per cent.* loss; that at Cadiz nearly at *par*: it is not to be believed that out of such a profit as 20 *per cent.* to the purchaser of a bill, the holder of cash at Cadiz could not continue to defray the expense of smuggling, and risk to export money from Cadiz to Lisbon, and purchase bills at the latter place. Indeed we know that they do export specie from Cadiz to Lisbon; the last vessel which brought money on account of government, brought a similar sum for individuals. The rise of the exchange, therefore, at Cadiz, which would increase the sums to be procured for bills at that place, would probably diminish the sum to be procured for bills at Lisbon. It is difficult to form an opinion upon this subject by any local or partial view of it; and I must say that the merchants and others at Cadiz, whose opinions a person would take on inquiry into it, would invariably give opinions against Duff's monopoly, and his system of keeping down the rate of exchange. By employing another or other persons to negotiate our bills upon the Treasury they would share in Duff's profits, and all money holders at Cadiz would gain by the increase of the rate of exchange. At Lisbon, where we have the means of employing so many people, we find it advantageous to employ only one broker; and I have never known an instance of our going more at large upon the market that the exchange has not been raised: and when once raised it does not fall.

I have written to Gen. Graham my opinion of the proposed operations. There is a very general report of peace throughout Spain, and even in the French armies, taken, I suppose, from the foreign journals; and the notion of the arrangement respecting Ferdinand is probably taken from the expressions in Ferdinand's own letter to Buonaparte on Kolli's business. I don't believe there is any negotiation for peace. I am convinced, however, that Buonaparte would be happy to make any arrangement which would tranquillize Spain, and would not throw the power of the government wholly into our hands. I believe there was something in Kolli's story.

I beg that you will tell the Regency that I have not lost sight of Ciudad Rodrigo, and that I shall do every thing in my power to relieve that place. After making every allowance however for detachments to the north, and one, of which I received intelligence yesterday, to Plasencia, the enemy cannot have less than 50,000 men in my front, of which number from 6000 to 8000 are cavalry. I must leave the mountains and cross the plains to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, as well as two rivers, to raise the siege. To do this, including Carrera's Spanish division, I have about 33,000 men, of which 3000 are cavalry. Included are 14,000 or 15,000 Portuguese and Spaniards, which troops, to say the best of them, are of a doubtful description. Is it right, under these circumstances, to risk a general action to relieve or to raise the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo? I should think not. To this add that there is nothing to relieve the place excepting the stores belonging to this army. However, I don't give the matter up; if they hold out like men they are worth saving, and I will incur a risk to save them. In the mean time they don't want stores or provisions. They have of the latter enough for a month to come, and plenty of the former, and there is time to try them.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorigo, 20th June, 1810.

I received last night your letter of the 16th. It is no trouble to have the reports translated for Dom M. Forjaz. They are the same that go to the Sec. of State.

I am surprised at the doubts about prosecuting the Marquez d'Alorna. I thought the crime of being a French partizan was the only one now punished in Portugal. The Marquez d'Alorna is however a *Fidalgo* of high degree, connected with all the great families in the country; and the same circumstances which have occasioned impunity in so many other instances of other offences are the cause of his safety. I consider the prosecution of the Marquez d'Alorna, however, to be a matter purely domestic, as long as he stays away; and probably it may be deemed a question in which the Regent and the members are so much interested personally, that it is not proper for us to interfere in it at all.

I have written to Dom M. Forjaz upon the police and other matters. I wish Dom M. Forjaz had mentioned in what instances irregular applications for means of conveyance had been made. The Commissary Gen. declares that he makes them invariably to the Corregidor of Viseu, according to the regulation of the Portuguese government; but this is one of the tricks encouraged by the government. The magistrates, when accused, accuse the British Commissaries; the accusation is scarcely ever made specific, is never substantiated, but still it serves for an excuse in argument. It would be much better that Dom M. Forjaz should not interfere by placing the carriages at stages as he proposes. Really the difficulty is ridiculous; there are 40,000 carriages in this province. The consumption of the army in this quarter may be 100,000 lbs. a day, including Portuguese; each carriage carries 600 lbs., and we are at the utmost 4 days from the navigation; this would not require many carriages. If there was any authority in the country, we ought to be better supplied than any army in the world.

I return you the telegraph. With the greatest difficulty we have discovered it, but it is very intricate and very imperfect, and no *cabo* in Portugal will understand it. I sent it to Beresford to beg he would look at it, and he found it so intricate that he tells me, in answer, that he could not understand it without the key. Observe that what is called the key is in the first page. We must have something more simple than this, or the whole expense will be useless. But if government are determined to persevere with this code, let me have back the enclosed.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorigo, 20th June, 1810.

The enemy broke ground before Ciudad Rodrigo on the 15th, and have continued working ever since. They had not, however, brought up the heavy ordnance for the siege yesterday. I have had a letter from the Governor, of the 13th, in which he declares his intention to continue to hold out; and expresses his confidence in the hope that we shall assist him. He complains that, owing to the destruction of the mills, he had been obliged already to commence the delivery of biscuit to the garrison; but, from the state of the magazines when the place was completely invested, I have no doubt that he has still provisions for 13 days. The

enemy has collected a very large force for this enterprise; and I have heard of the arrival of reinforcements in Castille from the northern frontiers. Unless therefore he should be induced to weaken his army for the siege, by detachments, in consequence of diversions made by guerrillas and others in different parts, I apprehend that any attempt which I should make to relieve the place, or to raise the siege, would fail, and might be attended by fatal consequences to the general cause. The army is, however, in a situation to be able to effect this operation if it should be advisable to attempt it; and I shall not give up all thoughts of it till the last moment.

Before Gen. Mahy had received the letter which I informed your Lordship, on the 6th June, that I had written to him, to urge him to make a diversion on the side of Astorga, he had moved upon Leon, on the 4th, from Villa Franca; and he repeated this operation again between the 7th and 9th. The enemy, however, attacked his advanced guard from Astorga, and obliged him to withdraw his troops from Leon. These movements of Gen. Mahy have induced the enemy to detach a considerable corps of cavalry and infantry to Astorga, which is, I understand, commanded by Gen. Kellermann; or the arrival of the reinforcements in Castille may have induced Massena to resume his projects upon Galicia, which he had appeared to abandon when he first assumed the command; and the heavy ordnance for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was moved from Salamanca. A considerable division of troops has likewise been moved towards Plasencia, and was in Baños and the neighbourhood, by the last accounts.

The war of the guerrillas is carried on with great activity throughout Castille.

The enemy has made no movement of importance in Estremadura since I addressed your Lordship last. His force is collected in the neighbourhood of Merida, on both sides of the Guadiana; and the troops of the allies are in the same situations as before. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 9th, when nothing extraordinary had occurred.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

I enclose a letter and its enclosure, which I have received from Marshal Beresford, complaining of certain pouches lately sent out from England for the use of the Portuguese troops, and recommending that some person should be appointed to survey the supplies of this description sent to Portugal, who should be responsible for them.

I heartily concur in this recommendation. It is shameful to see the manner in which government have been served by the contractors employed to supply the Portuguese army. Not only the pouches and clothing are as reported by Marshal Beresford, but I have lately had occasion to observe that the knapsacks, recently sent out, are of such bad quality, as to be almost useless.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 20th June, 1810.

I have received a letter from Lieut. Gen. Graham, in which he states that arms are wanting for the British troops at Cadiz; and I beg leave to request that a proportion may be sent there from England.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 21st June, 1810.

I believe that Lieut. Col. Grant writes to you; but, lest he should not, I mention to you that in a letter which he wrote me on the 17th, from Serradilla, he tells me that he had heard that 4000 men had passed the bridge of Arzobispo on the 13th. In a postscript he says that he had just heard from Talavera of the 15th, that 7000 men of the enemy's troops had entered Truxillo that day, supposed to be from Merida. He believed they were from Arzobispo. I do not think they could reach Truxillo from Arzobispo between the 13th and 15th, nor could they hear at Talavera on the same day of the arrival of troops at Truxillo; Talavera being 12 or 14 leagues from Truxillo. However, all this is deserving of attention.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 21st June, 1810.

I have received your letter of yesterday evening. I think you had better not attempt to send in my letter to Ciudad Rodrigo.

I have received some more letters intercepted in La Mancha. The French appear to have a very extravagant notion of the strength of Ciudad Rodrigo; they say it is well prepared for defence, and will hold out for twenty days after they shall have opened a breach. However, I believe you are right in your conjecture, and I should not be surprised if the silence of yesterday was to treat for surrender. These letters talk of further reinforcements, particularly of the arrival of above 7000 Imperial Guards at Burgos.

I had also in the night an account from Serradilla of the 18th, stating that a division of 7000 men was at Truxillo on the 15th. It is stated that this division had retired from Merida, but if it be true that it was at Truxillo, as stated, it must be a division which is stated to have passed at Arzobispo on the 13th. I have a letter from Hill, however, of the 18th, who does not appear to know of the march of this division. These intercepted letters talk of the siege of Badajoz after that of Ciudad Rodrigo, and express an expectation, founded on the existence of a French party in the town, that Badajoz will not hold out.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 22d June, 1810.

The accounts which I received from Badajoz this morning, of the 18th, give some reason to believe that the enemy intend to evacuate Estremadura. They have destroyed their works in the Conventual of Merida; and about 1500 men had marched for Truxillo. This account appears to be in some degree confirmed by that which I received yesterday from Serradilla, of the arrival of 7000 men at Truxillo, although that account was not very consistent in itself, and does not agree exactly with that which I have received from Badajoz.

It is not improbable that Massena wishes to concentrate his troops on this side of the Tagus; but we can do so likewise; and Hill has instructions applicable to this movement. I enclose a memorandum of the movement which I wish you to make in case of the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, which I consider not an improbable event. Carrera is now in operation with us, and cannot be better employed than he is with your advanced guard; but what will he do in case the enemy should succeed



in taking Ciudad Rodrigo? Does he propose to continue in operation with the British army, or to join the Spanish army, called, 'the left?' I mean that of the Marques de la Romana. If he should continue in operation with us, I should wish him to continue with your advanced guard.

P.S. I have just received your letter of the 21st. Adverting to the great superiority of the enemy's numbers, I am not desirous that you should risk an attack by a superior force to you and Carrera. When they attack you in front (if they should attack you), they will certainly turn you by your left.

I am sorry to tell you that I have just heard that Mr. Windham is dead. Lord Milton moved for a new writ for Higham Ferrers.

Memorandum for Major Gen. Picton and Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 22d June, 1810.

In the event of the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, I am desirous that Brig. Gen. Craufurd should retire with his advanced guard upon La Concepcion. On his arrival there, that fort is to be evacuated by the troops of the 3d division, who are to march to the stations Major Gen. Picton will allot for them, in the cantonments of the 3d division; and the guns, ordnance, and provision store in Fort Concepcion are to be sent back to Almeida, according to the arrangements already made for that purpose. The Portuguese 6 pounder brigade, now in Almeida, is then to join the 3d division.

The officer commanding at Fort Concepcion is to point out to Brig. Gen. Craufurd all the arrangements which he shall have made for the destruction of Fort Concepcion. Brig. Gen. Craufurd will keep his advanced guard in front of Almeida, till threatened by an attack by a superior force, and when he retires from Fort Concepcion, he will blow up that fort.

To Vice Adm. the Hon G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 22d June, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 17th inst., and I concur entirely with you in thinking that it is desirable that the squadron in the Tagus, alone, should be employed in the transport of our money from Gibraltar and Cadiz.

I write by this opportunity to Mr. Duff, who is our agent at Cadiz, to desire that the money may be invariably sent on board the vessels which you will send for it; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will fix the days on which those vessels shall sail, whether once a week, or once a fortnight, from Lisbon, and desire your secretary to let Mr. Duff know the days on which you will fix. It would also be desirable that I should know the days, that I might take that opportunity of writing. If, upon the arrival of the vessel from the Tagus at Cadiz, there should be no money ready, she might go on to Gibraltar, and return to Cadiz, and remain there till a sum should be ready, or till the vessel of the following week should arrive. I suggest this arrangement for your consideration; and I write by this post to Mr. Duff, and our agent at Gibraltar shall be written to as soon as I shall hear from you, that you have made this or any arrangement to send a vessel there.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 22d June, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 18th: my brother mentioned to me his wish that we should send to Cadiz a person of the description referred to in his letter to you; but I acknowledge that I differ with him in opinion respecting the utility of such an arrangement. I am convinced that the only consequence will be to render more unfavorable the rate of exchange for our bills at Cadiz; and that we shall make no permanent increase of our funds received from Cadiz by these means. I have communicated this opinion to my brother, but I have desired Duff to spare no pains to increase his remittances. I have also settled that the vessels sent from the Tagus shall bring the money from Cadiz.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Macdonald, A.A.G., Cadiz.*

22d June, 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 3d and 6th inst., together with the returns you have transmitted. I hope that you will have received before this letter reaches you the instructions that I have sent with regard to making up and forwarding the returns of the troops at Cadiz to this army, and I trust they are so explicit as to prevent any further trouble. In the different returns you have transmitted in your letter of the 3d, there are errors which it will be necessary to have rectified before we can regularly make up our returns for England. I have therefore taken the liberty of marking the differences that appear on comparison in our office here, and enclose a memorandum of the same, and I have to request you will have them rectified.

I also enclose detailed regulations to be observed by the troops serving under Lord Visc. Wellington in making up their returns; and I hope that these, with my former letters, &c., will fully explain every thing to you. With regard to your letter of the 6th inst., the Commander of the Forces has observed that his Excellency has no authority to alter any orders from the Commander in Chief in England, or other authorities, relative to the direct communication which has been so ordered; but it is necessary that his Excellency Lord Wellington should be furnished with the returns as directed, in order to conform to the general instructions his Lordship has received.

*The A.G. to Capt. Dance, Brigade Major.*

23d June, 1810.

His Excellency has been pleased to accept of your resignation as Major of brigade to the cavalry under the orders of Major Gen. Slade. I am at the same time desired to communicate to you that my Lord Wellington will have no objection to your entering the Portuguese service, as by that means you can alone be authorised to continue on service with the army now employed in the Peninsula.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 24th June, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 23d inst. The instruction which I sent you on the 22d was to provide for a particular event, viz., the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo. As soon as this should happen, it was obvious that the enemy would have his whole force disposable, and I should find it difficult, if not impossible, to cover the evacuation of Fort Concepcion, excepting in the manner stated in that instruction.

The instruction of the 28th May goes to provide for a different event, viz., the passage of the Agueda by the enemy in superior force to you, during the continuance of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. In that case I should have no difficulty in keeping up the communication with Fort Concepcion, as long as I might think proper, and at last I should be able to evacuate the fort. According to this interpretation of the instructions,

you will see that, if attacked during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, I wish that you should retire upon Fort Concepcion and Almeida if possible; but of course that must depend upon the enemy's movements upon your left; but that as soon as Ciudad Rodrigo surrenders, you should withdraw upon Fort Concepcion, for which I conclude you will have time.

My object is to be able to continue in our present situation as long as possible, both to encourage a continued resistance at Ciudad Rodrigo, and to be able to relieve the place, if it should be advisable to attempt it, in consequence of any alteration in the enemy's force. This does not appear to be a very probable event at present, and ought not to be provided for according to the common rules of prudence at any considerable risk; and there is a case not provided for in either of the memorandums of instruction, viz., the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the passage of the lower Agueda by the enemy in force at the same moment. In that case I should wish you to retire as directed by the memorandum of the 28th May; and I should wish you to send directions to the commanding officer at Concepcion to evacuate that fort, and blow it up, and retire upon Almeida.

In order to be nearer the scene of action at this critical movement, and not to throw upon others more responsibility than belongs to them, I propose to move the military branch of head quarters to Almeida to-morrow. I think it may be expedient immediately to diminish our equipment at Fort Concepcion, so as to render the evacuation of that fort more easy, upon which I shall decide to-morrow morning when I shall arrive at Almeida.

Regnier moved from Merida on the 20th to pass the Tagus at Almaraz, and Hill is about to cross at Villa Velha. Silveira tells me that the enemy have again diminished their force north of the Duero.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Celorico, 24th June, 1810.

Gen. Regnier moved from Merida on the 20th towards Almaraz, and will probably come up to Plasencia. Hill will cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, and will be at Castello Branco.

I enclose a letter for Gen. Slade, containing one for Gen. Hill, which I beg you to forward to Gen. Slade without loss of time; desiring Gen. Slade to form letter parties on the road to Castello Branco, till I can provide for the communication by post. I am going to Almeida to-morrow, and will communicate with you by a guide party by Castanheira.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 24th June, 1810.


I conclude that you will have moved across the Tagus, and I shall immediately send you information and instructions respecting your position, &c. You must draw your supplies from Abrantes. I rather believe you will find your cavalry too numerous in the hills, and it may be advisable to keep it on your right in the Alentejo. However upon that point I shall instruct you.

Establish a daily post with Abrantes. I shall order a daily post to be established immediately between this and Castello Branco; and, in the mean time, I desire Gen. Slade, who has his cavalry at Belmonte, to put letter parties on the road, letting you know where they are. One of them will deliver a duplicate of this letter.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 24th June, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 20th, and I am much obliged to you for the readiness which you express to give us assistance. In respect to the yard, if the gentlemen of the navy will undertake to manage it for us, I have no objection to the yard being placed across the mast, or in any other way they please; but if we *unlearned* are to have any thing to do with it, I should wish to have only one arm to the yard, and I should think that if the yard were supported by means of two large sized blocks, thus:



there would be no difficulty in discovering the numbers intended. No. 2 would be under the block nearest the mast; No. 3 between the two blocks; No. 4 under the block most distant from the mast. However, upon all this you must be the best judge. I should think the establishment at each station ought to consist of the person to be in charge of the signals, and one or two men to assist him, to whom more would be added from the army when we should occupy the position. These officers and men should be paid and treated in every respect as parties from the fleet acting on shore, and probably you might think it expedient to employ an officer to superintend the whole.

I write to Col. Fletcher to request him to let you know what number of stations there are, and where they are; and I request you will let him know how many officers or men you will send to each: he will arrange where they are to reside near the signal post, and will desire the Commissary at Lisbon to provide for their rations. I also desire Col. Fletcher to point out to you the situation for the gun boats in the Tagus; that is, where our right will be.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 24th June, 1810.

I have just received your letters of the 20th. You may depend upon my cordial concurrence in any measures you may adopt for the support of Dom M. Forjaz. I am quite convinced that he is the only man in Portugal fit for the situation which he fills.

It is useless to write any thing in answer to the Bishop's nonsense. I really don't understand what he means. I shall write to you upon the police when I see what government intends to do.

*The A.G. to A. A. Gs. attached to 1st, 3d, Light divisions, and Cavalry.* 24th June, 1810.

I am directed to desire you will be pleased to send in the General Order book of the — division of infantry to this office, for the purpose of being compared and ascertained whether all the orders since April, 1809, have been regularly received and entered.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Almeida, 25th June, 1810, 4½ p.m.

I arrived here about 2 o'clock, but I have not received your letter of this morning, as it was sent to Pinhel to meet me, and I did not come by that road. I have heard of the great explosion this morning, at or in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, and am very anxious to hear what it was.

Either Romana was misinformed of Regnier's movement of the 20th, or he has adopted a most extraordinary and dangerous mode of covering it. He was himself on the 21st near Campo Maior with 4000 infantry, and some cavalry; and he had a strong body of cavalry during the whole of that day at Badajoz. Either he does not intend to cross the Tagus, or he covers his march by these movements, and he will pass these troops by some of the lower ferries. I should believe that he did not intend to cross the Tagus, if it was not stated positively that he had destroyed the works of the Conventual at Merida.

I have directed the officer commanding at Fort Concepcion to evacuate that fort when you shall desire him to do so, removing those equipments which he has the means of moving, and blowing up the rest with the works. If you should retire upon Fort Concepcion, and the blowing up should devolve upon you, under the memorandum of the 22d, I beg you to remove all that there will be means to remove, which I believe is every thing, excepting some musket ammunition and provisions.

P.S. I shall pay you a visit to-morrow morning at an early hour; but do not lose the expectation of my coming prevent you from going out wherever you may have business. I shall follow you.

5 p.m. I have just received your letter of this morning.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Almeida, 26th June, 1810, 7 p.m.

I have nothing from Gen. Hill this day; but I have a letter from Badajoz of the 22d, stating that the enemy had retired again. I have told Col. Sutton that you would arrange a signal with him to let him know when he should evacuate Fort Concepcion, upon your retiring by the other road. There is certainly a very long tract of open country from your piquets to Gallegos, and from Gallegos to Alameda, to the river Dos Casas, and I wish it could be arranged to hold the ground on which your piquets are, and to have your infantry, or at least the main body, in the wood in front of Alameda, with your cavalry, and one battalion in Gallegos. I wish you would turn this disposition over in your mind, and see whether, by means of it, the piquets of infantry in front, which, after all, must be supported in their march across the plain to Gallegos by the cavalry, would not be as well supported as they are by the existing disposition.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Almeida, 27th June, 1810.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. Kennedy, Commissary Gen., to which I beg to draw your attention. I have never heard of the board stationed at Lisbon to settle the price of provisions throughout Portugal. If there is such a board, its duty is performed but little to the advantage of the public, and the general high price of provisions is a

strong practical confirmation of the impolicy and uselessness of such an establishment. It would be much more desirable for the government to leave the price of provisions to find its own level, and to oblige the people to furnish means of conveyance for the army for payment. The price of provisions would then soon become reasonable in all parts of the country.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Almeida, 27th June, 1810.

The enemy commenced his fire upon Ciudad Rodrigo on the 24th, and it has continued ever since. That of the place has been well kept up. Don Julian Sanchez, who commands a party of cavalry, which had been attached to the garrison for some time, quitted it with his party (195 men) without loss, on the night of the 22d, and brought me a letter from the Governor, in which he states his determination, and that of the garrison, to hold out to the last. Don Julian states that the garrison had the quantity of provisions which I understood they had, and plenty of ammunition.

Another person who left the place last night arrived at our advanced posts, and states that the enemy's fire had destroyed a great part of the parapet on the side attacked; that the garrison had lost 150 men killed, and 500 wounded; that there was a fire in the town; and that they were in distress for provisions. I can give no credit to this last part of the report, from the knowledge I have of the state of the provisions in the fort, when it was completely invested, and from Don J. Sanchez's report of their state on the 22d inst. The garrison still kept possession of the suburbs. It would be very desirable to relieve this place, the loss of which will be attended by many very important consequences. Among others, it will facilitate and connect the enemy's operations upon this country, in the safety of which His Majesty takes so great an interest.

It is obvious, however, that it would be impossible to relieve, much less raise the siege of, Ciudad Rodrigo, without fighting a general action, with forces which, I have reason to believe, not from report only, but from intercepted letters and returns, are infinitely superior in number to any that I have it in my power to bring against them. With every desire, and a strong interest for the preservation of this place, I cannot conceive that any view of the interests of the allies can render it desirable that I should incur the risk of a defeat, under such circumstances, in attempting to effect its relief; and although I have encouraged the Governor to persevere in its defence, and shall still encourage him to persevere, by maintaining a position in the neighbourhood as long as possible, and thus obliging the enemy to keep his force collected for the purpose of this attack, I have repeatedly and invariably told the Governor that the measures which I should adopt, when Ciudad Rodrigo should be in danger, must depend upon a larger view of the interests of the allies in the contest than the mere preservation, however important, of that place.\*

There had been reports in circulation for some time of the intention of the enemy to evacuate Estremadura, and to cross the Tagus with the 2d corps, which has been employed in that province hitherto; and the com-

\* See Appendix, No. XXVII., Spanish letter, 18th Jan. 1811, from Don J. D. Vascones to Don M. Alava.

munications of the Marques de la Romana to Lieut. Gen. Hill, of the 20th inst., gave reason to believe that this design was about to be carried into execution; and that the whole corps had moved upon Truxillo and Almaraz. On the 21st, however, they made another movement upon Badajoz and Campo Maior, upon the former on both sides of the Guadiana; and the patrols were pushed forward to within one league of Elvas. The cattle in the neighbourhood of Badajoz and Campo Maior were driven off; but I understand that the frequent recurrence of these patrols to the neighbourhood of these places has taught the inhabitants the mode of taking care of their cattle; and that their loss upon this occasion has been less heavy, notwithstanding that the enemy's force was greater, than usual. The enemy retired again to Merida on the 22d.

I moved the head quarters to this place on the 25th inst., as soon as I heard that the enemy had concentrated his whole force on the north side of the Tagus, in order that I might be nearer the scene of operations, and might more easily direct the movements of the allied army; but, as the enemy continues in Estremadura, I shall remove the head quarters again to Celorico, as it is attended with inconvenience to have them so far forward.

The enemy has drawn again into Castille all the infantry which had been detached to Zamora, upon Gen. Mahy's movements towards Leon. They have still some cavalry in that quarter. I have no intelligence from Cadiz of a later date than the 9th inst. The intelligence which I have received from different quarters tends to show the continued enmity of the inhabitants of the Peninsula towards the French, which breaks out into acts of open hostility whenever they are not in strength; and there are parties of guerrillas in operation in every part of the Peninsula from Irun to Cadiz. The intercepted letters from French officers, and from the adherents to the cause of the enemy in the Peninsula, tend to confirm the truth of this intelligence; and in many instances the writers express their conviction that the French power will never be established in this part of the world.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Almeida, 27th June, 1810.

In the existing state of Portugal, and adverting to the unprovided state of many of the Portuguese magazines, I beg leave to recommend that 2000 barrels of powder may be sent to the Tagus, in addition to the quantity heretofore sent.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Almeida, 27th June, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a letter and several returns from Marshal Beresford, regarding the clothing for the Portuguese army. The object of the Marshal's proposition is, that the British government should send to Portugal materials for the clothing of the whole number of the Portuguese infantry, as stated in No. 3, instead of clothing made up for 30,000 men, being the number subsidised by His Majesty. He calculates the expense of the materials, for the difference of numbers, as equal to that of making up the clothing for 30,000 men.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Almeida, 28th June, 1810.

My letters from Estremadura state that the enemy had retired on the

22d to Merida; and it does not appear that they intend, at least at present, to cross the Tagus. Silveira tells me that there was still a small body of infantry and cavalry at Zamora.

Your situation gives me a great deal of uneasiness; and it appears that, if the enemy should make their preparations to attack you before daylight in the morning, and should make the attack at daylight, you would find it very difficult to withdraw your corps. It is certainly very desirable that we should maintain our position as long as may be possible, but we must not risk such a loss as your corps would be. I have no apprehensions for the day or the night, but I am uneasy respecting the time which intervenes between the night and broad daylight. I think that, if your division was halted in the woods between Gallegos and Alameda, having one battalion and the cavalry and 3 pieces of artillery at Gallegos, and the piquets in their present situation, all would be safe. The piquets of infantry should withdraw to Gallegos at night, 2 or 3 hours after dark, and resume their situation after daylight in the morning.

P.S. I have just received your letter of this morning. You propose exactly what I recommend in the beginning of this letter, viz., to show the infantry piquets on the heights in front of Gallegos, or in their present situation, and withdraw them at night. If you put them out, you must keep a battalion in Gallegos in the day time to support them. Indeed, in the day time, I don't think there is any danger for anything. At night the battalion and piquets might go back to the woods, or remain at Gallegos, as you might think best. I conceive, however, that at present it would be in no danger at Gallegos, and to leave it there would be less harassing to the troops. I beg you to make your arrangements accordingly for to-morrow morning.

I have heard from — that the enemy had shown themselves again upon the Douro, opposite Freixo de Espadacinta. They ordered rations for 8000 men for this day.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Almeida, 28th June, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 19th, and I am much obliged to you for the pains which you have taken respecting our money concerns. I wait for your answer to my last letter, to determine whether or not I shall give Duff further assistance in procuring money; but I am still of opinion that we shall do best to leave the whole concern in his hands.

The force in our front is certainly enormous; and I only lament that it is impossible for me to relieve the brave garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy broke ground on the 15th, and opened their fire upon the place on the 24th, which they have continued ever since. The garrison still keep up a vigorous fire. The town was in flames in two places the day before yesterday, when I was at our advanced posts, which are in sight of it. Don J. Sanchez, a guerrilla, who had been attached to the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, left the place on the night of the 22d, and made his way to our outposts with his party, with the loss only of one horse. He says that he brought with him 195; he brought in reality about 90. He says that the place was supplied with provisions for at least a month, and with plenty of ammunition. The governor sent out a man on the night of the 26th. He said that they had lost 150 killed, and



500 wounded. This I don't believe. The town was in good spirits; but he said that they wanted provisions, which cannot be true.

The Marques de la Romana wrote to Gen. Hill on the 20th, that Regnier was about to cross the Tagus, which report was likely to be true, from former communications which we had had to the same purport. In expectation of this movement, Hill had been instructed to cross the Tagus also, and to keep himself in Regnier's front; and I then moved my head quarters to this place to be nearer the enemy, and more at hand to direct the operations. On the 21st, however, Regnier made one of his patrols to Badajoz and Campo Maior, and he returned to Merida on the 22d. I shall therefore remove my head quarters again to the rear. Hill had not moved, as Regnier retains his position.

I hear this morning that the enemy are threatening to cross the Douro into Tras os Montes, between the Tormes and the Agueda, upon our left, which is another reason for taking back my head quarters.

I am glad to find that the great plan of attack at Cadiz upon the enemy's lines is relinquished; it would have undoubtedly failed. It would be a great object, however, if you could seize the Trocadero.

Send me the originals or copies of as much intercepted correspondence as you can get. I know so much of the French that every letter is useful, and throws some light upon what is going on. Any return is desirable, particularly that of Junot's corps.

Memorandum for the 14th light dragoons.

Almeida, 29th June, 1810.

The object in placing the 14th light dragoons at Val de la Mula, &c., is to keep open the communication between Fort Concepcion and Almeida, and to assist and protect the retreat of the garrison to Almeida, under the orders which Col. Sutton has received. The officer commanding the 14th light dragoons will communicate with Col. Sutton on this point. When the garrison shall have retired to Almeida, the 14th light dragoons are to cross the Coa by the bridge of Almeida, and to march upon Freixedas.

If Gen. Craufurd should move the advanced guard to Fort Concepcion, the officer commanding the 14th light dragoons is to put himself under his command.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Almeida, 29th June, 1810.

I received last night from Stewart the letter which you wrote to me. I did not answer it then, as, upon the whole, I prefer the mode of occupying the ground which I had proposed to you. If you were to march from the wood to Gallegos every morning after daylight, the enemy from the heights of Marialva (from whence I understood from you that they could see all that passed in the plain of Gallegos) would see you; and they must then prepare to attack, or, at all events, make a reconnaissance with a large body: either would oblige you to retire, which is what we wish to avoid. They may know the state of things at Gallegos under the arrangement I proposed, but I do not think it so certain as under the other.

I have ordered the 14th light dragoons to Val de la Mula and Aldea del Obispo, with a view to protect the retreat of the garrison of La Con-

ception. I enclose the instructions which the officer commanding this regiment has. He is now at Concepcion. I have said nothing about the relief of your posts of hussars on the lower Agueda; because I think the duty of them will be much better done by the hussars than by any other of the troops. I have received your letter of this morning. I shall move the head quarters to Alverca to-morrow morning. There is nothing new this day from any quarter.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Almeida, 29th June, 1810, 6 P.M.

If the Marques de la Romana should arrive at Guarda in the course of the night, I request you to direct him to Alverca, where I shall have my head quarters to-morrow. There is nothing new. Ciudad Rodrigo is making a capital defence; and I only regret that the enemy have collected such a force that it is impossible for me to attempt the relief of the place.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Alverca, 30th June, 1810, 6½ P.M.

Col. Murray will send you directions to increase the troops in your front to one brigade of infantry; and Gen. Slade will be directed to move forward the Royal dragoons to observe Sabugal and Rapoula de Coa, and to communicate by his left with the brigade of your division. As I am now so much nearer Almeida than you, and so near you, you need not move forward the remainder of the division under the order of the 28th May, till you hear from me. But have them well closed up with Guarda. I consider it certain, from the disposition made of Gen. Craufurd's division, that he will retire upon Almeida. Ciudad Rodrigo still held out this morning.

*The A.G. to the Officer commanding 3d regt. (or Buffs).*

30th June, 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that, in consequence of the good conduct of Serj. Horner, of the 3d, or Buffs, the recommendation of Brig. Gen. Blunt, and the wish of Marshal Beresford to give the serjeant a commission in the Portuguese service, his Excellency is pleased to order that he may forthwith receive his discharge from the regiment under your command, and follow such orders as he may receive from Marshal Beresford. It may be as well to enclose the serjeant's discharge and the abstract of his accounts to Col. Arbuthnot, Marshal Beresford's military secretary.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 1st July, 1810.

I have at last received the return of Junot's corps, which makes it 25,900 effectives, of which 5000 are cavalry. Bonet's division is not in Junot's corps, and this division is likewise in our front. The returns would make Junot's corps and Ney's amount to about 56,000 effectives, of which nearly 10,000 are cavalry.

Orders from the Emperor for Regnier to cross the Tagus have been intercepted. He is to be replaced in Estremadura by the 5th corps, or Mortier's. However, I should doubt their carrying this measure into execution, for the Emperor, who writes from Dieppe and Havre, is evidently unacquainted with the state of affairs here, with the distresses of the French in Andalusia, and with the measures which Massena has adopted of reinforcing himself, by collecting all the troops from the northern provinces.

I have ordered a brigade instead of a battalion to be at and about Castanheira, to observe Castello Bom and Castello Mendo, and the Royal dragoons to watch Sabugal, communicating by their left with the brigade from the 4th division. I shall be obliged to you if you will send to these troops when you shall quit Alameda. I conclude that you will have no difficulty in retiring upon La Concepcion from your present position. There is nothing new from England.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alverca, 1st July, 1810.

I received this day some intercepted letters from Gen. Mahy, from which I observe that Buonaparte has ordered Gen. Regnier to cross the Tagus at Alcantara and to manoeuvre, in conjunction with Massena, on the right bank of that river. He has also ordered that the 5th corps under Mortier shall come into Estremadura, to replace that under the command of Regnier, which is to cross the Tagus. I have some doubts whether these orders will be carried into execution; but if Regnier should cross the Tagus, I beg you will cross that river likewise at Villa Velha, with the infantry and artillery, and one regiment of Portuguese cavalry of your corps, leaving on the left bank of the river, about Niza, &c., the remainder of Gen. Fane's division of cavalry.

You will make this movement whatever may be the strength of the enemy's corps, which will be brought into Alentejo to replace Regnier, for which I shall otherwise provide.

P. S. Ciudad Rodrigo still held out this morning. I believe that Gen. Carrera's division of infantry will soon pass the Tagus at Villa Velha, of which I gave you notice.

*The A.G. to the Commissary General.*

1st July, 1810.

Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd having bought from a French deserter a very good horse for an officer employed in taking plans of the country in the advance, and having promised the man 60 dollars for the horse, I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire you will pay for the same, as the horse is to be returned to the Commissariat as soon as he is no longer required by the General. The Provost Marshal has been directed to acquaint you with the name of the deserter at Celorico, who is to receive the money.

*The A.G. to the A. A. Gs. of divisions. (Circular.)*

1st July, 1810.

There not being a sufficiency of the enclosed printed letters for one to be sent to each regiment in the army, I send as many as can be spared equally among the different divisions. You will be pleased to hold the brigade majors responsible to you that each regiment in their several brigades is provided with either a printed or a written copy; the same must be stated in their next monthly returns.

Memorandum for Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alverca, 2d July, 1810.

When the enemy shall have brought the 2d corps of the army out of Estremadura across the Tagus, it is probable that he will endeavor to turn the right of the main body of the British army, by forcing in the troops which will occupy the country between the Zezere and the Tagus, as soon as he shall have obtained possession of Ciudad Rodrigo.

When Lieut. Gen. Hill shall have crossed the Tagus, there will then be in this part of the country the corps under the command of Lieut. Gen. Hill, and the 2 regiments of Portuguese regular infantry, 3 battalions of militia,

a brigade of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry, which have hitherto been in that country under the command of Col. Le Cor, and all the Ordenanza. If Lieut. Gen. Hill should be in time, I recommend to him to destroy the bridge over the Elja at Segura. If the melting of the snow in the hills should keep that river full, he need be under no anxiety respecting his right.

The object of the enemy will probably be to force the passes of the mountains between the Tagus and the Zezere. There are two great lines of road which lead through these mountains from the Spanish frontier; one by the Estrada Nova, as it is called, and the other by Castello Branco and Sobreira Formosa. There are other roads which lead through these mountains certainly; but these are the principal and the only roads practicable for artillery.

The first position which I should recommend to Lieut. Gen. Hill to take, is upon the Ponsul with his own corps, with his centre at Idanha a Nova, occupying Ladoeiro with his cavalry, most particularly as long as the Elja shall continue full.

The corps under Col. Le Cor ought, in this case, to be at Alpedrinha, in order to observe the entrance on the Estrada Nova, and to keep up the communication with Belmonte and Guarda. If the enemy should endeavor to force or turn these positions with a superior force, the retreat of Lieut. Gen. Hill will be by Castello Branco and the high road by Sobreira Formosa, while that of Col. Le Cor will be by the Estrada Nova, and each line of road must be defended. The Estrada Nova has been destroyed, but I understand not very effectually. It will be necessary, therefore, that Col. Le Cor, when he shall retire from Alpedrinha, should send his artillery by S. Vicente and Junçal towards Sarzedas, and make his way with his infantry only to Foz Giraldo.

Every part of both these roads may be defended. The first line on the great road is that of Ocreza, taking care to observe the road on the left from Junçal to Sarzedas. The next is the great position of the Alvito, with the right beyond the Ocreza at Villa Velha, and the left at Isna on the Estrada Nova; and the third is with the right behind the Ocreza, again at its junction with the Tagus. The Codes in front of Domingo also affords another position.

The positions in the Estrada Nova connect well with these, or they may be considered distinct. That at Moradad might continue to be occupied by Col. Le Cor, even after the main body should have withdrawn from Sarzedas. The 2 roads join at Cortiçada, and there is a separation at Cardigos; one road leading by Villa de Rey to the Barca upon the Zezere on the road to Thomar, and the other to Punhete and Abrantes. As already stated, the Estrada Nova has been destroyed, and Col. Le Cor knows in what places.

There are batteries in all these positions, and Col. Le Cor knows where situated; but Lieut. Gen. Hill should have them examined. Preparations should be made to destroy the ordnance and ammunition in all the batteries from which the ordnance cannot be carried off, in case the troops should be obliged to retire.

Gen. Fane's cavalry, with the exception of the regiment which Lieut. Gen. Hill will bring across the Tagus with him, will keep on the left

bank of the Tagus on Gen. Hill's right and in communication with him. If obliged to retire, it will cross the Tagus at Abrantes. If the batteries at Villa Velha should protect the bridge at that place, it may be kept as long as Lieut. Gen. Hill shall maintain the position of the Alvito: if these batteries should not effectually protect that bridge, it must be destroyed as soon as the corps shall retire from Castello Branco.

All the ferry boats must be taken off the Tagus above Villa Velha, and afterwards above the right of the corps wherever it may be.

Annexed to this memorandum is an extract of a report on the country, which is the subject of this memorandum. Major Gen. Leith will be upon the Zezere as a support to Lieut. Gen. Hill with the corps of troops placed under his orders.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 2d July, 1810.

From your letter of yesterday, which I received this morning, I think it possible that you may have come to La Concepcion. The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo places the whole of us in a new situation, which you will find provided for in the enclosed memorandum. If Ciudad Rodrigo should not have fallen, the instructions which you have before received are to hold good.

Memorandum for Major Gens. Picton, Cole, and Slade; Brig. Gens. Campbell and Craufurd.

Alverca, 2d July, 1810.

Upon the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, the Royal dragoons under Major Gen. Slade, and the troops composing the 3d and 4th divisions of infantry, and Gen. Craufurd's advanced guard, including with the latter the 14th light dragoons, 2 squadrons of the 16th, and 2 of hussars, will be situated as follows:

Brig. Gen. Craufurd's advanced guard at La Concepcion, or in front of Almeida; the 3d division of infantry at Pinhel, Porto de Vide, and one regiment of Portuguese infantry at Freixedas; the 4th division of infantry, Gen. Campbell's brigade, at Castanheira, &c., observing the passages of the Coa at Castello Bom and Castello Mendo, and the remainder of the division at Guarda, the Royal dragoons observing the upper passages of the Coa, as far as Sabugal. These officers are requested to communicate with each other, and with head quarters.

In case the enemy should (*threaten to*\*) attack Gen. Craufurd with a superior force, I wish him to retire upon Almeida, and eventually, should he find it necessary, across the Coa, holding the high grounds on the left of the river, and Valverde, and keeping open the communication with the fort as long as may be practicable.

If the enemy should pass the Coa at Castello Bom or Castello Mendo in force, Gen. Campbell is to collect his brigade at Jurumella, and is to retire gradually upon Guarda, taking care to give intelligence to Gen. Craufurd at La Concepcion of his movement, as well as to Gen. Slade. In this case Gen. Slade with the Royals is likewise to retire upon Guarda. If the enemy should cross the Coa at any of the upper passages of the river, Gen. Slade and Gen. Campbell are to retire upon Guarda.

It is desirable that, if it should be practicable, Gen. Slade with the

\* See letter of the 11th July, 7½ P.M., p. 162.

Royals should join Gen. Campbell's brigade in these movements, and Gen. Cole will be in readiness to protect their retreat upon Guarda with the remainder of the division.

When Gen. Craufurd shall receive the account of the retreat of Gen. Campbell, he will retire upon Freixedas. When Gen. Picton shall receive the account of the retreat of Gen. Campbell, he will collect his division at Pinhel, and as soon as Gen. Craufurd shall have arrived at Valverde, he will retire by Souro-pires upon Alverca.

If the enemy should attempt the lower fords and passages of the Coa in force, instead of the upper, or at the same time with the upper, or at the same time with an attack upon Gen. Craufurd, Gen. Picton is to give notice of this attempt to Gen. Craufurd, who is to fall back upon Valverde, if not already there. As soon as Gen. Craufurd shall have arrived at Valverde, Gen. Picton will retire by the road of Trancoso till he shall pass Pova del Rey, and will come to the heights on which are situated Villa Franca, Foidal, and Pova de Concilio, &c., and Gen. Craufurd will retire upon Alverca, and Gen. Campbell and Gen. Slade upon Guarda.

The regiment of Portuguese infantry of the 3d division at Freixedas will receive their orders from head quarters.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Alverca, 2d July, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 25th, and I hope that the arrival of my letter at Cadiz will remove all difficulties respecting the transport of our money.

It would not be proper for me to make any suggestion or request to you, inconsistent with the orders from the Admiralty, respecting the *Norge*. We ought to take care to have a large fleet in the Tagus, otherwise Buonaparte will strike a serious blow upon us, we may depend upon it. All the intercepted letters, and other intelligence, tend to show that he is making great naval exertions.

Ciudad Rodrigo held out last night, but I fear that they will have surrendered this day.

P.S. The Duchess of Richmond tells me that she is going to send Lord March here.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Alverca, 2d July, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 25th and 27th. I have no recollection of receiving any letter from Senhora Seriora de Niz, and I cannot conceive to what troops her complaint refers. She has omitted to mention time, or the regiment to which the soldier belonged who is supposed to have been murdered. I rather believe that the story refers to a transaction by the drivers of the artillery, which was inquired into; but it is an useless waste of time to search for the papers, till we shall have some more accurate description of the circumstances from the lady.

I have written to my brother respecting the sending a person to Cadiz, charged with the business of raising money; and as I differ from him and Gen. Graham, I prefer not to send any body till I shall hear further from him. Ciudad Rodrigo still held out last night, but I am afraid that it must have surrendered this day. I have desired the Commissary Gen. to give you all the money that can be spared.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Alverca, 3d July, 1810.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Gen. Cox, recommending the curate of Garcirey to the Spanish government. He is a person who has long given us intelligence of the enemy's movements in Castille, in consequence of which conduct he has been obliged to abandon his country, and I shall be obliged to you if you will recommend him to the Regency.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 3d July, 1810.

I enclose the copy of a paper which has been transmitted to me by Gen. Mahy, which purports to be the translation of a letter from the Prince de Neufchâtel to the Prince d'Essling, which had been intercepted, conveying information of the strength of the allied armies, extracted from the English newspapers.\*

It may be satisfactory to the government to have the reason which this paper affords, for believing that the enemy have no better means of acquiring intelligence in England than are therein referred to; but I would wish again to call the attention of His Majesty's government to the inconveniences and disadvantage under which we labor, from the indiscretion with which intelligence of this description is continually published in the English newspapers. Very recently all the newspapers contained accounts, not only of the numbers, but of the positions occupied by this army.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 4th July, 1810, 1 P.M.

I have received your note of half-past 7 this morning. The intelligence which I had before received from La Concepcion rendered this movement very probable. It would be desirable that if in your power you should occupy a height between Castillejo de dos Casas, and Villar de Puerco, from whence you will have nearly as good a view of the plain and of Ciudad Rodrigo, as you had on the Azava.

I have spoken to the Commissary Gen. regarding your wine. He has some on the road from S. Joaõ da Pesqueira, which you shall have. I shall ask leave from Marshal Beresford for the Captain of Militia, to whom you refer, to be employed on this service.

It appears by an intercepted letter received this day, that a corps of 10,000 infantry and some cavalry are to be employed under Gen. Seras, in the country lying between Zamora, Leon, and Astorga. This is probably the same body of troops of which we have heard so frequently. Bonet is either still in Asturias, or is to return to that quarter. There is nothing new from the south.

To Brig. Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Alverca, 4th July, 1810, 1 P.M.

I write to let you know that the enemy crossed the Agueda and the Azava this morning, and that Gen. Craufurd has retired upon the fort of La Concepcion. The siege still continues. The roads to the Coa, however, in your front are now open. Apprise Gen. Slade of these circumstances.

\* See Appendix No. II.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 4th July, 1810.

Ciudad Rodrigo still holds out, notwithstanding the efforts of the large force, and the formidable equipment which the enemy have collected there. The fire of the place is as vigorous as it was at first, but that of the enemy has slackened within these last few days; from which circumstance, and from the continuance of the siege, and from some of the enemy's magazines having exploded at its commencement, and from the reports of deserters, it is imagined that they begin to feel the want of ammunition. There has been a heavy fire of musketry on the last 2 nights; but there has been no change in the enemy's positions before the place. The whole of the corps of Ney, and the greatest part of that of Junot, have certainly been collected in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; and the enemy occupy in strength the right of the Agueda as far as San Felices.\*

The intercepted letters and various reports would give reason to believe that the 2d corps, under the command of Gen. Regnier, would be brought across the Tagus. The recent movements of that corps, however, do not manifest this intention. A division of about 1500 cavalry and infantry passed through the Sierra Morena on the 21st June; and their advanced guard, consisting of 300 men, were attacked at Los Santos on the 23d by a detachment from the division of Gen. Mendizabal, under the command of Col. —, and were defeated. A great part of the corps of Regnier was immediately moved by the great road of Seville to Zafra, probably to protect the junction of this detachment from Andalusia, and the corps had not re-assembled at Merida when I received the last accounts from Badajoz.

No movement of importance had been made in Leon. It appears to be the enemy's intention to form a corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men, under Gen. Seras, to occupy the country between Zamora, Leon, and Astorga, while a similar corps will be formed under Gen. Kellermann, to keep up the communication between the main army under Marshal Massena, and the places in his rear. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 19th June, when nothing extraordinary had happened.

P.S. Since writing this dispatch, I have received accounts that the enemy had passed the Agueda and the Azava this morning in strength; in consequence of which Brig. Gen. Craufurd had retired with the British advanced guard to the Fort La Concepcion.

*The A.G. to Col. Stopford, Brigade of Guards.*

4th July, 1810.

Since I saw you yesterday, and received a list of men of the Brigade of Guards fit for duty at Coimbra, I have received the enclosures from Capt. Marsden, which I felt it my duty to lay before the Commander of the Forces; and I am directed to acquaint you that if Ensign — has joined his regiment, he must be sent back to Coimbra. The Commander of the Forces is of opinion that it is impossible for any officer at the distance you are from Coimbra to have any knowledge of what is going on there, and at all events no officer can know what orders it is proper to give to the hospital or any part of it. The officer commanding the hospital at Coimbra is responsible to the Commander of the Forces for the performance of this duty, and the medical gentlemen must with him alone be the judges of what time it is proper to send off the convalescents to their regiments. Be pleased to return the enclosures.

\* See Appendix, No. IV.



*The A.G. to Capt. Marsden, D.A.Q.M.G., Coimbra.*

4th July, 1810.

I this morning received your letter and enclosures of 1st July, relative to Ensign ——'s conduct, previous to knowing the circumstances of any interference from Col. Stopford through an irregular channel. I had agreed yesterday to have such men of the brigade of Guards, as he reported were fit to march, sent to their regiments, and sent you a letter to that effect by yesterday's post. Your communication of this day, however, having thrown a new light on this subject, I herewith enclose the copy of a letter I have written to Col. Stopford; and you will please to detain Ensign —— and the men of the Guards at Coimbra, until you and the medical gentlemen think they ought to join.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 5th July, 1810.

I have received your letter, dated 2 P.M. the 4th, and I am highly gratified by the conduct of Capt. Krauchenberg, and Cornet Cordemann and his squadron of hussars. I beg that you will tell Col. Arentschildt that I will take an opportunity of reporting to His Majesty my sense of the conduct of the excellent regiment under his command, during the long and trying period that they have been at the outposts with you.

The Marques de la Romana is still here, and I have had frequent conferences with him on the situation of affairs. He appears to agree that it is impossible for us to do any thing for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, excepting probably to enable the garrison to evacuate the place, by drawing the attention of the enemy to this side. I think they will find much difficulty in effecting their object; but our part of the operation does not appear either very difficult, or attended with much risk. In the mean time, it appears that the place is not breached; and there is no doubt that there are still provisions for 17 or 18 days, even supposing that the inhabitants have no supply excepting from the general magazine. The Marques de la Romana is strongly impressed with the importance of their holding out till the last moment, which is certainly true; and he feels that even if there is no prospect of relief, it is the duty of those in Ciudad Rodrigo not to give up till the last moment. He could tell, and has told, the Governor this truth, which probably would not come so well from me.\*

If the enemy have drawn in again from Gallegos, I think it would be desirable that you should resume your position at Alameda, and place your piquets of cavalry on the Agueda, so as at all events to have a view of the place, encourage its continued resistance, and know what is going on. In that case I would throw the troops of Gen. Picton's division again into La Concepcion, and the 14th dragoons should continue there.

If you think you are better on this side of the Dos Casas, you might either keep the 14th dragoons with you, or send a part, or the whole of them, to the rear, as you may think proper. If you want to keep only 4 squadrons with you, they had probably better be 2 of hussars, and 2 of the 14th, sending the 16th back. If you wish to have 6 squadrons, keep 2 of each regiment; and if 8 squadrons, keep the whole.

I shall be obliged to you if you will direct your posts on your right to communicate with Gen. A. Campbell's brigade, which occupy Castello Bom, Castello Mendo, &c., if you should continue behind the Dos Casas.

\* See Spanish letter, (Appendix No. XXVII.)

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alverca, 5th July, 1810.

In my letter of the 2d April I communicated to you my opinion that you should co-operate with the Marques de la Romana in any movements or operations which might have for their object to facilitate the collection of provisions for Badajoz, Campo Maior, Olivença, and Alburquerque, and to form a magazine for the use of his army; and the existing situation of affairs in the Peninsula renders that object more than ever interesting. It is obvious that it cannot be effected as long as the enemy remain in possession of the open and fertile parts of Estremadura; and if these places should not be able to collect a part of the harvest now on the ground, and about to be cut, it must be expected that they will fall into the hands of the enemy for want of provisions.

The continuance of the corps of the Marques de la Romana in its position on the frontiers of Estremadura and Alentejo, which depends upon the security of these places, and upon the accomplishment of this object, is important to the cause of the allies, as affording additional security to the position of the British army in the Peninsula, and means of annoying the enemy in his operations against our position.

The letters which have been recently intercepted contain an order to Gen. Regnier to cross the Tagus with the 2d corps of the army, and to manoeuvre on the right bank of that river; and it appears to be intended to replace the 2d corps in Estremadura by withdrawing the 5th from Andalusia. From all accounts received of the state of affairs in Andalusia, it is not very probable that the French can diminish their force in Andalusia without evacuating that province altogether. If the 2d corps should be removed from Estremadura, and should not be replaced by the 5th, the Marques de la Romana will experience no difficulty in collecting his magazines in Estremadura without your assistance. Even if the 2d corps should be replaced by the 5th, this latter will probably not be very efficient, and he may still be able to hold so much of Estremadura as to enable him to effect his object. But even if the 5th corps, having replaced the 2d, should be sufficiently strong to prevent the collection of the harvest of Estremadura for the magazines of the places on the frontiers, it will be impossible for me to allow you to be cut off from the main body of the army, which would be the consequence of your remaining in Estremadura after the 2d corps should have crossed the Tagus.

If the 2d corps should cross the Tagus, therefore, you must abide by my instructions of the 1st inst., and cross that river by the bridge of Villa Velha without loss of time. If, however, the 2d corps should remain in Estremadura, it is desirable that you should, without loss of time, co-operate with the Marques de la Romana in an effort to dislodge Regnier from Estremadura, during such time as may be necessary to collect such parts of the harvest as may be required for the formation of the magazines. From the returns which we have of the 2d corps, it appears to me that this measure will not be very difficult by the united corps under the command of the Marques de la Romana and yourself, even though Gen. Regnier should have been reinforced by the troops said to have lately arrived from Andalusia. Accordingly, I request you to arrange an attack upon Gen. Regnier's positions in Estremadura in conjunction with the Marques de la Romana, adverting only to the following points:

1st; that it is desirable that the attack should be made by the 2 corps united in one solid mass.

2dly; that it is desirable that the troops under your command should not cross to the left of the Guadiana.

3dly; that it is desirable that you should not move further than Merida.

4thly; that, if Gen. Regnier should retreat across the Tagus, it is necessary that you should return and cross that river, according to my letter of the 1st inst.

5thly; you must, at all events, return to your position at Portalegre by the 1st Aug.

You will direct the Dep. Commissary Gen. attached to your corps to be prepared to supply your troops with provisions in this forward movement; and Gen. Leite will be written to, to have as many carts as can be collected, for the purpose of transporting the harvest to the magazines. He will also be requested to relieve the troops under the command of the Marques de la Romana, as far as his means may allow, in the garrisons which they occupy, in order to strengthen his corps in the field.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.*

5th July, 1810.

I have laid your letter before the Commander of the Forces, and his Excellency has been pleased to approve of your having given Lieut. —, 27th regt., leave to go to Lisbon. But upon a future occasion, when head quarters are so near, the Commander of the Forces desires the usual form of a Medical board to be resorted to.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 6th July, 1810.

I have received your two letters of yesterday. The position you have taken up will answer our purposes perfectly. You did exactly as I wished in retiring the day before yesterday. You could not have contested your ground, which, under the circumstances, it was no object to us to keep, at the risk of any loss. I am glad to find that Col. Elder's battalion showed a good disposition.

There is nothing new from any quarter, excepting that the French continue to show themselves on the Douro, between the Agueda and the Tormes; and that the Duc d'Orléans \* has arrived at Cadiz.

To Brig. Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Alverca, 6th July, 1810.

I write to let you know that Gen. Craufurd has a post at Fuentes de Oñoro, which will communicate with your post at Castello Mendo.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Alverca, 6th July, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 21st June, and of the 26th Nov. (No. 24,125), and one marked 'separate,' of the 17th June. I concur entirely in the measures which you had ordered to be adopted for the accommodation of the sick officers under your command; and I recommend it to you to make it as convenient, as comfortable, and as spacious for them as circumstances will permit. I also recommend it to you, if it should be possible, to hire a house for this purpose, rather than put the officers of the army, who may be taken ill, in a ward of the hospital, even

\* Louis Philippe, King of the French.

though it should be fitted up. These directions must, however, of course be considered null and void, if they should be inconsistent with those which you will receive from the Sec. of State upon this subject.

I have also to observe that it is very desirable that, if possible, the officers of the army who should become sick should not be removed to the hospital, if the owners of the houses in which they are quartered, or the owners of any houses, will allow them to remain in them; and if the Medical staff, general and regimental, are not sufficiently numerous to attend to the officers as well as the soldiers of your division, they must and shall be increased.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Alverca, 6th July, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 2d. I approve highly of the circular letter to the Bishops. I would give an English officer for Lisbon if I had one; but we have not one to spare. I am obliged to employ Leith upon the Zezere. Let the Spaniards have the uniforms. Have them valued, and get their receipt for them.

Ciudad Rodrigo still holds out. It is said that the wall is not breached.

G. O.

Alverca, 6th July, 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to notice the frequent omissions of the regiments to send proper returns of the necessaries, &c., of the soldiers to the general hospital along with them, the consequence of which is, that the purveyors of the hospital cannot be responsible for the necessaries of the men. They are referred to the G. O. 17th Dec. 1809, in which it will be observed, that a report is required to be made to the General officer commanding the brigade that it has been obeyed.

2. As it appears that the necessaries of several men, particularly 1st batt. 11th regt., were found deficient, in addition to the men who were sent in without proper returns, an officer of the 11th is to proceed to Coimbra forthwith, to inquire into the circumstances which occasioned the deficiencies.

3. The Adj. General will send to the Commanding officers the list of the names of the men, and the deficiencies of each.

4. As it appears, from comparing at the Adj. Gen.'s office the Division Order books with the General Order book of the army, that various omissions and mistakes have arisen, it becomes necessary to call the attention of the officers of the department very particularly to the future regularity of the G. O. issued by them to the different divisions.

5. It has been conceived by some gentlemen that the order books were their own property, and on the removal of an officer of the department from one division to another, they have thought themselves entitled to the order book of the division they served in.

6. It is the Commander of the Forces' positive directions, that the order books now belonging to each division are never to be carried away or exchanged, but to be considered as wholly appertaining to the division; and if it should be broken up or divided, the officer of the department in charge of the order books will apply to the Adj. Gen.'s office for instructions concerning them.

7. The officers of the department must enter the G. O. into the order book themselves, and not entrust them to a clerk. They must sign their names at the bottom of each day's orders, as being responsible for the entry.

8. The G. O. are to be kept at one end of the book and the Division Orders at the other, when they meet, a new book is to be procured, which is charged in the contingent account. This will facilitate the comparing the G. O.

9. Division order books will be called for every two months, to be compared, and returned with the Adj. Gen.'s signature as being correct: any errors the officers of the department will have to repair to head quarters to correct.

10. Division officers of the department will call for in the same manner the Brigade Major's order books, and compare them with theirs.

11. Officers of the department are not only to acknowledge the receipt of G. O., but they are to make a particular report, on the 1st and 14th of every month, of the days upon which no G. O. have been received, addressed to the Adj. General.

12. General officers commanding divisions will please to see these orders strictly complied with.

The place ought to have 16 or 17 days' more provisions. Don Julian says 20, or even more. Gen. Craufurd has his posts on the Dos Casas. The enemy are in Gallegos.

We hear that the insurrection is spreading and increasing in Castille. If this is true, the enemy will be obliged to weaken his force before Ciudad Rodrigo, and we may have a chance of relieving the place. The Marques de la Romana went this morning.

*The A.G. to Major Ainslie, A.A.G. Cavalry.*

6th July, 1810.

I enclose herewith a memorandum of omissions and mistakes in the orderly book of the Cavalry division. You will please to proceed to head quarters to correct the same, and when the errors are rectified, I will sign the orderly books as being correct up to the last entry. The orderly books will be detained until your arrival.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals, Celorico.*

6th July, 1810.

In reply to your letter of the 5th inst., under the statement you have made, the Commander of the Forces directs you will detain Mr. — until the arrival of the hospital mates from England.

With respect to instructions relating to transporting the sick from Leiria, I am to observe that the road from Leiria to Figueira is very bad, and there is no accommodation upon it; the distance from Leiria to Villa Nova and Villa Franca is only 13 or 14 leagues, and the road good, and there is also accommodation upon it, and at these places the sick would embark on the Tagus; you will therefore be pleased to make arrangements that they go from Leiria by this road. The brigade that was at Leiria being now gone to Thomar, the sick will be removed from thence to Punhete or Abrantes, and thence by the Tagus to Lisbon.

The Commander of the Forces directs that hospital mate — be placed under an arrest for disobedience of orders. The charges to be preferred against him, and the list of evidences, to be sent me by Dep. Inspector —; and you will be pleased to observe to that officer that his Excellency is much surprised that the Dep. Inspector should feel sorry to complain of any officer who misconducts himself, and that he should state that he has not preferred a complaint against the hospital mate until his conduct was such that he could not avoid it; whereas the Commander of the Forces expects that every breach of discipline or disobedience of orders will be reported by the superior officers of the army, with that promptitude and zeal which can alone promote that necessary obedience and attention without which the good of the service cannot be maintained nor due order preserved.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Cameron, 9th regt.*

6th July, 1810.

A serjeant and private of the 9th regt., shipwrecked in the *Ariadne* transport in 1805, having made their escape from the French service, have been forwarded from hence, with directions to proceed to Thomar, and report themselves to you as commanding the 9th regt. I have the directions of the Commander of the Forces to desire that these men may be clothed by the regiment, and 2 months' leave of absence granted them to proceed to England to see their friends.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 7th July, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 6th. I am not desirous that you should move across the Dos Casas, unless it should be perfectly convenient, or if you are to be exposed to an attack, and retire again. The French still continue to show themselves on the Duero. There is nothing new from any other quarter.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alverca, 7th July, 1810.

The Marques de la Romana left us yesterday morning, and will pro-

bably be with you shortly after you receive this letter. I showed him the instructions which I wrote to you the day before yesterday, to which he objected as to the restriction to your crossing the Guadiana. You will observe that I have thus put this point, 'it is desirable' that you should not cross the Guadiana. This only expresses my opinion; but you on the spot must be the best judge, whether you can effect your object without crossing that river; and whether you can cross the river with safety, or consistently with my other views for your corps, as stated in that dispatch. I believe, however, that when you undertake this operation, the difference whether you will be on the one side or on the other of the Guadiana, will be only the difference of a few miles of distance, as the river will probably be fordable every where.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Alverca, 7th July, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 30th June, on the subject of fixing the prices of provisions, &c., in the country, on which I had written to you. It is probable that the demand and consumption of the army in the country is the cause of the high price of provisions, and other articles; and that the Comarca in each district in which the army is stationed, or which contributes to supply its demands, fixes the price of provisions in reference to the additional demand thus created.

I do not think it would be just towards the public, that an addition of 25 *per cent.* on all our purchases should be made to the price thus increased by our demands. We have a right to expect from the country the provisions which we require, at the same price which the inhabitants pay for the same articles; and I do not think it would be proper that I should consent to an arrangement which should have for its object to make us pay more.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Alverca, 7th July, 1810.

I enclose a letter from Duff, which I do not exactly understand. It appears that he has raised money which he has consigned to you; and that my brother has desired him to do so. I rather think my brother is not aware of the mode in which our business is settled here; and probably the mode most likely to avoid confusion in our concerns would be for you to hand over the 60,000 dollars to the Commissary Gen., and send Duff his receipt for them; and this sum can afterwards be handed over from the Military chest to the chest of the 'Aids.'

I have desired Mr. Kennedy to give you all the money that he can. How much subsidy do you now owe to the Portuguese government?

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 7th July, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford with its enclosure, being the report of Brig. Gen. Miller on 3500 sets of accoutrements, of those lately arrived from England, which had been allotted for the service of the militia in the province of the Minho; which it appears are not new, the pouches small, and containing only 18 rounds of ammunition; to which I beg to draw your Lordship's attention.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Lord Aylmer, A.A.G. 1st division.*

7th July, 1810.

I have directed the orderly books of the 1st division to be returned to your Lordship. They are more correct than any other division books. Some few omissions and mistakes, previous to 14th Nov., are remarked in the paper herewith annexed; since that period only one G.A.O. is omitted. You will please to send a clerk over here with a copy of the enclosed paper to rectify the omissions pointed out.

*To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.*

Alverca, 8th July, 1810.

I have received your letter of yesterday. I believe I told you that I had the return of Junot's corps in detail. The account of the deserter is perfectly correct, but he has not stated all the troops of any division. The total effective infantry of this corps is 19,899; the cavalry, divided into 8 instead of 3 provisional regiments, is 4716. The total effectives of the corps, including artillery, is 25,956.

I have heard nothing yet from the garrison on the proposed plan of escape, and till I do, I do not propose to make any movements on this side; and I think upon the whole, that for the present you are best situated where you are. If you were to take the position at Espeja you would be obliged to fall back upon Villar Maior, and you would be much exposed, and would find it difficult to fall back upon the army in this valley, if I did not at the same time collect the whole, or the greatest part of the army upon the Coa. This must be done if it is necessary, but it is desirable to avoid it if possible.

I agree with you in thinking that the enemy will not attack Almeida, and it is not improbable but that after Ciudad Rodrigo shall have fallen, they will direct their march upon Castello Branco, and thus endeavor to cut in between Lieut. Gen. Hill and me. But I have in some degree provided for this movement. You will observe, that, excepting by Guarda or this place, you could not join the army in the valley of the Mondego. If you were to retire by Villar Maior, the enemy would be before you on the high road to Guarda. You would then be obliged to retire by Castello Branco, and whether the enemy take that road, or the road by the valley of the Mondego in their attack upon this country, it is most desirable that you should not be separated from the main body of the army. I hear from Estremadura, that Regnier has made a movement upon Sta Marta, Almendralejo, &c. &c.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.*

8th July, 1810.

In reply to your letter of the 6th inst., enclosing one from Lieut. Col. Lyon, 97th regt., and covering a court of inquiry on Lieuts. — and —, I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will direct Lieut. Col. Lyon to place Lieut. — under an arrest for 'ungentlemanlike conduct in striking Lieut. —, of the same regiment, at Guarda.' The court of inquiry will be laid before the Dep. Judge Advocate on his arrival at head quarters, where he is shortly expected, and the crime, &c., made out in due form, when a General Court Martial will be assembled.

*The A.G. to the Commissary General.*

8th July, 1810.

Very great inconvenience being still experienced by the head quarters of the army not being able to get their horses shod, as they require it, from the 2 farriers now employed, the Commander of the Forces has been pleased to permit a forge

cart to be attached to the A. G.'s and Q. M. G.'s department; and if there is one unemployed at Lisbon, I am to request you will be pleased to order it with some of the cart horses to head quarters, where it will be given in charge to 2 farriers, who will be procured, and who, under the direction of the assist. provost at head quarters, will be responsible for the same.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alverca, 9th July, 1810.

Although my different letters appear to me to provide for every probable event that may occur, it will save you some trouble, and will be satisfactory to you, to be made acquainted with my wishes, in the occurrence of certain events during your expedition into Estremadura.

Under my former instructions you were directed to fall back upon Abrantes, in case the officer commanding the troops in the mountains between the Tagus and the Zezere should have been unable to maintain himself in those mountains; and in case he should withdraw himself from a communication with the bridge of Villa Velha, that bridge was to be effectually destroyed; and for this purpose you were to keep an officer and a party at this bridge. You are still to follow the same instructions, and observe particularly that the destruction of the bridge at Villa Velha and all the boats there, in case the officer commanding in the mountains gives up his communication with that bridge, is most important for your march upon Abrantes, and your communication with the army. You must therefore leave a British officer and the party at the bridge of Villa Velha, and when they shall have done their work, they are to go to Abrantes by the left of the Tagus.

I have formed a corps under Gen. Leith upon the Zezere, with the object of securing the retreat of Le Cor from the mountains; the communication of this army with the Tagus; and of yourself through Abrantes with Punhete. I think these points are tolerably secure, and in a few days will be more so. But in the situation in which we are, it is necessary to provide for events which are possible, although I hope not very probable.

When Ciudad Rodrigo shall fall, it is probable that the enemy will direct the march of a large detachment, at least, of his army upon Castello Branco, and the mountains between the Tagus and the Zezere. It is not very probable, but it is possible, that the Tagus may be fordable at Villa Velha; in which case, if the enemy should be able to cross that river, your march upon Abrantes would be difficult. It is also possible that all my measures to secure your communication with Punhete may fail, owing to the strength of the corps which the enemy may throw into the mountains between the Tagus and the Zezere. In the former case, which is not very likely, you should direct your march to pass the river at Santarem: in the latter, I should have an opportunity of instructing

G. O.

Alverca, 9th July, 1810.

1. Paymasters of regiments and other officers, who have money to pay to the Commissary Gen. on account either of necessities furnished to the regiments, or any other account, are to pay it, on account of the Commissary Gen., into the hands of the Dep. Paymaster Gen., and take his receipt for the same.

2. The receipt of the Dep. Paymaster Gen. is then to be taken to the office of the Commissary Gen. at head quarters, and exchanged for the receipt of the Commissary Gen., which can alone be the discharge for the sum due.



you; but if I should not, I should wish you to pass the river at the same place, where boats will be prepared for you.

Ciudad Rodrigo still holds out; and it is obvious will hold out as long as their provisions shall last. I calculate that they have 10 days' provisions from the 11th, even supposing that there was no private store in the town, of which it is probable there were some.

According to the account of Don J. Sanchez, they would have provisions for 5 or 6 days more. So that there is reason to hope that you will have time for your expedition into Estremadura; and if we can effect the object of the expedition, we shall be in great style.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

This will be delivered to you by Lord Burghersh, whom I beg to introduce to you.

I learn from Estremadura that Regnier is gone to endeavor to dislodge the Spaniards from Xerez de los Caballeros, in which I believe that he has succeeded.

Sir S. Cotton wishes to relieve the two squadrons of the 16th which are with you, on Monday next; and I shall be obliged to you if you will have them collected at that time to come away.

I understand that there is some musket ammunition and some biscuit in La Concepcion, which may as well be sent back to Almeida, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Mr. Lutyens to settle with the government, or the authorities at Almeida, for their removal.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose the weekly state of the army of the 1st July; and an abstract of the state of the Portuguese army taken from the return of the 10th June, which will show you the disposable force which we have to oppose to the enemy. It is very desirable that the reinforcements destined for this army should arrive at an early period.

I likewise enclose the last state which I have received of the sick of the army. The difference between this state and the military return of the sick in hospital, is to be attributed to the fact that the regiments return all men as sick in hospital who have been sent to the hospital from the regiment, whether on the road to the hospital, convalescent at the hospital station, or on the road to join, recovered; and the hospitals return only those men who are actually on the hospital books.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

The enemy passed the Azava in force on the morning of the 4th inst., and obliged Brig. Gen. Craufurd to fall back with his advanced guard to the neighbourhood of the fort of La Concepcion, which had been occupied by a part of the 3d division of infantry. In making this movement, Capt. Krauchenberg and Cornet Cordemann, at the head of a small body

G. O.

Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers commanding divisions will direct that those soldiers who may be inclined to reap the harvest may have leave of absence for that purpose.

of the hussars and 16th light dragoons, had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves by making a gallant charge upon a superior body of the enemy. Upon mentioning the light dragoons, it is but justice to inform your Lordship, that they have been with the advanced guard throughout the winter, and have performed their duty in the most satisfactory manner.

The 3d battalion of the Portuguese chasseurs, under Lieut. Col. Elder, had also an opportunity of showing their steadiness during this movement of the advanced guard, and the skirmishing of the enemy which attended it. The 1st hussars had 5 men and 3 horses wounded, and the 16th light dragoons 3 horses killed.

The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo still continues, and the fire of the place is kept up with unabated vigor. The enemy having collected nearly the whole of Junot's corps, between the Azava and Agueda, I have not thought it proper to push our advanced guard so forward as Gallegos again; and it remains upon the river Dos Casas: and the piquets of the enemy are on this side of the Azava.

The Marques de la Romana was here last week to confer with me upon the state of affairs in this part of the Peninsula; and he appeared to be convinced of the impossibility of our affording relief to Ciudad Rodrigo, as long as the enemy should be enabled to keep collected near that place so large an army as he now has there. I have heard of the movements of the guerrillas in Castille; and I have reason to believe that the enemy has been in some degree distressed by their operations; but I do not find that they have weakened their corps employed in the operations against the place, or in covering them.

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 4th inst., I have received reports that the corps of Regnier, after having been assembled at Merida, broke up again on the 2d inst., and marched by Almendralejo and Almedral, to endeavor to dislodge the Spanish divisions of Ballesteros and Imaz, which extend from Olivença by Xerez de los Caballeros along the Guadiana into the Sierra Morena. From the accounts which I have received from Badajoz of the 7th, it appears that Gen. Imaz had retired from Xerez de los Caballeros upon Oliva; and it is probable that all these troops will be obliged to fall back across the Guadiana into Portugal; as, by the movements of Regnier, he has cut off their communication with Badajoz by Olivença. There had been some skirmishing between the outposts of these divisions and the French advanced guard, in which the French appear to have sustained loss; as 17 carriages with wounded had arrived in Merida on the 7th.

No movements of any importance have taken place in the north. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 26th June. Nothing had occurred there deserving your Lordship's attention; excepting the arrival of the Duc d'Orléans on the 19th.

To Brig. Gen. A. Campbell.

Alverca, 11th July, 1810, 6 P.M.

The enemy got possession of Ciudad Rodrigo by capitulation yesterday evening; and this morning there was an affair with our piquets, of which I have not received the details, in which we lost Lieut. Col. Talbot, 14th light dragoons, and 8 men killed, and 23 men wounded: we have taken

31 men and 29 horses. Gen. Craufurd has occupied Fuentes; but look out in the morning, and apprise Gen. Slade of these circumstances. Tell Gen. Slade that Carrera is about to march for Estremadura, according to the notice I before gave him.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

Since I wrote to your Lordship this day, I have received a report that Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered to the enemy yesterday evening. There was a large practicable breach in the place, and the enemy had made all the preparations for a storm; when, Marshal Ney having offered terms of capitulation, the garrison surrendered.

The enemy took up their ground before this place on the 26th April; they invested it completely on the 11th June; broke ground before it on the 15th June, and opened their fire upon it on the 24th June: and, adverting to the nature and position of the place, to the deficiency and defects of its works, to the advantages which the enemy had in their attack upon it, and to the numbers and formidable equipment by which it was attacked, I consider the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo to have been most honorable to the Governor, Don Andres Herrasti, and its garrison; and to have been equally creditable to the arms of Spain, with the celebrated defence of other places, by which this nation has been illustrated during the existing contest for its independence.

I have been most anxiously desirous to relieve the place since it has been attacked; and have been prevented from attempting its relief only by the certainty which I had that the attempt must fail; and that the immediate fall of the place and the irrevocable loss of the cause of the allies would be the consequence of the failure.

I had intelligence, of the truth of which I could entertain no doubt, that the enemy had collected in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, for the purpose of the siege, the whole of the 6th and of the 8th corps of the army in Spain; the former consisting of 31,611 effectives, including 4856 cavalry; the latter consisting of 25,956 effectives, including 4716 cavalry, according to returns of those corps of a very late period which had been intercepted, and communicated to me. There were besides other troops employed in the communications with the rear, and with the right of the enemy's army. The country in which I must have carried on the operations to raise the siege, or even to relieve the place, would have been highly advantageous to the enemy, on account of his superiority in cavalry.

Under these circumstances, however much I have been interested in the fate of this place, not only on account of its military and political importance, but on account of its brave Governor, and garrison, and inhabitants, I have considered it my duty to refrain from an operation which it was probable would be attended by the most disastrous consequences. While the Marquès de la Romana was here, I had arranged with him an operation, by which it was hoped that we might save the garrison; but the absolute impossibility of communicating with the Governor, for several days, has prevented its execution.

There was an affair between our piquets and those of the enemy this

morning, in which the enemy lost 2 officers and 31 men, and 29 horses, prisoners. I have not received the detailed account of this affair; but I understand that we have had the misfortune to lose Lieut. Col. Talbot and 8 men of the 14th light dragoons killed, and 23 men wounded.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 11th July, 1810, 7½ p.m.

I have received your letters of this day. The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo was to be expected, and the defence has been greater than we had a right to expect. I regret poor Talbot; he is a great loss.

I have looked over my instructions to you, and I see nothing to add excepting the word '*threaten*' in the 4th paragraph.\* That is to say, it will run, 'In case the enemy should *threaten* to attack Gen. Craufurd,' instead of, 'In case the enemy should attack Gen. Craufurd.' In short, I don't wish to risk any thing beyond the Coa, and indeed, when Carrera is clearly off, I don't see why you should remain any longer at such a distance in front of Almeida.

It is desirable that the communication with Almeida should be kept open as long as possible, in order that we may throw into that place as much provisions as we can, and therefore I would not wish you to fall back beyond Almeida, unless it should be necessary. But it does not appear necessary that you should be so far, and it will be safer that you should be nearer, at least, with your infantry. If you should retire towards Almeida, and should break off your communication with the posts in front of Castello Bom, and Castello Mendo, it would be desirable that you should leave a small body of cavalry in that quarter, to communicate with, and fall back upon Brig. Gen. Alex. Campbell, and acquaint him accordingly.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Alverca, 11th July, 1810.

As Marshal Beresford has established his hospital at the mouth of the Mondego as well as ourselves, and it would be equally desirable to save his troops as our own, in case we should be under the necessity of quitting the Mondego, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order the whole of the hospital ships up to the mouth of that river.

P.S. Mr. Stuart will inform you of the state of affairs here.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Alverca, 12th July, 1810.

I am sorry to tell you that Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered on the night before last. I have not got the particulars; but it appears that there was a very large breach in the place, that the French were prepared to storm, and Ney sent in to offer terms, and the garrison capitulated. This is the report of 2 French officers who were taken yesterday morning in a skirmish with our advanced posts. I enclose the copy of a dispatch which I wrote to government upon this subject yesterday, and which I think you will do well to communicate to the Regency.

The enemy have made no movement that I have been informed of, since the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, which I think extraordinary. The Marques de la Romana was here last week to confer with me upon the state of

\* See page 147.

affairs in this part of the Peninsula. He appeared equally convinced with myself, of the impossibility of our effecting any thing for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, and of the danger of the attempt. I believe he wrote to the Regency from hence.

Since my last, Regnier has made two movements to the southward; one to relieve a small detachment coming from Andalusia, which had been attacked by the Spaniards; the other, on the 2d inst., to attack Gen. Imaz, and, I believe, Ballesteros. He attacked Gen. Imaz on the 5th, and obliged him to retire to Oliva from Xerez de los Caballeros, and it was expected that he would also attack Ballesteros. But Gen. Mendizabal, who commanded the army in the absence of the Marques de la Romana, states his conviction that Regnier would be able to effect nothing against Imaz and Ballesteros united. I fear that he will drive them across the Guadiana into Portugal, as he had already cut off their communication with Badajoz by Olivença. Regnier had certainly been ordered by Buonaparte to cross the Tagus; but I imagine that Massena found that the guerrillas, although active to a degree, were not able to annoy him much during the siege; and as he had it in his power to avail himself of the force which Buonaparte had ordered might be employed in keeping up the communication with the rear, he preferred to keep Regnier on the Guadiana.

P.S. I heard last night that the Spanish troops in Asturias have been defeated, and that the French had advanced to the northern frontier of Galicia.

*The A.G. to J. P. Boys, Esq., Dep. Paymaster General.*

12th July, 1810.

The Commander of the Forces desires you will make an advance of 50 dollars each to 2 French officers, of the detachment of prisoners of war, who are to arrive at Celorico to-day, and for which this shall be your authority.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Alverca, 13th July, 1810.

I see by the newspapers that Lord March has been appointed to the 13th light dragoons, according to the intimation which I had received from the Duchess of Richmond, that the Duke had applied to have him removed to a regiment in this country. The 13th dragoons are in the Alentejo; and I think it would be better that you should send him here in the first instance, and I will take care of him. He might go by Thomar, from whence your son would forward him to me.

I have received your letter of the 7th inst., and will speak to the Commissary Gen. this day, respecting the rations for the party of the navy, which I will settle as you wish, and will write to you by the next post.

The enemy have made no movement since they obtained possession of

G. O.

Alverca, 13th July, 1810.

1. The men [according to the return underneath] were deficient in necessaries when sent to the general hospital on the 6th inst. These men have declared, what the Commander of the Forces is disinclined to believe, that the returns of their necessaries were made without a previous inspection by the officers of the companies to which they belong.

The General officers commanding brigades are requested to inquire into this circumstance.

The further particulars of the return are sent to the regiments concerned.

Ciudad Rodrigo. I have heard in various channels of the enemy's naval preparations, which have given me some anxiety, and government appear to be aware of them. I have repeatedly warned them of the danger of our position here, if the naval force was not sufficient, and I shall write to them again upon it. I do not think there will be much use in keeping a vessel of war at Figueira, if we have only an intelligent officer there to manage our transport and hospital concerns.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 13th July, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 12th.

Your complete success on the 11th appears to have been prevented by a series of accidents which could not be avoided. I shall be obliged to you if you will direct your posts on the left to report all extraordinaries to Major Gen. Picton's post on the Coa, and they might fall back upon them if necessary.

The horses sent in were all sold by auction for the benefit of the captors, before your letter reached me yesterday.

Have you any intelligence of the French having moved? Whatever may be their plan, I do not understand their keeping so large an army collected at Ciudad Rodrigo.

There is a detachment of the Guard at Burgos, and it appears to be stationed on the road, as if to protect the journey of Buonaparte to that place. If this be true, they are waiting for him; but still they would separate their army in some degree for the sake of subsistence.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 13th July, 1810.

I informed you in my letter of the 11th, that there had been an affair on that morning between the outposts of the two armies, of which I now enclose the copy of the report made to me by Brig. Gen. Craufurd.\*

\* Extract of a letter from Brig. Gen. Craufurd, Val de la Mula, 12th July, 1810.

'The enemy had, during the last 3 or 4 days, been in the habit of coming with detachments of infantry and cavalry into Barquilla, and with infantry into Sexmoro and Villar de Puerco, and I was desirous of cutting them off. But considering the vicinity of the enemy's position, and his strength in cavalry, I did not think it prudent to send a small detachment, and I therefore ordered all that were off duty of 6 squadrons to assemble behind the Dos Casas at 12 at night, on the road which leads from La Concepcion to Alameda.

'It was between 1 and 2 when we crossed the Dos Casas, and not a shot had then been heard since 6 or 7 the preceding evening, from which circumstance, and the severe fire of the 9th and 10th, I felt apprehensive that Ciudad Rodrigo had surrendered.

'Leaving Alameda on our right, and sending patrols on the road towards Gallegos, we went through the wood, and halted in a hollow within three quarters of a mile of Villar de Puerco. About sunrise we marched off again; and I have to regret that I did not, as I originally intended, keep sufficiently to the right to come out of the wood between Sexmoro and Villar de Puerco; this would have prevented what happened. But the anxiety to do what we had to do as quickly as possible, lest the enemy should have been advancing towards our position (occasioned by the continued cessation of fire at Ciudad Rodrigo), together with the appearance of some cavalry making off, induced me to take the shorter road, which led us through a bad defile.

'Immediately after the head of the column had come out of this defile, we discovered infantry, which, on account of a height and standing corn, were not seen until very close. The squadrons formed successively as they came out; and as the number of infantry did not exceed 300, they were attacked by Capt. Krauchenberg's squadron of hussars, followed by the 16th, part of the former having gone off after some French dragoons. The hussars received the fire of the square; but being unable to penetrate it, they passed on, leaving it

I have had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the troops upon this occasion. The small body of the enemy's infantry, employed on the patrolle with the cavalry, appear to have conducted themselves in the most gallant manner; but they could not have avoided sharing the fate of the cavalry employed on the same patrolle, if the appearance of the Hussars of the Legion, coming out of Barquilla, had not been taken for a body of the enemy, and had not occasioned a momentary discontinuance of the attack of the infantry, of which this body availed itself to withdraw into the woods, and to retire upon Sexmiro. Your Lordship will observe that the attempt to carry off this patrolle was made between the Agueda and the Coa, immediately in front of the enemy's army; and could succeed only by a *coup de main*. I enclose the return of our loss upon this occasion.

to their left. Had the 16th come straight upon it, the square being then without fire, it would probably have been broken; but they were too much to their left, and passed it on the other flank. At this moment a most unfortunate mistake took place, to which alone is to be attributed the escape of the infantry.

Some French dragoons were seen coming out of Barquilla, and behind them was a body of cavalry, which, from its position and manœuvres, every one supposed to be French. Another body of cavalry was likewise seen marching towards Barquilla, upon the road which comes from Valdespino, and no doubt was entertained that these also were French. This drew off our attention from the infantry, and the 16th and hussars advanced towards the cavalry that were near Barquilla, which, except the first mentioned party of French dragoons, proved to be the squadron of the 14th from Aldea del Obispo. Still, no doubt was entertained that those coming by the Valdespino road were French, but they turned out to be Capt. Grüben's squadron of hussars, who had been placed at night in the farm between Villar de Cierro and Barquilla, in order to cut off the enemy's retreat. About the same time a patrolle from the Gallegos road brought the report of some squadrons of cavalry having entered Alameda.

Whilst this was passing the 14th had come out of the defile; and I am informed by Major Hervey that the following circumstances took place.

Col. Talbot, after the first squadron was formed, charged the square without effect, and was killed; and whilst Major Hervey was forming the other two he received an order from Col. Arentschildt to march off from the left to oppose the cavalry near Barquilla, which he also supposed to be French. The enemy's infantry, continuing its march, got into Sexmiro, which was too near to the enemy's position for it to be possible for me to think of attacking it, particularly as we were now convinced that Ciudad Rodrigo had fallen; although 5 companies of the 95th, and 3 of the 52d, were in reserve between Castillejo and Barquilla.

We took 2 officers and 29 dragoons, as your Lordship knows. Our loss you are also acquainted with.

Return of the number of killed, wounded, and missing in the affair near Villar de Puercos, on the 12th July, 1810.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed . . . . .	2	—	7	15	9
Wounded . . . . .	—	2	20	16	22
Missing . . . . .	—	—	1	1	1

To the Rt. Hon. the Commander in Chief.

Alverca, 13th July, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Sec. of State, in which I have informed him of the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The army has for some time been cantoned in this part of the country, in such situations as were most likely to afford accommodation and provisions to the troops, from which I could assemble it with convenience, if I had found it practicable to undertake any operation for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, which place it was obvious that the enemy intended to attack.

The advanced posts under Gen. Craufurd were in front of Almeida, between the Agueda and the Coa, and along the Azava, which runs into the former river between Gallegos and Marialva; and I had occupied the Spanish fort of La Concepcion, with a view to Gen. Craufurd's more secure communication with Almeida, and to cover the assembly of the army beyond the Coa, if that measure should appear to be desirable.

Affairs remained in this situation till the 4th July, when the enemy crossed the Azava in force, and obliged Gen. Craufurd to retire upon La Concepcion. Upon this occasion Capt. Krauchenberg and Lieut. Cordemann, at the head of a squadron of the 1st hussars of the Legion, distinguished themselves; and the 3d batt. of Portuguese caçadores, under Lieut. Col. Elder, had an opportunity of showing their steadiness. The posts of Gen. Craufurd were then extended along and in front of the Dos Casas; and he occupied La Concepcion and the neighbouring village with his advanced guard; and the enemy occupied Gallegos, Sexmiro, &c., on this side the Agueda and the Azava, with their piquets.

On the 11th in the morning, Brig. Gen. Craufurd made an attempt to carry off one of the enemy's patrols, which for some days had been in the habit of going at daylight to Villar del Puerco. I enclose the copy of Brig. Gen. Craufurd's report upon this affair, which could succeed only by a *coup de main*, and the rapidity of the attack, and was successful so far as that the whole of the cavalry were taken prisoners. There is also every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the officers and troops which charged the infantry. The loss of Lieut. Col. Talbot, of the 14th dragoons, who had lately commanded that regiment, and had brought it to a high state of discipline and order, is much to be regretted.

The small body of the enemy's infantry which formed part of the enemy's patrol appear to have conducted themselves in the most gallant manner;\* but they must have shared the fate of the cavalry, if the hussars, seen coming out of Barquilla, had not been taken for a body of the enemy, and had not occasioned a suspension of the attack, of which they availed themselves to retire into the woods, and thence to Sexmiro. I enclose a list of the killed and wounded upon this occasion.

\* They were commanded by Capt. Gouache, 3e compagnie des grenadiers du 22<sup>me</sup> de ligne; he received the Cross of the Legion of Honor for his conduct on this occasion. (See Appendix to this volume, No. V.)



*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

13th July, 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to request that you will make particular inquiries relative to the officers whose names are on the enclosed paper as absent from the army without leave. His Excellency desires that those officers who cannot show to you a sufficient reason for their absence may be immediately ordered to join their regiments, as directions have been given to stop their pay.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 14th July, 1810.

I have received your letter dated the 12th, 7 P.M., which I conclude was written yesterday.

You are aware that Gen. Slade, with the Royal dragoons, is on the right of Brig. Gen. Campbell, and it is desirable that the posts which you have sent to Furcalhos should communicate with his post at Sabugal, and should fall back upon him if it should be necessary. I shall be obliged to you if you will give them directions accordingly, and write to Gen. Slade. — is put under your directions, and I think that you will do well to send to that quarter; but I have no Portuguese dragoons here.

It is said that Regnier marched from Merida to cross the Tagus on the morning of the 10th, but I have not heard of his movement from any body on this side.

It is strange that the enemy have made no movement since the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. I should almost doubt their being in possession of the place, and should be inclined to believe that the cessation from fire has been an agreement for a certain number of days, to see whether they would be relieved, as, whatever may be the enemy's ultimate plan of operations, it must be desirable to them at least to see the banks of the Coa.

I think you will do well to move your infantry to Junça, but you had better retain all your cavalry till you shall withdraw across the Coa.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Alverca, 14th July, 1810.

I have received your letter of this day, and am much obliged to you for the perusal of Cocks' \* letter, which contains a very clear account of the events of the 11th. I can show you Craufurd's letter to me, which does not throw any blame whatever upon the 16th, and indeed I never heard a doubt upon the subject.

The cause of the failure to take the infantry as well as the cavalry is, as Craufurd states to be, that a body of our own cavalry, which I conclude were Grüben's hussars, were seen coming out of Barquilla, and were taken by mistake for the enemy, which stopped the attack of the rear squadrons. The 16th had nothing to do with this mistake, nor probably is any body to blame for it. The French infantry appear to have behaved remarkably well, and probably were so posted that no efforts of cavalry could have forced them.

It would really not be fair to the 16th, to have any inquiry into their conduct in this affair. I have no doubt how it would turn out, but the very fact of inquiry supposes some grounds, which to suppose even would be injurious to them. You may show them this letter if you please.

\* Capt. the Hon. C. Somers Cocks, 16th light dragoons, afterwards killed at Burgos.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 14th July, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch of the 26th June (marked D). The questions which your Lordship has discussed in that dispatch are of a political nature, with which I can have no concern; and I trouble your Lordship upon the subject of them only to point out to you, that the object of my letter of the 30th May was not to induce His Majesty's government to refrain from reinforcing Cadiz to any extent that might be deemed advisable to provide for the permanent defence of that important post, but to dispose of the troops after they should have evacuated Portugal, in such a manner as that it would be easy to reinforce Cadiz, if that measure was necessary; and that if the reinforcements were sent they should be well received by the inhabitants of Cadiz.

However unreasonable it may appear to His Majesty's government and to his subjects in general, and is, in fact, it cannot be denied that the people of Spain are by no means satisfied that His Majesty's troops have taken so active a share, and have performed such efficient services in the war, as might have been expected from them; and the necessity which existed of refraining from undertaking any operation for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo will render this opinion more prevalent. It will become still more so, if it should be necessary to withdraw the British army from Portugal, without making an effort to retain our position; and the transfer of the army to Cadiz, and the offer of its services for its defence after these events, will revive the disposition to attribute to selfish motives the interest which His Majesty's government takes in the security of that place. However, these are political considerations for His Majesty's government to decide upon. I have only thought it necessary to bring under their view the existence of these opinions.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 14th July, 1810.

I have received your Lordship's letter, marked private and confidential, of the 26th June. In that which I wrote to your Lordship of the 30th May, I did not consider Gen. Graham's feelings upon my superseding him at Cadiz so much as I did the real injustice which such a supersession would be to him or to any man. I am convinced that Gen. Graham feels as he ought upon such a subject; but the question is not what he will feel, but what it is just or expedient to do by him. I acknowledge also that the justice of superseding Gen. Graham is not the only point of this subject which I have considered. I think that I shall myself stand in a very awkward situation at Cadiz.

1st; I believe that I am the senior Captain General in the Spanish army, excepting Cuesta, who is gone, or going, to the Balearic islands. That rank, and the claim to command which it would give me, I should of course waive; but when your Lordship adverts to the opinions which prevail in Spain already respecting the operations of the British army; and to those which will prevail more strongly if we should evacuate Portugal, without making an effort to retain our position, does it not occur to you that I at least shall not be a very welcome visitor at Cadiz; and that the high Spanish rank which I hold will afford, and will be stated as the objection to me as the commander of the British troops in the garrison?

2dly; therefore, I have no disposition to offer my services where they are likely to be refused, or where the offer is likely to be badly received. At the same time I repeat that I am at the disposal of the King's government, and will do what they have directed or what they may think proper to direct.

I am glad to find that the King's government are so anxious respecting the result of the contest in the Peninsula, in which the interests of Great Britain are undoubtedly materially involved. My last dispatches will have shown you the force which we have, and may expect to have, to repulse the attack of the enemy, who, it may be depended upon, will collect for this operation every thing that can be brought together. The head of a column of the Guard is at Burgos; and I should not be surprised if I was to hear that Buonaparte himself had come into Spain to direct these operations. Indeed, the orders which he has already given, and other circumstances, render this probable.

From what I hear of Sir J. Stuart, and from the reports which have been circulated of an intended attack upon Sicily, I think it probable that Sir John will not have sent off the troops expected here as reinforcements to this army; and this circumstance, and the great interest which your Lordship has expressed in your last letter for the result of the contest, induce me to suggest to you to send out to Lisbon, as soon as possible after you shall receive this letter, all the infantry which may be disposable. They might come in ships of war, which, if other reports of naval designs and armaments are founded, would not be useless in this part of the world; and the troops might return to England as soon as the danger should be removed, or as Portugal should have been evacuated.

I beg to inform your Lordship that I have now 3 brigades in this army without officers of the rank of colonel even to command them; that I have not a General officer to spare for any service; and that the troops from Sicily and America will have no General officers with them.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alverca, 15th July, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 12th, and conceive that you are quite right respecting the position for the assembly of the troops.

I have a letter of the 13th from Col. Grant, from which it appears that the enemy are about to cross the Tagus at Garovillas, as well as at Almaraz.

I have no certain intelligence of the enemy having made any movement since the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, although there is a report that 2 or 3 divisions have marched by the Puerto de Perales into Estremadura; that is, Upper Estremadura. This is by no means confirmed; and as we have troops and officers in that quarter, I do not believe it.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Alverca, 15th July, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 11th inst., containing one of the 7th from Dom M. Forjaz, in which he has enclosed one of the 5th June from Sr de Cardoso, in which the latter draws the attention of the government to the consequences which he supposes will result from the increased consumption of beef in Portugal. Sr de Cardoso has not stated any fact on which his apprehensions are founded; and indeed they are entirely

without foundation. But, besides an omission to state facts on which to found his conclusions, Sr de Cardoso has stated some circumstances which are notoriously unfounded.

That of which Sr de Cardoso complains is, that for the last 2 years and a half the armies in Portugal have been consuming the cattle destined for the agriculture of Portugal. I can only answer for the last 2 years, during which I positively deny that cattle for agriculture have been consumed by the British army; and I particularly deny that in the last year 26,000 head of cattle, belonging to Portugal, beyond the usual supply, have been consumed. The Portuguese army, being all subjects of Portugal, cannot have added materially to the consumption of wheat since they have been formed. I cannot be so certain that the cattle killed for their consumption have not been those belonging to the agriculture of the country.

I am apprehensive that, as the *Junta de Viveres* do not pay for the provisions of the army excepting in Lisbon, notwithstanding my repeated remonstrances, till the contract for meat was lately entered into, the troops took cattle where they could find them, and that some of the agricultural cattle were killed for food.

In respect to the British army, it will be recollected, from the month of September, 1808, till the month of April, 1809, the number of British troops in Portugal was but small, and they were all collected at Lisbon, and lived upon the markets of that city. When the British army was in Spain, either in 1808, or from June, 1809, till January, 1810, it did not consume the cattle of Portugal. The cattle in Spain are cheaper, and are easily got, and I know that none were brought from Portugal. Upon the return of the army into Portugal in January, 1810, it brought into that country not less than 1500 head of cattle, which may probably have been more than the amount of its consumption in Portugal, from April to June, 1809, before it entered Spain. The extraordinary consumption of the British army, then, which has taken place, has been from the end of January to this period, or for about 5 months.

The average weight of the cattle is about 450 lbs. each; and the number of persons at present fed by the British Commissariat is 38,000, which would give a consumption of about 80 a day, and would make the number consumed about 12,000, or less than half the number stated by Sr de Cardoso. But it must be observed that some of the troops are at Lisbon, and others on the Spanish frontier of Alentejo; and that it is probable that the former are fed from the market of Lisbon, and the latter by supplies from Spain. But in this part of the army, in which there is the greatest of the consumption, I can state most positively, from my own knowledge, that the greater number of the cattle come from the Minho and Galicia, and some from the frontiers of Castille; and the goodness of the meat, and the small price paid, which is much below the Portuguese contract price, proves that none of the cattle have been used, or even trained, for purposes of agriculture.

What I have above stated to you will show that there was no extraordinary consumption in Portugal by the British army before the month of January last; and it appears by the reports of Sr de Cardoso himself, of

the 26th Feb., that there were at that time in Portugal 218,000 bullocks for agricultural purposes, and 166,394 for food; of which there were in Beira alone 62,000 for agriculture, and 17,200 for food. We have drawn none from Beira.

In respect to the decrease of the agriculture of Portugal in the last 2 years and a half, having, within the last 2 years, been in almost every part of Portugal, I can answer for the fact being directly the reverse; and the large sums which have been spent in the country during that period, in the purchase of the produce of agriculture at very advanced prices, must have had the effect of increasing the cultivation of the country.

It is true that means of transport for the armies are wanting; but they are not wanting because the army have consumed the cattle which would afford those means, for those have not been consumed, at least by the British army, but because the inhabitants of the country are unwilling to produce them, and the magistrates will not force them to produce those means which they have registered. But if it were true that the cattle for agriculture had been consumed by the British army, the amount of consumption which I have stated, and which is the largest that we have known of, even if the whole had been taken from Beira, would not have occasioned this scarcity of means of transport.

The remedy proposed by S<sup>r</sup> de Cardoso to save the agricultural bullocks, and, of course, to increase the means of transport from the army, shows how little he has turned his mind to what is the peculiar duty of his office. That which he proposes is to issue salt meat or rice to the troops, instead of fresh beef. He forgets that the rice or the salt meat must be brought to the army on carriages; that the demand for carriages will therefore be increased, as the bullocks which are given as food are driven up to it; and that he is unable to furnish the number of carriages already required to feed the army with bread alone in its present position.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Alverca, 15th July, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 11th. The mode in which you propose to demand payment for the clothing delivered to the Spaniards is very correct.

In respect to the account with the Portuguese government, I enclose the state of that between the military chest and the chest of the 'Aids' to the 24th June. I think there is an error in the abstract which you have enclosed, of that between the chest of the 'Aids' and the Portuguese government. Owing to the mode in which Villiers settled the amount, the Portuguese government would not be entitled to the full subsidy till after the end of last year. For instance, government agreed to pay for 20,000 men from the 1st May, and Beresford was called upon to fix upon the regiments of the Portuguese army who were to make up these 20,000 men. Beresford did fix upon those regiments; but, owing to casualties, deficiencies of recruiting, and other circumstances, they never amounted to the number specified to be paid for; and I know that Villiers conceived that the Portuguese government were not entitled to payment for more than the return of those regiments amounted to; and, as well as I recollect, he so stated in Parliament; at the same time I believe that the Portuguese government had in their service not less than 40,000 men.

Since the 1st Jan., it has been differently arranged. Beresford, upon communication with me, and seeing the inconvenience and loss which the Portuguese government sustained by the former mode of making up the return, put into the return of the subsidized corps a number of regiments, which amounted then, and have always since amounted, to more than 30,000 men; and the Portuguese government, consequently, are entitled to the full sum which the King has engaged to pay them.

From your letter it would appear that you had paid the Portuguese government £650,441 16s. 3d., which sum, in addition to what Villiers had paid them, would be more than their due; but I rather believe that that sum is the whole that they have received, in cash, on account of the subsidy. But it appears to me that the credit side of their account ought to be corrected: 1st; by striking from £341,000 the amount to which they are not entitled, according to Villiers's mode of making up the account. 2dly; by striking from £490,000 the sum of £50,000, which is the proportion of the subsidy for 6 months, allotted for the payment of the English officers, with which the Portuguese government have nothing to do. After these deductions, I am afraid that the balance of £201,558 3s. 9d. will be reduced very low indeed, and will scarcely admit of the payment of the army demand on the government for supplies, as stated in the enclosed paper, amounting to £146,540.

The enemy have made no movement of any importance since the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. They appear to have spread themselves a little for the convenience of supplies.

P.S. We have received some cargoes of Indian corn from the Western Islands, of which the Portuguese government may have a part, if you will speak to Mr. Dunmore upon the subject.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 16th July, 1810.

I have received your letter of yesterday evening. It is desirable that we should hold the other side of the Coa a little longer, and I think that our doing so is facilitated by our keeping La Concepcion. At the same time I do not wish to risk any thing in order to remain at the other side of the river, or to retain that fort; and I am very anxious that when you leave it, it should be destroyed. I beg you, therefore, not to have any scruples about doing it too soon. You may be certain, however, that when you do destroy that fort, you will be obliged to draw your cavalry into Almeida, &c.; and the communication with the right of the Coa, excepting at that point, will be at an end.

I wish that it was not necessary to destroy La Concepcion: but we found it in ruins; and no man has urged me more strongly to destroy it than the Marques de la Romana. If you have any further communication with Loison, send my compliments to him, and tell him that I gave money to the officers of the 1st dragoons, and that the sum which he sent shall be transmitted to them.

P.S. It is almost certain that Regnier crosses the Tagus, and Gen. Hill is about to do the same. Silveira writes me that he had been informed that Seras, who commands the corps which had been formed north of the Duero, had been ordered to attack Puebla de Sanabria, and to examine his position at Braganza.

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I enclose a letter from Romana, which I opened. The enemy are certainly crossing the Tagus, and Hill has got his corps at Alpalhaõ to cross likewise.

I have a letter from Le Cor of the 16th, in which he gives me an account from a Spanish officer that the enemy had 4000 men, with artillery, at Baños; I conclude, to protect and assist the passage of Regnier.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

17th July, 1810.

In reply to your letter relative to Serj. Wilson and private Whitehead of the 3d Guards, it is the Commander of the Forces' direction that you employ a purveyor's clerk, or such other person as you can hire or procure, to take charge of the medical stores, as it is not in his power to allow of the above men being absent from their corps.

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I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to enclose a report received from the 11th regt. relative to John —, private in the said corps, and I am to desire you will cause inquiry to be made as to the medical officer who took this man for his servant when sent into hospital. It is the Commander of the Forces' pleasure that you place the medical officer that has committed this impropriety under an arrest, reporting to me so soon as you have executed this order.

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I have a letter from Salvaterra, stating that a part of Regnier's corps had passed the Tagus on the 14th. Although this intelligence is probable, I do not believe it is strictly true. I think, however, that both Gen. Hill and he must be across the river by this time.

P.S. Can you get any intelligence whether the enemy are making any preparations at Ciudad Rodrigo for the siege of Almeida?

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

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The enemy, according to all the intelligence which I have received, having most probably brought his corps across the Tagus, I think it likely that this letter will find you on this side likewise. My letter, and the memorandum of the 2d inst., took but one view of the subject, viz., the probability that, as soon as the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo would be concluded, the enemy would endeavor to penetrate into Portugal, without making the siege of Almeida, which event must, however, be contemplated. If they propose to undertake the siege of Almeida, it is probable that Regnier, instead of manœuvring upon Castello Branco, will take to his right at once from Coria, or will enter Portugal, and will then proceed to his right by Monsanto and Penamacor. The enemy's object will probably be to dislodge us from Guarda.

If you should find that Regnier, leaving you at Castello Branco or Idanha a Nova, moves to his right, I wish you to move immediately upon Atalaya, and send Le Cor forward to Caria, to keep your communication with us at Guarda. You will be prepared to move the following day to

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Belmonte, and thence to Guarda, where you will join the army; but, upon these movements, I shall instruct you further hereafter.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Alverca, 18th July, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 13th. I propose to write again to my brother respecting the Bayona islands, as I am convinced that the Spaniards will not do there what is necessary, either so expeditiously, or so well, as we shall. Would any advantage result from the possession of one of the Faro islands? This is the point to which government has drawn my attention. We have found some water on the Berlings, and I have desired them to persevere in their endeavors.

I am much obliged to you for the measures you have adopted respecting the hay. I write for Cadiz by the post which leaves this on Friday morning, and arrives at Lisbon on Sunday afternoon. 9 ships are fully enough for our purpose at Figueira. The hospital ships will still ply backwards and forwards as you before proposed.

I refer you to Mr. Stuart for an account of the state of affairs here.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 18th July, 1810.

The enemy have made no movement of any importance in this quarter since the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo. The greater part of their army continues near that place, with their advanced guard at Gallegos; and they have extended their right to San Felices on the Agueda; and they have detached a division of about 4000 men to their left, towards Coria and Plasencia, apparently to aid the movement of the 2d corps d'armée across the Tagus. This corps returned to Merida after it had obliged Gen. Imaz to retire; and broke up from thence again on the 10th, and moved towards the different passages of the Tagus, in conformity with the orders which had been received from the Emperor, as appears by the intercepted dispatch which I transmitted to your Lordship on the 3d July.

Notwithstanding the repeated requests which I had made to the Spanish authorities to remove or secure the boats on the ferries, I have reason to believe that the enemy found those at every ferry; and by the last accounts they were passing at all the ferries between Almaraz and Alconeta. They protected this operation by the occupation of the Salor; so that it was impossible to attempt to interrupt it without incurring the risk of being too late on this side of the Tagus.

Lieut. Gen. Hill has orders to pass that river at Villa Velha, as soon as he shall find that Regnier's movement is decided; and I hope that he is by this time at Castello Branco. I have besides formed a *corps de réserve* upon the Zézere, near Thomar, under the command of Major Gen. Leith.

A detachment from the enemy's corps at Seville attacked Gen. Ballesteros in the Sierra Morena, on the same day that Gen. Imaz was attacked by Gen. Regnier. Gen. Ballesteros retired, as he reports, without loss. The French corps continued in the Sierra Morena, occupying Monasterio; and by the accounts of the 15th from Badajoz, it appears that the banks of the Guadiana had been entirely abandoned by the enemy. No movement of importance had been made in the north; but Gen. Seras, who commands the troops which are stationed between Zamora and Leon, had

received orders to attack the Spanish detachment under Gen. Taboada, which was at Puebla de Sanabria; and to ascertain the strength of the Portuguese detachment at Braganza.

I have received no intelligence from Cadiz since the 26th of last month.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 18th July, 1810.

I enclose returns of the number of battalions, and squadrons, and companies of artillery in each of the 8 corps composing the French army in Spain and Catalonia, which I have extracted from a book lately intercepted, with the letter of which the enclosed is a copy.\* Each of the battalions ought to be reckoned 600 effective men; the returns of the 6th and 8th *corps d'armée* show that the battalions in those corps are stronger; and the squadrons ought to be reckoned 100 each. The artillery and others attached to each *corps d'armée* would make an addition of about 2000 men to each of those corps not equipped for a siege; and of above 3000 to those corps which are so equipped. Besides these corps there is a division of the Guard at Burgos which amounts to 7200 men, of which I have the returns.

It does not appear that there were any other troops on their march into Spain at the date of this book, nor any disposable for this service, excepting a corps of about 40 battalions, which had been collected at and in the neighbourhood of Nantes.

I would beg leave to draw the attention of His Majesty's government in a particular manner to this book. It is entitled, '*Emplacement des Troupes de l'Empire Français, à l'époque du 1<sup>er</sup> Juin, 1810. À Paris, de l'Imprimerie Impériale.*' It contains the distribution at the moment of the whole French army, in all the dependencies of the Empire! and it would be a most useful document to His Majesty's government. It is obviously one of an official and secret nature, but I should imagine that it would not be difficult to procure a copy of this book every month at the time it is printed. From the inspection which I have given to this book, it does not appear that the French government had it in their power to reinforce their army in Spain to any greater extent, by sending fresh regiments or battalions. The whole army appears disposed of, in situations from which they could not be withdrawn without inconvenience; with the exception of the corps at Nantes. All the dragoons and the greater part of the hussars and chasseurs are already in Spain; and there remain only the heavy cavalry in the other dependencies of the Empire. The Guard are not included in this book; nor, I imagine, a body of French troops employed as Guards with the King of Spain.

To Brig. Gen. R. Crauford.

Alverca, 19th July, 1810.

I have nothing new to tell you this day. Le Cor writes from Castello Branco on the 18th, that the enemy arrived at Coria on the 17th, whether from Castille or the Tagus he does not say. He says that it is reported Regnier's head quarters were to be at Plasencia, so that I suppose the troops at Coria are those from Castille. From Badajoz I learn that Regnier was still at Caceres on the 14th or 15th, and it was not believed

\* See Appendix, No. III.

that he was about to cross the Tagus. Hill was at Alpalhaço on the 16th, and Le Cor had not heard yesterday of his having passed the Tagus.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Alverca, 19th July, 1810.

The French have made no movement of importance since I wrote to you last. They have extended to their right as far as San Felices on the Agueda, probably with a view to procure subsistence more easily; and they have extended to their left to the neighbourhood of Coria and Plasencia. This last movement appears to have been intended to protect the passage of the Tagus by Regnier. I informed you in my last letter that he had received orders from the Emperor to cross the Tagus. After his operations against Imaz were concluded he returned to Merida; and broke up from thence again on the 10th, and moved his corps to Cáceres, and sent a detachment by Truxillo to Jaraicejo. The Spaniards, notwithstanding my repeated representations on this subject, had all the boats at the different ferries unsecured; and he has made demonstrations of an intention to pass at all the ferries from Almaraz to Alcantara. But I have not yet heard that he has actually passed; and it is not impossible that this movement, which was intended to facilitate the operations against Ciudad Rodrigo, has been suspended since the fall of that place. However, if this be the case, I cannot understand for what reason the French have allowed 9 days to pass, since that event, without doing any thing.

I was always certain that the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo would be a most unfortunate circumstance, and would be highly injurious to us. But I never expected that this event would make such an impression on the inhabitants of Castille, as it appears to have made; and I am therefore apprehensive that the majority of them, with their usual blind confidence in walls, and in their own prowess, have lodged their moveable property in the place, and that the whole is lost. In no other way can I account for the sullen silence which they have adopted towards us, since the place has fallen. We have not received a letter from Spain, or any intelligence, for the last ten days; and the officers who are out on the flanks of the army tell me, that not only they can get no intelligence, but can scarcely procure any body to carry their letters. This is not encouraging.

I have had no further accounts of the enemy's movements in Galicia since they arrived at Castropol. Seras had been ordered to attack Taboada at Puebla de Sanabria, and to look at the position of the Portuguese at Braganza; but he had not obeyed this order on the 17th. Mortier attacked Ballesteros in the Sierra Morena on the same day that Regnier attacked Imaz, and obliged Ballesteros to retire. I believe that Mortier's corps remained in the Sierra Morena as far as Monasterio, although the people of Badajoz say that he is gone from Seville to Cordova. The same order which directed Regnier to cross the Tagus, directed Mortier to come into Estremadura; but I believe if that part of the order is obeyed, as it is intended it should, the French will be obliged to evacuate Andalusia altogether.

I have lately received the '*Emplacement*' of the French army on the 1st June, 1810, from which I have extracted the state of their forces

in Spain and Catalonia. I enclose a return of the number of battalions of infantry, of squadrons of cavalry, and of companies of artillery, which they had in each *corps d'armée* on the 1st June; \* to which ought to be added 7200 Imperial Guards, either at or on this side of Burgos; and the French troops, composing the Guards of the King of Spain, amounting to about 4000 or 5000. Each battalion must be reckoned 600 effectives, each squadron 100 effectives, and each company of artillery 100 effectives. The battalions, &c., of the corps in my front are stronger, but there are some of these lately come from France, and great pains have been taken to reinforce these 2 corps. But you will observe that all this gives a force of not less than 240,000 men, besides gendarmes, sapeurs, &c., &c., who add to the strength of their armies.

The army in Catalonia is composed entirely of foreign troops, and there are a great many foreigners in the 4th corps.

I enclose the return of the regiments and battalions composing the 1st, 4th, and 5th corps, which are in Andalusia, and the division Dessolles, which was there and may be there still, although I have heard that it had approached Madrid.

The return of the artillery in these corps has not been extracted so correctly as that of the infantry and cavalry. There is some foreign

\* *État Général de l'armée Française en Espagne. 1 Juin, 1810.*

Corps d'armée et Généraux.	Nombre de Bataillons.	Nombre d' Escadrons.	Compagnies d'Artillerie.	Observations.
1 <sup>er</sup> Corps d'armée, Maréchal Victor.	32	20	17	before Cadiz.
2 <sup>me</sup> Corps d'armée, Général Regnier.	29	18	17	in Estremadura.
3 <sup>me</sup> Corps d'armée, Général Suchet.	32	8	27	in Aragon and Valencia.
4 <sup>me</sup> Corps d'armée, Maréchal Mortier.	27	24	9	in the Sierra Morena.
5 <sup>me</sup> Corps d'armée, Général Sebastiani.	24	20	11	in Andalusia.
6 <sup>me</sup> Corps d'armée, Maréchal Ney.	37	16	24	Ciudad Rodrigo.
8 <sup>me</sup> Corps d'armée, Général Junot.	32	32	7	Ciudad Rodrigo.
Armée de Catalogne, Maréchal Macdonald.	58	21	26	in Catalonia.
Division Bonet . . .	16	1	1	in Asturias.
— Dessolles . . .	12	—	2	near Madrid.
— Arrière Garde . . .	6	—	—	at Zamora.
— Réserve . . .	—	16	—	attached to Ney's corps.
— En garnison . . .	17	3	38	
Total .	322	179	179	

In this account the Imperial Guard, at and near Burgos, 7200 men, and the King of Spain's guards, 4000 or 5000 men, are not included.

N.B. There is more French artillery, in the 1st corps, and more foreign artillery in the 4th and 8th, than is mentioned in the *État Général*.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> The detail of the divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions, with their Generals, Colonels, &c., accompanies this *État Général*, but has been omitted, being too voluminous.

artillery in the 4th and 8th corps, and in the army of Catalonia, not included; and, I think, some French artillery with the 1st corps.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alverca, 19th July, 1810.

I have just received your letter of the 16th. The information which I have received of the enemy's motions on the Tagus is the same as yours. It is probable that they have passed, or are about to pass, but it is by no means certain.

The letters from Badajoz of the 15th say that the head quarters had not yet left Caceres, which is possible; but I must observe upon the Badajoz intelligence, that it must be older than that which you have.

Regnier was certainly ordered by the Emperor to cross the Tagus, with a view to aid in the operations against Ciudad Rodrigo; and he began his march long before he heard of the fall of that place. That event may have stopped it; and it is well that you should be cautious in your movements, till you shall be tolerably certain of his.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alverca, 20th July, 1810.

I have received this morning your letter of the 17th, and I reckon that you will arrive this day at Castello Branco. I have no doubt whatever that Regnier has crossed the Tagus; and the enclosed copies of reports from our outposts will show you that his route is most probably towards Ciudad Rodrigo. If your intelligence should confirm that which I enclose, or does not contradict it, you had better move in the morning to Atalaya. I do not know how Le Cor's troops are posted: if he has any on the left of Castello Branco, they might come on farther than Atalaya, to keep up your communication with us by Guarda.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Alverca, 20th July, 1810.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received intelligence that Regnier has crossed the Tagus, and is at Plasencia. I have also received intelligence that the French in Asturias, who had moved forward to Castropol on the frontiers of Galicia, had retired again.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Alverca, 20th July, 1810.

I have heard that the Bishop of Plasencia is going to Lisbon; and as we received great civilities from him when we were there last year, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will show him any attention that may be in your power.

*The A. G. to Major Gen. Picton.*

20th July, 1810.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from the D. A. A. G. by your order, covering enclosures from Lieut. Col. — (herewith returned), and I am to acquaint you in reply, that nearly 2 months have now elapsed since the army has been ordered to be in readiness to march, and that the regiment under the command of Lieut. Col. —, in particular, has been in a situation in which

G. O.

Alverca, 20th July, 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that when commanding officers of regiments, brigades, or divisions think it proper to order that any of the troops should fire by way of practice, they will give notice of their intention to fire to the detachments of troops which may be cantoned in their neighbourhood.

it might be called upon to make the most rapid movements at a very short notice. All the arrangements on the part of the Commander of the Forces have indicated a desire that all the regiments should be free from incumbrances, the sick are removed periodically, and every thing has been done to preclude the occurrence of the circumstance which Col. — has now reported. This letter has not explained in a manner at all satisfactory to the Commander of the Forces, his having detained these arms, &c., to this moment, nor the return of ammunition wanting the cause of his not having been completed sooner. The requisition for the same has been signed by me, and is herewith enclosed; and you will be pleased to call on the Commissary at Pinhel for carriages to remove the arms, &c., and the stores to the rear. As some of the articles to be returned, however, appear to belong to the Colonel of the regiment, it must be clearly understood that no claim upon the public can be made for them if lost.

P.S. An arrangement for sending off the women may be made by this opportunity.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 21st July, 1810.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of yesterday evening. I have heard from Hill, who was at Sarnadas on the 19th. I enclose the copy of a report from Capt. Grant from Penamacor of yesterday evening. Le Cor tells me that rations have been demanded at Zarza, but I imagine for the troops at Moraleja.

I have a letter from Silveira of the 19th, in which he tells me that 10,000 men had passed Ledesma for Zamora from Ciudad Rodrigo. I think that he has got this intelligence from Dubrawa, and there is reason to believe that it is not true. I hear that there is a large quantity of cannon at Gallegos, but I do not know whether it is of a large size.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 22d July, 1810, 8 P.M.

I went to Gen. Campbell this day, for which reason I did not write to you by the *parté*.

I had a letter from Gen. Hill from Castello Branco yesterday. It appears that Regnier's corps was, on the 20th, still at Coria and Moraleja, and there was a detachment at Ceclavin, and there were other reasons for believing that they were to move upon Zibreira. I have ordered 2 battalions to support your flanks; but I am not desirous of engaging in an affair beyond the Coa. Under these circumstances, if you are not covered from the sun where you are, would it not be better that you should come to this side with your infantry at least? Let me know how your division is situated as soon as you can, and I will answer you by the *parté* to-morrow, or earlier.

I have a letter from Silveira of yesterday: nothing new.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 23d July, 1810.

I received in the night your letter of the 22d. I have been much annoyed by the foolish conversations and reports and private letters, about the 16th light dragoons. Gen. Cotton wrote to me shortly after the affair of the 11th, to request that the conduct of that regiment might be inquired into; to which I replied, that in your report you had not made any charge against the 16th, and that it would not be just towards that regiment to make their conduct the object of inquiry, for a failure which appeared to me to have been produced by various unfortunate accidents, which could not be prevented.

Two or three days afterwards Gen. Cotton came here and told me that

he had traced some of these reports and conversations to Gen. — Upon which I had Gen. — and him before me; after having pointed out to the former the inconvenience and impropriety of a person in his situation circulating any reports about the troops, I declared my determination, if I heard any more of it, to oblige him to come forward with a charge against the 16th. So the matter stands here.

In respect to the business itself, it appeared to me from the first, that it would and must have succeeded, notwithstanding the gallantry and steadiness of the French infantry, if various accidents had not prevented the execution of the plan, as first formed; and I have stated this, as my opinion, in the report which I have made upon the business.

Your own report points out clearly the variations from the original plan, and the different accidents which occurred in the execution, among which, certainly, must be classed the charge of the 1st squadron of the 16th, to the left of the hussars; and the delay after the first charge by Talbot, owing to the 1st and 2d squadrons of the 16th having gone off after the cavalry. But even then the infantry would not have got away, if the squadrons coming out of Barquilla had not been taken for the enemy.

I can only say that I have never seen an attack by our troops in which similar, if not greater, accidents and mistakes have not occurred, and in which orders have not been given, for which no authority had proceeded from the Commander, and in which there were not corresponding accidents and failures. This is to be attributed to the inexperience of our officers, and I must add, to some good qualities in them, as well as in the troops. All this would not much signify, if our Staff and other officers would mind their business, instead of writing news and keeping coffee houses. But as soon as an accident happens, every man who can write, and who has a friend who can read, sits down to write his account of what he does not know, and his comments on what he does not understand; and these are diligently circulated and exaggerated by the idle and malicious, of whom there are plenty in all armies. The consequence is, that officers and whole regiments lose their reputation; a spirit of party, which is the bane of all armies, is engendered and fomented; a want of confidence ensues; and there is no character, however meritorious, and no action, however glorious, which can have justice done to it. I have hitherto been so fortunate as to keep down this spirit in this army, and I am determined to persevere.

In respect to the 16th light dragoons, they appear in this affair to have conducted themselves with the spirit and alacrity of soldiers. They failed in the intelligence, and coolness, and order, which can be acquired only by experience; but it would be too hard to impute to them, alone, the failure of complete success, which may be traced likewise to other accidental circumstances; and it would be equally cruel to allow the reputation of this regiment to be whispered away by ignorance, idleness, and slander. You and I agree entirely upon the whole matter, and I have gone into this detail, just to explain to you what has passed here, and upon what principle I have acted.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alverca, 23d July, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 22d, and I conclude that you are now



at Atalaya. Regnier's movements are by no means decided, but I am rather inclined to believe that he will move by Zibreira, &c., upon Castello Branco. If he should, you must move direct from Atalaya upon Sarzedas. Have the roads examined from Atalaya to Sarzedas. If he should come through Perales, I shall order you to Belmonte.

I have also received your letter of the 21st. I do not believe that Regnier has more than 15,000 men, of which not more than 11,000 or 12,000 are infantry. In respect to Fane's cavalry, I think you will find it useless and even burthensome to feed in the mountains, and I recommend to you not to take it. The enemy have made no movement of any importance; and I cannot judge exactly whether they mean to attack Almeida or not. The *parté* leaves this every day at 12.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Alverca, 23d July, 1810.

I received your letter of the 18th yesterday morning. I have no objection to the regulation respecting the boats on the Tagus, which appears calculated to carry into execution that which was before passed. There is nothing new here. The enemy have made no movement of importance within these few days, excepting a strong reconnoissance on the 21st, which induced Gen. Craufurd to blow up La Concepcion, and to collect his advanced guard near Almeida.

Regnier's movements have not yet decidedly indicated whether he is to join Massena, or acts separately in Lower Beira; but Hill is on this side of the Tagus, and at Atalaya, within 2 marches of our right. I do not yet know whether they propose to attack Almeida: I should think not; particularly as Regnier's movements rather indicate a march towards Castello Branco. I think the accounts of the French force, in my dispatch of last Wednesday, are quite correct.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Alverca, 23d July, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 18th, and the number of hospital ships which you have sent to Figueira will be quite sufficient.

Do you know whether we have any transports at Cadiz? Because the Marques de la Romana is looking for means to get off from hence, if we should be obliged to go.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Picton.

23d July, 1810.

The women of the division under your orders arrived here this afternoon: they have assembled, and seem very much dissatisfied at leaving their regiments; and I understand from the officer who has charge of the detachment, that he has not received any money for their subsistence, nor is any arrangement for their remaining at Lisbon made. Under these circumstances the Commander of the Forces feels the women cannot be compelled to proceed to the rear, and such of them as are unwilling to go must return to their regiments, of which you will duly apprise the officers commanding regiments. The officer is directed to proceed with the rest of the detachment and stores to Lisbon, and comply with the orders he has received.

To Brig. Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Alverca, 24th July, 1810, 3 p.m.

I have just heard that Gen. Craufurd was attacked this morning under Almeida, and that he has retired across the Coa; and I have desired him to retire upon Carvalhal at this side of the Pinhel river. I have also de-

sired him to send to your posts at Castello Bom and Castello Mendo, to desire them to retire upon the main body; but lest he should not be able to communicate with them, you will do well to send them these orders, as also to your post at Ponte de Sequeiros.

If any of Gen. Craufurd's cavalry has crossed at Castello Bom, or Castello Mendo, or Ponte de Sequeiros, keep them with you, and let them patrol towards the Coa, and on your left towards Almeida. If they should not have retired, and are in communication with your posts, let them know the orders, and desire them to retire upon you. If none of Gen. Craufurd's should be with you, Gen. Slade must afford you the means of patrolling to the Coa, and to the left, with his cavalry. Gen. Slade should also draw in towards you in the course of the evening and night; but let him continue to patrol as far forward as he can with convenience, as I wish to be informed what the enemy do on our right.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 24th July, 1810.

I received in the night your letter of yesterday evening. The enemy's posts at Cilleros and Valverde del Fresno indicate nothing but a desire to communicate with the main body of the army.

I believe I omitted to tell you that I had got lately the '*Emplacement*' of the whole French army of the 1st June, which is a very curious document, and gives a tolerable notion of their whole force in Spain, which is not less than 250,000 men. But I don't think they have means of reinforcing it much farther. This document, together with the returns which I have of the French corps in our front, gives me a knowledge of the names of all the principal officers, &c. employed with those corps; and any paper which may fall into your hands, such as a requisition upon a village, signed by an officer or Commissary, would be of use to me, as it would serve to show in some degree their disposition, and would aid other information.

I have observed that the French are singularly accurate in preserving the different *corps d'armée* in the order in which they are first arranged in the line of battle. The corps of Ney, Soult, Mortier, Victor, and Sebastiani are at this moment in the same situation, in respect to each other,

G. O.

Alverca, 24th July, 1810.

1. The officers commanding detachments proceeding to the army must conform to all the regulations in respect to sending men into general hospital, which are laid down for the conduct of the regiments by the different G. O.

4. The Commander of the Forces repeats that he considers the Assist. Adj. General at Lisbon, and the Commanding officer of the detachments at Belem, to be responsible that the officers proceeding in command of detachments from Lisbon are made acquainted with the G. O. which have been given out at different times for their guidance.

6. \* \* \* \* \*

7. The Commander of the Forces has no doubt that the measures he has adopted will soon discover to him who committed this horrid murder; but that the murderers may not any longer enjoy the fruits of their crime unpunished, he hereby offers a reward of 50 dollars and a pardon to any person who will give information to produce the conviction of the murderers.

8. The Commander of the Forces repeats that he is convinced, if the non-commissioned officers did their duty, these crimes could not be committed by the soldiers without their knowledge. It is incumbent upon those belonging to the regiments stationed at Guarda, whose uniforms have been described, to exert themselves to discover who committed this shocking murder.

that they held before the battle of Talavera; and Junot's corps has come in and has been placed upon the right of the whole. Knowing the names of the officers, the numbers of the regiments and battalions, and the names of the commissaries attached to each corps, and the general order in which they stand in the line, the name of any person making a requisition in any place, must aid me in forming an opinion of the disposition of the army.

Hill is at Atalaya, but I have no letter from him of this morning. The 4th and 6th caçadores will be at Valverde and Aldea Nova to-morrow, at your disposition.

2 P.M. I have heard both from Pinhel and Valverde that there was firing in your front as late as 9 this morning; but I conclude that I should have heard from you, if it had been serious.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 24th July, 1810,  $\frac{1}{2}$  before 3, P.M.

I have just received Capt. Campbell's note written at 11. I think that you had better retire upon Carvalhal, holding Valverde and the heights upon the Coa only by your piquets, and communicate with the left of the Pinhel with Gen. Picton. If you still have the left bank of the Coa, send to Gen. Campbell's post at Castello Bom, to retire upon the main body, and to communicate the same order to that at Castello Mendo.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Alverca, 25th July, 1810, 11 A.M.

From the letters which I have received from Gen. Campbell, I believe that he has either marched to Guarda, or is on his way thither; and that Gen. Slade will follow him there or will have gone there by some other road. This will be a little inconvenient to us; and I rather wish it had been avoided. If possible, I should wish you to stop Gen. Slade somewhere in front of Guarda towards the Coa; and request him to patrol towards Ponte de Sequeiros, the ford of S. Miguel, Sabugal, and the road towards Almeida. Let him take with him the hussars and the detachment of the 16th which have come in with Gen. Campbell, as well as the Royal dragoons.

You know the country better than I do, and can point out a fit situation for Gen. Slade; probably Parada would do as well as any other place. Tell him that I do not wish him to be engaged in any affair with the enemy; that all that I want is to have information of what is going on upon our right; and that if threatened by an attack by a superior force, I beg him to retire upon Guarda.

P.S. Keep Gen. Campbell's brigade at Guarda. If Gen. Slade has come in to Guarda, send him to the front in the morning.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Alverca, 25th July, 1810, 6 P.M.

Since I wrote to you this morning I have received yours of half past 11. You will have seen by mine that you had done exactly what I wished.

From the reports which I have of the enemy's movements in Gen. Craufurd's front and on his right, as well as at Cinco Villas and Villar Torpim, I think it probable that they will move in the morning to dislodge his corps, or Gen. Picton's, or both, with a large force; and pos-

sibly with more extensive projects. I have therefore directed Gen. Craufurd to fall back to Vendada, between Freixedas and Carvalhal, at moonlight; and I shall order him to retire still farther if I should find that the enemy are really in great strength. Pray apprise Gen. Slade of these movements. I think he ought to draw a little nearer to you about daylight; and as the enemy's movements may lead to a general retreat of the whole army, it would be desirable that you should fix upon some signal to be made to Gen. Slade from Guarda when he is to retire upon that place.

You shall hear from me by 9 o'clock. In these critical times I think it would be desirable that the forge carts of the Royal dragoons should be sent down the hill.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

The cavalry attached to Gen. Craufurd's advanced guard remained in the villages near the Fort of La Concepcion till the 21st inst., when the enemy obliged it to retire towards Almeida, and the Fort of La Concepcion was again destroyed. This fort had been destroyed by the French when they were in possession of Almeida, in the year 1808, at the time the Spaniards manifested the first symptoms of their desire to resist the yoke of the French government; and it had been repaired by my directions when I deemed it expedient to occupy it. It has now been left in the situation in which I found it.

From the 21st till yesterday morning, Brig. Gen. Craufurd continued to occupy a position near Almeida, with his left within 800 yards of the Fort, and his right extending towards Junça. The enemy attacked him in this position yesterday morning shortly after daylight, with a very large body of infantry and cavalry, and the Brig. General retired across the bridge over the Coa. In this operation, I am sorry to say that the troops under his command suffered considerable loss.

For various reasons it had been desirable to keep open the communication with Almeida and with the right of the Coa as long as was possible; but it was not intended to risk an affair or any loss for that object. The enemy had approached too near, however, before the retreat across the river was effected.

The enemy afterwards made 3 efforts to storm the bridge over the Coa, in all of which they were repulsed.

I am informed that throughout this trying day the Commanding officers of the 43d, 52d, and 95th regts., Lieut. Col. Beekwith, Lieut. Col. Barclay, and Lieut. Col. Hull, and all the officers and soldiers of these excellent regiments, distinguished themselves. In Lieut. Col. Hull, who was killed, His Majesty has lost an able and deserving officer. Brig. Gen. Craufurd has also noticed the steadiness of the 3d regt. of caçadores, under the command of Lieut. Col. Elder.

Since yesterday the enemy have made no movement; and I imagine that they intend to attack Almeida. Since I addressed your Lordship last, Gen. Regnier has crossed the Tagus with his whole corps, and has been established at Coria and Plasencia. I have received a report that on the 23d he had moved about 1500 men to Zarza la Mayor, from which I

conclude that his line of operations will be distinct from that of the other 2 corps. Gen. Hill has also crossed the Tagus, and is now at Atalaya, from whence he can either be joined to this army, or can be thrown in front of Gen. Regnier.

The enemy has now no troops in Lower Estremadura, and I have not heard of their making any movement in the north of Spain. I have not heard from Cadiz since the 26th of last month.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of Gen. Craufurd's report of the affair of the advanced guard with the enemy yesterday, and adverted to in my dispatch of this date; and the return of killed and wounded upon the occasion.\*

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

I think it proper to inform your Lordship that, since the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, the Commander in Chief and the officers of the French army in general in this part of Spain, have altered their system of rigor towards

\* Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd to Lieut. Gen. Visc. Wellington, K.B.

Carvalhal, 25th July, 1810.

I have the honor to report to your Lordship, that yesterday morning the enemy advanced to attack the Light division, with between 3000 and 4000 cavalry, a considerable number of guns, and a large body of infantry.

On the first appearance of the heads of their columns, the cavalry and brigade of artillery attached to the division advanced to support the piquets, and Capt. Ross, with 4 guns, was for some time engaged with those attached to the enemy's cavalry, which were of much larger calibre. As the immense superiority of the enemy's force displayed itself, we fell back gradually towards the fortress, upon the right of which the infantry of the division was posted, having its left in some enclosures near the windmill, about 800 yards from the place, and its right to the Coa, in a very broken and extensive position, which it was absolutely necessary to occupy, in order to cover the passage of the cavalry and artillery through the long defile leading to the bridge; after this was effected the infantry retired by degrees, and in as good order as it is possible in ground so extremely intricate; a position close in front of the bridge was maintained, as long as was necessary to give time for the troops which had passed to take up one behind the river, and the bridge was afterwards defended with the greatest gallantry, though, I am sorry to say, with considerable loss by the 43d and part of the 95th regts. Towards the evening the firing ceased, and after it was dark I withdrew the troops from the Coa, and retired to this place. The troops behaved with the greatest gallantry.

P.S. Those returned as prisoners and missing were taken in a charge with the enemy's cavalry, just after our cavalry and guns had begun to retire.

Return of the number of killed, wounded, and missing, in an action with the French army, near Almeida, on the 24th July, 1810.

	Officers.	Sejeants.	Drummers.	R. and F.	Troop horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. and F.
Killed . . . .	4	3	—	29	3	36
Wounded . . .	23	10	2	164	12	199
Missing . . . .	1	1	1	80	—	83

the inhabitants of Spain, for one of a milder description, which I understand has had the effect of reconciling many to the French government.

The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo was felt as a great misfortune by the people of Castille in general; and they are not satisfied with the British nation, as an effort was not made to raise the siege of the place. This dissatisfaction, combined with the effect which I have above described as having been produced by the improved conduct of the French officers towards them, has probably been the cause of their discontinuing all correspondence with us, of their ceasing to give us any intelligence, and even refusing to forward the communications of those employed to acquire it.

It is probable that these sentiments, and the consequent conduct of the people in this part of Spain in general, may be but temporary; but I have thought it proper to apprise His Majesty's government of their existence.

I have no late intelligence of the operations of the guerrillas in Castille.

To Sir D. Dundas, K.B., Commander in Chief.

Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter which I have written to the Sec. of State, relating to the operations of the advanced guard of the British army since I last addressed you; and the copy of a report from Brig. Gen. Craufurd, on an affair which he had yesterday with the enemy.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

I enclose an extract of a letter from Adm. Berkeley, which appears to be decisive regarding the occupation of the Faro islands.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 25th July, 1810.

Adverting to my dispatch of the 18th inst., containing returns of the number of battalions and squadrons in the French army, I have observed mistakes in some of them, which I think it desirable to rectify; and I now enclose corrected returns of the 2d, 6th, and 8th corps, which form the army of Portugal, which I request may be substituted for those transmitted in my dispatch of the 18th inst. It also appears that there were not more than 20 battalions at Nantes.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Alverca, 26th July, 1810, 9 A.M.

have just now come in from the advanced guard. It did not appear that the enemy had many people on this side of the Coa; but they had their piquets on the Pinhel, and I saw a column moving towards Pinhel from Valverde. Gen. Picton withdrew from Pinhel, &c. this morning. Gen. Craufurd's advanced guard is at Freixedas and Vendada.

I have directed the 2 Portuguese brigades in the Val de Mondego to put up in the pine wood near Roteiro, where they will be more centrally situated than they are at present.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Alverca, 26th July, 1810, 1½ P.M.

I have just received your letter of this day enclosing one from Capt. Cocks to Gen. Slade.

I don't think the movement of Regnier so certain as to draw Gen.

Hill to Guarda; for it is possible that the troops at Navas Frias and Valverde may be only detachments to keep up the communication with the troops on this side. Regnier will not move upon Guarda unless the enemy make a forward movement in other quarters; and in that case we must retire from that point. But as you have Gen. Slade in your front, it is not possible that you can be surprised, or can be attacked without having some hours' notice, during which you can communicate with me. You will therefore call to your assistance Col. Harvey's brigade in the first instance, if you should expect an attack; as it will not do, at all events, to lose Guarda till the army shall be well forward on its march towards Celorico; and I shall reinforce you by other troops if I should not wish you to retire.

If you should have occasion to send to me upon any thing important, particularly in the night, send an officer who knows the road; or, if you should not have one who knows the road, send a guide with him. I shall anxiously expect your accounts of the next patrol from Capt. Cocks.

There is nothing new on this side. Inform Gen. Hill of what you have heard respecting Regnier; and beg him to have an eye upon the Estrada Nova and the Serra de S. Simon. Part of Regnier's force was certainly at Zarza la Mayor on the 23d. Have you no accounts from Capt. Grant from Penamacor?

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 26th July, 1810.

There has been a report, for which, as far as I have seen, there is no foundation, that the enemy have marched a column on the Trancoso road, on our left. But I suppose I shall receive some report from Sir S. Cotton, who is in that direction still, about Souro-pires. He has orders to observe the road from Pinhel to Trancoso, with Gen. Anson's brigade of dragoons, and you are to observe Souro-pires with yours. Do not allow this arrangement to be interrupted by his being at Souro-pires, for sooner or later he will receive his orders.

There is a place called Jurumella, about 2 leagues on your right, which commands a view of the whole country, and is in communication with all the roads on this side of the Pinhel river. It communicates, by its rear, with Recammodo, and thence by the Ponte do Ladrão on the Mondego, to Celorico. I wish you would send there some intelligent officer with a small party of hussars. I should think that, if he knows the country, the view he would have of the enemy's forces will let him know their situation; and with a good glass by day he must see them.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 26th July, 1810, 20 m. past 7 P.M.

I have received your letter of this day. I had received Capt. Cocks' report from Villar Maior, of the same event which he reports to you, which is very important. At the same time the fact is not sufficiently ascertained to enable me to move Gen. Hill.

I had written thus far when I received your note from Freixedas. I beg that you will do every thing in your power to have early information of the enemy's movements, and let me know them without loss of time. It is very important that we should not allow them to make the siege of

Almeida without keeping their army collected; at the same time that we must not allow them to push us too hard in our retreat, if they do not intend to make that operation. As I have the army now disposed, I can place the whole between Celorico and Pinhanços the first march, at the same time that I can collect the whole in any part of our position in a few hours. But the enemy must not come too near us.

Gen. Cotton, with Gen. Anson's brigade, will retire by Cerejo, Marçal da Ribeira, and Baraçal, on Celorico. Nothing will go by the Trancoso road, which is out of the way.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

26th July, 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to apprise you that he is very desirous of there being every exertion used to forward the sick and wounded, who must not be allowed to make any delay on the road, it being very essential to keep the rear unobstructed, in the event of the movement of the army.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

A letter has been received from Gen. Cox, from which it appears that there is no notion of a siege at Almeida. The enemy, as he says, have no force there of any importance, and he can form no notion of their intentions from their movements.

These circumstances, and the general view of our situation, have determined me to make a movement to the rear with our infantry, with the exception of the 4th division, which I shall leave in observation in Guarda, and which, when it retires, will move direct upon Linhares. Your division will be at Celorico, and the whole cavalry, under Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, in front, observing the roads and points observed at present. I shall bring the heavy cavalry into the plain between this and Celorico.

Whatever may be the enemy's intentions (which I think are to dash at us as soon as they shall be prepared, and make our retreat as difficult as possible), we shall be in such a situation as to be able to effect it without being much pressed, or to move forward again if a blow can be struck with advantage. I shall desire Sir S. Cotton to see you this evening, and I beg you to give him all the information in your power.

G. O.

Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the officers commanding regiments, will invariably adopt effectual measures to prevent the streets of the towns in which they may be cantoned, or the roads in the neighbourhood of their cantonments, from being choked up with baggage, with carriages, or otherwise.

2. All carriages and loaded animals on their march must, when halted, if only for a short period, be packed in a field in the neighbourhood of the high road, or housed, but must not on any account be left in the streets of any village, or on the road.

3. When a regiment on its march is halted for any length of time, or when halted is bivouacked, the soldiers must not be permitted to sit or lie down upon the road, but must be placed on one side of it.

4. The officers commanding detachments with baggage, or carriages of any description, the conductors of ordnance or commissariat stores, and the officers commanding regiments, are responsible for a strict obedience to this order.

5. The General and other officers of the army will see the necessity of an early and strict obedience to the orders of the army, respecting the marching, cantoning, and provisioning of the troops, and to the preservation of order and discipline, as well as those which may be issued for the operations of the troops.



To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

I enclose a letter for Gen. Hill, which I beg you will peruse and forward. It explains our situation and the causes of our movement of to-morrow.

In respect to yourself, you will keep out in your front the 2 squadrons of Royal dragoons which will remain with you; and if the enemy should oblige Sir S. Cotton to retire from this place, or if you should be threatened by a serious attack by a superior force, you are to retire upon Linhares; giving the earliest intelligence of your movement to Sir S. Cotton, who will be here, and to me at Celorico. Keep Gen. Hill constantly informed of all that passes.

P.S. Lord Wellington wishes you to forward the letter to Gen. Hill by an officer.

F. SOMERSET.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

Since I wrote to you last, circumstances have altered in some degree in this quarter.

The loss which we sustained in the affair at Almeida, and the fatigue which the troops who were engaged had undergone, and the badness of the weather, rendered it impossible, and indeed it would have been useless, to endeavor to maintain the bridge of Almeida; and the loss of the high ground on this side necessarily occasioned the loss of our position at Pinhel. I therefore withdrew the troops from thence to this neighbourhood yesterday, and Gen. Craufurd's advanced guard to Freixedas, keeping only his cavalry posts of observation in front.

When I ordered you to Atalaya, and intended to draw you to Guarda, I conceived it possible that the enemy would have directed his attack in the first instance upon that point, and I intended to have brought matters to a crisis there. It is obvious, however, that whatever they may try upon Guarda, they have it in their power, and would turn it by our left, so that that plan is out of the question.

There is not the smallest appearance of the enemy's intention to attack Almeida; and I conclude that, as soon as they shall have got together their force, they will make a dash at us, and endeavor to make our retreat as difficult as possible. I therefore propose, in the morning, to make such a disposition of the army as to insure that point. Accordingly, I shall leave the cavalry in their present situations, observing all the roads, &c., on which they are at present; and shall move all the infantry of the army, with the exception of the 4th division, which will remain at Guarda, between Celorico and Pinhanços. The 4th division, when it shall retire, will go direct to Linhares. The heavy cavalry will be in the plain between this and Celorico, and the light cavalry in front, and on the left of this.

This new disposition puts out of the question bringing you to Guarda. I would have you, however, still maintain your position at Atalaya, till Gen. Cole shall have retired from Guarda, or till some movement in your own front shall have induced you to move upon Sarzedas, according to the directions before given to you. But you should make all your dispositions for retiring, as therein directed, and should put such part of Le

Cor's force upon your left, as you propose should be upon your left in the defence of the mountains.

To Brig. Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Alverca, 27th July, 1810, 7 P.M.

I have received your letter, and I beg you will feel no uneasiness respecting any disappointment I might have felt from your coming in. I was uneasy only because I did not know what you were doing, and could send you no directions: but the stay of Slade forward answers my purpose just as well as if you had remained.

P.S. Tell Gen. Cole that there is nothing new of any kind here this morning.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your dispatches, No. 26, 27, 28, and 29, of the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th inst. I propose hereafter to write to you on the subject of No. 26.

The government have expressed so much anxiety lately, for the fate of this country, that I should not think myself justified in employing elsewhere, just at this moment, the force which they have allotted for this purpose. I rather think, however, from the postscript of Gen. Campbell's letter, that no force will be detached from Sicily. I shall endeavor to send you some spring and commissariat waggons, and some horses and drivers belonging to the Waggon train. I have also received your letter of the 5th (marked separate), and I am obliged to you for the communication it contained, and entirely concur with you in the measures which you adopted to mark a respect for the Duc d'Orléans, at the suggestion of the Spanish government.

I beg to refer you to Mr. Wellesley for an account of the state of affairs in this quarter.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will apply to Adm. Pickmore to send to the Tagus, as soon as he can with convenience, all the transports and empty store ships which can be spared from the service of the troops under your command at Cadiz; as, in the event of our being obliged to evacuate Portugal, I shall be under the necessity of making some arrangement to remove the army under the Marques de la Romana.

If the Spanish government have any transports, or vessels of any description capable of transporting troops, it would be desirable to have them sent to the Tagus likewise; and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know what number you will send.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

The enemy obliged us to evacuate Fort Concepcion on the 21st, which we destroyed; and on the morning of the 24th they attacked Gen. R. Craufurd's advanced guard close to Almeida, and obliged him to retire across the Coa with the loss of 4 officers killed, 25 wounded; and 28 men killed, and 218 wounded. Although it was desirable to keep open the communication with Almeida as long as possible, both to supply the place

with provisions, which the poverty of the Portuguese government had obliged them to defer till the last moment, and to maintain our communication with the other side of the Coa, and obtain intelligence of the enemy's movements, yet I had wished to withdraw sufficiently soon; but unfortunately Gen. Craufurd did not begin to retire till the last moment. The enemy's numbers were about 4 times his in cavalry, and at least 3 times in infantry. We hear that their loss has been great. They made 3 attempts afterwards to storm the bridge of the Coa, in all of which they failed.

Having lost our communication with Almeida and the other side of the Coa, there was no use in contesting the passage of that river, in which we might be turned at almost all points: and I therefore yesterday withdrew our posts from the Coa. I consider it by no means clear that the enemy purpose to attack Almeida. I should rather think they do not, and that they wish to embarrass us in a forward position in the mountains.

Regnier crossed the Tagus about the 17th or 18th, and I understand that he is now on his march through Perales, towards Sabugal. Gen. Hill is at Atalaya; but I believe that I shall allow him to retire by the Zezere rather than by this valley, as the enemy is still too strong for us, and can turn us by our left as well as by our right.

I have received your letter of the 9th.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Alverca, 27th July, 1810.

I have received your letters of the 14th and 20th. It was settled at a very early period, I believe from the commencement of the subsidy to the Portuguese government, that the British officers should be paid by the Paymaster of the 'Aids;' and this charge was to come against the British government till otherwise ordered. It has never been otherwise ordered; and the £100,000 a year was included in the act made this year to cover that head of expense, from the 1st Jan.; and with this sum the Portuguese government have nothing to do.

The loss of the exchange should fall upon the British government: we have agreed to pay a certain sum, as the expense of a certain number of men, but this sum does not defray one half of the expense which it is intended to cover. It would be too hard to make the Portuguese government adhere to the first erroneous estimate, and then to charge upon them the loss upon exchange, when we ought to pay them in specie.

The *Fidalgos* in Portugal protect every vagabond, high or low; and the government tremble at the very name of a *Fidalgo*. But we must force them to do their duty, if possible.

In respect to the claim of the Portuguese government, as stated in your letter of the 20th, I can only say that I have no official knowledge of any agreement between Mr. Villiers and them; but, as well as I recollect, Mr. Villiers called upon them for an estimate of the expense of 10,000 men, which he forwarded to England; and the British government engaged to pay that rate of expense, first for 10,000 men, when they should be effective; and then for 20,000 men; and lastly, for 30,000 men. But, if I am mistaken, it is very easy to refer the question to the King's government. I was the person who prevailed upon the King's government to make the addition to the subsidy, which was made from

the 1st Jan.; and if I was not correct in my notion that the British government were to pay only a certain specified rate for 10,000 and 20,000 men, I did the Portuguese government a great injury, instead of a service, in prevailing upon the King's government to increase their subsidy; for I really believe that the existing subsidy for 30,000 does not defray the expense of 20,000.

I withdrew my posts from the Coa yesterday morning. Nothing has occurred since. Regnier has, I believe, come through Perales.

P.S. I do not believe that the enemy intend to attack Almeida. I have not heard of any preparations for that purpose; and I suspect they are collecting a large force to make a dash at me.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Celorico, 29th July, 1810, 6 p.m.

I concur entirely with you, that it is not desirable to fight a battle for Guarda; and it may be very certain that if you are attacked by a small body, and the siege of Almeida is not going on, a large body will be at work somewhere else.

I enclose a letter from Gen. Cotton, which arrived this morning, and I did not send it to you, as I was sure from the contents of mine that it contained nothing of importance.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 29th July, 1810.

The enemy's operations against Almeida are so very feeble, and their intentions so little distinct, and the intelligence which we receive has been lately so very bad, that I have thought it advisable to draw in the whole left of the army to the valley of the Mondego, holding Guarda still with a division of infantry, and the ground in front of Freixedas, &c., with our cavalry only. In this position I am equally prepared for any operation that it might be in my power to undertake for the relief of Almeida, if it should be attacked; and better prepared for our retreat, if that should be necessary. Regnier has not yet passed through the mountains.

We have heard from Gen. Cox; the garrison was in good spirits. I have received your letter of the 25th, for which I am much obliged to you.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 29th July, 1810.

In consequence of the receipt of your letter of the 27th inst., I have made an inquiry into the conduct of the 1st caçadores in the affair of the advanced guard with the enemy on the 24th inst.

It appears that this battalion did not quit its post on the right of the Coa, till it received orders to retire from Col. Beckwith of the 95th regt.,

G. O.

Celorico, 29th July, 1810.

4. The Commander of the Forces observes that notwithstanding repeated orders upon the subject, nearly all the regiments of the army have cars in their possession carrying baggage and attended by soldiers. He refrains upon this occasion from taking any further notice of this irregularity, but if he should see hereafter a cart drawn by bullocks in any part of the line of march of the troops, orders will be given that the baggage shall be destroyed, and the officer to whom it belongs will be brought before a General Court Martial.

5. The Commander of the Forces observed yesterday that several men of the Hanoverian Legion were straggling from their corps; he requests that Brig. Gen. Baron Low will report what number of men were reported absent from each regiment after the march of yesterday, and the cause of their absence.

then fell back upon the bridge of the Coa at an accelerated pace, and a part of the battalion crossed the bridge, mixed with the cavalry and artillery, and ascended the hill on the left of the corps; the remainder of the infantry of the division, and a part of the 1st caçadores, still continuing to occupy the ground on the right of the Coa, and in front of the bridge. After the whole division crossed the Coa, the 1st caçadores again took its position on the right of the 52d. It appears that the conduct of that part of the battalion which crossed the Coa mixed with the cavalry and artillery, has been the cause of the unfavorable impression which has been created respecting them in the affair; but they had no orders to halt on the right of the Coa when they were ordered to retire, and they saw the artillery and cavalry crossing.

Upon the whole, although the reports which have been circulated are exaggerated, there appears to have been some grounds for the complaints made of the conduct of the caçadores in the premature and accelerated passage of the river by some of them; but I am convinced that if the officers, on whose statement I had formed my opinion of the conduct of the 1st caçadores, had known of the orders the caçadores had received to retire, of the conduct of the whole before they retired, of part when some had crossed the Coa, and of the whole afterwards, these statements, however well founded, would not have been made. Every report which I have received, and every inquiry which I have made, has tended to raise still higher the opinion which I had formed of the conduct of the commanding officer.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Calorico, 29th July, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 5th inst., enclosing one of the same date from Mr. Under Sec. Harrison. I trouble your Lordship upon the subject again only to explain that the probable estimate, enclosed in my letter of the 30th May, was one drawn out by me from the statements of the expenditure in the preceding 8 months, made by Mr. Commissary Gen. Murray, and forwarded to your Lordship in the same dispatch. The estimate forwarded in my dispatch of the 6th June was framed by Mr. Commissary Gen. Murray, and was founded on the consumption of the army at that moment, and on the prices paid at the time for different articles. The consumption had increased in May and June with the numbers of the army, and with the numbers of the cavalry and horses for the artillery and waggon train in particular, beyond the average consumption of the 8 months extracted from the statement of the expenditure; and the prices of May and June had exceeded the average prices of the preceding 8 months, still more than the consumption of May and June had exceeded the consumption of the former period.

I hope that these circumstances will account for the difference between these estimates; one of which was framed by me solely for your Lordship's satisfaction, and till I could transmit a document founded upon better information, and framed by the officer whose duty it is to frame it. When I sent the first I believed it would be a tolerably exact representation of the expenses; but I subsequently found that it was otherwise, and the official document was forwarded in the following week.

To the Secretary of the Treasury.

Celorigo, 29th July, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th inst., conveying the pleasure of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury on the proposition contained in my letter to the Commander in Chief of the 28th Sept. 1809, regarding the mode of supplying mules to carry camp kettles, &c., for the army. I had already given directions that an allowance of one dollar a month should be paid for shoeing, &c. for each mule employed in the carriage of camp kettles, surgeons' chests, paymasters' books, veterinary surgeons' chests, serjeant armorers' and serjeant saddlers' implements, under orders which I had received from the Sec. of State of the 23d April last. I had also continued to pay to captains of troops and companies, paymasters, surgeons, and others obliged to furnish mules for the public service, the sums on their arrival in this country, which they had formerly received in the allowance called preparation money, in order to enable the same officers to provide their animals.

As you announce to me that it is intended to make some new regulations upon the subject, which will be transmitted to me, and as the nature of the service in which the troops have been engaged lately has not been so detrimental to the mules as that in which they had been employed in the last year, and has not been so expensive, to the officers upon whom the contract for supplying them is imposed, I do not think it necessary at present to avail myself of the permission of their Lordships to grant the 20l. bat money to each of these officers.

*The A.G. to the Officers commanding divisions, excepting the 2d.*

29th July, 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that, as several women have been sent away from the divisions to the rear, his Excellency does not see any necessity for obliging the women of the several regiments to quit them. There is no objection to their going to the rear if they think proper, and it must be clearly explained to them that they will not be allowed to go in cars if they stay with their regiments, but that they must keep with the baggage of their several corps if they remain with them.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.*

29th July, 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to observe that your sick arrived here yesterday on 8 cars, and about 28 in number, under the charge of Lieut. Bell, but that there was not any party whatever as a guard to escort them. It is absolutely necessary that each division should spare the requisite number of men to convey with regularity their different convoys to the rear, and if they are not forwarded in good order when they commence their march, they scarcely ever can regain it.

*The A.G. to the Commissary General.*

29th July, 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that as the Board of officers, who reported upon the damaged flour and biscuit, have deemed it damaged and unfit to issue to His Majesty's troops, it is his Excellency's pleasure that it should be forthwith destroyed, which you will be pleased to see executed.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorigo, 30th July, 1810, 10 p.m.

Pray send back every thing that you think Capt. Bull can spare, and I wish you would endeavor to make an arrangement that the farriers of those regiments, which want shoes, should have the facility of making

them at those carts which are drawn by horses, and that those drawn by bullocks should be sent to the rear.

Your letter of this day arrived in 2 hours. You do not appear to have occupied Jurumella, or to be aware of the advantage of occupying that post. You will see every thing from it, and it will of course give you proportionate security. I quite approve of your keeping your strength in the rear, and in reserve, and your posts of observation in front weak. I am afraid that some of the patrols of the heavy dragoons, in the rear particularly, are *too alert*. Where it is desirable that a communication should be kept up from the rear with the posts in front, it is better to have it done by a piquet, to which front and rear might patrol at fixed hours, and communicate intelligence; but from Trancoso, for instance, the officer has sent out 3 patrols to Povia del Rey, out of 30 men, in 24 hours!! It would be better to station 6 men half way to keep up the communication with Povia del Rey, and to patrol once or twice in 24 hours to those 6 men. The same might be done with advantage by all the regiments in the second line.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Celorico, 30th July, 1810, 10 A.M.

I received in the night your letters of 6 and 9½ P.M. Regnier's movement upon Cilleros puts out of the question any attack upon you till the enemy shall have collected in your front more of their force from their right. Having collected his advanced guard at Cilleros from Valverde, &c., Regnier's only movement can be upon Zarza and Salvaterra.

In a view to the facility of your retreat, I think you will do well to extend your division a little. That is to say, send one brigade to Misereilha, the Portuguese half way between the two, and the other brigade, with the light battalions of both, in Guarda. You will continue to hold that point, however, under the same instructions, for I observe that the enemy are feeling about with their patrols; and it would not answer to allow a small patrol to snap up so important a point as that is. You might make this movement this evening.

I have begged Sir S. Cotton to attach Capt. Cocks specially to you. I begged him to put an intelligent officer who knows the country and some hussars upon Jurumella, from whence the movements of any large body between Guarda and Almeida must be seen. I request you to write your communications, notwithstanding that you may think it proper to send an officer; as the mode of stating a circumstance makes a difference in the meaning, which occurred last night in your communication to Cotton.

P.S. I have just come in from Baraçal, and all appears perfectly quiet forward.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Celorico, 30th July, 1810, 8 P.M.

I concur entirely in the line of march which you have proposed for the Portuguese troops.

You are to have Capt. Cocks as well as the 2 squadrons of the Royals attached to you.

31st July, 9½ A.M.

P.S. There is nothing new this morning. Communicate with Col. Le Cor at Fundão.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 31st July, 1810.

I have desired Gordon, who carries this, to go into Pinhel with a flag of truce, and letters and money for Col. Wyndham, Lieut. M'Culloch, &c. &c. I shall be much obliged to you if you will warn officers who are taken, to take care what they write. I believe that Col. Wyndham could not have more accurately described your position, and the stations of your piquets and vedettes, than he has in his letter respecting his capture.

I think your communication with Guarda by any other road than that through Alverca and Recammodo is very little important. Take care that none of the enemy's flags are allowed to pass your out piquets. There is no ground for alarm; for the post at Trancoso I am more alarmed, lest all these alarms should destroy our cavalry entirely. Be very careful respecting the road by which the troops are to retire from Cerejo. If this is not well understood, the 2 columns will join on the high road.

I will send you people to manage the telegraph.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 31st July, 1810.

I received your letter of the 30th in the night, and I entirely approve of your march from Atalaya, and of the disposition you have made of your troops.

The advance of Regnier upon you cannot be insulated; if in earnest, it must be connected with the movements of corps in my front, and till those movements shall be a little more decided, it would probably be desirable that you should have an advanced guard of infantry at Castello Branco, and that you should bring Fane's cavalry across the Tagus, and keep that of Regnier in check a little in the open ground in front of the Ponsul, and thus enable you to know what is going on. When you would retire, Fane's cavalry would have to cross the Tagus again at Villa Velha, if possible, as their retreat through the mountains would be awkward to them, and would embarrass you. All this requires nice arrangement, which can be made only on the spot; and you will remember that it is most important to destroy effectually the bridge at Villa Velha when you can no longer command the use of it.

If the object of the enemy should be to push you through the mountains, I wish you only to delay them as much as may be practicable consistently with the safety of your corps. You are aware that Gen. Leith has a corps formed upon the Zezere and Codes in your rear, and you must not allow yourself to be cut off from him. Keep your communication with me by Guarda as long as you can; sending duplicates through Thomar when Le Cor shall retire from Fundão, or we shall quit Guarda: a single officer might find his way across the Zezere and the mountains, from Le Cor to me; but the secure communication will be by the road of Thomar.

If Regnier should strike to his right again towards Guarda, I beg you to move up again to Atalaya.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 1st Aug. 1810.

You will receive with this an order respecting the reception of flags of



truce, which I request you to circulate without loss of time, and pray let it be strictly observed.

I think that your second line, at least, might feed when they come upon their alarm posts in the morning, as the horses will not eat in the middle of the day.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 1st Aug. 1810.

I cannot understand why the forges should not do as much work in the rear as they can in front, if the farriers are made to do their duty. But whether they can or not, it is most extraordinary that the experience which the officers commanding regiments have already had, should not teach them that it will be impossible for the bullock carts with the forges to keep up with the cavalry only one march, if the cavalry should be obliged to go in any one day 5 leagues.

The enemy, therefore, must get these forge carts if they press upon our rear, as they undoubtedly will unless we can send them to some little distance. It then comes to this; either the commanding officers of regiments of cavalry *must* make the farriers do their duty at a distance in the rear; or I *must* withdraw to the rear all the regiments in want of shoes which have these bullock forge carts; or I *must* make up my mind to see those regiments of cavalry entirely destroyed thus early in the campaign. That which the commanding officers do not, or will not understand, is that we shall retreat, and that bullock carts cannot keep up on a retreat with cavalry. I am quite tired of this subject, upon which I have been writing above six weeks.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Celorico, 1st Aug. 1810, 2 p.m.

The proposition from the Captain of the guerrillas is rather of a delicate nature; and although I have no objection to his staying with Cocks, I must avoid giving any formal consent to his doing so, till the Marques de la Romana shall have consented to his quitting the Spanish service.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 1st Aug. 1810.

I am very much obliged to you for your letters of the 27th and 28th. The absence of the 23d regt. is uncomfortable, more particularly as I

G O.

Celorico, 1st Aug. 1810.

1. The following orders and rules are to be observed respecting communications with the enemy's out posts:

2. No flag of truce must be sent to the enemy without orders from the Commander of the Forces.

3. No letter, or other communication, must be sent by a flag of truce which has been ordered by the Commander of the Forces, unless such letter has first been transmitted to head quarters, and it must be open.

4. Flags of truce from the enemy must be received by the officer commanding the first post at which they will arrive. The officer commanding the post is to receive the flag of truce, or officer coming with it, to take from him the letter or communication with which he will be charged, and to give him a receipt for it, and he is then to send him back again to his own lines.

5. The simplicity and indiscretion with which communications have been made to the enemy respecting the positions, &c. of this army and other circumstances, render these orders absolutely necessary; and the Commander of the Forces trusts that the officers commanding at the out piquets, who may have to receive the enemy's flags, will confine their conversation entirely to the subject on which they are to communicate, viz. the receipt of the letter or message from the enemy, and the immediate departure of the officer delivering it.

believe I shall get none of the reinforcements ordered from the Mediterranean. However, I hope we shall do pretty well yet. I refer you to Mr. Stuart for an account of the state of affairs to this day.

To Col. Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

Celorico, 1st Aug. 1810.

I received yesterday your letter of the 16th, and I agree entirely in opinion with you, that Mr. Drummond can do no good at Lisbon and Cadiz; and he may do a great deal of mischief. I attribute his mission to a belief prevalent at the Treasury that we have not done our best to procure money, in which they may depend upon it they are mistaken. However, Mr. Drummond shall have all the assistance and information which I can give him; till I shall find he does more harm than good, when I shall have no scruple in sending him to the place whence he came.

Nothing of any importance has passed here since the 24th July.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 1st Aug. 1810.

I have spoken to the Commissary Gen. respecting the 2000 barrels of flour; and I am sorry to tell you that he can give 500 barrels only at present, unless he should put this army to great inconvenience. He will order the 500 barrels to be delivered by Mr. Dunmore.

I have not got my papers here, and I cannot tell whether the troops which passed through Irun, between the 6th and 10th June, were the Guard or not. I rather think the Guard were in Spain before that time: they were 7200 altogether.

My dispatch of this date will give you the news.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 1st Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to report that the 1st batt. 7th regt. is arrived from Halifax; but I understand that the 23d regt. is detained there, till relieved by the 2d batt. 8th regt., which only lately sailed from England. The arrival of the 23d regt. in this country, therefore, cannot be reckoned upon.

I have received no intelligence of the reinforcements expected from the Mediterranean. Private accounts received from Gibraltar state that the regiments ordered by government to be sent here from Sicily, and which your Lordship expected would arrive in the beginning of July, had not received orders to embark.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 1st Aug. 1810.

As I had no intention of engaging in a general action to prevent the enemy from investing and attacking Almeida, which place is fully provided and prepared for a siege; and as I could not maintain my posts upon the Coa without exposing them to be attacked by a superior force, I withdrew them from that river on the morning of the 26th. Finding on the 27th that the advanced guard of Regnier's corps had come through the Puerto de Perales, as far as Navas Frias; and the enemy having it thus in their power to throw their whole force upon both flanks of this army, and thus to bring on a general engagement in a situation advantageous to them; or to press the British army in its retreat; I withdrew the infantry another march to the rear, and it is now in the valley of the

Mondego, behind this place ; with the 4th division, under Major Gen. Cole, upon Guarda. The whole of the cavalry are in front, observing the movements of the enemy upon the Coa. Gen. Hill continued at Atalaya till he received reports that Regnier had again drawn his advanced guard through the Puerto de Perales, and had pushed it across the Elja, at Salvaterra ; and he moved yesterday morning upon Sarzedas ; leaving Col. Le Cor's division of Portuguese troops, which throughout the winter had been at Castello Branco, at Fundão, in communication with Major Gen. Cole.

The enemy in our front have made no movement of importance since the 26th, on which day they took possession of Pinhel : their principal force is near Almeida, but they have not broken ground before the place, and I have not been able to ascertain that any preparations have been made for the siege of that place. I have occasionally a telegraphic communication with the Governor, Brig. Gen. Cox, from the advanced posts of the cavalry at Freixedas, by the last of which, yesterday, he informed me that all was going on well. There are no French troops between the Tagus and the Guadiana ; and the Marques de la Romana has, I understand, collected his corps near Merida. The 5th corps, under Mortier, appears to be collected upon the Guadalquivir.

Nothing of importance has occurred in the north. The corps under the command of Gen. Seras has been collected between the Duero and the city of Leon ; and the whole force in this part of Spain appears to be distributed according to the orders received from the Emperor at the end of May. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 10th inst., where nothing extraordinary had occurred.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 1st Aug. 1810.

In a dispatch which I wrote to your Lordship on the 25th July, I informed you that the 1st batt. of Portuguese caçadores had behaved ill in the affair of the 24th.

I have since made further inquiries upon that subject, and I enclose your Lordship the copy of a letter to Marshal Beresford, in which I informed him of their result. My opinion is, that if all the circumstances of the case had been known, there would have been no complaint of the conduct of the 1st caçadores ; and adverting to the nature of the attack made upon the advanced guard on that day, to the superior numbers of the enemy, and to the difficulties of the ground over which the troops had to retreat, I am surprised that any part of a corps newly raised, as the 1st caçadores, should have conducted itself so well.

*The A.G. to the Commissary General.*

1st Aug. 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to enclose you a communication received from Major Gen. Picton, and to desire that Mr. Strachan may be directed to furnish the Portuguese brigades of artillery with whatever they may require in equal proportions with our own brigades, as they should have at least every thing shared with them, although our own supplies may not be to the extent required.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 2d Aug. 1810.

In the event of my being obliged to evacuate Portugal with the British

army, you are probably aware that I have received the instructions of His Majesty's ministers to carry it to Cadiz. In this case it appears probable that, for some days at least, we shall be superior to the enemy in force in that quarter, and it has occurred to me that it might be possible to effect an operation by which the enemy should be deprived at least of their establishments on the Trocadero, before they should receive any reinforcements from Portugal.

I request you to collect all the information that can be got on this subject, and which might be useful in enabling us to decide on the expediency of undertaking this enterprise, and on the mode of executing it, if it should be in our power to undertake it.

I beg to refer you to my letter of this date, to Mr. Wellesley, for an account of the state of affairs here.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorigo, 2d Aug. 1810.

The report of the arrival of Regnier's advanced guard at Navas Frias having been confirmed, and the enemy having it thus in their power to press upon our flanks, and force us to a general action, or hurry us more than was desirable in our retreat, I withdrew the whole of the infantry of the army into the valley of the Mondego, behind this place, on the 28th; excepting one division, which remains upon Guarda. The cavalry still maintains its position in front, observing the enemy's movements upon the Coa. Gen. Hill moved to his right from Atalaya on the day before yesterday, in consequence of the reports that Regnier's advanced guard had returned again through Perales, and had passed the Elja, near Salvaterra; and Col. Le Cor with his division, which throughout the winter has been at Castello Branco, is at Fundão, in communication with the troops at Guarda.

The enemy have made no movement of any importance since I wrote last; nor have they made any serious demonstration to attack Almeida; nor do I hear of any preparations for that operation. There are no French troops between the Tagus and the Sierra Morena. They have made no movement in the north; but Seras has got together his corps between Zamora and Leon: and the whole disposition ordered by the Emperor in the end of May has been carried into execution. I suppose we shall hear of his arrival soon.

To Adm. Sir R. Keats, K.B.

Celorigo, 2d Aug. 1810.

I have been much gratified by the receipt of your letter of the 24th July; and I assure you that I shall have much pleasure in co-operating with you for the public service. I doubt not that, before you left England, the King's servants gave you all the information in their power regarding the state of affairs in the Peninsula; but lest they should not, I will give you an outline of them in this letter.

G. O.

Celorigo, 2d Aug. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the officers of the Staff, and the infantry of the army, will not employ the farriers of the cavalry to shoe their horses.

2. The farriers of the cavalry must be employed solely in making shoes and shoeing the horses belonging to the cavalry.

Since the battle of Ocaña in November last, and the subsequent passage of the Sierra Morena in January, there has been no Spanish army in the field capable of making any resistance to the French. The allied British and Portuguese army under my command in this quarter, and the corps of the Marques de la Romana, consisting of about 10,000 or 12,000 men, without cavalry, on the frontiers of Estremadura and Portugal, are all that we have capable of opposing the enemy in front. There are small detachments of Spanish troops in the mountains of Ronda, between Gibraltar and Cadiz; in the Alpujarras in Granada, and in Cuenca; and there is a body of troops still assembled with O'Donell in the southern parts of Catalonia. But the operations of these troops are necessarily confined to enterprises on the enemy's flanks and rear, during the time they may be occupied in the siege of the fortified posts on the coast which still remain in the hands of the Spaniards, from the mouth of the Ebro to Cadiz; and to give countenance and assistance to the numerous bands of partisans which are carrying on a destructive warfare against the enemy in all parts of the Peninsula.

The enemy's force in Spain consists of 250,000 men, according to the best accounts I can make of it. Of this force above one third is engaged in the operations against this army. About 50,000 or 60,000 men, in 3 corps, are in Andalusia, of which 20,000 are engaged in the operations at Cadiz; 15,000 or 16,000 about Seville, &c. protecting their rear, and Sebastiani; with the remainder, towards Granada, &c. There are 2 strong corps in Catalonia and Aragon, but most of these troops are in the garri- sons; and there are about 20,000 or 30,000 men about Madrid, in the Asturias, Biscay, Navarre, and keeping up the communication by the high road from France.

From this relative view of the disposition of the two contending parties in the Peninsula, you will observe that the enemy have extended themselves to such a degree, that even with their large force they can make no rapid progress towards the final subjugation of the country till they shall have defeated this army, or obliged it to evacuate Portugal.

They cannot carry on the siege of Cadiz in the south, and I doubt their being able to carry on that of Tarragona, or that of Tortosa in the east; and till we are removed, the whole machine appears brought to a stand. It happens, unfortunately, that we can receive but very little, if any, assistance from any of the bodies of troops, which I have above described as being still in existence, excepting from the Marques de la Romana. However, being aware of the advantage of continuing upon the Peninsula, I propose to maintain my ground as long as I can, and I shall risk nothing at any great distance from the sea. I shall withdraw gradually towards Lisbon in proportion as I shall find myself pressed by the enemy; and, at last, if I should find that the chances are at all equal, I propose to try the event of a battle; if I should find they are not so, I shall embark the troops.

We have transports prepared in the Tagus for this purpose, and I think it not improbable that I shall be able to bring away with me a part of the Portuguese army; but besides this army, it will be necessary to have some means prepared of carrying off the corps under the command of the Marques de la Romana. When we shall go, this corps will be entirely

cut off, and we must remove it as well as our own troops. I had therefore written to Gen. Graham to request that he would apply to Adm. Pickmore to have the transports at Cadiz not immediately required for the troops sent round to the Tagus, from whence they can easily be sent to any point south of the Tagus, at which the course of the operations in this country might render it more convenient that the Marques de la Romana should embark. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will attend to Gen. Graham's application upon this subject.

When matters come to a crisis here, it will be very desirable that we should have a large naval force in the Tagus; and as it does not appear that the enemy is now in a situation to attempt any thing at Cadiz, I would suggest to you to come round to the Tagus with your squadron at that moment. I am so strongly of opinion that no serious attack can be made at Cadiz, till we shall have been obliged to evacuate Portugal, that if I had not received the intimation of the wishes of the King's government upon the subject, which I consider tantamount to positive orders, I should bring round to the Tagus for the contest Gen. Graham and the greater part of the force under his command.

So far for the general operations in the Peninsula. In respect to those at Cadiz, in which you are more immediately concerned, it is desirable that you should turn your mind at an early period, and should state your opinion to the Admiralty on the naval contest which there will be, sooner or later, in the inner harbour of Cadiz. As usual, the Spaniards left in the power of the enemy large naval means, in the merchants' yards at the Trocadero, and they have others in the forests beyond Chiclana, &c. &c.; and I have heard from all quarters that they are actively employed in constructing craft. I apprehend that you cannot depend upon the Spanish seamen in this contest, although the Spaniards may be able to supply vessels. But upon the whole of this subject, government should have early information, if they have it not already.

Adverting to the probable state of affairs at the moment that I might be obliged to evacuate Portugal, it has occurred to me, that as I shall immediately remove the army to the south of the Peninsula, we may, for some days at least, be stronger than the enemy engaged in the blockade of Cadiz, and that we might be able to strike a blow which should deprive them of their naval establishments on the Trocadero, &c. It is desirable that our minds should be turned to this object; and I will write to Gen. Graham to request that he will have all the military information upon the subject, to enable me to decide on the enterprise, if it should be in my power to attempt it.

In respect to other objects, you will observe that, even though I should be obliged to retire from Portugal, there are still many strong places on the coast of Spain, by means of which the contest in the Peninsula may be kept up. Tarragona, Tortosa, Peñíscola, Valencia, Alicante, Carthagena, as well as Cadiz, are fortified and garrisoned, and possibly each, but certainly most of them, are in a situation to receive important assistance from His Majesty's fleet. I do not know whether your station extends beyond Cadiz, but if it does not, the influence which you must possess over Sir C. Cotton would induce him to attend to these places.

From the character which I have heard of you, I have written to you with the freedom and confidence of an old acquaintance, which I beg you will attribute to my zeal for the cause in which we are both engaged, and to my desire to co-operate cordially with you for its success.

I beg to be kindly remembered to Capt. Cockburn.\*

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorigo, 3d Aug. 1810, 6 p.m.

I have just received your letter of 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ . You should immediately relieve the horses, at least of Cocks' party, and give him light dragoons or hussars instead of Royals. He possibly might experience some inconvenience if all his men were relieved, and still greater inconvenience if his detachment were much diminished; and he is in a most important situation in front of the right of the position of the army, and on the communication between the enemy's corps. I would therefore recommend to you to leave him as strong as he is, and refer to his own judgment to send in as many horses and men as he thinks he can spare, keeping the others, and the relief of the Royals, and of those men and horses he sends in. Tell him also to keep with him and employ as many Spaniards as he may find useful, and I will find means of paying them. Gen. Cole will have written to him about the German officer. The enemy's plan is evidently not decided, and our steadiness must embarrass them.

P.S. I sent Scovell and all the telegraph people to you this day. I think you had better send a copy of this note to Cocks. Do you understand that this note was written this day? it is dated the 1st.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorigo, 3d Aug. 1810.

I have just received your letter of the 30th July, containing the dispatch which you had received from Lord Strangford, and the copies of the notes which his Lordship had received from the government of Brazil.

My opinion in respect to the Portuguese government has invariably been the same. That government alone can rule the country at all which the Prince Regent has named. I recommend, therefore, that the Conde de Redondo and the Principal Sousa and the Dr. Raymundo Nogueira, should now be called to the Regency, for the same reasons that I recommended before that the Conde de Redondo should not be called to the Regency, without the Prince's authority.

In respect to yourself, you can no more accept the office of Regent without the King's consent, than I could that of Commander in Chief, or Marshal General, without the King's authority; but notwithstanding the additional trouble it may throw upon you, I do most anxiously recommend and entreat you to advise the King's government to give His Majesty's consent to your acceptance of this office, and to your holding it with the office of King's minister at Lisbon. I see no other mode in which we shall be able to manage this government at all, or to get through our difficulties. In respect to the trouble, I do not conceive it will throw much upon you. It will not be necessary for you to attend constantly. You will have a knowledge from Dom M. Forjaz of the important business

\* Adm. Sir G. Cockburn, G.C.B.

likely to come under consideration, and you can attend at that time; and the influence which you will soon acquire over the decisions of the government will prevent the other ministers from venturing to decide, during your absence, upon any measure of importance. In short, I am convinced that your being in the Regency will be highly beneficial; and at all events, is the only remedy for the mischief with which the new arrangement is pregnant.

There is another question worth considering; and that is, what is to become of the office of the Conde de Redondo? In my opinion there is no objection to his continuing to hold it as one of a government of six persons. As well as I recollect, the first constitution of government in Portugal placed all the ministers in the Regency; and if it is desirable that he should continue to be minister of Finance, I see no objection to his being so, and one of the members of the Regency at the same time.

You will see a letter which I have written to government this day, respecting an attack made by some of the people of Marmeleiro and Richoso on 2 of our patroles.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

3d Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ult. The Commander of the Forces is well pleased that the sick, &c., have reached their destination, and that the exertions of the Medical staff have been so creditable to themselves, which you will be pleased to make known to them.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorigo, 4th Aug. 1810, 2 p.m.

Send round to the people that they must retire from the villages, and let the magistrates know that if any of them stay, or if any of the inhabitants have any communication with the enemy, they shall be hanged.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Celorigo, 4th Aug. 1810.

Capt. the Hon. H. Pakenham, of the 95th regt.,\* has desired me to commend him again for promotion, which I do most anxiously, as his commanding officer; and I really do not believe that there is a more deserving officer of his rank in the King's army. When in office in Ireland I had already taken an opportunity of mentioning to your predecessor the wish of the Lord Lieutenant that Capt. Pakenham should be promoted;

\* Major Gen. Sir Hercules Pakenham, K.C.B.

G. O.

Celorigo, 4th Aug. 1810.

4. When a Lieutenant Colonel of a regiment is announced in G. O. to command a brigade of which the regiment under his command forms part, he is to receive a Staff allowance of Lieutenant Colonel on the Staff equal to the subsistence of his rank.

7. The Commander of the Forces has frequently had occasion to complain of the inconvenience which resulted to the public service from the practice which prevails of officers and soldiers pressing the carriages of the country by their own authority, and this inconvenience has been again felt in an aggravated degree in consequence of the pressing of carriages, in a recent instance, by a conductor of stores, —; he requests the commanding officer of artillery will report what occasion this conductor had for carriages, and will cause strict inquiry to be made, whether, before he pressed these carriages, he made application for them to any British commissary or magistrate of the country, and will report whether conductor — had made any report of his having pressed these carriages.

8. It is impossible to carry on the service if these irregularities are persevered in, and the Commander of the Forces is determined to punish, in this and in every other instance, any disobedience of his repeated orders upon this subject.



and as he had served under my command, and had been wounded at Obidos, I added a communication of my opinion of his merit as an officer, upon which ground alone I now solicit attention to his claims.

I also think it proper to solicit your attention to a claim of a similar description which I have before frequently urged, both as a General officer, and on the part of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, viz., that of Capt. Lloyd,\* of the 43d regt. This officer, always distinguished, has drawn my particular notice by the use of his talents at the advanced posts of the army; and the wound which he received in the affair of the 24th July has rendered his claim to promotion more urgent, if it has not added to its strength.

I have never been able to understand the principle on which the claims of gentlemen of family, fortune, and influence in the country, to promotion in the army, founded on their military conduct, and character, and services, should be rejected, while the claims of others, not better founded on military pretensions, were invariably attended to. It would be desirable, certainly, that the only claim to promotion should be military merit; but this is a degree of perfection to which the disposal of military patronage has never been, and cannot be, I believe, brought in any military establishment. The Commander in Chief must have friends, officers on the staff attached to him, &c., who will press him to promote their friends and relations, all doubtless very meritorious, and no man can at all times resist these applications; but if there is to be any influence in the disposal of military patronage, in aid of military merit, can there be any in our army so legitimate as that of family connexion, fortune, and influence in the country? I acknowledge, therefore, that I have been astonished at seeing Lloyd, with every claim that an officer can have to promotion, still a Captain; and others, connected with the officers of the staff, promoted as soon as their time of service had expired.

While writing upon this subject, I am also tempted to communicate to you my opinion upon another branch of it, viz., the disposal of the patronage of the troops when on foreign service. In all services, excepting that of Great Britain, and in former times in the service of Great Britain, the Commander in Chief of an army employed against the enemy in the field had the power of promoting officers, at least to vacancies occasioned by the service, in the troops under his own command; and in foreign services, the principle is carried so far, as that no person can venture to recommend an officer for promotion belonging to an army employed against the enemy in the field, excepting the commander of that army.

It was pretty nearly the case formerly in our own service; and I believe the greater number of the General officers of the higher ranks of the present day were made lieutenant colonels by Sir W. Howe, Sir H. Clinton, Lord Cornwallis, Gen. Burgoyne, Lord Dorchester, &c. But how is it now? The form remains still in some degree the same; that is

\* Afterwards Major of the 94th, and killed at the passage of the Nivelle on the 10th Nov 1813.

to say, my secretary keeps the register of the applications, memorials, and regimental recommendations, a trouble which, by the bye, might as well be saved; but the substance is entirely altered, and I, who command the largest British army that has been employed against the enemy for many years, and who have upon my hands certainly the most extensive and difficult concern that was ever imposed upon any British officer, have not the power of making even a corporal!!! It is impossible that this system can last. It will do very well for trifling expeditions and short services, &c.; but those who are to superintend the discipline, and to excite and regulate the exertions of the officers of the army, during a long continued service, must have the power of rewarding them by the only mode in which they can be rewarded, that is, by promotion. It is not known to the army and to strangers, and I am almost ashamed of acknowledging, the small degree (I ought to say nullity) of power of reward which belongs to my situation; and it is really extraordinary that I have got on so well hitherto without it; but the day must come when this system must be altered.

I do not entertain these opinions, and communicate them to you, because there are any officers attached to me in the service for whom I desire promotion. All my aides de camp, respecting whom I do feel an interest, have been promoted in their turn in their regiments, or are to be promoted, for carrying home the accounts of victories. The only person, respecting whose promotion I ever interested myself personally, was that of Colin Campbell, which the Duke of York had promised him, in consequence of his having brought home the accounts of two victories at the same time; and the difficulty which I experienced in obtaining his promotion, notwithstanding that promise, is a strong practical proof of the effects of the system to which I have adverted. The consequence of the change of the system in respect to me would be only to give me the power of rewarding the services of those who have exerted, or should exert, themselves zealously in the service; and thus to stimulate others to similar exertions.

Even admitting that the system of promotion by seniority, exploded in other armies, is the best for that of Great Britain, it would still be an advantage that those who become entitled to it should receive it immediately, and from the hand of the person who is obliged to expose them to danger, to enforce discipline, and to call for their exertions. I would also observe that this practice would be entirely consistent with the unvaried usage of the British Navy.

I admit that it may be urged with truth that a larger view may be taken of the interests of the public, in the mode of promoting officers of the army, than I am capable of taking; and this view may have suggested the expediency of adopting and adhering to the mode now in use; at the same time I must say that the public can have no greater interest than in the conduct and discipline of an army employed against the enemy in the field; and I am thoroughly convinced, that whatever may be the result in my hands, a British army cannot be kept in the field for any length of time, unless the officers composing it have some hope that their exertions will certainly be rewarded by promotion; and that to be abroad on service,

and to do their duty with zeal and intelligence, afford prospects of promotion not afforded by the mere presence of an officer with his regiment, and his bearing the King's commission for a certain number of years.

I have been induced to communicate these opinions to you, from the consideration of the claims of those officers to which I have drawn your attention at the commencement of this letter, from a strong conviction of their truth, and not, I assure you, from any interest I feel in the result. I would not give one pin to have the disposal of every commission in the army.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 4th Aug. 1810.

I am not in communication with the Sec. of State for Foreign affairs, and I don't interfere in the political concerns of the government; but I should recommend to you to draw Lord Wellesley's attention to the arrangement for the government of Portugal lately made in Brazil, and to the principles on which it has been made.

It is extraordinary that during the time that you and I have been working here to give strength and stability to the government, and principally to support Dom M. Forjaz, as being the best instrument to co-operate with us to carry on the war, the King's minister in Brazil should have promoted a new arrangement of the government, purposely calculated to destroy the very influence which we had supported. Then the admission of Dr. Raymundo Nogueira into the Regency, and the reasons for this admission, are truly ludicrous. He is to aid in the destruction of the influence of the Secretariat which we had labored to establish and support, and his appointment is to be agreeable to the lower orders, from among whom he is selected!

It is unfortunate for the people of the Peninsula that we in England have always thought proper to give a democratical character to their proceedings; whereas nothing was ever farther from their intentions. The principle of all the actions of the good people of these countries is anti-Gallican, and that alone: all that they desire is, that they should be saved from the grasp of the French, and it is a matter of indifference to them by what persons, or by what class of persons, their salvation is effected. In the abstract, I believe that they would prefer to be governed by the higher classes, from a feeling that those belonging to the higher classes have turned their minds more to the business of government, have more experience and capacity in the transaction of public business, and are more deserving of their confidence, as being more likely to save them from the French. If indeed the Doctor had ever shown any talents as a political character, there might be some reasons for his appointment; but as it is, it is absurd and mischievous.

That which we want in Portugal is, that the government should be supported in all its measures in Brazil; and that it should acquire strength and confidence in its own measures, in consequence of that support. The King's minister in Brazil might be highly useful by using his influence for that object. We also require that there should be some permanence in the authority of the persons employed to govern this country, and that

men's minds should be diverted from an expectation of change by every vessel which arrives from Brazil. Here also the King's minister in Brazil can be highly useful to us; but I must observe that it is by the adoption of a line of conduct directly the reverse of that which he has followed lately.

I hope that my letter to the Prince Regent, written in April, had not arrived in Brazil before this arrangement was made, as nothing can be more inconsistent with the principles and practice recommended in that letter than what is contained in the papers which you transmitted to me.

Proclamation to the people of Portugal.\*

4th Aug. 1810.

The time which has elapsed during which the enemy have remained upon the frontiers of Portugal, has fortunately afforded to the Portuguese nation experience of what they are to expect from the French.

The people had remained in some villages trusting to the enemy's promises, and vainly believing, that by treating the enemies of their country in a friendly manner, they should conciliate their forbearance, and that their properties would be respected, their women would be saved from violation, and that their lives would be spared.

Vain hopes! The people of these devoted villages have suffered every evil which a cruel enemy could inflict. Their property has been plundered, their houses and furniture burnt, their women have been ravished, and the unfortunate inhabitants, whose age or sex did not tempt the brutal violence of the soldiers, have fallen the victims of the imprudent confidence they reposed in promises which were made only to be violated.

The Portuguese now see that they have no remedy for the evil with which they are threatened but determined resistance. Resistance, and the determination to render the enemy's advance into their country as difficult as possible, by removing out of his way every thing that is valuable, or that can contribute to his subsistence, or frustrate his progress, are the only and the certain remedies for the evils with which they are threatened.

The army under my command will protect as large a proportion of the country as will be in their power; but it is obvious that the people can save themselves only by resistance to the enemy, and their properties only by removing them.

The duty, however, which I owe to H. R. H. the Prince Regent and to the Portuguese nation, will oblige me to use the power and authority in my hands to force the weak and the indolent to make an exertion to save themselves from the danger which awaits them, and to save their country; and I hereby declare, that all magistrates or persons in authority who remain in the towns or villages, after receiving orders from any of the military officers to retire from them; and all persons, of whatever description, who hold any communication with the enemy, and aid or assist them in any manner, will be considered traitors to the state, and shall be tried and punished accordingly.

\* See Appendix, No. VII.; Marshal Massena's proclamation to the Portuguese, Ciudad Rodrigo, 1st Aug. 1810.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 5th Aug. 1810.

I have received your letters to the 2d, 8 p.m. It appears to me that the disposition which you have made of your corps will answer perfectly.

It is very desirable that Le Cor should keep his station at Fundão, or indeed upon the Serra d'Alpedrinha, at least till he shall be obliged to retire by the enemy's movements upon him, as his corps preserves the communication between you and me. I think that one of his battalions at Caria, keeping a good look out towards Penamacor, would be of use for the same object. There is nothing new on this side.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 5th Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose an estimate of the expected expenditure of the army in the Peninsula to the 24th Aug., and of the expected means to the same period.

Au Maréchal Ney, Duc d'Elchingen.

Au quartier général de l'armée Anglaise, ce 5 Août, 1810.

J'ai reçu une lettre de la part du Général Loison sur le sujet du Major Napier\* du 50<sup>me</sup> régiment d'infanterie Anglaise. Aussitôt que cet officier est arrivé à l'armée, il s'est empressé de vous écrire pour vous remercier des bontés que vous avez eues pour lui, et pour vous envoyer la copie du cartel d'échange qui avait été fait en sa faveur. Il m'avait donné cette lettre pour vous l'envoyer, mais malheureusement je l'avais oublié.

Je vous envoie une lettre que je viens de recevoir de cet officier après lui avoir communiqué celle que j'ai reçue du Général Loison, et la copie du cartel d'échange qu'a le Major Napier.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 5th Aug. 1810, 9 p.m.

I wish that you would take an opportunity of making a telegraph signal to Gen. Cox at an early hour in the morning, and state to him the following 3 sentences :

'1. The deserters tell us that the report in the enemy's camp is that they will attempt to take Almeida by storm.'

'2. We do not believe the enemy will make this attempt.'

'3. Be prepared, particularly with your flank fire, every morning before day.'

I received Loison's letter, and sent Gordon with an answer. Send in the inhabitant of Linhares when he shall arrive at Freixedas.

*The A.G. to Ensign and Assist. Adj. Swinburne, 83d regt., Lisbon.*

5th Aug. 1810.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter enclosing some communications from the French officers that are prisoners, which they wished to be forwarded to their outposts, and I request you will inform them that I will take care to have them sent the first opportunity.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 6th Aug. 1810.

I wish to mention to you that I have received complaints from different quarters of the conduct of the hussars towards the inhabitants of the country, and their conduct has been so bad as to exasperate them exceedingly. It has gone so far that they have inquired whether they might kill

\* Major Gen., Sir C. Napier, G.C.B., Governor of Sind.

the Germans in our service, as well as in the service of the French, when urged to resist the enterprises of the latter. There is really no excuse for a soldier in the service of Great Britain plundering; and I shall be obliged to you if you will talk seriously to Arentschildt upon the subject, and point out to him how unfortunate it would be if this conduct, which can be of advantage to nobody, should deprive his regiment of the reputation which they have acquired.

Write to Cocks upon it also, as well as to any other officers who may command detachments of hussars.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole. Celorico, 6th Aug. 1810,  $\frac{1}{2}$  before 6 P.M.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give directions to Capt. Grant to have the inhabitants of Bemquerenza, to whom he refers as having prepared bread for the French, sent in to Guarda; and I beg you will send him thence here without loss of time.

Send here the inhabitants of Penamacor employed to get intelligence.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart. Celorico, 7th Aug. 1810, 11 $\frac{1}{2}$  A.M.

It would be very desirable to remove your hospital farther to the rear than it is. Those men who can ride on horseback might be kept either with their regiments, or, if they require more rest than they can get with their regiments, they might be sent here: but those who cannot ride should be sent to the hospital in the rear.

The Ordenanza have cut up a few Frenchmen, and taken some horses and prisoners, near Villar Maior, and the 1st regt. of Portuguese cavalry appear, by an account from Hill, to have taken 18 and killed 12, near Atalaya.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill. Celorico, 7th Aug. 1810.

I received in the night your letter of the 4th, and I am anxious to receive the further accounts of the success of the 1st regt. of cavalry.

I have heard complaints from Gen. Leith of the inconvenience which he feels from the weather in the occupation of his position on the Codes and the Zezere; and, adverting to the existing situation of affairs, I am of opinion that it will be expedient to keep his corps in reserve, rather than throw it in the position which I had allotted to it.

Besides the roads between the Zezere and the Tagus, which you and Le Cor occupy, there is one on the right of the Zezere, leading from Belmonte to Covilhão, and thence to Pampilhosa, and turning the head of the Alva towards Thomar. This road is excessively bad, and scarcely practicable for troops; but I observe that the enemy's inquiries have lately been for the road to Covilhão, and it is not impossible but that they may intend to push a column that way, which might intercept the communication between you and me.

I also observe the movement of the corps from Andalusia into Estremadura. The movements of this corps may render it desirable that we should have more security for our right than the Marques de la Romana can give us; and this is another reason why Major Gen. Leith's division should be in reserve. At the same time, that if the press should be

made upon you, it will be in your power or mine to throw him into the position formerly proposed for him on the Zézere and the Codes.

I enclose a copy of the instructions which I have given him this day, to which I beg your attention, as well as to the views I have for placing him in reserve, as explained in this letter.

To Major Gen. Leith.

Celorico, 7th Aug. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 5th inst., and I entirely concur with you in the expediency of keeping your troops under cover as much, and for as great a length of time, as possible. None of the regiments of this army, excepting those which prefer it, are now out. All are cantoned in the villages.

I beg of you to dispose of your troops as follows, till you shall receive directions from Lieut. Gen. Hill or from me, to alter this disposition:

Figueiro dos Vinhos . . . .	The 8th Portuguese regt. infantry.
Cabaços . . . . .	1 Portuguese do. do.
	1 do. do. do.
Thomar . . . . .	3 battalions of British infantry.
	2 brigades of Portuguese artillery.
Barca de Codes . . . . .	1 battalion of Portuguese militia.
	2 do. do. do.
Torres Novas . . . . .	1 regiment of Portuguese cavalry.
	1 do. do. do.
Santarem . . . . .	1 do. do. do.

I shall thus have it in my power to dispose of your corps, either in support of Lieut. Gen. Hill, or to preserve the communication between Lieut. Gen. Hill and this army; or to cover the right and communicate with the Marques de la Romana, as I may think proper.

I request you to let Gen. Hill know what arrangements have been made for the defence of the line which you were to have occupied under your former instructions.

I have written to the Portuguese government respecting the difficulties in supplying the Portuguese troops under your command, which, adverting to their numbers, and to the stations which they occupy, appear to me most extraordinary.

*The A.G. to Major Marston, A. Q. M. G., Coimbra.*

7th Aug. 1810.

I have to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces has appointed you until further orders military commandant of the general hospital at Coimbra, in the room of Capt. Marsden, 11th regt., deceased; and has been pleased to direct that you take upon yourself the complete superintendence of the sick and convalescent at that station.

You will be pleased to call upon Capt. Hamilton, 5th regt., the senior officer now at the depot, to put you in possession of all the regulations that have been from time to time issued for the rule and guidance of the concerns of the military hospitals; and you will not fail to pay the strictest attention to the 'Regulations for Hospital Stations,' extracted from G. O. and transmitted to the depôts. You will also forward with regularity the usual states, and will be pleased to communicate constantly with me, not only with respect to the constant routine of the business, but also with regard to any other alterations, arrangements, or circumstances, which you may think conducive to the public service.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 8th Aug. 1810, 8½ P.M.

I have just received your note of 5½ P.M., which contains interesting intelligence, which is confirmed from other quarters. If you keep a

strong post on your right at Jurumella, which can patrol the roads leading from Castello Mendo, Castello Bom, and Ponte de Sequeiros, nothing of any importance can come upon your right. The post at Jurumella might retire direct upon Recammodo, and thence into the plain near Ponte do Ladrão.

Your post at Freixedas becomes very important in case of the enemy making the siege. Ask Cox, in the morning, if they have broke ground; and ascertain by all means in your power, if the numbers augment in your front on this side of the Coa.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 8th Aug. 1810.

I have this day received your letter of the 3d.

I had a letter from Sir R. Keats, written from off the Tagus; but neither from him, nor from government, have I had the slightest intimation of any such design as that of which you have apprised me. If government had not expressed a wish that I should not do so, I should have brought the greatest part of the British troops at Cadiz round to the Tagus before this time; and at all events, knowing how important it will be to have a very strong fleet in the Tagus when we shall embark, I proposed to Sir R. Keats, in my answer to his letter, that if he should think it possible to quit Cadiz, he should come round to the Tagus with his squadron; and at all events, that he should send round the transports not immediately required for the service of the troops there. I assure you that I have had no intimation from government of this plan, and most particularly none respecting yourself.

Mr. Stuart will make you acquainted with the state of affairs here. The Portuguese troops are behaving very well, and if government will act as if they were in earnest in their desire to save this country, and will reinforce us handsomely, we shall not lose it.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 8th Aug. 1810.

Since I have commanded the troops in this country, I have always treated the French officers and soldiers who have been made prisoners with the utmost humanity and attention; and in numerous instances I have saved their lives. The only motive which I have had for this conduct has been that they might treat our officers and soldiers well who might fall into their hands, and I must do the French the justice to say that they have been universally well treated, and in recent instances the wounded prisoners of the British army have been taken care of before the wounded of the French army.

On this principle I interested myself last year in favor of Gen. Franceschi, who had been taken by a guerrilla in Castille, and had been confined in the Alhambra at Granada; but the Junta would not attend to my application to exchange him; nor would they allow the money to be given to him which I had sent there for him. Till I received the other day from Madame Franceschi the duplicate of a letter, which she had written to me in January, I believed that Gen. Franceschi had been released from confinement when the French entered Granada; but I conclude that it is not the case, and that he is now in confinement at Carthage, or at Alicante.



If he should be so, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send to him the enclosed letter, which contains one from his wife, and I beg you also to send him 100 dollars. I also wish you to urge the Regency to allow him to be exchanged. Let me hear from you what is become of him.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 8th Aug. 1810.

I enclose the weekly state of the army to the 1st Aug., and that of the troops at Cadiz to the 1st June.

I likewise enclose the weekly state of the detachments at Lisbon to the 1st Aug.; from which your Lordship will be able to see how the number of sick absent on the military return is made up. Besides the hospital and establishment at Lisbon and Belem, there is one at Coimbra, and one at Figueira; and there are sick men on their passage from Figueira to Lisbon.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 8th Aug. 1810.

In my letter of the 1st inst., I omitted to inform you that Lieut. Col. Wyndham, of the Royal dragoons, had been taken prisoner on the 30th July. It appears by his own account that, being Field officer of the day, he was visiting the advanced vedettes, and he rode up to one of those of the enemy, and was immediately taken by some French hussars. I understand that he is well treated by the French; and I have sent him money, which I know that he has received.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 8th Aug. 1810.

The estimate of the expenses of the army, and the resources to cover them, which I forwarded to your Lordship on the 1st inst., will have shown you that the latter have increased considerably lately.

It is impossible to tell how long it will be in our power to procure this increased supply of money for bills upon England; but I should hope that we are not likely to feel distress before the specie expected will have arrived from America.

I am concerned to inform your Lordship that from the communications which I have had with the Portuguese government and Marshal Beresford, I have reason to apprehend a failure in its pecuniary resources. In my dispatch of the 14th Nov. 1809, I made your Lordship acquainted with the result of the financial state of this government, as furnished to me officially by its officers, from which it appeared that there was a very large deficiency of means to cover the estimated expense. The expenses of the government have been increased beyond the estimate furnished to me, by the same events and circumstances which have increased the expenses of the British army, and by their having actually in the field, in active employment, a much larger proportion of the militia forces than had been expected by them. At the same time I have reason to believe that the receipts of the revenue have not been materially increased.

I was not employed in this country when the estimate was framed of the expense of 10,000 men of the Portuguese army, on which the original subsidy, and its subsequent increase at different periods, were founded; but I believe that that estimate was a very erroneous one, that it did not

include many expenses attending the number of men estimated for ; and the prices estimated were lower than those paid at that time, and much lower than those of the same articles at a subsequent period.

His Majesty's government will have received full information from the King's minister at Lisbon upon this subject ; but it is obvious that, although His Majesty has afforded to the Portuguese government very large pecuniary assistance, the sums with which he has assisted them have not been adequate to defray the military expenses, which they were at different times intended to defray, with the exception of the sum for the increase of pay for the Portuguese officers, and that for the pay of the British officers.

It is difficult to consider of the mode of increasing the pecuniary means of the Portuguese government without adverting to their whole system and conduct. There is great firmness, considerable talent and ability, great zeal, and the best inclination in the persons who compose the government in Portugal, but they are unfortunately under the control of the government of Brazil ; and it is difficult, if not impossible, to prevail upon them to adopt measures of obvious advantage, and even necessity, because some of them are referrible to the Prince himself, and others interfere with long established but vicious customs and prejudices. The local government do not feel themselves sufficiently strong in the support of the government in Brazil to attempt the reforms in all branches of the government which the circumstances of the country require ; and the consequence is, that many regulations of trade and finance, by which the revenue of the country would be much increased, have not been carried into execution. The King's minister at Lisbon will have acquainted His Majesty's government of the party existing in Portugal, not favorable to the French, nor hostile to the influence of His Majesty's government over the Portuguese councils, but jealous of the authority of the local government, and undermining its influence, and paralyzing its power by their private communications and intrigues through their friends and relations with the government in Brazil.

This party can be successfully checked and resisted only by the cordial support given to the measures of the local government in Portugal by the King's minister in Brazil ; and till that is done, our efforts in this country, either to increase the revenue, or to govern the country, as it ought to be governed in the critical situation in which it is placed, must fail in producing their effects.

In my dispatch of the 14th Nov. 1809, I pointed out to your Lordship one cause of the decline of the revenues of Portugal, and their deficiency to defray the expenses of the government, in the direct trade of His Majesty's subjects to Brazil. His Majesty's government must be the best judges of the policy of foregoing the advantages to be derived by his subjects, and by the revenue of Great Britain, by this direct trade, for the political advantage of increasing the revenue and means, and supporting the power of His Majesty's allies in the Peninsula.

I have reason to believe that the whole amount of the subsidy paid to Portugal is not equal to the loss of revenue alone, without reckoning other advantages surrendered by the establishment of the direct trade of His

Majesty's subjects to Brazil; and all the improvements which can be made in the revenue in Portugal will not make the revenue adequate to the expense.

I have thought it proper to bring this subject under the consideration of His Majesty's government, as being very important at the present moment.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 8th Aug. 1810.

Although I have no concern with the naval operations on the coasts of the Peninsula, I think it proper to draw your Lordship's attention to the objects referred to in the enclosed extract of a letter which I have written to Sir R. Keats, in order to draw his attention to them, in case he should have authority from government or means to attend to them.

It would be very desirable to have a squadron of men of war, with a few victuallers and store ships, on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, and in communication with the General officer commanding the troops in Catalonia and Valencia, in order to assist these places, to encourage their resistance to the enemy, and eventually, if necessary and practicable, to carry off their garrisons.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 8th Aug. 1810.

The enemy have made no movement of importance in front of this army since I addressed you on the 1st inst. They still maintain their position before Almeida, with a small corps on this side of the Coa, with their right at Pinhel; and the main body of their army is near Almeida, and between the Coa and Agueda. They have not yet broke ground before Almeida; and I have not received accounts, upon which I can rely, of any preparations for the siege of Almeida.

The corps of Regnier, which had appeared first at Navas Frias, and afterwards at Salvaterra, passed a detachment of cavalry and infantry across the mountains from Valverde and Cilleros to Penamacor on the 31st July, and they occupied Zibreira at the same time.

I am informed by Gen. Hill that the 1st regt. of Portuguese cavalry, under Col. Christophe, fell upon a party of French cavalry belonging to this detachment which were in Atalaya on the 3d inst., and pursued them to the neighbourhood of Penamacor, and killed 12, and took 18 prisoners. I have not received the details of this affair, which Lieut. Gen. Hill mentions as creditable to the troops, and cannot report our own loss. The Portuguese Ordenanza, also in that part of the country, have fallen upon one of the enemy's detachments, of which they killed 25.

Lieut. Gen. Hill holds Castello Branco with the advanced guard of his infantry; Brig. Gen. Fane, with the 13th light dragoons and 4 regiments of Portuguese cavalry, being in his front along the Ponsul.

Regnier had sent a detachment across the Tagus, apparently with a view to secure the boats on the river, which detachment occupied a fortified post at the junction of the Rio del Monte with the Tagus. This post was attacked by Brig. Don Carlos de España, and he carried it with a loss to the enemy of 150 men killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Mortier's corps has moved from the Guadalquivir, and by the last accounts had arrived at Fregenal, in the Sierra Morena. The Marques de

la Romana, from whom I heard on the 4th, appears to think the movements of this corps are not decided, and that they have been made solely to divert his attention from the Tagus. But as I find by my accounts from Cadiz to the 28th July that Gen. Lacy was about to return thither, and that all contest had ceased in the Sierra de Ronda, I imagine that the movement of Mortier is decided, and that he will establish himself in Estremadura, in obedience to the orders received from the Emperor. I trust, however, that advantage will have been taken of the absence of the enemy from Estremadura, for nearly a month, to fill the magazines of all the fortified places, and to provide for the subsistence of the army of the Marques de la Romana, in conformity with the arrangement which I made with him when he was at my head quarters at Alverca, and with my repeated suggestions since.

In the north, the French had advanced with a detachment of cavalry and infantry, and taken possession of Puebla de Sanabria on the 29th July, from whence the Spanish Gen. Taboada had retired.

Gen. Silveira had moved out from Braganza with some infantry, and a detachment of 200 cavalry; and he informs me in a letter of the 4th, that his cavalry had on that morning totally defeated that of the enemy, having taken 40 prisoners, only 2 officers and one soldier having escaped. When he wrote in the evening of the 4th, the enemy's detachment of infantry were shut up in Puebla de Sanabria by that under his command, and that of Gen. Taboada.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 8th Aug. 1810.

My dispatch of this day will have shown your Lordship that we may hope that all the trouble taken, and expenses incurred, to form the Portuguese army, will not have been thrown away; and adverting to the state of the contest in the Peninsula, and the state of the enemy's force both here and elsewhere, I cannot avoid again recommending to the consideration of His Majesty's government the means of reinforcing this army with British infantry.

In reference to the state of health of a great part of the army, it might be desirable to send these troops into cantonments in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, where they would be equally disposable for service in other parts of the world, as they would be by remaining in His Majesty's dominions. I am also of opinion that three fourths of the garrison now at Cadiz might be withdrawn from thence with safety, and employed with advantage in this country.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Sir W. Myers, Royal Fusiliers.*

8th Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter and enclosure from Capt. —, herewith returned; and you will be pleased to acquaint that officer that the Order he refers to is the common standing regulation of this army. It is in the G. O. of every regiment, which it is the duty of every officer, particularly a Captain, to be acquainted with. I am expressly directed, therefore, by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that his Excellency hopes he shall never again hear of such an excuse for a neglect of duty.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 9th Aug. 1810.

I have received the duplicates of your letters of the 6th and 7th.

Nothing of importance has occurred here. There is more appearance of the intention on the part of the enemy to attack Almeida than there has been before; but they have not yet broken ground.

Silveira's cavalry have cut up one of the enemy's detachments of cavalry near Puebla de Sanabria, and have taken 40 prisoners. With his infantry, and that of Gen. Taboada, he had 400 French infantry shut up in Puebla de Sanabria, and he expected on the 4th that they would surrender before morning; but I have not heard from him since the 4th, and I am apprehensive that the French will have been relieved.

I am a little anxious about Mortier's movements into Estremadura; not on account of the progress he will make, but I think that the Marques de la Romana is inclined to fight a battle. If we can only avoid any disaster of importance for some time, I hope we may do some good at last.

Tell Fane not to allow his cavalry to engage without evident advantage. I do not think that the enemy can throw forwards any large body of cavalry on your side till he shall advance in earnest.

Encourage the Ordenanza by all the means in your power; and make the inhabitants carry off their property, and be prepared to quit their villages.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Darroch, A.A.G., Lisbon.*

9th Aug. 1810.

Capt. —, of the 7th or Royal Fusiliers, having urged as an excuse for allowing some men of a detachment that was marched from Lisbon under his charge to join the hospital at Coimbra without a return of necessaries, that no orders were issued to him on the subject at Lisbon, and that he had been absent from the army from July, 1809, until he arrived in June last at Lisbon, and consequently never saw or was acquainted with the G. O. of the 17th Dec., I beg to be particularly informed whether any instructions were given to Capt. — at Lisbon, or from the dépôt at Belem, agreeable to the orders of that date, or if the enclosed printed instructions were all that he received. I beg further to call your attention particularly to this subject, and desire you will communicate with Capt. Tucker, Commandant at Belem, so that no officer ever leaves Lisbon with a detachment for the army without every instruction that has been given out in G. O. for the guidance of officers coming up with detachments, especially the Orders of the 17th Dec. 1809.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. the Hon. T. Fermor, 3d Guards.*

9th Aug. 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you, that if you refer to the G. O. you will see that those Lieut. Colonels who happen to be the seniors of the brigades in which their regiments are respectively placed, are to receive the allowance stated, in order to enable them to defray the expenses of their situation; and they are put in orders to command these brigades, which they would command at all events, only that they may receive the allowance. In fact there is nothing new in this G. O. except the allowance, as all these Lieut. Colonels being the seniors of their several brigades, have commanded them for a great length of time.

If the Commander of the Forces were to select officers to command brigades, they would of course be the seniors of the rank; but in this case the brigades being formed of a certain number of regiments, and there being no General officer or Colonel on the staff to command them, the senior officer in the brigade takes the command as a matter of course, and is put in orders only that he may receive an allowance to enable him to defray his expenses.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.*

9th Aug. 1810.

I have had the honor to lay your letter of yesterday's date, and several enclosures relative to Lieut. —, of the — regt., before the Commander of the

Forces; and I am directed to acquaint you that you may inform that officer through the regular channel, that he has been so long in arrest, because the Judge Advocate was employed in the trials at Lisbon, and since his return to the army it has not been convenient to assemble a General Court Martial.

It is no excuse for any neglect or omission of an officer that he had not seen the G. O., as every officer ought to be acquainted with them; and indeed the G. O., with the neglect of which Lieut. — is charged, prescribe nothing but the ordinary duty which every officer in command of a detachment ought to perform. However, at the desire of his General and commanding officer, the Commander of the Forces is pleased on the present occasion to overlook what has occurred, and his Excellency is pleased to direct Lieut. — should be released from his arrest and return to his duty.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. —.*

9th Aug. 1810.

I have had the honor to lay your letter of the 7th inst. before the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed to acquaint you that his Excellency has made the distribution of the army according to the best view he could take of the service each part was required to perform, and therefore it is not in his power to make the alteration you propose.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 10th Aug. 1810.

I write to let you know that I have detached Gen. Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, hitherto attached to Gen. Leith, to the Marques de la Romana. It will be necessary, therefore, that when you shall return, you should take with you through the mountains 2 regiments instead of one of Portuguese cavalry, leaving Fane with 3 regiments, including the 13th, on the left of the Tagus. There is one squadron belonging to Madden's brigade, now with Le Cor, which ought to be sent to Elvas to join its brigade, and you can replace it by one of Fane's: let it march to Portalegre and Arronches, and thence to Campo Maior, as that is the route which Madden himself will take. I have ordered some horse artillery to join Fane from Lisbon. There is nothing new.

P.S. I have received your letter of yesterday, and I enclose an official

G. O.

Celorico, 10th Aug. 1810.

7. The Commander of the Forces will not make any inquiry to discover the writer of the letters which have occasioned this unnecessary alarm in a quarter in which it was most desirable it should not be created. He has frequently lamented the ignorance which has appeared in the opinions communicated in letters written from the army, and the indiscretion with which those letters are published. It is impossible that many officers of the army can have a knowledge of facts to enable them to form opinions of the probable events of the campaign; but their opinions, however erroneous, must, when published, have mischievous effects.

8. The communication of that of which all officers have a knowledge, viz. the numbers and disposition of the different divisions of the army, and of its magazines, is still more mischievous than the communication of opinions, as must be obvious to those who reflect that the army has been for months in the same position; and it is a fact come to the knowledge of the Commander of the Forces, that the plans of the enemy have been founded on information of this description extracted from the English newspapers, which information must have been obtained through private letters from officers of the army.

9. Although the difficulties inseparable from the situation of every army engaged in operations in the field, particularly in those of a defensive nature, are much aggravated by communications of this description, the Commander of the Forces only requests that the officers will, for the sake of their own reputations, avoid to give opinions upon which they cannot have a knowledge to enable them to form any; and that if they choose to communicate facts to their correspondents, regarding the positions of the army, its numbers, formation of its magazines, preparations for breaking bridges, &c., they will urge their correspondents not to publish their letters in the newspapers until it shall be certain that the publication of the intelligence will not be injurious to the army or to the public service.

answer, which you may send to Gen. Regnier, or not, as you like. When you send your answer, do not date where your head quarters are

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorio, 10th Aug. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 22d July (marked No. 30), and that of the 22d (marked separate). It certainly appears that government are not aware of the exact situation of affairs in Spain, notwithstanding the pains which have been taken to apprise them of their state; and it appears from Lieut. Col. Bunbury's letter that they have still less knowledge of the position and strength of the different French corps in Spain.

In my opinion Sir J. Stuart has not been ordered to send the reinforcements to the Peninsula; and it has been left to his discretion whether to send them or not, in the same manner as it was left to the discretion of the Commanding officer in Halifax, whether he would send the reinforcements from thence. When responsibility for the safety of the territory under their charge is thus placed upon the officers commanding in them, it cannot be expected that they would detach their troops; more particularly as at the very moment the enemy may threaten an attack upon the point from which the troops are to be drawn. But even if all the troops expected from the Mediterranean should be added to your corps, I should still be of opinion that the attempt to raise the siege of Cadiz is one of considerable risk. If, however, you consider the letter from Lieut. Col. Bunbury to be an intimation of the wishes of government upon that subject, I beg you to detain the troops, if they should arrive from the Mediterranean.

My letter to Mr. Wellesley, of this date, will make you acquainted with the situation of affairs in this quarter; and you will see what little effect the operations of Gen. Lacy, and others in the Sierra de Ronda, and of Gen. Copons between the Guadiana and Guadalquivir, have upon the enemy's plans. My own opinion is, that this country is their object at present; and, as usual, they will abandon every thing else that does not contribute to its attainment. If I had not received the communication of the pleasure of government upon this subject, I should pursue the same plan, and withdraw you and three-fourths of your force from Cadiz in order to increase our strength here; and with that force, and any reinforcement, we might hope for some success; and any success would relieve Cadiz, and re-establish matters in the Peninsula.

I am concerned to hear of the desertion of the troops from Cadiz; but I am sorry to add that this crime has been, and is still, but too common in this army. I beg to draw your attention to the orders which I have given this day respecting the private correspondence of the officers of the army. I was astonished some time ago to see in the English newspapers an accurate account of the batteries and works erecting at Cadiz and on the Isla, with the number of guns, and of what calibre, each was to contain, and their distance from each other, and from the enemy's works. This information must have been extracted from the letter of an officer. If officers wish to give their friends this description of information, they should request them not to publish their letters in the newspapers.

Au Marquis de la Romana,

à Celorico, ce 10 Août, 1810.

J'ai donné des ordres aujourd'hui à la brigade de cavalerie Portugaise qui est sous les ordres du Général Madden, d'aller se joindre à vous, et se mettre sous vos ordres. Vous savez que cette cavalerie est neuve, mais les chevaux sont bons, et ils sont bien armés et équipés; et je juge par ce qui est arrivé de ce côté-ci que ces soldats feront leur devoir, si on leur fait justice en ne les exposant pas à des nombres inégaux. Le Général Madden est un officier Anglais de beaucoup de talent.

Je vous prie d'entendre que je vous attache ces régimens sous les conditions suivantes :

1°. Dès leur entrée en Espagne ils seront nourris, hommes et chevaux, selon l'étape Portugaise, pris des magasins de votre armée. Le Général Madden vous fera savoir les rations d'officiers, de soldats, et de chevaux.

2°. La discipline et l'économie intérieure de ces deux régimens seront exclusivement sous la direction du Général Madden.

3°. Quoique je ne désire pas que ces régimens ne fassent pas le service ordinaire à leur tour avec les autres troupes, il faut, en toute occasion importante, qu'ils agissent ensemble sous les ordres de leur Général et leurs propres officiers, et qu'ils ne soient pas détachés ou séparés de la personne de leur Général avec différentes divisions de l'armée.

4°. Ils me seront renvoyés aussitôt que je les demanderai.

5°. En cas que le corps du Marquis de la Romana se trouve dans la nécessité de se jeter dans les places de la frontière, cette brigade de cavalerie sera envoyée à Elvas, ou dans la frontière du Portugal pour attendre nouvel ordre de ma part.

Je ferai part au Général Madden d'une copie de cette lettre comme instruction pour le guider.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 10th Aug. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 6th, and I have taken such notice in the G. O. of the letters which you enclosed, as will I hope prevent officers from writing such nonsense in future. I am sorry to hear that our proctor's bills are so high, but we cannot help it. I think that Lord March can do without his helmet for a little while.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 10th Aug. 1810.

After the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the departure of the division of Gen. Carrera from this part of the country for Estremadura, the party of cavalry under the command of Col. Don Julian Sanchez was left here without any communication with any Spanish corps, without pay or means of subsistence or support. Adverting to the spirit of enterprise and intelligence which Don Julian had already manifested, and to the benefit which would result to the common cause from keeping his party embodied and in a state of activity, as well by the military services it is capable of rendering, as by keeping alive the spirit of hostility against the French throughout Castille, Don Julian and his officers and party being connected in friendship with all the heads of parties of guerrillas in that country, I have deemed it expedient to attach Don Julian for the present to the British army, in hopes that the Marquis de la Romana and



the Regency will approve of the measure; and I have engaged to provide for the pay and subsistence of his party during the time that he shall be so employed. As he will probably be employed at a distance from the army, occasionally in Spain and occasionally in Portugal, and as it would be impossible to attach a commissary to him, I have thought it best to give him a certain allowance for the rations of each officer, soldier, and horse, by which all violence to the people of this country, and disputes and complaints, will be avoided.

I enclose a copy of the estimate of the expense of this party for one month, amounting to 6955 dollars, which I have paid to Don Julian; and which, of course, will be a charge against the Spanish government. As the Marques de la Romana is in want of cavalry, I have attached to his army a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, under the command of Brig. Gen. Madden; and I enclose the copy of the letter which I have written to the Marques, containing the conditions on which I detached that body.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 10th Aug. 1810.

I write to the government every Wednesday for the packet which leaves Lisbon on Sunday morning; and to you every Friday, for the ship of war which leaves Lisbon on Monday for Cadiz; and I cannot adopt a better mode of making you acquainted with events here than by sending you a copy of my weekly dispatch to the government. I now enclose the copy of that which I wrote on the 8th inst. Since then nothing important has occurred.

I have a letter from Silveira of the 5th, at which time the enemy had shown some larger force in his front, but not sufficient to induce him to raise the blockade of La Puebla. I have letters from Badajoz of the 7th, and it appears that Mortier had made another forward movement from Fregenal. I hope the Marques de la Romana will not fight a battle; and if government are really in earnest about this country, and will reinforce us handsomely, or indeed at all, we may still be able to save every thing. The French are remarkably cautious. They risk literally nothing. I approved highly of the instructions of government to the Governor of Curaçoa, regarding the Caraccas, of which I conclude that you have a copy. In those to which you refer in your letter of the 28th July, they appear to have gone more into detail, and to have laid open their intentions in case of the occurrence of every possible event, more than was necessary just at the present moment.

I hope the Regency will have firmness to resist the demand of a free trade with the colonies; as a boon to the colonies, it might answer in some degree, and might be connected with measures of finance which would probably give them a very large revenue. But we have no right, and it is the grossest impolicy in us to demand it. Great Britain has ruined Portugal by her free trade with Brazil: not only the customs of Portugal, to the amount of a million sterling *per annum*, are lost, but the fortunes of numerous individuals, who lived by this trade, are ruined; and Cadiz will suffer in a similar manner, if this demand is agreed to. Portugal would be now in a very different situation as an ally, if our trade with Brazil was still carried on through Lisbon; and I would only ask, is it

wise, or liberal, or just, to destroy the power and resources, and absolutely to ruin our allies, in order to put into the pockets of our merchants the money which before went into their treasuries, and would be now employed in the maintenance of military establishments against the common enemy?

I have had no communication from government on the plan mentioned to you by Sir R. Keats, but the scheme had occurred to me, among others, to be carried into execution when we should be obliged to evacuate Portugal; and I have written to Sir R. Keats, and to Gen. Graham, upon the subject. You may depend upon it that our government will not give Spain one farthing.

To Major Gen. the H n. G. L. Cole.

Celorigo, 11th Aug. 1810, 3 P.M.

Tell Capt. Cocks to inform the inhabitants of Richoso that I will not pardon them till they give up those who committed the outrage on the troops; and that if they delay it much longer I will destroy their village. Let them give up those who committed the outrage, and trust to my mercy. If Capt. Cocks or you have any flints to spare you may give them, but you must make a demand for others to replace them.

To Brig. Gen. Sir N. Trant.

Celorigo, 11th Aug. 1810.

I enclose the extract of a letter and its enclosures, which I have received from Adm. Berkeley; and I am much concerned to learn that an alarm has been excited at Oporto, by letters written by officers of this army, who appear to have but little information, or means of forming a judgment of the real situation of affairs. Portugal being invaded by a powerful French army, it is reasonable that those who possess valuable moveable property in a town likely from its known riches and resources to excite the cupidity of the enemy, and incapable, from local circumstances, of making a defence to be relied upon, should adopt measures to remove their property to a place of greater security. But the inhabitants of Oporto had no ground for the excessive alarm which they appear to have taken from these two foolish letters; and the conduct which they adopted by creating a want of confidence among the troops employed in the defence of the frontier in which they are more immediately interested, might have had the most disastrous effects on their own interests and the general cause of the allies.

It is impossible for me to foretell the result of the operations of a war in which so much depends upon contingencies, upon the effect of which

G. O.

Celorigo, 11th Aug. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces wishes that the G. O. of the 17th June, 1809, regarding the mode of cutting and procuring green forage, may be considered applicable to the unthrashed corn required for the use of the horses of the army.

2. In cases in which the owner of the unthrashed corn, or the magistrate of the village, is not on the spot to take the receipt or payment of what is required, a commissary, or quarter master, is to keep a note of the quantity taken from the neighbourhood of each village on each day.

3. It is to be understood that when ripe unthrashed corn of any description is issued to the horses of the army, it is in lieu of an equal weight of straw and corn, and 24 lbs. are to be considered the full ration of unthrashed corn of any description.

no calculation can be made. In my situation it is a duty incumbent upon me to be prepared, as far as circumstances will permit, for every probable event; and although I do recommend to the inhabitants of Oporto to place in security their valuable property, I have no reason to believe that they are at present in any degree exposed to the rapacity of the enemy; or that they are likely to be so exposed in the probable course of the operations of the war. If circumstances should alter, there will be time to see, and provide against the increased danger, as far as our means will permit. I request you to adopt any mode you think best to communicate these sentiments to the principal inhabitants of Oporto. I wish that it was in my power to give them assurances of complete security; but I am as unwilling to deceive them, and that they should incur any loss by a blind confidence in me which they could avoid by early precaution, as I am desirous that they should not injure their own property and the general cause of the allies by premature and unfounded alarm.

Our powerful and inveterate enemy having declared his determination to subdue this peaceable, happy, and loyal people, and force them to submit to his iron yoke, it is reasonable to suppose, and it is known, that he has prepared vast means to accomplish his objects; and the early removal of valuable property from his reach is not only a duty which the merchants and others of Oporto owe to themselves and their families, but will eventually tend to the annoyance of the enemy, and is equally incumbent upon them, with the duty of determined resistance to the enemy by the whole population of the country.

I likewise enclose the copy of the G. O. which I issued yesterday to the army, to prevent the circulation of such unfounded alarms in future from hence.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 11th Aug. 1810, 6½ p.m.

I beg that you will let me know the name of the man you wish to have appointed Assist. Provost, and he shall be appointed.

Pay the spies any thing you think they deserve. If you are certain that they go to Valverde, you should pay them very well, as it is a service of much danger. Give them rations as well as payment, which will probably encourage them more than money.

I write to Beresford about the ammunition for the Ordenanza. I cannot read the name of the village which the people have not quitted, but let the Juiz de Fora know that they may stay or not, as they please, but that any man who has any communication with the enemy shall be hanged.

P.S. The enemy abandoned Penamacor yesterday morning.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 12th Aug. 1810.

I have just received your letter of the 7th, and I am happy to find that you have smoothed the difficulties in respect to the Admiral's appointment. There is nothing new. The French have withdrawn from Penamacor. I tremble about Romana, who appears to be determined to try another great action. It would be unfortunate if our prospects were to be again destroyed by the same circumstances which have so repeatedly put the whole contest in a state of risk.

*The A.G. to the Commissary General.*

12th Aug. 1810.

The Court of Inquiry that assembled to inquire into the circumstance of Mr. — having in his possession a considerable quantity of church plate, and which was found in his baggage, have laid their proceedings before the Commander of the Forces, who has been pleased to approve of the same, and has directed me to acquaint Mr. — that, although there do not appear any positive grounds of charge against him, his Excellency thinks his conduct suspicious, and that he hopes what has occurred will be a warning. The plate you will be pleased to cause to be delivered to Lieut. Col. Waters immediately, who has received directions to have it sent through the proper channel to the Bishop of Pinhel. The Juiz de Fora will give Col. Waters a proper receipt for it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 13th Aug. 1810.

Regnier has withdrawn his advanced guard from Penamacor to Penagarcia. Tell Gen. Cox, by telegraph, that the 3d Swiss regiment surrendered by capitulation, to Gen. Silveira, at Puebla de Sanabria, on the 10th inst.

P.S. I enclose some proclamations to be circulated.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Celorico, 13th Aug. 1810, 1 P.M.

I enclose a letter for Gen. Hill, which I beg you to peruse and forward. I am delighted with Silveira's success.

I likewise enclose a memorandum which has been given to me on the conduct of a German, by the name of —, who has quitted the party of Don Julian, and wants to enter the British service, in which view he is in some degree patronised by some of the British officers, and he is, I believe, at this moment with, or not very far distant from, Cocks' party.

It would be rather a delicate matter for me to take into the British service an officer who should have separated from the Spaniards on bad terms, under any circumstances; but when charges of the description contained in the enclosed paper are made against this officer, it is quite impossible for me not only to give him a commission, but to allow him to remain under the protection of any part of the British army. I wish therefore that he should be called upon to answer the contents of the enclosed memorandum; and if he should not be able to do so in a satisfactory manner, I shall not give him up to Don Julian; but I shall request him to go to the Marques de la Romana, and to satisfy him of the propriety of his conduct, before I can have any thing farther to do with him.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 13th Aug. 1810.

I have received your letter of 1 P.M. of the 11th. You will probably have heard before from Gen. Cole that the enemy had marched on the 10th from Monsanto to Penagarcia, which confirms Baron Tripp's notion of their retiring upon Zarza; and I agree very much in opinion with that which, it appears by Fane's letter, you entertain, viz., 'That they are about to re-cross the Tagus.' Regnier's movement to this side, although ordered by Buonaparte himself, was certainly a false one, and the sooner a remedy is applied, by re-crossing, the better it will be for the enemy. But, if they cross the river, you must cross likewise, and resume your old position at Portalegre, and replace Le Cor in his; leaving, however, until you hear further from me, 2 regiments of Portuguese cavalry on this side the Tagus, as I have sent Madden's brigade to the Marques de la Romana.

From comparing some returns, picked up at Penamacor, with those which I have of Regnier's corps, I don't think he has any reinforcements, excepting possibly of dragoons. He had 2 squadrons of each of the 17th, 27th, 18th, and 19th dragoons under Gen. La Houssaye; and 3 squadrons of the 22d chasseurs, and 2 of each of the 1st hussars and 8th dragoons, and 4 of the Hanoverian chasseurs, under Gen. Soult. He received a reinforcement in cavalry, consisting of the 4 squadrons of each of the 13th and 22d dragoons from the 5th corps, and these 2 regiments added about 1300 men to his force, but I believe he sent to the 5th corps at the same time La Houssaye's brigade of 1100 men. At least, I recollect receiving a report that La Houssaye's brigade had marched into La Mancha. If it did, Regnier has but little more cavalry now than he had in May: if he did not, he has about 3500 cavalry. You may probably find out from some of the deserters whether the regiments of La Houssaye's brigade are still with Regnier's corps. At all events let Fane understand clearly that his business is to observe the enemy, and to give you intelligence; and that I expect him not to engage in any affair unless he has an evident superiority of numbers.

P.S. I have the pleasure to inform you that the 3d Swiss regiment has surrendered in Puebla de Sanabria to Gen. Silveira.

To Dom M. Forjaz.

Celorico, 14th Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter, and of a list of promotions in the army, made by H.R.H. the Prince Regent, in Brazil, which I have received from Marshal Beresford. I intend by the first opportunity to have the honor of addressing His Royal Highness on the subject of this promotion; in the mean time I beg leave to recommend to the Governors of the Kingdom that they should suspend the publication of these promotions, for the reasons which I am about to state to them, till the further pleasure of His Royal Highness shall be received.

1st; I would beg leave to recall to the recollection of the Governors of the Kingdom, that, when Gen. Beresford was called from the service of His Majesty, to take upon him the command of the army of His Royal Highness, it was stipulated with him that the power of reward, as well as of punishment, of the officers and soldiers of the army, should be vested exclusively in his hands; or, in other words, that he should, exclusively, recommend officers for promotion, and approve and order the execution of the sentences of courts martial. These powers were lodged in the hands of Marshal Beresford, not because it was wished, by way of compliment, to give him the disposal of a large patronage as an advantage and an honor to him, and as a mark of His Royal Highness' favor, but they were given to him in order to facilitate and secure the performance of the arduous duty which he had undertaken; viz., to reform the Portuguese army: and the motive and object in placing these powers in the hands of Marshal Beresford were the benefit of His Royal Highness and the advantage of this Kingdom of Portugal. It is not necessary that I should now enter into the consideration whether these, among other measures adopted at this period, have been successful or otherwise. In a former letter of the

—, I have laid before His Royal Highness my opinion of Marshal Beresford's conduct, and of the success of his exertions to reform his armies, and every day's experience proves the justice of the opinions which I then laid before him. But I would beg leave to observe that the system which it appears has been adopted, of promoting officers in Brazil, who have not been positively recommended for promotion by Marshal Beresford, is a direct violation of the stipulation entered into with that officer, when he undertook the performance of the arduous duty which he has, with so much success, performed.

2dly; I would beg leave to call the observation of the Governors of the Kingdom to the fact, that this system is not less prejudicial to the interests of His Royal Highness, and of this Kingdom of Portugal, than it is inconsistent with the stipulations made with Marshal Beresford, and that it is entirely subversive of all authority in Portugal.

I shall not enter into the particular cases of the persons promoted, as that is sufficiently adverted to in the enclosed letter from Marshal Beresford. But I would wish to impress upon the minds of the Governors of the Kingdom, and of His Royal Highness and his ministers in Brazil, the impossibility which exists of enforcing any system of discipline and obedience in the army, or of carrying the country through the difficulties which are hanging over it, if individuals, instead of performing their duty to the satisfaction of their immediate superior on the spot in Portugal, and earning rewards by solid, substantial services and real merit, are to acquire them by private applications to the ministers at the Court of Brazil. It is obvious that the interests of His Royal Highness and of Portugal must suffer materially in every instance in which this system of preferment is carried into execution.

It is also subversive of all local authority in Portugal. It cannot be expected that Marshal Beresford can perform duties which have required that all the military patronage of the government should be placed in his hands, in order to enable him to perform them, if the ministers at Brazil are to attend to private applications from individuals; any more than the Governors of the Kingdom can perform the important duties imposed upon them, and which they also have hitherto performed so much to the public advantage, if they do not enjoy the full confidence of His Royal Highness; and if any private applications or recommendations are attended to by His Royal Highness' ministers in Brazil inconsistent with the arrangements made by the local government here under His Royal Highness' authority, or with the recommendations and advice which this Government may deem it their duty to give to His Royal Highness. Under these impressions, I earnestly recommend to the Governors of the Kingdom to suspend the publication of this list of promotions, in hopes that His Royal Highness will be induced, by the reasoning in this letter, to cancel it altogether; and that he will be graciously pleased to order his ministers in Brazil in future to carry into execution strictly the stipulation made with Marshal Beresford; and to recommend no military officer for promotion, or other mark of honour in the army in Portugal, who shall not have been recommended to His Royal Highness' gracious favor by Marshal Beresford.

To Lieut. Col. Ross, 48th regt.\*

Celorico, 14th Aug. 1810.

I received your letter of the 8th June from Barca de Codes. I was aware that you would be the senior Lieut. Col. of the brigade in which you are placed, but I was unwilling to put you in orders to command it till I had ascertained from you whether you would prefer to go as a Colonel into the Portuguese Cavalry, of which you would command a regiment and, possibly for the present, a brigade. This would be a permanent advantage to you during the war in this country, whereas the command of the brigade of British infantry would be but temporary till the arrival of some General officers or Colonels on the staff.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

14th Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge your letters of the 8th and 10th inst., and have communicated your proposal, relative to the carts for the sick, to the Commander of the Forces, to which there is some difficulty, as it is desirable that no carts should ever be unemployed; and if a demand of 20 carts for the sole use of each division is made by the Commissary of it, there will be more difficulty in getting from the country the carts necessary to bring up the supplies. The object is, if possible, to manage that the carts that come up with supplies return loaded with sick.

The Commander of the Forces conceives the G. O. enclosed, if acted upon, will insure the most efficient arrangement, and has desired me to transmit it for your consideration. The plan of collecting the sick of the different divisions at Pinhanços as a first stage, and then forwarding them by a relief of carts to Farinha, is only objectionable, as there is no hospital at Pinhanços; and it might be extremely inconvenient to collect many sick and remove them from one conveyance to another, where there is no hospital. If, however, you wish to establish a temporary hospital at Pinhanços, to answer this purpose, the Commander of the Forces has no objection, provided you deem it best.

His Excellency further considers that it may be advisable for you now to return to head quarters on the completion of the arrangement for the sick, in order that you may be at hand to direct what may further be necessary.

I beg you will have the goodness to call the attention of the Medical boards to specify in their reports to what place the officers, whom they recommend leave of absence, should go, whether England, Lisbon, Figueira, Caldas, or elsewhere. This becomes the more necessary when an officer is recommended a long leave of 6 weeks or 2 months. This has been the case in Capt. — and Major —'s instances, and in many of the last reports no destination is pointed out.

I have acquainted Brig. Gen. *Baron Low*, for the information of Paymaster —, that as the operation on him can be performed in this country, his Excellency cannot grant him leave to return to England.

P.S. I have sent the officer to take charge of convalescents at Farinha.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 15th Aug. 1810, 6½ p.m.

I enclose a report which has been made by Mr. Fielder, the Commissary attached to the 3d dragoon guards, of a detachment of the enemy having crossed at Villa Nova de Foz Coa, which Burghersh tells me he (Mr. Fielder) saw between one and two p.m. yesterday.

I have heard nothing of this detachment from any of the officers of the Ordenanza in that part of the country; and Sewell, Beresford's aide de camp, who left Meda, the head quarters of the commandant of the Ordenanza, at 3½ p.m. yesterday, says they had then heard nothing of this detachment there; and that if the detachment had crossed the Coa, under Villa Nova, they must have been seen before 10 in the morning. However, I think it proper to give you intelligence of this supposed detachment, and to beg you to order your piquets on the road to Trancoso, from Pinhel,

\* Major Gen. Sir Patrick Ross, G.C.M.G.

to have an eye upon their left and their rear, as well as to their front. Anson is, I understand, at Cerejo with the 16th, which place is, I think, completely covered by your piquets. If the story is well founded, I conclude that I shall receive some further intelligence during the night, and, at all events, I will send to Meda immediately to discover the truth. I rather believe, however, that the detachment, said to be 4000, will turn out to be a strong patrol of cavalry and infantry.

P.S. Since writing the above I have seen the Commissary, whose verbal account is precisely the same as his written account.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorigo, 15th Aug. 1810.

I enclose the last weekly state of this army, and the weekly return of the sick to the 28th July. Your Lordship will observe, from the weekly state, that the sick list has increased in some degree; but the diseases are, in general, fevers occasioned by the heat of the weather, and the cases are very slight, and yield to medicine immediately.

The probability that your Lordship will be disappointed in your expectations of the arrival of the reinforcements from the Mediterranean and North America, and the anxiety which His Majesty's government have expressed for the success of the operations in this country, induce me again to suggest for your consideration, that I should be allowed to draw away from Cadiz a large proportion of the force employed there; and from Gibraltar at least such part of the force belonging to that garrison as is cruising in ships of war and transports on the southern shores of the Peninsula, and as I may think can be spared from that garrison without endangering its security. These measures would appear to be desirable, whatever may be the strength of the reinforcements which may arrive from the Mediterranean, North America, or England.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorigo, 15th Aug. 1810.

I have deemed it expedient to make an advance of 6955 dollars to Col. Don Julian Sanchez, of the Spanish service, for the support of his corps of cavalry, for the reasons stated in the enclosed extract of a letter to His Majesty's minister at Cadiz; and I beg to receive the directions of His Majesty's government whether I shall continue to make similar payments to Don J. Sanchez, on account of the Spanish government, if I should deem it advisable to keep his troops in co-operation with the British army.

The course of the operations of the campaign may and will probably remove the troops under the Marques de la Romana within the Portuguese frontier; and I have already had a correspondence with that officer and with the Portuguese government, respecting the mode of supplying them with provisions in this country.

It is very obvious to me that they will get no regular supply of provisions, and that their passage through, and stay in the country, will be a most intolerable grievance upon the people, and worse than the presence of the enemy, if the supplies which they require are not paid for; and it is equally obvious that the Portuguese government cannot pretend to supply them with provisions, or with money to pay for the supplies of provisions which they will receive, as they cannot at this moment supply either provisions or money for their own troops: nor, from what I hear



of the distresses of the Spanish government, does it appear very probable that they will be able to send round money to support the troops of the Marques de la Romana while they shall be in Portugal. I should propose, therefore, to supply these troops from the British magazines, and by means of a British Commissary, while they shall remain within the Portuguese frontier; and to keep a separate account of the expense, to be charged against the Spanish government. I beg to receive the orders of His Majesty's government upon this subject.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorigo, 15th Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose the report of Lieut. Gen. Hill, with its enclosure, on the affair which the 1st regt. of Portuguese cavalry had with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Atalaya, which I had not received when I addressed your Lordship on the 8th inst.

The enemy still continue in the same positions in front of this army; they have not yet broken ground before Almeida, excepting to construct what I conceive to be a mortar battery, near the windmill, at which the left of Gen. Craufurd's division stood in the affair of the 24th of last month; but I understand that they are collecting materials and are transporting stores from Ciudad Rodrigo, apparently for the siege of the place. Gen. Regnier's advanced guard continued at Penamacor and Monsanto till the 10th, when it was withdrawn to Penagarcia, and still farther back towards Salvaterra.

The inhabitants of the country have generally quitted their villages, and the enemy experience great difficulty in procuring subsistence: they are obliged to send a considerable distance to find it, so that their detachments for this purpose and their patrols are much annoyed by the Ordenanza, and by the light detachments of the army.

In Estremadura, Mortier's corps advanced to Xerez de los Caballeros, while that of the Marques de la Romana was collecting at Olivença, Barracota, &c.: the enemy then moved from Xerez de los Caballeros to Zafra; and from Zafra it appears, by the last accounts which I have received from Badajoz of the 11th inst., that it had retired on the night of the 8th to Llerena; and the Marques de la Romana established his head quarters at Zafra on the 10th. I have not been able to ascertain whether all the French troops which had been brought from the Sierra de Ronda, &c., had arrived in Estremadura, but from the time which has elapsed since they passed Seville I should imagine that they had. I have reinforced the Marques de la Romana with a brigade of Portuguese dragoons, under the command of Brig. Gen. Madden, which I had in reserve upon the Tagus, so that his corps will be in a respectable state of efficiency.

I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the enemy's detachment, which I informed you in my dispatch of the 8th inst. was shut up in Puebla de Sanabria, by the troops under the command of Gen. Silveira and of the Spanish General Taboada, surrendered by capitulation on the 10th inst. I enclose two reports on this subject, of the 10th and 11th inst., which I have received from Gen. Silveira. It appears that Gen. Seras was moving to the relief of these troops in Puebla de Sanabria, but was too late; and Gen. Silveira very properly retired within the Portuguese frontier, rather than risk a general engagement. He has conducted

his detachment with great spirit and prudence since he advanced for the relief of Puebla de Sanabria, by which operation, in killed, prisoners, and deserters, he has deprived the enemy of more than 500 men. I have had no accounts from Cadiz since the 28th of last month.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorigo, 16th Aug. 1810, 6½ p.m.

I have received Waters's report, whom I had sent to Meda. The party which crossed the lower Coa was merely a plundering party of 400 or 500 men, and they are about Villa Nova de Foz Coa. However, keep a look out still upon your left.

To-morrow morning Pack goes with his brigade to Trancoso, which movement will encourage the Ordenanza, and we may look for certain information, if not for security, on that side hereafter. I find by the telegraph from Guarda that Cocks and his detachment, and the Ordenanza, have destroyed the mills near Castello Mendo.

I shall be with you in the morning, and shall be at Freixedas about 7, but I cannot dine with you to-morrow. I must defer that pleasure to some future day

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorigo, 16th Aug. 1810.

I have received your Lordship's dispatch of the 19th July, in which you enclosed a letter from the Sec. of the Treasury, containing the instructions of the Treasury to Mr. Drummond, for his guidance in the commission with which he is charged by their Lordships.

Nothing can be more satisfactory to me than that the Lords of the Treasury should have an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the objects referred to Mr. Drummond, through a channel in which their Lordships place confidence; and every information and assistance that it is in my power to afford shall be given to Mr. Drummond. But as some points are referred to the consideration of Mr. Drummond, upon which it might be very inconvenient, if not injurious to the public service, to make any alteration in the system now in practice, such as in the directions conveyed to him to 'point out any articles which he may think might be supplied from Great Britain, or from any other part of the world, either for the use of the British army, or in part payment of the subsidy to Portugal,' and in the directions to him to report any observations or suggestions which may occur to him for reducing the demand for money; and as it may be desirable that your Lordship and the Lords of the Treasury should receive the opinions of the Commissary Gen. and myself upon Mr. Drummond's suggestions, since we have had some experience in the resources of this country, and the demands of different kinds of the army, I propose to desire Mr. Drummond to furnish the Commissary Gen. with copies of all his reports to the Treasury, in order that our observations upon them may reach their Lordships as soon as possible.

I also propose to direct Mr. Drummond not to make any alteration in the mode of raising supplies of money at Lisbon or at Cadiz, without previous reference to me; of which directions, adverting to the evils which may result from any mistake of Mr. Drummond, I trust that His Majesty's government will approve.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 17th Aug. 1810.

The enemy have broken ground before Almeida, and I consider the siege of that place to be determined upon. Under these circumstances it is my intention to bring up the army a little nearer, so as to be able to strike a blow, if the enemy should afford an opportunity; and at all events to oblige the enemy to keep his corps in a more collected state during the siege than it is at present, and thus to render the operation more difficult on account of the want of subsistence. I think it not improbable that as soon as the enemy shall have found that we have moved, he will bring Regnier through Perales again; and in that case I wish you to come up again to Atalaya with your corps, keeping Le Cor on your left about Belmonte, and Fane on your right.

I send this by Lord Clinton. I have not heard from your quarter since the 12th, the date of your last letter.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 18th Aug. 1810.

I received yesterday your letter of the 13th, and I am concerned that you have reason to complain of the seamen of the transports. I am glad to find that the transports are coming round from Cadiz. It is desirable that these transports should be kept distinct from those belonging to this army, and should be considered solely applicable to the army under the Marques de la Romana.

There is nothing extraordinary. The enemy have broken ground before Almeida; and I am about to close up the army to the front again, in order to take advantage of any mistake or mishap, and at all events to oblige the enemy to keep his whole force collected for this siege.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 18th Aug. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 13th, and I enclose a letter to the Sec. of State on the subject of the transports detained in England and Ireland; and I request you to get from the Admiral, and to enclose in the letter, the names of the transports detained.

P. S. I have received your letter, and I concur entirely with you respecting this new proclamation, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will make my opinion of it known to the government.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 18th Aug. 1810.

I have received information that 20 empty transports, of which I enclose a list, which had been lent by the Admiral commanding in the Tagus to the Portuguese government, and sent to England and Ireland to bring out cargoes of corn in lieu of money for the subsidy, have been detained by the Transport board; and I request your Lordship to give orders that they may be allowed to receive their cargoes and to return to this country.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 18th Aug. 1810.

I beg to draw your attention to the publication of intelligence from Spain in the *Sun* newspaper of the 21st and 23d July, which I enclose. The newspaper of the 21st contains translations of letters to the Marques de la Romana, from persons whose signatures are affixed to them; which letters I know were written, as I have copies of the originals. The towns

in which these people reside are now in the possession of the enemy; and it is probable that these people will suffer for having corresponded with the Marques de la Romana.

The letters marked in the newspaper of the 23d July are from a correspondent of mine at Salamanca, who fortunately did not sign his name to his letters; and I believe I communicated these letters to the Marques de la Romana. It is not impossible that this person may likewise be discovered, and may suffer accordingly; but, if that should not be the case, the French need only publish the translation of these letters at Salamanca, and they will cut off this source of information. Indeed, the translation and publication of all these documents, without any further observation, would be sufficient to increase the already existing difficulty of procuring information in Spain, and to render it impossible.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorigo, 19th Aug. 1810.

Since I wrote to you on the 17th I have received your letters of that date. Gen. Craufurd will be at Freixedas to-morrow, and Gen. Picton immediately in his rear. I wish that you would order Le Cor up to Belmonte at all events, whether you move upon Atalaya or not.

To Col. Peacocke.

Celorigo, 19th Aug. 1810.

I learn from Dom M. Forjaz that there are at Lisbon and Setuval, and in the neighbourhood, a considerable number of French prisoners, whom it is desirable to send to England without loss of time.

I request of you (with the concurrence of the King's minister at Lisbon) to communicate with the Sec. of State upon this subject, and to obtain from him a list of the officers, and a return of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and to arrange with Adm. Berkeley respecting their embarkation for England. I write to the Admiral upon this subject by this post.

You will send to the Transport board a list of the officers, and a return of the non-commissioned officers and privates, when they shall sail for England; and inform the Transport board that these prisoners have been sent to England, and that you have addressed them by my directions.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorigo, 19th Aug. 1810.

I have had a communication with the Portuguese ministers respecting the number of French prisoners in and in the neighbourhood of Lisbon; and it appears to me to be very desirable that they should be sent to England without loss of time. I have desired Col. Peacocke to address you upon this subject, and to make all the arrangements preparatory to their embarkation; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will take measures to send these prisoners to England as soon as it may be convenient to you. I beg also to draw your attention to the surrender by capitulation of a Swiss battalion at La Puebla de Sanabria. This battalion, consisting of about 450 men, including officers, has been marched to Coruña, from whence it is desirable that they should be removed to England at an early period. If Coruña should not be within the limits of your command, I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate with the officer commanding His Majesty's ships at that station; and, if there should be no means there of removing these men, I would request you to

send there a transport or transports, for the purpose of conveying them to England.

I enclose the extract of a letter of the 25th July, which I have received from the Sec. of State. The return of the vessels, therein referred to, ordered to England, may probably afford you the means of performing these several services without inconvenience.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 19th Aug. 1810.

In respect to the cavalry at Trancoso, it must, of course, be under the orders of Pack, but, unless upon an extraordinary occasion, Pack must not use it, excepting for the purpose for which it is stationed at Trancoso, viz., to keep up the communication between your posts on the road to Pinhel and that place, and I will instruct him accordingly.

I do not like the enemy's attempt to make the siege of Almeida with the 6th corps only; and, in order to oblige him to perform that operation with more men, I propose to move up the infantry of the army to the front again. Accordingly, Gen. Craufurd will be to-morrow at Freixedas, and Gen. Picton's division in his rear: and on to-morrow or next day I shall move my head quarters to Alverca.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Celorico, 19th Aug. 1810.

As I conceive that the enemy ought not to be allowed to make the siege of Almeida with the 6th corps only, I move up the infantry of the army to-morrow, and Gen. Craufurd will be at Freixedas, and Gen. Picton in his rear. I wish that Col. Harvey's brigade may be moved up to Recammodo, and the artillery of your division to Guarda.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 19th Aug. 1810.

I enclose copies of certain papers which have been transmitted to me by Gen. Mahy, being translations, or copies and extracts, or the substance of letters recently intercepted.

It appears to me that these letters, with others written by the Duque de Santa Fé at Paris, which have likewise been intercepted, and have been forwarded to His Majesty's government, contain so accurate a description, from authentic sources, of the state of affairs in Spain, and are so highly interesting in themselves, that I propose to request Adm. Berkeley to send home a ship of war express with this dispatch.

His Majesty's government will see in these letters a description of the difficulties under which the enemy labor, in consequence of the operations of the guerrillas, notwithstanding the large force which, there is no doubt whatever, is employed in Spain; and the whole of the information before them will probably convince them, as it has me, that the enemy cannot conquer Spain without employing a force still larger; and that they cannot increase their force in the Peninsula, even admitting that they possess the military means, without increasing their pecuniary and other difficulties and distresses.

I beg also to draw the attention of His Majesty's government to the opinions delivered by these excellent authorities, of the value of Portugal to the Allies, of the mischiefs done to them by its continuance in our possession, and of the benefit which they expect to derive by depriving us of this possession.

There are other evidences from these same authorities in these papers of the great interests involved in the continuance of the contest in the Peninsula, which equally deserve the attention of His Majesty's government; but I wish to draw their attention to those parts of the correspondence which relate to the British army and to this country, as confirming every opinion that I have ever given them upon this part of the subject.

It will be unfortunate if Great Britain should not possess the means of securing still further the position of His Majesty's troops in Portugal, so as to ensure the continuance of the contest in the Peninsula, which it is evident to me must end favorably for His Majesty's interests, if his army can be maintained in the field in Portugal.

Besides the papers above referred to, I enclose a letter from Gen. Mahy to Don M. de Alava, who is employed here by the Spanish government, in which the former has explained the state of the forces in Galicia, and what might be done in that province.

I beg leave to refer to a former dispatch, written after the battle of Ocaña, in which I urged His Majesty's government to send to the Tagus the supplies which were necessary, and could be afforded for the arming of troops, and to keep them there at the disposition, when they should be required, of His Majesty's minister, who should be authorised and employed to distribute them. I beg to recommend this measure again to the consideration of His Majesty's government.

Since I addressed you on the 15th the enemy have broken ground before Almeida; and I propose to collect the army again to the front, in order to oblige the enemy to keep his forces collected during the operations of the siege, and thus increase his difficulties as to subsistence, and afford more scope for the operations of the guerrillas, and opportunities for the resistance of the people in Castille.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Calorico, 19th Aug. 1810.

The importunity with which I press the war in this country upon the attention of His Majesty's ministers will, I hope, plead my excuse for troubling you for a few moments with my own private feelings upon this subject. Nothing can be more irksome to me than the operations which have been carried on for the last year; and it is very obvious that a continuance of the same cautious system will lose the little reputation which I had acquired, and the good opinion of the people of this country. Nothing therefore could be more desirable to me personally than that either the contest should be given up at once, or that it should be continued with a force so sufficient as to render all opposition hopeless. In either case the obloquy heaped upon me by the ignorant of our own country, as well as of this, and by those of this whom I am obliged to force to exertion, and who, after all, will be but imperfectly protected in their persons and property, would fall upon the government. But seeing, as I do, more than a chance of final success if we can maintain our position in this country, although probably none in a departure from our cautious defensive system, I should not do my duty by the government if I did not inform them of the real situation of affairs, and urge them, with importunity even, to greater exertion.

I acknowledge that it has appeared to me, till very lately, that the

government themselves felt no confidence in the measures which they were adopting in this country; and not an officer has come from England, who has not told me that it was generally expected that he would, on his arrival, find the army embarking; and even some have told me that this expectation was entertained by some of the King's ministers. These sentiments are not encouraging; and I acknowledge that I have been induced to attribute the little exertion which has lately been made in the cause to this want of confidence of the members of the government in the result of the contest.

If government are really in earnest in the contest, I recommend the following measures to their immediate attention:

1st; To order positively the commanding officers in Sicily and Malta to send their troops. Those islands cannot be attacked under present circumstances.

2dly; The same orders to be sent to Halifax.

3dly; To make me responsible for the safety of Cadiz and Gibraltar, and to leave it to my discretion to draw away such parts of the garrisons of those places as I may think proper.

4thly; To send to Lisbon as much of the disposable Walcheren infantry, as may be in any state for service. They shall not be moved from the neighbourhood of that town, and they will probably recover there entirely.

5thly; To send to the Tagus, without loss of time, arms, military stores, clothing, shoes, great coats, and blankets; and to authorise me, or any body else, to give them to Spaniards or Portuguese, as may be thought expedient.

6thly; To send some victuallers and ordnance store ships to Lisbon loaded with provisions, arms, ammunition, powder, shoes, and great coats; and authorise me to send them round to the eastern coast of the Peninsula, for the supply of the garrisons, &c. there.

7thly; To authorise me to assist the Spaniards or Portuguese with small sums of money, if I should have it in my power, or stores, or provisions, if necessary.

P.S. There is one point to which likewise I wish to draw your attention again, and that is the necessity which exists of keeping a large fleet in the Tagus, as well of ships of the line, as of frigates and small craft.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Darroch, A.A.G., Lisbon.*

19th Aug. 1810.

In reply to your letter of the 15th inst. and enclosures, I have to request that great accuracy may be observed not only in furnishing the depôt at Belem and the garrison of Lisbon with all G. O. received; but that you will especially take care that all former orders are made up in the general orderly book at the depôt, and that all regiments that arrive from England immediately set clerks to work to copy every order of importance in the very first instance, taking the others afterwards.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Sir W. Myers, Royal Fusiliers.*

19th Aug. 1810.

I have received information from the A. A. G. at Lisbon that Capt. —, of the Royal Fusiliers, received no instructions for marching his party up to the army but those he got at the Adj. Gen.'s office, which did not include the specific order of the 17th Dec. The Commander of the Forces, however, thinks

that if Capt. — had made known his absence particularly to the commandant at Belem, and his ignorance of all orders that had been given out, and had taken pains to make himself master of any regulations that had been lately more strongly enforced, but which, nevertheless, are universal and usual in the service for the performance of similar duties, the neglect that arose would not have occurred; nor can his Excellency ever take as an excuse for a non-performance of orders, that an officer of this army can be under any circumstances ignorant of them, if he chooses to make himself acquainted with them.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.*

19th Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a letter I have received from the commanding officer of the artillery, and I am directed to request that there may be no similar delay on the part of regiments making their application for ammunition as soon as it is wanted.

*The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Howorth, R.A.*

19th Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, and I have communicated with Major Gen. Cole on the subject, and shall take such steps as I hope will prevent a recurrence of the inconvenience you complain of.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 20th Aug. 1810.

I enclose No. 1, the copy of a letter from Governor Cox, explaining a telegraph, No. 2; and No. 3, another telegraph which I had proposed to him; No. 4, Popham's book, which contains the explanation of the different signals made; and No. 5, a note from Governor Cox, given by Capt. Ellis, pointing out in what manner we were to know whether the Governor was using his own or Popham's code.

Adverting, however, to the facility with which we manage the Portuguese telegraph, I beg you to make the following communication to the Governor:

'Lord W. finds the Portuguese telegraph so convenient, that he recommends you to prepare one of the upright ones, to be put up, and used occasionally when that now in use shall be knocked down. Let the upright be as high as the present telegraph, and the board attached to the moveable beam be 3 feet English square, and we shall be able to distinguish it. The mode of using this telegraph is described in the Portuguese book. Have 2 or 3 of them made, in case the enemy should destroy one of them by his fire.'

G. O.

Celorico, 20th Aug. 1810.

1. The G. O. of the 17th Dec. 1810, specifying the ticket to be sent to the General hospital with sick soldiers, is applicable to detachments as well as regiments.

2. It is extraordinary that the Commander of the Forces should be obliged to remind the officers of the army, in G. O., of the common practices and forms of the service, and of the standing military regulations; as if these forms and regulations were not founded on the same principle of utility, and were not particularly necessary in an army on service in a foreign country.

3. The ticket required under the G. O. of this army to be sent with soldiers, is that in use throughout Great Britain, and ordered by His Majesty's regulations.

4. The King's regulations, likewise, and the common forms of the service, require that, when an officer is passing through a town in which there are troops, he should report himself to the commanding or Staff officer there stationed. All this is neglected, to the great inconvenience of the service.

5. The Commander of the Forces will at last find himself under the necessity of bringing to trial those officers who shall neglect the performance of the common duties required, not only by the G. O. of this army, but by the King's regulations and the universal practice of the service at home as well as abroad.



To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorio, 20th Aug. 1810, 3 p.m.

I have just received your letter of this morning. Do not make any alteration in your piquets or patroles to the front, till I shall see you. Lord Blantyre's brigade will be, for the present, at Baraçal, and it would probably be as well not to move the forge carts till I shall have an opportunity of talking with you. I shall be at Alverca in the morning.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorio, 20th Aug. 1810.

I received last night your letter of the 16th. In respect to Adm. Berkeley's appointment, the first question is what power the *Carta Regia* intends to give him; and the second, what power it is really necessary he should have over the boards and departments, in order to enable him to perform the duties and exercise the power given to him by the *Carta Regia*.

My opinion and practice has always been, that in the exact proportion that a person in the Admiral's situation declines to assume power is power conferred upon him; and that his moderation would give him more influence and real power than the assumption of direct authority. He may, however, be of a different opinion, and may be determined to enforce his own construction of the Prince's orders; and where there is a difference of opinion between the Admiral and government upon the construction of the Prince's orders, I conclude that the government will refer the case for my advice; and I shall advise to the best of my judgment. Whatever may be the result of this discussion, which probably is not of much importance, I would recommend to you to have an explanation with Adm. Berkeley respecting Dom M. Forjaz. Whether we are right or wrong does not much signify; but you and I, and Marshal Beresford, who are principally concerned in carrying on the war in this country, think Dom M. Forjaz the best instrument we can find in Portugal, and are determined to support him in authority. We are, I conceive, the fittest persons to judge, and the best judges upon this subject; and it will not answer for the Admiral to be induced by any cause whatever to set himself, or to allow his name to be used as an authority against what we think right upon this subject. I am convinced that the Admiral's patriotism, and his good wishes to the cause in which we are all engaged, will induce him, upon a proper explanation, to act with us respecting Dom M. Forjaz, whatever may be his private opinion of him. I shall hear from you again upon this subject, when I shall enter more at large into it.

There is nothing new. The enemy have broken ground before Almeida.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorio, 20th Aug. 1810.

Since I received your letter of the 4th, I have received from Mahy extracts from other intercepted letters from Urquijo, Mazaredo, O'Farrill, and Azanza; and others from Frenchmen at Madrid to the French ministers at Paris, which I thought so interesting, that I sent them to England by express yesterday, with letters of which I enclose copies. You will see, from these papers, that I concur entirely in the opinion which you entertained respecting the contest in the Peninsula, when you had seen Azanza's

letters only. The others are a valuable sequel to these; and the whole tend to show that Buonaparte has no means to support his armies in Spain, and that Spain can afford him no assistance whatever. The Spanish government were unable to govern, or to draw any reserve from the provinces north of the Ebro; and his more vigorous military system has made matters worse: the partisans and guerrillas have become more numerous; and the military corps maintained in those countries are more than ever unequal to govern them, or to maintain tranquillity.

Notwithstanding that they have so large a force opposed to us, it is not sufficient for their object, which will become every day more difficult. The people of Portugal are doing that which the Spaniards ought to have done. They are removing their women and properties out of the enemy's way, and taking arms in their own defence. The country is made a desert, and behind almost every stone wall the French will meet an enemy. To this add, that they have the British and Portuguese armies immediately in their front, ready to take advantage of any fault or weakness.

If we cannot relieve Almeida, it will, I hope, make a stout defence: the Governor is an obstinate fellow, and talks of a siege of 90 days. From the folly of the French in being a month before the place before they were prepared to attack it, the garrison, which was not a very good one, has become accustomed to the sight of them, and have confidence in themselves, and are in good spirits. The garrison are supplied for at least as long a time as they talk of holding out, and every day that they hold out is an advantage to the cause.

I refer you to a letter which I wrote to Sir R. Keats on the 1st, for an account of my intentions in case I should be obliged to evacuate Portugal, which I hope will not be the case yet, if government will adopt the measures pointed out in the enclosed letters to reinforce us. If Almeida should make a stout defence; if the Marques de la Romana will be satisfied with the defeat he received on the 11th, and will not risk another action in the field, my opinion is, that the French will be obliged to raise the siege of Cadiz. What is the Spanish government prepared to do in that case? Can they put an army into the field? Or can they do any thing to relieve us from the pressure which will be upon us?

I wish that you would talk over with Castaños the situation of affairs. Before this time the Spanish government ought to have had an excellent army formed and equipped in Cadiz, another in Carthagea, a third in the Balearic islands, and a fourth in Galicia, as well as that under the Marques de la Romana, all prepared to take the field, not to engage in general actions, but to give countenance and support to the partidas and guerrillas. But I fear there is nothing of the kind. It is not yet too late, and I only hope that if the Regency should have Cadiz opened for them, they will not be found in a state of inability to take advantage of that event. When the intercepted letters to which I have referred at the commencement of this letter shall reach Cadiz, I beg you to send me entire copies of them.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Alverca, 22d Aug. 1810.

I have sent Fletcher to endeavor to arrange a telegraph communication

between you and us; and I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will let us know by telegraph when any deserters come in, what regiment they belong to, what *corps d'armée*, and whence they come; and then send them to head quarters as soon as they can move with convenience. There is nothing new here this morning.

Memorandum for Col. Murray, Q.M.G.

Alverca, 22d Aug. 1810.

The officers employed by Major Gen. Leith, to procure intelligence and observe the enemy's movements, must be paid 3 dollars a day each, and their expenses, of which they must send the bills upon honor. I cannot but observe, however, that Major Gen. Leith being in the second line, it does not appear to me necessary that he should employ 3 officers in this manner. A correspondence with Gen. Hill, with Col. Carroll at the Marques de la Romana's quarters, and with head quarters, would answer all the purpose; and leave these officers to do duty with their regiments. Gen. Leith will hardly believe that we have only one officer thus employed. The officers employed to reconnoitre particular parts of the country may be paid the same sums as those employed to observe the movements of the enemy; but I should imagine that they must, by this time, have performed the service on which they were sent. In respect to the officers employed as engineers, they are to be paid, as usual, 10 shillings a day; but I should hope that, by this time, their work is finished. With every desire to provide amply for every service, it is still necessary to save the public money, as much as possible; and no expense must be incurred which can be avoided. It is also necessary to keep the officers with their regiments as much as possible.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 22d Aug. 1810.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from Gen. Mahy, in which he has requested to have 6 five and a half inch howitzers, with their ammunition. I have not the means of supplying him with these pieces of ordnance. I likewise enclose the copy of a letter and of a return of the Portuguese stores at Lisbon, to which I beg to draw your Lordship's attention.

I recommend that 200 barrels of powder, in addition to the quantity already required, may be sent to Lisbon, without loss of time; as well as 1000 rounds of canister shot for each of the calibres of 12 and 18 pounds; and 500 five and a half inch, and 500 eight inch shells.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 22d Aug. 1810.

The enemy broke ground before Almeida on the night of the 15th, and have continued their works ever since; but they have not yet opened their fire upon the place; and I understand that they experience great difficulty in working, on account of the nature of the soil, and that the fire of the garrison has delayed them considerably. As soon as I found that the siege of Almeida was determined upon, I moved the army again to the front, in order to oblige the enemy to keep his troops collected, and thus increase his difficulties of subsistence; and by the removal of the enemy's troops from Castille give more scope for the operations of the guerrillas,

and the general resistance of the inhabitants. The collection of the troops to the front will also enable me immediately to take advantage of any opportunity which may be afforded of relieving the place.

The enemy had collected the troops under the command of Gen. Seras, and of Gen. Kellermann, for the relief of the battalion which surrendered on the 10th inst., at Puebla de Sanabria, to Gen. Silveira; but they returned towards Valladolid as soon as that battalion surrendered; and the Spanish General Taboada is now at Puebla de Sanabria. The 2d corps under Gen. Regnier was still at Zarza la Mayor, with its advanced guard at Salvaterra, when I last heard from Lieut. Gen. Hill; and the troops under his command in the same position at Sarzedas. I have directed Col. Le Cor to move up to Belmonte from his position in the mountains, with the same view with which I have moved the army to the front.

The advanced guard of the corps under the Marques de la Romana, and Ballesteros's division, and the Spanish cavalry of 900 men under Gen. Carrera, the whole commanded by Gen. Mendizabal, were defeated by a part of Mortier's corps at Bienvenida, between Zafra and Llerena, on the 11th inst. The Marques de la Romana had intended to engage the enemy's corps with the whole of his force, and he was coming up himself with the 1st division of infantry. A reconnaissance made in the morning with the whole of the advanced corps, and the impetuosity of the General officers and troops, led to the action, in which the enemy turned and defeated the left of the Spaniards, and cut off their communication with the Marques de la Romana; and they were obliged to retreat in a dispersed state by Monasterio and Montemolin to Fregenal de la Sierra, where they were collecting again. The last letter I have from the Marques de la Romana is of the 15th from Salvaterra. He supposes that his loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, had been 500 men; Col. Carroll estimates it at 1000 men. The enemy had returned to Llerena; and it was imagined that they would retire again into Andalusia. The Portuguese cavalry had not joined the Marques de la Romana when this action was fought. The last letter which I have from Cadiz is of the 4th inst., when nothing extraordinary had occurred.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

22d Aug. 1810.

I am directed to transmit the accompanying memorial received from Mr. —, hospital mate, lately cashiered by sentence of a General Court Martial. In referring this application to obtain your opinion, I am further directed to convey the observation that his Excellency sees no just ground for taking such request into consideration.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alverca, 23d Aug. 1810.

I had already considered the possibility that Regnier might move across the fords of the Tagus at Villa Velha, and thus turn your right. It must be observed, however, that this movement, when made, must be in concert with the movement of the other corps in this quarter; and therefore it cannot be made till after Almeida shall have been carried. Also, although this movement will be in concert with others to be made here, the corps which makes it will be entirely disconnected from those which

will be in this quarter. This movement may have for its object to cut off the communication between the Marques de la Romana and you, and to insulate the Marques between the 2d corps and the 5th, as well as to turn your right flank. From the reports in circulation of the enemy's intention to attack Badajoz when they shall take Almeida, I should not be surprised if that were the object of this movement. It must be observed, that, if Regnier should cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, as supposed, his communication is cut off, not only with the corps here, but with the French troops in Estremadura, at least for a time. He can have no regular military communication across the Sever, nor any between Portalegre and the Guadiana, and you will be between him and the French corps in this quarter. If the movement is made, therefore, it can be but for one of two objects, to turn the right of our army, and oblige us to quit our positions in the mountains, in concert with other movements to be made in our front, or to turn the left of the Marques de la Romana and cut him off from us, in concert with other movements to be made in Estremadura. I have never seen the fords of Villa Velha; but, according to the description which I have read of them, I should believe that they are under the command of the right of your position. If this be true, Regnier cannot pass the Tagus at Villa Velha till he shall have dislodged your right.

There would be one effectual way of preventing this movement, and that would be to place Leith's corps at Niza, where he would be joined by a part of Fane's cavalry, and he would effectually defend this point. But there are several reasons against this disposition of Leith's corps, one of which is, that it is not in a state to be moved so far; and another, that I do not think this movement by Regnier so probable as one between the Zezere and the Alva; thus turning all the positions in this valley, and in the mountains behind Castello Branco and on the Zezere. By this movement the communication between you and me would be completely cut off, if Leith's corps were across the Tagus. The movement of Regnier across the Tagus is very important, in whatever way it may be viewed, and whatever may be the enemy's intentions; the following measures therefore should be adopted:

I recommend to you to destroy the fords at Villa Velha at an early period, as far as may be in your power, by stakes and stones in the river; blowing up, or otherwise destroying, the roads leading to the fords on both sides. If they should be under the command of your position in the mountains, you will of course impede the enemy's passage as far as may be in your power; but if you should find that he effects his passage, notwithstanding all the opposition you can give to it, you must then fall back upon Abrantes and Punhete.

If the enemy's design should be to turn the Marques de la Romana's left, you will cross the Tagus at Abrantes, and move up to Gavião, threatening his rear while he may be operating upon the Marques de la Romana. If Regnier's object be to turn our right, and to cross the Tagus by some of the numerous fords between Abrantes and Santarem, and Santarem and Salvaterra, you must adopt the following measures:

1st; You must have the bridge at Abrantes taken up, and the boats brought over to this side under the protection of the guns of the fort. They might be either sunk and kept under water, or brought ashore. I have already spoken about having the provision stores at Abrantes brought up from the bank of the river into the town, which ought to be done, at all events, without loss of time.

2dly; You should keep Fane in observation of the enemy's movements on the left of the Tagus as long as you can, directing him to fall back upon Santarem, where he will find a ford.

3dly; As soon as you find that the enemy's plan is to turn our right, which their first movement from Niza will show, you will order Leith's corps to Santarem, and with your own you will follow the enemy's movement along the Tagus. When your right shall reach Santarem, Leith's corps should move on upon Villa Nova, observing the fords at Salvaterra, below which place there is no ford.

4thly; All the boats must be sent down below Villa Nova, according to the directions before given to you.

The great object for you will be to prevent the enemy's passage at a point below you, which you will be able to effect by Leith's corps; and by the position at Santarem to prevent the enemy from annoying the march of this part of the army on the great road from Leiria to Lisbon, if he should cross on any of the fords above you.

The enemy have not yet opened their fire upon Almeida, but their preparations are very formidable. They have some difficulty in working the ground, and are obliged to make their trenches with gabions. The garrison are stout.

P.S. I have desired Murray to send you the copy of a plan we have, with some of the fords on the Tagus marked upon it; but I believe that the whole river from Barquinha to Santarem is fordable.

To ———.

Alverca, 23d Aug. 1810.

I have received your letter, containing a complaint against ———, of the Q. M. G.'s department, that he had ill treated one of your servants, into which I shall make inquiry, and let you know the result. It is impossible, however, for me to interfere in any manner with a billet given by the magistrate of Coimbra, for an officer and his family to be quartered in your house. I must at the same time inform you, that I am not a little surprised that a person of your rank and station, and quality in the country, should object to give accommodation in your house, and should make a complaint of this officer, that he had asked you for additional accommodation; when it appears by the letter which you enclosed, and which I now return, that when you objected to give him this additional accommodation for which he had asked, he acquiesced in your objection, and did not any longer require this accommodation.

The unfortunate situation in which Portugal is placed, and the desire of the insatiable enemy of mankind to force this once happy and loyal people to submit to his iron yoke, to plunder them of their properties, to destroy their religion, and to deprive them of their monarch, has rendered it ne-

cessary to collect in this country a large army, in order, if possible, to defeat and frustrate the designs of the enemy.

It is the duty of those whose age, whose sex, or whose profession do not permit them to take an active part in the defence of their country, to assist those employed in its defence with provisions, lodgings for officers and troops, means of transport, &c., and at all events not to oppose themselves to the granting of this description of assistance. These duties are more peculiarly incumbent upon the rich and high in station, who would be the first victims of, and greatest sufferers from, the enemy's success; unless indeed they should be of the number of those traitors who are aiding to introduce the common enemy into the country, to destroy its happiness and independence.

Under these circumstances, I am not a little astonished to receive these frivolous and manifestly unfounded complaints from you, and that you should be the person to set the example of objecting to give quarters to an officer, because he is married and has children.

It is not very agreeable to any body to have strangers quartered in his house; nor is it very agreeable to us strangers, who have good houses in our own country, to be obliged to seek for quarters here. We are not here for our pleasure: the situation of your country renders it necessary; and you, a man of family and fortune, who have much to lose, should not be the first to complain of the inconvenience of our presence in the country.

I do every thing in my power to alleviate the inconvenience which all must suffer. We pay extravagant prices for every thing we receive, with unparalleled punctuality; and I make it a rule to inquire into and redress every injury that is really done by the troops under my command, as I shall into that to which I have above referred, of which you complain in the conduct of ——— towards your servant.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.*

23d Aug. 1810.

The case of Capt. ———, of the 39th regt., has received such strong support in the enclosures contained in your letter of the 20th inst., that the Commander of the Forces has consented to grant the indulgence requested for that officer, although it is contrary to the established rule of this army to have less than 6 Captains with a battalion.

You will also be pleased to communicate to Lieut. Gen. Hill his Excellency's wish it should be impressed on Capt. ——— the propriety of his returning to his corps the moment his affairs may permit his absence, should such be the case previous to the expiration of his actual leave.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Alverca, 25th Aug. 1810.

I have received the directions of the Sec. of State to draw from Cadiz the 79th and 94th regts., and 100 men of the 95th regt., and the squadron

G. O.

Alverca, 24th Aug. 1810.

3. The Commander of the Forces publishes for general information, the following letter from His Majesty's minister at Lisbon, and the translation of a paper enclosed, being the proposal for a subscription to raise a sum for the release of several Portuguese captives at Algiers, to which it is the intention of the Commander of the Forces to subscribe 500 dollars.

4. Such officers as choose to contribute to this charitable purpose, will report their names, and the sums they propose to contribute, to the Adj. Gen. of the division in which they are placed.

of the 13th light dragoons, now at that place; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will order tonnage of the transports lately sent by Sir R. Keats for 1820 infantry, and for 160 horses, to be sent to Cadiz for their conveyance from thence to the Tagus.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Alverca, 25th Aug. 1810.

I enclose an extract from a private letter which I have this day received from Lord Liverpool; and, according to his Lordship's intentions, I have requested Adm. Berkeley to send transports to Cadiz to bring round to Lisbon the 79th and 94th regts., and 100 men of the 95th regt., and the squadron of the 13th light dragoons, which troops I request you to have embarked as soon as the vessels arrive for their conveyance.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Alverca, 25th Aug. 1810.

I shall speak to Beresford about the cavalry equipments for the Marques de la Romana. I have none, I believe, excepting some carbines, which I cannot give him. I enclose a letter from Principal Sousa, and my answer. Send back the former, and forward the latter, when you shall have perused it.

Send the 12 prints, which the government have given me, to Lady Wellington, in Harley Street, and I shall be much obliged to you. There is nothing new. The fire has not yet opened on Almeida; but it is expected that it will open this day.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Alverca, 27th Aug. 1810.

Adverting to the question put in Capt. Grant's letter of the 24th, transmitted by you yesterday, respecting the mules, &c., taken from the French, it is a matter of indifference to whom they belonged; they must all be sold by auction, and the money divided among the captors.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Alverca, 27th Aug. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 22d. Underneath\* you have the strength of the Swiss battalion to be sent home, and you are the best judge in what ship it would be expedient to send them.

We must land the troops at Lisbon, notwithstanding the length of the march and of the voyage.

\* Return of the Swiss battalion taken at Puebla de Sanabria.

Officers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Soldiers.
19	33	36	13	239—340

P.S. Besides the above, there are 1 officer, 2 serjeants, and 22 soldiers, wounded, some of whom will probably be in a condition to embark.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Alverca, 27th Aug. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 22d. If such frequent instances did not occur, in various quarters, of the intrigues of individuals against the cause, in the success of which they are personally as well as politically interested, one would not believe all the stories one hears of conduct of this description.

I cannot conceive what De Sousa expects the Portuguese would gain



by the appointment of the Duke of Brunswick to command the Portuguese army. This is a little intrigue which has been long on foot, at the bottom of which is —, who is as fond of having a concern in an intrigue as any person I know; and that foolish fellow De Sousa has entered into her views to please her, without considering the effect which this arrangement must have upon every thing here. The foundation of all our strength here is the unanimity of our proceedings. I doubt if I should be able to manage the concern if the Duke of Brunswick was to be at the head of the Portuguese army, and I was to meet the Portuguese vanity and self-sufficiency at every corner, encouraged as it would be by him.

I conclude that Lord Wellesley feels as Canning did about —. All that he desired of me was that I should allow nothing to be referred to — in England, and the policy of that arrangement is obvious: if matters are referred to —, they are not in the hands of our government. It is much better that, in a case of difficulty, in which you cannot prevail upon the government to decide as you like, the question should be referred to me in obedience to the Prince's order.

You will observe the turn which I have given to the fresh demand for money in my answer to Principal Sousa.

The fire opened upon Almeida yesterday. The garrison returns it vigorously.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alverca, 27th Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Lieut. Col. Fletcher, containing a requisition for some intrenching tools, and I request that your Lordship will be pleased to give directions to have them sent to Lisbon as soon as possible.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alverca, 27th Aug. 1810, 8½ P.M.

I am sorry to tell you that the enemy are in possession of Almeida; in what manner they obtained the possession I cannot tell, but we see that they have the place from our posts.

I shall in the morning again place the infantry in the valley of the Mondego, and shall remove the head quarters to Celorico; and I shall be prepared to draw off to the rear, to form my junction with you and Leith, if I should find that the enemy press me with a superior force.

You will act according to the instructions you have already received; and I think you will do well to withdraw Le Cor again from Belmonte, so as to be *en mesure* with you in the mountains.

Watch the movements of Regnier, which will probably give us a clue to the enemy's intentions.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Alverca, 27th Aug. 1810, 8½ P.M.

I just write, as I told you I would, to let you know that there is no doubt that the enemy is in possession of Almeida. You will get your orders from Murray for the movement of your artillery and of Harvey's brigade.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Celorico, 28th Aug. 1810.

I beg you to forward the enclosed to Gen. Hill. Consider the instruc-

tions which I wrote you on the day before I last left Alverca as applicable to the existing situation of affairs.

Let Cocks and Don Julian know that Almeida has fallen; keep the former in hand, so as that he may be in readiness to retire with you. I think the enemy will drive in Cotton in the morning at least as far as Alverca. The infantry, with the exception of your division, will all be in the morning in, and in the rear of, Celorico, the cavalry all in front of Celorico.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 28th Aug. 1810.

After I wrote to you last night, the fire at Almeida recommenced at about 9, and continued until near 2; but it had not recommenced at 9 this morning, when I left our advanced posts. There is no doubt but that the place has fallen. The enemy's piquets skirmished with ours on the whole length of our line this morning; and one of the German serjeants of their hussars told one of the serjeants of ours that they had possession of Almeida.

I cannot express how much I am disappointed at this fatal event, which I cannot account for in any manner. The place could not have been breached, and I suspect that it has been surrendered at discretion. Cox had there 500,000 rations of bread, of which he cannot have consumed 150,000; the remaining 350,000 will enable the enemy to invade Portugal.

Observe Regnier well. His movements will be the clue to every thing else. I expect that he will move to-morrow.

P.S. Your instructions to Col. Le Cor are what they ought to be. You must now consider him another division of your corps; and consider the letter of the 23d as applicable to this division as well as to the others.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

On the top of the hill at Maçã do Chaõ, 29th Aug. 1810, 7½ A.M.

I came out here to see if all was quiet, and I am glad to see it is so. I can see only one vedette on the telegraph hill, and a small piquet near it. There appear some people also in Freixedas. Your cavalry would be more quiet, and you would be able to make your movements with more celerity, and unseen by the enemy, if you were to withdraw the regiments to the rear of Alverca, occupying Bassa Cova, Maçã do Chaõ, and the huts in the hermit wood, and holding Alverca and the ground in front only by your piquets. Lord E. Somerset might in that case keep Baraçal, and go with the remainder of the 4th to Lagiosã. You might keep Anson with the 16th still at Cerejo.

If you do not see any objection to this arrangement, you might make it after dark, or before day in the morning; and let me know whether you adopt it, that I may order a corresponding movement by Gen. Cole at

G. O.

Alverca, 28th Aug. 1810.

1. The officers commanding at the several stations, on the high road by which the *parté* goes, or in the neighbourhood of the high road, are to keep a man stationed on the road to receive their letters from head quarters, or to deliver those to the *parté* which they wish to send to head quarters, in order that the *parté* may not be delayed as it has been hitherto.

The *parté* will, in future, have directions to wait for nobody, and to carry on to Thomar all letters which there may be no one stationed on the road to receive.

Guarda. If you should adopt it, you will send your own orders to Lord Edward, who must be by this time in Maçal do Chaõ. I think you should move your own head quarters to Maçal do Chaõ.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Celorigo, 29th Aug. 1810, 2½ p.m.

I wrote to Sir S. Cotton this morning to desire him to put his light cavalry in Bassa Cova, Maçal do Chaõ, &c., keeping his piquets only in, and in front of Alverca; and I desired him to let me know if he adopted this arrangement, in order that I might give you corresponding instructions. In answer he has told me that he again occupies Freixedas; that he will write to you if he should keep his piquets only in Alverca.

If you should find that he adopts the arrangement which I had proposed to him, I beg you to keep one battalion only in Guarda; and to have the other two where Gen. Campbell's brigade is; and send him to Linhares. The Portuguese brigade might likewise be moved to Linhares, if you think it proper.

You must bring Cocks with you across the mountains, if you are not quite sure that the valley of the Mondego is in our possession when he shall join you, and you will fall back. You might probably send him by the road by which Col. Harvey will march.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Celorigo, 29th Aug. 1810, 8 p.m.

I received your telegraph message (but as Fletcher was out, who had the key, I did not immediately understand it), and I have just received your note of 4 p.m., announcing the enemy's arrival at Sabugal, and their probable attack of Guarda. You have your instructions upon that point; and I think that at all events in the morning you had better carry into execution what I directed this day. Give Sir S. Cotton and me the earliest intelligence, by the most expeditious mode, of any thing that may come to your knowledge in the course of the night or morning. Have you any intelligence of Hill, or has he any of Regnier's movement?

P.S. There was nothing new in my front this day; and I think we shall still have to-morrow before us.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorigo, 29th Aug. 1810, 8 p.m.

I have just received a letter from Gen. Cole, by which I learn that the enemy are collecting a corps at Sabugal, partly or entirely Regnier's, and that it is supposed they will attack Guarda. They may be attacked in the morning, but at all events I think that before day in the morning you ought to place your troops as I proposed to you this morning, and you may still leave your small piquets on the heights of Freixedas. If Cole should retire, which he certainly will if attacked in force, you must also retire upon Celorigo with your cavalry. He will give you the earliest information of the enemy's movements in his front.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorigo, 29th Aug. 1810.

The enemy opened their fire upon Almeida late on Saturday night, or early on Sunday morning, the 26th inst.; and I am concerned to add that they obtained possession of the place in the course of the night of the 27th.

I will not conceal from your Lordship that this unfortunate event has disappointed me much; as, adverting to the manner in which the garrison was supplied with all the necessities for the defence of the fort, to the respectable state of the works, and to the good spirit which I had understood from the Governor that the garrison maintained, I had hoped that this place would hold out to the last extremity, if I should not have had an opportunity of relieving it; and at all events would have detained the enemy till a late period in the season. I have no intelligence, upon which I can rely, of the cause of its surrender. Some prisoners taken yesterday state that the magazine of the fort, which, however, was bomb proof, blew up on Saturday night; that, in the course of Monday, the Governor had desired to capitulate on the terms that the fort should be given up, but that the garrison and inhabitants should be allowed to join this army, which terms had been refused; and that the fire had then recommenced, and he had held out as long as his ammunition lasted, and had surrendered at 2 in the morning of yesterday; and that offers had been made to the soldiers of the garrison to take them into the service of the Emperor, or to send them prisoners to France, and that they had all preferred the latter.

This account deserves credit, as coming from an enemy; and it is so far confirmed, that I had an opportunity of observing that there was a cessation from hostilities from 1 p.m. till 9 on Monday night, when the fire recommenced, and lasted till near 2, when it ceased again. An explosion had likewise been heard at our advanced posts; and I observed, on Monday, that the steeple of the church was destroyed, and many of the houses of the town unroofed. I hope that this account will be found correct in all material points; and it will give me great satisfaction to find that the loss of Almeida, and the transfer to the enemy of the stores and provisions which it contains, have not been occasioned by any fault of the Governor or of the garrison.

I had a telegraphic communication with the Governor, but unfortunately the weather did not allow of our using it on Sunday, or during a great part of Monday; and when the weather cleared on that day, it was obvious that the Governor was in communication with the enemy.

Adverting to the position in which I had collected the army so near the place, it is unfortunate that I had not an opportunity of knowing their situation, after the loss of their magazine. After I was certain of the fall of the place, I moved the infantry of the army again into the valley of the Mondego, keeping a division upon Guarda, and the outposts of the cavalry at Alverca.

The enemy attacked our piquets twice yesterday in the morning, but feebly, and they were repulsed. In the afternoon, however, they obliged Sir S. Cotton to draw in his posts to this side of Freixedas. Capt. Lygon,\* of the 16th light dragoons, was wounded in the morning; and 2 men of the Royal dragoons were wounded in the afternoon. A piquet of this regiment made a gallant and successful charge upon a party of the enemy's infantry and cavalry, and took some prisoners.

The 2d corps, under Gen. Regnier, has made no movement of any im-

\* Major General the Hon. H. B. Lygon.

portance since I had the honor of addressing your Lordship last. A patrol, however, belonging to this corps, fell in with a squadron of dragoons, consisting of one troop of the 13th British, and one troop of the 4th Portuguese, belonging to Lieut. Gen. Hill's corps, under the command of Capt. White of the 13th, on the 22d inst.; and the whole of them were taken, with the exception of the Captain and one man, who, I since understand, have been killed. I enclose the copy of Brig. Gen. Fane's report to Lieut. Gen. Hill of this affair,\* which it appears was highly creditable to Capt. White and the allied troops engaged.

No movement has been made, and nothing of any importance has occurred, in Estremadura, since I addressed your Lordship last. In the north, the enemy moved a small body of infantry and cavalry on the 20th to Alcañices; but Gen. Silveira moved towards them from Braganza, and they immediately retired. The last accounts I have from Cadiz are of the 16th inst.; and I understand that Gen. Graham is about to send 2000 men from Cadiz round to the Tagus. Nothing extraordinary had occurred in that quarter.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 29th Aug. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 2d inst. You may depend upon it that the intelligence which I send you every week of the enemy's movements is as nearly correct as it can be. I receive the intelligence which goes to every body else, and I form my opinion of its truth from a consideration of the whole.

Junot's corps never went to Zamora. I believe the right was never farther than San Felices, on the Agueda, or, at farthest, opposite to Freixo de Espadacinta, on the Duero, between the Agueda and the Tormes. In respect to the enemy's force in Spain, I consider it 250,000 men, including guards, &c. The battalions at Nantes should each be reckoned 1000 at least, as they are within the French territory. In respect to the enemy's force upon the frontier of Portugal, the question is, what part of it is supposed acting against us? The 2d, 6th, and 8th corps are occupied with us exclusively; and the 5th corps, in Estrema-

\* *Brig. Gen. H. Fane to Lieut. Gen. Hill.*

Escalhos de cima, 22d Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to report to you that the troop of the 13th light dragoons and one of the 4th Portuguese dragoons, forming the squadron under the command of Capt. White, of the 13th, at Ladoeiro, this morning fell in with a patrol of the enemy's dragoons, consisting of one captain, 2 subalterns, and about 60 men. Capt. White fortunately succeeded in coming up with them, when he immediately charged and overturned them; and the result has been the capture of 2 lieutenants, 3 sergeants, 6 corporals, one trumpeter, and 50 privates, and about 50 horses. The Captain was also a prisoner, but escaped during the bustle on foot.

I am happy to say this has been performed without the loss of a man on our side: 6 of the enemy are wounded. Capt. White expresses his obligation to Major Vigoureux, of the 38th regt., who was a volunteer with him, and to the Alferes Pedro Raimundo de Oliveira, commanding the Portuguese troop (which he states to have done its duty extremely well, and to have shown much gallantry); and also to Lieut. Turner, of the 13th light dragoons, to whose activity and courage he reports himself to be indebted for several of his prisoners. I trust the whole will be considered to have merited the approbation of the Commander in Chief.

dura, has the Marques de la Romana in its front. I do not think the latter is equal to the former.

Besides the Marques de la Romana's corps on our right, we have Gen. Mahy's upon our left in Galicia; but Gen. Mahy's letters will have confirmed the statements I before made of the wants of this corps, and will show your Lordship that even if the divisions of Seras, Bonet, and Kellermann were not sufficient to keep it in check in Galicia, I cannot hope for any efficient co-operation from it. I would also beg to observe to your Lordship that the system of caution prescribed to me has increased the difficulty, already existing, of doing much for the Spaniards; and I could not with propriety advise them to place their armies in a state of risk, only to provide the better for my own security.

I am aware that their ultimate success depends upon my being able to maintain my ground. But still they would not understand the motive of the advice I should give them; more particularly as hitherto I have constantly urged them to keep their armies in a state of security, and not to risk them in actions of which the result was doubtful. I did arrange a plan of operations with the Marques de la Romana, applicable to his own corps when this country should be attacked; but, although I entertain a high opinion, and great regard, for the Marques de la Romana, I cannot feel confident that he will carry the plan into execution. Indeed I am apprehensive that he has already put it out of his power to be of much use to us, and the enemy certainly may cut him off from us. However, I have written to urge him to fall back, and secure his communication with us under any event.

I have already written to your Lordship fully respecting reinforcements. I am apprehensive that the Duke of Brunswick's corps will not be of much use. They will set an example of desertion, which they will increase amongst us, and it may reach the Portuguese army. One of the prisoners taken reports that Governor Cox has lost his arm, another that he was killed. I do not credit the last, as I am convinced that the proposition for the garrison to join the army came from him; and I have not mentioned either of the reports in my dispatch, in order not to alarm his friends unnecessarily.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorio, 29th Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a requisition for 10,000 blankets, which I request may be sent out as soon as possible to Lisbon.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorio, 30th Aug. 1810.

I have received your dispatch (No. 32), dated the 5th inst., and I am obliged to you for sending round the transports.

I am also much obliged to you for sending the reinforcement to this country of the 79th, and 2d batt. 88th regts., and the squadron of the 13th dragoons, which I have heard from other quarters are on their passage. I have, however, in this army so many corps of the same description with the 2d batt. 88th regt., which I had already sent away from Portugal to Gibraltar last year, as being unfit for service in the field, that I propose to keep this battalion at Lisbon and to send it back to Cadiz as soon as I

can relieve it by the 2d batt. 58th regt., also of the same description, from the army. I conclude that you will send off the 94th regt. from Cadiz as soon as you receive the letter from the Sec. of State, which I transmitted to you a few days ago. I am much concerned to hear of the illness of Major Gen. Ferguson, and that you have lost the benefit of his assistance. I beg to refer you to my letter, by this conveyance, to Mr. Wellesley for an account of the state of affairs here.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Celorico, 30th Aug. 1810.

I received yesterday your letter of the 16th, and I now enclose my weekly report of yesterday to government. The loss of Almeida is a great misfortune, but I do not lose all hopes yet. Since I wrote yesterday to government, I have heard that Regnier's corps has been brought to Sabugal, where it arrived yesterday; so that I have now got the 3 corps upon my hands. Since yesterday they have made no movement.

Government have sent me out 20,000 stand of arms, of which I shall send a proportion to you to be forwarded to Catalonia, &c. I shall send the remainder into Galicia and Biscay. I do not know how government are to get the money to give the Spaniards the million sterling of which they talk. The 10 millions are quite out of the question. You are already in possession of my opinion respecting the proposed treaty of commerce.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 30th Aug. 1810.

I heard from government of the appointment of Mr. Drummond, and I have written to that gentleman on the subjects referred for his inquiries. I am convinced that he will not be able to procure more money, either at Cadiz or Lisbon, than we get at present; and I only hope that his arrangements will not diminish our supplies. Villiers' favourite notion on supplies of money was that by exertion a great deal more might be got. My answer was, that we were neither pickpockets nor coiners; that we could get only the sums which it was convenient to, or the interest of, individuals to transmit to England; and that I did not see in what manner an increase of exertions by us could increase these sums. However, he has been more successful with the ministers in England than he was with me; and we owe to him Mr. Drummond's arrival. You will have seen my dispatch of yesterday. Regnier's corps is at Sabugal: since I wrote that dispatch I have received the information, so that I have now the 3 corps on my hands.

To Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.

Celorico, 30th Aug. 1810.

I have to request that when the 79th regt. shall arrive at Lisbon they may be immediately prepared for the field in the usual manner, as well as the squadron of the 13th light dragoons. The 88th regt. are to continue in garrison at Lisbon; and the 83d, as soon as the 88th shall arrive, are to be sent to join the army by the route of Thomar. When any regiments shall arrive, you will be pleased to direct that they may prepare for service in the field without loss of time.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 31st Aug. 1810.

I return the consul's bill and vouchers for expenses incurred at Faro, which I think it would be best that you should pay; as it is not specified whether the dispatches sent were mine, and on military subjects, or yours.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 31st Aug. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 27th. I think that the *Carta Regia* would have been better, if it had not been an apology. The Arganil militia, which was part of the garrison of Almeida, has been sent in, and the two other battalions are to follow this day and to-morrow. The Colonel reports that the explosion of the magazine destroyed the whole town, made a breach in the place, blew all the guns, excepting 3, into the ditch, destroyed all the ammunition, excepting 10 or 12 barrels of powder, and killed or wounded the greater part of the artillerymen. The garrison, till this accident, had sustained no loss, and was in the best order and spirits, and had no thoughts of surrender, and expected to hold the place for 2 months. The Colonel talks highly of the conduct of Governor Cox.

I am sorry to add that the whole of the 24th regt., with the exception of the Major and of the English officers, have gone into the French service. It is said that their object is to have an opportunity of deserting from it, which is well enough for the private soldiers, but is highly disgraceful to the character of the officers. The Major commanding the artillery was the person employed by Cox to settle the capitulation for him. He went out and informed the French of the exact state of the place after the explosion, and never returned!! Massena has made him a Colonel!! There is nothing new this morning. The enemy talked of attacking Guarda this day, but it is now 10½ o'clock, and I have just received a telegraph message from thence, stating that a patrol had come in, and there was nothing new.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 31st Aug. 1810.

I have just received your note, and I approve so entirely of what you propose, that I beg you to carry the new arrangement into execution this afternoon.

P.S. I have just had a telegraph from Guarda; there is nothing new on that side. Cole says that one of the militia officers has informed him that either Ney or Massena was gone to Pinhel.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 31st Aug. 1810.

From the period at which Regnier's movement to the northward was made, and at which the orders for it must have been issued, as well as because nearly at the same time the enemy's whole army was collected, I judge that these movements were not occasioned by the fall, or by the early expected fall, of Almeida; but that the enemy collected his army as soon as he found that I had brought up mine to the front. I consider it possible, therefore, that the intention of the enemy may yet be to remove Regnier's corps through the mountains. If, however, you should



find that Regnier moves upon Belmonte, and crosses the Zezere, so as to place himself between the Zezere and the Alva, or if he moves upon Guarda from Sabugal, where he now is, you must move directly by Villa de Rey upon Thomar, where you will receive further directions from me.

Possibly Le Cor, without his guns, might be able to reach the Zezere by the road of Sertom, and might cross that river at the Ponte de Cabril to Pedrogão Grande, or lower down at the fords of Foz d'Alja. If I should find that the enemy throw their whole force between the Douro and the Zezere, I shall endeavor to collect the allied army in the position of Ponte da Murcella, on the Alva.

P.S. In order to save time, and to avoid hurrying the British infantry, it occurs to me that you might move them now to Sobreira Formosa, from whence you could get them across the Zezere between Thomar and Villa de Rey in 2 marches. If Regnier should return to the southward, in order to move into the mountains, you could easily bring them up again to Sarzedas from Sobreira Formosa.

I should likewise observe to you that, if you should make this movement, it would not be necessary for you to go to Thomar to join me upon the Alva. Your line would be from the Zezere to Cabaços, thence to Espinhal; but you shall have the exact route by the post of to-morrow.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Leith.*

31st Aug. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter and enclosure herewith returned. It appears to me that the enclosed extract from the G. O. of this army elucidates the point in question. I have directed the book of G. O. since Lord Wellington assumed the command in Portugal to be forwarded to your A. A. G. by the first opportunity.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Arbuthnot, Mil. Sec. to Marshal Beresford.*

31st Aug. 1810.

It appearing by the enclosed documents, which I will thank you to return, that the reward to the Portuguese peasants bringing in prisoners has been paid, in the instance of the 2 Russians, both at Marshal Beresford's head quarters and at this office, I have to request that you will communicate to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces' wish that the rewards should be paid only at the British head quarters, where the prisoners are ultimately forwarded; unless it should be attended with some special inconvenience to the party interested, when it will be necessary for the Marshal to direct a particular communication to be made to me of the rewards paid and advanced at his head quarters, in order that I may include them in my account, and that we may guard against the circumstance of the gratuity being given in both places.

*To Major Gen. Leith.*

Celorico, 1st Sept. 1810.

Col. Murray has communicated to me Capt. Williams' report on the Zezere, which is very satisfactory. There is no doubt, that if we are to have any works upon the Zezere, they ought to be constructed on the principles stated by Capt. Williams, and in themselves efficient; and I should certainly be glad if the works on that river could be reformed as proposed by him. In this season of the year, however, it is in the power of the enemy to turn the line of the Zezere in so many different ways, that I should hesitate to disperse or fatigue the troops in any great degree, in order to reform the works as Capt. Williams proposes. If, however, the work can be performed either by the peasantry or by the troops,

without any great inconvenience, the line of the Zezere may hereafter become very important to the army; and I should be glad if what Capt. Williams proposes were done.

At present the enemy have collected their whole force in this front: whether they did so in consequence of my movements, in order to protect the siege of Almeida, the early surrender of which place they could not have expected when the collection of the force was ordered, or in order to press *en masse* down this valley, it is impossible for me to say. If the latter is their object, and they should carry it into execution, the line of the Zezere can be of no use to us. I shall endeavor, in that case, to collect the army upon the Alva, and stop them if circumstances will permit. I beg you to forward the enclosed letter by an officer to Gen. Hill.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Celorico, 1st Sept. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 15th and 16th Aug., by Lieut. Col. Ponsonby.

We are in want of General officers in this country, but I understand that Major Gens. Sir W. Erskine and Lumley, and Brig. Gen. Hay, have been ordered out; and as the late promotions have made many colonels, I imagine that we shall have a sufficient number of officers of rank for the duty of the army.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 1st Sept. 1810.

I enclose the duplicate of my letter of yesterday. I likewise enclose your route from the Zezere towards the Ponte da Murcella, in case it should be necessary for you to come that way. There is nothing new this morning. The enemy have made no movement that we have heard of.

I have omitted to tell you that the magazine at Almeida was blown up on Sunday night, and all the ammunition destroyed; a breach made in the place; the guns, excepting 3, blown into the ditch, and nearly all the artillerymen killed or wounded. The whole town was destroyed, and the stones of the buildings killed or wounded 40 men even in the enemy's lines.

Till the occurrence of this accident, the garrison had no idea of surrender. Their loss had been trifling, 3 or 4 men wounded; and they were in good spirits, and well supplied with every thing they wanted. They expected to hold out for 2 months. They all talk highly of the conduct of the Governor: even the enemy acknowledge that he behaved remarkably well.

To Marshal Beresford.

Celorico, 2d Sept. 1810, 1 P.M.

I have just received a report that the enemy have driven our piquet out of Freixedas and through Alverca to Bassa Cova, and a column of some strength was coming down Freixedas hill.

Our cavalry will probably be in here and hereabouts in the course of the evening, and you had better move your quarters this evening to Cortiço, and come here yourself.

P.S. Cole sends a report by telegraph, that the enemy are moving upon Covilhaç, which he says he does not believe.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Celorico, 2d Sept. 1810.

The enemy have driven our piquets through Freixedas and Alverca, and I shall retire from hence in the morning. Gen. Cole will leave Guarda this afternoon.

It is reported that Regnier moved upon Covilhaõ this morning. If it is so, you will have received intelligence of the movement from Le Cor, who was at Fundaõ. It is possible that I may receive positive intelligence upon this subject this evening, when I shall write to you again.

P. S. Since writing the enclosed, I have heard that Regnier moved upon Castello Branco. However, Le Cor will be able to give you the most correct intelligence of this movement.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 2d Sept. 1810.

I did not answer your former letter on the subject of the navy at our several signal stations, because I felt considerable embarrassment upon the subject. The difficulty does not consist in giving the officers and seamen additional rations, or an allowance in lieu of additional rations, so much as in creating a precedent by the grant of this allowance or these rations, which may be very inconvenient to the service hereafter. I beg you to consider the subject in that light. If you should still be of opinion that the additional rations, or an allowance instead of them, must be made, they shall be made, subject to a reference to England, or I will try to arrange to manage our signals without the assistance of these officers and men. I think it best to detain the transports which brought round the 79th and 88th, till we shall hear further from Cadiz, and not to send those respecting which I wrote to you on the 25th.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Celorico, 3d Sept. 1810, 8 A.M.

Every thing appears tolerably quiet in front, and I am going to Gouvea. I beg you to attend to the former instructions; observe the enemy's movements, but do not engage yourself in any serious affair. If you should find the enemy advance in strength, retire upon the Light division at Sampayo, giving Gen. Craufurd and me the earliest information of their movement, and observing them still with the hussars, or one of the other regiments of light dragoons.

Capt. Cocks is upon Prados, with a piquet of observation upon Guarda. Prados is on the hill on the left of the Val de Mondego, and from thence Capt. Cocks will retire upon Linhares. You can communicate with him either by Lagiosa, along the Mondego, or from Celorico through Linhares. It might be advisable to strengthen Capt. Cocks a little, so as to enable him to strengthen his post at, and to patrol from Guarda, to obtain better intelligence of the enemy's movements. The post at Trancoso also becomes important on your other flank. Murray has told you by what road it is to retire when you will come through Celorico.

I believe Cole has left the English key of the telegraph at Guarda with Cocks; if he has not, I shall desire him to send it to him. I shall leave mine with the telegraph officer you have had with you, who shall stay here. When Guarda and Celorico are finally evacuated, take care that

the telegraphs are destroyed; and probably the most effectual mode of destruction would be to have straw laid in them ready to burn them.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gouvea, 4th Sept. 1810.

I received your letter of the 2d this morning. If Regnier passes the Upper Zezere, or if he marches upon Guarda, and you should consequently make the march suggested in my letters of the 31st and 1st, Gen. Fane's cavalry should likewise cross the Zezere after you, as it is my wish to have the whole army on the right of that river. If Regnier, however, should move and attack you in the mountains between the Zezere and the Tagus, then the instructions of the 10th Aug. will apply to the disposition of Fane's cavalry. The movement directed for you by my letters of the 31st Aug. and the 1st Sept. was intended only to prepare you for what might possibly happen, viz., the collection of the enemy's whole force between the Zezere and the Douro, and for the march which I wished you to make in consequence. Le Cor could be in no danger from the enemy's movements, which were supposed in those letters; and he might have remained in safety at Fundaô, with his cavalry forward, at least till the enemy's movement would have been decided. Indeed, his remaining would appear important, to enable you to procure intelligence.

I withdrew the infantry of the army yesterday one march. The cavalry is still in the same situations; and we have a look out upon Guarda. The enemy has made no movement since Sunday, and I believe they returned to the Coa after driving in our piquets from Freixedas. Our piquets are again in Alverca. It is reported, but I do not know whether to believe the report, that the enemy have moved 50 pieces of cannon upon Sabugal, by Alfaiates, from Almeida.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gouvea, 4th Sept. 1810.

Since I wrote my other letter, two prisoners who were taken yesterday morning say that the enemy positively returned on Sunday to the Coa; but it was expected that the 6th and 8th corps would advance immediately by this road. An officer of Don J. Sanchez's party has also just been with me; and has informed me that Regnier marched on Saturday from Sabugal to Penamacor, and has collected his corps at that place. You must have heard of this movement, if it be true. If it be true, and the cannon has gone to Sabugal, it is probable that Regnier will cross the Tagus, and proceed according to the plan discussed in one of my late letters, and that he takes with him all, or the greater part, of the enemy's cannon, as he goes by the road which is the most practicable for artillery; at least, in the opinion and according to the knowledge and information of the enemy.

*The A.G. to the Rev. S. Briscall.*

4th Sept. 1810.

The Commander of the Forces having been pleased to direct that you should be attached as Chaplain to the head quarters of the army, I have to desire you will make such communications from time to time with the other Chaplains of the forces as will enable me to ascertain that they are at their respective situations, and doing their duties agreeable to the instructions they receive. As it will facilitate very much my communication with these gentlemen, I shall request of you from time to time to report at the office to me any thing extraordinary that occurs, so far as comes within your knowledge.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 5th Sept. 1810.

I enclose a letter from Col. Cox, late Governor of Almeida, to Marshal Beresford,\* containing a copy of the capitulation of Almeida, and an account of the circumstances which occasioned the early surrender of that place. It was impossible to expect that Col. Cox should continue the defence of the place after the unfortunate occurrence which he mentions; and I am happy to add, that all the accounts which I have received from officers and soldiers of the militia who have come into the interior under the capitulation, concur in applauding the conduct of the Governor

\* *Marshal Beresford to Marshal General Viscount Wellington.*

Moimenta da Serra, 4th Sept. 1810.

I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a letter I have received from Col. Cox, late Governor of Almeida, and a copy of the capitulation of that place.

With whatever regret it was we witnessed the unexpected fall of that place, uninformed as we then were of the cause, I think the circumstance related in the Governor's letter of the unfortunate loss of his entire ammunition, and the injury sustained by the town and works, and loss to the garrison by the effects of the explosion, will prove sufficiently the impracticability of a protracted defence; and I regret to say the conduct of ——— and ——— increased the difficulties occasioned by the explosion. The former had until the commencement of the enemy's fire acted with much zeal and propriety, but on that commencing slung himself up in bomb-proofs; and after the explosion, from personal fear and to avoid any further firing, took advantage of the consternation and confusion which must be ever attendant in such a case, to counteract the Governor's attempt to hold out at least some short time longer. ———, it appears, had acted well during the siege, but after the explosion appears to have added treachery to cowardice, and, to gain favor with the enemy, communicated to him the real state of the garrison, and that it had no ammunition whatever left, which caused Marshal Massena to refuse the terms demanded by the Governor.

Until the unfortunate accident of the explosion of the magazine the garrison appears to have been in the highest spirits, and in the best possible disposition and resolution to defend the town, and which they unanimously state their Governor's conduct inspired them with, as every officer and man gives the highest applause to his unremitting zeal and activity, encouraging all by his own example.

Your Lordship will see that it was of very little consequence what capitulation the garrison had got, as it is obvious the enemy would not have observed it, where it was his interest to break it, and which will be witnessed by his having detained by force, and contrary to the terms of the capitulation, 7 officers and 200 men from each of the 3 regiments of militia that were in the garrison, and this with the object of forming them into a pioneer corps.

The officers and soldiers of the militia regiments, to a man, continued to refuse to enter voluntarily into the service of the enemy, and the 7 officers and 200 men of each regiment were detained forcibly. Such are the circumstances which have come to my knowledge of the conduct of the garrison of Almeida, and which I think it necessary to communicate to your Lordship.

*Col. Cox to Marshal Beresford.*

Aldea del Obispo, 30th Aug. 1810.

The painful task has fallen to my lot of acquainting your Excellency that I was reduced to the necessity of surrendering the fortress of Almeida, which I had the honor to command, on the 27th inst., at 10 o'clock at night, in consequence of the unfortunate explosion of the great magazine of powder in the castle, and the small magazines contiguous to it, by which dreadful accident I was deprived of the whole of my artillery and musket ammunition, with the exception of a few made-up cartridges which remained in some of the expense magazines on the ramparts, and 39 barrels of powder which were deposited in the laboratory.

Upwards of half of the detachment of artillery, and a great number of infantry

throughout the siege, and in the unfortunate situation in which he was placed toward its close. It is certain, that until the explosion of the magazines of the place, the garrison had sustained but little loss, and were in the highest spirits; and, encouraged by the example of the Governor, and the confidence they had in him, were determined to hold out to the last moment.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Marshal Beresford, in which he enclosed the letter from Col. Cox; to which I have to add, that the 2 officers mentioned in that letter, —, and —, have entered the service of France, and that the latter has been promoted to the rank of Colonel. I am also informed, that when sent out by the Governor into the enemy's lines to negotiate the capitulation, and after he had informed the enemy of the unfortunate situation of the garrison, he did not return to the place when hostilities recommenced, but continued in the enemy's lines.

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soldiers, besides several of the inhabitants, were destroyed by the effect of this terrible explosion. Many of the guns were dismounted upon the ramparts, the works were materially injured, and a general dismay spread amongst the troops and inhabitants of the place.

In this distressing situation I received a letter from the Commander in Chief of the French army of Portugal, proposing to me that I should surrender the place to the French army under his command upon honorable terms, which, he said, he was ready to grant. I answered, that I wished to know the terms which he proposed; upon which the articles, of which I have the honor to send your Excellency a copy, were transmitted to me, and which, after using every effort in my power to obtain more favorable terms, I accepted, with an exception in favor of the militia regiments. I hope my conduct on this trying occasion will meet your Excellency's approbation, and that I shall remain justified by the circumstances in the eyes of my country.

The Prince d'Essling has been good enough to allow me to return to England on my parole, accompanied by Major Hewitt and Capt. Foley, of the 24th regt., and we are now on our way to France, to embark from thence for a British port.

#### Capitulation for the surrender of the fortress of Almeida.

Art. I. The garrison shall be prisoners of war, with the honors of war, that is to say, they shall march out with their arms, which they shall deposit on the glacis of the place.

Answer—accepted; except that the militia, being only few, shall return to their homes after having deposited their arms; they are not to serve during the present war against France or her allies.

Art. II. The officers of every description, and the soldiers, shall retain, the former their swords and baggage, and the latter their baggage only.

Art. III. The inhabitants shall retain their property, and shall not be disturbed for their opinions.

Art. IV. The military stores and artillery shall remain at the disposal of the French army, and shall be given up to the commander of artillery.

Art. V. The magazines, chests, &c., shall be given up to French commissaries appointed for that effect.

Art. VI. The plans and memorials of the fortress shall be given up to the commandant of engineers of the French army.

Art. VII. The sick of the English and of the Portuguese army shall be taken care of and maintained at the expense of the French army, and on their recovery shall follow the destination of the garrison.

Camp before Almeida, 27th Aug. 1810.

MASSENA, Prince d'Essling, &c.  
W. Cox, Governor of Almeida.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gouvea, 6th Sept. 1810.

Nothing has occurred this day worthy of attention. I rely upon your prudence and discretion not to engage yourself in any affair of which the result can be at all doubtful. Retire gradually, if you find the enemy threatening you in too great force; and let me hear from you constantly. If we can avoid any accident before we all join, I have confidence of our final success.

Some time ago I ordered Gen. Leith to throw one of Le Cor's regiments of regular infantry into the garrison of Abrantes, in case of retiring from that place; which is not necessary now, as the 22d regt. are in that garrison.

To Marshal Beresford.

Gouvea, 6th Sept. 1810.

I send herewith a prisoner, respecting whom I enclose a memorandum received from Col. Alava.

After this person had had with Col. Alava the conversations referred to in the enclosed paper, and of which I was apprised, which marked him as a suspicious deserter, I saw him conversing with different people in the public market place, such as sutlers and others, followers of the army, from whom he might have received intelligence, and I had him confined, and I now send him to be disposed of by the Commission.

To Major Gen. Leith.

Gouvea, 6th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 3d and 5th. I have no objection to the reform of the works on the Zezere in the manner proposed, and Capt. Williams is authorised to pay the peasants employed upon them at the following rates: artificers, 320 reis *per diem*; labourers 200 reis; and boys 120 reis *per diem*. Let application be made to the Commissary at Abrantes for money for this purpose, and I will grant a warrant for the amount, as soon as I shall be informed of it.

I have no doubt of the zeal of the troops under your command, nor of their desire to be actively employed. In answer to your desire to have more English troops under your command, I must inform you that I class and dispose of the troops of the different descriptions according to my views of the service which will be required of them, and not as a matter of favor to any officer.

Au Marquis de la Romana.

à Gouvea, ce 6 Sept. 1810.

J'ai reçu vos lettres du 1<sup>r</sup>. Vous aurez appris les mouvemens du corps de Regnier de la part du Général Hill. Ou l'ennemi va faire le mouvement sur notre droite, dont je vous ai écrit, ou il va faire le siège de Badajoz. On dit que du canon a passé d'Almeida à Sabugal, et de là vers Regnier; mais je ne suis pas sûr que ce soit vrai, ou que ce soit du canon de siège. Si c'est de l'artillerie de campagne, l'ennemi va tâcher de nous tourner par la droite et de vous couper d'avec nous avec une partie de ses troupes, tandis qu'il s'avancera par ici avec l'autre.

J'ai distribué mon armée de manière à faire face à tout. Je rassemblerai la plus grande force qu'il me sera possible, toute l'armée, si cela se peut, en Alentejo, si on va faire le siège de Badajoz, et cela sans perte de

tems. Vous savez ce qu'il faut faire si on se met entre nous deux en passant le Tage à Villa Velha, ou au dessous de la jonction de la petite rivière le Sever avec le Tage. Si vous trouvez qu'on passe le Tage au dessus du Sever, c'est très important de s'assurer de la possession de Campo Maior, ainsi ayez soin d'y mettre une bonne garnison; et, en tout cas, je vous en prie, une bonne garnison et un gouverneur sur lequel vous pouvez vous fier en Badajoz.

Je vous envoie la copie d'une lettre de Cox, la capitulation d'Almeida, et la copie d'une lettre que j'ai écrite là dessus au gouvernement Anglais.

P. S. Il y a un petit poste sur la frontière, qu'on appelle Ouguela, qui serait très important pour tous nos mouvemens pour relever Badajoz. Je vous prie d'arranger avec le Général Leite pour son occupation, ou qu'il soit complètement détruit.

Je vais vous dire pourquoi je crois que l'ennemi va faire le siège de Badajoz. Quand Regnier a marché de Sabugal, sa route pour nous tourner par Villa Velha était par Penamacor, Idanha a Velha, Idanha a Nova, &c.; et, protégé par les montagnes, il pourrait faire cette marche sans risque. Au lieu de cela, il a passé par Valverde del Fresno à Moraleja, et son armée s'est rassemblée encore une fois sur l'Elja, une avant garde seulement ayant passée par Penamacor, et s'étant replacée à Penagarcia. Il n'a pas donc l'intention de faire le mouvement par Villa Velha; et on va repasser le Tage au dessus d'Alcantara pour entrer en Estremadura. Voilà mes conjectures. Mais il se peut que l'ennemi ne connaît pas le pays et les routes aussi bien que moi, et qu'il craignait faire sa marche par Idanha.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Gouvea, 6th Sept. 1810.

The enemy appear to be moving to their left, probably for the siege of Badajoz. I wish that you would strengthen the party upon Guarda, and get Cocks to go out to the front towards Sabugal, and discover what they are about: whether they have really moved cannon from Almeida by Sabugal; whether it is cannon of a heavy calibre; whether the troops of the 6th (Ney's) corps have moved that way; and let me know the number of any regiment that has marched, and I shall know to what corps it belongs. It would be very desirable, if possible, to send somebody into the country about Valverde del Fresno, Cilleros, &c., as that is the road by which they are passing.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouvea, 6th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 3d, in which you omitted to enclose the note to which yours of the 2d was an answer. I have received a very extraordinary letter from the government, to which I have written the answer of which I enclose the copy; I beg you to send it to England.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouvea, 6th Sept. 1810.

You will see all my dispatches to government of this day and yesterday. I think it possible that the French are about to attack Badajoz. They are either going upon that operation or to turn our right flank. However if



the Marques de la Romana will come in in time, they cannot do us much mischief.

I have written a letter to Dom M. Forjaz, which ought to be published and generally circulated. I am told that confidence is flagging, and it is calculated to revive it without pledging me to any thing positive.

To Dom M. Forjaz.

Gouvea, 6th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing me that you had placed before the Governors of this Kingdom my dispatch of the 27th Aug. announcing the melancholy and unexpected news of the loss of Almeida; and that the government had learned with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to succour the place; hoping at the same time that the depression of the people, caused by such an event, will soon vanish, by the quick and great successes which they expect from the efforts of the army.

I have already made known to the Governors of the Kingdom that the fall of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that I deplored its loss and that of my hopes, considering it likely to depress and afflict the people of this Kingdom. It was by no means my intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had not been my intention to have succoured the place; and I now request the permission of the Governors of the Kingdom to say that, much as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan of operations which have been determined on, after the most serious deliberation, as most adequate to further the general cause of the allies, and, consequently, of Portugal.

I request the government to believe that I am not insensible of the value of their confidence, as well as of that of the public; as also that I am highly interested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I should forget my duty to my Sovereign, to the Prince Regent, and to the cause in general, if I should permit public clamor or panic to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 6th Sept. 1810.

I enclose the estimate of the expenses of the army, and of the means of defraying them to the 24th inst. I also enclose the state of the army on the 1st inst., and the last return which I have received of the sick. There have been more sick lately than there had been before; but the cases are very slight, and the men soon recover.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 6th Sept. 1810.

The 2d corps, under Gen. Regnier, which had been at Zarza la Mayor during the siege of Almeida, broke up from thence on the 28th, and marched to Sabugal and Alfaiates, where they arrived on the 29th; and the whole of the 3 corps, composing what is called the Army of Portugal, were thus collected in front of this part of the allied army.

The enemy attacked our piquets at Freixedas on Sunday, the 2d inst.,

in some strength, and afterwards withdrew to Vendada; in consequence of which, and from the reports of the prisoners and deserters, expecting that the enemy's whole army would move forward on the following day, I withdrew the infantry of the army one march into the valley of the Mondego on the 3d, still keeping the cavalry in the plain in front of Celorico, and a small post of observation on Guarda. It appears, however, that the 2d corps moved to its left from Alfaiates and Sabugal, one column by Valverde, the other by Penamacor, on Saturday and Sunday; and it is even reported that a part of the 6th corps has marched in that direction likewise; and the enemy were again collecting in force about Salvaterra and Zarza la Mayor, when I heard from Gen. Hill on the night of the 4th inst.

No movement has been made in front of this part of the army since Sunday, and the enemy's outposts continue at Vendada. I have received a report, which, however, wants confirmation, that the enemy have moved between 40 and 50 pieces of cannon from Almeida, likewise upon Sabugal.

No movement of importance has been made in the north since I had last the honor of addressing your Lordship. I imagine that the French troops in the Asturias have been in some degree pressed, as Gen. Seras has moved towards Leon.

In the south, Gen. Lacy landed on the 23d Aug. at Morla, and attacked the Prince d'Arenberg's position at Moguer on the 24th, he having been posted there with some troops belonging to the 5th corps, in order to cover the blockade of Cadiz on that side. It was intended that Gen. Copons should co-operate with this attack from Castillejos. The Prince, however, made good his retreat through Niebla on the morning of the 25th, before Gen. Copons arrived there, and he retired upon San Lucar la Mayor, within 4 leagues of Seville, with the loss, in his engagement with Gen. Lacy, of about 200 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. Gen. Lacy embarked again on the 26th; and Gen. Copons has been obliged to retire upon Castillejos and towards the Guadiana, as the Prince d'Arenberg had been reinforced from Seville.

These occurrences in Andalusia had obliged the division of the 5th corps, which was in Estremadura, to fall back in the Sierra; and the Marques de la Romana had moved forward to Zafra, in order to prevent this division from falling upon Copons. By a letter, however, which I have received from him of the 1st inst., he assures me of his intention to collect his troops upon the Guadiana immediately, in order that he may be in readiness to co-operate more immediately with me.

My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 16th Aug. The 79th, and 2d batt. 88th, and one squadron of the 13th light dragoons, have arrived in the Tagus from thence.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

6th Sept. 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint you that his Excellency the Commander of the Forces has been pleased to direct that Lieut. —, of the —, should be released from his arrest, as Major Gen. Slade has expressed that officer's contrition for his inattention to G. O.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. —.*

6th Sept. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, which is just come to hand, although I observe it is dated the 24th Aug., which appears extraordinary. I have laid it before the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed by his Excellency to observe to you that Lieut. — communicated to the Commander of the Forces your letter to him, from which it appeared that you wished that Lieut. — should not give you his assistance any longer as your A. D. C.; and Lord Blantyre having at the same time expressed a wish that Lieut. — should be permitted to remain with him, the Commander of the Forces granted him permission accordingly.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Gouvea, 7th Sept. 1810.

I beg leave to enclose copies of letters, reporting the neglect and want of cleanliness on board the cavalry transports which brought the 13th dragoons from Cadiz.

I shall be much obliged if you will repeat your orders upon this subject.

To Marshal Beresford.

Gouvea, 7th Sept. 1810.

I enclose some letters from Cox. The money sent him was intended for Portuguese as well as English officers, but he appears not to have had the Portuguese officers with him, and therefore they have got none. If you would let me know the names of those who have remained true to the cause, I will send them some money.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Gouvea, 7th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letter of this morning. I recommend to you to keep an officer with a good glass always upon the highest part of the hill above Maçal do Chaõ, from whence he will command a view of the whole country. Cocks will be well off. Put a few men at Linhares, to communicate with those at Prados.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouvea, 7th Sept. 1810

As you have not transmitted the note of the government, to which yours of the 2d was an answer, I am probably not very well able to judge of its contents; but in order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the government that I will not stay in the country, and that I shall advise the King's government to withdraw the assistance which His Majesty affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointments of Marshal Beresford's staff, for which he is responsible; or with the operations of the army, or with any of the points which, under the original arrangement with Marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management.

I propose also to report to His Majesty's government, and refer to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken if the Portuguese government refuse, or delay to adopt, the civil and political arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military operations which I am carrying on. The preparatory measures for the destruction of, or rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested by me long ago; and Marshal Beresford did not write to government upon them, till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes upon the subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures may be adopted, not

only in the country between the Tagus and the Mondego, north of Torres Vedras, as originally proposed, but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal; and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military officers. I have already adopted this measure with success in this part of the country, and it must be adopted in others, in which it is probable that the enemy may endeavor to penetrate; and it must be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it is only consistent with all the other measures which for the last 12 months I have recommended to the government, to impede and render difficult, and, if possible, to prevent the advance into and establishment of the enemy's forces in this country. But it appears that the government have lately discovered that we are all wrong; they have become impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had the power, I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending to this call, and the cause would now have been safe; but now, having the power in my hands, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government.

I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the Regency, and as I must attribute it to the persons recently introduced into the government, it affords additional reason with me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the subject to the Prince Regent, if I should hear any more of this conduct. I leave it to you to communicate the whole or any part of this letter to the Regency.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Gouvea, 7th Sept. 1810.

I have no news for you that is not contained in my letters to the Sec. of State, of which I enclose copies.

It appears that the enemy's plan is to attack Badajoz next, where I shall have more advantage in opposing him than I have had yet. 17 officers and 500 men of the 24th Portuguese regiment have already deserted from the French, and have come in at one place; and others have come into Braganza.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 7th Sept. 1810.

I enclose a letter which has been received by the Commissary Gen. of this army, upon which I have only to observe that if it is the desire of His Majesty's government to carry on extensive military operations, they must leave some power of reward for zeal, intelligence, activity, and ability in the hands of those who are to stimulate their inferiors to exertion; and that if the system proposed in the enclosed letter is to be adopted, it would be better at once that the heads of departments in England should take upon themselves the detailed management of concerns here, and should make themselves responsible for them.

While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid drawing your Lordship's attention to the mode of promoting, not only commissaries, but the officers of the army, and those attached to all the departments. With the

largest concern to manage that has lately been entrusted to any officer in the British army, and with the heaviest responsibility that ever was placed upon any, I have not the power of promoting a man of any rank or of any description; and the trial will certainly have been made in my case, whether with success or not still remains to be ascertained, with how small a proportion of the power of reward an officer in command of an army can carry on the service. At the same time I assure your Lordship that I have no desire to possess the power of promoting officers of the Commissariat, which it is the design of the enclosed letter to retain in the hands of the Commissary in Chief, or that of promoting officers in the army. I am not acquainted even with their names or their persons, excepting in the service; and excepting to reward their services, or to stimulate their exertions, it must be a matter of indifference to me whether they are promoted or not.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Baron Low, K. G. L.*

7th Sept. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th inst., which I have submitted to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces; and I am directed to acquaint you that positively no cars are allowed to carry baggage of any description, and that the Commander of the Forces will hold you responsible for the smallest disobedience of his orders in this respect.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G., Cavalry.*

7th Sept. 1810.

Having procured a forge cart to be attached to the Adj. Gen.'s office at head quarters, I am very desirous of getting 2 good smiths for the purpose of keeping the horses of the staff from the farriers of the dragoon regiments. If Sir S. Cotton could so far assist an arrangement which would be much for the public service, as to spare any man who may be an unemployed farrier in the dragoon regiments to work at head quarters, it would be of infinite advantage. I well know how valuable farriers are in the cavalry, and therefore this request is submitted with extreme reluctance: but I am sure, if managed, it would be attended with very general good effects; and feeling this, I have no hesitation in submitting it for consideration.

[*The same to Brig. Gen. Howorth, R.A.*]

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

Gouvea, 8th Sept. 1810.

I enclose another complaint respecting the boats upon the Mondego. I desire that Mr. — may send me without loss of time the register of the number of boats received and of the number delivered for the use of the Portuguese Commissariat for 10 days preceding the 3d inst. If my orders have been disobeyed, I shall bring Mr. — to a Court Martial.

To the Hon. A. C. Johnstone.

Gouvea, 8th Sept. 1810.

I received only yesterday your letters of the 30th Aug. and 1st Sept. The army is well supplied with cattle, but I will refer the suggestion contained in the latter to the consideration of the Commissary Gen.

I am obliged to you for the suggestion contained in the former, upon which subject I have repeatedly written to the Marques de la Romana; and I hope that by this time he will have made a disposition of his army by which his communication with us will be more certain.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.

Gouvea, 8th Sept. 1810.

The man named Leitaõ, who prepared and gave provisions to the French

at Penamacor, is now at Marshal Beresford's quarters, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire Capt. Grant to go over there and state to the Commission what he knows of him.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gouvea, 8th Sept. 1810.

I have received your two letters of the 6th. The enemy appear to be moving to their left, and I understand have some cannon at San Martin de Trebejo, which is heavy; but I cannot get positive intelligence of this fact.

I beg that you will tell Col. Le Cor, in answer to his letter, that if the people of the country are in earnest in their desire to defend themselves, and to be saved from the French, the proclamations of the Marquez d'Alorna, which contain nothing but sophistical nonsense, can have no effect upon them. I have no doubt that they are inclined to defend themselves, and that the country will yet be saved; but it is necessary that every person should do his duty, and that no encouragement should be given to the notions propagated by Alorna and other traitors, whose only object is to facilitate the entry of the country to the French. And yet it is extraordinary that any man in his senses should act this part, which is, after all, only that of the jackal; for the French would certainly not be satisfied even with the lion's share of the plunder, but would take all. The conduct of the Marquez d'Alorna can be accounted for only by imputing to him extreme folly and inordinate vanity and ambition. I am convinced that nothing is to be hoped for in a negotiation with such a man; but if any thing could be hoped for, I have no right to authorise Col. Le Cor to enter upon it; and I cannot allow of his having any communication with any body in the enemy's army.

To Marshal Beresford.

Gouvea, 8th Sept. 1810.

Upon considering the subject which you mentioned to me last night, I do not think it so important as it appeared to me upon first hearing it. The remedy which we agreed upon will answer some purpose, and I have it in my power to make some arrangements immediately, and others hereafter, which will effectually prevent all mischief of the description supposed in that quarter. I beg you, however, not to mention the subject to any body. The croaking which already prevails in the army, and particularly about head quarters, is disgraceful to us as a nation, and does infinite mischief to the cause; and it would become much worse if this story were known.

In respect to Principal Sousa, I shall have time to consider what shall be done with him between this and next Thursday. I can certainly get rid of him, if that is thought desirable, and an object worth incurring the unpopularity of any interference in the frame of the government by us.

To Marshal Beresford.

Gouvea, 8th Sept. 1810.

I return Silveira's letter of the 4th. He gets the report in his letter of the 5th from Echavarri, who writes to the same purport on the 3d to O'Lawlor. But I enclose a letter of the 2d from Salamanca, which positively contradicts the account of the arrival of the reinforcement at Toro,

and states that all the troops are gone into Navarre. I likewise enclose a letter from Ruman, which states that on the 28th the reinforcement had not arrived at Valladolid; could it be in Toro on the 1st? I shall write to Massena about the Ordenanza.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.*

8th Sept. 1810.

I have laid Col. Harcourt's letter, agreeably to your desire, before the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed to acquaint you that his Excellency can by no means admit a short march across the mountains as a reason why a camp kettle mule should be replaced at the public expense. You will therefore be pleased to direct Col. Harcourt immediately to call upon the captain of the company to replace the mule at his own expense; and you will acquaint me, for his Excellency's information, on the 10th inst., that these orders are obeyed.

I return Col. Harcourt's letter.

*The A.G. to Brigade Major —.*

8th Sept. 1810.

I have laid your letter of the 2d inst., addressed to Col. Pakenham, before the Commander of the Forces, and I am directed to acquaint you that, in consequence of your very long absence, he cannot permit you to resume your staff situation.

To Col. Peacocke.

Gouvea, 9th Sept. 1810.

I beg that 2 companies of the 2d batt. 88th regt. may be posted at S. Julian, to take charge of the new works there, and of that fort, with such a detachment of the Royal artillery as can be spared from the duties at Lisbon.

You will give directions to the officer who will command at S. Julian, to attend to the orders heretofore given respecting the works, and to allow no person whatever to go into or to inspect them, excepting the officers of the engineers or artillery, and persons employed under their directions, or persons having orders in writing from Marshal Beresford or me, to be admitted to view them. I request that the fort at Paço d'Arcos may be occupied by the troops from S. Julian, by an officer's guard of 20 men.

I beg you to arrange with the Portuguese Sec. of State, by the permission of the King's minister at Lisbon, to carry these orders into execution, and you will give the directions which may be necessary for cleaning out the barracks, &c. The post at S. Julian is still to continue under your orders.

Au Col. Pavetti.\*

Au Quartier Général, ce 9 Sept. 1810.

J'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez adressée de Thomar, et j'envoie vos lettres aux avant postes de l'armée Française.

Votre domestique a passé ici il y a trois jours avec vos effets; et comme je n'ai reçu aucune proposition de la part du Commandant en Chef de l'armée Française pour vous échanger, je vous prie de vous préparer à partir par la première occasion.

Au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Easing.

Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise, ce 9 Sept. 1810.

Il m'a fait la plus grande peine d'apprendre que vous avez donné des

\* Commanding the French *gendarmes*: he was taken prisoner at Nave d'Aver by the Portuguese Ordenanza.

ordres à l'armée Française de ne pas faire de prisonniers parmi l'Ordenanza Portugaise, et que les troupes Françaises obéissent à cet ordre, et fusillent tous ceux de ce corps qui leur tombent dans les mains.

Il faut que je vous fasse savoir que tout Portugais est obligé par les anciennes lois du pays de servir dans les troupes de ligne, ou dans la milice, ou dans l'Ordenanza; et que les troupes des trois descriptions sont également soumises aux lois militaires, et sont sous les ordres des officiers généraux Portugais. La preuve en est, que malgré que l'Ordenanza ait souffert et se plaint des ordres que vous avez donnés, et de la violation des usages de la guerre en leurs personnes, ils obéissent aux ordres qui leur ont été donnés; et ont préservé la vie, et ont bien traité tous les prisonniers qui sont tombés dans leurs mains. M. le Col. Pavetti, au sort duquel vous vous êtes intéressé, a été fait prisonnier par cette même description de troupes, et il en a été bien traité, aussi bien que son escorte.

Comme l'Ordenanza fait donc partie de l'armée Portugaise, comme elle est également sujette aux lois militaires, et comme elle agit d'une manière loyale envers les prisonniers de l'armée Française qui tombent dans ses mains, je vous prie de donner ordre que les officiers et soldats de l'Ordenanza, faits prisonniers, jouissent également avec les autres soldats de l'armée Portugaise des droits et usages de la guerre.

Depuis que j'ai commandé les troupes dans ce pays ci, j'ai fait tout ce qui a été en mon pouvoir, et j'ai réussi à faire faire la guerre d'une manière loyale; et j'ai fait respecter les usages de la guerre établis et reconnus parmi les nations civilisées qui avaient été oubliés. Mais si l'armée Française continue à faire fusiller les prisonniers qu'on fera de l'Ordenanza, on ne peut pas s'attendre que les soldats de ce corps, aussi bien que les autres soldats de l'armée Portugaise, ne retournent pas sur les prisonniers qu'ils feront de l'armée Française. Il ne sera plus en mon pouvoir de les protéger; et les ordres que vous avez donnés seront la cause des malheurs que souffriront les soldats de l'armée Française qui tombent dans les mains des troupes Portugaises.

To the Correspondent at Salamanca.

Gouvea, 9th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 2d inst., for which I am much obliged to you. We have had no news lately, but I shall write to you when there is any. Every thing is going on well, and I hope that in the end we must succeed.

I approve highly of the plan of general communication which you have mentioned. Let me know how I can aid you in it; and if you want money, how much, and how it can be sent. I have not got the paper which contained the letters; but I saw it. It is certainly a matter of no importance, although I considered it proper to inform you of it.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gouvea, 9th Sept. 1810.

There is some suspicion at Lisbon, whether with ground or not I cannot tell, of the Visconde de —, who is an officer of the — regt. of cavalry, with Fane. Some letters will be sent by him to his wife, by a servant who left Lisbon on the 5th inst., and it is desirable to endeavor to get



sold of these letters. Communicate with Fane upon this subject. The first thing to do is to endeavor to discover whether such a servant has been sent, or rather has reached the Visconde; the next to observe him, and to seize him when he leaves him, and forward his papers to me by post, and himself afterwards, under pretence that he is a spy. If possible, employ no Portuguese in this business, and do not create any suspicion of the Visconde, for I believe that, after all, there is nothing in the story. If you cannot discover the servant, and seize him, without bringing some Portuguese into the plan, or suspicion upon the young man, leave it alone, as I can have the servant stopped near Lisbon.

There is nothing new here. Watch Regnier's movements well, particularly if he goes across the Tagus.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Gouvea, 9th Sept. 1810.

I received last night your letter of the 5th. I do not recollect to have had the advantage of serving with the navy on shore, but there are several officers in this army who have, among others the Commissary Gen., and they all declare that they do not recollect an instance of the officers and seamen and marines having any additional allowance, either of provisions or pay, upon such service, excepting båt and forage for the officers, or the allowance of Brig. Generals for the captains, where officers of that rank were employed, of sufficient standing, and in command of brigades of seamen.

It is certainly a great disadvantage to us to be deprived of the assistance which it is now, and will be, I hope, more, in your power to give us in various ways; but, without orders from the Sec. of State, I cannot make any alteration in the allowances of pay or provisions, or establish a precedent which might be attended by such important consequences. I propose, however, to refer your letter to the Sec. of State, by the next packet. In the mean time I have requested Col. Fletcher to desire the Engineer in charge of our works to adopt measures to take charge of our signal stations; and if you should withdraw the officers and men of the navy from them, I request you to desire the Lieutenant to communicate, on his quitting them, with the Engineer.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouvea, 9th Sept. 1810.

Beresford has communicated to me your letter of the 5th, and as the Visconde — is in Hill's corps, I have written to Hill to endeavor to have the servant stopped, if he can do so without involving himself, or bringing unfounded suspicion on the Visconde. But, as he may not be able to do so, I recommend that, as the servant must be known by the police at Lisbon, they should stop him as a spy and seize his papers, as he shall approach Lisbon.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouvea, 9th Sept. 1810.

Marshal Beresford has stated to me a circumstance which appears to deserve some attention, upon which I am now about to trouble you. It appears that there was a fire at Lisbon nearly about the time that the accounts were received of the fall of Almeida, and that the two regiments

of militia of the town of Lisbon were employed upon the occasion. Either during the continuance of the fire, or after it, both officers and soldiers went into the neighbouring coffee houses to refresh themselves, and the general conversation among them turned upon the fall of Almeida, upon Massena's and Alorna's proclamations, and the probability that the English would embark; and the general notion appeared to be that it would be proper for these two battalions to take possession of *as Torres*,\* and prevent the English from carrying their intention into execution. These battalions were destined to garrison Setuval and Palmella; but, as their disposition appears to be warlike, I have ordered them up to the army, and I shall send into these garrisons other battalions not quite so well disposed to war. I have, besides, given directions that Col. Peacocke will occupy the only *Torres*\* which can be of any importance to us; and I hope soon to have it in my power to secure the command of all the communications with Lisbon, in such a manner as to set at defiance these patriotic citizens.

In the mean time, however, the temper of mind of Lisbon becomes a subject of importance; and, as the French appear inclined to afford us leisure to adopt any arrangements we may think proper on any subject, I think we cannot employ our time better than in accustoming these gentry to the discipline to which it is obvious they must submit as soon as matters become at all critical. What I should propose, therefore, is that the government should now carry into execution the plan of police which I proposed to them some time ago. If they consent to adopt it, it may be adopted, if they choose it, on a suggestion which I shall make to them; but they ought to publish a proclamation, directing that all the coffee houses should be shut up at sun set; that the patrols which are organised should go every hour, day and night; that all disorderly assemblages of people should be immediately dispersed, &c. These measures will accustom the mob of Lisbon to the discipline they must undergo, and will keep matters quiet at the critical moment. I can only declare this, that if I find the government hesitating upon this subject, and alarmed by the mob of Lisbon, and inclined to allow them to go to the lengths in which they will be really formidable, I shall forthwith embark the army, whatever may be the prospects of final success in our military operations. In taking this step, I shall literally obey the instructions which I have received; and the Portuguese nation will have the satisfaction of losing itself, and the Peninsula, notwithstanding the best prospects of salvation, by the folly of the people and the pusillanimity of the government. I shall be obliged to you if you will confer upon this subject with the government, and communicate to them my ideas as above stated.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what progress has been made in the organization of the shipping concerns, and the arrangements for embarkation, what quantity of forage they will have disposable, &c., &c., as we may as well take advantage of the present calm to settle all that matter conclusively. I must say that I attribute much of the existing agitation in Lisbon to the conduct of the government, and particularly of the new members of it: not from evil incli-

\* The forts.

nation and design, but from what is worse, probably, in men in public situations in these times; bad heads. If these foolish fellows cannot be kept in order, we must get rid of them; and one mode of doing so is, that I shall insist upon Sousa's being sent away; and he might go upon an embassy to England to ask for money, or any thing else that might be suggested; and once there, we might keep him there. However, it would be preferable, first, to try the effect of your presence in the government.

Pray write to Lord Wellesley, and beg him not to allow the English De Sousa to talk to him upon the affairs of Portugal, with which he has nothing to do.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Gouvea, 10th Sept. 1810, 4 A.M.

I received your letter at 1, and I have delayed till now to answer it, in hopes that I should have received something further from you.

If the enemy continues upon Guarda, you cannot keep your piquets so far forward as they are now. You must keep a post of observation at Prados; and the most advanced vedette in the daytime should be on the hill above Maçal do Chaõ; the hussars in Lagiosa, or in the open ground in front of Celorico; every thing else on this side of Celorico, or in that town. Put something in Linhares to keep up the communication by that road with the post at Prados, and something by the Val das Aras for the same purpose by the other. I think it most probable that this advance upon Guarda is a strong reconnaissance, particularly if the enemy do not advance upon your front this morning.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Gouvea, 10th Sept. 1810.

Having received no further intelligence from you or Cocks since last night, I conclude that the detachment seen from Guarda was not of the size stated by the dragoon; and that they did not even go to Guarda, and were only a reconnoitring party. It is not improbable, however, that, as they have been reconnoitring the roads towards Guarda for some days past, they will take possession of that town, and they can do it when they please.

A surgeon upon the French staff, who was attached to the 66th regt., has been taken prisoner, and just now brought in here. He was with the 66th on Thursday or Friday night, when they were moving towards Guarda to reconnoitre it. He lost his way, and was taken prisoner by the peasantry. He says that on this day or to-morrow, the head quarters were to be moved from Fort Concepcion to Pinhel. His other reports refer to matters foreign from the plan of operations in Portugal. Whether Guarda was taken possession of or not yesterday evening, I think you will do well to carry into execution the movement which you proposed yesterday with the Royals and the 14th light dragoons, to which Murray signified my consent yesterday evening.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Gouvea, 10th Sept. 1810, 2 P.M.

I have just received your letter of 10 A.M. I enclose one which I have received from Cocks. Both accounts appear to agree pretty well. If

the enemy advance in concert, I think that they will take possession of Guarda with a stronger force. I conclude that Cocks will have returned to Guarda. You will observe that he retired by the road to Manteigas, to which I see no objection when he shall retire again. But if he does so, there should be likewise a post on Prados, to observe the enemy, and also one at Linhares, otherwise they would be on the great road before you would know it.

The road from Guarda to Manteigas is by Misarelha, Fameliçaõ, Valhelhas, and Sameiro. From Misarelha there is a road by Vide Monte to Prados and Linhares. From Fameliçaõ there is a road to Mello, but a bad one. From Manteigas there is a road to this place, to Cea, and to every other place in this valley. Desire Cocks to have the road from Guarda to Manteigas examined, and let me know what kind of one it is.

P.S. The people of Covilhã lodged their property in Manteigas, but I fancy that nothing can keep the enemy out of that place. Send Cocks this letter, or a copy of it, as an answer to his, and tell him I shall keep his 2 men here to give them provisions, and send them to him early in the morning.

To Marshal Beresford.

Gouvea, 10th Sept. 1810.

Cocks sent a dragoon with a message to Cotton yesterday evening, at 5½, to inform him that a column, consisting of 3000 cavalry and 5000 infantry, were just entering Guarda. The dragoon arrived here at 1 in the morning; but I have as yet heard no more of this column. The telegraph, however, tells me that Cotton is at Celorico. A surgeon, taken prisoner on Thursday or Friday night, says that Massena's head quarters were to be moved this day, or to-morrow, to Pinhel. He was going with the 66th regt. to reconnoitre Guarda, when he lost his way, and was taken by the peasants.

When you talk of the survey of the ordnance and stores in the forts of the Alentejo, do you mean Setuval and Palmella, or Elvas and La Lippe? Because I fear that Leite will be a little jealous of interference in the latter.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Baron Lou, K.G.L.*

10th Sept. 1810.

I have laid your letter of the 8th, and the enclosures from Lieut. Col. Belleville and Paymaster —, before the Commander of the Forces, and am directed to acquaint you that his Excellency will not grant the leave of absence requested, because the Paymaster states in his letter that he considers his responsibility for money which he has received on account of the battalion to be at an end. You will therefore be pleased to inform Mr. — that he and his securities are responsible for every sum that he has received on account of the battalion; and that he has mistaken the mode of obtaining a favor from the Commander of the Forces, if he supposes it is to be procured by making a vain and fruitless threat.

N.B. I return the enclosures.

To Marshal Beresford.

Gouvea, 11th Sept. 1810.

I enclose you Forjaz's letter respecting Capt. Fain. Will you order him to Lisbon? I find that Senhor Sodré\* is a suspected person, as well as Lemos and Mosinho. Let me know when you wish that I should send the orders for — to go to Elvas.

\* The Portuguese interpreter and translator at the head quarters.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouvea, 11th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 8th, which has induced me to suspend the execution of an intention which I had formed of writing to the government on the 3d article of their *Noticia*, respecting the officers of the army who have entered the service of the enemy. The arrangements under this article are directly contrary to those which Beresford and I had settled and agreed to recommend, and which I recommended in my letter to the government of the 5th, and which Beresford has, I believe, announced in G. O. to the army. However, as I understand from your letter that you approved of this *Noticia*, as well as of the Proclamation, &c., I shall defer noticing the subject to the government.

I do not recollect a circumstance which made such an impression on the British army, and upon the English officers serving with the Portuguese army, as the account of the conduct of the officers of the 24th regt.; and after full consideration, the measure which I recommended, and the distinct statement of the principle on which it was recommended, appeared the only means of reconciling the minds of the officers of the British army to what had occurred, and to further service with the Portuguese; at the same time that it held out a standard of sentiment and principle for the officers of the Portuguese service on similar occasions. I wished to avail myself of this opportunity of showing them what the principles of men of honor, and the sentiments of officers and gentlemen, ought to induce them to do on similar occasions. I am sorry to say that this object is defeated by the publication of the notice of the government; and it would have been accomplished, if the government would have waited for the official communication of the circumstances on which they have decided, as I am convinced that you would have seen at once my object in the measure which I recommended, and would have supported it with all your influence. As it is now the arrangement, it must be left to take its course.

While writing upon this subject, I should wish to draw your attention to the inconvenience resulting from the precipitation of the government, as well as from the practice, notwithstanding what I before wrote to them, of publishing Marshal Beresford's accounts, as well as mine, of the same transactions. There is no person who deprecates mystery more than I do; and it is impossible for two people to understand each other better than Beresford and I. He is 2 miles from this, and I see him every day; and I believe that we take pretty nearly the same view of every transaction. But a different mode of expression, a difference in the degree of importance assigned to any transaction, the details of which are related by different individuals, who probably have taken the same view, make a material difference in the eyes of the very jealous public, both of the Peninsula and of England, who will judge of our actions.

In a late instance I see that the Portuguese papers have observed and canvassed some little difference which they suppose there was between Beresford's reports and mine, which observations will certainly be copied into the English newspapers, with all the additional observations which malevolence can suggest. I attribute the publication of these reports made by Beresford to the feverish state in which the government has been

since Principal Sousa has become a member of it. Beresford very properly makes a daily report of events, but it must be observed that the view to be given in these reports cannot be so accurate as that which is given after the events have been well considered and further inquired into.

For instance, if I had written to you yesterday, I should have told you that the enemy had on Sunday night marched a large column upon Guarda. I now know that this was merely a reconnaissance, that but a few cavalry entered Guarda, and that the whole fell back upon Sabugal yesterday, owing to their patrols falling in with ours. There is no harm in government being informed of these events as they come to our knowledge; but where is the use of keeping the public in a state of fever by the publication of them? But it comes to this, if the Portuguese government publish any report of military transactions, excepting mine, I shall make them no report; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will intimate this to them. They now have the same report that I make to my own government.

It appears that you have had a good smart contest with the government respecting our plan of operations. They will end in forcing me to quit them, and then they will see how they will get on. They will then find that I alone keep things in their present state. Indeed, the temper of some of the officers of the British army gives me more concern than the folly of the Portuguese government. I have always been accustomed to have the confidence and support of the officers of the armies which I have commanded; but, for the first time, whether owing to the opposition in England, or whether the magnitude of the concern is too much for their minds and their nerves, or whether I am mistaken and they are right, I cannot tell; but there is a system of croaking in the army which is highly injurious to the public service, and which I must devise some means of putting an end to, or it will put an end to us. Officers have a right to form their own opinions upon events and transactions; but officers of high rank or situation ought to keep their opinions to themselves: if they do not approve of the system of operations of their commander, they ought to withdraw from the army. And this is the point to which I must bring some, if I should not find that their own good sense prevents them from going on as they have done lately. Believe me that, if any body else, knowing what I do, had commanded the army, they would now have been at Lisbon, if not in their ships.

As for advancing into Spain, the idea is ridiculous. I can only tell you, that of which I am the most apprehensive is that the enemy will raise the blockade of Cadiz. Unless Heaven shall perform a miracle, and give the Spaniards an army, arms, and equipments, we should be ruined by this measure, and then the cause is gone. Now, supposing that I am wrong in my plan of operations, and the principal officers of the British army still more wrong, and Principal Sousa and the Bishop right, and that I have it in my power to act offensively in Spain, how would it be when the French army in Andalusia would be brought against us? Would the Spanish force, which a part of that army keeps shut up in Cadiz, be equal to the whole of it in the field? Not unless, by a miracle, Heaven would add to their numbers!

The intelligence from Madrid is very interesting. I observe, however, that they have omitted a great part of the French force in their statement. Regnier's force is not mentioned at all. I enclose a most interesting dispatch which my brother has desired me to send you. Let me have it again.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Gouvea, 11th Sept. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th inst.; and the detail of the distribution of the transports, which it contains, is very satisfactory. As it is always in our power to send transports to Cadiz, and not so easy to get them back again, I think it would be advisable to detain the transports which brought the 79th and 88th regts. The 6 empty victuallers and store ships might be sent to England.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

11th Sept. 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you, in reply to your letter to him relative to a suspicious person that is in confinement at the head quarters of the 14th light dragoons, supposed to be a spy, that there appears from your statement sufficient evidence against this man to convict him before the commission that is established; and you will be pleased to cause him to be sent under an escort to head quarters. The person relative to whom I wrote in a former letter which I addressed to you, and who is in confinement here, is named —; and I beg to be informed if you know the circumstances of this man's apprehension, or any thing concerning him.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Moimenta, 12th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letter, at noon, conveying the intelligence of the enemy advancing upon Guarda. I am here, dining with Beresford. You had better carry into execution this evening, or early in the morning, the directions contained in my letter written to you yesterday morning at 4.

Arrange with the officer at Trancoso that he is to fall back by the road before pointed out to you, when your piquets shall be obliged to retire from the front of Celorico.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 12th Sept. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a correspondence respecting the want of cleanliness in the cavalry transports which conveyed the squadron of the 13th light dragoons from Cadiz to Lisbon, in consequence of which the horses of that squadron have become very sickly.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 12th Sept. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch of the 17th Aug., in which you enclosed one of the 15th Aug., addressed to Lieut. Gen. Graham.

I am not certain, from the perusal of these papers, whether it is your Lordship's intention that any troops should be sent from Cadiz to Portugal besides the 79th and 94th regts., and the squadron of the 13th light dragoons; or whether it is your Lordship's intention to leave to Gen. Graham a discretion to send more troops to Portugal, if he should find that I am pressed by the enemy. I understand that I am not to call

for more than those already arrived; but Gen. Graham, as well as His Majesty's government, is acquainted with my opinion that all the British troops might with safety be withdrawn from Cadiz, with the exception of a small detachment, and that the reinforcement of this army is an object of importance, if it be wished to maintain the contest in the Peninsula.

Au Marquis de la Romana.

à Gouvea, ce 13 Sept. 1810.

Le Général Hill vous aura appris que le corps de Regnier est encore une fois venu de ce côté ci; je ne comprends pas pourquoi, à moins que ce ne soit vrai, comme on le dit, qu'une partie du corps de Junot est allé à Salamanque, à cause des insurrections du côté de Valladolid. Je vous écris seulement pour vous dire que comme j'avais entendu que quelques chevaux de la brigade de Madden étaient blessés aux dos par les selles, je lui ai fait renvoyer deux escadrons du régiment qui est à Elvas, pour les remplacer jusqu'à ce que les siens seraient rétablis; et je vous prie de mettre ces deux escadrons sous les ordres du Général Madden avec les autres.

Tous les Portugais ont déserté, excepté à peu près 200 qui n'en ont pas eu l'occasion, et ceux là ont été envoyés prisonniers en France. On a abandonné le projet de faire de ce corps le cadre d'une Légion Portugaise.

Je crois que quelques uns des bataillons que je vous ai dit être à Nantes et sur la Loire, ont joint le corps de Junot.

P.S. Je n'ai pas eu de vos nouvelles depuis le 1<sup>r</sup> du mois.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gouvea, 13th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 11th. A detachment which, from your account of the march of Regnier's corps, and as it came from Penamacor, I believe belonged to the 2d corps, entered Guarda yesterday, and retired towards the Coa again in the evening. I have as yet heard of no movement this day.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouvea, 13th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 11th. I am very much afraid that the government are going too fast with their suspicions. I find they are about to send a number of suspected persons to the Western islands. Surely, if there is any ground for suspicion, it is not proper to send them to those islands. I have sent them Capt. Fain, whom they desired to have; but I believe there was no reason to suspect him. I dismissed him from our Staff for illness and neglect of duty; but these faults do not constitute treason and disaffection.

I enclose my dispatch to government, as well as one for the Portu-

G. O.

Gouvea, 13th Sept. 1810.

2. The Commander of the Forces laments that Capt. — should have thought proper to defer till he was brought to trial, to explain the disrespectful expressions which he made use of to his commanding officer, notwithstanding the repeated offers made to him by his commanding officer to receive such explanation.

The officers of the army should recollect that it is not only no degradation, but it is meritorious for him that is in the wrong to acknowledge and atone for his error, and that the momentary humiliation which any man may feel, upon making such an acknowledgment, is more than atoned for by the subsequent satisfaction which it affords him, and by avoiding a trial and conviction of conduct unbecoming an officer.



guese government, which I beg you to keep, unless the government shall engage to make public the reports they receive from me only.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 13th Sept. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter from Lieut. Gen. Hill, in which he has recommended that Mr. Ogilvie should be appointed a Dep. Commissary. From a sense of the abilities and services of Mr. Ogilvie, I had already appointed him to act as a Dep. Commissary till His Majesty's pleasure should be known; and I now beg to request your Lordship to use your influence with the Commissary in Chief in his favor. I assure your Lordship that the supply of troops is no easy matter in this country; and that the officers of the Commissariat, who really perform their duty, require encouragement.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 13th Sept. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Lieut. Gen. Graham, respecting Col. ——. Col. — has since arrived at Lisbon, and I have desired him to remain there for your Lordship's further instructions.

I have already apprised your Lordship of the measures which I had adopted to encourage desertion from the enemy's army opposed to me; and I am convinced that their success is limited only by the difficulty of communicating with the foreign corps, and by that which the soldiers experience in getting away. From what I know of Col. —, I do not think him capable of removing or decreasing either the one or the other.

Great suspicion attaches to all foreigners in the Peninsula, particularly to those who have been in the enemy's service. I have already been obliged to send Col. — to England once, on account of the suspicions which were entertained of him, very much owing to his own misconduct; and I should send him away again immediately, if your Lordship had not been desirous of employing him here. I request, however, that the circumstances which I have above stated may be considered, and that I may have your Lordship's further orders respecting this gentleman.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 13th Sept. 1810.

About the period when the accounts of the loss of Almeida arrived at Lisbon, there was a fire in the town, at which the 2 regiments of militia were employed; and either during the continuance of the fire or after it was over, many of the officers and soldiers of these regiments went into the coffee houses to refresh themselves. Here the conversation turned upon the operations of the armies, upon the loss of Almeida, and upon the proclamations by Massena and the Marquez d'Alorna; and I understand that the sentiment which generally prevailed was, that the design of the English army was to embark, and that it was the duty of those 2 regiments of militia to seize 'the towers,' as they are called, meaning Belem, S. Julian, the Bugio, &c., and to prevent the execution of this design. I should not have troubled your Lordship upon this subject, having already adopted measures to employ this militia more usefully for the public service, and to secure the towers, if I did not conceive that these sentiments of the militia were in some degree connected with those

entertained by the Portuguese government, and with their conduct since the recent changes.

This country has before been in great danger, and a great part of it, probably the richest and most important, was last year in the possession of the enemy; but at all times, and under all circumstances, I have possessed the confidence of the government; and their object has been, as far as was in their power, to forward my views for the public service. I have apprised them of the system of operations in which I deemed it expedient to carry on the defence of the country, and they are aware of the grounds of my opinion, and the details of the plan; and till the late change, excepting occasional remarks from the Patriarch on the supposed danger of his favorite city Oporto, I never received from the government any observation, excepting of confidence, in the measures which I recommended or adopted; and the confidence and satisfaction of the public surpassed that of the government. But the Principal Sousa, who was introduced recently into the government, is of that impatient, meddling, and mischievous disposition (without, however, designing to do harm), that we cannot expect to go on as we have hitherto, so long as he shall continue a member of the government. His indiscretion is equally well known with the other defects of his character; and to this I attribute the dangerous sensation which appears to have been occasioned at Lisbon on the fall of Almeida.

In imitation of the fatal conduct of the Central Junta, the Portuguese Regency, since the late changes, have flattered, instead of coercing the mob of Lisbon, which will become dangerous in proportion as this new system is persevered in. They have likewise, in imitation of the same body, interfered in the military operations, have deliberated upon the propriety of adopting offensive measures, and of moving the army into Spain; and I have no doubt that from the usual indiscretion of the same gentleman, these deliberations and opinions are as well known to the mob of Lisbon as they are to me. Then they have cast reflection and suspicion on every Portuguese employed by Marshal Beresford and me, likewise, in imitation of the Central Junta; and in many important instances, some relating exclusively to the army, they have recently disobeyed the orders of the Prince Regent, to adopt no measure without consulting my opinion.

His Majesty's government will be the best judges what measures ought to be adopted, as a remedy to these evils: but I have already desired Mr. Stuart to give notice to the Regency, that if they continued to interfere in any manner with the military operations, or with the appointments of Marshal Beresford's staff, I should recommend to His Majesty's government to withdraw the army; and if I found that they did not adopt the political and civil measures recommended to them, to correspond with the military operations, I should bring their conduct under the consideration of His Majesty's government; and that if they refused or omitted to coerce the mob of Lisbon, their neglect in this instance would immediately create a danger which would oblige me to evacuate the country, under the instructions which I had received.

In respect to the military operations, His Majesty's government are best aware whether they have been conducted in a manner satisfactory to

them or not. About a year has now elapsed since the army under my command has been the only force which could keep the field in the Peninsula; and, contrary to the general expectation, it is still in the field, has sustained no important loss, and the successful result of this campaign to the enemy becomes every day more doubtful.

The Portuguese Regency may be right in their notion of an offensive operation, and I may be wrong in the calculations which have induced me to prefer the defensive system which I have pursued; but I am very certain that the General and other officers of the British army, at least, of the two, prefer that which I have adopted; although if some of them held the command, the army would long ere now have been in their transports. In respect to an offensive operation in Spain, I have only to observe that if I have mistaken the strength of the several French corps now opposed to me (which is scarcely possible, as I have their returns to the middle of July), and I believe that the Regency have neither information nor fixed plan of any kind, I think I may infer, from the general conduct of the French, that they would not allow their army to be for any length of time inferior to their enemy; and that the result of this advance, if it could be attempted, would be the abandonment of their projects in Andalusia. This would not give the allies any corresponding increase of force, unless the Spanish Regency could, in an instant, raise, form, arm, and equip an army. It could not be supposed, even by the Portuguese Regency, that the army which is now blockaded at Cadiz by a part of the enemy's force in Andalusia, could be equal to the whole of that force, when they should be in the field. The offensive operations, therefore, and the movement into Spain (supposing this last to be allowed by the instructions of His Majesty's government), whatever might be their commencement, must end in defeat and disgrace, and in the destruction of the cause of the allies in the Peninsula.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 13th Sept. 1810.

The enemy have made no movement of importance in front of this part of the army since I addressed you on the 6th inst. A body of about 800 infantry, and some cavalry, entered Guarda on Sunday evening, and obliged our post of observation to retire from thence: the enemy remained there that night, but retired to Alfaiates again in the morning after their patrols had fallen in with ours. Another detachment entered that city again yesterday, and our post of observation retired. The enemy withdrew towards the Coa again in the evening. By letters from Lieut. Gen. Hill, of the 11th, I learn that the whole of the 2d corps were in movement again to the northward from the neighbourhood of Zarza and Salvaterra, and I therefore imagine that the troops which entered Guarda yesterday, and which came from Penamacor, belonged to this corps. No movement has been made in the north, or to the southward of the Tagus.

I have heard of the march within the Spanish frontier of 2 divisions, each of 10,000 men, commanded by Gen. Reille and Gen. Drouet, which, it is said, have been turned off into Navarre, on account of the increasing disturbances in that part of the country. I am not certain that the troops which I know have passed the frontier have been disposed of in this

manner; but I rather believe that some of the battalions, which I heretofore informed your Lordship were collected on the Loire, have joined the 8th corps.

I understand that, with the exception of about 200 men, the whole of the 24th Portuguese regt. have quitted the enemy; and that they have relinquished their intention of making this regiment the foundation of their Portuguese levy, and have sent these men prisoners to France. I have every reason to believe that these men likewise would have returned to Portugal, if it had been in their power. My last letters from Cadiz are of the 1st inst.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 13th Sept. 1810.

The letter which I have had the honor of addressing to your Lordship this day will probably point out the expediency of stationing in the Tagus a large naval force. It is desirable, at all events, that I should be made acquainted with the intentions of His Majesty's government upon this subject at an early period, as there are several measures depending upon it.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Gouvea, 14th Sept. 1810.

I judge, from letters which I have received from England since I wrote to you on the 11th inst., that Lieut. Gen. Graham may consider himself authorised to send to Lisbon another detachment of the troops under his command; and I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will send back to Cadiz the transports which brought round the 79th and 88th regts., which in that letter I requested you to detain in the Tagus.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Gouvea, 14th Sept. 1810.

I am much obliged to you for your letter regarding the horse transports. We experience so much inconvenience from disorders acquired by horses in transports, that I had written to government in order to have some general regulation to provide for their being cleaned regularly after being used.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Gouvea, 14th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 31st Aug. and the 1st inst., and you will have observed from my former letters that I agree entirely with you respecting the impolicy of the conduct of our government regarding the Spanish colonies. From what I hear I believe that they think in England it is impossible to prevent the spirit which has broken forth in Caraccas from spreading all over America. It is my opinion they are mistaken; and the conduct of the people at Monte Video is likely to open their eyes. I likewise think that a premature declaration of independence in the colonies is likely to defeat our object, which must be to keep them out of the hands of France.

I understand that the mulattos and whites at Caraccas have quarrelled already; and, if that is the case, depend upon it not only the other colonies will not follow their example now, but they will consider the matter well before they will separate themselves from Spain, even though Spain should have been completely conquered by the French. The probability

of the division of the people of color and whites, or rather of the rebellion of the former, is not so great after the conquest of Spain by the French as it is now, unless the people of color should have before their eyes the example of successful rebellion in the Caraccas. I trust, however, that the conduct of Monte Video will open the eyes of our government.

I enclose the copy of my report to government of yesterday. I suspect that the French have got some of the troops which I told you were collected at Nantes as a reinforcement. I have heard of 3 of these battalions having joined Junot's corps.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouvea, 14th Sept. 1810.

Dr. Franck has sent me a letter regarding a person who is in the British service by the name of Le Court, whom the government have desired to send out of Portugal. It is really necessary to begin drawing some line upon this subject, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will say that I shall send Mr. Le Court and his son to England, although it will be very inconvenient to the army to do so, if the government will be so kind as to state the grounds which they have for suspecting either of improper conduct. Mr. Le Court was employed by me to take care of the French prisoners going home from Oporto last year, and he has since been employed with the army hospitals, and both he and his son have given great satisfaction.

I have heard that the mob of Lisbon attacked Col. Pavetti, whom I lately sent down to Lisbon as a prisoner, and one of our officers who was in charge of him. This is the way in which they began last year, and they ended by attacking Sir J. Cradock's house; and I believe that Villiers' servants were insulted, and he did not think his own life very safe. If I find the fact to be well founded, I shall call upon the government to state what steps they have taken to punish those guilty of this outrage. I think that the French have got a reinforcement, not only from Nantes, but from a corps which was at Versailles. I find 3 battalions, which were at Nantes in June, now in Junot's corps, and one battalion, which was at Versailles, in Ney's.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G., Cavalry.*

14th Sept. 1810.

I have laid your letter of this date before the Commander of the Forces. He wishes as much as possible to encourage the peasants bringing in the men they find of the French army, and therefore is glad to reward all that arrive, whether they come with deserters or prisoners of war. It is, however, desirable, as far as possible, for the sake of the men, to know of which description they are.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Gouvea, 15th Sept. 1810, 8 p.m.

The enemy have entered the valley of the Mondego in strength, by Guarda and by Maçal do Chaõ; and I understand that Massena's head quarters were to be this day at Pinhel, and to-morrow at Trancoso.\* If that is the case, it is probable that they will move a considerable column by Viseu, which would turn any position we might take upon the Alva. I do not yet know whether it is Regnier's corps which has moved into the valley by Guarda, but you will know that to a certainty from Le Cor; and, if it should be so, you will of course have carried into execu-

\* See Appendix, N.º VIII. and No. IX.

tion your instructions of the 31st Aug. If you should find, when you shall receive this, that it is Regnier's corps that has passed through by Guarda into the valley of the Mondego, or if part of it, which is probable, has crossed the Upper Zezere, the other part having come into the valley of the Mondego by Guarda, send orders to Gen. Leith to move his corps from Thomar to Cabaços, Espinhal, and Foz d'Arouce. I send this letter open to him, that he may be prepared to obey your orders upon this subject. If the enemy should not have moved in force by the Viseu road, this will enable us yet to stop him upon the Alva; if he should, it will only oblige me to give Gen. Leith's corps the trouble of a counter-march.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Gouvea, 15th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 28th Aug., and I am much obliged to you for the communication of the intentions of the Commander in Chief respecting Capt. Pakenham. I certainly understood that Capt. Lloyd of the 43d was a candidate for promotion by purchase. If officers who are able to purchase will not purchase, they must wait until it comes to their turn to be promoted.

In respect to other parts of your letter, I observe from some expressions which it contains, and the general tenor of your observations, that I trod upon tender ground when I addressed you on the subject to which it relates. The sooner I quit it therefore the better, and I shall confine myself merely to referring you to my letter, in respect to the claims of gentlemen of family, fortune, and influence, to promotion; from which you will observe that I urged the expediency of attending to their claims to promotion, only when their professional merits were at least equal, if not superior, to those of others. When I wrote to you I had no intention of making any invidious statement of the advantages which any set of individuals had derived from the system of promotion which had been adopted. I adverted to what is generally understood and reported in the army; and as I purpose to drop the subject entirely, about the result of which I do not care a pin, I shall not enter into any proof of the truth of the statement which I made.

In respect to Colin Campbell, I shall add that you have been misinformed, or I am much mistaken. Before I came to Portugal the first time, the Duke of York promised both Lord Wellesley and me that he would promote him to be a Major, in answer to our recommendations solely on account of his services. He then carried home the dispatches with the accounts of the successes of Roliça and Vimeiro, and he was made a Major by brevet; and the Duke then told him that as soon as he could appoint him to an efficient Majority he would make him a Lieut. Colonel by brevet, recollecting that he had before intended to promote him, and that he had increased his claim by bringing home the accounts of two successes. I never intended to say that I was not obliged by the Commander in Chief's attention to the claims of Colin Campbell to promotion; but I asserted, and with due submission to superior authority must maintain, that he had claims which, independent of any recommendation of mine, must have promoted him.

To Lieut. Col. F. Hervey, 14th Light dragoons.

Gouvea 15th Sept. 1810.

Upon perusal of the letters which you gave me yesterday from Col. Taylor and Mr. Fremantle, and from Col. Torrens to Col. Taylor, I cannot advise you to make any further effort to have your commission of Lieut. Colonel dated to the day of the vacancy.

I am decidedly of opinion that your claim to this favor is strong: 1st; as it was granted to Lieut. Col. Wynyard in a vacancy in this army occasioned in an action in which he was not present. I understand also that there is another recent instance of the grant of this favor to Col. Nisbett, whose appointment was antedated to the period of the vacancy to which he was promoted on the permanent staff. 2dly; the misfortune which you suffered in a former action in this same service would appear to give you a claim to consideration. 3dly; you were present in the affair in which the vacancy was occasioned: and, lastly, it was owing to an unfortunate accident that you were not recommended by me sufficiently early to have your commission signed before the brevet took place.

Col. Talbot was killed in the morning of Wednesday the 11th, the day on which I usually dispatch the mail for England from head quarters, in order that it may be sent by the packet which leaves Lisbon on Sunday. By accident I did not receive the account of Talbot's death till Wednesday evening, and I was obliged to detain the messenger to write the dispatch with the account of it, and I did not recommend you by that occasion, as I did not know what officers were to be promoted in the succession. You were not recommended till the following Wednesday, the 18th. If you had been recommended, as you ought to have been, on the 11th July, you would, in the usual course, have been appointed to the Lieut. Colonelcy before the brevet took place.

Although the delay in the transmission of the recommendation is thus the cause of your being lower down in the list of Lieut. Colonels than you would have been, I am convinced that you will believe that, if I could have imagined that there was to be a brevet, I should have hastened rather than have delayed the letters recommending you. Notwithstanding all this, I cannot recommend to you to adopt any mode of obtaining an earlier date to your commission, of which the Commander in Chief will not entirely approve.

To Major Gen. Leith.

Gouvea, 15th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 11th inst., with the proceedings of the General Court Martial on the trial of Lieut. —, of the — dragoons.

It is always my wish to attend to the recommendation of a General Court Martial, but I am desirous that the Court, of which you are President, should reconsider their recommendation in favor of Lieut. —. It appears to be founded solely on the length of his confinement, which, I must observe, has been in arrest at large. This length of confinement has been owing, in a great measure, to Lieut. — himself, as he did not know the name of the officer, or the number of the regiment to which he belonged, to whom he asserted that he had reported his arrival at Abrantes, and from whom he declared that he had received his orders to proceed to Lisbon. Much time was spent in inquiry for this officer, and then the time of the Dep. Judge Advocate was occupied by other trials.

The extent of the service on which the army is employed, and the difficulty and inconvenience of calling officers from their duty in one part of the army to attend as witnesses upon a trial in another, was the cause of continued delay in bringing Lieut. — to trial: and I would beg the General Court Martial to observe, that if length of confinement is considered and admitted as the ground of recommendation in this instance, it ought in every one, in which the public convenience may render the delay of the trial of an officer necessary.

To Marshal Beresford.

Gouvea, 15th Sept. 1810.

I thought it likely that you would come over this evening, and I did not send to you to let you know that the enemy moved upon Guarda this day in strength, and apparently in earnest, as they have crossed the hill, and are on this side as far as Lagiosa. They likewise moved from Freixedas in strength upon Baraçal. My last note from Cotton was at 5 p.m., when he was about to retire through Celorico. I do not yet know where he will be for the night.

The lady sent to your head quarters says that Massena was to be this day at Pinhel, to-morrow at Trancoso. I enclose a note which she brought from Alorna to his wife, which rather shows that the route of the main body is by Viseu. I don't know whether it is Regnier's corps, or a part of Ney's, which has come through Guarda.

P.S. Send off to Trant at Moimenta.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Gouvea, 15th Sept. 1810.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have just received from the Sec. of State; and as I conceive that it is important to reinforce this army, I beg that you will send to the Tagus the 94th regt., the 2d batt. 30th regt., and the 2d batt. 44th regt.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Gouvea, 15th Sept. 1810.

I enclose a letter for Lieut. Gen. Graham, which it is important should be sent to him without loss of time; and if the vessel which leaves Lisbon every Monday should have sailed when this shall reach you, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will dispatch another vessel with it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Gouvea, 15th Sept. 1810, 3½ p.m.

I consider it almost certain that the enemy have now taken possession of Guarda in earnest; and I think it probable that they will now move forward in your front, and possibly on the Trancoso side in the morning. You had better, therefore, move to the rear of Celorico the whole of the cavalry this afternoon, with the exception of the hussars, which may remain at Celorico, or in front of the town observing the plain.

Put the regiments into Villa Cortez, Cortiçó, Carrapichana, Mesquitella, &c., and if you leave the hussars in front of Celorico, one regiment in that town.

If, however, you find that they do not come in great numbers down the hill of Guarda this afternoon, and you think that you can remain in Lagiosa, Memojal, and Baraçal, without danger of being disturbed this night, you might remain; otherwise it is better to move, although at night. At all



events, you must get the regiments to the rear of Celorico in the morning at daylight. Watch Prados, &c., well.

P.S. Probably you could put more squadrons into Celorico, and the others in the rear in the neighbourhood of that town, without making any great noise in the night.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart. Gouvea, 15th Sept. 1810, 20 min. before 5 P.M.

I have received your note of 2 P.M., and I have heard from Capt. Cocks from Misarelha that the enemy were pushing down Guarda hill; and they have moved a column, but apparently of no great strength, upon Fame-licaõ. You had better retire every thing on this side of Celorico, or into that town for the night, leaving only the hussars in front. It is very desirable that you should put the horses up somewhere for the night, and it would be best at once to remove them to the rear. You may depend upon it that the movement is general. Let me hear from you as soon as the enemy appear to have taken their ground for the night. Don't forget the troop at Trancoso.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart. Gouvea, 15th Sept. 1810, midnight.

I was in hopes that I should have heard from you as soon as all was quiet for the evening; and I am now apprehensive that the directions I shall give you may not suit the situation in which you may be. I wish you to fall back.

I have just received your letter of 8½. I think you had better put the 2 heavy regiments in march to the rear at 4 in the morning. Let them be followed by the 14th, the 16th follow the 14th, and the hussars wait to follow the enemy's movements. Let the baggage go off, and pass through Sampaio and Pinhanços. The officers of the General Court Martial will join their regiments.

There is some straw at Villa Cortez, which should be destroyed by the rear regiment.

P.S. You had better draw the hussars through the town before daylight. Apprise Cocks of your movement; he is at Villa de Mata and Prados.

To Charles Stuart, Esq. Gouvea, 15th Sept. 1810.

I have only time to tell you that the enemy entered the valley of the Mondego this day in force by Guarda, and by Maçal do Chaõ; and I believe that they are about to move a column by Trancoso and Visau. I shall know more, however, in the morning.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart. Gouvea, 16th Sept. 1810.

I fear that we shall knock up the regiments if we don't allow them to get to their ground; and the hussars, having observed the enemy into Celorico, should be allowed to retire to their cantonments. We have a good deal of work before us, and we must not knock up the troops. I have received your note of the 12th from Celorico.

To Marshal Beresford. Gouvea, 16th Sept. 1810, 8 A.M.

The enemy showed yesterday 2 brigades of infantry and 3 or 4 regi-

ments of cavalry on this side of Baraçal, and 5 regiments of cavalry and about 5000 infantry on this side of Guarda. Their advance on that side was at Porto de Carne. The peasants told Cocks that more troops were following these from Pega, and that Belmonte was occupied. But we have a letter from Hervey from Covilhã of yesterday, in which he does not mention this fact. I have nothing from the side of Trancoso. They have only a few squadrons of dragoons on the road from Guarda towards Manteigas. I have ordered our cavalry to fall back, and they are now, I believe, in march. I cannot tell from our telegraph hill whether the enemy has yet moved. I propose to move my head quarters to Cea, yours to S. Romaõ. Murray wishes me to go to Villa Doce, which is a league further back; but I shall not determine upon that till I see how things turn out in the course of the day. Could you come over here?

To Marshal Beresford.

Cea, 17th Sept. 1810.

I enclose a report received in the night. The column mentioned as marching on our left went off by Fornos yesterday morning, and was at Fornos about 3 p.m. It can scarcely have got so far as Mangualde last night. It can have no guns with it; and the prisoner says that Junot has marched upon Oporto, which I conclude means upon Moimenta, from the lower part of the Coa; and this column is intended to keep up the communication with him.

You should order all your sick away from Coimbra at all events, and send people down to be in readiness to remove or destroy your ammunition and other stores there without loss of time. I am going to give similar orders.

P.S. I have ordered every thing to be prepared for a short move in the afternoon, if the enemy should move. The whole of the 2d and 6th corps are in the valley of the Mondego. I enclose another report from Waters.

Au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling.

Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise, ce 17 Sept. 1810.

Le Capitaine Percy,\* au sort duquel je suis fort intéressé, a été blessé et pris, ou tué hier auprès de Celorico, et je vous serai bien obligé si vous voulez permettre qu'on donne de ses nouvelles à mon aide de camp, le Major Gordon; et s'il n'est pas tué, si vous voulez permettre qu'il reçoive les secours d'argent, hardes, &c., que je lui envoie.

J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer des lettres que j'ai reçues, il y a deux jours, du Gouverneur d'Elyas. Je crois que c'est arrangé entre nos gouvernemens que les officiers non combattans ne seraient pas prisonniers de guerre, et si vous l'entendez de cette manière, je prierai le gouvernement Portugais de permettre qu'on renvoie M. Galland; mais en tout cas je lui ferai donner l'argent qui lui est nécessaire.

To Major Gen. Leith

Villa Doce, 17th Sept. 1810.

As the enemy's whole army has decidedly entered the valley of the

\* The Hon. H. Percy. He was afterwards aide de camp to the Duke of Wellington, and carried home the dispatch of the battle of Waterloo.

Mondego, I conclude that you will have received orders from Gen. Hill to make the movement stated in my letter to the General of the 15th.

I wish you in the first instance not to come farther than Espinhal with your division; and on the day that you shall find that the head of Gen. Hill's corps shall arrive at Espinhal, you will move on with your division to Miranda do Corvo, and you will remain there till you shall receive further orders. I request Gen. Hill also to collect his corps at Espinhal, Penella, &c., and remain there till further orders. The 2d and the 6th corps came to Celorico yesterday, and a part of them crossed the Mondego to Fornos. More have crossed the Mondego this day, and no part of the enemy's army has moved this way. It is generally understood that the whole army is between the Douro and the Mondego, and are about to march upon Coimbra. I shall have troops in Coimbra to-morrow. Send this letter to Gen. Hill.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Sampaio, 17th Sept. 1810, 8½ A.M.

It does not appear that the enemy are moving in front, but it is evident that they are doing so on the left beyond the Mondego. I see a very heavy dust hanging over Mangualde.

I think you had better, as soon as convenient to you, make the disposition for the day. Let every thing march, excepting what you will leave in Sampaio and Gouvea to observe the enemy. These should fall back as soon as they shall observe them entering the plain in any strength about Villa Cortez, &c., and not engage any thing. The hussars here want bread.

*The A.G. to Major Marston, A.Q.M.G., Coimbra.*

17th Sept. 1810.

I have to acquaint you that it is the Commander of the Forces' orders that the sick should be removed from Coimbra to Figueira, at which place the whole are to embark as soon as they arrive. It will be necessary that you should ascertain not only the number of our own sick, and the quantity of tonnage for them at Figueira, but also the Portuguese sick, as they are also to be moved.

With regard to the women whom you mention in your letter of the 15th, received this day, you will be pleased to have such proportion of them sent to Figueira as you may understand there is room for in the ships after the sick are accommodated; and the remainder, or indeed the whole, should there not be tonnage, be sent by route to Lisbon. Of course all sick officers, &c., are comprehended in the removal.

To the Hon. A. C. Johnstone.

Cortiço, 18th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 12th and 14th, for which I am much obliged to you. I believe that we may have every confidence in the Governor of Elvas, who is a very honest and an able man, and who does not want for firmness.

The enemy's recent movements on the right of the Mondego have enabled me to call in all the detached corps of this army, and we shall have them collected immediately. I wish that the Marques de la Romana was a little nearer to us. However, I hope he is in no danger.

Mr. Kennedy, the Commissary Gen., will send a gentleman to Badajoz immediately, to endeavor to purchase for the army a supply of cattle.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Cortiçó, 18th Sept. 1810, 6 A.M.

In case you should not have read Waters's reports, I send them to you. It is evident that the enemy's arrangements are all directed to a movement on the right of the Mondego; but it is still desirable to have an eye upon their proceedings on the left of the river. I think, therefore, that you should leave an intelligent officer, with a party of hussars, in Gouvea, who might keep a few men in Sampaio. This is desirable, as well to keep an eye upon what is passing upon that road, as to communicate with Waters at Folgozinho.

I beg you to write to him, and desire him to forward his reports to the officer of hussars at Gouvea, and desire this officer to send them on to you.

P. S. Tell the officers of hussars to give any reward that Waters may desire to the peasants who shall bring letters from him.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cortiçó, 18th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 15th, and I entirely concur with you, that nothing can be more shameful, or more injurious to the common cause, than the recent conduct of the Portuguese government. If I should find that it is really believed that we have any concern in the recent arrests, I shall adopt some mode of denying it publicly; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will take every opportunity of saying that those who have been arrested are not more displeased with the measure than we are all.

P. S. Mr. Stuart will tell you the news. Things are not quite so bad as they will be supposed. The enemy's movements have enabled me to order

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Extracts from the Instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

Head quarters, Cortiçó, 18th Sept. 1810.

'The 1st division of infantry will march to-morrow morning from Foz d'Arouce, by N<sup>a</sup> S<sup>a</sup> da Serra; the ford of the river Deixa, near Venda do Cego; and by Cruz dos Morouços to Coimbra. But the artillery, and all other carriages attached to the division, will move to-morrow through Miranda do Corvo to Cazal Novo, and will proceed on the 20th through Condeixa to Coimbra.

'Brig. Gen. Pack will march his brigade at daybreak to-morrow morning to Sta Comba Daó. He will push his advanced guard a considerable way in front, and will endeavor to ascertain whether the enemy has made any movement towards S<sup>ta</sup> Comba Daó and neighbourhood, either from the side of Viseu through Tondella, or direct from Manuaalde by the left bank of the river Daó.

'If the enemy should have already advanced towards the neighbourhood of S<sup>ta</sup> Comba Daó (which is not supposed to be the case) in such force as to prevent Brig. Gen. Pack from making his march to that place, he will continue to watch the enemy as long as possible upon the right bank of the Mondego, and will retire towards Sampaio, when forced to recross the river.

'If Gen. Pack should, however, succeed in making his march to-morrow to S<sup>ta</sup> Comba Daó, he will continue there till further orders, or until forced by superior numbers to retire. In the latter case he will fall back behind the river Criz, by the road towards Barril, and will dispute the passage of the Criz as long as it appears prudent to do so. When forced to fall back from the right bank of the Criz, he will retreat through Barril and Mortagooa towards Botaó.

'Gen. Pack will communicate all intelligence, after he has reached S<sup>ta</sup> Comba Daó, through Mortagooa to Botaó; and he will station a letter party of his cavalry at Mortagooa for that purpose, and will take care that the magistrate there has mounted guides always in readiness to accompany the dragoons sent to Botaó. It will be desirable, in the event of the enemy marching in the direction of the bridge over the Daó at S<sup>ta</sup> Comba Daó, or by the bridge over the Criz between that place and Barril, that these bridges should be destroyed before his arrival. An officer of engineers has accordingly been ordered to accompany Gen. Pack to superintend that service; and a supply of powder will be forwarded for the purpose by the General officer commanding the artillery.'

Hill, Leith, and Le Cor to join me. Coimbra is safe, and we have a good position.

To Marshal Beresford.

Cortiçó, 18th Sept. 1810.

I enclose a complaint against the Juiz de Fora of Torres Novas, which I request you to lay before the special commission.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cortiçó, 18th Sept. 1810.

The enemy collected the whole of the 2d and 6th corps in the valley of the Mondego on the 15th, and on the 16th in the morning moved upon Celorico, from the two directions of Guarda and Maçã do Chaõ. They at the same time moved a large column on their right towards the right of the Mondego. Our cavalry retired from Celorico, and the enemy then moved a column of infantry and cavalry from thence on Fornos towards Mangualde. I understand that they had not yesterday arrived at Mangualde, although it was at first reported that they arrived there on the night of the 16th. They were all day yesterday employed in moving troops from Celorico on Fornos. I have not heard what they have done this day.

It is said that the 8th corps moved by Trancoso on Penaverde on the 16th, so that the whole are collected on the right of the Mondego. This movement has enabled me to call in all my detached corps, and I expect that Hill will cross the Zézere this day, or will do so to-morrow. Leith will move when Hill does.

I have begun by securing Coimbra with 6 brigades of infantry, against any advanced guard that might have been pushed forward. The other 3 divisions and the cavalry are on and in front of the Alva, the advance of the latter still observing the enemy near Celorico.

As soon as I shall hear that Hill has moved, I shall cross the Mondego, move up the troops from Coimbra, and have Hill, Leith, and Le Cor joined to my right. I shall be in a good position, covering Coimbra and the communication with Oporto, which I hope to be able to preserve. There are certainly many bad roads in Portugal, but the enemy has taken decidedly the worst in the whole Kingdom. You will hear a good deal of these movements, and I conclude that it will be necessary to appease the mob by the imprisonment of a few French partisans; but I think the enemy are mistaken in their plan: they evidently do not know the country, and in the mean time we are safe.

I have received your letters of the 15th; I never was so shocked as upon hearing the account of the arrests. I declare publicly against it; and if I find that justice is not done to us by the Portuguese nation upon this subject, I shall take some opportunity of making known my opinion of it to the public. I make no objection to the publication of any official papers received by the government; but I wish to give them reports of the transactions which I am conducting, and if they publish any other reports, I shall not give them any. Of course, both Beresford and you must make regular reports to the authorities by which you are respectively employed; but it is impossible to lay before the public two reports on the same transactions, in which the ingenious public, or rather, the newswriters, will not discover an inconsistency: this I want to avoid. I have not heard one

word from Romana of the plan which Mr. C. Johnstone says he entertains; and I do not believe he entertains it.

Au Col. Pavetti.

Au Quartier Général, ce 18 Sept. 1810

Je viens de recevoir vos lettres. Les gendarmes sont prisonniers de guerre comme les autres soldats. Votre domestique Bernard Gomarki ne sera pas censé prisonnier de guerre; ni votre domestique Baptiste Cella s'il est envoyé ici.

To Major Gen. Leith.

Cortigó, 19th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 18th, and I conclude that you will be this day at Espinhal. I beg that you will march your division to-morrow morning to Foz d'Arouce, stretching the head of your column on as far as Villa Franca.

Let Gen. Hill know that you have received these orders, and that I expect that he will be at Espinhal to-morrow, and that he shall receive directions to march on the next day. The advanced guard of Regnier's corps moved yesterday along the left of the Mondego to Sampaio, where they arrived at 11 o'clock. I believe that the rear of the 6th corps crossed the Mondego to Fornos yesterday, and the movements of the advanced guard of the 2d corps of this day will show definitively what line this corps will take. Send this letter on to Gen. Hill.

Extracts from the Instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

19th Sept. 1810.

The following troops will march to-morrow morning, under the orders of Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, from Coimbra to Mealhada, and the villages adjacent:

- 'The 1st division of infantry.
- 'The 1st batt. 7th Fusiliers, and
- '1st batt. 79th regt.
- 'Brig. Gen. Campbell's, and } Brigades of Portuguese infantry.
- 'Brig. Gen. Colman's
- 'And the brigade of Portuguese artillery attached to them.

'Sir B. Spencer will be pleased to leave orders for the brigade of British artillery attached to the 1st division to follow to Mealhada on the 21st inst.

'The Light division will move from its present cantonments at daybreak to-morrow morning; will cross the river Mondego at the Barca de Couço, and will march from thence to Mortagosa.

'Brig. Gen. Craufurd will send forward, as early as possible, to ascertain whether the artillery of the division can proceed by the above route; and should no practicable road for artillery be found, he will lose no time in reporting the same to head quarters. But if the roads are practicable, though difficult for guns, the artillery may divide the distance into two marches. Gen. Craufurd will put himself in communication as early as possible with Brig. Gen. Pack, who is at S<sup>ra</sup> Coma Daó, and who is to be under Gen. Craufurd's orders whilst the army continues in the position in which it will be placed by the movements of to-morrow.

'Instructions given to Brig. Gen. Pack are enclosed for Gen. Craufurd's information.

'In the event of Gen. Craufurd being forced to fall back, by the advance of a superior enemy, he will retire to the neighbourhood of the convent of Busaco.

'He will be pleased to report any thing particular that occurs to Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer at Mealhada, as well as to head quarters.

'The 4th division of infantry will move from its present cantonments to-morrow morning, and after crossing to the right bank of the Mondego it will canton in the neighbourhood of Penacova. But the artillery of the division will march to-morrow, through Foz d'Arouce and Miranda do Corvo, to Casal Novo; and will proceed on the 21st through Condeixa to Coimbra, where it will receive further orders.'

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Cortiço, 19th Sept. 1810, 8 A.M.\*

I have only now received your letter of 5 P.M. yesterday. I shall wait here this day. Desire Arentschildt to watch well the movements of Regnier's advanced guard, particularly if they turn off at Pinhanços to the bridge over the Mondego. Keep up the communication with Waters.

To Lieut. Col. Waters.

Cortiço, 20th Sept. 1810.

I am very much obliged to you for all the information you have sent me, and I beg you will come to head quarters with Capt. Goldfinch, when you please.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Cortiço, 20th Sept. 1810.

I have given you this day's rest in order that you may distribute the remount horses to the different regiments.

You see that the enemy have all crossed the Mondego, and I propose that you should cross to-morrow, upon which subject Murray writes to you. You must take care to cross the Mondego below its junction with the Daõ, otherwise you will find it difficult to cross the latter.

Be so kind as to leave on this side of the Mondego an intelligent officer, either Krauchenberg or Cordemann, or Cocks, with about a squadron, to observe the enemy's movement between the Daõ and the Mondego, and do you take care to keep up a communication with him.

P.S. Send the enclosed to Waters.

To Col. Le Cor.

Au Couvent de Lorrão, ce 20 Sept. 1810, 10 heures du soir.

Je viens de recevoir une lettre du Général Hill de la date d'hier, par laquelle j'apprends que vous êtes arrivé hier au soir à Pedrogão Grande. Aussitôt que vous recevrez cette lettre je vous prie de marcher sur Ponte da Murcella et par la route en faisant les marches qui vous conviendront le mieux. Faites moi savoir ce qu'elles seront. Je compte que vous ferez une marche demain le 21, et que vous serez en arrière de la Serra da Murcella à S. André de Poyares après demain le 22.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Lorrão, 20th Sept. 1810.

The 2d corps, under the command of Gen. Regnier, was again brought to the northward, and arrived at Sabugal and Alfaiates on the 12th and 13th inst. On the 15th, the enemy moved a large force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery upon Guarda the third time, and passed the hill into the valley of the Mondego, and obliged our party of observation which had been stationed there under Capt. Cocks, of the 16th light dragoons, to retire upon the Serra. On the same day, a large column passed the hill of Alverca (which forms the left of the Guarda range) and Maçal do Chaõ, and halted at Baraçal, likewise in the valley of the Mondego ;

\* Lieut. Col. Bathurst, Military Secretary, to Marshal Beresford.

Cortiço, 19th Sept. 1810, 7 P.M.

Lord Wellington desires me to inform you that he forgot to mention he is very desirous that you should send off to Trant to direct him to proceed as expeditiously as possible to Agueda and Sardaõ, crossing the Vouga, if possible, at S. Pedro do Sul, or any where below it. When at Sardaõ he will be on the left flank of the army, and will cover the road over the Serra leading towards Oporto.

and the 8th corps, under Gen. Junot, passed the Coa at Porto de Vide. Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton withdrew the British cavalry through Celorico on the morning of the 16th, and the enemy entered that place on that day from the side of Alverca and Guarda; and the 8th corps entered Trancoso.

The enemy, instead of following the retreat of our troops from Celorico by the valley of the Mondego and the left bank of that river, immediately marched by Jejua to the bridge of Fornos, and the advanced guard was in Fornos on that night. They followed this movement on the succeeding days by passing all the troops of the 2d and 6th corps from Celorico over the bridge of Fornos, with the exception of the advanced guard of the 2d corps, which, on the 18th, protected the passage of the rear of the column and passed yesterday at a bridge lower down the river. A small party entered Viseu yesterday. The enemy's intention in these movements is apparently to obtain possession of Coimbra, with a view to the resources which that town and the neighbouring country will afford them. The movements, however, which I had previously made to enable me to withdraw the army without difficulty from a position in which I did

Extracts from the Instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

'20th Sept. 1810.

'The cavalry under the orders of Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton (with the exception of one squadron) is to cross the Mondego to-morrow morning, and proceed to occupy cantonments in the vicinity of Mortagoa, and in the villages which lie near the road that leads by the convent of Busaco to Mealhada. Sir S. Cotton will be so good as to ascertain at what places the passage of the Mondego can be most easily effected by the cavalry; adverting, however, to its being necessary to pass the river below where it is joined by the Daô.

'By sending to the Light division, which is to pass the river this day, he may ascertain whether its artillery has been able to accompany it, or has been obliged to proceed to Mortagoa by a different route; and he will be so good as act accordingly with respect to the troop of horse artillery attached to the cavalry.

'Major Gen. Cole will be pleased to put the 4th division in march by its left at day-break to-morrow morning, and conduct it up the valley of Naranja, in the lower part of which it is now cantoned. The division is to continue its march to the neighbourhood of the convent of Busaco, and it is to be halted, or cantoned, near where the road leading from Mortagoa to Mealhada crosses the serra on the north side of the park wall of the convent of Busaco.

'The artillery of the division has been ordered to join it from Coimbra by Mealhada.

'Major Gen. Picton will move the 3d division to-morrow morning by its left across the Mondego at Penacova, and will place it in the cantonments which the 4th division now occupies, but from which it will move at daybreak to-morrow. The road being practicable for Portuguese artillery, that which is attached to the 3d division will follow in rear of the division. In cantoning the troops, Gen. Picton will be so good as push the left as far up the valley of Naranja as may be convenient, adverting to its being unnecessary to keep any considerable force at Penacova.

'Major Gen. Leith will march the troops under his orders to-morrow morning, from Foz d'Arouce and neighbourhood, to the cantonments at present occupied by the 3d division, but from which that division is to move to-morrow. Gen. Leith will be pleased to place the left of his division near the Mondego, opposite to Penacova.

'Lieut. Gen. Hill will be so good as direct the British artillery which is with his corps, on its march from Espinhal, to turn off at Miranda do Corvo, and proceed by Condeixa to Coimbra, where orders will be sent to regulate its further march.

'Head quarters are to move this day from Cortiço to the convent of Lorvaô, on the right bank of the Mondego.

'The officer in command at Condeixa will, immediately on the receipt of this order, cause the 9 pounder brigade of artillery at that place to march by Coimbra to Mealhada. The distance may be divided into two marches, the first of which should be to Fornos. A report is to be sent on to Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, commanding at Mealhada, of the time when the brigade of artillery may be expected to arrive there.

'None of the other carriages which are with the park are to move from Condeixa.'



not consider it advisable to risk an action, enabled me to secure Coimbra against the attack of any small corps; and the whole of that part of the army which has been under my immediate command, with the exception of 5 regiments of cavalry, has passed to the right of the Mondego, and in front of Coimbra, Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade of Portuguese infantry being at Sta Comba Daõ with the Royal dragoons, and Brig. Gen. Craufurd's division at Mortagoa. The cavalry will pass to-morrow.

When Regnier made the former movement to the northward, apparently with the intention on the part of the enemy of attacking this part of the army with his whole force, I had directed Lieut. Gen. Hill, and Major Gen. Leith, who commanded a small corps upon the Zezere, to prepare to join me; and as soon as I found from the enemy's movement of the 15th, that he was then about to carry his intention into execution, and that the plan was decided, I directed those officers to march. Major Gen. Leith is this day at Foz d'Arouce, and will join the army to-morrow; the head of Lieut. Gen. Hill's corps is at Espinhal, and will join on the next day. I also expect that Col. Le Cor, who has been with a small body of troops in the mountains of Castello Branco, will join about the same time. I shall thus have collected in one body the whole of the disposable force in Portugal, and I hope to have it in my power to frustrate the enemy's design.

I imagine that Marshal Massena has been misinformed, and has experienced greater difficulties in making his movements than he expected. He has certainly selected one of the worst roads in Portugal for his march.

Since the affair of the 11th Aug., in Estremadura, which I heretofore reported to your Lordship, the Marques de la Romana has been successful in carrying off two of the enemy's small detachments, one in the neighbourhood of Cordova, and the other in proceeding as a relief to the enemy's garrison in Castillo de las Guardias; and the Marques's advanced posts were within 3 leagues of Seville. Marshal Mortier, however, collected his corps, and moved out of Seville in strength, and the Marques de la Romana was obliged to retire into Estremadura. On the 14th the Spanish cavalry was engaged with that of the enemy near Fuente de Cantos, the Portuguese brigade, under Brig. Gen. Madden, being at La Calzadilla. After the engagement had lasted a considerable portion of the day, the Spanish cavalry gave way in some confusion, and Brig. Gen. Madden having moved forward, fell upon the enemy in a most decided and effectual manner, overthrew and pursued them to their cannon, and killed and wounded many, and took some prisoners and saved the Spaniards. The Marques de la Romana, from whom I have received the account, mentions in high terms the conduct of Brig. Gen. Madden, and of the Portuguese troops under his command, which he says has excited the admiration of the whole army. The Marques de la Romana has retired upon Merida, and after fixing a good garrison in Badajoz, is about to take a position between the Tagus and the Guadiana.

I must take this opportunity of mentioning to your Lordship the obligations I am under to the British cavalry commanded by Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton. Since the end of July, they have alone done the duty of the outposts, and the enemy has never been out of sight of some of them; and

on every occasion their superiority has been so great, that the enemy does not use his cavalry excepting when supported and protected by his infantry. The 1st hussars, under Col. Arentschildt, in particular, have had many opportunities of distinguishing themselves; and it is but justice to mention the zeal and intelligence with which the duty of the outposts has been performed by Capt. Krauchenberg and Cornet Cordemann, of the 1st hussars, and by Capt. the Hon. C. Cocks, of the 16th light dragoons. Nothing of importance has occurred in the north. My last letter from Cadiz is of the 9th.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Convent of Busaco, 21st Sept. 1810, 9½ P.M.

By the accounts which Lord FitzRoy Somerset has brought of the enemy from Gen. Craufurd, I judge that the 6th corps, at least, is assembled on the left bank of the Criz; and I conclude that it did not attempt to pass this day, because the other corps were not ready. Their first operation must be to drive in the squadron of the Royals which are on the Criz, in order to repair the fords of the bridge; and when this body is driven in, you may be certain that the whole, not only of this corps, but of the others, will advance in a few hours afterwards; you should therefore have all your dispositions made to retire the troops in advance, when the squadron of the Royals should be obliged to quit the Criz.

I have not yet heard the result of the examination of the Ponte de Vagia, above the bridge, near S<sup>ra</sup> Comba Daõ. You should observe this point, as it is the nearest to Tondella; and not only the bridge exists, but the banks of the river are more practicable than they are lower down. If you withdraw from Mortagoa, bring the whole of the troops to the villages on the fall of the hill between this place and that. I shall be with you in the morning.

We have an excellent position here, in which I am strongly tempted to give battle. Unfortunately Hill is one day later than I expected; and there is a road upon our left by which we may be turned and cut off from Coimbra. But I do not yet give up hopes of discovering a remedy for this last misfortune; and as for the former, the enemy will afford it to us, if they do not cross the Criz to-morrow.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Convent of Busaco, 21st Sept. 1810, 9½ P.M.

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of this day at 6 P.M. from Gen. Stewart.

I am much concerned that you did not receive the orders to march till 8 in the morning. I gave them at 6 in the evening, as soon as I found that it was desirable you should march. I was also concerned to learn from Gen. Stewart that, although the march was short, some of the troops, owing to that circumstance, did not reach their ground till morning.

You received a note from Gen. Craufurd which I opened. Lord FitzRoy Somerset arrived here since, having left the Criz at 3; the 6th corps was certainly collected on the left bank, but we had a piquet of the Royals on the right bank which was not driven in; and while that piquet remains, the enemy cannot repair the bridge or the ford to pass. I do not think there is any chance of your being attacked; at all events, none at present,

of your being attacked without my being on the spot to state the nature of the resistance; and I therefore do not now think it necessary to give any particular instruction upon that subject.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Busaco, 21st Sept. 1810.

I think it proper to enclose to your Lordship an extract of a letter which I have received from the Marques de la Romana stating his sentiments on the good conduct of the brigade of the Portuguese cavalry under Brig. Gen. Madden in the action with the enemy's cavalry on the 14th inst.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Convent of Busaco, 22d \* Sept. 1810, 8½ p.m.

The enemy have appeared upon the Criz in force, and have crossed that river apparently with the intention of repairing the bridge for the passage of their army. We have our advanced guard still at Mortagoa; Gen. Leith's, Gen. Picton's, and Gen. Cole's divisions in the Serra de Busaco; and Gen. Spencer, with his own division and 2 Portuguese brigades, at Mealhada. The British cavalry is also in front at Mortagoa.

The enemy have this day made some demonstrations of an intention to recross the Mondego. The French are not in the habit of separating their forces much; and I do not entirely credit this report, but still the movement which they have made must be attended to.

We have a detachment of cavalry under Lieut. Cordemann, of the 1st hussars, K.G.L., on the left bank of the Mondego, near Sampaio, who reports that this day several parties of the enemy appeared on that side of the river. These parties certainly belong to Regnier's corps; and I wish you to make the arrangements as follows, to be prepared for any event that may occur.

1st; to send a regiment of cavalry to Moita, about 9 miles in front of Ponte da Murcella; and to have small piquets of cavalry on all fords of the Mondego from Foz Daõ to Foz d'Alva.

2dly; to have strong piquets of Col. Le Cor's infantry at Ponte da Murcella and Ponte de Val d'Espinho on the Alva; and to be prepared to spring the mines in these bridges if the enemy should advance.

3dly; to have small piquets on the Serras to communicate between these and your cantonments or camp in the rear.

4thly; if the enemy should cross the Mondego in force, you must make the disposition of your force as follows: Col. Le Cor's division at Arganil. The cavalry in the open ground between Arganil and the Alva. Gen. Hamilton's Portuguese division on the Serra da Saboga, and keeping the communication with Le Cor. The 2d division of the British infantry on the Serra da Murcella. The infantry need not go on the Serras till the piquets in front of them shall be attacked, but the communication between the Serra da Saboga and Arganil must be effectually provided for; and Arganil, if the enemy attacks that point with his whole force, must be supported by the whole of yours.

5thly; in order to provide for the most probable event, viz. the attack

\* See Appendix, No. IX., Le Maréchal Prince d'Esling à S. A. le Prince de Neuchâtel et Wagram, Vice Connétable, Major Général, Visu, ce 22 Sept. 1810.

by the enemy's three corps on this point and the Serra between this and the Mondego, with the exception of the cavalry and the piquets mentioned in the 1st, 2d, and 3d instances, you will have your whole force in readiness to move by its left, at a short notice, across the Mondego at the Barca de Penacova, and thence to this place. Upon this point of preparation orders will be sent to you, as well as for the momentary disposition of your corps; but, if I should have occasion to call you here, I shall send an officer with the order, who will be able to show you the road. I shall go over to see you, if I can venture from this point so long. In the mean time,

P.S. Send any sick you may have to the Barca de Penacova, where there will be boats to take them to Coimbra. Let somebody, however, first inquire whether the boats are there.

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Extracts from the Instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

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Busaco, 22d Sept, 1810.

'The following arrangement for the 3d division is to be carried into effect early to-morrow morning.

'The division is to be cantoned or huttet in two separate corps, as follows:

'One brigade of British infantry to be near Loreda or Carmos, at the point from whence it can most conveniently ascend the serra to the southern extremity of the park wall of the convent of Busaco.

'One brigade of British infantry, the Portuguese brigade, and the artillery, to be near the villages of Contencas and Palheiros, at the point where the road, coming over the serra from S. Antonio do Cantaro, passes through to go to Botas.

'A strong piquet from the latter body of troops is to be posted on the eastern side of the serra near S. Antonio do Cantaro; and a piquet of communication is to be placed upon the top of the serra where the road crosses it. The pioneers of the regiments are to be employed, in the first instance, in making a communication to enable the artillery to ascend to the top of the serra; and, in the next place, in making such other communications as may facilitate the ascent of the infantry. Major Gen. Picton and Major Gen. Leith will communicate with each other, and will mutually support each other in case of either being attacked.'

'The following arrangement for the troops under Major Gen. Leith is to be carried into effect early to-morrow morning.

'The division is to be cantoned or huttet in two parts as follows:

'One part, consisting of the British brigade and Lusitanian legion, and one brigade of artillery, is to be placed near the road which leads between the southern extremity of the Serra do Busaco, and the chapel of N<sup>a</sup> S<sup>a</sup> del Monte.

'These troops are to place a strong piquet and two pieces of artillery on the height of N<sup>a</sup> S<sup>a</sup> del Monte.

'The other part of the division, consisting of the remaining troops under Major Gen. Leith's orders, is to be placed near the point where a road comes over the Serra do Busaco from Goudalim and Carvalho, and descends into the valley of Laranjeira; a strong piquet from these troops is to be placed at the foot of the slope upon the eastern side of the serra, and a piquet of communication with it is to be established on the top of the serra.

'The pioneers with the division are to be employed in making communications to facilitate the movements of the artillery and troops to the points most liable to be attacked, and to where the guns can be placed to most advantage.

'Major Gen. Leith and Major Gen. Picton will communicate with each other, and will mutually support one another in case of either being attacked.

'Lieut. Gen. Hill will place the left of the British infantry of his corps to-morrow morning in the cantonments in the valley which leads from S. Miguel to the Mondego opposite Penacova, and which lies behind the Serra da Murcella. The right of the British infantry to be at S. Miguel and vicinity.

'The cavalry to be in the villages behind the infantry, with the exception of one regiment, which is to be in advance of Ponte da Murcella at Moita.'

(Circular.)

'The whole of the troops are to be held in readiness to move upon the shortest notice, without baggage, and provided with bread for 3 days. Those which are not upon duty in advance towards the enemy are to cook their meat every day at an early hour in the morning for the day following.'

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Convent of Busaco, 22<sup>d</sup> Sept. 1810.

I enclose my dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the day before yesterday. There has been no alteration since.

The enemy have not passed the Criz, and are all on this side of the Mondego. I am in a capital position, but I fear it may be turned by its left. Its right is quite secure; and I have always the retreat open on Coimbra.

Au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling.

Au Quartier Général de l'armée Anglaise,  
ce 24 Sept. 1810.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence m'a adressée le 14 de ce mois.

Ce que vous appelez 'des paysans sans uniforme,' 'des assassins et des voleurs de grand chemin,' sont l'Ordenanza du pays, qui, comme j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous assurer, sont des corps militaires commandés par des officiers, payés et agissant sous les lois militaires. Il paraît que vous exigez que ceux qui jouiront des droits de la guerre soient revêtus d'un uniforme; mais vous devez vous souvenir que vous-même avez augmenté la gloire de l'armée Française en commandant des soldats qui n'avaient pas d'uniforme.

Vous vous plaignez de la conduite de l'Ordenanza à Nave d'Aver envers M. le Colonel Pavetti. La question est seulement si un pays qui est envahi par un ennemi formidable a le droit de se défendre par tous les moyens en son pouvoir. Si ce droit existe, le Portugal est justifié en mettant en activité l'Ordenanza, un corps reconnu et organisé par les anciennes lois du pays. Je peux assurer votre Excellence que l'Ordenanza de Nave d'Aver a bien traité M. le Colonel Pavetti, et il aurait été puni s'il l'avait maltraité. Je voudrais n'avoir pas entendu que malgré que cet officier fût aussi bien traité et par le Capitaine de l'Ordenanza et par moi, la maison du Capitaine de l'Ordenanza à Nave d'Aver avait été brûlée, et que quelques uns de sa compagnie ont été pris et fusillés parcequ'ils avaient fait leur devoir envers leur pays.

Je suis fâché que votre Excellence sente quelques inconvénients personnels de ce que les Portugais quittent leurs foyers à l'approche de l'armée Française. Il est de mon devoir de faire retirer ceux que je n'ai pas les moyens de défendre; et j'observe que les ordres que j'ai donnés là-dessus n'étaient presque pas nécessaires. Car ceux qui se ressouvenaient de l'invasion de leur pays en 1807, et de l'usurpation du gouvernement de leur Prince en tems de paix, quand il n'y avait pas un seul Anglais dans le pays, pouvaient à peine croire aux déclarations que vous

G. O.

Busaco, 24th Sept. 1810.

Heads of departments will send in to the Adj. Gen.'s office on the 25th inst., or as soon after as possible, nominal returns of the officers at present serving in their respective departments, specifying the regiments to which they belong, and the names of the places in which they are stationed.

The A. A. Gs. attached to divisions will send in to the Adj. Gen.'s office on the 25th inst., or as soon after as possible, nominal returns of the Generals and other Staff officers at present serving in the respective divisions, specifying the nature of their appointments, regiments and stations, and to note at the bottom any alterations which have taken place during the preceding month.

faites la guerre aux Anglais seuls; et ils pouvaient à peine trouver la conduite des soldats de l'armée Française, même sous vos ordres, envers leurs propriétés, leurs femmes, et eux-mêmes, conformes aux déclarations de votre Excellence.

Il n'est pas étonnant donc qu'ils quittent leurs foyers volontairement, brûlant et détruisant tout ce qu'ils ne peuvent pas emporter; et je n'ai nulle excuse à offrir pour l'encouragement que je leur en donne, excepté pour les inconvénients personnels qu'ils peuvent causer à votre Excellence.

Votre Excellence a été mal informée sur l'affaire de la milice ci-devant partie de la garnison d'Almeida. Avant de vous plaindre de l'infraction de la capitulation d'Almeida, votre Excellence aurait dû se ressouvenir qu'elle a été violée aussitôt que signée. Votre Excellence s'est engagée que les officiers et soldats de la milice retourneraient chez eux; et malgré cet engagement, vous en avez détenu 7 officiers et 200 soldats de chaque régiment, pour en faire un corps de pionniers. La capitulation d'Almeida est donc nulle, et je suis en droit d'en faire ce que je voudrais. Mais je puis vous assurer qu'il n'y a pas un soldat de la milice qui était à Almeida, au service.

To Dom M. Forjaz.

Busaco, 24th Sept. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th inst. containing a note from the Governors of the Kingdom, explanatory of the views which induced them lately to send certain persons out of the Kingdom, which I acknowledge I do not consider sufficient; and if my opinion had been consulted, I should have given it against the measure. These persons are suspected of being friendly to the enemy, which they have shown by no act excepting criticisms on the conduct of the armies, by assertions that the British troops would embark, and others of this nature calculated to damp the enthusiasm of the people. Many of their assertions may have been perfectly true, although imprudent at the moment; and I must say that I think it is not just in the government to punish and stigmatize people for words spoken which are only imprudent. It might have been worthy consideration whether the tone and matter of these supposed conversations had not been taken from some of the recent deliberations of the government themselves. That which is required in the government is to punish those guilty of neglect and malversation in office, those who disobey or delay to obey orders, and those who neglect, or delay, or omit to perform the duty of their situations.

By producing a reform in the manners and opinions of the country, in this respect, they would render a real service, and it would certainly be saved; but I am sorry to say that notwithstanding my repeated remonstrances, I have not yet heard of one person having been punished for these crimes, the most fatal in these times; and they still exist in a most lamentable degree.

I am happy to learn from such high authority as the government themselves, that the popular clamor had no effect upon the measure which I am now considering, as I acknowledge that I had at first been apprehensive that popular clamor alone had been the cause of it.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Busaco, 24th Sept. 1810.

I was not able to go to you as I intended. I think it would be desirable to place the whole of Fane's cavalry upon the Serra de Moita, keeping piquets upon the fords of the Mondego between Foz Daß and Foz d'Alva. The enemy were yesterday inquiring the road to Galizes, &c.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Convent of Busaco, 24th Sept. 1810, 8 P.M.

I have a letter from Waters of yesterday from the Serra de Caramula, in which he says that the enemy's plundering parties are in the Serra, but they retire from it in the evening.

I have desired Gen. Leith to get some Portuguese dragoons to be stationed in his front at Gondalim, near the Barca de Cerco, but you had better send a small party there this day. Sir Stapleton will take care of the Serra on your left. You will make a handsome retreat from your present situation if you are only prepared in time. Indeed, I believe it would now be time to place the different corps of your division and Pack's brigade *en echelon*, on the two sides of the road, from the entrance of the heights to the village where you have your quarters.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Busaco, 24th Sept. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 17th and 19th. I concur in the queries which you have made to the Admiral respecting the tonnage in the harbour.

However, unless some terrible accident happen, or unless the French raise the siege of Cadiz, I hope there will be no occasion to embark this winter. The French advanced guard is on this side the Criz, ours at the bottom of this Serra; their whole army between the Criz and Tondella, or Viseu at farthest; ours upon this Serra, or that of Murcella. We are in an excellent position, indeed one which cannot easily be attacked in front; and, if they wait another day or two, they will be unable to turn it on the only vulnerable point. I shall do every thing in my power to stop

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Convent of Busaco, 25th Sept. 1810.

Should you have reason to believe that there is not any large force of the enemy on the left bank of the Mondego, the Commander of the Forces directs that you will cross the river at the ford near Penacova to-morrow morning at daybreak. You will bring with you the 2d division of British infantry, and also Major Gen. Hamilton's division of Portuguese infantry and the artillery attached to it. You will be pleased to march these troops by their left; and Major Gen. Leith will be directed to send an officer to point out to the head of your column a road by which it can ascend the Serra do Busaco near its southern extremity. After ascending by that road, the column is to continue its march by the communication which has been formed along the serra, towards this end of it; and when the head of the column has gained ground sufficient to enable the whole to form line, the column is to be halted, and is to continue in that situation, prepared either to wheel up on the ground where it stands, or to be put again in motion towards the left of the position, as circumstances may require.

When upon the serra, the troops are to be kept a little behind the ridge, so that they may not be seen by the enemy until it becomes necessary to move them up on the ridge to repel an attack. You are to leave Major Gen. Fane with the cavalry under his orders in front of Ponte da Murcella, and you will direct Col. Le Cor to place his division and guns upon the Serra da Murcella. You will leave at S. Miguel all the baggage of the troops that cross to this side of the Mondego under your orders. A supply of musket ammunition will be in the course of this night at Botão; and a supply has also been ordered up by water to Penacova. I beg you will acknowledge the receipt of this letter by the bearer, or by another messenger, if that will be more expeditious.

the enemy here. If I cannot do it here, I shall still try to stop him at Coimbra. The army is in good spirits, and all going on well. I beg you will transmit the French prisoners taken by the Spaniards to England.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Convent of Busaco, 27th Sept. 1810

We have been engaged with the enemy for the last 3 days, and I think we shall be attacked again to-morrow, as I understand they must carry our position, on which, however, they have as yet made no impression, or starve. Our loss has been trifling; that of the British troops about 300 men; that of the Portuguese, who have conducted themselves remarkably well in several brisk attacks, rather greater; the loss of the French must have been very large indeed, and we hear from deserters that they are much discouraged. Our position is an excellent one, and it is certainly

‘Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer.

‘Convent of Busaco, 25th Sept., 7 1/2 P.M.

‘The Commander of the Forces directs that you will move the 1st division, together with the Portuguese brigades (Brig. Gen. Campbell’s and Brig. Gen. Colman’s), and all other troops now under your orders, and all the artillery at Mealhada, before daybreak to-morrow morning, to the village of Luz, which is at a short distance from this, and near the great road from Mealhada here. The troops are to march by battalions or brigades from their respective stations, to avoid the loss of time which would arise from forming them into more considerable columns, and also to render their march lighter and more expeditious. The whole are to march by the *right* of battalions; but such as are cantoned nearest this, will, of course, be nearest to the head of the column.

‘Be so good as send forward an officer to announce the approach of the troops, and the probable time of their arrival at the village of Luz. The baggage of all the troops under your orders is to be left at Mealhada.’

‘Q. M. G. (Circular, &c. Confidential.)

‘In the event of the army being ordered to retire from the position which it occupies on the Serra do Busaco, the following are the roads by which the several divisions are to move:

‘1st; The troops under the orders of Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer will move by the great road through Mealhada to Fornos, and thence into the large plain below Coimbra; and will cross the river Mondego, at the ford near Casas Novas.

‘Sir B. Spencer is already aware how his column is to avoid interfering with any other troops, in passing through Fornos; and he will be pleased to give orders that an officer, who knows the turn that the column is to take in the village of Fornos, may be placed there (with a guard), in due time to prevent any part of the baggage that precedes the troops from taking a wrong direction. The whole of this route is practicable for artillery. Sir B. Spencer will receive further orders how he is to proceed after crossing the Mondego.

‘2d; The 4th division will retire by a road which leads direct from Busaco to Fornos, through the village of Marmeleira. This road has been reconnoitred by Lieut. Westmacott, of the Royal Staff Corps, and reported fit for British artillery. Lieut. Westmacott will be sent to conduct the column. After reaching Fornos, the 4th division is to continue its march by the great Coimbra road. It will cross the Mondego by the bridge at Coimbra, and ascend the hill upon the other side of the river. Major Gen. Cole will not discontinue his march along the great road, after passing the Mondego, until he receives orders to that effect; it being necessary that he should move on sufficiently to give room for the divisions following in the rear of the 4th.

‘3d; The Light division will retire by the road which passes through the village of Paul to Botaõ, and thence to Fornos. From Fornos the Light division will take the great road to Coimbra; but it will halt before reaching the houses called Cazas do Conigo Paes, at which point the troops under Major Gen. Picton are to enter the great road, and these troops are to be allowed to move into the great road before the Light division resumes its march. The road through Paul and Botaõ to Fornos has been reconnoitred by officers of the Light division, and also by Capt. Scovell, of the Q. M. G.’s department, who will be attached to the Light division during the march, as far as Fornos. The whole of this road is reported practicable for British artillery. Brig. Gen. Craufurd will receive further orders during the halt of his division between Fornos and Cazas do Conigo Paes.

‘4th; The troops under Major Gen. Picton will retire by the road which leads through Alagoa and Eiras, and joins the Coimbra road at Cazas do Conigo Paes. This road has



no easy task to carry it; but I think they will make another trial. Pray detain the packet till the result of the action is known.

P.S. Be so kind as to tell the Admiral that I saw his son this day, after the action in which Gen. Leith's corps were engaged, and that he was quite well.

To Major Gen. Leith and to Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Busaco, 28th Sept. 1810, 8 A.M.

Have you had any patrolle out to the front of your right, towards Gondalim, or beyond Carvalho Velho?

Has Gen. Hill any intelligence from the left bank of the Mondego?

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Busaco, 28th Sept. 1810, 10½ A.M.

Send to Le Cor, and desire him to have at least a battalion and 2 guns on the northern extremity of the Serra da Murcella, in order to defend the right flank of the post of N<sup>o</sup> S<sup>a</sup> del Monte.

been reconnoitred, and reported fit for Portuguese artillery, by Lieut. Shanahan, of the Royal Staff Corps, who will be sent to conduct the column. The troops under Major Gen. Picton will enter the great road at Casas do Conigo Paes, after the 4th division has passed that point, taking their place in the column of march between the 4th division and the Light division. After coming into the great road, Major Gen. Picton will continue to follow the 4th division, until he receives further orders.

'5th; Major Gen. Leith's division will retire by the road which leads through the village of Povoa to Dienteiro, and thence by the Quinta dos Lagares do Seminario to the convent of S. Antonio dos Oliveira above the town of Coimbra, where Major Gen. Leith will halt and wait for further orders. This road has been reconnoitred and reported practicable for light artillery (aided by men at some steep ascents), by Lieut. Shanahan, of the Royal Staff Corps: as that officer is, however, to be attached to the 3d division during the march to Coimbra, Major Gen. Leith will lose no time in having the road reconnoitred by officers of his own division. The 9 pounder brigade which was with Major Gen. Leith having been attached for the present to the corps under the orders of Lieut. Gen. Hill, it will conform to the movements of that corps.

'6th; The troops under Lieut. Gen. Hill which are in the position of Busaco will (in the event of the army retiring) recross the Mondego at the ford near Penacova, and will be placed between that point and the village of S. Miguel de Poyares. A separate instruction will be given to Lieut. Gen. Hill respecting the further operations of the above part of his corps, and also of the other troops belonging to it which are still on the left of the Mondego, in the neighbourhood of Ponte da Murcella.

'7th; Lieut. Gen. Hill's corps on retiring will march by its right. All the other divisions above mentioned will move by their left.

'8th; The cavalry will retire by the great road through Mealhada and Fornos, and thence into the large plain below Coimbra, following Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer's corps.

'Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton will send forward an officer with a small party of dragoons to Fornos, to take post at the point where the road turns in that village to lead into the great plain. This officer is to prevent any part of the cavalry from taking a wrong direction, or from interfering with any of the other troops that are to move from Fornos by the great road to Coimbra. The officer and guard directed to be stationed at this point by Sir B. Spencer, is not to quit it until relieved by the party of dragoons above mentioned. Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton will form the cavalry in the great plain below Coimbra, and will there wait for further orders.

'9th; It is clearly to be understood, that no movement under this instruction is to take place, unless in the case of orders being received for the army to retire.'

'Q. M. G. (Circular.)

'Serra do Busaco, 28th Sept. 1810, ½ before 5, P.M.

'The camp kettles and the meat are to be immediately sent for, and the troops are to cook as soon as they arrive. Such regiments as can find means of doing so, at hand, may make huts. Piquets are to be thrown out along the front, and a connexion to be established between those of contiguous divisions. A line of communication, by means of small posts, is also to be established along the position itself, for the purpose of insuring the prompt circulation of orders during the night. The General officers commanding divisions will be so good as report to the Q. M. G. the place where each will be stationed during the night. The whole of the troops are to be under arms at their respective stations on the position at half an hour before daybreak to-morrow morning.'

Let Fane watch well the movements of the enemy's left, and give me the earliest intelligence of them. Foz d'Alva is a very important point.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

On the Serra, 28th Sept.,  $\frac{1}{2}$  before 6 p.m.

Observe the enemy upon the right, and if there is no attack directed upon that side, close the British infantry to the right.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.\* On the Serra, 28th Sept. 1810, 10 min. before 7 p.m.

I see the columns behind the wood in front of your right, but not standing to their arms. I can't see any thing to your left of them. I think that, if you see nothing upon your left, you had better collect at least one regiment of Col. Harvey's brigade to support your centre and right.

As Gen. Craufurd is threatened as well as you, you had better not draw towards you in the first instance more than 2 battalions of the Germans. You need not move any of the Germans till you are certain that you are about to be attacked.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Fornos, 29th Sept. 1810.

It appears that the enemy withdrew last night from their position in front of the Serra; but we do not yet know which way they have marched, after passing the hills between the Serra and Mortagoa. Our cavalry have not seen them on the road from Mortagoa to Sardaõ; nor are they seen passing the road which leads to the rear from the Criz. It is possible, therefore, that they may be about to cross the Mondego, and endeavor to force your right.

Give me the earliest intelligence of any movement of this description. Let Fane occupy the Serra de Moita with his cavalry, and show himself upon the Mondego, and well forward in the valley. If you should find that the enemy cross the Mondego, send Le Cor immediately to Arganil, and depend upon my being with you, with the whole army, in a few hours. If they try our left instead of our right, I shall give you instructions for movements corresponding with ours.

Gen. Craufurd is still upon the Serra; Gen. Cole and Gen. Spencer near this place; Gens. Leith and Picton between this and the Mondego.

P.S. Since writing the above I have received accounts which induce me to believe that the enemy have moved to our left.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Fornos, 29th Sept. 1810,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  p.m.

If the enemy should advance upon you in force, you must retire from Mealhada. Gen. Cole is with his division at Carqueijo, about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile in front of this, where I wish you to go if you should retire. Craufurd will be at Botaõ this night. I propose that you should fall back in the morning, according to your former instructions from the Q. M. G. Send off your baggage early.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Coimbra, 30th Sept. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th inst., with the proposal to land the regiments which may arrive from Eng-

\* Written in pencil.

land at the mouth of the Mondego. I am much obliged to you for the suggestion, but I wish all ships with troops to proceed to the Tagus.

To the Right Hon. Lady Sarah Napier.

Coimbra, 30th Sept. 1810.

I am concerned to be again the channel of conveying to you intelligence

Extracts from the Instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

Coimbra, 30th Sept. 1810.

'The Commander of the Forces directs that Lieut. Gen. Hill will put the troops under his orders in motion to-morrow morning towards Thomar. These troops include the 2d division; the Portuguese division under Major Gen. Hamilton; the troops under Col. Le Cor, of which the Santarém militia, and 2 regiments of Lisbon militia, when they join, are to be considered as forming a part; and the cavalry under Major Gen. Fane.

'Lieut. Gen. Hill will form these troops into 2, or, if he shall think it expedient, into 3 separate divisions, to follow each other at intervals along the line of march, in order to avoid the inconvenience of having too large a body in one column. The rear of the infantry should be to-morrow at Foz d'Aronce.

'Lieut. Gen. Hill will be so good as communicate the details of the arrangements he may make for his further march to Thomar, as soon as they are determined upon; and he will continue to report daily to head quarters by the following routes:

'1st; Through Venda do Cego to Coimbra.

'2d; Through Miranda to Condeixa.

'3d; Through Ançã to Pombal.

'The 3d division will move to-morrow morning from Condeixa to Pombal; but Major Gen. Picton will be so good as order the reserve brigade of 9 pounders which is with the division, to remain at Condeixa till further orders.

'Major Gen. Leith will be pleased to move his artillery this afternoon into the great road that leads to Condeixa, and as far on at least as Sarnache; and order it to proceed to-morrow to Redinha (between Condeixa and Pombal), to which place he will also march his division to-morrow morning, at daybreak, if he receives no other order before that time.

'The 4th division will move this afternoon from its present quarters to a village called Cruz dos Morouços, about 2 miles from Coimbra, on the road to Condeixa.

'The troops under Brig. Gen. Craufurd are to fall back this afternoon to the neighbourhood of Cazas do Conigo Paes, the Light division from Eiras, and the troops with Gen. Pack from Fornos, by the great road.

'The spare carriages of the brigade of artillery are to be sent back this afternoon to the square in the suburb, at the south end of the bridge of Coimbra; and if there is any baggage still with the division, it is to be sent back to join that which is already in the olive groves on the top of the hill beyond the bridge of Coimbra.

'Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer will be pleased to move the troops under his orders to-morrow morning through Pereira, Granja, &c., to Soure, leaving, however, one brigade of British infantry in the neighbourhood of Granja, to be a support, as circumstances may require, to the cavalry, when it falls back by the route above mentioned.

'Sir B. Spencer will be so good as inform Sir S. Cotton at what place the brigade of infantry intended as a support to the cavalry in case of need is posted.

'Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton will be pleased to move the brigade of heavy cavalry to-day into the great plain below Coimbra; and bring one of the other two brigades of cavalry to this side of Fornos, keeping out the other brigade in front of that place. If pressed by the enemy he will move the whole of the cavalry division into the great plain; and, if necessary, he will retire across the Mondego by the fords in the neighbourhood of Cazas Novas, near which place (on the left bank of the river) Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer's corps is now cantoned.

'In the event of the cavalry moving still farther back, it is to march from Cazas Novas through Pereira, Fermoçella, Granja, &c., to Soure; and Sir S. Cotton will communicate with Sir B. Spencer, whose corps is to move to-morrow morning by the same route, and will regulate the length of his march as circumstances seem to render necessary, apprising Sir B. Spencer of every thing extraordinary that occurs, and transmitting his reports to head quarters through Condeixa, after he has passed the Mondego, until he is informed that the Commander of the Forces has moved back beyond that place. Sir S. Cotton will endeavor to obtain intelligence whether the enemy is pushing forward any troops from the direction of Tentugal, Monte Mór or Velho, or any other place on the lower part of the Mondego.

'The officer commanding the detachment of cavalry at Botoão will call in this afternoon the party of dragoons left at Busaco by Brig. Gen. Craufurd. He will patrol the roads from Botoão towards Busaco, and more especially those towards Mealhada; and he will communicate with Sir S. Cotton at Fornos, and receive his orders respecting his further movements.'

of a distressing nature, but you received the last which I communicated to you in a manner so becoming yourself that I have less reluctance in writing to you than I had upon the former occasion, although the cause is more serious. The army was engaged with the enemy on the 27th, and your sons Charles and George were wounded.\* I saw the former after he was wounded, and he was well and in good spirits, although he had a severe but not a dangerous wound in the jaw. George is wounded in the hip, but very slightly, and both are doing well.

You will see the account of the action in which the troops were engaged, and I hope it will be some consolation to you to reflect that your sons received their wounds upon an occasion in which the British troops behaved so well.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Coimbra, 30th Sept. 1810.

While the enemy was advancing from Celorico and Trancoso upon Viseu, the different divisions of militia and Ordenanza were employed upon their flanks and rear; and Col. Trant with his division attacked the escort of the military chest and reserve artillery near Tojal, on the 20th inst. He took 2 officers and 80 prisoners, but the enemy collected a force from the front and rear, which obliged him to retire again towards the Douro. I understand that the enemy's communication is completely cut off, and he possesses only the ground upon which his army stands.

My dispatch of the 20th inst. will have informed you of the measures which I had adopted and which were in progress to collect the army in this neighbourhood, and, if possible, to prevent the enemy from obtaining possession of this town. On the 21st the enemy's advanced guard pushed on to S<sup>ta</sup> Comba Daô, at the junction of the rivers Criz and Daô; and Brig. Gen. Pack retired across the former and joined Brig. Gen. Craufurd

\* Major Gen. Sir C. Napier, G.C.B., and Major Gen. Sir G. Napier, K.C.B.

G. O.

Coimbra, 30th Sept. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the General and other officers and soldiers of the army, for their conduct during the whole time they occupied the position of Busaco, and in the action with the enemy on the 27th inst.

He witnessed several instances of intrepidity in the officers and troops, and others have been reported to him by the General officers, of which he will not fail to report his sense to His Majesty, and to the government of H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

Every friend to his country and to the liberties of the world, and the whole British army, must have observed with the greatest satisfaction the gallantry and steadiness of the Portuguese troops during these days, and that they, equally with their brother soldiers in His Majesty's service, have deserved and obtained the approbation of Marshal Beresford, and of the Commander of the Forces.

Although the designs manifested by the enemy's movements induced the Commander of the Forces to withdraw the army from their position, which it was not in the power of the enemy to force, he hopes to be enabled, by the discipline and determined bravery of the officers and troops, to frustrate all his designs, and to save this country, 'in which the British army has been so well treated,' from the degrading yoke which is prepared for it.

2. \* \* \* \* \*: which sentence has been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

3. Although the Commander of the Forces has long determined that he will not pardon men guilty of crimes of which these prisoners have been convicted, he is induced to pardon these men in consequence of the gallantry displayed by the 45th regt. on the 27th inst.

He trusts that this pardon will make a due impression upon the prisoners, and that by their future regular and good conduct, they will endeavor to emulate their comrades, who have by their bravery saved them from a disgraceful end.

at Mortagoo, having destroyed the bridges over those 2 rivers. The enemy's advanced guard crossed the Criz, having repaired the bridge, on the 23d, and the whole of the 6th corps was collected on the other side of the river. I therefore withdrew the cavalry through the Serra do Busaco, with the exception of 3 squadrons, as the ground was unfavorable for the operation of that arm.

On the 25th, the whole of the 6th and of the 2d corps crossed the Criz in the neighbourhood of S<sup>ta</sup> Comba Daõ; and Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade and Brig. Gen. Craufurd's division retired to the position which I had fixed upon for the army on the top of the Serra do Busaco. These troops were followed in this movement by the whole of the corps of Ney and Regnier (the 6th and the 2d); but it was conducted by Brig. Gen. Craufurd with great regularity, and the troops took their position without sustaining any loss of importance. The 4th Portuguese caçadores, which had retired on the right of the other troops, and the piquets of the 3d division of infantry, which were posted at S. Antonio de Cantaro, under Major Smyth of the 45th regt., were engaged with the advance of Regnier's corps in the afternoon, and the former showed that steadiness and gallantry which others of the Portuguese troops have since manifested.

The Serra do Busaco is a high ridge which extends from the Mondego in a northerly direction about 8 miles. At the highest point of the ridge, about 2 miles from its termination, is the convent and garden of Busaco. The Serra do Busaco is connected by a mountainous tract of country with the Serra de Caramula, which extends in a north easterly direction beyond Viseu, and separates the valley of the Mondego from the valley of the Douro. On the left of the Mondego, nearly in a line with the Serra do Busaco, is another ridge of the same description, called the Serra da Murcella, covered by the river Alva, and connected by other mountainous parts with the Serra d'Estrella. All the roads to Coimbra from the eastward lead over the one or the other of these Serras. They are very difficult for the passage of an army, the approach to the top of the ridge on both sides being mountainous.

As the enemy's whole army was on the right of the Mondego, and it was evident that he intended to force our position, Lieut. Gen. Hill crossed that river by a short movement to his left, on the morning of the 26th, leaving Col. Le Cor with his brigade on the Serra da Murcella, to cover the right of the army, and Brig. Gen. Fane, with his division of Portuguese cavalry and the 13th light dragoons, in front of the Alva, to observe and check the movements of the enemy's cavalry on the Mondego. With this exception, the whole army was collected upon the Serra do Busaco, with the British cavalry observing the plain in the rear of its left, and the road leading from Mortagoo to Oporto, through the mountainous tract which connects the Serra do Busaco with the Serra de Caramula.

The 8th corps joined the enemy in our front on the 26th, but he did not make any serious attack on that day. The light troops on both sides were engaged throughout the line. At 6 in the morning of the 27th the enemy made two desperate attacks upon our position, the one on the right, the other on the left of the highest part of the Serra. The attack upon the right was made by two divisions of the 2d corps, on that part of the

Serra occupied by the 3d division of infantry. One division of French infantry arrived at the top of the ridge, where it was attacked in the most gallant manner by the 88th regt., under the command of Lieut. Col. Wallace, the 45th, under the command of Lieut. Col. the Hon. R. Meade, and by the 8th Portuguese regt., under the command of Lieut. Col. Douglas, directed by Major Gen. Picton. These 3 corps advanced with the bayonet, and drove the enemy's division from the advantageous ground which they had obtained. The other division of the 2d corps attacked farther on the right, by the road leading by S. Antonio de Cantaro, also in front of Major Gen. Picton's division. These were repulsed, before they could reach the top of the ridge, by the 74th, under the command of Lieut. Col. the Hon. R. Trench, and the brigade of Portuguese infantry of the 9th and 21st regts. under the command of Col. Champelmond, directed by Col. Mackinnon. Major Gen. Leith also moved to his left to the support of Major Gen. Picton, and aided in the defeat of the enemy by the 3d batt. of Royals, the 1st batt. of the 9th, and the 2d batt. of the 38th regts. In these attacks Major Gens. Leith and Picton, Cols. Mackinnon and Champelmond, of the Portuguese service, who was wounded, Lieut. Col. Wallace, Lieut. Col. the Hon. R. Meade, Lieut. Col. Sutton of the 9th Portuguese, Major Smyth of the 45th, who was afterwards killed, Lieut. Col. Douglas, and Major Birmingham, of the 8th Portuguese regt., distinguished themselves. Major Gen. Picton reports the good conduct of the 9th and 21st Portuguese regts., commanded by Lieut. Col. Sutton and Lieut. Col. A. Bacellar, and of the Portuguese artillery, under the command of Major Arentschildt. I have also to mention, in a particular manner, the conduct of Capt. Dansey of the 88th. Major Gen. Leith reports the good conduct of the Royals, 1st batt., and 9th, and 2d batt. of the 38th regts.; and I beg to assure your Lordship that I have never witnessed a more gallant attack than that made by the 88th, 45th, and 8th Portuguese regts., on the enemy's division which had reached the ridge of the Serra.

On the left the enemy attacked with 3 divisions of infantry of the 6th corps, on the part of the Serra occupied by the Light division of infantry commanded by Brig. Gen. Craufurd, and by the brigade of Portuguese infantry commanded by Brig. Gen. Pack. One division of infantry only made any progress to the top of the hill, and they were immediately charged with the bayonet by Brig. Gen. Craufurd, with the 43d, 52d, and 95th, and the 3d Portuguese caçadores, and driven down with immense loss. Brig. Gen. Colman's brigade of Portuguese infantry, which was in reserve, was moved up to the right of Brig. Gen. Craufurd's division, and a battalion of the 19th Portuguese regt., under the command of Lieut. Col. Mac Bean, made a gallant and successful charge upon a body of another division of the enemy, which was endeavoring to penetrate in that quarter. In this attack, Brig. Gen. Craufurd, Lieut. Cols. Beckwith, of the 95th, and Barclay, of the 52d, and the Commanding officers of the regiments, distinguished themselves.

Besides these attacks, the light troops of the two armies were engaged throughout the 27th; and the 4th Portuguese caçadores, and the 1st and 15th regts., directed by Brig. Gen. Pack, and commanded by Lieut. Col.

Hill, Lieut. Col. Luis do Rego, and Major Armstrong, showed great steadiness and gallantry.

The loss sustained by the enemy in his attack of the 27th has been enormous. I understand that the Generals of division, Merle, Loison, and Maucune are wounded, and Gen. Simon was taken prisoner by the 52d regt.; and 3 Colonels, — officers, and 250 men. The enemy left 2000 killed upon the field of battle, and I understand from the prisoners and deserters that the loss in wounded is immense.

The enemy did not renew his attack, excepting by the fire of his light troops on the 28th; but he moved a large body of infantry and cavalry from the left of his centre to the rear, from whence I saw his cavalry in march on the road from Mortagoa over the mountains towards Oporto. Having thought it probable that he would endeavor to turn our left by that road, I had directed Col. Trant, with his division of militia, to march to Sardaõ, with the intention that he should occupy the mountains, but unfortunately he was sent round by Oporto, by the General officer commanding in the north, in consequence of a small detachment of the enemy being in possession of S. Pedro do Sul; and, notwithstanding the efforts which he made to arrive in time, he did not reach Sardaõ till the 28th at night, after the enemy were in possession of the ground. As it was probable that, in the course of the night of the 28th, the enemy would throw the whole of his army upon the road, by which he could avoid the Serra do Busaco and reach Coimbra by the high road of Oporto, and thus the army would have been exposed to be cut off from that town or to a general action in less favorable ground, and as I had reinforcements in my rear, I was induced to withdraw from the Serra do Busaco.

The enemy did break up in the mountains at 11 at night of the 28th, and he made the march I expected. His advanced guard was at Avelans, on the road from Oporto to Coimbra, yesterday, and the whole army was seen in march through the mountains. That under my command, however, was already in the low country, between the Serra do Busaco and the sea; and the whole of it, with the exception of the advanced guard, is this day on the left of the Mondego.

Although, from the unfortunate circumstance of the delay of Col. Trant's arrival at Sardaõ, I am apprehensive that I shall not succeed in effecting the object which I had in view in passing the Mondego and in occupying the Serra do Busaco, I do not repent my having done so. This movement has afforded me a favorable opportunity of showing the enemy the description of troops of which this army is composed; it has brought the Portuguese levies into action with the enemy for the first time in an advantageous situation; and they have proved that the trouble which has been taken with them has not been thrown away, and that they are worthy of contending in the same ranks with British troops in this interesting cause, which they afford the best hopes of saving. Throughout the contest on the Serra, and in all the previous marches, and those which we have since made, the whole army have conducted themselves in the most regular manner. Accordingly all the operations have been carried on with ease; the soldiers have suffered no privations; have undergone no unnecessary fatigue, there has been no loss of stores, and the army is in the highest spirits.

I have received throughout the service the greatest assistance from the General and Staff officers. Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer has given the assistance his experience enables him to afford me; and I am particularly indebted to the Adj. Gen. and the Q. M. Gens., and the officers of their departments, and to Lieut. Col. Bathurst, and the officers of my personal staff; to Major Gen. Howorth and the artillery, and particularly to Lieut. Col. Fletcher, Capt. Chapman, and the officers of the Royal Engineers. I must likewise mention Mr. Kennedy, and the officers of the Commissariat, which department has been carried on most successfully.

I should not do justice to the service, or to my own feelings, if I did not take this opportunity of drawing your Lordship's attention to the merits of Marshal Beresford. To him exclusively, under the Portuguese government, is due the merit of having raised, formed, disciplined, and equipped the Portuguese army, which has now shown itself capable of engaging and defeating the enemy. I have besides received from him all the assistance which his experience and abilities, and his knowledge of this country, have qualified him to afford me.

The enemy have made no movement in Estremadura, or in the northern provinces, since I addressed your Lordship last. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 9th inst. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the allied armies in the course of the 25th, 26th, and 27th. I send this dispatch by my aide de camp, Capt. Burgh,\* to whom I beg to refer your Lordship for any further details, and I recommend him to your Lordship's notice.†

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army on the 25th, 26th, and 27th Sept. 1810.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed . . . . .	11	6	180	5	197
Wounded . . . . .	62	32	920	12	1014
Missing . . . . .	1	3	54	10	58

The Portuguese loss is included in the above numbers.

Au Marquis de la Romana.

à Coimbra, ce 30 Sept. 1810.

Alava ou O'Lawlor vous aura appris ce qui s'est passé de ce côté ci ces derniers jours; et je vous enverrai demain la copie de ma lettre au gouvernement. L'ennemi a fait une perte immense. Les troupes se sont bien conduites, et notre perte n'est pas grande; je n'ai aucun doute sur les résultats de cette campagne.

\* Lord Downes, K.C.B.

† See Appendix, No. XIII., for the French report of the battle of Busaco. Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram, Major Général, Coimbra, 4th Oct. 1810.



J'ai envoyé au Commissaire Anglais à Estremoz pour pourvoir à la subsistance de votre corps quand vous entrerez en Portugal. Il est pourvu d'argent pour vous donner 80,000 piastres, et de 8000 paires de souliers. Je vous envoie une lettre à son adresse, que je vous prie de lui envoyer quand vous entrerez en Portugal pour vous mettre en co-opération avec nous. Je vous prie de faire les arrangemens qui suivent pour régler cette affaire :

1. Toute subsistance qui sera prise par les troupes Espagnoles en Portugal passera par les mains du Commissaire Anglais.

2. Les Commissaires de guerre Espagnols, attachés aux troupes Espagnoles, donneront des réquisitions et reçus au Commissaire Anglais pour tout ce qu'ils recevront pour les troupes.

3. La ration pour les troupes Espagnoles sera la même comme celle des troupes Anglaises, viz., une livre et demie de pain, ou une livre de biscuit et une livre de viande par jour. Pour les chevaux 10 livres d'avoine et 10 livres de foin ou de paille.

4. Le gouvernement payera, à l'arrangement final des deux nations, pour chaque ration pour homme ou cheval le même prix que paye le gouvernement Portugais, selon l'arrangement fait par moi en Juin, 1809, quand les troupes Portugaises recevaient des provisions du Commissaire Anglais.

Je vous prie d'établir la bonne discipline dans votre armée, sans laquelle, soyez sûr que nos troupes manqueront de subsistance dans ce pays ci, malgré tous nos arrangemens. Menez avec vous seulement les officiers Généraux et de l'Etat Major qui vous seront nécessaires. Je serai préparé à vous donner des transports pour 10,000 hommes, en cas que, malgré mon attente, nous soyons obligés de nous embarquer.

Les trois corps qui sont ici sont toujours diablement forts, malgré leurs pertes ; mais je ne suis pas trop sûr qu'ils ne s'avancent pas tout de suite. S'ils le font, je vous appellerai à mon secours, et je vous prie d'être préparé à marcher. Je vous prie de venir par Elvas, 3 lieues ; Estremoz, 6 lieues ; Arrayolos, 6 lieues ; Monte Mór o Novo, 3 lieues ; Vendas Novas, 3½ lieues ; Pegoes, 3½ lieues ; Aldea Galega, 5 lieues, où vous trouverez des barques pour vous embarquer, pour vous joindre à la droite de nos positions. On sera préparé à vous donner des provisions pour 10,000 hommes et 160 chevaux sur cette route.

P.S. Le Maréchal Beresford a écrit au Général Leite pour l'empêcher de demander les deux escadrons de cavalerie.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Coimbra, 30th Sept. 1810.

You will receive herewith a copy of my dispatch containing an account of our operations to this day, and you may now allow the packet to sail when you like. I am quite certain the French will not get Portugal this winter, unless they receive a very large reinforcement indeed. It is probable that they will not succeed, even in that case. But if they should, and it should be necessary to embark the Portuguese troops, I must protest against their embarking in boats, or in any vessels excepting those of the same description as those in which the British army are to be embarked. The government shall have transports to send to the Cape de

Verd islands for horses; but let us wait a little to see the result of what is now going on.

To Gen. Sir D. Dundas, K.B., Commander in Chief. Coimbra, 30th Sept. 1810.

I have the satisfaction of enclosing a copy of my dispatch of this date to the Earl of Liverpool, containing an account of the good conduct of the troops under my command, and most particularly of their gallantry in the action of the 27th.

To Capt. Daniel, H.M.S. *Jasper*, off Figueira. Coimbra, 30th Sept. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th, and I shall be obliged to you to order all ships having on board troops and stores to proceed to the Tagus.

*The A.G. to the Officer in charge of prisoners of war.* 30th Sept. 1810.

You are to proceed with the French officers, prisoners of war, consisting of one lieutenant colonel and 3 captains at head quarters, to Lisbon. They are to be conducted by peasantry to Villa Nova, and to be there embarked. The peasants are to be relieved at the different stages, for which you will receive an order from Marshal Beresford. A serjeant and 8 men will accompany you. These may be relieved by any Portuguese militia or ordenanza on the road, and return to join their division. Rations are to be drawn for the officers at the different stations by the medical officer who has directions to proceed with them. On arrival at Lisbon they are to be delivered to Col. Peacocke, commandant of the place.

The officers have received money for their private purposes. Your expenses will be liquidated by producing a statement of them to the Military secretary.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart. Pombal, 2d Oct. 1810, 10½ A.M.

I received your note as I was leaving Redinha, and I am sorry to learn that you sustained a loss yesterday. I saw Krauchenberg on the road, and he was tolerably well. Murray has conveyed to you your instructions for this day, and I have nothing to add to them. Craufurd is by this

Condeixa, 1st Oct. 1810.

‘Arrangements for the further movements of the centre and left of the army.

‘1. Brig. Gen. Campbell’s and Brig. Gen. Colman’s brigades of Portuguese infantry will separate from Sir B. Spencer’s corps, and march on the 2d inst. through Lourigal and Guia to Monte Redondo; and on the 3d inst. to Marinhas. The artillery heretofore attached to these brigades will move with them unless it be ascertained that the roads are not practicable for it, in which case it is to continue with the 1st division.

‘2. The remainder of Sir B. Spencer’s corps is to march to-morrow from Soure through Almagreira, and it will receive further orders at the point where it enters the great road about a league beyond Pombal.

‘3. The cavalry has been ordered to fall back to-morrow through Almagreira, where Sir S. Cotton will receive further orders. The movements of the cavalry must, however, be regulated by circumstances, and Sir S. Cotton will retain possession of Soure as long as it can be held without risk.

‘4. The 3d division will march to-morrow from Pombal to Leiria.

‘5. Major Gen. Leith’s division will march to-morrow to the neighbourhood of Boa Vista, about 1 league short of Leiria.

‘6. The 9 pounder brigade and the reserve of artillery, and the forge carts of the cavalry which are drawn by horses, will march this day from Condeixa to join Major Gen. Leith’s division, with which they will continue to move till further orders.

‘7. The 4th division will halt this day near Arrifana, about 2 miles beyond Condeixa, and proceed to-morrow to the heights beyond Pombal.

‘8. The Light division will fall back, according to circumstances, towards Condeixa; and to-morrow to Redinha.

‘9. Head quarters will be this day at Redinha.’

time at Redinha, where he will halt for some time; and you might as well communicate with him. He will be here this afternoon.

I move my head quarters to Leiria this evening; but I shall stay here for two or three hours, to see how things go on in front. Mellish left Coimbra yesterday evening. He did not see any guns. One of Junot's divisions of infantry had passed at Coimbra, and was on the road between Coimbra and Condeixa; one brigade about half way, the other near Coimbra. Some cavalry had passed by the ford. From all this it would appear that the enemy are not in a situation to annoy us much this day. Junot's corps being the right of the army, there can be nothing, excepting some of his cavalry, on our left.

There are 10,000 lbs. of Indian corn and barley here, in 20 cars, belonging to the Portuguese army. If you want it, send the enclosed order to this place to a serjeant of the 15th Portuguese regt., who is in charge of the corn, and it will be delivered to you. If you should not want it, send an order to the serjeant to march on. There are likewise here 6000 rations of straw, if you should want any.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have heard that there are here 5000 rations of Indian corn for the cavalry, so that you will not want that which the Portuguese serjeant has; and I have ordered it to Thomar.

To the Hon. A. C. Johnstone.

Leiria, 3d Oct. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters to the 26th Sept., for all of which I am much obliged to you.

G. O.

Leiria, 3d Oct. 1810.

1. \* \* \* \* \*  
There are some stragglers from these three regiments than from all the others of the British army taken together, which must be occasioned either by the neglect of the officers, or by the soldiers being unable to keep up with the march. In either case, these regiments are unfit to do duty with the army; and if the Commander of the Forces should observe any more of this straggling on the march, he will send the regiments into garrison, and report their conduct especially to His Majesty.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests, that Major Gen. Leith will communicate these Orders to the Portuguese troops in his division, of whom, particularly the Lusitanian Legion, there is as much reason to complain as of the British brigade. He also requests to have a return this day of the number of men missing from each regiment, British and Portuguese, in the division, on each day's march, since the 1st inst. inclusive.

3. General officers commanding divisions are requested to direct the Provost Marshal attached to their division, to punish any man who may be found straggling from the regiment and division to which he belongs.

4. General officers commanding divisions are requested to direct that there may be an inspection of the soldiers' packs, both British and Portuguese, this day after the march, and every thing, not strictly regimental necessaries, is to be taken from them and burnt, and those who have these articles are to be punished, as they have certainly procured them by plunder.

Major Gen. Picton is requested not to allow the troops of his division to enter any town unless necessarily obliged to pass through it, until further orders.

A. G. O.

Leiria, 3d Oct. 1810.

The Commander of the Forces is concerned to have been under the necessity of carrying into execution the determination which he has so long announced, of directing the immediate execution of any soldiers caught plundering; and that a British and Portuguese soldier have consequently been hanged this day for plundering in the town of Leiria, where they were contrary to order, and for this criminal purpose. He trusts that this example will deter others from those disgraceful practices in future; and the troops may depend upon it that no instance of the kind will be passed over. They are well fed and taken care of, and there is no excuse for plunder, which could not be admitted on any account. Once more, the Commander of the Forces calls upon the commanding officers of regiments to oblige their men to march in a regular manner with their companions.

It is very desirable that some arrangement should be adopted to give the Spanish nation an army. They have certainly nothing in the shape of one at present; and they must have the aid of Great Britain, both in officers and equipments, in order to be enabled to form one. It is not in my power, however, to give the aid of the former from this army, as I have supplied the Portuguese army with officers almost exclusively from the regiments in this country; and there remains with each barely a sufficient number to do the duty, and certainly not enough to provide for the casualties of the service. It would not answer to hold out hopes of a description of assistance which it is not in my power to give; and therefore I shall be obliged to you if you will acquaint the Marques de la Romana with my ideas upon this part of the subject.

Money to pay and provide for the troops is equally necessary with arms, and equipments, and discipline. It is impossible to expect that any people will submit to military discipline, or will do what is required of them as soldiers, if they are neither fed, nor clothed, nor paid; or that food, raiment, and pay for the troops can be provided for without the advance of money by the State. The mode of procuring this money is, however, purely a Spanish question, with which I can have nothing to do, although I think it probable that the Spanish government would be happy to avail themselves of some mode of the description suggested by you. Adverting to the situation of Spain relatively to the colonies, it might be doubted whether individuals would be found to advance their money in England, on the credit of the bills to be drawn by the Regency on the government of Mexico, even at the advantageous rate proposed; but this is a question for the consideration of the Spanish government on one side, and the individuals on the other, with which I can have no business.

The arrangement of this concern, however, in the manner proposed, would affect the situation of the British army. We draw a very large proportion of our supplies of specie from Cadiz, where it is procured by bills upon the Treasury, regulated by Mr. Duff. There must of course be a limit to the sums to be procured in this manner at Cadiz; and it is obvious that if the Spanish government are to have £600,000 out of the money to be procured at Cadiz for bills of exchange upon England, that sum of money will be *minus* in the military chest of this army. I am so convinced of the truth of this proposition, and have stated it so frequently to the King's government, and to the King's minister at Cadiz, that I could not with propriety now recommend the adoption of any measure to procure funds for the payment of the Spanish armies, which should interfere with those funds allotted for the British army, without which the contest could not continue long. I recommend to you, however, to bring the whole subject under the consideration of Mr. Wellesley at Cadiz, who will certainly give it every attention in his power, and be happy to attend to your suggestions.

Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Leiria, 3d Oct. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 29th Sept.; and although I could not save Coimbra, I have very little doubt of being able to hold this country against the force which has now attacked it. There will be a breeze near Lisbon, but I hope we shall have the best of it.

In respect to money from Cadiz, the government have sent out Mr. Drummond for the special purpose of inquiring what could be done to increase our funds, and I cannot interfere with him. I am induced to believe that Duff got as much money as can be procured, and I should be anxious not to take the business out of his hands. But, as I said before, it is Mr. Drummond's business to inquire; and if the result of his inquiry should be that the funds can be increased by any new mode of proceeding, I shall not be found wedded to that upon which we have acted hitherto.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Leiria, 3d Oct. 1810.

I transmit by Col. O'Lawlor the copy of a dispatch to the Sec. of State, containing an account of the recent operations of the army under my command, which I request you to lay before the Regency of Spain.

Col. O'Lawlor has been employed by the Spanish government with this army since the month of June, 1809, and recently in the same commission with Col. Alava. I have had every reason to be satisfied with both these officers. They were both with me during the late operations of the army; and as they are perfectly acquainted with all that passed, Col. O'Lawlor will be able to give the Regency any further details they may be desirous of having, for which reason I send this dispatch by him.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Leiria, 3d Oct. 1810.

I have but little to add to the intelligence contained in the dispatch which Col. O'Lawlor will give you with this. I withdrew our advanced guard to this side of the Mondego on Sunday, and the enemy took possession of Coimbra. They have since crossed the Mondego, but not in great strength. The allied army is behind this town, and the advanced guard in Pombal. We shall make our retreat to the positions in front of Lisbon without much difficulty, or any loss. My opinion is, that the French are in a scrape. They are not a sufficient army for their purpose, particularly since their late loss, and that the Portuguese army have behaved so well; and they will find their retreat from this country a most difficult and dangerous operation.

I have received your letter of the 22d Sept. You have already my opinion upon making La Carlota Regent of Spain. You and I entirely agree upon that subject. The Spanish politicians have only one object in the measure, and that is to get hold of the resources of this country, as they are afraid of forcing the people of Spain themselves to submit to the privations and inconveniences to which they must submit, if ever they mean to form an army. I rather believe that, under the ancient laws, La Carlota cannot be the Regent herself. How is this? I do not believe that much benefit would be derived to the common cause from the association of La Romana with the existing Regency.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Lightburne.

3d Oct. 1810.

I have to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces is pleased to allow Brigade Major Potter to return to his duty as Brigade major to the brigade under your command. I am likewise to inform you that the officer who has been acting as Brigade major during Major Potter's absence is to receive the pay and emoluments from the time Major Potter left the brigade until the day of his return, which you will be pleased to see carried into effect.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Leiria, 4th Oct. 1810.

There is a report that there are some stragglers, Portuguese as well as English, in the villages on the right and left of the road near where you are cantoned, and I shall be obliged to you if you will send out patrols, and take up all men of this description, and send them in here as prisoners.

Murray will have sent you your instructions. Keep yourself right in front to observe the enemy, and do not engage in any affair with a superior force. After this day's halt, the sooner the enemy advance, the better: I have little doubt of the result.

Am Maréchal Ney, Duc d'Elchingen.

An Quartier Général, ce 4 Oct. 1810.

Je vous envoie l'extrait d'une lettre\* que je viens de recevoir de l'Angleterre; et j'ai grand plaisir de pouvoir vous communiquer un événement qui pourra vous être agréable.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Leiria, 4th Oct. 1810.

The Commissary Gen. has just given me the enclosed order issued by you, which cannot be carried into execution without incurring the risk of starving the divisions of the army which precede you on the march. I would also observe to you that if the officer commanding one division gives orders of this description in respect to one part of the road, the officer commanding another may give one of a similar description respecting another, and in this contest what becomes of the responsibility of the Commissary General?

P. S. There is no occasion to countermand the order; but I think you had better desire the Commissaries not to carry it into execution.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens.

Leiria, 4th Oct. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 31st Aug., 11th and 19th Sept., for all of which I am much obliged to you.

Let us drop the subject of army promotion altogether, for I assure you I feel no interest in it, excepting with a view to the public good, in which I may be mistaken; and I should be sorry that you believed that I disapprove of any thing you have done in your office. My opinions went against the system, not against the mode of carrying it on. I am quite indifferent where my regiment is, as far as I am concerned. I rather think it is better for the officers that the regiment should be in England.

I am much obliged to you for relieving me from Major Gen. ——— and Col. ———. I have no public objection to make to the former, but he has been guilty of many little improprieties which render him a discreditable person with the army; and before I had received your letter of the 19th, with the official letter announcing his recall, Major Gen. ———, who commands the division in which his brigade is posted, had urged his removal so strenuously, that I had determined to send him word that he had my leave to quit the army, and go to Lisbon. Sir D. Dundas will be the best judge whether this communication will be sufficient authority to hold the language which he proposes to hold to him. In these times I should prefer avoiding to employ him and give no reason;

\* Respecting his nephew.

and I should have acted accordingly, if I had sent him leave of absence, as I intended before I received your letter.

I have seen ———, and I think he will do very well; and I dare say so will ———.

The French have not yet any force this side of Coimbra. We make our retreat with great ease. This day we all halt; and I have every thing now so clear that I shall go no farther till I see their movements. The old troops behave very well. The young ones are not quite so well acquainted with me, and they have had a few stragglers; but I shall soon have them all in good order.

Au Marquis de la Romana.

à Leiria, ce 5 Oct. 1810, 6 heures du matin.

L'ennemi a passé le Mondégo en force hier; les avant postes étaient à Pombal, et je vous prie de vous mettre en marche par la route que je vous ai envoyée dans ma dernière lettre aussitôt que vous pourrez. C'est à dire par Elvas, Estremoz, Monte Mór o Velho, et Aldea Galega.

P.S. Vous feriez bien de laisser votre cavalerie, au moins la cavalerie Portugaise, sur la frontière pour masquer votre mouvement; et en tout cas, envoyez les deux escadrons qui appartiennent à la garnison d'Elvas à Elvas si vous faites passer cette ville par la cavalerie Portugaise.

To Col. Peacocke.

Alcobaça, 5th Oct. 1810.

I beg that, as soon as convenient after the receipt of this letter, the 2d batt. 58th regt. may be moved by the usual marches to Torres Vedras. Also that all the officers and soldiers of the army who are fit to do their duty, and are now at Lisbon or Belem, may be sent to Cabeça de Montachique, where they are to wait until they shall receive further orders to join their respective regiments.

Send me a return of the names of the officers and number of men of each regiment who will join, and you will take care that each is provided with the usual camp equipments and with 60 rounds of ammunition.

You will also send to Cabeça de Montachique any regiments which may have landed; and all the officers and soldiers of the Royal artillery in Lisbon, Belem, or S. Julian, with the exception of those belonging to Capt. Lefevre's troop. Send me a return of the names of the officers and number of men of these latter who will be at Cabeça de Montachique.

Desire the Commissary at Lisbon to adopt measures to supply with provisions the troops who will be at Cabeça de Montachique.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Alcobaça, 5th Oct. 1810.

The enemy having moved forward his advanced guard in strength in front of Coimbra, on the evening of the 30th Sept., and in the morning

1. O.

Alcobaça, 5th Oct. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces announces to the army that 30 of the stragglers, who are absent from their regiments, of which 10 are British soldiers, were taken yesterday by the enemy in villages near the road on which the army marched 3 or 4 days before, that is on the 1st and 2d inst. This misfortune would be a subject of regret to the Commander of the Forces under any circumstances, but it is particularly so, as it has been occasioned by the irregularity of the soldiers themselves, and by the neglect of their officers to attend to the orders repeatedly issued upon this subj.ct.

of the 1st inst., I thought proper to withdraw the advanced guard of the British army to this side of the Mondego on the 1st, and to continue the retreat of the main body of the army. In retiring the British cavalry from Fornos, Capt. Krauchenberg, of the hussars, and Capt. Cocks, of the 16th light dragoons, charged the enemy. Capt. Krauchenberg was wounded, but, I am happy to say, not severely.

I continued the retreat of this part of the army by the roads of Soure and Pombal to Leiria, near which town the whole arrived on the 3d, and halted yesterday, the advanced post being in Pombal. Lieut. Gen. Hill's corps retired by the road of Espinhal upon Thomar, where it arrived yesterday.

The enemy's advanced guard arrived yesterday at Redinha, and he drove in our piquets at Pombal in the evening; and I had intelligence that the 8th *corps d'armée* was at Condeixa, and the other troops on this side of the Mondego. I have, therefore, this day continued the retreat, and the advanced guard will be in the rear of Leiria.

With few exceptions, the troops have continued to conduct themselves with great regularity, and they have suffered no fatigue. The army is now at no great distance from the position in which I proposed that it should receive the enemy, and it is in high spirits. From all accounts which I have received, the enemy suffer great distress. The inhabitants of the country have fled from their houses universally, carrying with them every thing they could take away which could be deemed useful to the enemy; and the habits of plunder which have so long been encouraged in the enemy's army prevent them from deriving any general advantage from the little resource which the inhabitants may have been obliged to leave behind them. Nothing of importance has occurred in the northern or in the southern provinces of Spain since I addressed you last. My last letters from Cadiz were dated the 22d Sept.

P.S. I have learnt that Gen. Grandorge and Gen. Foy, both belonging to the 2d corps, were wounded in the action of the 27th ult., as well as those officers mentioned in my last dispatch, and that Gen. Grandorge has since died of his wounds.

To Capt. —, Royal Engineers. (Circular.)

Rio Maior, 6th Oct. 1810.

I enclose a memorandum, by which you will see the manner in which I have divided into districts the country which has been fortified between the Tagus and the sea; the objects for which this division has been made; and that you are appointed regulating officer of the district No. —. I likewise enclose a list of the redoubts and works in that district; stating the number with which each is marked; the number of guns it contains, and the number of infantry deemed necessary for the defence of each.

The business of your situation, as regulating officer of district No. —, is to arrange the troops in their several stations, when they shall be sent into the district to occupy the redoubts; to take charge of the mines intended to blow up the roads and bridges; and to carry my orders in the district into execution, till an officer to command the troops within it shall be appointed; you are then to assist him in making his arrangements as one of his staff, and in the defence of his post, with your professional abilities.



Memorandum for Lieut. Col. Fletcher, Royal Engineer, and the Commissary General.  
Rio Maior, 6th Oct. 1810.

With a view to the occupation of the works in the line in the front of Lisbon, they must be divided into certain districts, and an officer must be appointed to command or regulate the troops in each.

The troops, viz. the militia, the British and Portuguese artillery, and the Ordenanza artillery, must be assembled in the district; and the officer commanding, or the regulating officer, must make the arrangement and distribution of them, to be carried into execution when it shall be necessary by the advance of the enemy.

The districts are to be as follows:

- No. 1. From Torres Vedras to the sea. Head quarters, Torres Vedras.
- No. 2. From Sobral de Monte Agraço to the valley of Calhandriz. Head quarters, Sobral de Monte Agraço.
- No. 3. From Alhandra to the valley of Calhandriz. Head quarters, Alhandra.
- No. 4. From the banks of the Tagus near Alverca to the pass of Bucellas inclusive. Head quarters, Bucellas.
- No. 5. From the pass of Freixal inclusive to the right of the pass of Mafra. Head quarters, Montachique.
- No. 6. From the pass of Mafra to the sea. Head quarters, Mafra.

The Commissary Gen. of the British army must supply all the troops in these positions, under the arrangement of June, 1809, and there must be a Commissary in each district.

No. 1,	.	.	.	.	.	Tents for 2,500 men
No. 2,	.	.	.	.	.	2,000 ..
No. 3,	.	.	.	.	.	5,000 ..
No. 4,	.	.	.	.	.	5,000 ..
No. 5,	.	.	.	.	.	10,000 ..
No. 6,	.	.	.	.	.	10,000 ..

No. 1 District. Troops to be assembled at the head quarters forthwith:

2470 Militia infantry.	
250 Ordenanza artillery.	Regulating Royal Engineers.
140 Regular Portuguese artillery.	Capt. Mulcaster.
70 British artillery.	Lieut. Thompson.

No. 2 District. Troops to be assembled at the head quarters forthwith:

1300 Militia infantry.	
300 Ordenanza artillery.	Regulating Royal Engineers.
140 Regular Portuguese artillery.	Capt. Goldfinch.
40 British artillery.	Lieut. Foster.

No. 3 District. Troops to be assembled at the head quarters forthwith:

400 Militia infantry.	Regulating Royal Engineers.
60 Ordenanza artillery.	Capt. Squire.
60 British artillery.	Lieut. Piper.

No. 4 District. Troops to be assembled at the head quarters forthwith:

1100 Militia infantry.	Regulating Royal Engineers.
500 Ordenanza artillery.	Capt. Burgoyne.
80 Regular Portuguese artillery.	Lieut. Stanway.

No. 5 District. Troops to be assembled at the head quarters forthwith:

2400 Militia infantry.	
480 Ordenanza artillery.	Regulating Royal Engineers.
120 Regular Portuguese artillery.	Capt. Dickenson.
50 British artillery.	Lieut. French.

No. 6 District. Troops to be assembled at the head quarters immediately.

700 Militia infantry.	
350 Ordenanza artillery.	Regulating Royal Engineers.
230 Regular Portuguese artillery.	Capt. Ross.
40 British artillery.	Lieut. Hulme.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Rio Maior, 6th Oct. 1810, 11½ A.M.

I have just arrived here. The enemy entered Leiria yesterday evening with cavalry and infantry; and our advanced guard was about a league and a half on this side of that town. They withdrew this day to Candieiros, about 2 leagues from hence, and I have not yet heard that they had been at all pressed by the enemy. If the enemy should get on as far as Candieiros this day, they will be at Alcoentre to-morrow. At all events, the advanced guard will be here to-morrow. Your movements, therefore, become a subject of some anxiety to me.

I understand that half, possibly the whole, of your infantry will be at Santarem this day. Every thing that arrives at Santarem this day should march in the morning to Azambuja. Any part of your corps which makes a short march into Santarem to-morrow morning must move on to Cartaxo, and the whole must move early the next morning upon Villa Franca. If Fane's cavalry should be able to get through Santarem to-morrow, it may follow your march as above stated; but it must positively be able to reach Castanheira early on the 8th.

If there are any boats at Santarem, you should embark your sick and other incumbrances, and send them down to Lisbon. If there are no boats, send them across the Tagus by the ford, and down the left bank of the river to Salvaterra. In like manner any of your infantry or cavalry which cannot quit Santarem to-morrow, so as to arrive at Castanheira early on the 8th, ought likewise to cross the Tagus by the ford at Santarem, and proceed to Salvaterra, to which place orders will be sent them to go where boats shall be sent to ferry them over the river.

I shall write to you again this evening, as soon as I know how far the enemy have pushed their advanced guard. In the mean time make all your arrangements for to-morrow as herein suggested.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Rio Maior, 6th Oct. 1810, 8½ P.M.

Since I wrote to you this morning, and since the accounts were sent to you that the enemy had passed a column towards Porto de Moz, I have heard from Sir S. Cotton that they have shown some troops in front of his advanced posts at Carvalhos, which, however, had not advanced. They had not followed Sir Stapleton's march this day; and at sunset this evening all appeared quiet, and no movement could be seen at the top of the Serra de Junto, near this, on either side of the mountain. I think therefore that your rear may be able to make its march to Castanheira, even though it should not move from Santarem till the day after to-morrow. I shall, however, know more of the enemy's movements this night or to-morrow; and I shall write to you again to Santarem if I should think it probable that my letter will reach that place before you will leave it, or to Azambuja.

My head quarters will be to-morrow at Alemquer. The cavalry will stay here as long as it can, and Gen. R. Craufurd will be at Alcoentre.

To Major Gen. Sontag.

Rio Maior, 6th Oct. 1810.

Lieut. Col. Bathurst will have apprised you of my wish to employ you, and will have conveyed to you my request that you should proceed to Torres Vedras, where you will receive further orders from me.

The object for which I have requested you to go there is to take the command of the troops destined for the defence of the redoubts constructed at and in the neighbourhood of Torres Vedras, and extending from thence along the river to the sea. The redoubts and works at Torres Vedras are numbered from No. 20 to 27 inclusive, and have 48 pieces of cannon, and require 3800 men for their defence. The redoubts on the left of Torres Vedras are No. 30, at Ponte de Rol; 31, Alcatena; 32, S. Pedro da Cadeira; 111, 112, and 113, between 32 and the sea. These require 1500 men, and have 33 pieces of cannon.

I enclose a note of the number of men deemed, by the chief Engineer, necessary for the defence of each redoubt, and of the number of guns in each, and a memorandum from the chief Engineer of the object in view in constructing these works. My intention is to occupy these works partly with British infantry, partly with Portuguese infantry of the line, and partly with Portuguese militia.

I have ordered to Torres Vedras immediately the 58th regt., consisting of 300 R. and F., and 2 regiments of militia, consisting of 1700 men. To these I shall add another British regiment, a Portuguese regiment of the line, and another regiment of militia, if I should find that the enemy manifests any intention of moving in that direction. I have also ordered to Torres Vedras 60 British artillery; 140 Portuguese artillery of the line, and 250 artillery of the Ordenanza: so that the garrisons for the redoubts will be complete in artillery, and will be wanting only in their complement of infantry.

I enclose a memorandum, by which you will see the mode in which I have divided the district of country between the Tagus and the sea; and that I have appointed a regulating officer for each district. These regulating officers are the Engineers who constructed the works; and, in the case of an appointment of a General officer to command in any district, would only assist him as part of his staff. Capt. Mulcaster and Lieut. Thompson are appointed to the station at Torres Vedras. I have also sent Lieut. Dundas to Torres Vedras to act as Brigade Major under your orders. There are provisions at Torres Vedras for the troops destined to defend that post. There is musket ammunition, and 60 rounds for each gun in the redoubts. There are likewise tents there for 2500 men.

I recommend that you should immediately distribute the artillerymen in the several redoubts according to the number required for each gun; that you should likewise station a proportionate number of the infantry intended for the defence of each redoubt in it immediately, so that the officers and men may become accustomed to their station. The 58th had better be kept, 5 companies at Torres Vedras, the other 5 companies in the 6 redoubts between Torres Vedras and the sea.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Rio Maior, 6th Oct. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 5th, and I shall take care that the Commissary Gen. shall not exchange any paper during the existing crisis. I do not know what people feel at Lisbon, but we at the army entertain but little doubt of success. The Bishop and Sousa would do more harm than good in the north, where we are carrying on operations of great im-

portance; but I hope the letter which I enclose will bring these gentry to their senses, or I shall certainly carry into execution the threat which it contains.

I believe you and the government do not know where the lines are. Those round Lisbon are not those in which I shall place the army, but those extending from Torres Vedras to the Tagus. All I ask from the government is tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops; and as God Almighty does not give 'the race to the swift or the battle to the strong,' and I have fought battles enough to know, that even under the best arrangements, the result of any one is not certain, I only beg that they will adopt preparatory arrangements to take out of the enemy's way those persons who would suffer if they were to fall into his hands. I shall have my head quarters at Alemquer to-morrow.

P. S. I shall add the last paragraph of this as a postscript to my other letter.

To Charles Stuart, Esq

Rio Maior, 6th Oct. 1810.

I have just received your letter of the 5th. I beg that you will do me the favor to inform the Regency, and, above all, Principal Sousa, that His Majesty and the Prince Regent having intrusted me with the command of their armies, and exclusively with the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or any body else, to interfere with them; that I know best where to station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and I shall not alter a system framed upon mature consideration, upon any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz., to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army, and of the people, while the troops shall be engaged with the enemy.

As for Principal Sousa, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since he has been a member of the government; that being embarked in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to their end; but that no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula, for one moment, after I shall have obtained His Majesty's leave to resign my charge, if Principal Sousa is to remain either a member of the government, or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I shall; and if I should be obliged to go, I will take care that the world, in Portugal at least, and the Prince Regent, shall be made acquainted with my reasons.

From the letter of the 3d inst., which I have received from Dom M. Forjaz, I had hoped that the government were satisfied with what I had done and intended to do; and that, instead of endeavoring to render all further defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of the town. But I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weakness; and that their expressions of approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure. I

request you to communicate this letter to the Regency; and to transmit it to the Sec. of State for Foreign affairs.

P.S. All I ask from the Portuguese Regency is, tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions *for their own troops*, while they shall be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt of success; but as I have fought a sufficient number of battles to discover that the result of any one is not certain, even under the best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt preparatory measures to take out of the enemy's way those persons and their families who would suffer if they were to fall into his hands.

*The A.G. to the Commissary General.*

6th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint you that I have stated the substance of Mr. —'s conversation with me, 'in which he pressed for an inquiry into the circumstances attending his being placed under an arrest by Brig. Gen. —,' to the Commander of the Forces; and I am directed to acquaint you, for Mr. —'s information, that as it appears he was released from his arrest, and accepted the same by returning to his duties, it is not for the Commander of the Forces to urge Gen. — now to bring Mr. — to a Court Martial, the only proceeding that the Commander of the Forces in such cases would approve of.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Alemquer, 7th Oct. 1810, 8½ P.M.

When I heard from Sir S. Cotton from Rio Maior at 3, the enemy were about Candieiros, and I think it probable that they will be at Rio Maior, and be at Alcoentre this night. However, I have no account since 3 this afternoon.

Your whole corps, even including that part of Fane's cavalry which will not leave Santarem until to-morrow morning, will be in good time.

P.S. I am going to Alhandra in the morning. If I should find that the enemy move to Rio Maior this day, I shall go either to Arruda or Sobral de Monte Agraço with my head quarters to-morrow. You shall know in the morning whether I go, when I go, or whether I remain here.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Alemquer, 7th Oct. 1810.

I enclose my dispatch of the 5th to the Sec. of State. Nothing of importance has occurred since: we have continued our retreat without difficulty, and the troops, with the exception of the advanced guard, will be in their positions to-morrow. Our cavalry had a skirmish with the enemy on the 5th, in which they had the advantage. I entertain very little doubt of our success. I hope that Romana will have marched this day to join us.

To Marshal Beresford.

Alemquer, 7th Oct. 1810.

Regulating officers are appointed to the several fortified districts as follows: and I shall be obliged to you if you will direct the officers commanding the militia, and the Ordenanza and regular artillery, to report themselves, and to apply to these officers for orders. (See p. 317.)

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Alemquer, 7th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 4th and 6th inst. I think you had better detain the *Melpomene* and *S.*

*Firenze* for a few days. With regard to the transports mentioned by Sir R. Keats in his letter to you of the 24th Sept., I am of opinion they should be sent back to Cadiz.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Alemquer, 8th Oct. 1810, 5 A.M.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th inst. The forts of Cascaes and S. Antonio have never been considered as at all affecting the place of embarkation of the army, if embarkation should become necessary, nor the passage of the transports from the Tagus.

In the event, however, of the army occupying the works at S. Julian, the ordnance in Cascaes and S. Antonio might be used by the enemy against the former; and it would therefore be desirable that the ordnance and stores should be removed from these forts to S. Julian, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will have this done. Indeed, I understood that it had been done long ago, under the general directions given to remove the ordnance and stores from all the forts not within the line of our own works.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Alemquer, 8th Oct. 1810, 5 P.M.

I have received your letter of the 7th. In my opinion, none of the transports ought to be sent home under present circumstances. I do not believe there are any sick or wounded soldiers at Lisbon who will not recover there.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to order the armed transport and the flat boats which you mention, up the river, to anchor off Alhandra. I have directed the bank of the river to be cut down, so as to enable the guns of the latter to bear upon the enemy.

To Col. Peacocke.

Alemquer, 8th Oct. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 7th. I had hoped that I should have had more men of the artillery, and I beg that you will order those at Cascaes to march upon Mafra, and desire the commanding officer of artillery to send me a return, accounting for every man of the British and German artillery at Lisbon and in the neighbourhood.

I beg you to issue tin camp kettles to the regiments recently arrived, and let them march as ordered; but I beg you will understand that it is important to have the troops in health, and not over fatigued, and therefore I desire that they may make their marches early in the day; that if they leave Lisbon late, their march should be proportionably shortened; and that they should not march in the night. Although these regiments are now to be supplied with tin kettles, they are eventually to have the others, and the officers commanding companies must provide mules for their carriage.

I experience great inconvenience from the want of the return of the recovered officers and soldiers sent to Montachique.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Arruda, 8th Oct. 1810, 3½ P.M.

I send 2 persons with this letter, who will be guides to any body you may have to send to me; I am not more than 6 miles from you. The

enemy's advance on the Alcobaca road was last night at Caldas, but this day's rain will have impeded their progress. I think, however, that the great attack will be upon the left.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Arruda, 8th Oct. 1810.

The Q. M. Gen. sends orders to Major Gen. Fane to withdraw the cavalry under his command to Tojal and Loures to-morrow morning, with the exception of one squadron of British cavalry, and 2 squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, which are to continue to observe the ground in front of the right of the army, as long as it may be practicable for them.

I request you also, to-morrow morning, to send a brigade of Portuguese 6 pounders (which you were to have sent to Gen. Leith in exchange for the 9 pounders), and two 6 pounders belonging to the brigade with Major Gen. Leith, which you brought from N<sup>a</sup> S<sup>a</sup> del Monte, from Villa Franca, through Alhandra and Arruda to Sobral de Monte Agraço, where the 6 pounder brigade is to join the 6th division of infantry; and the two 6 pounders are to be sent on to Ribaldeira, to join the 3d division of infantry. I also request you to send from Villa Franca, through Alhandra and S. Antonio do Tojal to Cabeça de Montachique, the Portuguese 9 pounder brigade which has been with your corps; where it is to remain in reserve, and in readiness to move at a short notice. The other Portuguese 6 pounder brigade with your corps, and the 3 pounder brigade with Col. Le Cor, must be brought to Alhandra.

It is my intention that the troops under your command should (as they have hitherto) be the right of the army; and occupy the position of Alhandra, &c. There must be a brigade of British infantry for the occupation of the line on the right, extending from the high road to the Tagus; and adverting to the strength of the remainder of the ground, it is my opinion that, as the whole of the mountain is scarped, one brigade of Portuguese infantry of Gen. Hamilton's division, and the 12th regt., and the 3 batts. of militia under the command of Col. Le Cor, will occupy this ground, and the other ground which I am about to describe, very sufficiently; unless the enemy should make his great attack on the right flank: in which case further measures will be necessary.

There are 6 batteries on the line from the Tagus to the left of the mountain, containing thirteen 12 pounders, and seven 6 pounders, numbered from 1 to 6 inclusive; and six redoubts, No. 114 for 100 men, with two 9 pounders; No. 115, for 100 men, with two 9 pounders; No. 116, for 100 men, with five 9 pounders; No. 118, for 400 men, with eight 12 pounders; No. 119, for 350 men, with six 12 pounders; No. 120, for 130 men, with two 12 pounders, and *à fleche*; No. 117, for 150 men.

You will find the batteries and redoubts on the hill so placed, as not only to defend the faces of the hill itself, but to command different parts of the road from Arruda to Alhandra. No. 6 commands the valley upon the left of the position, through which a road leads to Calhandriz.

In order more effectually to stop any body of troops attempting to turn the left of the position by the valley of Calhandriz, Nos. 7 and 8 have been constructed, each calculated to contain 200 men, and having in each of them three 12 pounders; and further, upon a hill on the left of the

valley, No. 121, for 250 men, and three 9 pounders; No. 122 for 300 men, and three 12 pounders; No. 123, for 300 men, and three 12 pounders, and one 9 pounder.

I conceive that the infantry above mentioned will be sufficient for the occupation of all these works and ground in the first instance; and I shall hereafter send you directions for the disposal of the remainder under your command. In the mean time I request you to allot the brigades and troops for the occupation of this ground; but they need not move into their position till the enemy be rather nearer.

In order to provide artillerymen for all these works, 300 artillery of the Ordenanza, 140 Portuguese artillery, and 40 British artillery, have been ordered immediately to Alhandra. Capt. Squire, of the Engineers, has been appointed the regulating officer of this district, in order to assist whoever may be appointed to command the troops in it; and he can give you every information, and will assist you in making the arrangements for the distribution of the troops, &c. I recommend that the artillery, at least, should be posted in the redoubts and batteries as soon as they shall arrive. Tents have been ordered to Alhandra for 5000 men, and some should be sent into the works for their accommodation. A double set for the usual number of men will probably keep them dry. The Portuguese artillery and Ordenanza in the works must receive their provisions from the British Commissary at Alhandra: and some of them must come down from the works for them daily.

To Major Gen. Picton.

Arruda, 8th Oct. 1810, 3½ p.m.

I am very much obliged to you for having made arrangements to occupy the redoubts at Torres Vedras till the arrival of Gen. Sontag. I have been to the right this day, and shall be with you to-morrow. Col. De Grey is ordered to observe the enemy in your front and on our right flank, and report to you. I think the attack will be upon our left, by Torres Vedras.

I beg you to peruse the instructions to Gen. Sontag, which Lieut. Dundas has.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Arruda, 8th Oct. 1810, 3½ p.m.

I send with this a letter for Gen. Picton, which I beg you to peruse and to forward to him. The enemy did not come more forward than Candieiros upon the high road yesterday, and they had not many troops on that road. I have not yet heard of their having come to Rio Maior, on the high road. If they do not come there to-day, the attack will certainly be on our left; and so much the better. Hill is at Alhandra, where I have been this day.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. —.*

8th Oct. 1810.

In reply to your letter of the 7th inst., from Ribaldeira, I am directed to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces is of opinion that it would not be proper for you now to absent yourself from the army.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Leith, 5th division.*

8th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th inst., and enclosures, herewith returned; and you will be pleased to communicate to Brig. Gen.



Spry that the Commander of the Forces will speak to Marshal Beresford to relieve him from the command of the Thomar militia.

I am likewise directed to request you will inform Brig. Gen. Hay that there is no excuse whatever for the — regt. There were plenty of shoes to be had if they had been applied for. The men that stayed behind committed all kinds of irregularities. The Commander of the Forces is strongly inclined to report the battalion to His Majesty, and to recommend the removal of it, and that the promotion of the officers may be stopped.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Stewart, 3d or Buffs, commg. 5th caçadores.* 10th Oct. 1810.

I have not failed to lay your letter of yesterday's date before the Commander of the Forces, and I have strongly represented the circumstances you stated in your conversation with me; but although his Excellency admits the justice of your claim, and the fair right you have to return hereafter to the command of the Buffs, he nevertheless cannot at the present moment, in the face of the enemy, sanction an arrangement which would place new commanding officers at the head of two battalions, and which might be extremely prejudicial to the service. With this impression his Excellency desires that you may for the present remain with the 5th caçadores; and hereafter he will take an opportunity, at a proper moment, of attending to your claim to take the command of the Buffs.

*The A.G. to Col. —, officer commg. 2d batt. — regt.* 10th Oct. 1810.

I herewith enclose the extract of a letter from the A.A.G. at Cadiz, and I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire you will account for this breach of orders relative to not sending in the returns of the regiment under your command.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

S. Quintino, 11th Oct. 1810, 8 A.M.

I received your letter of yesterday in the night from Mr. Sodré. That which the enemy has got on the road between Carregado and Alhandra is only his advanced guard; and I recommend to you to hold the town of Alhandra, keeping a few guns at the church, and barricading the streets. The enemy can bring no guns to the heights on the left of the high road as long as this weather lasts; and this measure will preclude the necessity of your throwing your people into the position prematurely, where they would be exposed to the bad weather.

I recommend to you, however, to occupy immediately the 3 villages on the left of the Serra, called Calhandriz, Dos Mellos, and Loureiro. The first is loop-holed, and there is an abattis in its front; and it commands the passage by the valley of Calhandriz, which the redoubts on the left of the heights, and the corresponding redoubts on the other heights, are calculated to defend. There are roads to these villages from Alhandra, at the back of the Serra, and from Alverca. 60 British artillery were ordered to you yesterday, and all the Portuguese artillery of the line, remaining at Lisbon, were ordered to Alverca. I have now sent to order 200 volunteer artillerymen from Bucellas to Alverca, and they will bring you a note from Capt. Burgoyne.

P.S. They swear that the tents have been sent from Lisbon. Make inquiries about them at Alhandra and Alverca. When the gun boats arrive, make some of them take their stations above the town, so as to assist in enabling you to hold it.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

S. Quintino, near Sobral, 11th Oct. 1810, 11½ A.M.

I hope that your men are well put up in Arruda in this terrible wea-

ther. I do not think the enemy's plan is quite decided yet. He has still some troops at Alemquer, and there is a body of cavalry and infantry (I saw of the latter about 300 men) on this side of Alemquer. I mean, however, to hold the town of Sobral as long as I can. The peasants say that they were marching this morning upon Villa Franca, which is to attack our right, where Hill is. They can make no impression upon the right, positively; and they must therefore endeavor to turn Hill's position upon the Serra of Alhandra by its left. This is a tough job also, defended as the entrances of the valleys are by redoubts, and the villages by abattis, &c. However, that is what they must try.

The paved road which leads through Arruda passes on to Alhandra, in front and under the fire of the Serra of Alhandra: there are roads of communication with this road, on its left, going to Alhandra, with Villa Franca, and I believe Castanheira, but these are at present impracticable; and on its right with Loureiro and Calhandriz, in the valley of Calhandriz, by which Hill's position on the Serra of Alhandra may be turned. These roads are, however, not paved, and are, of course, now impracticable, and there are redoubts upon the heights on both sides of the valley of Calhandriz, and the village itself is prepared.

In the present state of the weather the enemy may certainly get light troops upon the paved road from Arruda to Alhandra, without passing through Arruda, but they positively cannot get guns there; and as the only paved or at all practicable road to Arruda, from this side of the river of Arruda, passes through Sobral, I hope that that point is, for the present at least, pretty secure.

From this statement, however, you will see how important the situation of Arruda and the possession of the pass of Matos (which, by the by, itself turns Hill's position) are to our operations. Arruda, itself, I do not think, could be held for any great length of time against a superior force, but the pass of Matos can, defended as it is by the two redoubts. I understand from Fletcher also that the redoubts command the road going out

Distribution of the allied army on the 10th Oct. 1810:

Corps.		Stations.
3d division	.	.
Brig. Gen. Campbell's	} Portuguese brigades	Torres Vedras.
Brig. Gen. Colman's		
Col. de Grey's brigade of cavalry	.	Ramalhal, in front of Torres Vedras.
5th division	.	Enxara dos Cavalleiros.
6th division	.	Ribaldeira.
4th division	.	Duas Portas.
1st division	.	Sobral.
14th light dragoons	.	In front of Sobral, towards Abregada.
Brig. Gen. Pack's Portuguese brigade	.	In front of Sobral, towards Alemquer.
Light division	.	Arruda.
Caçadores, battalions of ditto	.	Matos and Carvalhal, behind Arruda
2d division	.	Alhandra.
Major Gen. Hamilton's Portuguese infantry	.	Villa Franca.
Col. Le Cor's Portuguese infantry	.	Alverca.
Major Gen. Fane's cavalry	.	Loures.
Three squadrons of ditto	.	{ On outpost duty in front of Major Gen. Hamilton.
Three regiments of cavalry under Lieut. Gen.	.	
Sir S. Cotton	.	{ S. Antonio do Tojal, and to move to-morrow to Mafra.
Head quarters	.	
	.	Sta Quintina, near Sobral.

of Arruda towards Alhandra. So that if you should find it most advantageous to give up Arruda, the enemy could not make much use of that road, at least by daylight.

I need say nothing to you about the defence of the pass of Matos. I think it would be desirable, however, that you should occupy, with the 52d or 43d, the high ground which continues from the right of the right hand redoubt, looking from Matos towards Arruda. As soon as the attack upon Hill shall be absolutely decided, I shall move Sir B. Spencer's division upon S. Iago dos Velhos, about 2 or 3 miles to the south of Matos, on the road from Matos to Bucellas. He will then occupy the heights of S. Romão on your right, bringing his right to the redoubts which protect the left of the valley of Calhandriz. I do not like to move him yet, however, because I still think it possible that the enemy may turn himself this way; and if he does, I have another arrangement prepared for him, upon which I shall write to you hereafter. I wish you, however, with a view to this arrangement, to look out for the roads of communication from Matos to the high road from Sobral to Bucellas.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

S. Quintino, 11th Oct. 1810.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will make me three separate reports of your affairs at Leiria, Alcoentre, and Quinta da Torre, that I may send them home, as being all highly creditable to the cavalry. I have already taken an opportunity of expressing to the Sec. of State how much the army were indebted to the cavalry, and I shall be happy to have another opportunity of doing so.

The 14th light dragoons, 1 squadron of the 16th, and 1 of hussars which you had sent to Gen. Craufurd, are now here, and I have put up the greater part of them, keeping out only 3, necessary to observe the enemy this side of Alemquer. De Grey is very quiet at Ramalhal, in front of Torres Vedras. I think that you had better collect at Mafra all stray squadrons and detachments, and individuals of all the regiments, as well as the head quarters of the hussars, 16th, and Royals, and make them up again as well as you can. I shall give orders for all of them to be sent to you.

P.S. Don't be long in what you have to do, as I think I shall have occasion both for you and Fane soon.

Memorandum for Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

11th Oct. 1810.

I believe that the force which appeared yesterday at Alemquer is the same advanced guard, and it afterwards proceeded by Carregado towards Villa Franca. Col. Hawker, however, should receive orders to patrolle well forward towards Alemquer, so as to ascertain whether there is any force of the enemy in Alemquer, and of what strength.

If the enemy should move from Alemquer upon Sobral de Monte Agraço in superior strength, I should wish the following arrangements to be made.

Gen. Sir B. Spencer's division to move to Zibreira, and canton in that village and Gozondeira. Head quarters to Patameira. Major Gen. Cole and Major Gen. Campbell to retire when necessary from Duas Portas and Ribaldeira, and occupy the heights immediately behind those villages, extending their line across the high road from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

Gen. Pack's brigade is in that case to occupy for the present the redoubts on the heights above Sobral de Monte Agraço, with his light infantry in the redoubts on the points of the rocks above the road leading to Arruda, marked Nos. 11, 12, and 13. The largest number should be in No. 11. Nos. 12 and 13 require each about one third of No. 11.

Capt. Williams, of the Engineers, will communicate to Gen. Pack all the details of the information respecting these redoubts.

*Lieut. Col. Bathurst, Mil. Sec., to the Hon. A. C. Johnstone.*

11th Oct. 1810.

I am directed by Lord Wellington to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th Oct., relating to money concerns, and I am to acquaint you that his Lordship has no doubt that the 3 millions of dollars which you mention will be wanted for the service of the army, and that the Commissary Gen. will be happy to give his bills at the exchange of the day, whenever these dollars will be offered; but his Lordship cannot at this distance of time enter into any positive engagement to receive them for bills on England upon any terms.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.*

11th Oct. 1810.

Lest you should not have seen the G.O. of the army at Lisbon, I think it right to apprise you that you are appointed to command the brigade of infantry, consisting of the 2d batt. 5th regt., 2d batt. 83d regt., and 94th regt., lately under the command of Major Gen. Lightburne, and in the 3d division of the army now at Torres Vedras. You will be pleased therefore to repair immediately to join your brigade; and if you will report to me the officer you wish to appoint your aide de camp, he shall be inserted in G.O.

*To Charles Stuart, Esq.*

Ajuda, 12th Oct. 1810.

I received this morning your letter of the 10th. No tents arrived yet! The troops are suffering every where for want of them; and Gen. Hill was obliged to draw in from Villa Franca.

I do not know that the enemy has more than an advanced guard in Alemquer. He reconnoitred us last night at Sobral with a large body of cavalry and some infantry; and, by mistake, our troops left the place, and I believe neither party were in it during the night. We were in it, however, this morning. I believe the floating battery went off up the river this morning, and is off Villa Franca.

I must write to England on the Admiral's desire to have an allowance for carrying home prisoners of war. It is a new question, on which I cannot decide.

*To Brig. Gen. Pack.*

Ajuda, 12th Oct. 1810, 2 p.m.

Capt. Chapman has delivered your message to me; and, first, I beg to assure you that there is no chance that the communication between your troops in the redoubt and the army will be interrupted; but, if such a chance existed, I had provisions prepared for the troops in the redoubts, which were consumed by the troops that first arrived at Sobral. In this supply wood was included, and forage for horses and mules. Wood and forage are still in large quantities in Sobral; and I have again desired the Commissary Gen. to send some more provisions to the redoubts, and to send there also some of the wood at Sobral: and, if you will be so kind as to send your mules to Sobral, with a note from yourself to the Commissary there, they may bring away with them as much forage as they can carry.

In respect to tents, the Portuguese government were to supply them; but they have failed in this, as they have in every thing else. You must only keep your troops in the neighbouring villages and houses till it shall be necessary to occupy the redoubts in force, with piquets only in the redoubts; and, before it may be necessary to go into the redoubts, I still hope that you will have the tents. I beg that you will communicate with the commanding officers of the 2 regiments of Lisbon volunteers, who are to go to the redoubts likewise.

I beg you to send an officer round to the 3 redoubts occupied by the caçadores, and see that they are either in their stations or near them, and that the artillerymen are there likewise; and that these people are supplied with provisions.

P.S. I shall be obliged to you if you will see whether a communication exists, or can be made, from the left and rear of the redoubts to Zibreira.

Au Marquis de la Romana.

à Ajuda, ce 12 Oct. 1810.

Je reçois ce matin votre lettre du 7, et je vous prie de faire rester la cavalerie Portugaise, si vous le trouvez bon. L'avant garde de l'ennemi est à Alemquer. Je ne sais pas où est le corps d'armée. Peut-être que le mauvais tems, qui a rendu les chemins exécrables, l'empêche de s'avancer, comme il m'empêche d'entreprendre quelque chose sur son avant garde.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Ajuda, 13th Oct. 1810.

The army continued its retreat by the routes of Alcobaça and of Rio Maior; and Lieut. Gen. Hill's corps by that of Santarem, till it arrived with its right at Castanheira and Villa Franca, its centre at Sobral, and its left at Torres Vedras, on the 7th and 8th inst., without being pressed or molested by the enemy. The movement of that part of the army under my own immediate command was covered by the British cavalry under Sir S. Cotton; and that of the troops under Lieut. Gen. Hill, by the 13th dragoons and Portuguese cavalry, under Major Gen. Fane. The British cavalry had several occasions of distinguishing themselves, upon which I enclose Sir S. Cotton's reports,\* and I must add my sense of the obligations

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Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton to Lieut. Gen. Viscount Wellington. Miguel, 6th Oct. 1810.

The enemy attacked my piquets on the Pombal and Soure roads at 6 A.M. yesterday, and obliged them to retire upon the former road. I went forward with the supporting squadron (16th light dragoons) to reconnoitre the enemy, when, perceiving that he was in force (7 regts. of cavalry, 6 guns, and a division of infantry), and that his cavalry (2 regts.) were advancing rapidly, I sent for 2 more squadrons of the 16th and one of the 1st hussars, determining to seize the first favorable opportunity of checking him before his infantry could come up. This was done in the most gallant manner by the piquets of the Royals, 14th and 16th dragoons (amounting together to about 60 men), and a squadron of the 16th. This attack, by which the enemy had a good many killed and wounded, had the effect of checking him till supported by 6 pieces of artillery and the rest of his cavalry. The squadrons above mentioned then retired in the best order, charging the head of the enemy's column with great success 8 times during the retreat to the Mendinello, about 2 miles. After passing the river I was well supported by Capt. Bull with 2 guns. The enemy then allowed me to withdraw the troops, and I retired gradually through Leiria to the position to which (according to the instructions received through the Q.M.G.) I had sent the body of the cavalry in the morning.

I cannot speak too highly in praise of the gallant and steady conduct of officers

which I owe to this body. They were preceded on the march immediately by the advanced guard of infantry, under Brig. Gen. Craufurd.

On the 8th the rain commenced, which usually falls at this season of the year in Portugal, and has continued with great violence ever since. This has probably increased the enemy's difficulties, and delayed his progress. He has shown some troops in front of our right at Villa Franca, and a large division of cavalry, with some infantry, patrolled up to Sobral de Monte Agraço on the 11th, having driven in our piquets of cavalry and infantry.

A large division of infantry, which I understand to be the advanced guard of the 8th corps, moved upon Sobral yesterday evening, from whence

and men upon this occasion, and I am happy to say that though frequently exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, our loss was trifling. On the part of the enemy the number of killed and wounded was considerable. Few prisoners were brought away (though many were made in the different attacks), owing to our being on the retreat before a very superior and increasing force; consequently not being able to bring off such as we wounded or dismounted.

I think it my duty to recommend to your Lordship's notice Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G., whose exertions contributed much to the good order and regularity preserved by the troops upon retiring; and I beg leave to mention that I received great assistance from Capt. the Marquis of Tweeddale, and the rest of my staff.

P.S. I send to head-quarters 3 officers and 20 dragoons and horses prisoners.

Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton to Lt. Gen. Visc. Wellington. Quinta da Torre, 9th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to report to your Lordship the good conduct of Capt. Murray, 16th Light dragoons, who with part of his squadron had been left yesterday on piquet near Rio Maior, after I retired to Alcoeitre. The enemy's cavalry advancing rapidly drove Capt. Murray through the town of Alcoeitre, when I ordered that officer to attack the 3 squadrons which the enemy had pushed into it. This Capt. Murray, with part of his squadron only, executed with great spirit, killing and wounding a great many of the enemy, and bringing off about 20 men and horses. Most of the enemy's wounded and several who were made prisoners escaped by getting into the houses. I am happy to add, that we did not lose a man or horse, except one taken by the enemy in consequence of his saddle turning.

Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton to Lt. Gen. Viscount Wellington. Carregado, 9th Oct. 1810.

The enemy's cavalry advanced this morning to Quinta da Torre, where I kept him in check till he was supported by 3 battalions of infantry and artillery, when I fell back with the 3 regts. of cavalry upon the plain, on the flanks of which the enemy sent small parties of cavalry with infantry, but did not follow with the body of his cavalry.

In the evening I sent the regiments on towards this place according to instructions, and remained myself with detachments of the hussars and 16th Light dragoons to observe the motions of the enemy. The enemy's infantry remained in the wood near Quinta da Torre, the body of his cavalry filed off in the direction of Abregada. A piquet supported by a strong squadron was left by the enemy in front of the wood. I sent Capt. Cocks, 16th dragoons, with a few dragoons of that regiment and some hussars, to attack the piquet, and supported him with the rest of Capt. Aly's squadron of hussars. These officers charged the enemy with great spirit and success, and without any material loss. The whole of the enemy's squadron and piquet would have been taken had they not been supported by infantry. One officer, 19 men, and 16 horses were taken, and the enemy had the greater part of his squadron and piquet killed or wounded. I had ordered a squadron of the Royal dragoons to be in readiness to support, should there be occasion; but by some mistake this squadron (when the 16th and hussars were retiring with their prisoners) advanced towards and received the fire of the enemy's infantry, by which they lost 2 men and 4 horses killed, and had a few wounded.

Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer withdrew the advance of his division, and the enemy continue in that town; the division under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer being closed on this side of it, and at no great distance from the great redoubt of Sobral. They also this day attacked the piquets of Gen. Cole's division near Sobral, but without much effect. I have learnt with great satisfaction that the Portuguese troops (Col. Harvey's brigade, the 11th and 23d regts.) again distinguished themselves upon this occasion. Col. Harvey unfortunately was wounded, but I hope not seriously.

G. O.

Rinão, near Sobral, 13th Oct. 1810.

When any officer is desirous of communicating a message to the Commander of the Forces, it is only necessary to send it to the nearest telegraph, and to request the officer of the navy at that telegraph to communicate it to the Sobral station: in the same manner messages may be communicated to any other station.

Memorandum for Col. Murray, Q. M. G.

13th Oct. 1810.

When the army shall be ordered to occupy the position of Zibreira and Patameira, the troops will be formed as follows from the right:

Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer's division, with its right at the two windmills between Zibreira and the redoubts of Sobral, will occupy a line extending to an old mill on the right of Zibreira; and thence to another old mill on the left of the church of Zibreira, bringing their left to the ravine. This line extends about 1000 yards. The remainder of the troops of the division to be in reserve in the rear of this line, with the exception of the battalions of light infantry attached to the brigades which are to occupy Zibreira.

Major Gen. Picton's division is to form with its right in a line with the left of the 1st division, and is to extend to the village of Patameira, about 800 yards. The remainder of this division to be in reserve in rear of the right of Gen. Cole's division, throwing its light infantry along the ravine in its front, and occupying the houses and Patameira.

Major Gen. Cole's right is to rest on the ravine in a line with Patameira; his centre on the lower of the 2 mills on the hill on which there are 2; and his left on the high road from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, where that road passes through the Portella. This line extends 1700 yards, and the remainder of the troops of this division will be in reserve in the rear of its left, throwing the light infantry battalions of the brigades of Portuguese and British infantry out in its front.

The 6th division are to place their right at the point where Major Gen. Cole's left will stand, and occupy the mountain on the left of the Portella, looking to Ribaldeira, placing the Lusitanian Legion on the mountain still further upon the left, on the left of a road leading from Runa into the high road from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

Major Gen. Leith's division will be in reserve in rear of the right.

Brig. Gen. Campbell's and Brig. Gen. Colman's brigades in reserve in rear of the left on the high road from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

The artillery to be placed as follows:

The British 9 pounders, and the 6 pounders attached to Gen. Hill's division, at Zibreira.

The 6 pounder brigade attached to the 1st division at the mills on the right of that division.

Major Arentschildt's 9 pounders and 6 pounder Portuguese brigades at an old mill on the right of Patameira.

Major Dickson's 9 pounder Portuguese brigade, and the brigade of Portuguese 6 pounders attached to Major Gen. Leith's division, on the left of the village of Patameira, and on the right of Gen. Cole's division.

The brigade of artillery attached to Gen. Cole's division at the mill, where his centre will stand.

3 of the 6 pounders attached to the 6th division in the Portella, on the high road from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, and 3 on the road from Runa to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

The 3 pounders attached to Brig. Gen. Campbell's brigade to be in reserve, as well as Capt. Ross' troop of horse artillery.

The officers commanding divisions will reconnoitre the situation of their several posts. The communications are from the great redoubt of Sobral by the windmills to Zibreira; thence to the rear, and across the ravine by a concealed road to Patameira: thence in the rear of Patameira to the right of Gen. Cole's post; thence behind the mountain on which his centre will stand, to the high road leading from Ribaldeira to Enxara dos Cavalleiros.

As soon as possible, cover should be made for the guns of Zibreira, and on the right and left of Patameira, masking this from the view of the enemy.

As soon as I shall have ascertained the line of the enemy's operations, I shall take up the line of defence of the army; and as I conceive that I have reason to hope for success, I propose to bring matters to extremities, and to contend for the possession and independence of Portugal in one of the strong positions in this part of the country. The Marques de la Romana marched to Campo Maior on the 8th inst., to join this army and share our fortune.

All is quiet in the north of Portugal. I understand that one of Gen. Bacellar's detachments, under Col. Wilson, was in the position of Busaco on the 6th inst.; and it is reported that Col. Trant has entered Coimbra. As all the inhabitants, however, have quitted the country, and the weather has rendered the communication by sea impossible, I cannot procure accurate intelligence from that part of the country. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 4th inst.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

13th Oct. 1810.

I have laid your letter of yesterday's date before the Commander of the Forces. He regrets the spring waggons have failed, but he thinks it would be quite impossible to make the arrangement of the bullock cars you propose, it being so essential to keep the roads clear; and it would not be possible to get the cars. All that can be done therefore is for you to write to the staff surgeons of divisions to take every opportunity, by the return of the provision mules, or of cars that may be going back, to send their sick to Bucellas, Loures, Montachique, and Mafra, from which places they must be forwarded to Lisbon, as far as possible by cars at those stations, and by some waggons stationed at Bucellas. I shall communicate with the Commissary Gen. on the above subject, and let you know what he states.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Stewart, 5th caçadores.*

14th Oct. 1810.

I have laid your private letter of the 10th inst. before Lord Wellington, and have urged all I could say on the subject; but his Lordship cannot alter his decision, as expressed to you in my former letter, and I would recommend your not pressing it further.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Olfermann, 97th regt.\**

14th Oct. 1810.

I have laid your letters of this date before the Commander of the Forces, and am directed to acquaint you that if you proceed and report yourself to Col. Pakenham, commanding the brigade consisting of the Fusiliers, 61st regt., and Duke of Brunswick Oëls' light infantry, and if you act as a Brigade Major to the latter corps, explaining to them such instructions as the Colonel commanding may think proper to issue, as also pointing out to them the states and returns they are to furnish this department with from time to time, his Excellency will take a

\* *Note.* Ernst Olfermann entered the British service in 1796, as a bugler in the 90th regt., and became serjeant major of that regiment on the 11th June, 1799. Serving in the island of Minorca, under Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir C. Stuart, he was promoted, in December of the same year, to be Adjutant and Ensign of the battalion of Queen's Germans, afterwards the 97th regt., and was wounded in March, 1801, at the battle of Alexandria, in Egypt. He was with his regiment at the battle of Vimeiro, in 1808, and on the 17th Oct. 1810, was appointed Major of Brigade on the staff of the army in the Peninsula. This situation he resigned in 1813, to serve with the Hanoverian troops assembled under the command of Lieut. Gen. Count Wallmoden, on the Elbe, in the north of Germany; and after the affair at der Gölhrde he was named Major in the Brunswick service, Lieut. Colonel on the 28th Dec. 1813, and Colonel and Brigadier General on the 9th Aug. 1814. He was chief of the staff of the Brunswick troops in 1815; and on the death of H.S.H. the Duke of Brunswick, at Quatre Bras, on the 16th June, 1815, he succeeded to the command of them, and was wounded at Waterloo. He afterwards, as Major General, in January 1816, commanded the Brunswick contingent in the army of occupation in France. He died at Blankenburg, on the 18th Oct. 1822.



proper opportunity of taking your services into consideration. On showing this letter to the officer commanding the 97th, and proceeding to join Col. Pakenham, it will be a sufficient authority to the former to give you permission, and the latter is already apprised you will be ordered to join him.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Ajuda, 15th Oct. 1810, 5 A.M.

The enemy have now got a good large body in front of Gen. Spencer, at Sobral, and he withdraws this morning to Zibreira. A squadron of the 14th dragoons will be sent to you, as likewise the axes. Fletcher will give orders respecting the bridge which you mention to Runa. We shall want you upon our right, if the enemy collect their whole force in the centre, which, at present, appears probable, though not quite clear. Pray examine all the roads leading from your rear to the great redoubt of Sobral. I move my head quarters this morning from hence to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, but I shall either be at the great redoubt all day, or they will know there where to find me.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Ajuda, 15th Oct. 1810, 5 A.M.

I don't think the enemy's designs are yet quite clear, but they rather point to our centre, where they have assembled a large corps, and the prisoners say that the whole are thereabouts.

Sir B. Spencer withdrew this morning from the front of Sobral, where he could not stay longer without engaging on terms of disadvantage. Pack is in the great redoubt, and this road is completely blocked. I move my head quarters, however, this day to Enxara dos Cavalleiros, in order to be nearer what appears at present to be the probable scene of action.

I moved your troops to Bucellas the day before yesterday, partly in order to be able to close them to the centre, if that should be the active scene; partly because that I think at Bucellas, and from thence in the villages, along the foot of the Serra de Serves, as far as the Casal de Portella, some of them would be better situated to give support to the troops in the redoubts at Trancoso, and to those which defend the left of the valley of Calhandriz, than they would be further to the right. I wish you would look over this ground, and the communications with its rear, and see how it could be best supported. These troops, however, should still remain at Bucellas, &c. for the present, and I beg that the other British and Portuguese brigade may be in readiness to march at a short notice to join the centre of the army.

Keep an officer at the signal post, and I will send you the orders by signal, as well as by message.

Le Cor shall occupy the lines of Alhandra, while you will be away; and the 2d batt. 88th shall be ordered up from Lisbon to support him.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

15th Oct. 1810.

Although the Commander of the Forces entertains the most confident hopes of the happy result of the operations of the army, still he is desirous to provide for every possible contingency, and take such measures as will insure the embarkation of the army against every fatality or accident that may arrive.

As his Excellency is excessively pressed with business, and is obliged to be on horseback all day, he has directed me to desire you will wait upon the Admiral,

and express the above reasons as the cause of Lord Wellington's not writing himself; and that you will then concert with the Admiral the means of embarking without loss of time all those cases in general hospital that are actually bedridden cases, and that in the event of an embarkation would have to be carried on board ship. Such men as are able to walk could at any moment be sent on board; but as the transport of men is a slower operation, and as I understand from you there are many cases that would require long time to recover, and perhaps in any event would have to be sent to England, his Excellency thinks it advisable to lose no time in the embarkation of cases of this description.

You will be pleased to report to me, for the Commander of the Forces' information, the number of sick that will be thus embarked, their cases, and what remain in the general hospital at Lisbon.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 16th Oct. 1810, 11 A.M.

I enclose an order for Col. Fisher to deliver to your directions the 12 pounders belonging to the British army; and I likewise enclose an order for the brass 12 pounders, Portuguese. I would recommend the former, as the French have with them French 12 pounders, which are heavier than the Portuguese brass 12 pounders.

I consider the loss of the boats at Santarem to be the greatest misfortune that could happen to us, and it may oblige us to change our position, and take up our second line. The French will either arm these boats, and operate upon Hill's right flank, in which case the strength of your flotilla, and the support to be given to it by larger vessels, will become an object for your consideration; or they will use them to form a bridge, and establish themselves upon the island in the Tagus, across Hill's right flank; or they will use them for a bridge or other communication with Mortier, whom they will have it in their power to draw to their support either on this side or on the other side of the river. In whichever way the boats may be used, their loss is a serious misfortune; and at all events the whole of the Alentejo lies at the mercy of the enemy!! The government may congratulate themselves upon this notable arrangement. They would not adopt in time any one measure to remove what might be useful or necessary to the enemy; they neglected their peculiar business to occupy themselves with what did not concern them; and there is not an arrangement of any description which depended upon them, or their officers, which has not failed. At this moment the enemy are living upon grain found close to the lines; and they grind it into flour with the mills in our sight, which the government were repeatedly pressed to order the people to render useless, and which could have been rendered useless only by taking away the sails. Then the boats are left at Santarem in order to give the enemy an opportunity of acting upon our flank and thus dislodging us!

The first object to attend to is to prevent the enemy from establishing himself on the island of Alhandra; your gun boats, by occupying the river at the north east end of it, and on both sides, will probably prevent that, if supported by something stronger in the main channel. Another object well deserving of attention is the great island Lyceria, which is, I

G. O.

Enxara dos Cavalleiros, 15th Oct. 1810.

2. General officers who have detained orderly dragoons without the express permission of the Commander of the Forces, and who are not entitled to them, are desired to send them forthwith to Mafra, to join the head quarters of their regiment.

understand, full of corn and cattle. If you could get a flotilla of gun boats up the eastern channel of the river to the point of separation, where the two channels form this island, this object might be effected; otherwise, I fear, it will not.

I have not heard from Gen. Hill that he was in want of seamen to work his guns. He has a great number of artillerymen, both British and Portuguese, as well as of the Ordenanza, and I am convinced that the seamen would give us more efficient assistance in the gun boats on the river.

P.S. If you cannot get gun boats to the north east end of Lyceria, by the eastern channel, it will be necessary to have some naval strength off the south west end of it, lest the enemy should endeavor to pass a force down that way.

The enemy have made no movement of importance yesterday or this day. They appear to be fortifying themselves at Sobral; but their delay is probably connected with the acquisition of the boats at Santarem.

I have directed that a heavy battery may be constructed on the right flank of the lines at Alhandra, which will tend to support the gun boats there.

To Brig. Gen. Alex. Campbell.

At the great redoubt, 15th Oct. 1810, noon.

I see some large bodies of troops forward, which appear from hence to be in movement towards you. You had better be in readiness to fall back upon the position pointed out for you in the Memorandum sent by the Q. M. G., in case it should be necessary, keeping your piquets well down upon the river. I do not wish you however to quit your villages till it shall be necessary.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Enxara de los Cavalheiros, 16th Oct. 1810, 11 A.M.

The Admiral has just now apprised me of the loss of 40 boats at Santarem, which is a serious misfortune, to be attributed solely to the government. I have written to him upon the arrangements to be adopted in consequence of it, which go principally to our own defence, but there are others which require the early attention of the government.

1st; The island of Lyceria, which is at present at the enemy's command, is full of corn and cattle. There is a safe communication now with the south end of it, and all the supplies should be drawn away immediately to Lisbon. If the Admiral can station a flotilla at the N.E. extremity of this island, so as to prevent the enemy from bringing their boats lower down the river, if not already brought down, this island may yet be safe. But at all events, the corn, cattle, straw, &c., should be brought away from it.

2dly; The province of Alentejo being now open to the enemy, the people should be directed to remove under the cover of Palmella, and fort S. Philippe, at Setuval, which are both garrisoned; and the Ordenanza should be collected there. It is probable, however, that fort S. Philippe and Palmella are not provisioned, as was the case with Obidos, which was therefore abandoned, and is the case with other Portuguese forts, notwithstanding repeated applications and remonstrances.

3dly; Care should be taken of the other boats on the river, that they do not fall into the hands of the enemy. Positive orders ought to be given that all boats of every description should anchor on this side, on every night, between Alhandra and Lisbon. As soon as the Marques de la Romana's corps shall be across the Tagus, there will be no occasion for fleets of boats going over; and when they do go, for provisions or other purposes, they should be under the charge of some officer of the police, who should force them to return.

I have received your letter of the —. In my letter to Dom M. Forjaz, which I signed this morning, I intended, and do advert to the conduct of all the militia of Lisbon, as well as to that of Thomar. The conduct of the whole is infamous, and some measures must be adopted to force people who pretend to be soldiers, and receive pay and provisions as such, to do their duty. The Lisbon volunteer chasseurs are as bad as the rest; I do not believe one third of the numbers are here.

The enemy have made no movement of importance this day. They have certainly one, probably two *corps d'armée* on this front near Sobral, but not a shot has been fired since the day before yesterday, excepting from the lines at Alhandra on a reconnoitring party yesterday.

P.S. If there should be no provisions in fort S. Filippe or Palmella, some ought to be sent by sea.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Enxara de los Cavalleiros, 16th Oct. 1810,  $\frac{1}{2}$  before 1, A.M.

I conclude that you will have heard that the people of Santarem allowed 40 large boats to fall into the hands of the enemy!!!

I have written to the Admiral upon the measures to be adopted for the security of your right flank; and Col. Fletcher writes to Capt. Squire to desire him to construct a work in the rear of the right of your line for 4 heavy guns to command the navigation of the river, and give protection to the gun boats. In the mean time the officer commanding the gun boats should be informed of these circumstances, and should be desired to watch the river above Alhandra closely at night, so that nothing may pass down.

I hope that you received my letter of yesterday morning.

Take care that, if the enemy should make a serious attack upon your post at the church of Alhandra, you shall have it in your power to draw away your guns in time. If you should find that they are advancing upon you seriously to attack you in the lines at Alhandra, which I can hardly believe, you had better bring one of your British brigades from Bucellas to Alverca to give support to the other. It appears to me, however, most likely that, if they wish to carry the lines of Alhandra, they will try your left flank rather than your right, and if so your troops are better stationed at Bucellas and Villa de Rey than at Alverca. Probably one brigade might occupy an intermediate position at the Casal de Portella with advantage. If you should think so, move them.

The 8th corps, and I believe the 6th, are near Sobral. They have made no movement, and not a shot has been fired for these 2 days, excepting one this morning from one of the redoubts between this and Arruda

To Brig. Gen. R. Crauford.

At the great redoubt, 17th Oct. 1810.

I received last night your letter of the 16th. I could see the reconnaissance of yesterday on our right from hence; but I am much obliged to you for the information which your letter contains. The roads are not yet fit for the march of your guns, and I therefore still keep them here; but I have ordered 6 Portuguese 3 pounders to S. Ajuda this day, and I beg you to send a person to that place to bring them to you. They are narrower in the axle tree, and lighter than our carriages, and will probably answer your purpose equally well with the 6 pounders, but you shall have the latter as soon as the roads will bear them.

The positions which the enemy have taken up in our front, and the measures which they are adopting to fortify themselves on their right, induce me to believe that their attack will be principally directed upon our right. I see that they have troops encamped on the heights above Villa Franca; and Hill tells me, in a letter of last night, that there were large fires on the heights near Alhandra, from which his piquets were obliged to withdraw in the evening. I have brought Gen. Leith's division to the rear of this fort, where part of it is encamped. Gen. Spry's Portuguese brigade will be cantoned this night in a village in the rear of the redoubts Nos. 12 and 13. The Hanoverian legion are in the villages behind No. 11; to all of which the British brigades in Gen. Leith's division will be a reserve. If the enemy should make his attack between this and Arruda, I think these arrangements will make us tolerably secure, and will give time to make a further movement of troops to the right. On the other hand, if he should make his attack upon the centre or left wing of the army, with all the troops in front of this place, I shall be able to transfer Gen. Leith's division to be the reserve of the right of the centre, for which I originally intended him.

The disposition which I have above described will show you what line I wish you to take. If the enemy attack Hill's right, and our line to the left of this redoubt, my wish and intention is to employ you in an offensive movement. If they attack Hill's left, by Trancoso or the valley of Calhandriz, and at the same time the ground on the right of this redoubt, I should prefer that you should look to Hill, rather than to the redoubts Nos. 11, 12, and 13. It would be necessary, however, for you to observe the ground between Nos. 10 and 11. All is quiet this morning in the front.

G. O.

Pero Negro, 17th Oct. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General officers of the army to the orders which have been often issued, relative to the detention and use of dragoons as orderlies.

2. If circumstances require that any General officer should use dragoons to keep up a communication, he will apply for a party for that purpose, which must be sent back as soon as the purpose for which it was applied for is accomplished, and the dragoons must not be used as orderlies contrary to orders, on any account.

3. The Commander of the Forces is convinced that General officers will see the necessity of attending to this order, in order to keep the cavalry in a state of efficiency.

4. All General and Staff officers, who have dragoons with them, are requested to send a return of their names, their troops, and the regiments to which they belong, to the A. A. G. of the cavalry at Mafra.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 17th Oct. 1810, 8 A.M.

I have just received your letter of the 14th, and 2 of the 16th. As for the prisoners taken from the enemy, whether by Portuguese or English troops, I have hitherto always considered them as English. The Portuguese have no means either of feeding or taking care of them. Indeed I was obliged lately to take off their hands and send to England the prisoners which they had made at Chaves, before we had any English army in the field in Portugal: I do not know, therefore, what prisoners Major Pernet has charge of on board the *Princeza da Beira*.

The way in which the matter is managed here is, that all prisoners taken are sent to the Provost Marshal at head quarters, and are forwarded by him to his assistant at Lisbon. He draws their provisions from the Commissary for them from time to time, and application is then made to you for a passage for them to England, when they are in sufficient numbers to render it worth while to send a ship home with them.

This arrangement answers very well for the present; but if their numbers should increase much, we must appoint an officer or officers to take charge of them, who will perform that duty which is now performed by the Provost Marshal.

I hope that the accounts which you have received of the enemy's having found 40 boats at Santarem are not well founded,\* as Hill tells me that when he wanted boats there on the 7th he could find only 5; and Beresford had armed parties in all the upper parts of the river, burning all the boats they could find. They went so far as to burn the spare boats belonging to the bridge of Abrantes.

From what I see of the Tagus from hence, I should imagine that no part of it can now be fordable; and, at all events, if the river was fordable, I have no apprehension whatever that any part of the army now in Portugal (excepting parties to get provisions or plunder) will cross the Tagus to carry on an operation on that side. And there is nothing to be apprehended from Mortier's corps, which by letters from Estremadura of the 11th, received last night, I find had withdrawn towards Seville.

I am concerned to find, however, from your letter of the 16th, that if the enemy should take possession of the ground on the left of the Tagus, extending from Almada to Traffaria, our fleet has increased in size to such a degree, that a great number of the transports would be compelled to put to sea. As I do not think it probable that the enemy has it at all in his power to undertake such an operation at present, this circumstance does not now much signify, but it is one of serious consideration for the British government, in case of any other invasion of Portugal by a larger force, which should be capable of making an attack upon both sides of the Tagus. It is quite clear to me that Portugal and England cannot afford a force to do more than defend one side of the river; and if the transports cannot remain in safety, the enemy being in possession of the left bank, the defence of the country ought not to be attempted.

All my measures and arrangements upon this subject have been founded upon your opinions conveyed in your official letter of the 26th

\* The accounts were not well founded.

Oct., in answer to certain queries from me directed to this point; and if you have seen any reason to alter your opinion, I recommend that you should revise it, and state it again in the same form.

I am perfectly aware of the strength of the ground on the left of the Tagus, but unfortunately it would not answer our purpose of saving Lisbon and the Tagus from the enemy. I have reports and plans for fortifying and occupying it, but I have never thought of carrying the plans into execution for the reasons I have above stated, and it is now too late to think of them. If the enemy, now in our front, should cross the Tagus with his whole army, which is hardly practicable, I must only do the same with mine; and I agree with you in thinking, not only that I shall be before them, but shall have the best position in the country, although not fortified.

I do not wish the sick men (now ordered to be embarked) to be sent to England. I am firmly of opinion that the enemy cannot succeed; but as I know that their situation is desperate, we must expect that there is no risk they will not incur to attain their object, and I know enough of operations of this kind to be aware that nobody can be certain of their result. My wish therefore is to have embarked in the ships every body who cannot walk down to the beach, because, in case any accident should happen, I know well that, even under the best arrangements, those who must be carried will have but a bad chance of being removed.

P.S. The name of the French General killed by the gun boats was St. Croix. He was an excellent officer and much respected.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 17th Oct. 1810.

I have received your letter without date, forwarded by the messenger who brought the mail. I enclose the letter from the Prince Regent, which I beg you to return. I have likewise one from Linhares which I have not yet read.

The government proceed in their seizures of carriages and mules in so injudicious a manner, that they do us more harm than good. They seized some of the mules and carriages employed by the Commissariat on monthly hire, some of them, I believe, Spaniards. In the same manner the Admiral seized the boats employed by the Commissariat, in order to transport Romana's army from Aldea Galega. Then when they have got these mules and carriages they do not employ them, but the animals and people are kept starving and shivering under a guard, while we are wanting provisions, &c., here.

I conclude that they have (as they ought to have) a register of every mule and carriage in and about Lisbon. They should make requisitions for the carriages, and mules, and boats, according to their register, that is to say, the police should send orders to such and such individuals, owners of carriages or mules, to produce them at a named place, where the person requiring them should be ready to receive them, and put them in use. According to this mode every animal produced would be used; and none would be seized of those already in use, because they are not upon the register. But this requires an attention to system, a regular method of carrying on business; punishments in case those to whom the directions of

the police are sent do not produce their carriages or animals when required from them, which are inconsistent with the flighty spirit of the government of the present day. However, you may depend upon it that what I have above stated is the only mode of doing the business effectually, or indeed without injuring us. The carriages and mules which bring up our provisions must be sufficient to remove the sick and wounded till there shall be a general engagement, for which there must then be a special arrangement.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

17th Oct. 1810.

In reply to your letters of the 15th inst., relative to an arrangement for transporting the slighter cases of diseases from the hospital on shore to hospital ships, I am directed to acquaint you that his Excellency fully approves of the plan, and he desires you will wait upon the Admiral, and settle with him the mode of carrying it into effect. Lord Wellington has written to the Admiral relative to more vessels being appropriated to the use of the hospital, &c.

With regard to your query relative to the 4 wounded officers and 50 privates, his Excellency desires they may be treated in every respect like British soldiers, and a part of the hospital allotted to them.

I apprehend that none of the sick or wounded which have fallen ill these last 5 or 6 days have yet reached Lisbon, and I fear there are a great many.

*The A.G. to Col. Peacocks, Lisbon.*

17th Oct. 1810.

In reply to your letter and enclosure, herewith returned, I have to acquaint you that no compensation has been ever given to deserters, but they are allowed to enlist in the foreign corps upon bounty.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 18th Oct. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th inst., in which you enclosed a copy of your note of the 16th to Dom M. Forjaz, and the copy of his answer of the 17th. I must observe upon the latter, that months have elapsed since I pointed out to the government the situation in which the country would, sooner or later, be placed by the enemy's invasion, and recommended the measures to be adopted with a view to alleviate the evil to the inhabitants of the country, and to render difficult and impede the enemy's progress.

I repeated these warnings and recommendations at different periods, while the enemy was upon the frontier during the summer. Instead of attending to what I recommended, the government was employed in debating upon the expediency of maintaining the war upon the frontier, upon which, as an abstract proposition, there could be no doubt, but unfortunately we were deficient in means to effect the object.

By a fortunate concurrence of circumstances I was enabled to delay the enemy's progress very considerably, and nearly three weeks had elapsed from the time he passed the Coa before he passed the Mondego at Coimbra; and still nothing was done by the government, of all that was recommended to them; and the Sec. of State now says, that the first the government heard of the retreat of the army from Coimbra was on the 3d inst. He has not adverted, however, to the fact, that in February last the government were informed of the line of operations to be carried on, and that since April last, it was obvious that Portugal was to be attacked by a force so large, as to render those operations a measure of necessity,



and therefore that the precautions for the good of the people, and for the annoyance of the enemy, which before April and in the intermediate period were repeatedly recommended, ought to have been adopted before the army even reached Coimbra on its retreat.

There is no doubt of the evacuation of Obidos, or of the cause of that misfortune, as stated by me, viz., the want of provisions which had been ordered for that place weeks before.

*The A.G. to Col. Darroch, A.A.G., Lisbon.*

18th Oct. 1810.

I have to request you will send me immediately a return of the French prisoners of war now at Lisbon, specifying their regiments, rank, and the corps of the French army they belong to. You will also, in like manner, send me a return of the French officers who may be still at Lisbon; and you will acquaint the Commandant that no more prisoners of war are to be sent off until further orders, as the Commander of the Forces has it in contemplation to agree to an exchange that has been proposed for some English prisoners that have been made.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole.*

18th Oct. 1810.

The 2 French soldiers of the 46th regt. who have been sent in state they deserted 6 days ago, that they are natives of Germany, although in the French service, and that they long had the intention of deserting. If this is true, it would be hard to consider them as prisoners. The dragoon also states himself a deserter. The 2 men of the 15th regt. admit they were taken prisoners.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.*

18th Oct. 1810.

I have to request you will forward to this office regular returns of the prisoners and deserters as they may arrive at Gen. Hill's division, at the same time specifying whatever information may be obtained from them, which must be regularly entered in a book kept by you for that purpose.

*The A.G. to Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd, Light division.*

18th Oct. 1810.

A German chasseur who arrived with the other prisoners states that his horse has been detained by an officer of the 43d regt., for which he has received no payment. As this is contrary to G.O., you will be pleased to direct that the horse is sent in to be sold by auction at head quarters.

*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

18th Oct. 1810.

195 dollars being sent in from the French advanced guard for the 3 officers of the 3me hussards that were taken on the 5th inst., and they having only received from me 150, I herewith send an order for 45 dollars on the Paymaster Gen.; and you will be pleased to deliver the amount to the French officers, taking their receipt for the same.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G., Cavalry.*

18th Oct. 1810.

The G.O. which have been issued will answer Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton's wishes with regard to the orderlies. The Commander of the Forces allows one orderly to each General commanding a division, and one to the Adj. Gen. and one to the Q. M. Gen. Major Gen. A. Campbell is allowed to keep 2 for the purpose of communication. These are all that have been reported to me, or as yet applied for through me. Sir B. Spencer, Gen. Baron Low, and Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd have parties, which they will of course account for to the Lieut. General.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 19th Oct. 1810.

I received your letters of the 17th in the night. With respect to the prisoners of war, I do not conceive that there will be any inconvenience in taking care of them, as we have hitherto, as long as they remain in our

hands. When they are handed over to the navy in order to be kept in a prison ship, or to be sent to England, the officers whom you propose to appoint to act for the Transport Board might take charge of them, and make such arrangement as you might think proper with Major Pernet, with the consent of the Portuguese government, for their subsistence. I confess, however, that as the French treat well the prisoners whom they take from us, and the Portuguese treat their prisoners exceedingly ill, particularly in point of food, I should prefer any arrangement by which prisoners who have once come into the hands of the Provost Marshal of the British army, should avoid falling under the care of any officer of the Portuguese government. This, however, is entirely a matter for your consideration, with which I have nothing to do.

I am glad to find your opinion continues the same respecting the anchorage in the Tagus. If it should be necessary to occupy that anchorage, which does not appear very probable, I should think that many vessels might be sent out of the river, such as victuallers, store ships, &c., retaining none excepting those necessary to receive the troops, &c. Brigadier Rosa's conduct certainly appears extraordinary. The position of the gun boats is very satisfactory. I learn that the marine battalion attached to the French army has been ordered to the Tagus, it is supposed to construct a bridge. It is possible, however, that it may be to man gun boats. The only improvement which I could suggest in your distribution is, that the advanced flotilla, near Salvaterra, should be strengthened. There would be no risk in this arrangement if the southern channel should be navigable, and it would effectually protect the island of Lyceria.

To the Rt. Hon. ———.

Pero Negro, 19th Oct. 1810.

I received your letter, regarding Mr. ———, late Lieut. of the — regt., and I am much concerned that the conduct of that officer was such as to prevent me from attending to your request. When in arrest for one crime, he insulted, in the grossest and most wanton manner, another officer; for which offence he refused to make any apology, although desired to do so by me, and he broke his arrest.

If I were to interfere in favor of those who commit offences of this description, I should give such a blow to the discipline and subordination of the army, that there would very soon be no army remaining. I am convinced that you will perceive the impossibility of my interfering in any manner in this case.

P.S. I enclose an extract from the G. O. of the army, containing the crimes of Mr. ———, and the decision of the General Court Martial.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Pero Negro, 19th Oct. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th Aug., directing that I should have inquiries made respecting certain complaints forwarded by Lieut. ———, of the — batt. — regt.; and as I conceive

G. O.

Pero Negro, 19th Oct. 1810.

2. Officers commanding regiments are requested to send to the Military Secretary their recommendations for the vacancies that have lately occurred.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests that the officers of the army will not shoot in the park of Mafra, without having leave to do so from the government.

that the Commander in Chief was not aware that the subject of these complaints had already been under my consideration, and had been inquired into by me, and decided upon, I wish to bring what passed under the view of the Commander in Chief, before I direct any further inquiry, which, if it must take place, must be one into my own conduct.

Lieut. — is an officer of whom I do not entertain a very good opinion. When the army was marching into Spain in June, 1809, he endeavored to remain behind his regiment in Portugal upon false and frivolous pretences, and he was afterwards accused and tried by a General Court Martial for striking Lieut. —, and for absenting himself from his regiment during the battle of Talavera, of which crimes he was acquitted, as appears by the enclosed extract from the G. O. The principal witnesses against him on this trial were Capt. — and Lieut. —; and but a few days had elapsed after he was released from his arrest, when he wrote the enclosed letters, No. 1 and No. 2, complaining of the conduct of those officers.

No. 3 and No. 4 are the copies of Capt. —'s and Lieut. —'s replies to the charges against them, and No. 5 the copy of the draft of a letter written by my directions to the commanding officer of the — batt. — regt. on Lieut. —'s complaints. Nos. 6, 7, and 8 are the answers received to No. 5, which, in my opinion, completely acquitted Capt. — of any corrupt or improper motive in the transaction of which Lieut. — accused him; and I therefore wrote the commanding officer of the — regt. a letter on the 13th Dec., of which the enclosed No. 9 is a copy.

The Commander in Chief will be best able to judge, from a perusal of these papers, whether there is any ground for further inquiry. If there is, I would submit that the inquiry ought to begin with myself, as my conduct and former decision upon the same point must be the basis of any inquiry into the complaint by Lieut. —. If, however, the Commander in Chief should be of opinion that there ought to be no further inquiry into these complaints by Lieut. —, I would submit that that officer ought to be tried by a General Court Martial, on a charge for forwarding direct to the Sec. at War a complaint of his superior officer, not transmitting it through the commanding officer of his regiment, according to His Majesty's Regulations.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 19th Oct. 1810.

When I was establishing the line of posts to be taken up by the army in this part of the country, I deemed it expedient to provide for the speedy communication of intelligence from one to the other, by the establishment of telegraphs; and I requested Admiral Berkeley to allow officers and seamen belonging to the squadron in the Tagus to go on shore to undertake the management of them. He complied with this request, but on the 29th Aug. wrote me the enclosed, No. 1, claiming an extra allowance for the officers and seamen employed on this duty, upon which the correspondence Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 followed. As I thought it proper to send my papers away from the army during its retreat, I had not these by me when I received the Admiral's letter of the 12th Sept., otherwise they should have been laid before your Lordship at an earlier

period; and I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship if you will give me directions whether I am to give any, and what additional allowance of pay or provisions to the officers and seamen, who are serving on shore with the army, beyond that of båt and forage to the officers. Although the Admiral had withdrawn the officers and seamen from the telegraph stations before the army arrived in this part of the country, he has sent them back to their stations since we have been here.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

19th Oct. 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that the Portuguese government have consented to give up the Rope walk for a hospital for the British army, and his Excellency is of opinion it would be very advantageous to accept of this place, being more convenient for the purposes of embarkation, and affording thus the convenience of rendering it optional whether even the worst cases should continue to be embarked, as the situation of the Rope walk will always be most favorable for any sudden embarkation. In the event, however, of this place being occupied by you for the general hospital, all other places appropriated now for that purpose must be given up; and you will immediately wait upon Mr. Stuart, the ambassador, and acquaint him of your intention to occupy it, agreeably to these instructions. You will have the goodness in this case then immediately to set about arranging the removal of the hospital stores, bedding, &c., from the present hospitals, and when the Rope walk is fit to receive the patients the present houses are to be delivered up. Should any particular objection or difficulty occur to you in carrying these instructions into effect, you will be pleased immediately to acquaint me, for the information of the Commander of the Forces.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 20th Oct. 1810.

I was aware that a register had been made of boats and of means of transport in and about Lisbon; and what I meant was, that the government should make use of that register in their requisitions for these means, and not proceed to an indiscriminate embargo, with all its evil consequences. You will receive my dispatch open. Sir Wyndham Dal-ling is going home, and I mean that he should take it, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give it to him.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 20th Oct. 1810.

Since I addressed you on the 13th inst., the enemy have been employed principally in reconnoitring the positions occupied by our troops, and in strengthening their own. In effecting the former object they have skirmished with the troops on our outposts, who have always conducted themselves well.

On the 14th they attacked with infantry, supported by artillery, a small detachment of the 71st regt., which formed the advanced guard of Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer's division, near Sobral de Monte Agraço, in order to cover one of these reconnoitring parties. This detachment having the Lieut. Col. Hon. H. Cadogan and Lieut. Col. Reynell at their head, charged the enemy in the most gallant style, and drove them into the towu. The whole of the 8th *corps d'armée*, however, and part of the 6th, arrived on the ground near Sobral on that evening, and I therefore thought it proper to withdraw Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer's division from the advanced situation which it had occupied, and these troops marched to Zibreira, about one mile in the rear, on the 15th, in the morning.

The gun boats on the Tagus, under Lieut. Berkeley, with which Adm. Berkeley has supported the right of the army near Alhandra, have likewise been engaged with the enemy's reconnoitring parties, and have been of great service to us.

I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the report which I communicated to you in my last dispatch of the 13th, regarding the march of the detachments of troops under the command of Gen. Bacellar, has been confirmed. Col. Trant arrived near Coimbra on the 7th, and immediately attacked the enemy's outposts, which he cut off from the town, and he then pushed into it, and took possession of it. The resistance made by the enemy did not last long, and he took 80 officers and 5000 men (principally sick and wounded) prisoners. I have the honor to enclose the copy of his report to Marshal Beresford and of a letter from Marshal Beresford, upon this success.\* On the following day, Brig. Gen.

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\* Marshal Beresford to Marshal Gen. Visc. Wellington. Casal Cochim, 20th Oct. 1810.

Since writing to your Lordship the information I have received from Brig. Gen. Miller relative to the re-occupation of Coimbra, I have received from Col. Trant a more detailed statement of the circumstances, and which I have the honor of annexing a copy of for your Lordship's information.

The prisoners, by Col. Trant's statement, appear to have been more numerous than by the first accounts we were led to consider them; 300 or 400 afterwards collected by Brig. Gen. Miller, dispersed in plundering parties in the neighbourhood of Coimbra, will have to be added to what Col. Trant captured.

The circumstance and mode of the re-occupation of Coimbra is an additional proof of the activity and prudent enterprise with which Col. Trant has fulfilled the objects of the instructions given to him, and which I have no doubt your Lordship will appreciate.

Col. Trant to Marshal Beresford.

Coimbra, 7th Oct. 1810.

I have much pleasure in acquainting your Excellency with my having successfully attacked the town of Coimbra this day, with the loss of only a few men killed and wounded.

In my letter of the 6th I had the honor to inform you, that it was my intention to proceed to Mealhada in the course of the day, with an expectation of forming a junction with the corps under the command of Brig. Gen. Miller and Col. Wilson, and combining an attack on this city; but, on my arrival there, I learned that those two corps were delayed from want of supplies in the very exhausted districts extending immediately north of Busaco, and that the cavalry attached to them could not move forward in consequence of the fatigue it had experienced in its former marches.

I had now no other alternative in order to prevent any measures of defence taking place at Coimbra, from whence I was only 3 short leagues distant, than to proceed on with my own division, while yet a strong probability existed of my arrival at Mealhada not being made known.

I therefore marched at mid day, having a squadron of cavalry in my front, under the command of that gallant young officer Lieut. Dutel, whose name I have already had occasion to submit to your Excellency's notice, supported by 200 light troops; the column of infantry was headed by the Coimbra regiment as the post of honor. In my plan of attack it was intended to enter at two points at one time, one division by the high road from Oporto, the other to branch off from the column on having passed Fornos, and by ascending the heights to the eastward of the town, enter by the Arco S<sup>ra</sup> Anna, passing through Loretto; but this arrangement was to take place only in the event of my finding the enemy on his guard.

At a short distance from Fornos, towards Mealhada, I fell in with a detachment of the enemy to the right of that village; it commenced firing; but having pushed on the cavalry to Fornos, I succeeded in cutting it off from all communication with

Miller and Lieut. Col. Wilson arrived at Coimbra with their detachments, and they have since taken about 350 prisoners, being soldiers who had straggled from their regiments on the enemy's march, as they say, in search of food. Col. Wilson has since advanced to Condeixa with an advanced guard of infantry and cavalry, and Brig. Gen. Miller is at Coimbra. I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford on these transactions.

A detachment from the garrison of Peniche, sent out by Lieut. Col.

Coimbra, and it surrendered, after losing some men; and I met no other post of the enemy. I directed the cavalry to gallop through the principal streets, cross the bridge of the Mondego, and by penetrating into the Lisbon road, to intercept any information sent to the main army. This was effected with the utmost spirit by Lieut. Dutel, with the loss of only 1 dragoon killed. I dispatched divisions of infantry into the principal parts of the town; an unconnected resistance took place during an hour, in which we had only 2 men killed; Col. Serpa, of the Penafiel, and about 25 men wounded of that corps. Col. Serpa commanded the 1st brigade, and his spirited conduct has entitled him to your Excellency's approbation. On the S<sup>ra</sup> Clara side of the Mondego, where a great proportion of the enemy's force was stationed in the Convent, some irregular firing was kept up upon the cavalry in crossing the bridge; but the French commanding officer, immediately after Lieut. Dutel had crossed, proposed capitulating. I proceeded to the Convent, and would allow no terms but discretion. On my promise of exerting my protection against the insults of the peasantry the troops laid down their arms and marched out.

I have reason to believe the number of prisoners exceeds 5000, of whom nearly 4000 are marched off towards Oporto, including an entire company of the Emperor's Marine guards; 3500 firelocks were found, and almost the whole loaded, from whence you may form an idea of the number in a state for defensive service: those arms I have distributed amongst the Ordenanza of the country; I found no artillery. We got possession of a quantity of oxen and sheep, which were collected for the subsistence of the enemy's troops, and have proved a seasonable supply to our own. Amongst the prisoners are, I should suppose, 80 officers. The Commissaire Ordonnateur en Chef, M. Flandin, who represented a governor, will remain sick at Coimbra.

From the nature of the attack, your Excellency will easily conceive how difficult it was to control the soldiers, or to prevent the armed peasantry from plundering. These latter, I am sorry to say, committed acts of violence, but, I believe, not more than 6 or 8 Frenchmen were the victims of their resentment. I should here observe, that nothing can possibly exceed the state of wretchedness in which I found the city; the enemy, not content with sacking it to the very utmost extent, and stripping the few housekeepers who remained of even their personal clothing, had wantonly set fire to some houses, and had heaped into the streets, in one general mass of disorder, all the furniture which they could not take with the army; it cannot be expected, therefore, that soldiers, of whom about 800 were natives of the town and its neighbourhood, accompanied by their wretched relatives, could patiently witness a scene of devastation in which their property had been thus unjustifiably and irretrievably destroyed. I request your Excellency, however, to be persuaded that every possible exertion has been made to give protection to the French who have fallen into our hands; and after the first moments, I succeeded in securing them from insult.

As Brig. Gen. Miller and Col. Wilson's corps will arrive here to-morrow, I propose to leave one of my brigades behind, and to march, with the remainder of my division, as an escort to Oporto; for such is the animosity of the people of this country, excited by the late passage of the French army, that I consider my presence absolutely necessary, particularly in the intermediate district between the Mondego and Vouga.

I shall conclude this report by assuring your Excellency that the spirit of the militia upon this occasion was such as would do credit to any troops of the line, and I have observed no individual exception; I do not, therefore, compliment any particular officer.

Blunt,\* under Capt. Fenwick, has been successful in a similar manner, and has brought 28 prisoners, made in the rear of the enemy's army, having killed 9; and Lieut. Col. Waters, who has been employed by me with small detachments of cavalry and infantry, also in the enemy's rear, has taken many prisoners.

The difficulties which the enemy experience in procuring subsistence, owing to their having invaded this country without magazines, and having adopted no measures for the security of their rear, or of their communication with Spain, have rendered it necessary for the soldiers to straggle in

\* Marshal Beresford to Marshal Gen. Visc. Wellington. Fort Sobral, 17th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to report to your Lordship that, by letters from Brig. Gen. Miller, from Coimbra, I am informed of our northern militia having entered that place on the 8th inst. Col. Trant, with the Oporto militia, it appears (I have no report from that officer), first entered it; and Brig. Gen. Miller and Col. Wilson, who, with the militia of the Minho and some regular cavalry, had followed the enemy along his own line of march, on the eastward of the Sierra of Caramula, entered a few hours after Col. Trant.

Brig. Gen. Miller had collected, of stragglers and pillagers left in the rear of the French army, about 350, and more were continually bringing in. Col. Wilson, with an advanced guard of about 200 cavalry and 4 battalions of militia, was to be at Condeixa on the 10th and 11th.

The whole of these prisoners have been sent off to Oporto.

Marshal Beresford to Marshal Gen. Visc. Wellington. Casal Cochim, 19th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to annex, for your Lordship's information, a letter which I have received from Brig. Gen. Blunt, governor of Peniche, informing me of the loss occasioned to the enemy by some small parties sent out from his garrison, and of the good conduct of those troops of the line and militia employed on those occasions.

Brig. Gen. Blunt to the Military Secretary.

Peniche, 16th Oct. 1810.

You will be pleased to represent to his Excellency Marshal Beresford, that a few days since I sent out a party consisting of 1 serjeant and 18 privates of the Tondella militia (volunteers) with the view of intercepting couriers, or any other service by which they might annoy the enemy; they returned yesterday, bringing with them 2 cavalry horses equipped, some swords, pistols, caps, &c. The serjeant reports having fallen in with 30 horsemen, at the moment dismounted, attacking them and killing 5; the rest made their escape. The horses flew in different directions, so that only 2 could be secured. 1 militia man was killed and 2 wounded.

You will also be pleased to report to his Excellency, that in consequence of information received from the country people that between 200 and 300 marauders were destroying the habitations and committing dreadful outrages on the few peasants that fell into their hands, about 5½ leagues from this, I detached the Major da Praça Fenwick with 150 recruits and militia yesterday evening to disperse or bring them in, in which he has succeeded, killing a few men,† and making 28 prisoners, with the loss of only 2 men. Major Fenwick speaks in the warmest terms of the ardor of the recruits and militia, with the officers who commanded them; but what, under the circumstances, he has considered equally worthy of admiration, was to see resentments stifled, and the soldiers, alive only to the feelings of humanity, anxious to spare the enemy they had subdued.

You will also be pleased to report the arrival of 12 deserters, who, with the prisoners, shall be sent to Lisbon the first favorable occasion.

P.S. I hope his Excellency will not disapprove my having permitted the party of militia to dispose of the horses.

† 5 killed. 4 wounded.

search of food, and not a day passes that prisoners and deserters are not sent in. All remained quiet in the north of Portugal according to the last accounts.

Marshal Mortier retired from Zafra and Los Santos on the —th, and according to the last accounts he had arrived at Seville with the troops under his command. Gen. Ballesteros had followed him to the neighbourhood of Castillo de las Guardias, and the Portuguese and Spanish cavalry had moved on from the Guadiana towards the Sierra Morena. In the mean time the infantry of the Marques de la Romana's corps was put in motion for this quarter on the 8th inst., and the head of it, the division under the command of Gen. O'Donell, arrived at Cabeça de Montachique yesterday, having crossed the Tagus in the morning. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 4th.

P.S. I send this dispatch by Lieut. Col. Sir W. Dalling, of the 3d Foot Guards, who is obliged to go home on his private affairs, and I beg to refer your Lordship to this officer for any further information that you may require.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 20th Oct. 1810.

As it is possible that the army may be obliged to make marches during the winter, on which there will be a great consumption of shoes, I take the liberty of recommending to your Lordship to order to Lisbon without loss of time 100,000 pairs of soldiers' shoes of the best quality, and that orders should be given to continue the manufacture of them.

*A M. le Général Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major de l'armée Française.* Ce 20 Oct. 1810.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 15 Octobre, et je suis chargé par son Excellence le Vicomte Wellington, K.B., Général en Chef de l'armée Anglaise et Portugaise, de vous faire connaître que son Excellence consentira à l'échange qui a été proposé par S. A. M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling; mais qu'il sera nécessaire afin d'arranger cet échange de faire passer à son Excellence le Vicomte Wellington une liste des noms des officiers Anglais et Portugais, et le nombre des soldats Anglais et Portugais, qui sont actuellement prisonniers auprès de l'armée Française. Pour parvenir au même but, j'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer, ci-incluse par ordre de notre Général en Chef, une liste des prisonniers Français, officiers et soldats, qui sont à Lisbonne. Il y en a encore qui ont été pris ces jours derniers, mais jusqu'à présent nous n'avons pas la liste exacte de ceux qui sont en route pour le dépôt.

Je suis chargé en même temps de vous dire que son Excellence le Vicomte Wellington a reçu un rapport qu'il y a 80 officiers et 5000 prisonniers qui sont tombés entre nos mains à Coimbra, mais jusqu'à présent son Excellence n'a pas reçu la liste des noms et des grades des officiers. Il faut aussi vous rappeler, M. le Général, des officiers Français qui ont été pris à la bataille de Busaco, et que son Excellence ne voudrait pas transporter à cause de leurs blessures graves et de leurs prières à cet effet. Leurs noms sont ici joints, et ces messieurs ont donné leurs paroles d'honneur comme prisonniers de guerre.

Quant aux 3 officiers du 3<sup>me</sup> hussards qui ont été faits prisonniers près d'Alcobaca, son Excellence le Vicomte Wellington a donné l'ordre qu'ils recevraient chacun la somme de 50 dollars (ou piastres). Par un parlementaire qui est arrivé le jour suivant, une bourse contenant la somme de 195 dollars (ou piastres) a été reçue: comme ces messieurs sont partis pour Lisbonne et pour Angleterre deux jours après leurs prises, il n'était pas possible de leur faire passer cet argent; ainsi les 150 dollars qui ont été donnés ont été remplacés dans notre caisse militaire, et j'ai l'honneur de vous remettre les 45 de surplus par l'officier qui porte cette dépêche.



To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 21st Oct. 1810.

I enclose you a newspaper, which contains a paragraph which I have marked, to which I request you to draw the attention of the government. I have sins enough of my own to answer for; and it is rather hard upon me to incur the odium of having recommended acts to this government, which they committed without my knowledge, and of which I could not approve. I must request that they will publish my letter to them upon the absurd and odious transaction to which this paragraph refers.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 21st Oct. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 20th. I shall speak to Mr. Kennedy about the arrangement for the means of transport, upon which I have only now to observe, that it is made expressly with a view to save the carts of the *Lisbonites*, and to use those of strangers, just in the manner that the government do every thing else in which Lisbon is concerned. The remarks of Dom M. Forjaz, upon the immense means of transport which the army possess, deserve an answer, and they should have one if I had more leisure. In fact, all our means consist in Spanish muleteers; and if we had not had their services, we must have evacuated Portugal long ago. I should object to the British army having two thirds of the means of transport procured by embargo, if we did not in fact feed the whole army, regulars and militia, and Ordenanza, Portuguese and Spanish.

The instructions to the Alentejo gentlemen will answer perfectly.

P.S. I have seen Mr. Kennedy, and he thinks that if they must embargo means of transport, the mode proposed is the best that could be adopted.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Pero Negro, 21st Oct. 1810.

I have not been able to write to you for some time, having been so much occupied; and I now send you copies of my last dispatches. I have no idea what the French will, or rather what they can do. I think it is certain that they can do us no mischief, and that they will lose the greatest part of their army, if they attack us. They will starve if they stay much longer; and they will experience great difficulty in their retreat.

The head of Romana's corps has joined the army. All quiet in the north to the 13th inst. Pray tell Gen. Graham how much I should be pleased to have him here, but I did not consider myself at liberty to call him here; and indeed Lord Liverpool's letter, in which he allowed me to call for some of the troops, gave me to understand that I must not call for Gen. Graham.

P.S. I am apprehensive that the Cortes are becoming a *National Assembly*, and will ruin the cause.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Pero Negro, 22d Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose an account of money advanced by me for the subsistence of the corps under the command of Don J. Sanchez, which I request you will submit to the Spanish government, in order that the amount may be repaid to the British government.

*The A.G. to Col. Darroch, A.A.G., Lisbon.*

22d Oct. 1810.

As it is impossible to keep an exact account here of the prisoners and deserters who arrive from the enemy, as they come in to different points of the line, and it would be an inconvenience to forward them to head quarters, I have to call your serious attention to this object, and to desire that you will take the necessary measures for sending in to me, every 1st, 8th, and 15th of each month, an exact return of prisoners and deserters, agreeably to the annexed form. You will be so good as to communicate these instructions to the Commandant, and request his assistance in forwarding this object with regularity.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Redoubt of Sobral, 23d Oct. 1810, 7 A.M.

I enclose a memorandum, which goes to settle a point on which Gen. R. Craufurd made a reference to me yesterday evening. I have spoken to Beresford respecting the relief of Col. Stewart. He will be relieved this day, and may join the Buffs as soon as relieved.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Redoubt of Sobral, 23d Oct. 1810, 7 A.M.

I received yesterday evening your letter of the 22d. I have the same complaints from every brigade in the army, respecting the detention of the soldiers in the hospital at Lisbon; and there is one glaring fact which the gentlemen of the hospital cannot get rid of, and that is, that the military return of sick absent is double that of the number of sick returned by them in the hospital. It is true that there is a depôt of convalescents at Belem, but that establishment cannot account for the difference. I propose to give an order upon the subject this day.

I should be happy to make your division stronger, and I have had in contemplation various modes of effecting that object; but you must see the difficulty which is created by the arrival of General officers, of rank superior to yours. However, I hope that I shall be able, in some manner, to increase your force.

My intention in bringing up a brigade to S. Jago dos Velhos was, not to limit the space which I wished you to attend to, but to have a body of troops in readiness to throw in upon the ground about Trancoso, and extending from No. 8 to the mills (marked A in your plan), in case the enemy should make a push at the valley of Calhandriz. The guns from the point (B in your plan) in front of Trancoso will be with you probably this day; and I should wish to have them placed in the proper situation, and you to have the general charge between Gen. Hill's left, which extends to No. 8, and the right of Gen. Leith.

P.S. I enclose a memorandum, of which a copy will be sent to Gen. Hill, and another to Gen. Lumley.

Memorandum for Lieut. Gen. Hill and Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd, to be also communicated to Major Gen. the Hon. W. Lumley.

Sobral, 23d Oct. 1810.

Lieut. Gen. Hill will adopt such measures as he shall think necessary for securing the entry of the valley of Calhandriz, by the Quinta de Belhaco, upon which he will communicate with Brig. Gen. Craufurd, who will have a battery placed at the point of the ground extending from the redoubt No. 9, to fire upon the road from Arruda to Alhandra, and to defend the left of the entrance of the valley of Calhandriz. Major Gen. Lumley's brigade of infantry is stationed at S. Jago dos Velhos as a re-

serve and point of support to the left of Gen. Hill's corps, and the right of Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd's division.

Major Gen. the Hon. W. Lumley will examine all the roads leading from his cantonments to the redoubt No. 8, and to the windmill about 800

G. O.

Pero Negro, 23d Oct. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces has observed with the greatest concern, the large number of men returned by the several regiments as sick in general hospital, compared with the returns received from the medical officers of the number of men actually on their books in the hospitals.

2. The former, at present, is more than double the latter, and it must be owing to some existing abuse.

3. The Commander of the Forces has besides been informed by many officers commanding regiments and brigades in the army, that there are many non-commissioned officers and soldiers walking about the streets in Belem and Lisbon, quite recovered, while others are doing the duty of these men before the enemy in the field.

4. In order to put a stop to these abuses, the Commander of the Forces desires that the following regulations may be attended to.

5. He repeats the orders which have been so frequently issued, that no officer in the medical department shall have any soldier from the ranks as his servant or bat man, or to attend upon him in any manner, and declares his determination to bring before a General Court Martial any officer of the medical department who shall make use of a non-commissioned officer, or soldier, in any menial capacity whatever, or as a clerk, store keeper, ward master, or orderly, except under the following regulations.

6. A Board to assemble at Lisbon to-morrow, to consist of Col. Peacocke, the Inspector General of Hospitals, and Capt. McKenzie, A. Q. M. G., to consider of and decide upon the number of clerks, store keepers, ward masters, and orderlies from the ranks, required to attend upon the sick.

7. In considering these points, the Board will advert to the facility of obtaining the service of Portuguese clerks, store keepers, &c. at Lisbon, and they will send the return for the inspection and approbation of the Commander of the Forces.

They will also advert to the necessity that the officers of the medical department should themselves attend the wards of the hospitals, and not have non-commissioned officers as ward masters, at a period when the whole army are left at their post day and night. The Commander of the Forces must insist upon the officers of the medical department being at all times in the wards of the hospitals.

8. When the necessary number of attendants in the hospital shall be fixed, Col. Peacocke will fix upon the names of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the several regiments, who are to be attendants in the hospital, and he will send lists of their names to the several regiments.

9. Col. Peacocke is requested occasionally to inquire respecting the number of sick and wounded in the hospital at Lisbon, and to augment or diminish the number of attendants according to the number of sick, and according to the degree of assistance which can be procured by the employment of Portuguese attendants, reporting such increase or diminution to the Commander of the Forces, and sending lists of names of non-commissioned officers to be so employed, or dismissed from employment, to the several regiments.

10. All men thus dismissed from employment in the hospitals, either now or at any future period, are to be sent by the first opportunity to their regiments, and the Commander of the Forces positively forbids that any non-commissioned officer or soldier shall be employed as an attendant, at the hospitals at Lisbon or Belem, without the order of Col. Peacocke, in his orderly book.

11. Non-commissioned officers and soldiers, employed as attendants in the hospitals, are not on any account, at any time, to quit the square of the building in which the hospital is.

12. The soldiers when discharged from the hospital are to be sent to the convalescent barracks at Belem, and it is to be understood by their officers and them, that they are not sent there for their amusement, but that they may recover their health entirely, and return to their duty with the army. There appears therefore no occasion for their being in the streets and public houses at all hours of the day and night, but they ought to be made to lead a sober and regular life.

13. The Commander of the Forces therefore desires, that no non-commissioned officer or soldier in the convalescent barracks at Belem may be suffered to go out of the barrack yard, at any time, excepting on duty in charge of an officer or non-commissioned officer.

14. The Commander of the Forces refers the Commandant of the depôt at Belem to the G. O. of the 17th June, 1809.

15. He likewise desires, that non-commissioned officers and soldiers, convalescent in the depôt at Belem, may not have a ration of wine, unless the surgeon who attended them while in hospital should recommend that they should have it for their more early recovery.

yards on the right of that redoubt, in the rear of the Quinta de Belhaco; to the Quinta de Belhaco by those windmills, as well as by Trancoso; to the redoubt No. 9, and the ground extending from the right of No. 9, to the point on which Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd will have the battery constructed; to the village of Matos.

Major Gen. the Hon. W. Lumley will attend to any requisitions he may receive from Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd for any assistance, if that point of the position should be attacked which extends from Matos to the Quinta de Belhaco.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 23d Oct. 1810.

All the accounts which I have received of the proceedings of the enemy lead to a belief that they are collecting and making materials to construct a bridge to cross the Tagus.

It is impossible for me to say positively whether they will perform this operation, having first endeavored to carry the positions occupied by the army, or without making such an attempt; but, adverting to the numbers with which they entered this country, and to their probable existing force, and to the character and reputation of the General commanding the army, and to the importance of the object to be gained by their forcing our position; and the certain loss of character, of time, and of all the objects of the campaign, by their retreat without attempting to carry it,—I cannot believe that the attempt will not be made, as soon as the means of passing the Tagus in a retreat in case of failure, shall have been prepared.

Whether the attempt to carry our positions will be made or not, it is obvious that the enemy is constructing this bridge solely with a view to pass into the Alentejo, to which point I beg you to call the serious attention of the Portuguese government.

1st; I recommend to them, without loss of time, to adopt the measures for the removal of persons, valuable property, cattle and grain, which they ought to have adopted at an early period, in the provinces of Beira and Estremadura. They might move either towards Elvas, towards Lisbon, or towards Setuval, in all of which places they will be secure; or behind the river Alcacér do Sal, or towards the province of Algarve.

2dly; I recommend that the mills should be rendered useless for the moment, by carrying off the sails and some of the iron pins of the wheels.

3dly; it is necessary that the government should adopt early measures to enable the army to follow the enemy into the province of Alentejo.

The orders should be prepared, directed to the owners of large boats, to attend where they might be required, with boatmen, &c., and measures adopted to ensure obedience to these orders. We shall want to re-establish, immediately, the three bridges, at Punhete over the Zézere, at Abrantes, and at Villa Velha over the Tagus (for I believe the bridge at Abrantes has been taken up). The government should therefore immediately prepare the boats and the means of laying three bridges; which might be laid down and used on the lower part of the Tagus for the passage of the army, if that mode of passage should be found preferable to that by boats. It is useless for the government to point out to me, that it would be desirable to endeavor to prevent the enemy from passing into Alentejo. I am

aware of that; but unless I weaken the position on this side of the Tagus, upon which every thing depends, I cannot effect that object. Indeed I doubt whether I should be able to effect it at all under any circumstances.

I cannot conclude this letter without requesting you to point out to the government, the inexpediency of giving to the Ordenanza of Alentejo the arms which were sent by the British government, to arm the organised corps of militia; and the folly of sending into the Alentejo 2 pieces of cannon.

The Ordenanza are very capable, if they choose it, of preventing plunderers and marauders from crossing the river, or from plundering, if they should get across; but it must not be expected that they will make any resistance of the description which ought to be made by troops to whom 500 stands of new arms are delivered, or to whom 2 pieces of artillery are attached; and these arms will be thrown away and be lost to the service, and the cannon will fall into the hands of the enemy, to the disgrace of the Portuguese army. I would observe also, that if it were right to give these arms and cannon to the Ordenanza, the military officers of the government ought to have been consulted upon the subject; but unfortunately the existing Regency cannot avoid interfering with military affairs, with which they have no concern.

*The A.G. to Col. Darroch, A.A.G., Lisbon.*

23d Oct. 1810.

Lieut. Crompton cannot be allowed any officer under him, or any assistance in a clerk: the Commander of the Forces does not think it necessary. It has been stated to me that the Provost, who should assist and have charge of the prisoners, is employed as a clerk in the Town Major's office. Should this be the case, and it reaches the Commander of the Forces' knowledge, his Excellency will not fail to take serious notice of it. As to a Commissary or Dep. Commissary of prisoners of war, &c., Lisbon is not a station where such officers can be permanently necessary.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.*

23d Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the information given by prisoners and deserters, &c., which has been laid before the Commander of the Forces. His Excellency is of opinion that the servant Schielbert and the 3 men of the 70th regt. must of course be considered as prisoners, and not allowed to have the advantages of being deserters. The amount of the sale of horses, mules, or appointments you will divide among the captors, if they are taken with prisoners; or give to the owners, if deserters, as an encouragement, agreeably to the arrangements which the Commander of the Forces has fixed heretofore.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 25th Oct. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st inst. When the Q. M. G. requires boats, or any other means of facilitating the operations of the troops, which would occasion expense, he is obliged, under the regulations of the service, to apply to the Commissary Gen. to hire or purchase them for him. This is the common practice, and there was nothing irregular in Col. Murray's application to Mr. Kennedy, or Mr. Dunmore, to procure boats for the transport of the Marques de la Romana's corps, from the left to the right bank of the Tagus.

I know nothing of Mr. Rawlings' arrangements; but I am convinced that the Commissary Gen. could not procure a sufficient number of boats for this purpose, in time, without application to the officer at Lisbon, in charge of the boats in the lower part of the Tagus. I have not the papers

by me at present to enable me to state who this officer is. But about a year has elapsed since, at my recommendation, an arrangement was made for numbering and registering all the boats on the Tagus, and for placing those in each part of the river under the special direction of a particular officer; I believe the commanding officer at Lisbon was the person who had the direction of the boats below Santarem. Some short time ago, however, an alteration was made in this arrangement; and a person was specially appointed to perform this duty, to whom the application ought to have been made for the boats required upon this occasion, and by whom they would of course have been supplied.

I have no doubt that you will be able to procure copies of both these regulations at Lisbon. One of the objects of that which I recommended was to be able at all times to command the boats to leave those parts of the river likely to be in the possession of the enemy; another was, to avoid the system of embargos, than which nothing can be more inconvenient to the public service. The first object has been tolerably well accomplished; and till lately, the register has answered the purpose of avoiding the necessity of laying general embargos on the boats in any of the rivers.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 25th Oct. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 24th with its enclosures, and I am much concerned that the Portuguese government, instead of giving their own orders immediately for carrying into execution the arrangement recommended to them, should have sent the civil magistrate employed by them to me, to know in what manner he was to perform a duty purely of a civil nature. I have sent him back to receive the instructions of the government; I have none to give excepting what are contained in my letter of the 23d inst.

In respect to the difficulties attending the measure of evacuating the Alentejo by the inhabitants, stated by Principal Sousa, I shall first observe that, since that person has been in the government, I have not made one proposition of any description in the execution of which he has not thrown difficulties, and has not opposed; but I hope that the time is fast approaching when I shall be relieved from the task of having any business to transact with this gentleman. In respect to the difficulties and inconveniences stated, if they were greater, I could not prevent the French from crossing the Tagus, without incurring the risk of the defeat of the army and the loss of Lisbon. Even Principal Sousa would probably rather prefer these misfortunes, than suffer the inconveniences of which he has transmitted the exaggerated statement; but these inconveniences and losses will be found either not to exist at all, or to be trifling in degree if the government, instead of sending the civil magistrate to me for instructions, will perform their duty and instruct him themselves, or give him a copy of my letter to you of the 23d inst., and send him at once into the province.

If the instructions contained in my letter of the 23d are not sufficient, or not suitable to the circumstances, the government should give others without loss of time, and not refer to me again matters in which I can have no concern whatever. The loss and inconvenience resulting from the

measure recommended will result from delaying it; there will be none if it is adopted in time.

In respect to the occupation of Almada by the enemy, I think it very unlikely, unless he should receive a very large reinforcement, of which there is no probability. Such a movement would expose the enemy, particularly if my recommendation is followed, to the loss of his whole army. But I am supposed to know best where to send officers and detachments, and what points to guard, and I am responsible for all my actions. I do not think it necessary to send an officer or troops to Almada; but I beg that the people, and their riches, and the boats, may be moved from the left bank of the river.

I must observe that it is not becoming in members of the Portuguese government to urge me to weaken the army by detachments, when they know that, owing to the weakness and pusillanimity of their system of government, nearly two-thirds of the militia are absent without leave, and the military laws have not the power of punishing them; when they know also that throughout the last year in which the works have been constructed, which have saved the country, I was never able to procure a tenth part of the number of workmen required, notwithstanding repeated and earnest representations and remonstrances to the government; and that the works are consequently not so complete as they ought to have been, and that more men are required for the defence on this side the river, and fewer can be spared for any operation on the left bank.

*A M. le Général Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major de l'armée Française.* Ce 25 Oct. 1810.

J'ai l'honneur de vous annoncer que les ordres sont expédiés pour un nombre d'officiers, sous officiers, et soldats Français, prisonniers de guerre, semblable à l'état que je viens de recevoir des prisonniers Anglais et Portugais au pouvoir de l'armée Française, d'approcher les avant postes, le 27 de ce mois, vers midi, afin d'effectuer l'échange que les Généraux en Chef ont ordonné. Un officier de l'Etat Major aura le commandement de vos prisonniers, et il arrangera tout l'échange avec un officier Français, que je vous prie, M. le Général, d'expédier pour le même objet. Son Excellence le Vicomte Wellington échangeera de même manière les autres militaires quand ils arriveront de l'Espagne.

*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

25th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint you that, agreeably to an arrangement proposed by Marshal Massena, and consented to by the Commander of the Forces, such French prisoners as are able to march, not exceeding the numbers specified in the enclosed return, are to proceed by route and under a proper escort to-morrow to Alhandra, for the purpose of being exchanged for a similar number of our prisoners, at the outposts of the 2 armies, on the following morning. It will be necessary the prisoners should march with provisions for to-morrow and next day.

The enclosed list of the rank of the officers and the numbers of the soldiers the French propose exchanging will enable you to select officers of as nearly similar rank as you can, that may be in our custody, for the purpose of carrying the exchange as far as possible into effect. It will be necessary for an intelligent officer to have the charge of the prisoners, and he will receive further directions from Lieut. Gen. Hill at Sobral Pequeno, near Alhandra.

P.S. 344 French prisoners are to be exchanged for the 120 British and 224 Portuguese.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Hill.*

25th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a letter I have received from the Chef d'Etat Major of the French army, and to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces has

agreed upon the exchange therein proposed, as also the manner in which it is to be carried into effect; and orders have been sent this night to Lisbon that a similar number of French prisoners to the British and Portuguese who are fit to march, and also a like number of French officers, should proceed to Alhandra to-morrow, for the purpose of carrying into effect the following day the exchange proposed. It will be necessary that Lieut. Col. Rooke should meet the staff officer who will be sent with the English and Portuguese to be exchanged, in order that every explanation necessary should take place, and the service be properly executed. I have requested the Commandant of Lisbon to send an intelligent officer up with the prisoners, and only to send men capable of marching, not exceeding the number agreed upon. I have directed the men should march with provisions for to-morrow and next day; so all that they will require to-morrow at Alhandra will be some place to stop in until the following morning.

I shall be obliged to you to return the papers enclosed, being originals. Col. Peacocke is ordered to send you an exact list of their prisoners who will arrive.

I enclose a letter announcing his Excellency's consent to this exchange, to be sent in in the morning.

Memorandum for Marshal Beresford.

Pero Negro, 26th Oct. 1810.

In the existing situation of affairs it is desirable that Col. Wilson's detachment should be brought down towards Thomar and Torres Novas, so as to confine the enemy's detachments on that side. It will still be necessary, however, that Col. Wilson, Brig. Gen. Miller, and Col. Trant should advert to the necessity of their keeping up their communication with, and their rear open to, the lower Douro. Accordingly, when Col. Wilson shall establish himself at Thomar, if he should find that the enemy move upon him in force there, or endeavor to retire by that road, he will send off his infantry by Espinhal and Foz d'Arouce, and across the Mondego, at the Barca de Penacova, to the Convent of Busaco, and thence by any road he pleases towards the north. If the enemy should not press him at Thomar by the road of Torres Novas, the infantry might retire from Thomar by the road of Ourem and Leiria, or, if the season should be favorable, direct from Thomar upon Coimbra. His cavalry and any light detachment of infantry might move from Foz d'Arouce upon Ponte da Murcella upon the Alva, and carry into execution the objects of your former instructions. A sketch of the country from Thomar towards the Mondego and Alva will be sent to you for Col. Wilson's use.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 26th Oct. 1810.

I have received your private letters of the 21st, one without date, and one of the 25th this morning. In answer to Lord Wellesley's queries respecting the Portuguese Regency, my opinion is, that the Regency ought to be appointed by the Prince Regent, to act during his pleasure. They ought to have full powers to act in every possible case, to make

G. O.

Pero Negro, 26th Oct. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces has directed the Com. Gen. to supply the troops with a certain quantity of rice till further orders. The quantity supplied will be 1 lb. among 8 men, which is to be boiled up with their meat.

2. Commanding officers of regiments will make requisitions upon the Assist. Coms. attached to brigades for this rice, as soon as the latter shall be enabled to supply it.

3. In order to keep up the supply of cattle, the Commander of the Forces has likewise given orders that the troops shall be supplied for the present with salt meat on two days in each week.

4. The Commanding officers of regiments will settle with the commissaries the days on which they are to receive fresh, and those on which they are to receive salt meat.



appointments to offices, to dismiss from office, to make and alter laws; in short, every power which the Prince himself would possess, if he were on the spot. They ought to report in detail their proceedings on every subject, and their reasons for the adoption of every measure. The Prince ought to decline receiving any application from any of his officers or subjects in Portugal, not transmitted through the regular channels of the government here, and ought to refer all such applications to the consideration of the Regency. He ought to adopt no measure respecting Portugal, not recommended by the Regency. The smaller the number of persons composing the Regency the better; but my opinion is, that it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing it, excepting Principal Sousa, with whom I neither can, nor will have any official intercourse. The Patriarch is, in my opinion, a necessary evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity and confidence throughout the country, which would increase if he were removed from office, and he is the kind of man to do much mischief if he were not employed. If we should succeed in removing the Principal (which must be done), I think the Patriarch will take warning, and will behave better in future.

In respect to military operations, there can be no interference on the part of the Regency, or any body else. If there is, I can be no longer responsible. If our own government choose to interfere themselves, or that the Portuguese Regency should interfere, they have only to give me their orders in detail, and I shall carry them strictly into execution to the best of my ability, and I shall be responsible for nothing but the execution. But if I am to be responsible, I must have full discretion, and no interference on the part of the Regency, or any body else.

I should like to see Principal Sousa's detailed instructions for his *embuscadas* on the left of the Tagus. If Principal Sousa does not go to England, or somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we lose in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, and the wrong direction given to the deliberations of the government, is inconceivable. The gentlemen destined for Alentejo ought to have been in the province on the evening of the 24th. But, instead of that, 3 valuable days of fine weather will have been lost, because the government do not choose to take part in an arrangement which, however undeniably beneficial, will not be much liked by those whom it will affect; although it is certain that sooner or later these persons must and will fly, leaving behind them all their valuable property, and, as in the case of this part of the country, every thing which can enable the enemy to remain in the country.

In answer to Dom M. Forjaz's note of the 22d, enclosed in yours (without date), I have to say that I know of no carriages employed by the British army, excepting by the Commissary Gen.; and none are detained that I know of. I wish that the Portuguese government, or its officers, would state the names of those who have detained carriages, contrary to my repeated orders; or their regiments, or where they are stationed. But this they will never do. All that we do with the carriages is to send back sick in them when there are any. It will not answer to make an engagement that the wheel carriages from Lisbon shall not come further

than Bucellas, Montachique, &c. Many articles required by the army cannot be carried upon mules, and the carriages must come on with these. In many cases the Portuguese troops, in particular, are ill provided with mules; therefore this must be left to the Commissaries Gen. of the armies, under a recommendation to them, if possible, not to send the Lisbon wheel carriages beyond the places above mentioned.

I wish in every case that a regulation made should be observed; and the makers of regulations should take care always so to frame them as that they can be observed, which is the reason of my entering so particularly into this point.

In answer to your letter of the 25th, I enclose you the copy of an answer which I gave Mr. C. Johnstone to a similar proposal made to me. I cannot enter into a contract to receive a certain sum of money, at a certain advanced rate of exchange, at a future period. The offer should be conveyed to government, who alone can decide upon it.

I have now, I believe, answered all your letters excepting one (without date), conveying the paragraph proposed to be published by the government, respecting the paragraph in the *Sun*. I think they ought to say, not only that we had no share in that proceeding, but no knowledge of it till it was carried into execution. However, I see the subject has got into discussion in England, and I therefore write to the Sec. of State upon it, and send him a copy of my letter to the Portuguese government.

I have no objection to the publication of Beresford's letter about Madden, and I shall settle with him about the transmissal of these reports in future.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Peru Negro, 26th Oct. 1810.

The Commissary Gen. having deemed it advisable to endeavor to procure cattle at Oporto for the service of the army, I shall be much obliged to you if you will order 3000 tons of horse transports to proceed there, in order to transport to the Tagus the cattle which Mr. Mackenzie may purchase there.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Peru Negro, 26th Oct. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter (without date) respecting the request made by Col. Trant, that tonnage should be provided, to send 3800 French prisoners from Oporto to England.

My opinion is, that it is not expedient to send any of the transports from the Tagus for this service; and that it is desirable that they should be sent in those vessels which you may be able to procure at Oporto; and that those for whom you may not be able to procure tonnage at Oporto, or in the northern ports, should remain at Oporto till means may be found of removing them to England. I do not think it would be proper to remove them to the Bayona islands.

There are at present at Lisbon 12 French surgeons, whose names I enclose; and as several of the prisoners at Oporto are sick or wounded, I recommend that you should send there 6 of these gentlemen to attend upon them.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 26th Oct. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 21st and 22d. I am convinced that the enemy are not yet prepared with means of passing the Tagus with any thing but marauding parties; and the best people to employ against them are the Ordenanza, and the irregular horse lately got together. The swamps on the island of Lyceria would not do your marines and seamen much good; and they are not necessary to keep the enemy's marauding parties in order.

When they shall have prepared their bridge, the matter will become too serious for any number you could detach from your squadron, and they might experience difficulty in getting away again. I recommend to you, therefore, at present not to make the detachment proposed. Hereafter it might be desirable to station a few men at Alcochete, about a league in front of Aldea Galega.

*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

26th Oct. 1810.

In the event of the French prisoners not having marched previous to your receipt of this letter, it is the Commander of the Forces' pleasure that they should be sent to Alhandra by water, for which purpose you will apply to the Admiral immediately for boats.

I herewith enclose a letter for Capt. Mellish, D.A.A.G. at Lisbon, whom Lord Wellington directs should have charge of this service. He will receive your instructions, agreeably to my letter of yesterday, and the enclosed contains further orders for his guidance.

*The A.G. to Capt. Mellish, D.A.A.G.*

26th Oct. 1810.

Col. Peacocke will give you instructions relative to your proceeding with 344 French prisoners from Lisbon to Alhandra this day, in order to be exchanged with a similar number of British and Portuguese, at the outpost to-morrow. If the prisoners have already marched, you will be so good as to follow them to Alhandra, applying to Gen. Hill for all further orders, as I have written to him, stating the whole arrangement. Lord Wellington, however, is desirous that you should be employed on this service. If the prisoners have not marched, they are to proceed by water. You will carry with you an exact list of the French prisoners, and exchange them with the British and Portuguese.

On the service being completed, such soldiers of ours as are equipped and properly clothed will proceed to join their corps, and you will send them under charge of non-commissioned officers, requested from the 2d division for that purpose. The Portuguese, in like manner, will be sent to their respective regiments, if in a state to join them; if not, they must be sent to the depôts at Lisbon to be equipped, and marched up to the army with the next batch of convalescents. In this latter case you can make use of the boats returning for their passage.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Slade.*

26th Oct. 1810.

I am to call your very serious attention, by direction of the Commander of the Forces, to the irregularity and incorrectness with which the returns of your brigade are made out, and his Excellency desires you will seriously apprise the commanding officers of regiments that he will hold them responsible for such incorrectness as appears with their names signed to the returns; and if the Brigade Major omits again to forward them at the time required to the A.A.G., the Commander of the Forces will be under the necessity of appointing another officer to the situation.

*The A.G. to the Marques de la Romana.*

26th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose, for your Excellency's information, the copy of a G.O. which has this day been issued by the Commander of the Forces, relative to

the supply of the troops with rice, and also the issue of salt meat rations 2 days in the week. The Commander of the Forces has directed the same arrangements in the issue of provisions to the Spanish forces.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 25th inst., regarding the arrival of the *Sabrina* and convoy with French prisoners from Oporto; and I concur with you in thinking that it is desirable to send them to England, without loss of time, in one of the troop ships, with such a quantity of tonnage as may be sufficient for the purpose of removing them, the whole returning to Lisbon as soon as possible.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 24th and 25th. I mentioned to Mr. Stuart that in case the enemy should retire, we shall want immediately to re-establish the bridges at Punhete and Villa Velha, and at Abrantes, if that should be destroyed, in order that the government might not cavil at the expense of preparing 3 bridges, which we shall want, at all events, if we stay in the country. If the 3 bridges should be prepared, I should begin by laying them down in some convenient situation above Salvaterra, and pass the army over in 3 columns.

I am afraid that we should find it inconvenient to cross to the island of Lyceria, as I believe there is no road across the island which an army could use. There is certainly none across the low island opposite Alhandra, which, if the bridge is placed at Alhandra, must be crossed as well as Lyceria.

I cannot find out where the enemy are making their bridge, or where they propose to place it. From Loison's movement towards Santarem, and, I believe, even towards Thomar, I should think that they have given up the plan of crossing the Tagus.

Nothing can be worse than Principal Sousa. I have written to England about him, and have sent to the Sec. of State my letter to the Portuguese government disapproving of the arrests. I have no doubt that the Portuguese government circulated the report that I had been the cause of them, and I am strongly inclined to publish at Lisbon my letter to them upon their subject.

P.S. This was the day of our dispatching the mail for England, otherwise I would have gone to Alhandra to see you and Lady Emily.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th Sept., regarding Col. Wilson.\*

I found this officer doing duty with the Lusitanian Legion when I arrived in Portugal; but I do not know by whose leave or authority; and he has continued in that corps ever since. He is now confidentially employed by Marshal Beresford and me at the head of the staff attached to the Portuguese General officer commanding the troops in the northern provinces of this Kingdom; which troops are stationed in the enemy's

\* Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Wilson, K.C.B.

rear, and acting immediately upon all his communications with Spain. All the arrangements for these operations have been made and carried on through Col. Wilson, the loss of whose services will be seriously felt by the army in this country.

I venture to delay ordering him to join the Royal York Rangers till the Commander in Chief shall have read this letter, and shall have decided whether it is most important that he should continue where he is, or proceed to join the regiment to which he belongs.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

When the Marques de la Romana came to my head quarters at Alverca in the month of July last, I arranged with him, among other points, that, in case the enemy should move into Portugal to attack this army, he should march to our assistance; and that if he was pressed by the enemy on the side of Estremadura, he was to fall back upon Portugal. The Marques de la Romana, however, informed me some time ago, that in case of his entry into Portugal to assist the British army, or for his own safety, it was impossible for him to provide for the subsistence of his troops while in this country, and he urged me to request the Portuguese government to supply him.

I forwarded this request, but the Regency stated that they were unable to comply with it, and I am aware that they are not able to supply with regularity their own troops.

In a subsequent correspondence the Marques de la Romana complained to me that his troops were destitute of pay, clothing, shoes, and every necessary, and that he had no money, and he earnestly entreated me to supply him in case he should march into Portugal. Under these circumstances, I thought it proper, when I called upon the Marques de la Romana to march into Portugal, and when I was certain of the enemy's advance after the battle of Busaco, to give him £20,000 sterling on account of the Spanish government, and 8000 pairs of shoes; and to engage to feed his troops while they should remain in Portugal, also on the account of the Spanish government, on the same terms as under the arrangement of June, 1809, the Portuguese government pay for rations received from the British Commissariat for the Portuguese troops. I enclose an extract of a letter written to the Marques de la Romana upon this subject.

I hope that His Majesty's government will approve of these arrangements. I did not think myself justified in not bringing into our positions all the force which was at my disposal; and it would have been vain to expect any service from the Spanish troops if they had not been paid, fed, and provided like the other troops with which they were to act; and their march through the country, and their stay in it, would have been worse than the invasion of the enemy. The Marques de la Romana, even if provided with money, would have experienced difficulty in procuring provisions on his march through Alentejo; and here, unassisted by the English or Portuguese magazines, he would have found none.

I propose to send to His Majesty's minister at Cadiz the accounts of the sums which will be due by the Spanish government for the money, provisions, and necessaries delivered to the Marques de la Romana's corps.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose the originals of 2 letters for the Prince d'Essling,\* recently intercepted between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, which deserve the attention of His Majesty's government. That from the Prince de Neufchâtel, No. 1, shows that the enemy have means of acquiring intelligence in England. The strength of the different divisions of this army quoted in this letter, must have been extracted from the weekly states transmitted home, which alone contain the accounts of the distribution of the army into divisions. The letter No. 2 shows the source from which Massena may draw his reinforcements; but from the letter No. 1, it is obvious that the reinforcement which it appears has arrived at Vitoria, was not intended for him, and it is possible that it may have been sent to another quarter.

It appears from other letters, intercepted at the same period, that as late as the 8th Oct., no intelligence had been received at Valladolid of the battle of Busaco, from which Massena would have begun to doubt of the sufficiency of his means to effect his object; and it may therefore be concluded, that even if these 15 battalions, or if the 9th *corps d'armée* had not been allotted for service in some other quarter of the Peninsula, they could not have received at Vitoria Massena's requisition for assistance till the 16th Oct., and that they cannot be in this neighbourhood till the middle of next month.

All the accounts which I have received of the distresses of the enemy for want of provisions would lead to a belief that their army could not remain long in the position in which it is placed, and it is astonishing that they have been able to remain here so long. There is no doubt whatever, that no issue of bread or flour has been made to the army since it marched from Almeida, where the soldiers were loaded each with biscuit for 15 days, which the greater proportion of them being unable to carry, had thrown away. They have since received meat only, and such vegetables as they could pick up.

As the Portuguese government neglected to adopt the measures which I had recommended to them, even in this neighbourhood, viz., to prepare the people for withdrawing from those parts of the country into which the enemy should move his army, carrying with them their valuable property, and whatever could tend to the subsistence of the enemy, or to facilitate his progress, driving off their cattle, and rendering useless the mills, it is impossible to form a judgment respecting the quantity of subsistence which the enemy may have found in that part of the country which they occupy with their troops, or to which they may send their detachments. I am convinced, that if the measures which I recommended had been adopted in time, in this neighbourhood, and on the banks of the Tagus, they would have been as successful as they were found to be in the province of Beira, and on the banks of the Coa and the Mondego; and the enemy would have been obliged before now to commence his retreat for the want of provisions to support his army. But it is impossible now to form a judgment of the supply which he has found, or of the length of time which he may be enabled to remain in his position.

\* See Appendix, No. X. and No. XI.

This is not the only cause that I have to complain of the recent proceedings of the Portuguese government, and I beg to assure your Lordship, that if Principal Sousa is not removed from the Regency, and even from Portugal; and if the Prince Regent does not give power and authority, and his support and countenance to the government which he will appoint to conduct his affairs here, it is useless to pretend to carry on military operations on an extensive scale, of which Portugal is to be the basis, or to preserve this country.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

Your Lordship has been apprised of the measures which had been adopted to induce the inhabitants of Portugal to quit that part of the country through which the enemy was likely to pass, or which it was probable would become the seat of his operations, carrying off with them their valuable property, and every thing which could tend to the enemy's subsistence, or to facilitate his progress. There is no doubt that these inhabitants had sufficient knowledge, from former experience, of the treatment they would receive from the enemy; and there is no instance of those of any town or village having remained, or of their having failed to remove what might be useful to the enemy when they had sufficiently early intimation of the wishes of government, or of myself, that they should abandon their houses, and carry away their property.

All those who are acquainted with the nature of military operations, with their dependence upon the assistance of the country to supply the wants of the army, and particularly with the degree to which the French armies depend upon this assistance, must be aware of the distress which this system has occasioned to the enemy; and the official and private letters which have been intercepted, are filled with complaints of its effects, which have been repeated in the official papers published in the *Moniteur* at Paris.

It happened unfortunately, that the Indian corn harvest, which is the principal support of the inhabitants of a large part of Portugal, was on the ground at the moment of the enemy's invasion. This of course could not be carried off: the enemy's troops have, as usual, destroyed what they could not move; and nothing remains. If, therefore, the result of the campaign should be to oblige the enemy to withdraw from Portugal, it is much to be apprehended that the greatest distress will be felt in those districts through which the enemy's troops have passed, which there are no means whatever in this country of relieving.

Upon former occasions, the wealthy inhabitants of Great Britain, and of London in particular, have stepped forward to assist and relieve the distresses of foreign nations, whether suffering under calamities inflicted by Providence, or by a cruel and powerful enemy. This nation has received the benefit of the charitable disposition of His Majesty's subjects, and there never was a case in which their assistance was required in a greater degree, whether the sufferings of the people, or their fidelity to the cause they have espoused, and their attachment to His Majesty's subjects, be considered. I declare that I have scarcely known an instance in which any person in Portugal, even of the lowest order, has had commu-

nication with the enemy inconsistent with his duty to his own Sovereign, or with the orders he had received.

I would, therefore, beg leave to recommend the unfortunate portion of the inhabitants who have suffered from the enemy's invasion, to your Lordship's protection; and I request you to consider of the mode of recommending them to the benevolent disposition of His Majesty's subjects, at the moment which I hope may be not far distant, that the enemy may be under the necessity of evacuating the country.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

Having observed that I am supposed to have advised the measures recently adopted by the Regency in Portugal, in respect to certain individuals who have been sent out of the Kingdom; and as I know that credit is given to calumnies of this description, and that they are frequently repeated, and brought forward in the shape of charges against those who are serving His Majesty abroad, I am desirous that your Lordship should be informed how this matter really stands.

The first I heard of the arrest of the persons in question was from public report, and from the Portuguese newspapers. The Secretary of the Regency afterwards sent me a paper upon the subject, of which I enclose a copy, to which I wrote the answer expressing my disapprobation of the measure, of which I enclose the draft.

I am decidedly of opinion that the Portuguese government had no reason for arresting these individuals, excepting a desire to gratify the populace by an act of vigor against those supposed to be well wishers of, and partisans of the French. It is impossible for me to say whether they are so or not, but I am very certain that they had it not in their power to do any mischief, and that their sudden arrest and transportation for crimes not stated, were calculated to do much injury at the time, by creating general suspicion and mistrust. I am afraid that the Portuguese government, after they had carried this measure into execution, and had found that commiseration for the sufferings of individuals had excited the disapprobation of many persons in Lisbon of the whole proceedings, gave their sanction to the reports which were circulated by their friends, that it had been adopted at the suggestion of the British authorities, although they had adopted it not only without consulting any of us, but had persevered in carrying it into execution, notwithstanding the remonstrances of His Majesty's minister and of the Admiral, and they knew that I disapproved of it entirely.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

I enclose a letter from Lieut. Col. Fletcher of the Royal Engineers, and a list of Engineer's stores required for the service in this country. The articles required in former requisitions have not yet arrived, and if they have not yet sailed from England it is desirable that no time should be lost in dispatching them. I have also to request your Lordship will give directions that all the articles of camp equipage, provisions, and military stores, and blankets, &c., for the troops, may be sent out as soon as possible.



I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will give directions that 2 brigades of  $5\frac{1}{2}$  inch iron howitzers (without chambers), weight 13 cwt., mounted upon heavy 6 pounder travelling carriages, may be sent to the Tagus for the use of this army. It would be very desirable that these carriages should be mounted upon axletrees of the following dimensions, viz.: breadth from wheel to wheel, 4 feet  $2\frac{1}{2}$  inches, extremity of the axletree from point to point, 5 feet  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inch. But if there are none of these carriages in the yard, it is better that we should have them of the usual dimensions, than that there should be any delay in the arrival of these pieces of ordnance.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

As the troops are liable at this season to complaints in their bowels, which in many instances end fatally, particularly in this country, in which they cannot be prevented from eating grapes and drinking the new wine, I have thought it proper to direct that an issue shall be made to them from the stores of a quantity of rice, not exceeding one pound among 8 men each day, which I hope may have the effect of checking the tendency to this disorder, and aid in its cure in cases in which it has been already acquired. I propose to direct this issue as soon as the troops shall be in a situation to purchase any thing in addition to their rations. I hope that His Majesty's government will approve of this arrangement.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

I enclose 2 letters from Marshal Beresford, with reports from Brig. Gen. Blunt, of successes against the enemy's detachments, by parties detached from the garrison of Peniche. The former was mentioned to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 20th inst.\*

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

I observe that I am accused in the French official paper, the *Moniteur*, of having promised to endeavor to raise the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; and it is stated that my letters to Gen. Herrasti, the late Governor of that fortress, contained that promise; and as the *Moniteur* is considered an authority against those serving His Majesty abroad, and the charge is one of a serious nature, I think it proper to transmit to your Lordship extracts of the letters which I wrote to Gen. Herrasti upon the subject of

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\* Marshal Beresford to Marshal Gen. Visc. Wellington. Cazal Cochim, 20th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to annex the extract of a letter I have this instant received from Brig. Gen. Blunt, by which your Lordship will see he continues to pick up the marauders and stragglers from the enemy.

Brig. Gen. Blunt to the Military Secretary.

Peniche, 19th Oct. 1810.

You will be pleased to report to his Excellency Marshal Beresford, that, in consequence of information, I detached a party on the 17th, under the command of Major Tavares, to fall in with the enemy's foragers, but unfortunately the enemy had retired.

Major Pinto was detached yesterday for the same purpose to a distance of 5 leagues. He succeeded in taking 23 prisoners; 2 of the enemy were killed and one of the recruits. It is great gratification to see the alacrity with which they offer themselves on every occasion.

the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, and of the assistance he was to expect from the army under my command. After the summons of the place by Marshal Ney in the month of February, I placed Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd's division within the Spanish territory, between the Coa and the Agueda, in order to be nearer Ciudad Rodrigo, and to prevent the enemy from cutting off the communication with that place.

The Junta of Castille, of which Gen. Herrasti was the head, remonstrated against this disposition, as they said the country could not supply provisions for the troops; and I then wrote them a letter to apprise them of the object I had in view in that disposition, and to inform them that I should alter it, as it did not appear to be satisfactory to them. The Junta of Castille then sent me a deputation of two of their members to Viseu, to request that I would not alter the disposition which I had made, with which request I complied; but in the conversation which I had with these deputies, I pointed out to the Junta that Ciudad Rodrigo was not the only object intrusted to my care; that when that place should be attacked, I must take into consideration, not only the relative strength of the two armies immediately in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, but other operations going on at the same time in other parts of the Peninsula before I should determine whether I could undertake its relief.

Two days afterwards, on the 26th April, the place was invested on the right of the Agueda, by Ney's corps, but its communication remained open with the country on the left of that river, in consequence of the position of Gen. Craufurd's division. I found from Gen. Herrasti's letters, that he was inclined to consider that I had entered into a formal engagement to proceed to the relief of the place at all events and at all risks, when it should be attacked, and I therefore wrote him from Celorico a letter, on the 7th May,\* of which I enclose an extract, No. 1, in which I stated that the relief to be expected from me depended upon circumstances; and in order that the matter might be more fully explained, and that the whole of the Junta might be informed of what my intentions were, I sent this letter by Col. O'Lawlor, an officer in the service of Spain, who had been for some time attached to the British head quarters, who did explain to the Junta that operations of the British army depended upon the strength of the enemy's army by which the place should be attacked, and upon other operations going on in other quarters at the same time.

I repeated the same sentiments in a letter to the Governor, of the 6th June,† of which I enclose the extract.

As your Lordship knows, that place was not completely invested till the 11th June, and after it was invested, I received another letter from Gen. Herrasti, requesting my assistance, to which I wrote the answer No. 3,‡ in which I referred him to my former letters, and to the communication by Col. O'Lawlor.

I don't know whether he ever received this letter, but I thought it proper to use the terms in which that letter is written, because it was not improbable that it might fall into the hands of the enemy, and it was

\* No. 1, see p. 55.

† No. 2, see p. 105.

‡ No. 3, see p. 125.

desirable even for Ciudad Rodrigo itself, that they should not be made acquainted with my intentions.

From the perusal of these papers your Lordship will be able to judge whether I deserve the imputation of having deceived Gen. Herrasti with hopes of relief. The only chance of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo was to have made Gen. Hill's corps cross the Tagus in June, and to unite the whole British army in that operation. But this could not be done unless the Marques de la Romana could maintain himself in Estremadura against the 2d corps of the French army, after Gen. Hill should have been brought away. I proposed this plan to the Marques de la Romana in the interviews which I had with him at Alverca during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, but he declared that he could not maintain his position in Estremadura if Lieut. Gen. Hill should cross the Tagus, and Regnier should still remain in that province.

I did every thing in my power short of deceiving Gen. Herrasti with hopes of relief at all risks to the army under my command, to induce him to defend the place intrusted to his charge.\* It is a very convenient doctrine for the French, that a fortified place which is attacked by them and has no hope of relief from an army in the field, ought to surrender without making any defence; but the contrary doctrine is the only one by which they can be effectually opposed. The inhabitants of every town in a state of siege must suffer considerably, but their remaining in it during the period of the siege is a matter of choice, and in the case of Ciudad Rodrigo in particular, was not a matter of necessity; and it would be quite a new principle in war, and a most advantageous one for the French, that every town threatened with a siege of which the inhabitants might feel the inconvenience, and for which there could be no hope of relief by an army in the field, ought to surrender without making any defence.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

The enemy still occupy the same positions in front of this army which they held when I addressed you on the 20th inst. They have detached some troops towards Santarem, and on the 23d Gen. Loison marched towards that place with the division under his command, and it appears from accounts from the commanding officer at Abrantes of the 24th, that a body of the enemy's infantry and cavalry had entered Thomar on that day.

The reports which I have received from the prisoners and deserters who have been brought in, concur in the accounts of the distress felt by the enemy for the want of provisions of all descriptions. They state that they are collecting and preparing materials to construct a bridge over the Tagus; but although we have a good view of that river from different parts of the ground occupied by the army, and have officers and others employed on the left of the Tagus to observe the motions of the enemy, I have not been able to discover either where this work is carrying on, or where the bridge is to be placed on the river, if it should be constructed. The enemy appear very anxious to collect boats, and on the 24th endeavored to drive a party of the Ordenanza from Chamusca by

\* See Appendix, No. XXVII. Spanish letter of Don J. D. Vasconer to Don M. de Alava, 18th Jan. 1811.

the fire of their artillery, in order to obtain possession of some which were under that place.

Col. Wilson had been at Leiria with the cavalry attached to Gen. Bacellar's division, and had proceeded to Ourem. The advance of the infantry was at Pombal. On the side of Obidos and Ramalhal, the British cavalry, and a battalion of Spanish light infantry, and the troops of the garrison of Peniche confine the enemy's detachments; and they really possess no part of the country excepting that on which their army stands.

By the last accounts from Gen. Siiveira of the 17th inst., it appears that all was quiet in the north, and he had not received any accounts of the march of troops in Castille. The parties of guerrillas had been more daring than usual, and they had united in the neighbourhood of Valladolid early in the month of October, to the amount of 1500, in order to carry off a convoy of money which had been raised in contributions from the country, in which attempt, however, they failed.

According to the accounts of the 21st from Estremadura, it appears that Marshal Mortier's corps was still at Seville, and Gen. Ballesteros was observing it from Aracena. The 2d division of the Marques de la Romana's corps under Gen. Carrera arrived at Lisbon on the 25th, and will be with the army this day. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 4th inst.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 27th Oct. 1810.

My dispatches of this date will give you an idea of our situation, which I hope will be satisfactory to you. In my opinion the enemy ought to retire, for he has no chance of annoying our position; and delay will only aggravate his distress, and make his retreat more difficult.\* I calculate that a reinforcement of 15,000 men would not give him so good an army as he had at Busaco. He had 2000 men killed there: Trant took 5000 prisoners at Coimbra: above 1000 prisoners have gone through this army: many men have been killed by the peasantry, and in the skirmishes with our different detachments: and they had 200 or 300 men wounded in the affair with our outposts about Sobral. They cannot have less than 4000 sick, after the march they have made, the distress they have suffered, and the weather to which they were exposed. Indeed, the deserters and prisoners tell us that almost every body is sick. From this statement you will judge of the diminution of their numbers, and you will see that I have not much reason to apprehend any thing from the '15 *beaux bataillons*' which fought at Essling, and which cannot be here before the middle of November. I don't think I have much to apprehend, even if Mortier should be added to them. However, we shall see how that will be.

We have an excellent position, which we are improving every day; and the army is in good order and spirits, and not sickly. By the last returns, we had 4200 in hospital, and no serious disorder. We had 8500 sick in the military returns, but these include convalescents at Belem, of whom, I hope, under better regulations, not to have quite so many.

I am not quite certain that I ought not to attack the French, particularly as they have detached Loison, either to look for provisions, or to open the road for their retreat; but I think the sure game, and that in

\* See Appendix, No. XV. and No. XVI.

which I am likely to lose fewest men, the most consistent with my instructions and the intentions of the King's government; and I therefore prefer to wait the attack. Besides, although I have the advantage of numbers, the enemy are in a very good position, which I could not turn with any large force, without laying open my own rear, and the road to the sea. This is the worst of all these strong countries, that they afford equally good positions to both sides. I beg your Lordship will hurry out our supplies of all kinds, and the horses for the artillery.

I hope that Lord Wellesley will relieve me from Principal Sousa. I cannot act with that gentleman; and indeed the Portuguese government must be put on a proper footing, and forced to do its duty.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Hill.*

27th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint you that, as it appears by the enclosure the exchange of prisoners is delayed, his Excellency is of opinion that it would be advisable to send back the French prisoners to Lisbon to-morrow, directing them to be in readiness to come up again by water when written for. Capt. Mellish, D.A.A.G., in charge of the French prisoners, will receive your further instructions on the subject.

If you will have the goodness to open any intimation made to me at the outpost, and write immediately to Col. Peacocke to send up the prisoners by water, dispatching an officer with the same, I think it may forward the service sooner than if the order is waited for to go from me.

Please to return the enclosure, being the original.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 28th Oct. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 26th inst., and I am much concerned to have to inform you that the cattle and other articles of supply, which the government have been informed have been removed from the island of Lyceria, are still on the island; and most probably the Sec. of State, Dom M. Forjaz, who was at Alhandra yesterday, will have seen them. I shall be glad to hear whether the government propose to take any and what steps to punish the magistrates who have disobeyed their orders, and have deceived them by false reports.

The officers and soldiers of the militia, absent from their corps, are liable to penalties and punishments, some of a civil, others of a military nature. 1st; they are liable to the forfeiture of all their personal property, upon the information that they are absent from their corps without leave: 2dly; they are liable to be transferred to serve as soldiers in the regiments of the line, upon the same information; and lastly, they are liable to the penalties of desertion, inflicted by the military tribunals. The first two are penalties which depend upon the civil magistrates; and I should be very glad to have heard of one instance in which the magistrates of Lisbon, or in which the government had called upon the magistrates at Lisbon to carry into execution the law in either of these respects.

I entreat them to call for the names of the officers and soldiers absent without leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments of militia; to disgrace any one or more of the principal officers, in a public manner, for this shameful desertion of their post in the hour of danger; and to seize and dispose of the whole property of the militia soldiers absent without leave, and to send these men to serve in any of the regiments of the line.

I entreat them to adopt these measures, without favor or distinction of any individual, in respect to any one regiment, and to execute the laws *bonâ fide* upon this subject, and I shall be satisfied of their good intentions, and shall believe that they are sincerely desirous of saving the country. But if we are to go on as we have hitherto; if Great Britain is to give large subsidies, and to expend large sums in the support of a cause, in which those most interested sit by and take no part; and those at the head of the government, with laws and power to force the people to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are aware of the evil, but neglect their duty, and omit to put the laws into execution, I must believe their professions to be false; that they look to a little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his allies can place no confidence.

In respect to the military law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military persons, who have deserted their duty in these critical times, will be punished as they deserve. But the Governors of the Kingdom forget the innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded to them on the defects in the proceedings of Courts Martial, which, in times of active war, render them and their sentences entirely nugatory. As an additional instance of these defects, I mention that officers of the Oliveira militia, who behaved ill in action with the enemy at Villa Nova do Foz Coa, in the beginning of August last, and for whose trial a Court Martial was immediately assembled, are still, in the end of October, under trial, and the trial will probably not be concluded before Christmas. In like manner the military trial of these deserters of the militia, after assembling officers and soldiers, at great inconvenience, for the purpose, cannot possibly be concluded till the period will have gone by in which any benefit might be derived from the example of the punishment of any one, or number of them.

This defect in the administration of the military law has been repeatedly pointed out to the government, and a remedy for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by the Prince Regent, but they will not adopt it; and it would be much better if there were no laws for the government of the army, than that the existing laws should continue without being executed.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 25th Oct. 1810.

The Marques de la Romana has spoken to me respecting the exportation of Merinos sheep by the Americans from the Portuguese ports. As for my part, I am well convinced that neither Americans nor English will ever derive any general advantage from the Merinos. Rich individuals will keep the breed pure, and will have the power of keeping them warm in winter, and may get a little fine wool from them, but I am inclined to believe that the change of the pasture can alone insure the continuance of the produce and fineness of the wool. However, it would gratify the Spaniards, and probably some persons in England, if the Portuguese government would prohibit the exportation of Merinos through their

ports, excepting probably by British subjects to Great Britain or Ireland, and you might urge this upon them.

I have written you a letter this day, which I wish you to show to the Regency. If the French can feed in the country, (and they will be able to feed, if the resources are not removed out of their reach,) they will stay till they will be reinforced; for they are still too strong for me to attack them, and they are in as good a position as mine is. The government and people, therefore, are seriously interested in removing food out of their reach. But if they will not do that, I hope they will take the measures proposed for strengthening the militia. If these corps were complete, I should be very indifferent about the enemy's reinforcements. Indeed, as it is, I do not care much about them; but 7000 or 8000 men, in which number the militia are deficient, would secure many points for me which are at present but bare.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Pero Negro, 28th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose an estimate for the pay of the corps of cavalry under Don J. Sanchez, on which I have advanced 4000 dollars, which I request you will submit to the Spanish government, in order that the money may be repaid by them.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Pero Negro, 28th Oct. 1810.

I enclose a letter to the Sec. of State, conveying a detailed account of the assistance which I had given to the Marques de la Romana for the troops under his command, on their entrance into this country, and of that which they are to receive while here.

I request you to receive back from the Spanish government the sum of £20,000, advanced in money; and I shall hereafter acquaint you with the amount of the value of the shoes and other necessaries, and of the sum to be paid for rations, according to the terms settled in my letter to the Marques de la Romana, enclosed in the dispatch to the Sec. of State.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Pero Negro, 28th Oct. 1810.

I enclose two dispatches, written yesterday, to the Sec. of State, which will explain to you the situation of affairs here.

It is impossible to say what Massena will do. It appears to be imagined in the army that reinforcements are coming; but I do not think that a reinforcement of 15,000 men will give him back such an army as that which he brought into Portugal; and I do not think what he had was sufficient to accomplish his object. It is reported here that Mortier has marched from Seville to join Victor at the Isla. If that be true, I should imagine they are going to try an attack upon that point; or else the reports of the sickness of the troops before Cadiz are well founded; and Mortier is gone there to aid in the duties of the siege.

*The A.G. to Dr. French, Inspector of hospitals.*

28th Oct. 1810.

I have laid your letter and enclosures, relative to the appropriation of the Rope walk at Lisbon, before the Commander of the Forces. His Excellency is well satisfied with your exertions on the subject, but things must remain as they are at present. I am charged, however, particularly by his Excellency to write to

the English ambassador to acquaint the Admiral that the demand for the Rope walk did not proceed either from you or the Commander of the Forces, but the offer of the *whole building*, for the accommodation of the British sick, came from the Portuguese government.

*The A.G. to his Excellency Charles Stuart.*

28th Oct. 1810.

The Inspector of hospitals having transmitted the enclosures to me for the Commander of the Forces' information, I am directed by his Excellency to request that you will be pleased to inform the Admiral that the demand for the Rope walk, for the accommodation of the sick, neither originated with the Commander of the Forces nor Dr. Franck; but the offer of the *whole building*, for the accommodation of the sick and wounded British, came from the Portuguese government.

Be pleased to return the enclosures, being originals.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

28th Oct. 1810.

I have not failed to lay your letter of the 25th inst. before his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, because I felt satisfied that an immediate communication of your feelings as there expressed was essential both for your satisfaction and his Excellency's information; and I am directed to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces is of opinion that your letter is written under a misconception of the G. O. alluded to, as the Commander of the Forces declares it in no way reflects upon you, and he thinks it impossible to show where the Order points at any want of zeal, or exertion, or ability in you, in the discharge of the important duties committed to your care.

The G. O., in his Excellency's opinion, goes to remedy abuses in the employment of orderlies, ward masters, &c., in the hospitals, and greater abuses in the convalescent depôt at Belem, with which you have nothing to do. These sentiments, therefore, of his Excellency, I think, will be perfectly satisfactory to you.

*The A.G. to Capt. Tucker, Belem.*

28th Oct. 1810.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter containing a proposal for an arrangement for the depôt at Belem, which the Commander of the Forces will take into consideration, and I hope very shortly increased aid will be afforded you. His Excellency will consider the officers you recommend, if an opportunity offers.

I have likewise to acquaint you that I received this morning the nominal lists, &c., of the depôt. It has enabled me to give complete information to the different regiments of the army of the numbers of, and names of their men at Belem; and the general return is satisfactory in accounting accurately for all the convalescents, &c., at Belem.

*The A.G. to Capt. Tucker, Belem.*

28th Oct. 1810.

Lieut. —, of the — regt., seems to have marched from Lisbon on the 26th, and from Belem the 25th, with a detachment of 41 men. He has only brought up 29 of these soldiers in a march of 5 leagues. Either the men were not fit to join their regiment, or some gross neglect of the officer has been the cause of only 29 of this detachment arriving. I have, therefore, ordered him back to Belem to account for the men that have strayed from him, and to find them all out on his way; and if no satisfactory account can be given you, you will make a special report to me, in order that Lieut. — may be placed under an arrest, and tried by a General Court Martial for neglect of duty.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Leith, 5th division.*

28th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint you, in reply to your letter and enclosures herewith returned, that no allowance can be made for the packs alluded to, because, in disobedience of positive orders and regulations, the men with their packs must have been not less than 20 miles in rear of their regiments when their packs were destroyed. Disobedience of orders at all times, and in all cases, puts an end to any claim that might exist to compensation for losses.



*The A.G. to Major Gen. Leith, 5th division.*

28th Oct. 1810.

In reply to your letter and enclosures herewith returned, I have to acquaint you that the claim transmitted should go before a Board of claims, when one may be ordered, but the Commander of the Forces does not think any Board of claims would admit of it. Compensation is never given for losses occasioned by accident, when the claimant has an allowance purposely to avoid the chance of that accident occurring.

To the Hon. A. C. Johnstone.

Pero Negro, 28th Oct. 1810.

I received this morning your letter of the 28th, and I am concerned that an inaccuracy of expression in my letter to Mr. Stuart, respecting your proposal to supply the army with dollars, should have given you the trouble of writing to me on the subject. The Commissary Gen. is authorised to draw bills upon the Treasury for money; and he has made bargains with individuals for the delivery of money into the military chests, for bills to be drawn at certain rates of exchange. But these bargains have been invariably for money to be delivered within a named, and a very short period of time, which has seldom exceeded a few days; and in no instance has the period been undetermined. I doubt that the Commissary Gen. is authorised to make a bargain with any person for the delivery of dollars for the use of the army, at a distant and undetermined period, even at a favorable rate of exchange; and therefore I would recommend to you to make your offers to the Treasury.

I assure you that it seldom happens to me to give an answer upon a subject of this description, without consulting with the gentlemen at the head of the department to which the consideration of it belongs; and although I did not consult with Mr. Kennedy upon the offer contained in Mr. Stuart's letter, I had spoken to him upon a proposition which you before did me the favor to make to me; and it appeared to me that the same objection rendered it necessary to decline to accept of either.

Instructions for Capt. Wedekind, R.E.

Pero Negro, 29th Oct. 1810.

Upon the receipt of this letter, you will wait upon his Excellency Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley, and inform him that you are appointed by me to communicate with the officer employed by him to have the boats and other materials, viz., balks, planks, anchors and cables, cordage, &c., prepared for 3 bridges, one over the Zézere at Punhete, one over the Tagus at Villa Velha, and one over the Tagus at Abrantes. You will receive the Admiral's commands respecting the officer with whom you are to communicate; and you will immediately wait upon him, and inquire from him what arrangements have been made, and in what state of preparation are these several bridges; what quantities of materials he has in readiness, and what quantities wanting; and what steps have been taken to procure the materials wanting; and you will report the result of your inquiries for my information.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 29th Oct. 1810.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 28th inst., and I am very apprehensive that you will have much trouble with our bridge concerns, which the government ought not to have imposed upon you.

As 2 of our bridges have been destroyed, and I conceived that that of Abrantes was so likewise, I wished that the government should make their arrangements, through the bridge-master (who has always managed these concerns for us), to supply us with boats, &c., for 3 others; and I proposed to use these to pass the lower Tagus with the British army, when the enemy's operations should render that measure desirable.

I have now sent instructions to an officer of Engineers to wait on you, upon the subject of these bridges, and I recommend to you to refer him to Col. Fisher, and to leave to these two officers all the detail of the preparations for these bridges, supplying them from the naval stores with such articles of beams, planks, cordage, anchors, &c., as they may require, and assisting them with your influence over the owners of boats. From the enclosed extract of my letter to Mr. Stuart on this subject, you will observe that I requested the government would make all the arrangements for having boats at command to ferry the army over the Tagus, if it should be necessary, as well as boats to be formed into bridges eventually.

The place at which I should fix these bridges in the lower Tagus, if I should ever fix them in this part of the river, and that in which I shall cross the river, if I should ever cross it, must depend upon the enemy's operations. I think it probable, however, that there is no road across the island of Lyceria from the proposed landing place opposite Alhandra, and that I should not place any large proportion of the army there. In respect to the island of Lyceria, and the left bank of the Tagus, I am apprehensive that we shall get into some little confusion in that quarter, as both the government and the Governor of Setuval, &c., have made that part of the country the object of their peculiar attention, and I know nothing that is going on there, what troops they have, or what enemy they have to oppose. I heard cannon in that quarter the day before yesterday; and, excepting the two brass 3 pounders sent over by the government, I was not aware that they had a gun.

Under such circumstances, I never pretend to interfere in any concern. My own opinion is, that the Ordenanza cavalry and infantry are fully sufficient to prevent the plunderers of the French army from crossing to do any material mischief, unless the French have means of crossing at a time a much larger body of men than they have yet shown us. If they have those means, I must adopt measures to curb their plunderers on that flank, as I have on the other, which will be more efficient than the efforts of the Ordenanza.

In this view of the question, some large boats on the right of our line at Alhandra would be very useful, particularly if there is any road which troops could use from that end of the island of Lyceria.

But the best and easiest mode of all, of preventing plunderers from crossing to that side of the Tagus, is to remove out of their reach every thing, to obtain which, they would cross, for it is really out of my power to look after every bullock and pig in the country; and at all events, while the bishops and priests are carrying on war without quarter, and the Governor of Setuval is co-operating with them, contrary to orders, I cannot interfere in any manner, and I have no knowledge on which I could venture to found an order.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send the coppered horse transports to Oporto, in the first instance, for the cattle, and let them be followed by others to the amount of 3000 tons. I hope that you are right about the quantity of cattle in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, but, if I am not misinformed, you are mistaken; and I have already begun to give the British army salt provisions during 2 days in the week.

I have directed the Commissary Gen. to make inquiries respecting the facility of purchasing cattle at Vigo, and we can send there hereafter. In the mean time, I do not believe that there will yet be any difficulty in getting vessels into and out of the Douro.

I shall be very happy to see you and Capt. Beresford.\*

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 29th Oct. 1810.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th, respecting the French prisoners at Oporto, and I beg to acquaint you, that as Col. Trant has sent the prisoners from Oporto to Lisbon, for the care of whom I had requested you to send to Oporto 6 French surgeons, by my letter of the 26th; I now request you to apply these surgeons, as you may think proper, for the care of such French prisoners as you may send home.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 29th Oct. 1810.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th, respecting the transports wanted for the conveyance of cattle from Oporto, and I request that you will send to Oporto first the fast sailing horse transports, and afterwards any other horse ships that may be necessary to make up 3000 tons. I hope there will be no difficulty as yet in getting across the bar of the Douro.

I fear that you are mistaken in your account of the number of cattle near Lisbon. I cannot request you to send a vessel to Vigo for cattle, until I have sent a Commissary to make inquiries about the practicability of making purchases there.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 29th Oct. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 28th inst. I have written to Mr. C. Johnstone, who wrote to me about my answer to his offer to supply us with money from America.

I have appointed an officer to look after our bridge affairs. I do not know whether the paper No. 2 in your letter, strikes you as it does me and Beresford; but if the government were desirous that any measure which they were forced to adopt should not be carried into execution, it appears to me that this is the kind of instruction they would give. I never saw so cold a performance, or one which shows more clearly, that the measure ordered was not their own, but was pressed upon them by you, and that it might be carried into execution or not. If I did not know that the individuals are afraid, I should swear they were treacherous.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will make me acquainted with your opinion upon this paper; and if it should agree with mine, I shall send it home, and to the Prince Regent, to show him how his govern-

\* Adm. Sir J. Beresford, K.C.B.

ment co-operate with my views for the country. At all events, I should be glad to know who drew it.

I don't know whether they sent you open a dispatch which I wrote to Lord Liverpool on Saturday, to endeavor to prevail upon him to get a subscription in London for the Portuguese who have suffered by the passage of the French through the country. I propose to have one in the army, and I have no doubt that every soldier will contribute. But besides this measure, we must turn our minds seriously to the introduction of large quantities of grain into the country during the winter. I spoke to Sampayo yesterday upon this subject, and told him that I would lend myself to the accomplishment of any reasonable plan for this purpose.

I have not much leisure to enter deeply into the consideration of details, but I shall be obliged to you if you will consider the subject, and see what it will be best to do, and how to do it, to prevent the people of Upper Beira, in particular, from starving in the winter and spring. The French, it is true, made but a short stay in that province, and the destruction did not spread very wide. But it was complete where they did pass; and I imagine that the people can now have nothing, excepting what they were able to carry with them. They did carry away a great deal, for they had evacuated their houses nearly a month before the French entered, but still the poor will be in want, and we must endeavor to relieve their distresses.

I hope this rain will set at rest the question of the Alentejo. The reports of the bridge still continue. But I can scarcely believe that the French will be able to manage it, if the river should fill again. However, that which is certain, is, for the people to move out of the way with their property, and I always wish to bring things as near to a certainty as I can. I return your intercepted letters.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.*

29th Oct. 1810.

In reply to your letter of yesterday's date, and enclosures herewith returned, I am to acquaint you that officers may go to Lisbon, on private business, with the leave of the Lieut. General commanding the cavalry, in the morning at daylight, if all is quiet, and be with their regiments the following morning at daybreak, but not stay longer on any account. The commanding officer of the regiment must judge of the time necessary for any officer to remain at Lisbon on regimental business, but the Commander of the Forces conceives 6 hours enough for any regimental business any officer can possibly have.

Lieut. —, of the — dragoons, may proceed to Lisbon, reporting himself on his arrival to the Inspector Gen. for a medical board.

*The A.G. to Col. Mackinnon.*

29th Oct. 1810.

Your letter of the 27th, and enclosures, have been submitted to the Commander of the Forces. His Excellency is very much shocked at the account Lieut. — gives of the mode in which the sick and wounded were conveyed from Coimbra; and he will be glad if Lieut. — will positively state the name of any officer, or medical officer, who went at the time he did, or if he can, state the day on which he quitted Coimbra. His Excellency wishes particularly to discover who the surgeon was that refused to dress the soldier's stump, and who was the senior officer of the escort. When an officer observes these abuses going on, it is his duty not only to inform his superiors of their existence, but to name, or to assist in the discovery of the persons who have been guilty of them, otherwise he becomes an encourager of their continuance.

The Commander of the Forces will see whether any arrangement can be made for paying the expenses incurred by Lieut. —. It is his Excellency's intention that a serious inquiry should take place into this business.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

29th Oct. 1810.

I regret to be under the necessity of sending you the enclosed letters, as I am sure the circumstances therein detailed will give you most serious concern. It will be necessary that you should make the strictest inquiry to ascertain, for the Commander of the Forces' information, who the military and medical officers were who came down with the detachments of sick with Lieut. —, as it is his Excellency's intention, in justice to the service, to make the conduct of those gentlemen the subject of most serious inquiry.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B., 1st division.*

29th Oct. 1810.

In reply to an application, transmitted for leave of absence, from Major —, — regt., herewith returned, I am directed to desire you will acquaint that officer, that if his health requires 2 months' leave of absence, he must apply for a medical board to recommend the same. If his private affairs induce him to demand the leave, he must distinctly state that the necessity of having permission to go to England is paramount to every other consideration in the world. Under present circumstances the Commander of the Forces can give leave upon no other grounds.

You will be pleased to call the attention of all officers applying for leave of absence, very seriously, to the situation in which they place the Commander of the Forces to refuse them the indulgence, when they must be conscious, from the state of affairs, it is impossible for him to grant it. A due reflection of these circumstances, it is hoped, will prevent further applications until officers can make them more satisfactory to their own feelings, and more consonant with the disposition of his Excellency to attend to their wishes when his duty permits him to do so.

*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

29th Oct. 1810.

An officer of the 22d infantry taken yesterday in front of Torres Vedras is herewith forwarded to Lisbon. I request you will give an order that he may receive a sum of money, the same as is allowed to others in his situation, and which you have already received instructions for, from the Military secretary.

*The A.G. to Capt. Mellish, D.A.A.G.*

29th Oct. 1810.

Agreeably to the orders already transmitted to you, it is his Excellency the Commander of the Forces' pleasure, that you proceed with the French prisoners under your charge to the outposts in front of Alhandra, on the 30th inst., at 12 o'clock in the day, where you will be met by M. Le Doux, an officer of the staff of the French army, who will, on the part of the enemy, conduct to the advanced posts the officers and soldiers whose exchange has been agreed upon. You will not fail to take with you exact lists of the prisoners delivered over, and receive lists from M. Le Doux of those that are received in exchange; and you will follow such further orders as have already been communicated to you in my letter of the 26th inst.

I enclose herewith a letter for M. Le Doux.

*The A.G. to M. Le Doux, officier de l'Etat Major de l'armée Française.* Ce 29 Oct. 1810.

Le Capitaine Mellish, officier de l'Etat Major de l'armée Anglaise, qui vous présentera cette dépêche, est chargé de la commission d'accompagner les prisonniers Français aux avant postes, afin de consommer l'échange qui a été arrangée par MM. les Généraux en chef des deux armées.

Il vous donnera tous les renseignemens nécessaires de la part de l'armée Anglaise d'effectuer cet échange, et il attendra la même chose de votre part, selon l'avis que je viens de recevoir de M. le Général Fririon, chef d'Etat Major.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.*

29th Oct. 1810.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, and the accompanying enclosure, from the Chef d'Etat Major of the French army. Col. Peacocke and Capt. Mellish have instructions to forward the service alluded to the moment they received instructions from you that the day of the exchange was determined on. I have judged it best, as Capt. Mellish comes with the prisoners, and is probably

charged by Col. Peacocke with all the details, to enclose a letter of further instructions to him, and also a letter of authority for him with M. Le Doux, which I hope will answer every purpose.

Capt. Mellish has directions relative to sending such of the British and Portuguese as are exchanged, and who are not in a fit state of equipment to join their regiment, to the dépôt at Lisbon.

*The A.G. to Capt. Mellish, D.A.A.G.*

29th Oct. 1810.

I herewith send a sword, which you will deliver to M. Le Doux, with my compliments to M. le Général de division Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major. He will be pleased to state to the General that the sword was taken with Adj. Oberlet, of the 22d regt. of infantry. The Adjutant declares it was lent him by the Captain of his company, and under such circumstances I have much pleasure in returning the Captain of the 22d regt. his sword.

I enclose also a letter for the Colonel from Adj. Oberlet.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Taylor, 2d batt. 88th regt.*

29th Oct. 1810.

I have submitted your wishes to the Commander of the Forces, but he is unable to grant your request, as the parade duties of a regiment are not those only to which a commanding officer has to attend; and the situation of the 2d batt. 88th regt. calls for redoubled attention on the part of the commanding officer, and alone affords a sufficient reason for not complying with your wishes.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 30th Oct. 1810.

Referring to the subject of my letter of yesterday, I enclose a paper which I have received regarding supplies which might be procured at Viana.

*The A.G. to Marshal Baresford.*

30th Oct. 1810.

I have the honor to forward to your Excellency a communication that has been received from the Commissary Gen., and I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to request that your Excellency will give orders that the horse, alluded to in the papers, should be returned in the first instance to the Commissariat, from whence it shall be given to the Portuguese cavalry, if it should belong to that corps. As a general rule, it is proper that horses stolen should be returned to their owners; but a horse in the service of a public department ought to be allowed to remain with the department, until the right to it by the real owner is proved, by his producing evidence that the horse was stolen from him, and, therefore, Lieut. Col. — ought not to have detained the horse. His Excellency also requests that you will be pleased to desire Lieut. Col. — to state to what practices he refers in the letter I enclose.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Pero Negro, 31st Oct. 1810.

I send you two reports, and a letter showing that the enemy are getting large supplies on that side the country. I should think that Gen. Anson might contrive to intercept these parties between Obidos and Cadaval,

G. O.

Pero Negro, 30th Oct. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces has given directions, that an issue of a blanket for two men of the non-commissioned officers and rank and file may be made to the several regiments, and the Commanding officers of regiments will as soon as possible send to the Q. M. G. returns of the number of blankets which they will require for this proportion for the effective men.

The regiments which retained their blankets in the month of June last, will of course receive none, but the Commander of the Forces requests that the Commanding officers of those regiments will send to the Q. M. G. a return of the number of great coats they have in store, and will make application for means of transport to have them brought up to their regiments, and issue them to the men to whom they belong.

The regiment will likewise make a return of the number of great coats wanting to complete every non-commissioned officer and soldier with a great coat.

having Obidos occupied on one side of him, and Torres Vedras on the other, and it is really very desirable that these supplies should be intercepted. Pray desire that an effort should be made. The enemy's force is but very small on that side, and they cannot do you any mischief.

To Marshal Beresford.

Pero Negro, 31st Oct. 1810.

I shall talk to you about the case of this promotion when I shall see you to-morrow.

It would be very desirable that you should hint to Forjaz, that as long as the government continue to carry on their operations, and to give their orders to officers on the left of the Tagus, it is impossible for us to interfere in any manner. We might possibly, if they were to withdraw, get Fane over with a battalion of caçadores, and some cavalry, and the Ordenanza and some of Congreve's rockets, and do something; but till the government cease their operations, I shall do nothing.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 31st Oct. 1810.

I have received your 2 letters of the 30th. It is impossible for me to interfere at all in the affairs on the left bank of the Tagus, till the government shall withdraw from all interference in that concern. I should only render the confusion greater than it is.

If the enemy construct only a raft at Barquinha, it is for the sake of getting plunder. They cannot cross the army by such means. I don't think it quite certain that Loison has marched, or that they have more than 2 or 3 battalions up the Tagus with their cavalry.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 31st Oct. 1810.

I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I hope that they will have the effect of inducing them to take some decided steps, as well regarding the provisions in the Alentejo, as the desertion of the militia. The Ordenanza artillery now begin to desert from the works, although they are fed by us with English rations, and taken care of in the same manner as our own troops.

Your note, No. 1 of the 29th, is strictly true in all its parts. The French could not have stayed here a week if the provisions had been removed; and the length of time they can now stay depends upon the quantity remaining of what they have found in places, from which there existed means of removing every thing, if the quantity had been ten times greater. They are stopped effectually in front; all the roads are occupied; and they can get nothing from their rear; but all the military arrangements are useless, if they can find subsistence on the ground which they occupy. For aught I know to the contrary, they may be able to maintain their position till the whole French army is brought to their assistance. It is heart breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

31st Oct. 1810.

I have laid the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry before the Commander of the Forces, by which it appears the returns of the 14th light dragoons were both received by Lieut. Col. Elley's clerk, which you will be pleased to notify to that

brigade accordingly; and in future his Excellency directs that if a brigade do not send their returns at the proper time, or if they are not received when expected, immediate application for duplicates may be made by the A. A. G., so that the army returns may, on no account, be delayed, and an inquiry into the neglect or cause of their not coming in due time can always take place afterwards. His Excellency trusts a similar occurrence will not happen again.

*The A. G. to Marshal Beresford.*

31st Oct. 1810.

I herewith enclose for your Excellency's information the copy of a letter from Major Gen. Sontag, by which it would appear that the Portuguese brigades, under Generals Campbell and Colman, only thought of replacing their ammunition at the moment they might be expected to march. The Commander of the Forces is desirous that your Excellency would give such warning as you may think fit that all the ammunition of the Portuguese is inspected, and in a fit state, or the damaged replaced, so that none need be applied for at the moment the services of the brigades are required.

To Major Gen. Fane.

Pero Negro, 1st Nov. 1810.

You will receive directions from Col. Murray to march to Lisbon with one brigade of Portuguese cavalry and a battalion of caçadores from Gen. Hill's corps, and to cross the Tagus, by boats which will be prepared for you. Our wish is, if possible, that you should go up with the tide as far as Camora, from whence there is a road of 3 leagues to Salvaterra; but you had better communicate with the naval people upon this subject, and go to the place to which the troops can certainly be conveyed in one tide, and at which the horses can certainly land.

The objects in sending you across the Tagus are as follows:

1st; To observe the enemy's movements on the right of the river, and convey to us some certain information of what they are about.

2dly; To prevent them from crossing it, if possible. This of course must depend upon the means they have of making a first establishment on the left bank of the river, compared with those you will have to resist them.

3dly; To endeavor to destroy their establishments of boats, timber, rope, casks, &c., which they have formed, as it is said, at Santarem and Barquinha.

In respect to the first point, we have at present the following intelligence: that the enemy have spread themselves from Santarem to Punhete, along the river. They have some cannon, and about 3 or 4 battalions of infantry. The troops they have are, in general, cavalry. Till you would get to Salvaterra, you would not have a view of the main branch of the river; and you should proceed on to Chamusca.

In respect to the second object, it is impossible for me to form any opinion of the means of passing the river which the enemy possesses, from the contradictory accounts I have received. They talk of their having completed 2 boats which were on the stocks at Santarem, and of their having 3 or 4 more; but I am not sure what they have. Besides the caçadores, you ought to find all the Ordenanza of those districts collected under the command of Lieut. Col. —, whom you will take under your orders. He has with him two 3 pounders. If you should find that the enemy has means of passing a large body over the river at a time, of which I shall hear from you, I must increase the force there, and adopt other measures.



In respect to the third object, I have to inform you that Brig. Gen. Rosa has orders to send over the Tagus with you two 12 pounders on travelling carriages and artillerymen. The Governor of Setuval has orders to send to Camora to meet you some 6 pounders, which he had lately brought from Setuval for a warfare which he was carrying on on the left of the Tagus.

If you should find that the means of drawing the 6 pounders are sufficient to draw the 12 pounders, you had better take the latter with you. If they are not, you had better take the 6 pounders. In that case you will send the 12 pounders back to Lisbon in the boats; but if you should take with you the 12 pounders, you will either send the 6 pounders to Setuval, if you can find bullocks to draw them there, or if not, you will send them over to Lisbon in the boats. Besides this, I have requested Adm. Berkeley to send with you some of Congreve's rockets, and some officers and seamen who are acquainted with the mode of using them. You will communicate with the Admiral upon this point, and with Brig. Rosa, the commanding officer of Portuguese artillery, respecting the 12 pounders. I should hope that between the 12 pounders and the rockets, we shall be able to destroy all their little establishments at Barquinha and Santarem.

The next thing upon which I must instruct you is your retreat, in case the enemy should cross the Tagus in superior strength. It is not very probable, according to all accounts, that he will attempt it below Santarem. If he should cross above the situation in which you will be, you will retire gradually upon Salvaterra, and from thence to Aldea Galega, giving the A. Q. M. G. and me the earliest information of your movements, in order that boats may be prepared to transport you. You will find a good post at Alcochete, about a league in front of Aldea Galega. If the enemy should cross below you in force, you must in that case retire direct from the river till you shall come upon the great road leading from Monte Mór to Aldea Galega, and thence to that town.

If by any accident you should be cut off from Aldea Galega, which is not very likely, you will retire upon Palmella and Setuval.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 1st Nov. 1810.

I have directed Major Gen. Fane to cross the Tagus with a body of troops, with a view to observe the enemy's movements on the right of the river; and to endeavor to destroy the collection of materials which they have made at Santarem and Barquinha for the purpose of constructing a bridge.

The Q. M. G. will apply to the Commissary Gen. for boats to transport the troops under the command of Major Gen. Fane; and I shall be obliged to you if you will aid him with your influence in procuring them. Major Gen. Fane might probably derive some advantage from the use of Congreve's rockets, in the destruction of the enemy's collection of materials for a bridge at Barquinha and Santarem; and as there are none in the stores of the army, and I understand there are some in the fleet under your command, I shall be much obliged to you if you will send a proportion of Congreve's rockets with the force under the command of Major

Gen. Fane, with an officer and seamen who know how to make use of them. I expect some shortly from England, when those which you will supply to Major Gen. Fane shall be replaced.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 1st Nov. 1810.

I have no doubt that the government can produce volumes of papers to prove that they gave orders upon the several subjects to which the enclosures relate; but it would be very desirable to know if they state whether any magistrate or other person has been punished for not obeying these orders.

The fact is, that the government, after the appointment of Principal Sousa to be a member of the Regency, conceived that the war could be maintained upon the frontier, contrary to the opinion of myself and of every military officer in the country; and instead of giving positive orders preparatory to the event which was most likely to occur, viz., that the allied army would retire, they spent much valuable time in discussing with me the expediency of a measure which was quite impracticable, and omitted to give the orders which were necessary to the evacuation of the country between the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants. Then, when convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed that duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of the measure; and, moreover, I have but one gentleman in my family to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language; and they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still making them referrible to me, without my knowledge or consent; and still knowing that I had no means whatever of communicating with the country, and they issued them at the very period when the enemy was advancing from Almeida.

If I had not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco, he must have been in his present situation long before the order could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All this conduct was to be attributed to the same cause, a desire to avoid adopting a measure which, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, was likely to disturb the habits of indolence and ease of the inhabitants, and to throw the odium of the measure upon me and upon the British government.

I avowed in my Proclamation that I was the author of that measure, and that government might have sheltered themselves under that authority; but the principle of the government, lately, has been to seek for popularity, and they will not aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon.

I cannot agree in the justice of the expression of astonishment by the Sec. of State, that the measures should have been executed in this part of the country at all. The same measure was carried into complete execution in Upper Beira: notwithstanding that the army was in that province, and the means of transport were required for its service, not a soul remained; and excepting at Coimbra, to which town my personal authority and influence did not reach, not an article of any description was left behind; and all the mills upon the Coa and Mondego, and their dependent streams,

were rendered useless. But there were no discussions there upon the propriety of maintaining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given, and they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly.

In this part of the country, notwithstanding the advantage of having a place of security to retire to; notwithstanding the advantage of water-carriage; notwithstanding that the Tagus was fordable in many places, at the period when the inhabitants should have passed their property to the left of the river, and fortunately filled at the moment the enemy approached its banks, the inhabitants have fled from their habitations, as they would have done under any circumstances, without waiting orders from me or from the government; but they have left behind them every thing which could be useful to the enemy and could subsist their army, and all the mills untouched. Accordingly the enemy still remain in our front; and notwithstanding that their communication is cut off with Spain, and with every other military body, if the provisions which they have found should last, of which I can have no knowledge, they may remain until they shall be joined by the whole French army in Spain. I believe that in Santarem and Villa Franca alone, both towns upon the Tagus, and both having the advantage of water carriage, the enemy found subsistence for their army for a considerable length of time.

Thus will appear the difference of a measure adopted in time, and the delay of it till the last moment; and I only wish that the country and the allies may not experience the evil consequences of the ill fated propensity of the existing Portuguese Regency to seek popularity.

In the same manner the other measure since recommended, viz., the removal of the property of the inhabitants of Alentejo to places of security, has been delayed by every means in the power of the government, and has been adopted, at last, against their inclination. As usual, they commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing the enemy from crossing the Tagus; they then sent their civil officer to me to receive instructions, and afterwards they conveyed to him an instruction of the —, to which I propose to draw the attention of H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal and of His Majesty's government. His Royal Highness and His Majesty's government will then see in what manner the existing Regency are disposed to co-operate with me.

The additional order of the 30th Oct., marked 5, in the enclosures from Dom M. Forjaz, shows the sense which the Regency themselves entertained of the insufficiency of their original instructions to the Desembargador, Jacinto Paes de Matos. I may have mistaken the system of defence to be adopted for this country; and Principal Sousa and other members of the Regency may be better judges of the capacity of the troops, and of the operations to be carried on, than I am. In this case they should desire His Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged; and they know that there is not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is not devoted to promote it; and the records of the government will show what I have done for them and their country. If, therefore, they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence in the measures which I adopt, by desiring that I

should be removed, they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their Prince, to co-operate with me by all the means in their power, and thus should neither thwart them by opposition nor render them nugatory by useless delays and discussions. Till lately I have had the satisfaction of receiving the support and co-operation of the government; and I regret that H. R. H. the Prince Regent should have been induced to make a change, which has operated so materially to the detriment of his people and of the allies.

In respect to the operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion that the Ordenanza would be able to prevent the enemy from sending over any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling to adopt any measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, that as soon as circumstances should render it expedient, on any account, to withdraw the troops which I should have sent to the left of the Tagus, the Ordenanza would disperse. The truth is that, notwithstanding the opinion of some of the government, every Portuguese, into whose hand a firelock is placed, does not become a soldier capable of meeting the enemy. Experience, which the members of the government have not had, has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use of the different description of troops in this country; and it would be very desirable if the government would leave, exclusively, to Marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements.

The conduct of the Governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the cause of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. He brought forward his garrison to the river against orders, and did not reflect, and possibly was not aware, as I am, that if they had been attacked in that situation, as they probably would have been, they would have dispersed; and thus Setuval as well as the regiment which was to have been its garrison, would have been lost. It was necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent that misfortune, and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and the Ordenanza, as usual, dispersed; and the government will lose their 500 stand of new arms, and if the enemy can cross the Tagus in time, their 3 pounders.

These are the consequences of persons interfering in military operations who have no knowledge of them, or of the nature of the troops which are to carry them on. I am now under the necessity, much to the inconvenience of the army, of sending a detachment to the left of the Tagus.

*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

1st Nov. 1810.

I herewith enclose an extract of a letter from Lient. Col. Rooke, and I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire you will report to me, for his information, the state in which the French officers, prisoners of war, are kept, and if they have all necessary comforts: should this not be the case, you will be pleased to take measures that their treatment may be such as to give them no reason to complain.

*The A.G. to Col. Darroch, A.A.G., Lisbon.*

1st Nov. 1810.

Herewith I return the letters for the French officers. His Excellency the Commander of the Forces cannot admit of their being forwarded.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.*

1st Nov. 1810.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letters and enclosures relative to the exchange of prisoners. You will be pleased to order the French prisoners not exchanged immediately to be sent back to Lisbon by water.

With respect to the demand of M. Le Doux relative to the Assist. Surgeon, the Commander of the Forces directs me to acquaint you that he some time ago proposed to the Commander in Chief of the French army, that surgeons should be considered as *non-combattants*, and should not be detained as prisoners, and his Excellency offered to allow a surgeon to return to the French army, who was a prisoner at Elvas. The Commander in Chief has given no definitive answer to this proposition; and now Lord Wellington having in his power, and under his charge, many wounded of the French army, not only will he not allow any surgeon that has been taken to return to it, as a *non-combattant*, without exchange, but he will not allow any surgeon or other medical person to be exchanged.

You will probably have an opportunity of stating the above message when the 4 men which are due to you arrive.

I shall be glad of the return of the British received in the exchange so soon as you can remit the same.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Leith, 5th division.*

1st Nov. 1810.

In reply to your second letter and enclosures of the 31st ult., relative to the packs of convalescents, I have to acquaint you that it seems very improbable that Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd's division should be the first that these men coming up from Lisbon fell in with. I have, therefore, to beg you will call upon Brig. Gen. Hay to make the officer in charge of these convalescents produce the route by which he marched from Lisbon, and if he should from any circumstances have deviated from that route by order or otherwise, it will be necessary he should have an authority for so doing; as at present, and solely under the explanations that have been given, it does not appear possible to the Commander of the Forces that the rear guard of the army should be the first troops that these men fell in with.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

1st Nov. 1810.

I herewith enclose some papers relative to a supply of medicines that have been required by the Spanish army. I have his Excellency's directions to desire you will immediately give orders for the forwarding of these medicines to Enxara de los Cavalleiros, acquainting me when they are sent, and the probable time of their arrival. You will be pleased to call upon the Assist. Commissary Gen. at Lisbon for the necessary means to forward them.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Pero Negro, 2d Nov. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th ult., with its enclosures, on the subject of Mr. Kennedy's representations of the want of sufficient escorts for his stores.

I recollect that the Commissary Gen. mentioned to me, about the period of the date of his letter to the Commissary in Chief, the inconveniences experienced from the deficiencies of stores when they reached the army from the depôts, occasioned partly by the desertion of the bullock drivers, and partly by robberies committed by the same description of persons, and by the mule drivers. Upon that occasion I pointed out to Mr. Kennedy the inconvenience which would result to the service from giving escorts to every convoy of grain or bread, from the irregularity of the British soldiers when detached from their corps; and the probability that the employment of these escorts would occasion greater inconveniences and deficiencies than were at that moment experienced. The Spanish muleteers, who perform the greatest part of the transport service of the army, would not submit to the brutal violence of a drunken English soldier, and these people would desert with their mules if escorted by

troops; and I believe that the delays which the drunkenness and irregularity of the troops would have occasioned in the arrival of the stores, and the loss by their own thieving, would have been found still greater than those suffered by the dishonesty of the muleteers.

Another practice very common among the troops would have been found equally prejudicial to the service in the case of the use of carts. A detachment has scarcely ever gone as an escort with carts, even carrying treasure or sick, that the soldiers have not taken bribes from the drivers to be allowed to quit the convoy with their carts and bullocks. This practice leads to fresh irregularities of the same description. They must then be employed to press carts in the country to supply the deficiency of transport, occasioned by their own villany and forgetfulness of their duty. This is always an act of violence; and the inhabitants frequently bribe the soldiers not to press their carriages.

All these circumstances induced me to believe, that it was better to submit to the inconvenience of the loss of some of the stores, than to suffer that inconvenience, with the additional evils which I have above described. I did however make arrangements to have the convoys attended by detachments of the Ordenanza, and I believe there was afterwards no positive loss of stores, although the petty robberies of mule and cart drivers still continued.

I do not think that 2 companies of a veteran battalion would behave better than the other British troops employed on this service. No soldier can withstand the temptation of wine. This is constantly before their eyes in this country, and they are constantly intoxicated when absent from their regiments, and there is no crime which they do not commit to obtain money to purchase it; or if they cannot get money, to obtain it by force. I believe that the best mode of ensuring the safety and the regular arrival of stores from the depôts to the troops, would be to employ a sufficient number of sober, honest, and steady conductors, to send one at least with each escort, and having thus provided a control over the drivers of bullocks and mules, which would ensure their regular arrival at least, and check their dishonesty, I would recommend that they should be made responsible for the losses and deficiencies in their loads.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 2d Nov. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st inst., and to acquaint you that I think it will be advisable, under present circumstances, to detain the troop ships, and to send to England, in transports, the prisoners and enlisted deserters as soon as may be possible.

*The A.G. to the Officer commanding the — regt.*

2d Nov. 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire you will acquaint me, for his Excellency's information, whether it is in the power or the practice of the officers of the 2d batt. — regt. to confine, and afterwards release persons from the regimental guard of the — regt. without the authority, knowledge, or consent of the commanding officer of the corps.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 3d Nov. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d inst., and I am much obliged to you for embarking Major Gen. Fane's detachment.

It is not necessary that I should enter into any discussion of the comparative merits of Congreve's rockets and carcasses; or that I should enter into any defence of the former, of the merits or demerits of which I have no experience, never having seen them used. I should hope, however, that the Master General of the Ordnance would have urged His Majesty's government not to send any to this country, if they are what you describe; but Capt. Beresford having mentioned to me that he had some of them on board the *Poictiers*, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will allow some of them, with some seamen of the *Poictiers*, to be sent over to Major Gen. Fane, in order that they may, at least, be tried against the collection of the enemy's materials for their bridge at Santarem and Barquinha, as I fear that he will have no opportunity of trying the 24 pound carcasses which you have been so kind as to offer him, since the gun boats, in which the 24 pound guns are, cannot go higher up than Salvaterra; and there are no means on the left of the river of moving the 24 pounders, even if mounted upon travelling carriages, by land, from Salvaterra to the station at which Major Gen. Fane would have to use them.

To Major Gen. Fane.

Pero Negro, 3d Nov. 1810.

I cannot be answerable for a madman. We sent the orders to the caçadores as stated to you. — got hold of them; and you know the consequence. I wish I had it in my power to give you well clothed troops, or to hang those who ought to have given them their clothing. You must make the best of them, and I shall give you full credit for every thing you do.

I had understood from Beresford that there were some artillery men at Lisbon, and therefore I did not order those from Hill. They went to Lisbon this day with orders to Rosa to send them over to you immediately.

You may desire Major Downman to go to you if you like it. I will speak to Gen. Howorth upon the subject.

To Marshal Beresford.

Pero Negro, 3d Nov. 1810, 10 A.M.

It gives me the greatest satisfaction to inform you that I have received the King's commands to invest you with the Order of the Bath, of which I now transmit you the insignia. When we meet, we will settle the period and mode in which I shall invest you; but I rather believe it had better be in the mode in which I invested Sir J. Sherbrooke, in presence of as many officers of the army and other individuals as I can collect at a feast; or if you prefer that mode, on a parade of some of the troops. I likewise send you your medal.

I am just returned from the redoubt of Sobral. One camp, that on the

G. O.

Pero Negro, 3d Nov. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces desires the Commanding officer of the dépôt at Belem may be ordered to warn Lieut. — of the — of the necessity of attending more particularly to his duty when he shall march with a detachment of convalescents in future. The excuses he has made for bringing up 29 men out of 41 placed under his command are frivolous, and by his own account many of the men said to be unable to march, have since joined the army under another officer.

2. The Commanding officer of the dépôt at Belem will report if Lieut. — had a copy of the orders of 24th June, 1809, relative to the march of detachments.

left of the wood, is gone ; and I did not see so many men in the others as before, or so many arms piled in front of the camps. It is possible, however, that the rain may have kept the men in the huts, and that they took their arms with them. The piquets were as usual.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 3d Nov. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 2d. If the enemy pass the Tagus in force, the Admiral cannot defend the island of Lyceria with 100 marines and his gun boats ; and the communications upon it are so difficult, that I doubt whether we should protect it. In the rear of the lines all is safe, and the army and town of Lisbon have the resources. You will see by my dispatches of this date that the resources which the enemy will get, and we shall want, are every thing in the contest.

The Portuguese government are not aware of the difficulties of my situation, or of the orders of the British government, or of the King's wishes and intentions ; and they give me more trouble in writing letters upon their nonsense, and lose more of my time, than can be conceived. I am responsible, and they are not, for the success of our operations ; and if they will not do what I advise them, I shall only place their refusal or omission upon the records of the government, in justification of myself.

I did agree to feed the Marques de la Romana's troops, and fed, and now feed, those of whose march I had any notification. I had no knowledge of Don Carlos de España's march, and of course made no provision for it ; but his numbers are not 1200, and he cannot be very burthensome to any body ; and as the Portuguese have a Commissary in that quarter, and we have not, they may as well feed his troops, and I shall pay the expense. Dom M. Forjaz is very exact in calling for an explanation upon this subject, but not so much so in inquiring how many of the Portuguese troops are fed, who receive their rations from us. Indeed, the garrison of Abrantes is now subsisting on our stores there, and so is the garrison of Peniche !

I think you are quite right about your silence to government respecting their removal to the north !

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 3d Nov. 1810.

I wish it was in my power to give your Lordship an opinion of the probable course of the enemy's operations, founded upon the existing state of affairs here, considered in a military point of view ; but from what I am about to state to your Lordship, you will observe that it is impossible to form such an opinion.

The expedition into Portugal was, in my opinion, founded originally upon political and financial, rather than military considerations. It is true, that with a view to the conquest of Spain, there were advantages purely military to be derived from the removal of the British army from Portugal ; but I think I could show that it was not essentially necessary to effect that object, particularly after the door into Castille had been closed upon us, by the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.

The political object, therefore, in removing us from Portugal, which was the effect that our evacuation of the Peninsula would have had upon



the inhabitants of Spain in general, and upon those of Cadiz in particular; and the financial object, which was the possession and plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, were the principal motives for the perseverance in the expedition into Portugal. I believe the latter to have been more pressing even than the former.

It is impossible to describe to your Lordship the pecuniary and other distresses of the French armies in the Peninsula. All the troops are months in arrears of pay; they are in general very badly clothed; their armies want horses, carriages, and equipments of every description; their troops subsist solely upon plunder, whether acquired individually, or more regularly by the way of requisition and contribution; they receive no money, or scarcely any, from France; and they realise but little from their pecuniary contributions in Spain. Indeed, I have lately discovered that the expense of the pay and the hospitals alone of the French army in the Peninsula amounts to more than the sum stated in the financial *exposé* as the whole expense of the entire French army. This state of things has very much weakened, and in some instances destroyed, the discipline of the army; and all the intercepted letters advert to acts of malversation and corruption, and misapplication of stores, &c., by all the persons attached to the army.

I have no doubt, therefore, that the desire to relieve this state of distress, and to remove the consequent evils occasioned by it, by the plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, was the first motive for the expedition into Portugal. The expedition, not having been founded upon any military necessity, has been carried on and persevered in against every military principle. We know that Massena could expect no immediate reinforcements; and without adverting to the various errors which I believe he would acknowledge he had committed in the course of the service, he has persevered in it, after he found that he was unable to force the troops opposed to him when posted in a strong position, and when he knew that they had one still stronger in their rear, to which they were about to retire; and that they were likely to be reinforced, while his army would be still further weakened by sickness, and by the privations to which he knew they must be liable on their march. He knew that the whole country was against him; that a considerable corps was formed upon the Douro, which would immediately operate upon his rear; that at the time of the battle of Busaco he had no longer any communication with Spain; and that every step he took farther in advance was a step towards additional difficulty and inconvenience, from which the retreat would be almost impossible.

If the expedition into Portugal had been founded upon military principle only, it would have ended at Busaco; and I do not hesitate to acknowledge that I expected that Massena would retire from thence, or at all events would not advance beyond the Mondego. But he has continued to advance, contrary to every military principle; and I therefore conclude that the pressure of financial distresses, which was the original motive for the expedition, was that for persevering in it, and may operate upon the measures of the present moment.

In this view of the case, it is probable that Massena may endeavor to maintain his position, as long as he can keep alive any proportion of his

troops, being certain that the same difficulties which induced the Emperor to undertake the expedition without any military necessity, would induce him to make every effort to reinforce him at the earliest possible period of time, and therefore that he will remain some time longer where he is. Your Lordship is already acquainted with the means of reinforcing him. There is no doubt that, by raising the siege of Cadiz, and abandoning other unattainable objects, Massena may be reinforced to a very considerable extent.

Under these circumstances, I have frequently turned over in my mind the expediency of attacking the French army now in my front, before it should be joined by its reinforcements; and, upon the whole, I am inclined to be of opinion that I ought not to do so. I enclose your Lordship an account of the number of battalions, squadrons, &c., which entered Portugal with Massena, and I cannot believe that they composed an army of less than 70,000 men at the battle of Busaco. I calculate their loss, including sick, since that time, at 15,000 men, which would leave them with 55,000 men, of which 6000 or 7000 are cavalry, at the present moment.

The effective strength of the British army, according to the last returns, was 29,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and one regiment at Lisbon, and one at Torres Vedras, which, in the view of the contest, ought not to be taken into the account; and I enclose a statement of the Portuguese force, according to the last returns. Besides this force, the Marques de la Romana's corps consists of about 5000 men; making a total of 58,615, of which I could command the services, in case I should act offensively against the enemy, of which about 4000 would be cavalry. Besides these troops, there are different bodies of militia, infantry and artillery, in our positions; but I should deceive myself if I could expect, and your Lordship if I should state, that any advantage would be derived from their assistance in an offensive operation against the enemy.

Although the enemy's position is not so strong as that which we occupy, there is no doubt but that it has its advantages; one of which is, that in attacking it, we could hardly use our artillery. I would also observe, that in every operation of this description by the British army in Portugal, no attempt can be made to manœuvre upon the enemy's flank or rear; 1st, because the enemy show they are indifferent about their flanks or rear, or their communications; and 2dly, because the inevitable consequence of attempting such a manœuvre would be to open some one or other road to Lisbon, and to our shipping, of which the enemy would take immediate advantage to attain his object.

We must carry their positions, therefore, by main force, and consequently with loss; and in the course of the operations I must draw the army out of their cantonments; I must expose the troops and horses to the inclemencies of the weather at this season of the year, and must look to all the consequences of that measure in increased sickness of the men, and in loss of efficiency and condition in horses.

I observe that, notwithstanding the length of time which has elapsed since the greatest and most efficient part of the French army has been employed against us, there is yet no other military body in the Peninsula which is capable of taking, much less of keeping, the field: and the relief of Cadiz, which appears to me to be a probable consequence of the state of

affairs here, would not give us the assistance of an army from that quarter, either in the way of co-operation or of diversion; nor would the removal of Sebastiani from Granada, which would be the consequence of the relief of Cadiz, enable Blake to make any progress beyond the Sierra Morena towards Madrid. We should still stand alone in the Peninsula as an army; and if I should succeed in forcing Massena's positions, it would become a question whether I should be able to maintain my own, in case the enemy should march another army into this country. But, when I observe how small the superiority of numbers is in my favor, and know that the position will be in favor of the enemy, I cannot but be of opinion that I act in conformity with the instructions and intentions of His Majesty's government, in waiting for the result of what is going on, and in incurring no extraordinary risk.

Every day's delay, at this season of the year, narrows our line of defence, and consequently strengthens it; and when the winter shall have set in, no number, however formidable, can venture to attack it; and the increase of the enemy's numbers at that period will only add to their distress, and increase the difficulties of their retreat.

I have thought it proper to make your Lordship acquainted with the course of my reflections upon this subject, and my present determination, which I hope will be consistent with the wishes of His Majesty's government. Circumstances may change: the enemy's distresses for provisions, and the operations of our detachments in his rear, may induce him to detach to such a degree, as to render a general attack upon him a measure of positive advantage, in which case I shall alter my determination. But adverting to the necessity of placing the troops in the field in this season if I should make any attack, the advantage must be very obvious before I adopt a measure which must be attended by the consequence of losing the services of my men by sickness.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 3d Nov. 1810.

I have not observed any alteration in the enemy's position or numbers since I addressed you on the 27th ult.\*

They have a considerable body of troops, principally cavalry, on the Tagus, between Punhete and Santarem; and I have reason to believe that Loison's division of infantry had not marched in that direction, as I reported to your Lordship they had in my last dispatch; some of the corps composing that division have certainly remained in the camps in front of this army. The enemy have pushed some troops across the Zezere above Punhete, principally cavalry, apparently to reconnoitre the roads in that direction and the fort at Abrantes; but I conclude that the rains which have fallen within these few days will have swelled that river, and that these troops will have retired again.

They are still reported to be at work upon materials for a bridge both at Santarem and Barquinha; but I have detached Major Gen. Fane with a body of cavalry and infantry to the left of the Tagus, from whom I hope to receive accurate accounts of what is passing opposite to him on this side; and he will endeavor to destroy these materials if it should be practicable.

\* See Appendix, No. XVI., No. XVII., and No. XVIII.

It is reported by all the deserters that the enemy's troops continue to suffer great distress from the want of provisions. It is impossible to form an estimate of the quantity of provisions which they found in the villages on the ground which they occupy; but it is certain that they can draw none from any other part of the country, the whole being in the possession of our troops.

The garrison of Peniche, and the garrison of Obidos, which place Capt. Fenwick, of the Portuguese service, has lately occupied, under the direction of Brig. Gen. Blunt, and the British cavalry, continue to carry on a destructive warfare in the rear of the enemy's right, while the high road from Coimbra by Leiria is in the possession of Col. Wilson's detachment. I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford, on the effects of the operations of Brig. Gen. Blunt and Capt. Fenwick.\*

I have received no letter from Gen. Silveira of a later date than the 19th Oct. He had not, at that time, heard of the march of any of the enemy's troops in Castille. He occupied with his detachment the roads from Almeida to Trancoso, Celorico, and Guarda. He had heard that Gen. Bonet had evacuated the Asturias, and, it is supposed, had moved into Biscay.

I have letters from Estremadura and Castro-marin of as late a date as the 27th Oct., stating that Mortier's corps was still at Seville in a very inefficient state, and having many sick.

My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 22d ult.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 3d Nov. 1810.

I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the letter which I addressed to you on the 27th June last, and its enclosures, respecting the system of clothing the Portuguese troops; and to request that if the system recommended by Marshal Beresford should be adopted, the materials should be sent out without loss of time; or if that system should not be adopted, the clothing should be sent out. I have sent at different times requisitions for several articles of equipments for the troops and military stores, which I have been informed had been embarked long ago, but they have not yet arrived; and I am apprehensive that the masters of the vessels, in which these articles are embarked, are in the habit of delaying their departure from England long after opportunities of sailing have offered.

It is desirable that some measures should be adopted to ensure their

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\* Marshal Beresford to Marshal Gen. Visc. Wellington.

Sepataria, 3d Nov. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a return taken from the several reports received from Brig. Gen. Blunt, of the number of killed and prisoners to the detachment which he sent from Peniche to Obidos, under the command of Capt. Fenwick (lieutenant in the Buffs) since his former reports of the proceedings of that officer, and which, with what had been previously reported upon, will make the amount of the enemy's loss to that detachment, besides the wounded which they are generally enabled to carry off, about 160 men.

I take the occasion of remarking to your Lordship the zeal and judgment of Brig. Gen. Blunt in re-occupying the town of Obidos when the principal force of the enemy had passed it; and he gives much applause to Capt. Fenwick for his activity and conduct in the command of the small force he had been enabled to detach from Peniche.

departure from England by the first fair wind, after the vessels shall have been laden.

Blankets for the British, as well as for the Spanish troops, intrenching tools, and all the provisions which have been required, should be sent off as soon as possible. The service is suffering at present for want of the blankets and intrenching tools.

*The A.G. to the Marques de la Romana.*

3d Nov. 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint your Excellency that the medicines intended for the use of the Spanish army will arrive at Enxara de los Cavalheiros on Sunday morning, directed to the care of the Commissary Gen., who will deliver them over on your Excellency's application.

May I beg you will have the goodness to desire the senior medical officer of the Spanish army to transmit the receipts to me upon their delivery.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franch, Inspector of hospitals.*

3d Nov. 1810.

I am directed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces to desire you will put Apothecary —— into arrest for disobedience of orders, in taking a soldier of the 11th regt. as his servant.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.*

3d Nov. 1810.

In reply to your letter of this day's date, I beg to acquaint you, for the information of Lieut. Gen. Hill, that my letter of the 1st inst. conveys his Excellency's determination relative to the exchange of surgeons, as *non-combattans*, and to request that an answer may be given to the late application of General Fririon, verbally, at the outposts of the army.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 4th Nov. 1810.

I have received an application from His Majesty's minister at Lisbon, that I would request you to allow 3000 tons of transports to proceed to Algiers, to bring back to Lisbon cargoes of corn, for which Mr. Sampayo, the importer of the corn, will pay the usual freight of such a voyage.

As I conceive that the transports may be spared for this service, I shall be much obliged to you if you will allow that quantity of transport tonnage to proceed, as stated in the enclosed copy of a letter from Mr. Sampayo, under convoy, if there should not be in the Tagus empty store ships or victuallers, which I should like to have employed on this service.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 4th Nov. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2d, and I beg to acquaint you that it is impossible to keep the prisoners of war in this country, and I hope, therefore, that you will send them home according to former arrangements by the earliest opportunity.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 4th Nov. 1810.

I propose to invest Marshal Beresford with the Order of the Bath on

G. O.

Pero Negro, 4th Nov. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to hear that some officers of the army have forgotten their own situation so far as to threaten the serjeant postmaster at Lisbon.

2. It is to be understood that the serjeant postmaster at Lisbon is not obliged to send letters from the office to any body excepting the Commandant, the A. A. G., and the A. Q. M. G., and officer commanding the depôt. The other officers at Lisbon must send to him for their letters after the bags are duly sorted, and not before; and Col. Peacocke is requested to protect the postmaster from the violence or impatience of any individual.

Wednesday at Mafra, and intend to give a great feast there, at which I hope to have the pleasure of your company, and that of Lady Emily Berkeley and the Miss Berkeleys. I have ordered quarters to be prepared there for you and your family. Will you ask Sir T. Williams and Sir T. Hardy, and the Captains of the squadron, to favor me with their company at dinner at Mafra on that day; and I shall be very happy to see any of the gentlemen of the squadron who will do me the favor to come in the evening. I propose to invest the Marshal at about 5 o'clock, and we shall dine afterwards, and then the ball.\*

P.S. As I don't know the names of the Captains of the squadron, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will allow one of your clerks to send to them, and to Sir T. Williams, invitations to dine in my name. There will be quarters prepared at Mafra for any person who will apply for them to Capt. Kelly, the D. A. Q. M. G., who will attend there on Wednesday morning.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Pero Negro, 4th Nov. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 21st Oct., and my brother will make you acquainted with the state of affairs. Nothing, I assure you, would give me greater satisfaction than to have the benefit of your assistance here; but I don't consider myself authorised by government to call you from Cadiz.

In the letter which I wrote to Lord Liverpool on the subject of reinforcements from Cadiz, I said that he ought to allow me to draw you and the greatest part of the garrison from that place: in answer to which, he allowed me to take such a number as, including those which you had before sent, would make 4000 men; but he did not allow me to call for you, and I must, therefore, consider his former directions upon that point to be still binding. If the siege, or rather the blockade, should be raised, you will, of course, either come round here with the greatest part of the troops, or you will take the field with the Spanish army. I should doubt that the King's government would approve of the latter measure; but as you are in correspondence with the Sec. of State, you may be acquainted with his sentiments upon this subject.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Pero Negro, 4th Nov. 1810.

Since I received your letter of the 22d, I have reflected upon the appointment of a Regency in Spain, which I think is the most important point that can come under the consideration of the Cortes; and their conduct in this business will probably decide the fate of their country.

The natural course of all popular assemblies, of the Spanish Cortes among others, is to adopt democratic principles, and to vest all the powers of the State in their own body; and this assembly must take care that they do not run in this tempting course, as the wishes of the nation are decidedly for a monarchy: by a monarchy alone can it be governed; and their inclination to any other form of government, and their assumption

\* All the society of Lisbon, and the officers of the army, not on duty, were invited to this ball; but the whole of the officers were requested to be at their posts on the following morning before daylight.

of the power and patronage of the State into their own hands, would immediately deprive them of the confidence of the people; and they would be a worse government, and more impotent, because more numerous, than the Central Junta.

Whatever may be their ultimate views, I have no doubt that they will immediately appoint a Regent, or a Council of Regency; but I think that the choice of the Regent will be in some degree influenced by the desire to keep the power of the state in their own hands, and for this reason it is so important.

If the Cortes should choose Romana, or Blake, or O'Donnell, they will have plausible reasons for intrusting to them the smallest quantity of patronage and power that can be required to carry on the government, and for retaining the largest portion in their own hands. They will say, the throne is Ferdinand's, and we are the guardians of it; these individuals are military men, and of course ambitious; and if we should intrust them with too much power, they may overturn us and Ferdinand, and erect upon our ruins a military government of their own. These apprehensions are not ill founded, and may fairly be entertained; but to act upon them, would lead to the formation of a feeble executive government, and to the assumption of the greatest part of the power and patronage of the State by the Cortes, and its committees, to the ruin of the character of that assembly, and the destruction of its real and fair influence in the country, occasioned by the confidence of the inhabitants in its wisdom and justice.

My opinion, therefore, is, that for the sake of the Cortes themselves, they ought not to attempt to make such a selection. In the difficult circumstances in which they are placed, they have no chance, unless they adhere to the ancient laws and constitution of their country. The laws and constitution of Spain have either pointed out the person who ought to be Regent, in case of the occurrence of such an event as the captivity of the King; or if they have not provided for that precise case, they have provided for others, to which this case would bear sufficient analogy. I should recommend to the Cortes to appoint, or rather recognise, as Regent of the Kingdom, with all the regal authorities, whoever would succeed to the office according to the law, as applied to the case upon fair analogy.

I acknowledge there may be difficulties and inconveniences in this arrangement, but in what arrangement are there none? If the Princess of Brazil should be the person, the Court will be inundated by intriguers of all nations and descriptions; and the appointment of her may be attended by other evils and inconveniences. But the free constitution of the Cortes will be in some degree a remedy for the first; and as for the last, I conceive that the advantage of having as Regent the person entitled by law to fill the office, will more than counterbalance any other evils which might result from this, or any other appointment. As for all the difficulties of the succession, and of the connexion between Portugal and Spain, they are not to be considered for a moment. Great Britain and Portugal and Spain will settle these questions easily, when the Regent shall be appointed, whoever the person may be. I wish you would turn over in your mind the considerations above referred to, and talk them over with the members of the Cortes, if you think they are of any weight.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 4th Nov. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 3d, with its enclosures. I have written to the Admiral to request him to send the transports to Algiers for the corn. I don't know how your correspondent could have got the letters from the Emperor to the King, &c. It does not appear, by our accounts from England, that Napoleon is gone to Germany.

I have no doubt that Massena is waiting for reinforcements.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 4th Nov. 1810.

I enclose a letter and its enclosures, which I have received from Col. Peacocke, upon the abuses committed by persons who pretend to import goods for the use of the British army, and who are indulged by the Portuguese government with the privilege of importing them duty free. I should wish the government to place the grant of this indulgence, if after this abuse of it they are so kind as to continue it, under the following regulations :

1st ; That all applications for the indulgence of importing goods for the British army, duty free, should be accompanied by an exact list of the articles to be imported, stating the quantities of each, and should be countersigned by the Commissary in Chief of the army.

2dly ; That the application should not be granted till the owner shall have entered into a bond to proceed to the head quarters of the British army with the goods in one week from the period of granting permission to import them ; and to arrive by marches, calculated at 2 leagues each day, or to forfeit a sum equal in amount to double the duties on the articles imported.

3dly ; That the penalty of this bond shall be enforced if, within one fortnight after the expiration of the term at which the owner of the goods ought to arrive at head quarters, he does not transmit to the Sec. of the government a certificate of the Commandant at head quarters that the goods, of which the detailed list will be transmitted, had been brought to the head quarters of the army to be disposed of.

I request you to return the enclosures, as I propose to have a further inquiry into the conduct of Mr. Berkeley.

*The A.G. to the Marques de la Romana.*

4th Nov. 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to a letter I have received, containing a requisition for blankets for the Spanish army, that the Commander of the Forces has not one blanket or great coat which he can give to the Spanish troops at present ; but so soon as the blankets which are expected from England arrive, your Excellency shall have a proportion of them.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Leith, 5th division.*

4th Nov. 1810.

In reply to your letter of the 2d inst., and enclosures herewith returned, I have to acquaint you the statements therein made are not satisfactory to the Commander of the Forces, as it appears the officer, with the party of convalescents, marched from Thomar without orders, and serj. Barber, whom he left in his rear, missed the brigade and went to Coimbra. His Excellency, therefore, thinks that the public can neither be called upon to pay for the loss of packs on a march undertaken without orders, nor for the accident of the serjeant being in the rear and having missed his brigade.



*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

4th Nov. 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint you that your statement, as far as your arrangements for the French prisoners, is perfectly satisfactory, and may be continued; and his Excellency is satisfied that your representation to Mr. Stuart will have the desired effect of affording better treatment to those who are now under charge of the Portuguese government, and which is much complained of by them.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.*

4th Nov. 1810.

In reply to your letters and enclosures herewith returned, the Commander of the Forces does not think it an advisable measure to permit voluntary offers of service abroad from a culprit who may, by obstinacy and perseverance, get the character of being incorrigible. There is besides great difficulty when such men are sent to the *dépôt* in England, and therefore his Excellency can give no encouragement to this mode of proceeding in the army. Men must be made sensible of their errors by severe punishments frequently repeated, if they persevere in them; and a General Court Martial might take still stronger measures if necessary. As no Court Martial has been transmitted, his Excellency cannot form a decided opinion on the case of ——— of the 94th, but he is not disposed to agree to what is proposed from the papers already sent.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 5th Nov. 1810.

When I wrote to you yesterday about the feast, I was guilty of an omission which I fear will not be forgiven. I forgot the whole Rio Major family; I shall be obliged to you if you will send invitations to the whole of them, including even old Machado.

La Marqueza de Lourical also, and la Duquesa da Lafoës and her sister, I am told, ought to be invited.

To Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.

Pero Negro, 5th Nov. 1810.

I have this day ordered a Board to inquire into the circumstances of the complaint of Lieut. ———, which I have no doubt will end in a manner satisfactory to you. I shall not, however, omit this opportunity of expressing to you how much I feel concerned at the tone and purport of the several letters which I have received from you lately, evidently written under the notion that these complaints were reflections upon you, encouraged by me. A moment's reflection would point out to you that they are reflections upon me (Lieut. ———'s complaint in particular) much more than upon you; and that, in fact, it matters not upon whom they reflect; it is our duty to attend to them, to investigate their truth, and to prevent, if possible, the recurrence in future of such circumstances, if they ever existed.

We all do the best in our power to carry on the service in a manner

G. O.

Pero Negro, 5th Nov. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces desires that when paymasters or quartermasters, or other officers of regiments are sent to Lisbon on duty, they may not take detachments of non-commissioned officers and soldiers with them.
2. The *dépôt* at Belem will always furnish the men which are required for any fatigue duty which they may require to be performed.
3. Officers and others allowed servants, who proceed to Lisbon on duty, or on account of their health, if allowed to take with them their servants, should not be allowed to retain those soldiers who are able to do their duty. There are at Belem men belonging to every regiment in the army not fit to do their duty in the field, who should be employed as servants to officers and others who, on account of duty or health, are obliged to remain at Lisbon or Belem.
4. When any officer proceeds to Lisbon with a detachment, or with only one soldier as his servant, he must make a nominal return of the detachment, or send the soldier's name to the officer commanding the *dépôt* of convalescents at Belem.

that shall be most satisfactory; and I have been much misunderstood by you, and the gentlemen of the medical department, if it is supposed that I have expressed any thing like dissatisfaction with the mode in which its duties have been conducted. But the best arrangements which we may make may fail from the neglect, or omission, or want of experience in those whom we employ to carry them into execution; or our orders may be disobeyed, as mine and yours are every day; and the service may be, by any one of these modes, not carried on as it ought to be; and it may be necessary to inquire into the causes of these accidents. These inquiries, it is true, always suppose that there has been some failure; but, because there has been failure, it does not follow of course that there has been fault, and much less on the part of the head of the department.

I have thought it proper to give you this explanation, as I have really been much concerned to find that you have supposed that there was any disposition to convey any thing but applause on your conduct, and that of your department in general.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 5th Nov. 1810, 8½ P.M.

I am very much obliged to you for your kindness to Marshal Beresford and me; and I enclose a letter from Mr. Dep. Commissary Dunmore, which I hope will provide for you the means of moving what is necessary for Lady Emily, who, I anxiously hope, will not suffer by her desire to favor us with her company. We shall all appear in our best attire, but I fear that, with many, bad is the best; and we shall be highly flattered by your company, and that of the Captains of the fleet, whether in full or in frock uniforms.

*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

5th Nov. 1810.

In transmitting to you the enclosed papers by order of the Commander of the Forces, I have also to communicate to you the outline of the instructions for the Board which is ordered to assemble at Lisbon on Friday the 9th inst.

The letters, &c., herewith sent, will explain to the Board the different data on which the inquiry is instituted. When the Board assembles, it is to inquire into the complaints conveyed in your letter of Lieut. —, — regt., now wounded at Lisbon, to his commanding officer, marked 'No. 2.' The Board will proceed to his quarters, and receive his deposition of the facts stated in the letter:

1st; On what days and in what places the sick soldiers had no rations.

2d; Whether he can state the names of any soldiers whose wounds were days without being dressed.

3d; Whether he knows the name of the surgeon who refused to dress the soldier's stump when asked; and if he does not know his name, whether he can point him out, if all the surgeons employed with the escort were brought before him, in which case the surgeons must all appear.

4th; You will call before you Lieut. —, of the — regt., and examine him as to the route by which he marched, the regularity of his march, the places where the sick and wounded received rations, &c., the conduct of the orderlies and escort, the attention of the surgeons to their duty, the fact stated of the cars having passed their halting places.

5th; You will call before you the several surgeons and assist. surgeons employed on this same service, and examine them, so as to throw light on all the circumstances that occurred; and if they should be able to find out any soldiers that came down with this escort, they should be examined also.

And, lastly; you will be pleased to adopt such further examinations as may tend to a thorough investigation of all the allegations produced in the letter of Lieut. — to his commanding officer.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 6th Nov. 1810.

I have received your letter of 11 A.M., the 5th inst. I assure you that I am no partisan of Congreve's rockets, of which I entertain but a bad opinion, from what I recollect of the rockets in the East Indies, of which I believe those of Congreve are an imitation. It is but fair, however, to give every thing a trial, more particularly as I have received the orders of government to try these machines. I don't think it would answer any purpose to try them here; but I understand that the enemy have 7 boats on the square at Villa Franca, which possibly might be reached by the rockets fired from Hill's advanced piquet, and they might be tried there.

Au Marquis de la Romana.

à Pero Negro, ce 6 Nov. 1810.

Je suis bien fâché de vous faire savoir que les officiers Espagnols vont dans le parc du Prince Régent à Mafra, et y tuent les cerfs et autre gibier. Un officier Anglais a fait savoir à un d'eux qu'il était défendu de chasser là, sans la permission du gouvernement: il lui a répondu qu'il chasserait malgré la défense, ayant la permission de son chef; et, si vous le désirez, je pourrai vous faire savoir le nom de l'officier. Je vous prie, en attendant, de faire donner l'ordre qu'on n'y chasse plus; et d'y envoyer tout de suite un officier de l'Etat Major pour faire sortir du parc tous ceux qui pourraient s'y trouver.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 6th Nov. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 5th. I do not know of any objection to sending some of the prisoners to the Cape de Verde islands; and, if the government should state none, I have no objection to allow vessels to go with them, as the voyage will not be longer than to England. All I want is to get rid of the prisoners from Lisbon; and, if they cannot be kept in safety out of England, they must go there, notwithstanding the orders of the Admiralty. These orders, after all, are not positive.

In respect to the horses, it must be observed that they are not yet selected and purchased, and some time must elapse before they can be prepared for embarkation. I cannot allow the transports to remain at the Cape de Verde islands longer than is necessary to land the prisoners and take on board the horses, if they should be ready. As it is probable they will not be ready, it is better that we should send horse transports for the horses at some future period, and confine ourselves at present to the removal of the prisoners to the Cape de Verde islands, if the government should see no objection. At all events, the horses which we should now get at the Cape de Verde islands would not be fit for the service till next campaign; and if we get rid of the enemy now in our front, we shall have plenty of time to send for them.

I long to see Mascarenhas' papers. I don't fear 40,000 men, if the town is prepared to hold out in provisions, and the government will exert themselves to get in every thing they can. I hear from Don J. Sanchez of the 27th, from Laganilla, that about 4000 or 5000 men had entered Salamanca, including two regiments of dragoons, which I see are those which Massena left with Seras or Kellermann; and that they expected 9000 or 10,000, some from Navarre, and others from the garrisons in

Castille. He says that they are preparing to bring into Portugal a large convoy of provisions. I understand from his letter that the whole number they expect at Salamanca is 9000 or 10,000, and not that number in addition to those now arrived. However, I have no apprehension for the consequences, if the government will take care to bring all the provisions into the town, and out of the enemy's way, that they can lay their hands upon.

I don't know where Laganilla is, but I believe not far from Plasencia; and if so, Don Julian would have heard of the march of any troops from Madrid, whether by Plasencia or through Old Castille.

P.S. I think you had better send Mascarenhas up here, that we may examine him, and all the evidence there may be respecting his having served the enemy, and having had their papers upon him.

To Col. Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

Pero Negro, 6th Nov. 1810.

I received yesterday your letter of the 19th Oct.; and I assure you that I had great satisfaction in doing justice to Mr. Kennedy, and the officers of the Commissariat department, in my report of recent transactions in this country.

In respect to Mr. Ogilvie's promotion, nothing that you have written has altered my opinion upon that subject. It may be very proper to frame rules for the conduct of a department, and to conduct a department according to the rules laid down for its government; but that is not the mode in which the service can be carried on; and if the attempt is made and persevered in in the Commissariat with respect to the promotion of the officers, an army will be lost on some fine day on account of the total incapacity of the greater number of the officers, seniors as well as juniors, to perform any duty excepting that which they learn in England, viz., the superintendence of deliveries by a contractor, and to compare his accounts with his vouchers. For this reason I contend for it, that when a man like Mr. Ogilvie is found out, who is really capable of being the Commissary Gen of an army, the rule is a bad one which prevents his immediate promotion. I may be wrong, but I have objections to all those rules which prevent the promotion of officers of merit. It is the abuse of the unlimited power of promotion which ought to be prevented; but the power itself ought not to be taken, by regulation, from the crown, or from those who do the business of the crown. By these regulations we are undermining, as fast as possible, the efficiency of the government. There is no power any where of rewarding extraordinary services, or extraordinary merit; and under circumstances which require unwearied exertion in every branch and department of our military system, we appear to be framing regulations to prevent ourselves from commanding it by the only stimulus, the honorable reward of promotion.

These are my decided opinions. They go to the principle of our proceedings, and not to Mr. Ogilvie's case alone. If Mr. Kennedy was gone to-morrow, Mr. Ogilvie is, I think, the person upon the whole most qualified to fill his situation; and I should then propose that he should be made a Commissary Gen. I wish to know whether in any service in the world a man has ever been placed at the head of such a concern as that which I am conducting, without having the power of selecting the person

who shall succeed to fill such an office as that which Mr. Kennedy fills; and whether any minister could show his face to the country, and object that such an appointment is contrary to the regulation. The regulation therefore must be nugatory, and ought not to have been made.

As for the gentleman who might succeed to Mr. Kennedy, he is quite unfit for the situation, and I could not do business with him for an hour. This is a stronger case than that which exists; though, by the bye, that is pretty strong. Mr. Ogilvie, an Assist. Commissary, is found the most capable in the whole department of conducting the business of Gen. Hill's separate corps, and he cannot be made a Dep. Commissary because he has not served 5 years; and there are other Assistants in the army senior to him, who, although very good men, and possibly able to do the duty of Assist. Commissary, are not able to do the duty which Mr. Ogilvie performs well, and for which he was selected, notwithstanding that there were many Dep. Commissaries with the army!! The next thing to do will be to order that the Dep. Commissaries shall perform these superior duties when there are any with the army; and then I hope the gentlemen in London will be so kind as to be responsible for all that passes here; and bear all the abuse, misrepresentation, &c. &c., which he must make up his mind to, who is honored with the command of the British troops on a foreign service.

*The A.G. to the A. A. Gs. of divisions.*

6th Nov. 1810.

I herewith enclose a nominal return of non-commissioned officers and privates employed in the general hospital at Lisbon, belonging to the division to which you are attached. You will be pleased to make the names of these men known to the regiments concerned; and should more men hereafter or at present be detained, which are not reported to the regiments in a similar manner, it will enable officers commanding corps to institute more particular inquiry with regard to their men.

Please to return the enclosure when notified, being original.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Langley, R. W. Train.*

7th Nov. 1810.

In the G. O. of this day you will perceive you are appointed President of a Board which is directed to assemble at Lisbon on Friday next, to investigate certain circumstances that will be referred to you.

I am directed, as an instruction from the Commander of the Forces, to refer the Board to the enclosed papers which I transmit, and to desire that you will make an immediate investigation, on the meeting of the Board, into all the allegations stated by Dep. Com. Gen. Dunmore against Mr. ——. For this purpose you will proceed to call before you Dep. Com. Gen. Dunmore, and any evidences that may be produced by him, having such regard at the same time to such delicate considerations as he alludes to, relative to the paper enclosed in his letter, as is consistent with the ends of justice and the due course of the inquiry.

You will next summon Mr. —, or such persons as he may desire to be examined on his part; and you will take such further measures as will throw every possible light on the transactions alluded to, reporting to me the result of your proceedings for the information of the Commander of the Forces.

*The A.G. to Dep. Com. Gen. Dunmore, Lisbon.*

7th Nov. 1810.

I have to acquaint you that I have received the Commander of the Forces' instructions to direct a Board to assemble on Friday next, the 9th inst., at Lisbon, for the purpose of investigating the circumstances contained in your letter of the 31st ult. to Col. Peacocke, with regard to the practices and proceedings of Mr. ——. Lieut. Col. Langley, R. W. Train, is appointed President of this Board, and I have furnished him with the necessary instructions.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 8th Nov. 1810.

Adverting to the information which I recently received from your Lordship, that there was a regiment of dragoons in the west of England in readiness to embark for this country, if its services should be required, I have to inform your Lordship that I would rather recommend completing the regiments now in this country with horses or mares of 5, 6, and 7 years of age, to sending out fresh troops. Neither the dragoons nor their horses are capable of performing much service in the first season after their arrival; and many horses are lost, being unaccustomed to the food of the Peninsula, and from the want of experience in the mode of taking care of them. We have found the British cavalry more efficient in this campaign, and particularly at the close of it, than it was in the last, notwithstanding that in this campaign they have had more hard work. I am therefore of opinion that the best mode of keeping up the cavalry of this army would be to send strong horses of a serviceable age to the regiments now in the country.

I also wish to draw your Lordship's attention to the wants of the artillery in horses. I should recommend that 500 serviceable horses for the artillery should be sent out at an early period, and it will be necessary hereafter to send from England frequently fresh horses for the artillery. In the course of this and last year many horses and mules for this branch of the service were purchased in Portugal and Spain. But neither of a sufficient size can now be procured: and I imagine it will be necessary to aid the Portuguese army with some horses of a good size for their artillery. At all events, as there are horse transports in the service of government, which might hereafter be employed in transporting the horses from England, it would be cheaper to bring all that are wanted from thence, than to purchase them in this country; and the horses are infinitely better than any that can be procured in the Peninsula.

P.S. I have just been informed by Brig. Gen. Howorth that 500 horses are required for the immediate use of the artillery, besides the 170 now on their passage; therefore 700 will be wanted in order to give any assistance to the Portuguese artillery.

To Major Gen. Fane.

Pero Negro, 8th Nov. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 6th in the evening. I find that the only draught they had for the guns on the left of the Tagus was oxen; and Beresford has repeated his orders that you should be plentifully supplied with these animals. They will be slow, but very sure. I have desired Gen. Howorth to send over to you a party of British artillery, with a rocket carriage drawn by horses, and some rockets, the whole lately come from England; so that you will be able to try these machines very effectually. I also desired Rosa to send you a 5½ inch howitzer, that you might also use the 24 pound carcasses. All this and the caçadores will have arrived some time ago.

The enemy's movements look like an intention to attack Abrantes, where Col. Lobo commands, who is doing remarkably well; and I shall be obliged to you if you will let him know how well I am satisfied with him.

On the left of the Tagus is Don Carlos de España with about 1200

Spanish troops, with whom I wish you to communicate by your right, and to keep all matters straight between him and Lobo. Don Carlos I believe to be a very good kind of man, and a good officer. Lobo has at Abrantes not only the boats of the bridge there, but I believe those of the bridge of Punhete; and he ought to have those of the bridge of Villa Velha. He has very prudently taken up the bridge of Abrantes; and since the enemy have appeared in force on the left of the Zezere he has sent the boats over to the left of the Tagus, and has given charge of them to Don Carlos de España. The order which Lobo has respecting these boats is to have combustibles in each, and every thing prepared to burn them at a short notice, but not to burn them till the last extremity, and till he shall be certain that they will otherwise fall into the hands of the enemy.

I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate with Don Carlos on this point particularly, and see that he understands exactly what he is to do, and is prepared to do it.

The boats at Abrantes are now more important than ever. 1st, it is very important that the enemy should not get them; and 2dly, it is very important that we should not lose the use of them, unless absolutely necessary to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy: for if Lobo is to be attacked at Abrantes, I must and will support him from the left of the Tagus, and so I beg you to tell him; and we shall want the boats there.

Our guns were removed from the neighbourhood of the Zezere, and I believe throughout Lower Beira; but of this last, although ordered, I am not certain. Let me hear from you if the *çaçadores* have their clothing.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Pero Negro, 8th Nov. 1810.

I enclose a letter from Fane. Have you had any account of the transactions of the 5th at Abrantes? Don Carlos de España, in a letter of the 4th to the Marques de la Romana, mentions that the enemy had approached that place on that day with cavalry and infantry, and were at no great distance, as appeared by their fires at night. I should not be surprised if they were to attack Abrantes after all. I must mention to you that the 17<sup>me</sup> *légère*, which is in Regnier's division, has, I believe, marched from the neighbourhood of Villa Franca. If Abrantes is attacked, we must support the place from the left of the river: I would recommend therefore that Lobo should be desired not to destroy all the boats of the bridge, if the enemy should approach him, but to send them to the left of the river, in charge of Don Carlos de España, whom I will put in communication with Fane, and I will direct Fane only to destroy them if it should be found that Don Carlos cannot maintain his post.

Don Carlos says they were sending off baggage by the road of Villa de Rey. Let me hear from you early what directions you will send Lobo, that I may send others of a corresponding nature to Fane. Tell Lobo that he shall be supported, if attacked.

P.S. I enclose you a report of what passed at Abrantes on the 5th, just now received.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 8th Nov. 1810.

I enclose the copy of a dispatch from the Prince d'Essling to the

Prince de Wagram,\* on the battle of Busaco, and the copy of a paper supposed to be a set of questions to be asked the bearer of the dispatch at Paris, and the answers which he was to give.† They were taken on a person by the name of Mascarenhas, a Portuguese, who is in the French service, and aide de camp to Junot. This person was on his road through the valley of the Mondego, towards the frontier, in the disguise of a Spanish peasant, and was taken by the Ordenanza.

As some doubts are entertained here respecting the proceedings to be adopted in this person's case, and as I wish to avoid any discussion with the enemy upon it, till the Portuguese government shall have an opportunity of deciding upon it, it is desirable that this dispatch should not be made public, or at all events that the name of the bearer of it should be kept secret for some time.

Your Lordship will observe that this is the second dispatch which Massena had written since his entering into Portugal, both of which we have got.

In regard to his account of the battle of Busaco, and of the loss sustained by the French army, I would request your Lordship to observe; 1st; the difference between the account of loss in the dispatch, and that in the officer's written answer to the supposed question; and 2dly; the immense loss of officers, viz., 3 colonels killed and several others wounded, which could not have been unattended by a proportionate loss of troops.

*The A.G. to M. le Gén. Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major de l'armée Française. Ce 8 Nov. 1810.*

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 6, que j'ai soumise à son Excellence le Vicomte Wellington, K.B., Général en Chef des armées combinées, et je suis chargé de vous envoyer la réponse suivante.

En considérant la proposition qui a été faite par S. A. M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling pour l'échange des prisonniers, le Général en Chef ne peut pas oublier que le même a été proposé avec la stipulation d'échanger 'de votre part' deux officiers Anglais, le Capitaine Percy, 14<sup>me</sup> dragons, et le Lieut. Carden, 1<sup>er</sup> dragons, auxquels son Excellence prenait un vif intérêt, et que cependant l'échange n'a pas été conclu. L'excuse qu'on donnait aux avant postes était, que ces messieurs étaient renvoyés en Espagne. En conséquence, le Général en Chef s'est bien déterminé de ne pas agréer aucun autre échange, dans lequel ces deux officiers et M. Haines ne soient pas inclus.

Il faut aussi rappeler à votre souvenir, M. le Général, que si M. Percy et M. Carden ont été renvoyés en Espagne, cet arrangement aura du avoir lieu entre le tems que son Excellence le Prince d'Essling a proposé l'échange et le moment quand il fut décidé de l'effectuer.

Je vous prie, M. le Général, de faire parvenir cette réponse à S. A. M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling, et j'ai l'honneur de vous renouveler les assurances de ma haute considération.

To J. Dunmore, Esq., Dep. Commissary Gen.

Pero Negro, 9th Nov. 1810.

I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will place at the disposition of his Excellency Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley, one of the Commissariat waggons drawn by a sufficient number of horses; and such other means of transport as he may require, and as you may have at your disposal at Lisbon; and I shall inform the Commissary Gen. that I have given you these orders.

\* See Appendix, No. XIII.: Marshal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, to the Prince de Neufchâtel et Wagram.

† See Appendix, No. XIV.



To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Pero Negro, 9th Nov. 1810, 12½ p.m.

I have not got by me a return of the guns on the Zezere and Lower Beira, but I am afraid there were many more than the officer gives you an account of, for you will observe that he calls them 'field pieces.' Will you look at your return of them? Do you understand by 160 head of cattle, a large part of them bullocks, that those not bullocks were cows or sheep?

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Pero Negro, 9th Nov. 1810.

I had received Silveira's letters, for which I am obliged to you, and return them. As we cannot pretend to defend the entrance into Portugal by the road of Celorico, I should prefer to consider Silveira's corps only as one of observation, to retire towards the Douro when the enemy shall move in force, and then to operate upon their flanks and rear, and cut off as much provision and baggage as possible. If Bacellar has placed his troops in column on the road from Coimbra to Lamego, he can easily reinforce Silveira, and co-operate with him in effecting these objects. But I would not allow them to make any attempt to defend the entrance into the country, and in that view I would not reinforce Silveira.

In respect to the bridges of the Coa, I am afraid that, at this season of the year, it would be useless to destroy even those on the lower Coa. The upper Coa is no barrier at any season; and the enemy could, from Ciudad Rodrigo, enter by Alfaiates and Sabugal, and go thence either to Alverca or Guarda, without difficulty, if all the bridges were destroyed. I hope the intelligence of the destruction of the bridge of Villa Velha will be confirmed; I prefer that they should not cross the Tagus at all. I believe they must now go up as high as Almaraz, and I doubt whether they have boats even there.

Upon looking over the returns of the population of the districts of which the enemy have possession, I find that it amounts to 109,000 souls. They cannot exist much longer in that country.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 10th Nov. 1810.

The assistance which I have uniformly received from you, not only in

G. O.

Pero Negro, 10th Nov. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to have received reports from some of the regiments of the desertion of British soldiers to the enemy; a crime which, in all his experience in the British service, in different parts of the world, was till lately unknown in it; and the existence of which, at the present moment, he can attribute only to some false hopes held out to these unfortunate criminal persons.

The British soldiers cannot but be aware of the difference between their situation and that of the enemy opposed to them; and the miserable tale told by the half-starved wretches whom they see daily coming into their lines, ought alone, exclusive of their sense of honour and patriotism, to be sufficient to deter them from participating their miserable fate. However, although the Commander of the Forces laments the fate of the unfortunate soldiers who have committed this crime, he is determined that they shall feel the consequence of it during their lives, and that they shall never return to their friends or their homes. He accordingly requests that the Commanding officers of regiments from which any soldier has deserted to the enemy, will as soon as possible send to the Adj. Gen.'s office a description of his person, together with an account when he was enlisted with the regiment, where born, and to what parish he belongs, in order that the friends of these soldiers may be made acquainted with the crime which they have committed, may be prepared to consider them as lost for ever, and may deliver them up to justice in case they should ever return to their native country.

those objects to which I have drawn your attention, from time to time, but in others to which you have adverted yourself, induces me to suggest a mode in which the navy might most materially contribute to the success of His Majesty's arms, and to the salvation of this country.

I have long considered that, after occupying the most important points in the position of the army, it was most desirable that I should have a disposable force capable of moving to any point which might be attacked, or of acting offensively against the enemy, if circumstances should render that measure advisable. The strength which I have added to the several positions of the troops has already increased my disposable force, but it would be increased if we could have the assistance of a brigade of seamen, and of a battalion composed of the marines of the squadron, in a proportion still greater than their numbers would add to the numerical strength of the army.

If you should see no objection to the plan,\* I would propose to you to land the seamen and marines whom you should think proper to employ in this manner, and to place them in barracks or cantonments in the first instance, in the neighbourhood of S. Julian, Cascaes, &c., where they might be arranged in companies and battalions, and the officers and petty officers posted to each, where they might be properly equipped for a further advance towards the positions occupied by the army, and might learn some of the most simple and necessary evolutions of the troops, in order that they might execute them with facility, at the moment their services would be required. I would propose to leave them in this situation, till circumstances should render it necessary or desirable to draw some of the troops out of the positions they now occupy, to be disposable for other parts; and I would then move the battalion of marines and the brigade of seamen to occupy the fortified positions from which the troops would have been withdrawn.

When the brigade of seamen and battalion of marines would move into these positions, the Commissary Gen. of the army would of course provide for their subsistence; in the mean time it might be more convenient that they should be subsisted by the pursers of the ships to which they severally belong. I should wish you however to decide upon these points as you may think best; and if you should prefer that the Commissary Gen. should provide for them, a commissary shall be attached to them immediately, in the same manner as to the other brigades.

If you should approve of this plan, I will send an officer of the Adj. Gen.'s and one of the Q. M. G.'s department to Lisbon, to place themselves under the orders of the officer whom you shall appoint to command the brigade. And I will have all the arrangements made for quartering them, as I have above proposed for your consideration.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 10th Nov. 1810.

As the case of Mascarenhas, who is a lieutenant in the French cavalry and aide de camp to Junot, may involve a question of retaliation, I am

\* On referring this proposition to the Admiralty, the Board would not approve of landing the seamen of the fleet.

anxious, if possible, to have the opinion of His Majesty's government before the Portuguese government shall decide upon it.

When the Prince Regent quitted Portugal in the year 1807, he issued a proclamation, of which there will be of course a copy in London, in which he directed his subjects whom he left behind, in substance, not to take up arms against the French, and many of them served the French in civil and military capacities. The Portuguese army was marched out of the country, and is still in the service of the French Emperor; and many of the officers who entered the French service during the time that Portugal was in possession of the French, of which number is Mascarenhas, quitted Portugal with Junot. Mascarenhas was Junot's aide de camp, and he is a lieutenant of cavalry in the French army.\*

I had always considered the case of those Portuguese who entered the service of the French in the years 1807 and 1808, as very different from the case of those who entered their service in 1809, when Soult obtained possession of Oporto. In the former period the Sovereign had quitted the country, and although he had not formally relinquished the government, he had left his subjects to take their own course under that of the usurper; and those who entered the French service had to choose between desertion from it or quitting their native country. In the latter period the legitimate government of their Prince was in existence in the country, and those who entered the service of the enemies of their country should be considered only as traitors. The mere act of serving the French during the period of the usurpation has not been considered a crime in Portugal. Many of those who were guilty of it have since been, and are now, employed; and that alone which makes any distinction in Mascarenhas' case is, that he continued in the service of the French, in which he was engaged, after the restoration of the government of his Prince.

I am inclined to consider him in the light of many of His Majesty's subjects who are serving his enemies under the connivance of government, contrary to the laws, and to His Majesty's repeated proclamations at the commencement of every war, calling upon his subjects to return to his dominions from the service of foreign powers; and if this view of the case be correct, it is equally unjustifiable to involve the two countries in a question of retaliation (as it may be depended upon that the retaliation will not be confined to Portuguese officers) on this case, as it would be in the case of any one of those individuals who might be taken in arms against His Majesty's government.

An example of this description is not necessary in this country. There exists no disposition in any class to favor the French invasion, and it appears, upon the whole, that the best measure to be adopted, in respect to this person, is to send him, after trial, to Brazil, to be disposed of as the Prince Regent may think proper.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 10th Nov. 1810.

Nothing of any importance has occurred since I addressed you on the 3d inst. The enemy reconnoitred Abrantes on the 5th inst., and under cover of that operation moved a small body of cavalry and infantry through Lower Beira towards Villa Velha, evidently with an intention of obtaining

\* See Appendix, No. XIV.

possession of the bridge on the Tagus at that place. They found it however destroyed, and this detachment returned to Sobreira Formosa. The greatest number of the boats which the enemy had been able to collect together are in their bridge on the Zezere, which is a very bad one, and will, I hope, be destroyed by Major Gen. Fane's artillery.

I have a letter from Gen. Silveira of the 3d inst., from Trancoso. He had his detachments on the Coa, and one of them (consisting of a battalion of the 24th regt., which had been in garrison at Almeida during the siege, and which Marshal Massena had reported to the Emperor as having voluntarily entered the French service) had driven in the outposts of the present garrison at Almeida. Gen. Silveira reports that about 5000 French troops were at Salamanca, and in motion on the frontier towards Ciudad Rodrigo, and that these troops were supposed to be intended as a reinforcement to the army in this country. He also mentions that 2 regiments of infantry had arrived at Valladolid, and were stated to be the advanced guard of a corps, likewise on its march to this country. By the accounts from Badajoz of the 4th inst., it appears that Mortier's corps was still at Seville, and the troops very sickly. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the —.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 10th Nov. 1810.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th ult. with its enclosures respecting the ships of war which are sent from Lisbon for money, and I beg leave to transmit a letter I have received from Adm. Berkeley on the subject.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 10th Nov. 1810.

I enclose the fortnight state of the army to the 1st inst. There is no sickness in the army of any importance. The number of men actually in hospital is below 4000: the others, returned 'Sick absent,' are at the convalescent depôt at Belem. The continued badness of the weather renders it necessary to keep the soldiers, when dismissed from the hospital, rather longer at Belem than it would be otherwise.

Your Lordship will be concerned to observe the continued and I regret to add increasing desertion of British soldiers to the enemy, a crime which, till within the last few years, was almost unknown in the army. It is difficult to account for the prevalence of this crime, particularly in the army lately. The British soldiers see the deserters from the enemy coming into their lines daily, each with a story of the unparalleled distresses which their army is suffering, and of the loss of all hope of success in the result of their enterprise; at the same time that they know and feel that they are suffering no hardship or distress, and that there is not an article of food or clothing which can contribute to their health and comfort that is not provided for them; that they are well lodged and taken care of in every respect, and not fatigued by work or duty, and having every prospect of success.

The deserters from the British regiments are principally Irishmen, and I attribute the prevalence of the crime very much to the bad description of men in all the regiments which are drafted from the Irish militia, and

also to the irregular habits which many soldiers had acquired, and had communicated to others in the retreat of the army through the north of Spain in the winter 1808-9, and in their subsequent service in the French army, and in their wandering through the country back again into Portugal.

*The A.G. to the A. A. Gs. of divisions.*

10th Nov. 1810.

I sent you in my letter of the 6th inst. a return of non-commissioned officers and privates in the — division, who are employed in the general hospital at Lisbon, under the arrangements of the G. O. of the 23d Oct.

On examining the weekly states of the —, I find that there are the following regiments who return a very considerable number of men on detachment at Lisbon and Belem.

\* \* \* \* \*

You will be pleased to acquaint the General officer commanding the — division, that the Commander of the Forces desires he will call on the commanding officers of the above corps to make a special inquiry upon what duty the men thus returned 'on command' are employed; and if they are employed on regimental duty, they are to be ordered to join their regiments, excepting the number allowed to attend to the regimental baggage under the G. O. of the 10th June, 1809.

The commanding officers are likewise to report what general, division, or brigade duty their men are employed upon, if they should be so employed, in order that the Commander of the Forces may judge of the necessity of their continuing employed on these duties. They will state particularly what number of these men, thus returned on 'command,' are employed as orderlies at the general hospital under the arrangements of the G. O. of the 25th Oct. 1810.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

Pero Negro, 11th Nov. 1810.

I enclose a letter from Mr. C. Johnstone, and my answer; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will write to him about the hay, to the purport of the paragraph in my letter concerning that article. Take care to specify that the hay shall be of as good quality as the English hay, and pressed; and I think you had better give him a commission upon his purchases for this and every other description of supplies.

To the Hon. A. Cochrane Johnstone.

Pero Negro, 11th Nov. 1810.

I have only now received your letter of the 9th inst. The situation of affairs in the Peninsula, and the general tenor of the instructions to the Commissary Gen., do not allow of my encouraging contracts for the delivery of articles at distant periods of time, and prices to be fixed upon by me. But I yesterday desired the Commissary Gen. to make an arrangement with you, for the purchase of a quantity of flour to be imported from America; and I now send your letter of the 9th on the subject of hay and horses.

I tell him that I conceive it will be desirable to take advantage of your offer to purchase in America, and import hay for the public service in this country, upon commission, on the terms of landing it at Lisbon, at Gibraltar, or at Cadiz, or in England, as may be deemed expedient, making of course an allowance for the additional freight, if the original destination of the voyage should be altered.

In respect to horses, I imagine that the government pay for them in England at present, 30 guineas, of an age fit for immediate service. They are brought to this country in transports, and the expense of their voyage

is only their food in their transports. I conceive that the loss of horses on the voyage is trifling. From this statement, you will be best able to judge whether horses of an equally good description could be got at as cheap a rate in America and landed here. If they could, I should be glad to take them. But as all the horses received for the use of the army must be inspected by a Board of officers of the Cavalry, or of those belonging to one of the departments to which the horses would be attached, and there may be a difference of opinion about the fitness of the horses for the service between these Boards and the person who may import the horses from America, I should not recommend any speculation in horses to any person in that country.

Indeed, horses can, or ought to be got with facility, to any extent in England, at the price above stated; and the assistance of the resources of America, however desirable in food for man and beast, does not appear to be necessary in horses.

To Major Gen. Fane.

Pero Negro, 11th Nov. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 9th. Don Carlos de España is a Frenchman, and I believe I told you in my last, I knew no reason why you should not have a good opinion of him. He is certainly a better officer than the Spanish officers in general are. In respect to provisions for his troops, I promised the Marques de la Romana that the Spanish troops should be fed by the British Commissariat while in Portugal; but I was not apprised of the arrival of Don Carlos' troops, which were intended to operate upon another line, and he came to Abrantes of his own accord. No provision was therefore made for them, and it would be very inconvenient to attach a British Commissary to them. I have therefore desired that they might be fed from the Portuguese stores at Abrantes; and so little did I believe that there was any ground of complaint for Don Carlos of the want of provisions, that the Portuguese government have remonstrated with me on the consumption of provisions which his corps, I believe only 1200 men, has occasioned at Abrantes. As, however, the quantity of provisions at Abrantes is very large, particularly such belonging to the British army, I request you to desire Lobo to supply Don Carlos with provisions for his troops upon regular requisitions and receipts; and I beg him to report to Marshal Beresford immediately the quantity of provisions of all descriptions in the place, and the rate of daily consumption, including, specifically, Don Carlos' demand.

In respect to bayonets, desire Don Carlos to send an officer to the Marques de la Romana immediately with a return of the bayonets he wants; and upon the Marques de la Romana's application they shall be delivered to that officer.

I intended, myself, to give you notice of any danger from the south, and to instruct you upon the occasion. The reason for which I did not advert to that circumstance in the instructions which I gave you before is, that the line which I should wish you to follow in that case would vary according to the course of events here, and to the amount of the enemy's force approaching by the left of the Tagus. It is not impossible that I might have it in my power to assemble a corps on the left

of the Tagus, which should be superior to any thing which the enemy could bring; and, in this case, the line which I should wish you to adopt would be very different from that which you would adopt in case I should be under the necessity of withdrawing you from that side of the river.

What I have above stated will show you the reasons for still delaying to instruct you in reference to the possible occurrence of the enemy entering the Alentejo from Estremadura; but I see no reason why you should not observe what is passing in that quarter. I beg of you, therefore, to open a correspondence with Gen. Leite, who commands at Elvas, and let him know what is passing upon the Tagus; and request him to let you know, and desire Col. Brito de Mozinho to let you know what may occur in Estremadura, Andalusia, &c., which may come to their knowledge. Tell him that I ordered you to write to him, and that every thing is going on well here.

I observe that the officer of artillery has taken on more rockets than I intended, and than can be of any use for experiments. I desired that he would take one carriage drawn by 4 or 6 horses, and I understand that he has taken 4 carriages drawn by 20 horses, and 20 loaded mules. In case it should be necessary to bring you back across the Tagus, it might, in the existing state of the roads, be very difficult to draw off this equipment; and we should then possibly be obliged to leave in the hands of the enemy the means of burning the town of Lisbon. This is a very serious consideration. Accordingly, I request that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will investigate this rocket concern. Send down to Lisbon, by water or otherwise, all the rockets belonging to the *Poictiers*; and desire the officers of the British artillery in charge of the rockets to keep with you only one carriage, or a few loaded mules sufficient to try the experiment, and to send the remainder of the equipment to the place of embarkation on the left bank of the river, and the horses or mules of the whole equipment (excepting those of the one carriage which will be kept for trial) across the river to Lisbon. By this arrangement we shall leave none of these machines on the left of the river if I should withdraw you; and, if you should find them useful, and should require more than are contained in the one carriage, or than on the mules which you will detain, you can send the horses down to the embarking place for another carriage, or the mules for an additional load.

In answer to your first letter of the 9th, I inform you that I shall speak to Beresford respecting the conduct of the government regarding the clothing of the caçadores, which he certainly understood was ready.

I shall inquire about the Portuguese artillery going without an officer. I shall send an officer to Chamusca; but Hervey is there for the purpose of acquiring information.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 11th Nov. 1810, 10 A.M.

I have received your letter of the 9th at night.

The bridge at Villa Velha is burnt. The boats of the bridge of Abrantes, and all the materials belonging to it, still exist; the bridge of Punhete was taken up, and I believe the boats were taken up to Abrantes, where they now are.

The orders which I have given to Abrantes are at all events to prevent the boats from falling into the hands of the enemy, but not to destroy them till it shall be certain that the enemy must obtain possession of them.

As you say very truly, the anchors of the boats that are burnt must still remain, and will answer for other boats and bridges. Whether the boats of the bridges are destroyed or not, or whatever may become of the anchors now down, it is absolutely necessary that the boats used in bridges, in these torrents, should each have an anchor; and, as an additional security, a rope must be passed across the river, to which each boat should be fastened. The rope alone would be sufficient in the summer season; but, when the torrents come down in the winter, not only are the anchors required to hold them, but great attention must be paid to the whole machine, otherwise not only the bridge would become impassable, but the boats unserviceable.

I enclose an extract of my letter to Mr. Stuart upon this subject; likewise a copy of my instructions to Capt. Wedekind of the Engineers. All that I wish in respect to the boats for the new bridges is, that we may know where to lay our hands upon them when we shall require them. In respect to the other materials for the bridges, I wish to have them prepared, and in readiness to be sent up the river when we shall want to use them; and I have employed Capt. Wedekind upon this business, in order that I may know exactly what is prepared, and what is not, when the time shall come when I may have to cross the Tagus.

P.S. I observe that I sent you, on the 29th Oct., the extract of my letter to Mr. Stuart of the 23d, on the subject of the bridges; and I therefore do not now trouble you with it again.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Pero Negro, 11th Nov. 1810.

I enclose copies of dispatches to government, which will make you acquainted with the state of affairs here.

The Marques de la Romana is a good deal distressed by the paragraphs in the Cadiz newspapers respecting his march to this quarter;\* and I acknowledge that I am of opinion that neither the public mind in Spain, nor those whose conduct is likely to become the subject of these discussions, are prepared for them.

The freedom of the press is undoubtedly a benefit, and it is difficult possibly to fix the limits beyond which it shall not go. But, if the benefit consists in the information which the press conveys to the nation and the world in general, it appears to be necessary that that information should be founded in fact, and that discussions upon the conduct of military operations, and the characters of officers who carry them on, should be founded on real knowledge of events, of the true state of affairs, of the character of the troops, and, above all, of the topography of the country which may be the seat of the operations.

I think much mischief is done in England, not only to me personally, but to the character of the army and of the country, by foolish observations upon what passes here, in all the newspapers. But in England we are accustomed to these calumnies, and to read this nonsense, which it is to be hoped makes no real impression, particularly as the same news-

\* See Appendix, No. XXIV.



paper generally contradicts the first statement, or argues against the first reasoning, in the course of a short time after it has been inserted. But in Spain, a country unaccustomed to these discussions, in which all, even the best men are objects of suspicion, and every measure is considered the result of a treasonable conspiracy, it is highly dangerous to expose men in the situation of the Marques de la Romana to this description of calumny, and unfair statement and sophistical reasoning on his conduct. And it is particularly hard upon the individual, because, in the present situation of affairs in the Peninsula, neither he, nor his friends, nor the government, who in this instance have approved of his conduct, can venture to defend him, because, if they do, on real grounds, they must convey information to the enemy.

There is another very forcible objection, in my opinion, to subjecting officers in the situation of Romana to this description of discussion, and that is the effect which it may be expected it will have on the officers and soldiers of the armies under their command. The Spanish armies, which are neither fed, nor paid, nor clothed, cannot be kept together by the bonds of discipline, as I keep my troops; but the authority of the General and the operations of the armies depend almost entirely upon the opinion which they entertain of him, and the confidence they repose in him. Both must be shaken by this description of discussion; and I should not be at all surprised if Romana were to inform me, on some fine day, that the opinion of his army was against his remaining here, and that he must go; as Carrera informed me, during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, that notwithstanding his opinion agreed entirely with mine, and he wished to remain with me during the campaign, the opinion of his troops would be so much against us, if we did not attempt to relieve the place, that he should be obliged to separate from me, if it should fall; and he actually marched on the evening of the day that the place surrendered. This fact shows what it is to command troops held together solely by opinion, and how dangerous these discussions must be in a country which has only an army of this description.

Romana's junction with me in this position was founded upon two circumstances. 1st; the impossibility of his remaining in Estremadura, if I should be obliged to embark; and the expediency of his embarking his troops at the same time, in order to save them for the Spanish nation. 2dly; upon the expediency of increasing, to the utmost extent that was practicable, the disposable force which I should collect in these positions.

In respect to the operations proposed for Romana in these discussions on the enemy's rear, I would observe, that the enemy have shown in this campaign, and throughout all their operations in Spain, that they are entirely indifferent as to what passes in their rear; and it is a circumstance not generally observed in the French system, and which makes them most formidable as opponents, that they invariably operate upon the flanks and rear of their enemies, but are entirely indifferent as to what passes on their own communications.

We have so much force in their rear at present, that they can have no communication with Spain excepting by large corps; and they have not

attempted such a communication. The addition of the Marques de la Romana's corps to the other troops thus employed would not have increased their difficulties for subsistence, or have enabled us to press closer upon their rear, because, even if the Marques de la Romana could have ventured to place himself on the right of the Tagus, behind the enemy, he could not have ventured to place himself on the right of the Zezere. The enemy must still have had possession of the country along the right bank of the Tagus to that river, and they extend no farther now. But if the Marques de la Romana had placed himself upon the right of the Upper Tagus by Abrantes, and we had been obliged to embark, what was to become of his corps? It must have been left behind to the mercy of the enemy, or must have made the best of its way through the mountains to the Mondego, and thence to the north of Portugal. In the mean time, the want of its services and assistance in these positions, by its absence for other objects, in a situation in which it could be of no use, might be the cause of the loss of the whole, and of the misfortune of our being obliged to withdraw.

I have written you thus much in order that you may have topics wherewith to remind your friends in the Cortes that they should not always go full gallop; they should pull the bit sometimes, or they will destroy the whole fabric which it is their object to raise, and will lose the confidence of all the wise and thinking men in Europe.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 12th Nov. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th, and I assure you that I shall always be happy to acknowledge the cordial assistance which I have received from you, and from the naval force under your command, since I have had the honor of commanding His Majesty's troops in this country, of which your immediate attention to the suggestion contained in my letter of the 10th is only an additional instance. Major Marston is the officer of the Q. M. Gen.'s department directed to conduct the details of quartering the brigade of marines and seamen, and to put himself under the orders of the officer whom you will appoint to command the brigade. He will wait upon you to receive your commands, and to be placed under the orders of that officer. He has likewise been directed to make requisitions for canteens and camp kettles for the men, which will be supplied as to the other troops.

G. O.

Pero Negro, 12th Nov. 1810.

2. The Brunswick Light infantry are to be attached to the Light division until further orders.

3. This corps is to detach 1 company to do duty with the light infantry of Col. Pakenham's brigade, and 2 companies to do duty with the light infantry of Major Gen. Daulop's and Brig. Gen. Hay's brigades in the 5th division.

4. The Commander of the Forces refers the General officers commanding divisions and brigades, to his orders on the formation and use of light infantry battalions in each brigade, and he desires that they may be strictly adhered to: he again recommends the detached companies of the 5th batt. 60th regt., and those now detached from the Brunswick Light infantry, to their care and attention, and desires that these companies, when not in battalions with the light infantry companies of the regiment, in the manner and at the time pointed out in the G. O., may be kept at the head quarters of the brigade.

5. Brigade Major Olfermann, attached to Col. Pakenham, is to be attached to the Light division until further orders.

I am inclined to be of opinion that the seamen will be of most service if armed with firelocks. As they will be in positions, some time would elapse before they could close with their enemy, and they would be awkwardly situated if they had no fire-arms in their reach. It is to be observed, also, that the musket and bayonet may be used equally well with the pike, if an opportunity should offer of closing with the enemy.

I concur entirely with you that, in case it should be necessary to embark the army, these men must be the first sent to their vessels; and, indeed, the possibility of their services being required in their ships before it should be requisite for me to call for their services on shore, was one of the reasons for which I proposed Fort S. Julian, &c., as the first place of their assembly.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Pero Negro, 12th Nov. 1810.

By letters from Gen. Blunt to Sir W. Beresford, I learn that the enemy have strengthened in cavalry their foraging parties on the side of Obidos; and they are now too strong for his parties of recruits and peasants from that garrison. It would be very desirable if you would give them a lesson on that side by cutting up one of their parties.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Pero Negro, 12th Nov. 1810.

I have been thinking for some time of reinforcing your division, and you see what I have been able to do in this way this day. The truth is, that if I should make you as strong as I could wish, there will be other claimants for the command of the division; and I think it much better to keep a Portuguese brigade in reserve and unattached, to be attached to you when it is necessary to reinforce you, than to place one permanently under your command which would give claims to others.

In the mean time I wish to know from you in what manner you will dispose of the Brunswick Light Infantry between your brigades, that I may put your distribution of them in orders.

I also wish to attach Col. Wynch of the 4th to your division, as Colonel on the Staff, and to command Col. Barclay's\* brigade in his absence, if you have no objection to him.

P.S. If you could come over here some day, I would show you Massena's dispatch on Busaco, which I have got, from which it appears that you attacked Loison *en deux colonnes serrées en masse*!!

To Major Gen. Fane.

Pero Negro, 12th Nov. 1810.

I enclose a report I have received from Capt. Goldfinch, on the line of country from Palmella to the Tagus, in front of Aldea Galega. You will see that the right of the position at Rilvas is not very good; but at the same time it might be advisable to oblige the enemy to go round by the open country between Palmella and the right of the morass, and you might gain time by it: and as it is as well always to be prepared with a measure from which advantage may be derived, I would recommend you to have

\* Col. Barclay of the 52d died of the wound he received at the battle of Busaco.

mines prepared in the bridges and causeways, stated to cross the rivers and morass, the destruction of which would impede the passage. The bridges and causeways will not be the worse for these mines, if we should never blow them.

I rather believe there is some camp equipage belonging to the British army at Abrantes, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Lobo to issue some tents to Don Carlos de España, in order to cover his people from the rain in this terrible weather.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pero Negro, 12th Nov. 1810.

I have received a letter from Marshal Massena, in which he has requested, as a personal favor to himself, that the Marqueza d'Alorna may be allowed to join her husband, and that I will have her escorted to the advanced posts of the French army. I beg that you will lay this request before the government. I don't recommend it to their attention, because I can easily conceive that there may be reasons why they should not think proper to comply with this request; and I have nothing to urge in favor of it, excepting the wish to relieve the sufferings of the Marquise d'Alorna. If, however, they should think proper to grant the request, I will take care to have the lady escorted in safety to the advanced posts of the French army; and, at all events, I cannot but recommend to the Governors of the Kingdom to adopt measures to have this lady treated with all the attention due to her rank and misfortunes, and provided with all the comforts which circumstances will permit.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Pero Negro, 12th Nov. 1810.

Since I wrote to you on the 10th respecting Mascarenhas, I have received the enclosed papers from Dom M. de Forjaz, from which it appears that the government have passed over entirely the point which I referred for consideration, viz., the distinction in the cases of those who entered the service of the French in 1807 and 1808, from the cases of those who entered their service in 1809 during Soult's invasion, because it will have very extensive consequences. Of course all those who quitted Portugal in 1807 and 1808 will be entitled to the benefit of the same distinction in their cases. You will see also that they are determined to try and execute Mascarenhas, and I believe it is best for me to give no further opinion upon the subject.

It would appear, from the manner in which the enclosed paper is written, that it was drawn by Principal Sousa; and if he is the writer of it, he has altered his opinion probably upon finding that it agreed with mine.

I think it not very important what they do with Mascarenhas, as there is one fact in his case that would justify the putting him to death, whatever might be the decision on the point referred to in my dispatch of the 10th inst.; and that is, that being a lieutenant of cavalry in the French service, and aide de camp to Junot, he was taken in the disguise of a Spanish peasant; and upon his first examination by the officer who took him, declared that he was a Spanish peasant. He is therefore liable to be hanged as a spy. I had not seen his examination when I wrote to you on

Saturday, and was not certain of this fact. There is nothing else of importance in his examination, excepting that he says he was desired to ask for a reinforcement of 40,000 men.

There is nothing new since I wrote on Saturday, excepting that the 23d regt. are arrived, with only 12 sick. The rain has been very heavy for the last 3 days.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Picton, 3d division.*

12th Nov. 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint you that four days is a longer leave of absence to Lisbon than the Commander of the Forces permits of. If, however, you deem it essential to Lieut. —, his Excellency will not object to it, although he does not see the use of Lieut. —'s being at Lisbon while the papers are making out to which he alludes.

*The A.G. to Capt. Goodman, Deputy Judge Advocate.*

12th Nov. 1810.

I herewith enclose the charges, a little revised, to be preferred against Surgeon —, of the — regt. I have sent him a copy of the same.

The proceedings against the Lieutenant of the Royal Artillery are to be discontinued, in consequence of his having made a most humble apology to the corps, and the Commander of the Forces consenting to look over his conduct on this one occasion.

I have written to Major Gen. Campbell, in whose division Lieut. — is, to know if he consents to allow of his disobedience in not parading his men agreeably to the G. O. of June, 1809; also in having his men in billets. On the other points, I am fully of your opinion. If Lieut. — consents to own his error, I shall acquaint you, and of the Commander of the Forces' pleasure; if not, I shall communicate again with you as to the charges to be preferred by him.

I have to request that you will examine into the different cases of the prisoners sent to the Provost at Lisbon, preparing the charges against each, &c. As a Court Martial will soon be assembled, I have directed all the different papers to be sent to you.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Alex. Campbell, 6th division.*

12th Nov. 1810.

I have received the enclosed letter from the Deputy Judge Advocate, and I mentioned yesterday evening to the Commander of the Forces what you stated of Lieut. —, of the — regt. His Excellency is disposed to release this officer from his arrest, and permit him to return to his duty, if he is satisfied of his misconduct in his disobedience of orders in having the soldiers in billets, and their not being regularly paraded, according to the G. O. of June, 1809. You will be pleased to acquaint me if this officer is content to be released under these circumstances, that I may direct the Judge Advocate accordingly.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Leith, 5th division.*

12th Nov. 1810.

In reply to your letter of yesterday's date, I have the honor to acquaint you that the treatment of the soldiers of your division in the houses you allude to, must depend on the circumstance by whom they are provided, and who has the charge of them. If you have directed the surgeon to take care of them, it must be on the general hospital principle. If the men's rations, on the other hand, are drawn, and the surgeon provides them with nothing, there is no reason why any stoppage should be made.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Pero Negro, 13th Nov. 1810.

It is very desirable that the French officers and soldiers, prisoners of war, now at Lisbon, should be sent to England in empty store ships and victuallers, or transports, as soon as may be convenient.

To Major Gen. Fane.

Pero Negro, 13th Nov. 1810.

I received, in the night, your letter of the 11th at noon. I conclude that the enemy will, by this time, have got back their troops from the left of the Zezere; but if they should not, and the river should still be full, or if at any time hereafter they should be on the left bank of that river, and the communication cut off, and you think you can strike a blow against them by joining with what you have and Don Carlos de España, the disposable force of the garrison of Abrantes, I have no objection to your making the attempt. Take care, however, to have good information of the amount of the enemy's force on the left of the Zezere, as I should not like to lose Abrantes, which might be the consequence of any severe loss in the failure of this attempt.

The French have moved a small corps, 3000 men, to Llerena in Estremadura from Andalusia. This appears to be intended only to keep in check the guerrillas and parties on that side. Ballesteros' division of Spanish infantry, and Madden's cavalry, and the Spanish cavalry, are in the front of this French division, and had driven in their outposts. By accounts from the south, it appears that Soult is turning his attention to some plan of expedition against Cadiz by sea. He was fitting out boats at San Lucar; and it is said has passed 12 round to Puerto de Sta Maria.

In respect to your 12 pounders, you must only take care to give them a good start of you when you shall march back. Indeed, unless you should want them for some object of destruction on the right of the river, it would be best to keep them always well upon your left, probably as far down as Salvaterra.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Pero Negro, 13th Nov. 1810.

I am sorry that I was not at home when you called. I have a letter from Silveira, as you will probably likewise. I have also heard from Austin to the 9th. I think you may let the Baron go. If the enemy want ammunition, it is more likely to be powder than ball; and Trant's report must be nonsense. I enclose Cotton's letters in answer to mine, respecting the patrols on that side. I hope that Blunt is mistaken; and I think he must be so.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.*

13th Nov. 1810.

In reply to your letter of yesterday's date, I have to acquaint you, for the information of Lieut. Gen. Hill, that the Commander of the Forces has no objection to Lieut. Elliot of the navy being received back upon his parole, if the enemy spontaneously offer it; but Lieut. Col. Colborne must give them to understand that no civility of this nature will induce the Commander of the Forces to depart from the declaration made in my last letter to Gen. Fririon, chief of the staff of the French army.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Sontag.*

13th Nov. 1810.

In reply to your letter of the 12th inst. I have to acquaint you that I have referred the same, together with the enclosure, to the Commissary Gen., and I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to remark how necessary it is that the duties of the chief of that department should in no degree be interfered with: he must alone be responsible to his Excellency for the supplies of the whole army. It appears to the Commander of the Forces, by your statement, that the very monopoly you complain of would be increased in a tenfold degree, if Antonio Maria Carnero was to be employed for the whole concern of supplying the troops, &c. at Torres Vedras.

*The A.G. to Capt. —, D.A.A.G.*

13th Nov. 1810.

I cannot refrain from most seriously adverting to the manner in which the G. O. were left in the — division on your leaving the army on account of your health.

On my calling for the general orderly books of the different divisions of the army, for the purpose of being compared with my own general orderly book, I could find nothing in possession of the officer who succeeded you in the — division, and with whom every document and book should have been left, but a confused parcel of original letters received from this office, containing G. O. which you had not even taken the trouble to arrange, much less to have copied and entered with regularity.

I must observe no other officer in charge of a division in this army ever neglected his duty in a similar manner; I have, therefore, to desire you will, so soon as the Board of which you are a member has concluded its sittings, commence a general entry of all the orders of this army in your own handwriting from the 27th April, 1809, for the use of the — division, up to the period when you received your leave of absence. You will be able to copy all these orders at the Adj. Gen.'s office, Lisbon; and so soon as the same is finished, you will be pleased to report to me, in order that you may undertake some other duty.

In consequence of the state in which your division G. O. were found, I beg leave to refer you particularly to the G. O. 6th July, 1810, issued at Alverca.

To Major Gen. Fane.

Pero Negro, 14th Nov. 1810.

I received in the night your letter, giving an account of your cannonade upon the boats at Santarem, which I hope will have had a much better effect than you suppose. There is more ammunition at Çamora. I have spoken to Beresford respecting an officer of artillery, and another howitzer for you.

In respect to the depôt of materials at Santarem, I am anxious that an attempt should be made to destroy it, whatever may be the consequence to the town, if you believe it really exists there. I should be very sorry to destroy the town, or any part of it; but I should never forgive myself if, having it in my power to destroy the means of passing the Tagus, I omitted to make use of it; and the enemy were afterwards to be able, by this depôt, to have a communication with a body of troops, which we must expect they will employ on the left of the river. I beg you, therefore, to let Lieut. Lindsay make the attempt if you think the depôt of materials is really there, which I believe there is no reason to doubt.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Pero Negro, 14th Nov. 1810, 8½ A.M.

There is not much use in going to Sobral this morning, but I believe I shall go over to Craufurd's in the course of the day, and I will either call or send to you, that we may meet at the fort, if you are for a ride. I should be glad to see Silveira's enclosures from Salamanca. The question with regard to the directions to be given to Austin is difficult, and I have been turning it over in my mind since yesterday morning.

I send you a letter from Fane. It will be necessary that he should have another howitzer. Would it be possible to send him an officer of artillery? Is the Portuguese artillery axletree worked up in Portugal? You see what Fane says about the collection of materials at Santarem, and the necessity of incurring the risk of destroying the lower town in order to destroy them. Even if we do destroy the town, I am afraid we are not certain of effecting our object, but I believe we must attempt it. I

desired Fane, in a letter which I wrote him yesterday, to join his force with that of Don Carlos and Lobo, and attack the French on the left of the Zezere, if the communication should continue to be cut off, and he thought he could do it without risk to the disposable force of the garrison. I wish you would write to Lobo to tell him to give Fane every information of the enemy on the left of the Zezere, and to assist him as far as may be in his power, if Fane should determine to cross the Tagus to attack them.

P. S. From an intercepted letter, of the 19th Sept., from Berthier to Soult, it appears that an *armée du midi* had been formed, and Soult, I believe, appointed to command it; and it was intended to form an *armée du centre*. Soult's authority was confined to the Sierra Morena.

Au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling.

Au Quartier Général, 14 Nov. 1810.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre non-officielle que votre Excellence m'a adressée le 10 de ce mois, et j'ai fait prier les Gouverneurs du Royaume, de la part du Ministre de sa Majesté Britannique, qu'ils permettent à la Marquise d'Alorna de quitter Lisbonne pour rejoindre son mari. C'est avec bien de la peine que je fais savoir à votre Excellence que la Régence a refusé ma demande, et je suis fâché qu'il ne soit pas en mon pouvoir de faire ce qui est agréable à votre Excellence en cette occasion.

Je n'ai nul désir d'entrer en discussion avec votre Excellence sur une affaire sur laquelle nous pourrions avoir une différence d'opinion, surtout pas dans une lettre non-officielle: et je ne répéterai pas les raisons que les Gouverneurs du Royaume m'ont données pour le refus: mais votre Excellence doit sentir que le gouvernement et le peuple du Portugal ont à se plaindre de la conduite du Marquis d'Alorna.

En tout cas, les Gouverneurs du Royaume m'ont promis que Madame la Marquise aurait toutes les attentions que demandent son sexe, son rang, et ses malheurs; et toutes les commodités qui peuvent adoucir son séjour à Lisbonne et son sort. Le Marquis d'Alorna peut être certain qu'elle est en sûreté; mais s'il le trouve agréable, je crois que je pourrais persuader aux Gouverneurs du Royaume de permettre à Madame la Marquise d'aller en Angleterre, d'où elle pourrait passer en France pour le rejoindre.

The A.G. to Dr. Franch, Inspector of hospitals.

14th Nov. 1810.

I have to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces is well pleased with the arrangement you have made, reducing the general hospitals from 13 to 4.

You will be pleased to communicate with Col. Peacocke relative to the officers going sick from the army not sending their addresses and quarters to the medical officer. If their quarters are noted at the Town Major's office, it will be easy then to find them out. If there should be any neglect to notify their quarters, the Commandant can rectify the same by a garrison order.

The A.G. to M. le Gén. Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major de l'armée Française.

14 Nov. 1810.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre en date du 12 Nov. Son Excellence le Général en Chef des armées combinées me charge de vous inviter de faire ses remerciemens à S. A. M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling, pour la permission que S. A. avait bien accordée à M. Elliot, Lieutenant de vaisseau, de rentrer sur parole



à l'armée Anglaise, et les ordres sont expédiés aux avant postes de recevoir cet officier.

J'ai l'honneur de vous renouveler, M. le Général, les assurances de ma haute considération.

Memorandum to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B. Pero Negro, 15th Nov. 1810.

I have perused the correspondence on the charges against Dr. —, and I conceive not only that there is no proof, but there is no matter of charge against Dr. —, excepting in the matter relating to Gen. Blunt, of which there is ample proof. I conceive, however, that Dr. — ought not to be brought to trial on this charge.

Upon perusing this correspondence, it naturally occurs that the gentlemen who could find leisure, and could be inclined to write so much about nothing, could have very little to do. The charges and the ground for them, where there is ground, originate in private correspondence; and Dr. —, instead of acting as a person in his situation ought, viz., when he receives a charge against an officer placed under him, to have it put in the shape of a charge, and, in the hour of inquiry, begins to write other private letters, to other persons, about honor, character, &c. &c.; and at last they have produced a volume which contains no one point bearing upon the matter.

In my opinion, if Dr. — is an improper and dangerous and mischievous person, he ought to be dismissed from his situation, and the Phisico Mor ought to be called upon officially to state whether he has, or not, any charges against Dr. —.

It is curious enough that Dr. — should be charged with writing that the Phisico Mor had said that he had charges against Dr. —, and that the question should never have been asked the Phisico Mor.

To Brig. Gen. R. Crauford.

On the hill in front of Sobral, 15th Nov. 1810, 20 m. past 10 A.M.

You will have observed that the enemy have retired from the ground they occupied with their right, about Sobral, and I think it most probable that they will have retired their whole army towards Santarem. Sir B. Spencer's division is now feeling its way on towards Alemquer, and a patrol of our cavalry is just gone to the wood in front of No. 11.

If you should find that the enemy have retired their left, as well as their right, I beg you to cross the river at Arruda, and feel your way on towards Alemquer, by the direct road leading from Arruda. Send this note on to Gen. Hill, by the direct communication from Arruda to Alhandra. I wish him to feel his way on by the high road of Villa Franca and Castanheira, to Carregado, with the advanced guard of his corps. I shall soon have some British cavalry at Sobral and Alemquer, and Gen. Hill had better get some of the 13th light dragoons from S. Antonio do Tojal, to observe in his front.

We must make our first movements with caution, as I heard last night that the enemy had a reinforcement on the frontier of Upper Beira on the 9th.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley. In front of Sobral, 15th Nov. 1810, 10½ A.M.

The enemy retired their right in the course of last night, and have probably retired their left from the high road of Villa Franca.

I have sent to Lieut. Gen. Hill to move on, and I think it would be desirable to have some of the boats sent up the river immediately, in case we should have to send more troops across. They might come as far as Alhandra, to which place I shall send them further directions.

I conclude that Lieut. Berkeley will move up the river on Gen. Hill's flanks.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Heights above Alemquer, 15th Nov. 1810, 3½ p.m.

I enclose a letter in triplicate, which I wrote you this morning, and I hope that somebody at Arruda will have opened it, and will have acted upon it in your absence. You see the enemy at Villa Nova, I conclude, and I request you to communicate with the officer in command of Gen. Hill's outposts, who will, I hope, be this night at Carregado. In the morning I wish you to feel your way cautiously to Villa Nova, and thence on the road to Santarem.\*

I shall move Gen. Spencer's division in the morning to Alemquer, and Gen. Hill's corps I shall close up on the high road along the Tagus. I shall be up here very early in the morning.

To Major Gen. Fane.

Pero Negro, 15th Nov. 1810.

The enemy retreated last night, and their outposts were this evening at Villa Nova. They have all gone to Santarem. Our advanced guard is this night at Alemquer, they will to-morrow be well on towards Santarem. Gen. Hill will be at Villa Nova, and Sir B. Spencer at Alemquer.

The enemy intended either to retire across the Zezere, into Spain, or across the Tagus into Spain, or across the Zezere, to attack Abrantes. The last is possible, as I last night received an account, that on the 9th, they had a considerable reinforcement on the frontier of Beira Alta.

I have requested the Admiral to have boats brought up the Tagus, and I propose to pass over Gen. Hill's corps to Salvaterra, or at least to be in readiness for that movement as soon as possible. This will enable me to prevent the success of an attack upon Abrantes, at all events, and possibly the movement of retreat across the Tagus; and if they retreat across the Zezere, I shall be able to annoy them by passing the river at or above Abrantes.

You must in the first instance rocket Santarem, if you believe that the boats and materials are still there; in the next, you must encourage Lobo at Abrantes to hold out, whatever may be the attack made upon him. If the French should pass the Tagus between you and him, desire him to get his boats over to the right of the Tagus, and let Don Carlos de España pass over to Abrantes, and tell him that, in this case, Abrantes cannot be attacked. You will in that case take care of yourself, by withdrawing down the river.

If you find that they are using their materials in constructing a bridge over the Zezere, move your cavalry opposite to Abrantes; make a great show there; throw the bridge over the Tagus, with the exception of 3 or 4 boats on the other side (the right), and have every thing in readiness for a complete bridge for you and Hill to cross, either to pursue the enemy through Beira Alta, or to oppose the enemy in his attack upon Abrantes. In this case (of their using their materials to make a bridge

\* See Appendix No. XXII

over the Zezere), I think it probable that you will have your caçadores and rockets and artillery still opposite Santarem; but if you should have reason to believe that the whole have been taken from Santarem, or that the design to cross the Zezere is manifest, move your whole force opposite to Abrantes, and encourage Lobo and the garrison by all the means in your power.

There is still a chance that the enemy may take up and try to keep a position at Santarem, endeavoring to keep his rear open, and his communication with Ciudad Rodrigo across the Zezere. However, this ought not to alter your measures. As soon as you are certain that they are using their materials to cross the Zezere instead of the Tagus, make the communication with Lobo your object, still holding your communication with the right of the army, and rocketing Santarem, if you should think there is any thing there to be destroyed.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

16th Nov. 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that in the advance of the army it will be necessary to provide for the establishment of general hospitals at different stations, which will be fixed upon hereafter, according to circumstances. They will all be in the first instance on the Tagus. It is desirable therefore that you should immediately make your arrangements for sending up the river by water bedding and other articles and medical attendants, in the first instance, for an hospital of about 300 men at Villa Nova, and next for 300 more at Santarem. The men would be sent down from these establishments to Lisbon, and in proportion as the army should advance towards the frontier, if it should advance, these establishments would be broken up, and others formed in more advanced situations.

From what I have stated, you see that your presence at head quarters will now become essentially necessary, after having made your arrangements, and given directions for the above hospitals. It will be necessary you should communicate as soon as possible with me, in order that I may know when to apprise the different divisions of the arrangement.

As the medical gentlemen will all now be wanted forwards, in the event of the Court of Inquiry not having closed its proceedings, it must be adjourned until further orders, of which I shall apprise Col. Peacocke.

*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

16th Nov. 1810.

I have to acquaint you that, in the event of the Board of Inquiry concerning Lieut. —'s allegations against the medical officers in charge of the sick, &c.,

G. O.

Alemquer, 16th Nov. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that when any of the General officers quit their quarters, if only to take a ride, they will leave at home some person to receive, open, and carry into execution any orders that may be sent to them.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests the officers commanding regiments will be very cautious in occupying the quarters in which the French troops may have been quartered; to make their men clean them well out before they sleep in them; and, if possible, to have fires lighted in them, but care must be taken not to burn the houses. These precautions will be found to contribute much to preserve the health of the soldiers.

3. The allowance of rice, which has been given to the troops lately, must of necessity be discontinued as soon as the Assist. Commissaries will have issued that which they have with their several brigades.

G. O.

Alemquer, 17th Nov. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces directs that the Corps of guides shall be augmented, and the establishment of mounted men to be in future

Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Trumpeters.	Privates.
6	6	8	8	2	50

and Capt. Scovell, D. A. Q. M. G., will take measures to complete them as soon as possible.

coming from Busaco not having closed their proceedings, and in case the attendance of any medical officer should still be required by the Board, it will be necessary it should be adjourned until further orders, as these gentlemen's presence is essential now with the army in the advance.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Cartaxo, 18th Nov. 1810.

The enemy are still too strong for us this day at Santarem, and I have delayed the attack upon them till to-morrow morning, in order to have the assistance of the 1st division. If they stay, we shall then attack them.

I enclose my letter of the 15th to Fane, which I believe you have already seen. I beg that you will instruct him to cross the Tagus to Abrantes immediately with his cavalry, light infantry, and Don Carlos de España's brigade, if he should find that the enemy are retiring from the Zezere through Lower Beira, and to annoy them as much as he can, still keeping his communication with Abrantes. He may take some troops from Abrantes if he wants them.

Let your troops move on by the usual stages on the left of the Tagus, as soon as they shall have crossed the river. When you will arrive opposite to Abrantes, you will follow the instructions above given to Fane, with this difference, that you may be able to cut off the rear of the enemy entirely, when your corps shall be up; or if the whole rear should have passed Abrantes before you shall have arrived there, you will push it as hard as you can with safety till you arrive yourself upon the Ponsul.

I shall follow the enemy to the Zezere, where I shall endeavor to get the Light division over the river to join you.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Cartaxo, 19th Nov. 1810, 5 p.m.

I have received Fane's letter of last night from Abrantes, which almost induces me to believe that I have made a mistake in sending you over the Tagus at all; and I am certain that you should proceed no further up the river than Chamusca at present with the head of your corps; that Gen. Lumley's brigade should remain at Almeirim, and the Portuguese troops at Salvaterra. The cavalry might go up to Chamusca. You should not go any farther till you shall find that the enemy have decidedly passed, or are passing, the Zezere. In order to be in time for Major Gen. Lumley, I send him orders to halt at Almeirim, and the Portuguese to halt at Salvaterra, but for the cavalry to go to Chamusca.

I did not attack Santarem this morning, as the artillery intended for the left missed its way; and I am rather glad that I did not make the attack, as the enemy have there undoubtedly a very strong post, which we must endeavor to turn; for, if they have not retired across the Zezere, or towards the Alva, they must be too strong for us here. I believe, however, I shall attack them to-morrow.

Pray let the river be watched at Chamusca, as well as at Almeirim, and let me know every thing that passes on this side.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 21st Nov. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a letter and its enclosures, which I have received from Mr. Kennedy, relative to the freight for treasure carried in His Majesty's ships.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Lumley.

Cartaxo, 21st Nov. 1810.

I received this morning your letter of the 20th, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will continue to observe the enemy's movements on the right of the Tagus, and keep me informed of them. The officer who will take this to you will point out the place at which the boat of communication is stationed. Endeavor to see the road from Santarem to Torres Novas, as well as that to Golegão. Possibly it may be seen from the steeple of the church, or some other high building at Almeirim.

Tell Gen. Hill that the rain has destroyed the roads, and filled the rivulets to such a degree, that I am obliged to delay the movements on the enemy's right, which I had intended to make yesterday with a view to dislodge him.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 21st Nov. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 1st and of the 10th, and I now enclose the copy of my dispatch to government of this day.

I have not got by me a copy of a letter to Mr. C. Johnstone, but, as well as I recollect, I gave no opinion upon his plan. I refused to give him any officers, and I referred him to you.

In respect to the Princess of Brazil, I acknowledge that my opinion has been changed in consequence of my apprehensions of the democracy of the Cortes, and of their desire to take into their own hands the patronage and the exercise of the power of the executive government.

The French have a position at Santarem, compared with which Busaco is nothing. However, when it shall be fair weather, and the roads passable, I hope to dislodge them by moving on their flanks.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 21st Nov. 1810.

I enclose my dispatch to government, which I beg you to send home, and to let the packet sail. The enemy have a position stronger than Busaco or Sobral, and the rain, which is destroying them, enables them to maintain it. One of our brigades could not march 2 miles yesterday in less time than 3 hours. It did not get in till 2 o'clock. This day we are at a stand still; and if the weather shall clear up, I hope to be able to dislodge them by movement. Let the government do what they please with the Deputies arrived, or expected to arrive, from France.

I think that Austin's quarantine ought to be stopped, as the yellow fever is disappearing at Cadiz.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 21st Nov. 1810.

The enemy retired from the position which they had held for the last month, with their right at Sobral and their left resting upon the Tagus, in the night of the 14th inst., and went by the road of Alemquer towards Alcoentre with their right, and Villa Nova with their left. They continued their retreat towards Santarem on the following days.\*

The allied army broke up from their position on the morning of the 15th, and followed the march of the enemy, and the advanced guard was at Alemquer, and the British cavalry and the advanced guard at Azambuja and Alcoentre on the 16th, and at this place on the 17th. In these move-

\* See Appendix, No. XIX., No. XX., and No. XXI.

ments they have made about 400 prisoners. These troops have been followed in their march by Sir B. Spencer's and the 5th division of infantry, under Major Gen. Leith.

On the 17th I received accounts from Major Gen. Fane, from the left of the Tagus, that the enemy had constructed another bridge on the Zezere; that which had been first thrown over that river having been carried away by the floods; and that they had on that day marched a large body of troops from Santarem towards Golegão, and I immediately passed Lieut. Gen. Hill's corps across the Tagus at Valada in boats, which Adm. Berkeley had been so kind as to send up the river to aid and facilitate the operations of the army. The object of this movement was that Lieut. Gen. Hill might give countenance and assistance to Abrantes, in case the enemy should attack that place; or, that if they should retire from Portugal through Lower Beira, he might annoy them on their retreat.

On the 18th the British cavalry and the advanced guard found the enemy's rear guard so strongly posted in front of Santarem, that it was impossible to attack them with any prospect of success; and although my posts on the left of the Tagus have informed me that the enemy continue to send troops and baggage along the road on the right bank towards the Zezere, their rear guard have still maintained their post; and they have evidently in that post, and in Santarem, a sufficient body of troops to enable them to hold the strong position of Santarem against any attack which I might make on its front. At the same time, the rain, which has been so very heavy since the 15th, has so completely destroyed the roads and filled the rivulets, that I have hitherto found it impossible to dislodge the enemy from his position at Santarem, by movements through the hills on his right flank. The bad state of the roads has also possibly been the cause of the enemy remaining at Santarem so long.

Although the enemy have moved large bodies of troops to the eastward from Santarem, I have not yet heard that any large numbers have crossed the Zezere. I cannot be certain, therefore, that their intention is to retire from Portugal entirely. Their army being collected between Santarem and the Zezere, they are in a situation to be able, and they may endeavor to maintain themselves in that strong position till the reinforcements, which I know are on the frontier, can join them; and for this reason, and because I was unwilling to expose to the inclemencies of the weather a larger body of troops than it was absolutely necessary to employ to press upon the enemy's rear, and to support the advanced guard, I have kept in reserve a considerable proportion of the allied army, some of them still in the cantonments in the line of our fortified positions. I have also ordered Gen. Hill to halt the head of his corps at Chamusca, on the left of the Tagus, till the enemy's movement shall have been decided.

I have not heard from Gen. Silveira, who is on the frontier of Upper Beira, since the 9th inst., and he then informed me of the movements of different bodies of troops which I suppose to be 20,000 men in Castille, apparently levying contributions of provisions, &c., for the army in Portugal. These accounts have been confirmed by others of a later date, the 13th inst., from Salamanca.

Having advanced from the positions in which I was enabled to bring the enemy to a stand, and to oblige them to retire without venturing upon any attack, it is but justice to Lieut. Col. Fletcher, and the officers of the Royal Engineers, to draw your Lordship's attention to the ability and diligence with which they have executed the works by which these positions have been strengthened, to such a degree, as to render any attack upon that line occupied by the allied army very doubtful, if not entirely hopeless. The enemy's army may be reinforced, and they may again induce me to think it expedient, in the existing state of affairs in the Peninsula, to resume these positions; but I do not believe they have it in their power to bring such a force against us as to render the contest a matter of doubt. We are indebted for these advantages to Lieut. Col. Fletcher and the officers of the Royal Engineers, among whom I must particularly mention Capt. Chapman, who has given me great assistance upon various occasions.

Your Lordship will have observed how much the effective strength of the army in proportion to its total numbers has increased lately. There is no sickness in the army of any importance; and above one half of those returned as sick in the military returns are convalescents, who are retained at Belem till they shall have gained sufficient strength to bear the fatigues of marching, and of their duty in the field.

Besides the allied army, I enclose the copies of a correspondence which I have had with Adm. Berkeley, from which your Lordship will observe that an additional force had been provided from the fleet; and I take this occasion of informing your Lordship, that in every instance I have received the most cordial and friendly assistance from Adm. Berkeley and the officers and men of the squadron under his command. Rear Adm. Sir T. Williams has even done me the favor to come up the Tagus to superintend the passage of Gen. Hill's corps over the river.

In my dispatch of the 20th Oct., I informed your Lordship that the Marques de la Romana had joined the allied army in their positions in front of Lisbon, with a considerable detachment of the Spanish army under his command. He still continues with us; and I receive from him much valuable advice and assistance.

Throughout the period during which we occupied those positions, every thing went on with the utmost regularity, and to my satisfaction, notwithstanding that the force was composed of troops of various descriptions and of different nations; and I attribute these advantages entirely to the zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and the conciliatory disposition of the chiefs and General officers of the armies of the different nations; and I have no doubt that the same cordiality will prevail as long as it may be expedient that the armies should continue united. Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, and the officers of the general staff of the army, have continued to give me every assistance in their power. My last dispatches from Cadiz are dated the 9th inst.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 21st Nov. 1810.

My dispatch will give you a tolerably correct notion of the state of affairs here. At first I thought the enemy were off, and I am not certain

yet that they are not going. They had certainly made no preparations for holding the position at Santarem; and if they do not propose to stay, they hold it only till the state of the roads will allow them to continue their retreat. If they do propose to stay, and to hold this position as a *tête de cantonnement*, they must have received orders to do so from Paris, since they began to retreat.

This is possible, nay it is probable, that if they have had any communication with the frontier, they have received orders not to quit the country, as the political effect of their retreat will be great. But whatever may be the political effect of their retreat, I am convinced there is no man in his senses who had ever passed a winter in Portugal who would not recommend to them to go, rather than endeavor to maintain themselves upon the Zezere during the winter, or than attack our position, whatever may be the strength of their reinforcements.

However, it is probable that we shall have another campaign in the Peninsula, and your Lordship will probably have turned your mind to some measure for the reinforcement of the numbers of the army in general. Whatever may be your measure, I earnestly recommend to you to bring it forward at the commencement of the session, as you will then enjoy the benefit of it early in the campaign; whereas, if you bring it forward after, or allow it to be deferred till the Easter holidays, you will not get your men to their corps till July and August, nor to the army till September or October.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Lumley.

Cartaxo, 22d Nov. 1810.

I received last night your letter of yesterday evening. The midshipman of the Navy who has the command of the boats stationed for the communication was directed to let you know where they were placed. I am very anxious to hear whether you see the road from Santarem to Torres Novas from Almeirim or the neighbourhood.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Cartaxo, 22d Nov. 1810, 8 A.M.

I received last night your letter by Churchill. It is, I think, now tolerably certain that the enemy are not going to cross the Zezere; and we must now endeavor to discover what they are about. Desire Fane to endeavor to get people up the left of the Zezere, to discover whether they are marching on the other (this) side by Cabaços and Espinhal. They appear to intend to retire that way, or to remain in the country till they get reinforcements from Spain; and I am inclined to think the former is their plan.

The rivulets were so much swelled yesterday that we could do nothing on their right. I am just going to our left, to see what we can do this morning.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Picton, 3d division.

23d Nov. 1810.

In reply to your letter of the 18th inst., which only reached me yesterday, I

G. O.

Cartaxo, 23d Nov. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the Commanding officers of regiments will inform the soldiers that the wine casks are a most valuable property to the people of this country, and he desires that they may not be destroyed.



have the honor to acquaint you that, under your strong recommendation, there will be no objection to Lieut. Col. — proceeding to Lisbon; but under no circumstances can the regulation of this army respecting the report of a medical board on his case be dispensed with previous to his proceeding to England, much less for the reasons assigned, which have not the smallest influence on the Commander of the Forces, and his Excellency is surprised such sentiments should have been entertained by Lieut. Col. —.

I have directed a medical board to assemble on Lieut. Col. —, so soon as he shall arrive at Lisbon and have reported himself to Mr. Bolton, inspector of hospitals.

*The A.G. to Capt. —, D.A.A.G., Lisbon.*

23d Nov. 1810.

I have laid your letter of the 20th inst. before the Commander of the Forces, who is not disposed to alter the directions I have already conveyed to you by his order.\*

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Cartaxo, 24th Nov. 1810, 11 A.M.

The enemy reconnoitred our left on the 22d, instead of my reconnoitring their right. They brought forward about 700 or 800 men on that side, and drove in our piquets to the bridge of Calhariz, but retired again in the night. This circumstance, and all the information, tends to prove that they have brought up their troops from the rear to the support of the right of their position at Santarem.

I do not understand the enemy's meaning in the continued removal of artillery and boats up the river. Has the artillery been removed from Golegão? Do you observe the further removal of the boats after they have left Golegão? We heard some time ago that the enemy intended to throw a bridge across the Tagus at Punhete, on the left of the Zezere; and their fortifying the heights on the two sides of the Zezere gives some reason for a belief that this is their intention, with a view possibly to attack Abrantes, or to open Alentejo to their parties.

Barquinha also appears to me to be not a bad situation for a bridge over the Tagus. If Capt. Squire should be with you, I request you to let him examine the river from opposite Golegão up to Abrantes, particularly at Punhete and Barquinha, and see whether the enemy would have any facilities in throwing their bridge over at any of those places. It would be very desirable if you could get somebody over the river to ascertain to what places the enemy take their boats and materials, and what number of boats there are still remaining at Santarem. I am endeavoring to get this information by emissaries from this side.

In respect to Fane's detachment, and Don Carlos de España's, there is no doubt that, when Fane could no longer exercise his command, Don Carlos should be the person to exercise it as the senior Officer.

In the existing state of affairs, I think that the detachment ought to be brought rather nearer to you, and that the following objects should be attended to in the position of the Portuguese, as well as the Spanish part of it.

1st; To take care of the boats, &c., of the bridge of Abrantes.

2dly; To observe the enemy's bridge over the Zezere, above Punhete, and keep an accurate account of all that passes.

3dly; To observe the river from Chamusca to opposite to Punhete,

\* See letter to Capt. —, 13th Nov., p. 419.

particularly those parts which may be deemed the most favorable situations for the passage of the enemy, and to give you the earliest intimation of the collection of materials, &c.

I received yesterday a letter from Gen. Hamilton, stating some difficulties in the passage of a rivulet in his neighbourhood. This is important in every view of the case; and you should immediately take measures to have the communication made as good as it can be made from Chamusca to the place where you disembarked, and where you would have to embark in case you should again come over to the right of the Tagus. It is also important to enable you to get up your artillery, and collect your corps, if you should find that the enemy propose to cross the Tagus. Indeed, notwithstanding that if we should have to return to the lines we shall want your artillery, I think that you ought now to have with you one, if not two, brigades of artillery, and one brigade at Almeirim with Gen. Lumley. Gen. Lumley ought also to have with him a detachment of cavalry, to enable him to watch the Tagus from Almeirim to Chamusca.

If we should again return to our lines, I propose to make the following arrangement of your corps. To march Gen. Hamilton's infantry, and all the artillery, baggage, and cavalry, to Aldea Galega, where the Admiral will have boats to transport them across the river. To march the 2d division of infantry to the place where it disembarked, and there embark it again in Sir T. Williams' flotilla, and bring it over the Tagus to Alhandra, either by the main channel, if this part of the army should still possess the right bank of the Tagus, or, if not, by the eastern channel. The baggage of the 2d division of infantry would have to go round by Aldea Galega.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 24th Nov. 1810.

The enemy have made no alteration of importance in their position since I addressed you on the 21st inst. The assembly and movements of our troops towards the right of the position at Santarem, notwithstanding the continuance of the rain and the swelling of the rivers, have occasioned some jealousy on that flank; as, on the 22d, they brought up a large body of troops, apparently from Torres Novas and the rear, which drove in the piquets of Major Gen. Anson's and Brig. Gen. Pack's brigades at the bridge of Calhariz, where they halted, and the enemy retired in the night. This circumstance, and the information which I have received, tend to prove that large detachments of the troops which have marched to the rear, have returned to the neighbourhood of Santarem. The artillery and baggage, however, still continue to move on the road from Santarem up the Tagus to Golegão. The enemy have a detachment of about 4000 men at Punhete, on the left of the Zézere; but the bridge upon that river is a very bad one, and very unequal to bear the passage of an army.

I have ascertained that no detachments of the enemy's troops have passed to the frontier through Lower Beira, excepting one of cavalry and infantry of about 1500 men, under Gen. Foy, which I informed your Lordship, in my dispatch of the 10th inst., had returned to Sobreira Formosa, after having been at Villa Velha, where the bridge of boats was destroyed. This detachment afterwards marched to Ciudad Rodrigo; and

I understand that Gen. Foy is with the troops which are now upon the frontier.

I have received accounts from Gen. Silveira to the 16th inst. The advance of the enemy's corps had arrived at Pinhel, and he attacked it on the 14th. He drove in their advanced posts, and took 4 officers and many soldiers prisoners; and many of the enemy were killed and wounded. Gen. Silveira states his loss to be 30 killed, and about the same number wounded. He mentions, in high terms, the conduct of the officers and troops, particularly of the 24th regt.

Some of the enemy's detachments had likewise appeared upon the Upper Coa; and I imagine that, if they enter Portugal, it will be by Celorico and the valley of the Mondego. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 19th inst.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 24th Nov. 1810.

I enclose you a letter which I have received from Gen. Cameron, to which I request to draw your Lordship's attention. He has served His Majesty with zeal and ability, as far as his line of service has gone, till at last he is quite worn out, and I propose to give him leave of absence. In this country he has always conducted himself to my satisfaction; and in the battle of Talavera, his brigade, which was in Sir J. Sherbrooke's division, was very prominently engaged, and sustained much loss.

It would give us all in this army great satisfaction if some mark of the King's favor were conferred upon this old gentleman; and I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you can recommend him for such. I have heard that he is desirous of being made a baronet; and if that cannot be done, I should think him deserving of a government. He raised the 79th regt. at the commencement of the late war, which he commanded, with credit to himself, in every service in which the army was engaged, till he was made a General officer; since which time he has served, as he says, in this country; and I know no man more deserving.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Cartaxo, 25th Nov. 1810.

I have sad reports of the Lusitanian Legion pulling to pieces the houses in Alenquer. I request you to call before you Baron Eben, and the Commanding officers of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, and inform them that I have had reason to complain of that corps more frequently, since they joined the army, than I have of all the other corps of the army taken together; and that I cannot but attribute the variety and the frequency of these acts of misconduct and indiscipline entirely to the want of attention on the part of their Commanding and other officers; that if I do not see an early change in the habits of that corps, I shall turn them out of the army, and send them to a distance from the other troops, with which they are unfit to serve; and I shall report to H.R.H. the Prince Regent the names of the officers whose inattention to their duty must be the cause of the gross misconduct of the troops. I shall also consider it my duty to report to His Majesty the names of the officers of his service who are serving in the Lusitanian Legion.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 25th Nov. 1810.

I enclose a copy of my dispatch of yesterday to the Sec. of State. Since writing that letter I have received further accounts of the position of the French army, which appears to be principally collected about Torres Novas and Golegão; and I am afraid that I shall not be able to do anything of importance with them, without putting matters in a state of risk.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 26th Nov. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 25th. I think it much more probable that I shall have to retire, and resume our position, than that I shall be able to advance. The enemy is in considerable strength at and on their right of the position of Santarem, and they have their whole army at Torres Novas, Golegão, &c., with a post at Leiria, and one on the other side of the Zezere, at Punhete. I could not attack them without incurring the risk of placing the fate of the Peninsula on the result of a general action in which the advantage of ground would be much in favor of the enemy. Indeed, the continued bad state of the roads, and the swelling of the rivers, would prevent my moving for the present, even if it were desirable for other reasons; and in the meantime, I received accounts last night of the advance through Lower Beira of a detachment of 6000 men of those troops which I had been informed were upon the frontier.

The larger body, I believe, still remains upon the frontier, at least they were still in Silveira's front on the 17th. These accounts must prevent, for the present, at least, the execution of a plan which I had in contemplation to strike a blow on that detachment of the enemy which was across the Zezere. Under these circumstances, that which I must look for from Gen. Hill's corps, is to get the English infantry belonging to it back to Alhandra as expeditiously as possible, when I shall find the enemy likely to advance again. I had settled the following plan for the passage of the whole corps.

1st; That the artillery, cavalry, Portuguese infantry, and baggage, should march along the left bank to Aldea Galega, where I would have requested you to embark them in boats, and to have them carried over.

2dly; That the English infantry, about 5500 men, should embark in the flotilla at , and proceed in the boats at once to Alhandra, by the great western channel, if this part of the army should still be in possession of the right bank of the river, as far as Vallada; if not, by the eastern channel, covered by Lyceria.

A conversation, however, which I had yesterday with Sir T. Williams, has induced me to alter this plan. It appears that it is desirable to get the boats down the river again, and the seamen into their ships; and I have settled with Sir T. Williams, that when it may be desirable to pass

G. O.

Cartaxo, 26th Nov. 1810.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers and Commanding officers of regiments will take measures to prevent the soldiers from using the doors and windows, and pulling down the timbers of the houses for fire wood.

The consequence will be that the soldiers will be without quarters, besides the serious injury that these practices occasion to the inhabitants of the country.

over Gen. Hill's corps, the flotilla shall come up to where the British infantry will embark, unless it should be found practicable to march across the island of Lyceria; in which case a bridge will be thrown from Camora to the island, and the troops will embark on the island opposite to Alhandra.

I am convinced that the roads in Lyceria are of that description that troops cannot march upon them in the wet season; and, therefore, the embarkation of the British infantry at Camora, where the flotilla can be in one tide, and of the cavalry, artillery, baggage, and Portuguese infantry at Aldea Galega, appears to be the plan best suited to all the circumstances of the case; and I will give you notice when I shall wish to carry it into execution.

P.S. Since writing the above I have received a letter of the 20th from Silveira, from which I learn that the troops coming in from Lower Beira are 12,000 or 14,000 men, and Drouet's corps appears still to remain in Castille.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Cartaxo, 26th Nov. 1810, 3 P.M.

I have received your letter of yesterday, for which I am much obliged to you. The reinforcement on its march through Lower Beira consists certainly of convalescents and detachments from the troops now in Portugal. It is said by some to consist of 5000 to 6000; by others of 10,000 or 12,000 men. The 9th corps does not form part of this reinforcement. This corps is still on the frontiers of Castille.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order the 6 pounders and howitzers mentioned in the enclosed letter (which you sent to me), and two 12 pounders, which came across the Tagus with Gen. Fane, and all the ordnance and stores on the left bank of the river, with the exception of those belonging to your own corps, to be sent back to the arsenal at Lisbon without loss of time, by Aldea Galega.

The rocket carriages may as well go back likewise by the same route.

P.S. I shall be very glad to have the route and distances from opposite to Abrantes to Aldea Galega, with a draft of the route, if you can send it to me.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 26th Nov. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 25th, with its enclosures. I have repeatedly written to government respecting the pecuniary wants of Portugal, but hitherto without effect. I have no doubt but that some more assistance must be given to this country. I do not like the Conde de Redondo's paper, because he attempts to prove that we are in debt to the government where no debt exists; and he attempts to prove this debt from a statement in a ministerial newspaper, instead of from the actual engagements of the government and the state of transactions under those engagements. That which they ought to do is to make out a statement of their claims under the actual engagements of the British government, and the payments; they ought then to show what their actual receipts of revenue, contribution, &c. have been under the different heads, and their expenses; also their future expected income and expense; and from all

this show how inadequate the subsidy from Great Britain is to defray the expense which it is intended to cover.

I have had in contemplation different modes of increasing the army; but I do not advise drafting any part of the militia. One thing to do is to make the Lusitanian Legion into 2 regiments of caçadores, and to add 4 other regiments of caçadores, and 2 regiments of the line. All this put together will make an increase to the establishments of 6000 infantry, which we want most. But it is impossible to do any thing of this kind with the existing government.

You will have received the accounts from the north and Lower Beira. I doubt the 9th corps coming in. I believe that the troops now marching through Lower Beira are the convalescents and detachments belonging to the regiments already in Portugal.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Picton, 3d division.*

26th Nov. 1810.

I herewith enclose, by direction of the Commander of the Forces, the proceedings of a Board of Inquiry held at Lisbon on the 5th Nov. to inquire into certain allegations made against the medical department of the army by Lieut. —, of the — regt., which you will be pleased to communicate to Col. Mackinnon and Col. —, commanding the — regt.

I am likewise instructed to inform you that the perusal of these proceedings has convinced the Commander of the Forces that the march of the sick and wounded of the 3d division from the field of battle at Busaco was conducted in as regular a manner as under the circumstances it was possible. His Excellency is of opinion that the principal inconvenience which was suffered by any was to be attributed to the delay of their removal till the morning of the 29th Sept., which he concludes was occasioned by the want of conveyance; and afterwards the Commander of the Forces observes the wants felt by the sick and wounded are to be attributed to the irregularities of themselves and their fellow soldiers, the orderlies appointed to attend and take care of them. His Excellency has had too frequent occasion to lament these irregularities, for which it is to be apprehended that it is most difficult to find an effectual remedy.

The Commander of the Forces wishes that Assist. Surgeon — had been called upon to explain the expression reported to have been made use of by him in respect to dressing a soldier's wound, as it appears in other respects he, as well as the other medical officers, did their duty in a most meritorious manner on this painful march.

It is not his Excellency's desire to prevent complaints of the description of that made by Lieut. — of any department of the army; but it is obvious here, as well from Lieut. —'s own letters as from the result of the inquiry, that the complaint originally made to Col. —, and which was the occasion of the inquiry, was caused as much by the disposition of Lieut. — to complain as by a sense that the matters complained of required redress, or could receive it. A moment's consideration, or a slight inquiry, would have convinced Lieut. — that the drunkenness of the orderlies and their irregularities were the causes of the principal evils, viz. the want of their full rations by the wounded; and after all, it turns out that in no case were they any day without a large part of their allowance, the whole of which was provided and drawn for them. And the same degree of consideration and inquiry, and probably the recollection of his own experience, would have taught Lieut. — that British soldiers are unfortunately irregular when absent from their regiments, and greatly addicted to liquor; and it is neither fair nor candid to bring, as an aggravation of a charge against a department, irregularities for which no prevention has yet been found, even though this charge is contained in a private letter.

Having made known these sentiments of the Commander of the Forces to Col. Mackinnon and Lieut. Col. —, as also through him to Lieut. —, and the proceedings of the Board, you will please to return the latter to me.

I have received instructions further to communicate these opinions of his Excellency to the Inspector of hospitals, and to inform him that the Commander of

the Forces is entirely satisfied with the medical gentlemen employed, and that the removal of the sick and wounded was conducted in as regular a manner and with as little inconvenience and loss as it was possible under existing circumstances.

*The A.G. to Dr. Franck, Inspector of hospitals.*

26th Nov. 1810.

I enclose herewith the copy of a letter which I have written, by the Commander of the Forces' direction, to Major Gen. Picton, commanding the 3d division of the army. This letter will put you entirely in possession of the sentiments of the Commander of the Forces on the proceedings of the Board of Inquiry held at Lisbon, agreeably to the G.O. of the 5th Nov., and will enable you to communicate these opinions to the officers of your department.

I am especially directed by his Excellency, in transmitting the enclosed letter, to assure you that his Excellency is entirely satisfied with the zealous exertions of yourself and the medical gentlemen employed in this army; and he is persuaded that the removal of the sick and wounded was conducted in as regular a manner and with as little inconvenience and loss as it was possible under the existing circumstances. I feel great satisfaction in transmitting these sentiments of entire approbation on the part of the Commander of the Forces.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Cartaxo, 27th Nov. 1810, 9 A.M.

I have just received your letter, enclosing a number from Col. Lobo, who appears, as usual, to think that the whole force of the enemy is coming upon him. I should think that one fact which he mentions in another letter, viz., 'that the enemy have strongly fortified the church of Punhete, and have made intrenchments upon the road from thence to Abrantes,' might convince him that the enemy's measures on that side of the Zezere are merely defensive, and that the force stationed there is intended to cover the march of the reinforcements and convoys coming through Lower Beira.

There is one part of Col. Lobo's last letter which requires an immediate answer, and that is the postscript regarding the bridge. If the enemy should attack Abrantes, it was my intention to assist the place from the left of the Tagus; and, in that view, the preservation of the bridge was an object: and I desired Fane to have it laid over the river, excepting 4 or 5 boats on the right bank, which might be added when we should want to use the bridge. I am afraid, however, that the enemy might get at the boats of the bridge, notwithstanding the fire of the works of Abrantes; and this being the case, I think, upon the whole, it would be best to take up the bridge, and have all the boats brought over to the left bank, there to be kept in charge of Don Carlos' people. We should thus keep up the communication, and support the garrison by boats, in case it should be necessary. I beg you will read this letter to Col. Lobo.

I wish that the gentlemen in Abrantes, and particularly —, would begin to have some little confidence in themselves, and in that which they have been repeatedly told; viz., that the enemy can make no serious attack upon Abrantes without sending a large force across the Tagus;

G. O.

Cartaxo, 27th Nov. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces reminds the Commanding officers of regiments of the inconvenience which the troops have experienced from the want of salt occasionally during the campaign, and he urges them and the officers commanding companies, to make their men take care of the salt which they receive occasionally with their salt meat.

that he cannot send a large corps across the Tagus without exposing himself to loss on one side or the other; that if he makes an attack upon Abrantes without sending a force across the Tagus, I must have it in my power, and will relieve and reinforce the place; and lastly, that the successful attack upon Abrantes is impracticable, if these gentlemen are of good heart and do their duty; and that the regular attack of the place, at this season of the year, is out of the question, and that the enemy are unprovided with means to undertake it.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Leith, 5th division.*

27th Nov. 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you, in reply to your letter of yesterday's date and enclosure, herewith returned, that it would appear to be necessary not only to provide the troops with the food that is requisite for them, but to remind them to eat it. The troops have had quantities of salt delivered to them with their salt meat, of which the commanding officers of regiments and companies should have made them take some care, from having experienced the inconvenience of the want of it before. But at all events one mule sent to the banks of the Tagus at Alhandra or Alverca would carry salt in sufficient quantities to supply the troops for a great length of time.

In respect to the want of vegetables, the Commander of the Forces is sorry to find that the 5th division are in such bad quarters, for he observes there is no want of vegetables in any other part of the army.

To — and H. F. Sampayo, Esq.

Cartaxo, 28th Nov. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th inst., relative to the freight to be paid for transports to be sent to Algiers for corn.

Early in this month I received an application from His Majesty's minister at Lisbon, that I would request the Admiral to allow 3000 tons of transports to proceed to Algiers to bring back to Lisbon cargoes of corn, for which Mr. Sampayo, the importer of corn, would pay the usual freight for such a voyage. In consequence of this application, I wrote, on the 4th Nov., a letter to Adm. Berkeley, of which I enclose a copy; and I am much disappointed to find that the vessels have not yet sailed, and that they are detained, because it is wished to alter the terms on which Mr. Sampayo himself requested that he should have the use of the vessels.

It is impossible for me to interfere any further in this concern. If the vessels should sail, I shall consider myself bound to take care that Mr. Sampayo shall pay no more than the usual freight for such a voyage. If they should return without cargoes, Mr. — and Mr. Sampayo must abide by the decision of the Treasury, to be exempted from all demands of freight; to which indulgence I should think their claim would have been strengthened, if the vessels had been dispatched at the moment they were applied for and granted, and much valuable time had not been lost in discussions to make the bargain rather better.

*The A.G. to the Commissary General.*

28th Nov. 1810.

I understood from Lieut. Col. Bathurst that he had forwarded to you, by order of the Commander of the Forces, an application transmitted to me by Assist. Provost Davis at Lisbon, in consequence of 6d. per day being stopped for his rations. I enclose a letter which covered the Assist. Provost's application; and as I have received no answer from the Military Sec., I am anxious to know what is decided in this case, thinking, as I do, that it will be hard to make the provosts,



as attached to the staff of the army, pay any thing for their rations, and believing that it is not usual so to do.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 29th Nov. 1810.

From a letter which I received yesterday from Mr. — and Mr. Sampayo, I am sorry to observe that the former has contrived at last to mix himself up in our concerns, by entering into partnership with the latter in the Algiers purchases of corn; and I recognise his efforts to make the bargain better, in the discussions which have lately taken place respecting freight, from which delay and inconvenience will, I am afraid, be experienced.

It would be worth while to give Sampayo a hint that he will not improve his situation by a connexion with Mr. —. He knows that I have always treated him handsomely, and have been disposed to give a liberal consideration to any statement of losses incurred by those who have served the army. But I will not be forced to authorise a bargain in the first instance which is inconsistent with the regulations and instructions of the Treasury, which is what Mr. — has invariably driven at since he has turned his mind to our concerns; and the consequence of Sampayo's connexion with him will be, that he will exclude himself from them in future.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Cartaxo, 29th Nov. 1810, noon.

I have received yours of the 29th, which ought to have been dated the 28th.

I have had more trouble with Don Carlos de España and his provisions than I have with those of the whole army; and I am sorry to observe, from a letter which Marshal Sir W. Beresford put into my hands, that Don Carlos has threatened to make his soldiers take provisions wherever they can find them. I beg that you will tell Don Carlos that I do not allow of such conduct in any officer or troops; and that, if I find that he and his troops are guilty of that or any other misconduct, I shall have him provisioned to the frontiers of Estremadura, to which province he shall go.

The inconvenience which Don Carlos has felt, if he has felt any, is to be attributed entirely to his own irregularity: 1st; in coming to Abrantes without any previous orders from the Marques de la Romana, or any communication with me by which I could order arrangements to be made for his supply; and 2dly; from the total want of system and arrangement in his own brigade, and his want of officers to make the deliveries to the troops. From this cause the Portuguese or British magazines are obliged not only to supply the articles for the consumption of his troops, but to supply Commissaries to make the detailed deliveries to the troops. When the Marques de la Romana's army came into Portugal, I promised to supply them with provisions, and those have been regularly supplied of whose march I have been apprised; and, notwithstanding the irregularity of Don Carlos de España's arrival, he has been supplied also. His complaints upon this subject have been without foundation; for it is a curious circumstance, that on the very day I received the first of them, I likewise received from the Portuguese government a representation of the

expense of provision stores at Abrantes, by his being in the neighbourhood. I had already given Fane directions upon this subject, and I beg now that you will settle whether Don Carlos de España's brigade is to receive provisions from the magazine at Abrantes, or from your Commissary at Chamusca, or elsewhere; and you will direct accordingly that the quantity of provisions required for this brigade may be issued to the person or persons whom Don Carlos de España shall send to receive them, either daily or every 2 or 3 days, as you may find most convenient, upon the regular requisitions and receipts for the service.

I beg of you to send to Don Carlos de España a copy of this letter; and I can only say that if I shall receive any further complaints, either from, or of the conduct of, this brigade, I shall request the Marques de la Romana to relieve me from the pain of having any thing to do with it. I am happy to learn that you are better.

*The A.G. to Col. Darroch, A.A.G., Lisbon.*

29th Nov. 1810.

In reply to your letter, transmitting an enclosure from Assist. Provost Davis, I have to acquaint you that the Assist. Provosts marshal of this army are placed on the same footing as officers of the staff in respect to the stoppage for provisions, and consequently no deduction is to be made from Assist. Provost Davis for his rations.

To J. Duff, Esq.

Cartaxo, 30th Nov. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 17th Nov., and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what are the causes, besides the scarcity of money, at Cadiz, which have prevented you from continuing your remittances of specie for the use of the army in this country. The military chest is now very low, and it would be very desirable to receive from you as much as it may be in your power to send.

To Capt. Churchill.\*

Cartaxo, 30th Nov. 1810.

I have received your note, and I have written to Lord Liverpool a letter in favor of Mrs. Catlin Craufurd, which will go by the post to-morrow. I know that Mrs. Craufurd is acquainted with Lord Wellesley, and I think she had better state her case to him herself.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 30th Nov. 1810.

Capt. Churchill, the aide de camp of the late Brig. Gen. Catlin Craufurd, has informed me that it is intended by his friends to apply to government for some provision for his widow, who has been left with a large family in very bad circumstances.

Although Gen. Craufurd was not killed in action, he certainly died of a fever which he caught in the performance of his duty in this country; and as he was a respectable officer, who had served in the Peninsula with distinction, and I believe that his widow is a person of excellent character, I beg leave to recommend her case to the favorable consideration of government.

\* The late Col. C. H. Churchill, Q. M. G. in Bengal, mortally wounded at the battle of Maharajpore, Dec. 1843.

To H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

Cartaxo, 30th Nov. 1810.

The Governors of the Kingdom will, without doubt, transmit to be laid before your Royal Highness, a detailed account of recent events and transactions in Portugal; and I should not think it necessary to trouble your Royal Highness upon this occasion, if some discussions which I have lately had with the Governors of the Kingdom had not rendered it desirable that I should make your Royal Highness acquainted with the opinions which I have entertained, and the principles on which I have acted. Your Royal Highness is informed, that till the recent change made in the government of this country, I had the good fortune to possess the confidence and good opinion of the Governors of the Kingdom; and notwithstanding the magnitude, the variety, and the intricacy of the affairs which I had transacted with them, there had existed no difference of opinion upon any point of importance.

When the peace was made in Germany, in Oct. 1809, it was necessary that I should consider of the system of military operations to be carried on by the allied armies of your Royal Highness and of His Majesty, the command of which had been intrusted to me, in reference to the state of affairs in the Peninsula; to the description of the troops of which the armies were composed; and the defence of your Royal Highness' dominions. Having formed the plan in concert with Marshal Beresford, I went to Lisbon early in February last from the frontiers of Beira, purposely to communicate it to the Governors of the Kingdom, whose approbation, including that of the Patriarch, it received.

It is not necessary that I should trouble your Royal Highness with a detail of this plan. It was founded upon the fact, that the allied army under my command was the only organised body existing in the Peninsula which could keep the field against the enemy.

I considered that Lisbon and the Tagus were the sinews of your Royal Highness' government, the point of communication with your Royal Highness' person and with His Majesty's government; and that they were the objects which it was essential for the allies to retain, and for the enemy to get possession of.

I also considered that it was expedient, in the existing state of the war in the Peninsula, to avoid risking the fate of the whole in one general action, the result of which might, from circumstances, be doubtful. I therefore made the possession of Lisbon and the Tagus the principal object of my attention; others were considered subordinate to these, and were to be maintained or not, according to the circumstances of the moment, and to the chance I had of success in a contest to maintain them with the force which the enemy should employ to obtain possession of them.

These principles were thoroughly understood, and were approved of, as well as the details of the plan which was founded upon them; and I have invariably acted upon these principles in all the operations which I have carried on since I have commanded the allied army.

Unfortunately, one of the gentlemen who was appointed by your Royal Highness to be a member of the new government, in the month of , did not approve of the plan of operations, or of the principles on which it

was founded. Possibly, when your Royal Highness appointed me to be the Marshal General of your armies, and to hold that office with all the powers and privileges which were enjoyed by the late Duque de Lafões, your Royal Highness intended that I, and not the local government of Portugal, much less any individual member of the government, should be responsible for the plan and conduct of the military operations. At all events, His Majesty, with the command of whose troops I am likewise intrusted, considers me responsible for the honor and safety of his army; and I could not allow any individual, however respectable, to interfere in the performance of duties peculiarly and exclusively, in my opinion, my own.

The Principal Sousa, however, was of opinion, that the war ought to have been maintained, at all events, upon the frontiers of Beira; that an offensive operation ought to be carried on within the Spanish frontier; that a general action ought to be fought, at all risks; and he entertained and delivered other opinions upon the details of the operations, with which, in my judgment, he had no concern whatever.

Entertaining these opinions, both of the plan of operations which was adopted and of that which ought to have been adopted, he, by his influence over the other members of the government, prevailed on the government to omit and delay to carry into execution many measures recommended by me, which were calculated to aid the military operations, and to be of service to the people of the country themselves; in order to refer to me, and discuss, the propriety of adopting another system of operations which he preferred.

As it was probable that circumstances would render it advisable to bring the contest to a decision in the neighbourhood of the capital, it was necessary that the different divisions of which the army was composed should retire from the frontier; and I recommended that the people of the country should be directed to remove out of the enemy's reach, carrying with them, as far as was possible, their valuable property and what could be useful to the enemy, and rendering useless the mills. This measure had been successfully adopted in Upper Beira, under the provisions of a Proclamation issued by me on the 4th Aug. 1810;\* and it could be carried into execution effectually, and with convenience to the inhabitants of other parts of the country, only by being adopted at an early period; and it was recommended at an early period to the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom.

But it was delayed in respect to the country between the Tagus and the Mondego till the last moment, by various discussions, and under various pretences, and particularly because it was contended by the Principal Sousa, that the war ought to be maintained on the frontier. The inhabitants consequently had not time to carry it into execution; and the enemy have found, in Portuguese Estremadura, every thing which could tend to their comfort and subsistence, and to enable them to maintain their position in Portugal, notwithstanding that, as your Royal Highness is aware, the local circumstances of Portuguese Estremadura afforded

\* See p. 208.

means of removing these articles out of their reach, which do not exist in other parts of the country.

Although I have adopted the plan of operations which I have followed upon mature reflection, and every day's experience convinces me of its propriety, it is possible that the Principal Sousa may be right, and I may be wrong; and that it would have been expedient to adopt the system recommended by him, which I had thought the experience of the misfortunes in Spain had exploded. But even in this case, I contend for it, that the Governors of the Kingdom ought to have adopted without delay the measures which I recommended to them, to aid and conform to the plan of the military operations.

As I have already explained to your Royal Highness, some of the Governors of the Kingdom, including the Patriarch, approved of the plan which was adopted; but even if they had not (and I admit that the Principal Sousa had not), it was still their duty to aid and co-operate in that plan by every means in their power, and particularly not to thwart or delay measures recommended by me. If I was wrong; if I had showed myself incapable of executing the great trust reposed in me, the proper steps to be adopted would have been to request your Royal Highness and His Majesty to dismiss me from my command; but as long as I continued to exercise it, the Governors of the Kingdom were bound, as honest men and well-wishers to their country, to aid and co-operate with me as I recommended. By the delays occasioned by the opposition to those measures given by the Principal Sousa, they have been rendered nugatory, and parts of your Royal Highness' dominions, and some of your people, are now suffering.

The influence of Principal Sousa has, in this instance, been pernicious; and I leave it to your Royal Highness to determine, whether it is expedient that that gentleman should continue to be a member of the government.

It is with pain that I make this appeal to your Royal Highness. I am fully aware of the patriotism and of the integrity of this gentleman, and of his connexion with persons of high rank in your Royal Highness' service and of consideration in this country. But I cannot conceal from your Royal Highness, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting business with your government since he has been a member of it; all confidence is at an end; and your Royal Highness will judge whether it is possible for things to go on as they are.

It is unnecessary that I should trouble your Royal Highness upon the sentiments of each individual member of the government, on the questions to which this letter relates. In late instances, I believe that a large majority of the members of the government have decided at once to adopt the measures which I have recommended to them; and have not suffered them to be delayed by farther references to me, and by the discussions proposed by the Principal Sousa; and I am convinced, that if this gentleman should be removed from the government, affairs will be conducted with the same unanimity and satisfaction to me as they had been till his appointment.

I cannot conclude this letter without stating to your Royal Highness, in

justice to myself, that I have never obtruded my opinion upon your government on any subject not immediately connected with the military service, or the operations of the army, on which they have not previously desired to have it. The differences of opinion which I have had with the government, or, more properly speaking, with Principal Sousa, have been either on subjects exclusively military or on others intimately connected with the military operations; for in nothing else do I take any concern.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 30th Nov. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of the draft of a letter which I have addressed to H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal, on the subject of the recent discussions which I have had with the local government of this country.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 30th Nov. 1810.

It is very desirable that you should have some inquiry made regarding the requisitions which have been made for supplies of different kinds either by me or the heads of departments since the month of April last, and the measures which have been adopted to comply with them, and the state of forwardness in which those measures are at present. The orders go from your office very regularly; but I imagine that either the inferior departments do not attend to the early execution of them, or that measures are not adopted to force the vessels to sail when the supplies are embarked, as a great length of time elapses before the supplies arrive here after the receipt of the requisition has been acknowledged.

Some articles of provision required by Mr. Kennedy in June last have not yet arrived; and others are still wanting, required by the chief Engineer even at a more distant date.

From what I have seen of the service, I am convinced that much benefit would result from tracing the mode of execution of 2 or 3 different orders from the moment of their issue from the Sec. of State's office, to the period of the arrival of the articles in the Tagus.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Cartaxo, 1st Dec. 1810.

Gen. Lumley writes word that 8 pieces of artillery, with ammunition, entered Santarem yesterday afternoon, of which I give you intelligence, although I think it of very little importance, and not a sign of any hostile movement on the part of the enemy. We had a patrol yesterday at Pernes, where the enemy have about 4 battalions, and as much, with 2 regiments of dragoons, at Alcanhede: this does not look very formidable.

The reinforcement which had arrived at Cardigos has returned in some haste to Sobreira Formosa; a movement which I do not exactly understand. The Ordenanza do them much mischief, and they are in the greatest distress.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Cartaxo, 1st Dec. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have addressed to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and a memorial by Col. Lord Aylmer and Lieut. Cols. de Lancey and Elley, in which these officers express

their desire to receive the medal which His Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer on certain officers of the British army lately. In transmitting this application from these officers, it is but justice to them to state that they have performed their duty in a most satisfactory manner since they have been under my command, and that there are no officers in the army who are more highly deserving of His Majesty's favor.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 1st Dec. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 27th and 29th. I have had some

Distribution of the allied army on the 1st Dec. 1810.

Right bank of the Tagus.	
Divisions.	Brigades.
CAVALRY.	
	16th light dragoons . . .
Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton.	1st hussars, K.G.L. . .
Quinta Chevoens, near Cartaxo.	1st Royal dragoons } 14th light .. } 3d dragoon guards . . . 4th dragoons . . . Capt. Bull's troop of horse artillery.
INFANTRY.	
1st division, Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer.	Brigade of Guards . . . Major Gen. Cameron's brigade . . . Brigade of artillery . . . Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine's brigade . . . Brigade of King's German Legion . . .
3d division, Major Gen. Picton.	Two British brigades } One Portuguese brigade . . .
4th division, Major Gen. Hon. G. L. Cole.	Two British brigades } One Portuguese brigade . . .
5th division, Major Gen. Leith.	Two British brigades } One Portuguese brigade . . .
6th division, Major Gen. Campbell.	Two British brigades } One Portuguese brigade . . .
Light division, Brig. Gen. Craufurd.	Two brigades, British and Portuguese . . . Capt. Ross's troop of horse artillery.
Portuguese Infantry.	Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade . . . Brig. Gen. Campbell's brigade . . . Brig. Gen. Colman's brigade . . . Col. Le Cor's . . .
A division of the Spanish army	. . .
58th regt., 2d batt. . .	. . .
88th regt., 2d . . .	. . .

Left bank of the Tagus.

Lieut. Gen. Hill's corps. Head quarters near Chamusca.

Divisions.	Brigades.	Stations.
2d division, Major Gen. Hon. W. Stewart.	Major Gen. Hon. W. Stewart's brigade . . . Major Gen. Hon. W. Lumley's brigade . . . Major Gen. Hoghton's brigade . . . Brigade of artillery . . . Major Gen. Hamilton's division of Portuguese infantry . . . 13th light dragoons . . . Two brigades of Portuguese cavalry . . . Brigade of Portuguese artillery . . .	Chamusca. Almeirim. Chamusca. Mugem. Mugem, &c. Chamusca, &c. Opposite Vallada.

reports on the island of Lyceria, and I wait some further information to decide definitively upon the plan by which I shall get Gen. Hill at the river again, if it should be necessary.

I am obliged to you for the report on the late bridges of Villa Velha and Punhete. You see that we shall require fresh materials for 2 bridges at least. I have sent to inquire about the pontoon bridge which you mention at Villa Franca.

The Commissary Gen. and the Portuguese government are now employed in carrying off the forage from the ground you mention, and I hope this object will be soon effected.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 1st Dec. 1810.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to direct that the *Flora* transport, which is loaded with 10,000 stands of arms, and with accoutrements, stores, &c., may be sent to Cadiz under convoy; and that the Captain of the *Flora* may report his arrival to Mr. Wellesley, His Majesty's minister with the Regency, and deliver the letter which I have the honor to enclose.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Cartaxo, 1st Dec. 1810, 1 P.M.

Adverting to the intelligence received this day from Col. Lobo, that the enemy's reinforcements have returned from Cardigos to Sobreira Formosa, I wish that you would order Col. Otway's brigade of Portuguese dragoons to move up the Tagus by Gavião and Niza, and observe what passes on the other side of the river, as far on as the little river Sever. Let him send to all the owners of *barcas*, or boats, to put them in places of security and concealment on the left of the Tagus. I hope you are better.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 1st Dec. 1810.

I have requested Adm. Berkeley to send to Cadiz the *Flora* transport, which is laden with arms, and accoutrements, and stores, of which I enclose you the return and the invoice, and this letter will be delivered by the master.

I beg that you will give directions that these arms, &c., may be issued to such of the Spanish corps as you may think proper. I rather think that the ordnance, &c. might be sent to Gen. O'Donell, in Catalonia, with much advantage.

There is another transport in the Tagus, laden in the same manner, which I shall send to Cadiz as soon as I shall hear from you that men have been raised who are capable of taking these arms into their hands with any advantage to the cause.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 1st Dec. 1810.

The detachment of the enemy's troops, whose advanced guard were engaged with Gen. Silveira on the 14th Nov., passed to their left and appeared at Sabugal on the Upper Coa, on the 19th, from whence they moved on by Belmonte and Fundão, and by the two roads leading towards the Zezere, through Lower Beira. They arrived at Cardigos on the 25th; but I have since learned that they had returned again to Sobreira Formosa,



and even farther back, towards Castello Branco. The Ordenanza of Lower Beira have hung upon their rear in these movements, and have done them a good deal of mischief.

This detachment consists of the troops which went out of Portugal with Gen. Foy, who is gone to Paris; of the troops belonging to the 3 corps in Portugal, which had been left in garrison at Salamanca, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida; of 3 or 4 battalions which had been detached from the 8th corps, by order of the Emperor, and placed under the command of Gen. Seras for the purpose of operating upon the frontier; and of the convalescents of the 3 corps, amounting to about 2400 men. It is difficult to ascertain the precise numbers of this reinforcement, but I should imagine that it does not exceed 8000 men.

The troops composing the 9th corps, which I find are the battalions that, in my dispatch of the 18th July, I informed your Lordship were assembled at Nantes and in that neighbourhood, have occupied the garrisons and stations in Castille, from which the troops that have lately entered Portugal have been drawn. I believe that these battalions of the 9th corps are composed of Germans, and I think it probable that there will be great disinclination to draw them into Portugal, on account of the desertion already experienced from the German troops, particularly on every occasion on which they have been near the British army.

The enemy continue to hold their position at Santarem, which they have strengthened considerably. They have likewise fortified a post at Punhete, on the left of the Zezere, probably to cover the bridge over that river from any enterprises which might be attempted upon it by the garrison at Abrantes. They have reinforced their troops about Pernes and Alcanhede, on the right of the position of Santarem, and all our movements in that quarter appear to be viewed with great jealousy. Indeed, I believe that the whole army is concentrated in the neighbourhood of Torres Novas and Golegão; and that the 2d corps holds the position of Santarem; and part of the 8th the posts on the right at Alcanhede and Pernes.\*

The weather has continued to be very bad since the middle of November, and the cross roads are impassable for artillery and very difficult for infantry, and the rivulets much swollen. Under these circumstances it would be still impossible to make any movement of importance upon the right flank of the enemy's position at Santarem, in the course of which some divisions of troops would not be insulated and exposed to be cut off. But the enemy having concentrated their army in the neighbourhood of Torres Novas, &c., I do not propose to make any movement by which I shall incur the risk of involving the army in a general action, in ground less advantageous than that which I had fixed upon to bring the contest to that issue. The enemy can be relieved from the difficulties of their situation only by the occurrence of some misfortune to the allied army; and I shall forward their views by placing the fate of the campaign on the result of a general action, on ground chosen by them instead of on that selected by me. I therefore propose to continue the operations of the light detachments on the flanks and rear of the enemy's army, and to confine them as much as possible; but to engage in no serious affair

\* See Appendix, No. XXIII.

in this part of the country on ground on which the result can be at all doubtful.

My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 19th ult., from which I learn that there was reason to believe that the enemy meditated a serious attack upon the position of the allies; and that His Majesty's minister and Lieut. Gen. Graham had applied to Gen. Campbell for the assistance of one battalion of infantry from Gibraltar. The preparations for this attack depending upon the removal of the boats lately arrived at Puerto de S<sup>ta</sup> Maria to the Trocadero, are not yet in sufficient forwardness to occasion any immediate apprehension; and in the meantime I shall be better enabled to form a judgment of the designs of the enemy in respect to this country. If, however, I should find that they continue, and make any progress in their preparations for the proposed attack of the position of the allies at Cadiz, I shall immediately detach a body of troops to that quarter.

From all accounts which I receive from Castello Branco I learn that the guerrillas are very active, and have been very successful lately against the enemy.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 2d Dec. 1810.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday to government; from which you will observe that I have received your letter of the 17th Nov., and that from Gen. Graham of the same date.

I am of opinion that the enemy is not in a state of preparation to make the supposed attack upon Puntales, and it is probable that they will not be in the requisite state of preparation for some time. In the interval I shall be better enabled to judge than I am at present of the enemy's designs upon this country, and their means of carrying them into execution; and if I should find that I can do it with safety, or if the enemy should get forward with their preparations for the attack of Puntales, so as to render it clear that they intend to attack that point, I shall send a body of British troops to Cadiz.

I now write to Lieut. Gen. Graham to beg that he will, for the present, detain at Cadiz any troops that Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Stuart may send from Sicily for this country.

I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous that in the third year of their war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz, the seat of their government, upon having one or two more or less British regiments; and that after having been shut in for ten months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of Gen. Graham and the British officers on the danger of omitting them. The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities, that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation, till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.

I send you the *Flora* transport, with 10,000 stands of arms and sets of accoutrements, &c.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Cartaxo, 2d Dec. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 19th Nov. and its enclosure. I think it probable that the enemy will experience great difficulty in making the preparations for the proposed attack upon Puntales, and in removing their boats and establishing them in the Trocadero; and in the interval it might be expected that the works between the Cortadura and Puntales will be completed. At all events, I shall be enabled to judge of the nature of the enemy's designs on this country, and of their means of carrying them into execution; and if I should find that they get forward with their preparations for an attack upon you, or if they cannot collect the means of carrying on their attack here, I will send a body of British troops round to Cadiz.

I think it is not impossible, in the existing situation of affairs in Sicily, that Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Stuart may detach the body of troops which he was directed to send to Portugal from Sicily; and if he should do so, and they should go to Gibraltar or Cadiz, I request you to detain them at Cadiz till you shall hear further from me.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will communicate to me any thing that may occur, or any intelligence which you may receive by Ayamonte, as well as by the usual sea conveyance by Lisbon. Mr. Wellesley will communicate to you the accounts which I have sent him of the situation of affairs here.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Cartaxo, 2d Dec. 1810, 10 A.M.

I have just received your letter of the 1st, and I am much concerned to hear of the serious indisposition of Lieut. Gen. Hill, who I hope will soon recover. In the meantime I am convinced that the service will be well carried on by you; and I refer you to my letters to Lieut. Gen. Hill for instructions, and if you should entertain any doubt upon any point I shall hear from you.

The enemy's force is concentrated a good deal about Golegão, Torres Novas, and Santarem, but they do not appear to me to be in a situation to attempt any thing in any quarter; and I think that they are waiting for orders from Paris.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.*

2d Dec. 1810.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of Major Gen. Anson's letter of yesterday's date, addressed to you; and I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to state, in reply, that no G.O. in this army are to be broken in upon without previous application, mentioning the reasons which may render any deviation advisable, upon which his Excellency will always take a determination; and there are very few instances where a reference to head quarters is not practicable.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

Cartaxo, 3d Dec. 1810.

I enclose the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry which has been held on a statement made by Dep. Commissary Dunmore on the conduct of Mr. ——. This gentleman was represented to me, in the course of the summer, as having made a great exertion to supply the officers and soldiers of the army with various articles of necessaries which they required; and as being likely, according to the appearance of the state of affairs at that moment, to incur very large losses.

I was induced, therefore, on account of the very favorable opinion entertained of Mr. — by Col. Pakenham, Sir W. Myers, and others, to give directions that assistance might be given to Mr. — to enable him to transport his stores to the army (at his own expense); and that if the Commissariat should want any of the articles of supply which he had brought out, they might be purchased from him rather than from other persons, provided he sold them of an equally good quality at an equally cheap rate.

I observe, from the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, that a construction has been given to those directions which they were never intended to bear. They were intended to be applied solely to those articles which Mr. — had then at Lisbon, of which it was my wish that he should have an opportunity of disposing, as it had been represented to me that he had been encouraged by different officers of the army to bring them out.

It has been understood, however, as it appears both by Dep. Commissary Dunmore and Mr. —, that these orders were intended to apply not only to what Mr. — had at the time landed at Lisbon; but to whatever goods of any description he might hereafter import into Portugal: thus giving Mr. — a description of monopoly of the consumption of the British army; and this gentleman has in fact taken advantage of this erroneous construction given to these orders, by importing wines and other articles, to which they were never intended to apply, and offering them for sale to the Commissariat.

I now desire that it may be understood that these orders are entirely countermanded; and I will have nothing to do with Mr. —.

I beg also that you will inform Dep. Commissary Dunmore that I approve entirely of his having made the statement reporting the conduct of Mr. —, which has been the subject of inquiry.

It is quite evident to me that Mr. — has taken advantage of the indulgence of importing goods duty free, afforded by the Portuguese government to those who supply the British army with what they want, not for the purpose for which that indulgence was granted, viz., that the goods might be afforded at a cheaper rate to the officers and soldiers of the army, but to increase his own profits nearly to the amount of the duties payable to government, and to put more money into his own pocket.

Not satisfied with this irregular profit, he has even gone further, and has derived a profit by selling to others the use of the indulgence to import duty free which had been granted to him.

I have, however, regulated this matter in such a manner that it shall not be abused in future; and I now communicate to the —th regt. my opinion that Mr. — may continue the trade of sutler to the army, if he thinks proper, but that some other person ought to be the Paymaster of that regiment.

I observe that Mr. — has stated that he has a complaint to make of Dep. Commissary Dunmore; and I request you to ascertain what that complaint is; and if it is of a serious nature, and there should be cause for complaint, I shall have it inquired into.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 3d Dec. 1810.

I delay to answer you about the ordnance till I shall receive Col. Fletcher's report on the ground on the left of the Tagus. I am anxious to take an opportunity to look at that ground myself, which I think I could manage, and return here in the course of the night. It would be necessary, however, that the Prince's boat should be placed at Villa Franca for me; and I shall be very much obliged if you will let me know at what time it will be high water at Villa Nova, in the course of 3 or 4 days.

It is desirable that the reason for placing the boat at Villa Franca should not be known in Lisbon.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 4th Dec. 1810.

I enclose a report from Capt. Dickinson, who was employed by me to look for the pontoon bridge which you mentioned, in your letter of the 29th Nov., was over a creek above Villa Franca.

I have ascertained that in all weathers infantry can march from Salvaterra across the island of Lyceria to a place opposite to Alhandra. The infantry of Gen. Hill's corps will march from Salvaterra across the island of Lyceria to the south end of the island, at which place I shall be obliged to you if you will have boats to cross them over when I shall write to you for them.

The cavalry, artillery, and the weighty part of the baggage will go to Aldea Galega, from whence they can be passed over.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Cartaxo, 4th Dec. 1810, 11 A.M.

I am much obliged to you for your 2 letters of the 3d. I can scarcely believe that Gen. Gardanne's retreat can have been occasioned by the circumstances to which it is attributed; at least, if it has, his conduct is very unlike what we have known and heard of French General officers. I should think that, having been within 2 leagues of the bridge on the Zezere, he would, at least, have patroled to that point, and have endeavored to ascertain the precise situation of affairs before he withdrew his reinforcement. I should therefore think it probable that he did communicate with the main body of the army, and, however extraordinary his movement and the mode of making it, that he made it by order.\*

I beg that you will appoint an officer to act in the Visconde da Lapa's situation during his absence, if you can find one. There is nothing new on this side. 2 packets have arrived from England, but not here yet. I enclose a letter from Col. Peacocke, by which you will see that the King is better.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 4th Dec. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d inst., and I am much obliged to you for Mr. Bell's paper, which proves in the clearest manner, that the Portuguese government have received in money only a sum exceeding that to which they are entitled under His Majesty's engagements by about £60,000; and, if the provisions, &c. given to them are charged, they will have received an excess of £544,000 sterling, to

which a further addition will be to be made of the pay to the regiment employed at Cadiz.

I think this statement ought to be brought under their consideration. I have directed Mr. Kennedy to continue his payments to the chest of the 'Aids' as far as may be in his power.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 5th Dec. 1810.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will order the Prince's boat to be at Villa Franca to-morrow morning at 11 instead of at Villa Nova; and I shall be able from thence to reach Almada, so as to be in time to see everything.

To Col. Peacocks.

Cartaxo, 5th Dec. 1810.

I am anxious to go down the river to see the ground on the left of the Tagus from Almada; and I have settled to go down to-morrow morning, if circumstances should permit, and have requested the Admiral to send the Prince's boat to Villa Franca for me.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let Col. Fletcher know that I shall be at Almada to-morrow between 1 and 2, and that I shall be glad to meet him there. I shall also be much obliged to you if you will send over to Almada 3 or 4 horses, in order that I may reconnoitre the ground.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 5th Dec. 1810.

I propose to go to Almada to-morrow, to look at the ground on the left of the Tagus: if circumstances should permit, and if you will give me leave, I will dine with you afterwards, previous to my return at night.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 5th Dec. 1810.

From your letter of the 3d, I am apprehensive that my address to the Prince Regent may have involved you in some unpleasant discussions in the Regency, but after what had passed I could not avoid writing to the Prince, and it would not have been fair to transmit such a letter without sending it to the government, that they might have an opportunity of justifying themselves.

All my proceedings have been founded on the following principles:

1st; That by my appointment of Marshal General of the Portuguese army, with the same powers as were vested in the late Duque de Lafoës, I hold the command of that army independent of the local government of Portugal.

2dly; That by the arrangement made by the Governors of the Kingdom with the King's government, when Sir W. Beresford was asked for by

G. O.

Cartaxo, 5th Dec. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers and the Commanding officers of regiments will take measures to prevent the troops under their command from cutting the olive and other fruit trees for fire wood.

2. Parties on fatigue from each regiment should be sent out every morning to cut the quantity of wood required for fires; and as there is no want of fire wood in the neighbourhood of all the cantonments, there can be no occasion for cutting the olive trees for that purpose.

the former to command the Portuguese army, it was settled that the Commander in Chief of the British army should direct the general operations of the combined force.

3dly; That supposing that my appointment of Marshal General did not give me the independent control over the operations of the Portuguese army, or that, as Commander in Chief of the British army, I did not possess the power of directing the operations of the whole, under the arrangement above referred to, it follows that either the operations of the two armies must have been separated, or the Portuguese government must have had the power of directing the operations of the British army, as well as those of the Portuguese army.

4thly; It never was intended that both armies should be exposed to the certain loss which would have been the consequence of a disjointed operation; and undoubtedly His Majesty's government never intended to give over the British army to the Governors of this Kingdom to make ducks and drakes with.

The Governors of the Kingdom must, in their reply to my letter, either deny the truth of these principles, or they must prove that my charge against them is without foundation, and that they did not delay and omit to adopt various measures recommended by me and Marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond with the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under the influence of Principal Sousa, under the pretence of discussing with me the propriety of my military arrangements.

If you think it proper, you may make this an official communication, and show it to the Governors of the Kingdom. At all events, it may be of use to you in the communication you may have upon this subject with the Regency.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Cartaxo, 7th Dec. 1810.

I will dine with you on Monday next with great pleasure.

In respect to your going to England, I wish you would wait till January, in order that we may see the result of Gen. Foy's journey to Paris, and its effect upon the state of affairs here, which we must soon know.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 7th Dec. 1810.

I am aware that it is not, in general, advisable to take any notice of the falsehoods published by the French government; but having it in my power to give so complete a contradiction to the letter supposed to have been written from Viseu, by the Intendant Gen. Lambert, on the 5th Oct., as published in the *Moniteur*;\* and to show, not only that the contents of that letter are false, but that in fact such a letter could not have been written by Lambert, or any other French agent, or at any time after the 28th Sept., I trouble your Lordship upon the subject.

The account by Massena himself of the battle of Busaco, which I transmitted to you on the 8th Nov., will show that M. Lambert could not have received from the French Commander in Chief the account which he is supposed to have forwarded; and the enclosed memorandum of the operations of the different Portuguese detachments in Upper Beira, from 27th

Sept. to the 7th Oct., will show your Lordship that neither M. Lambert nor any other Frenchman could have heard at Viseu what was passing at Coimbra on the first 5 days of October, or could have written from Viseu after the 28th Sept., or could have sent to the frontier after the 3d Oct. I believe that M. Lambert did not enter Portugal till the 14th Nov., with Gardanne's division, at which time he was made prisoner by Gen. Silveira, in his attack upon the advanced guard of that division. I have also to mention that I have reason to believe that Gen. Drouet, who is stated to have forwarded M. Lambert's letter, and to have written himself upon the same subject from Valladolid on the 12th Oct., did not arrive in that city till the 20th Oct.

These circumstances will tend to show to your Lordship the miserable expedients which the French government adopt, and the falsehoods which they publish, to deceive the people of France and of the Continent on the real state of affairs in the Peninsula.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 7th Dec. 1810.

I enclose a return of the number of men and horses required to complete the regiments of British cavalry in this country.

As the appointments of the heavy cavalry are so much more weighty than those of the light dragoons, and the larger horses of the former are with difficulty kept in condition, it would have been desirable to have a larger proportion of the light dragoons, or hussars, with this army; but as the officers, the men, and their horses, are now accustomed to the food they receive, and to the climate, I do not recommend that the regiments should be changed, or that any additional regiments should be sent out, excepting possibly the remaining 2 squadrons of the 3d hussars, K.G.L., of which 2 squadrons are already at Cadiz.

Your Lordship will observe that nearly 1000 horses are wanting to complete the several regiments to the number of men they now have, and 1460 to complete to their several establishments. I would recommend that no horses should be sent for service to this country which will not be 6 years old in May; and that mares should be sent in preference to horses, as it has been found that they bear the work better than the horses.

I also beg leave to recommend that about 50 or 60 horses or mares of a superior description should be purchased, at the price of £40 or £50 each, as a remount for the officers of the cavalry, who cannot find horses in the Peninsula at present fit for this service, and would pay this price for these horses.

As great difficulty has been experienced in making shoes and shoe nails for the horses of the cavalry by their farriers, particularly after the cavalry have been actively employed for any length of time, and many horses have been consequently lost, I recommend that 4000 sets of horse shoes, and a double proportion of horse shoe nails, should be sent to the Commissary Gen. for the use of the cavalry, of the same description with those provided for the horses of the Royal artillery. The regiments to which these shoes would be issued would of course pay for them.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 8th Dec. 1810.

The detachment of the enemy's troops commanded by Gen. Gardanne,



which I reported to you in my last dispatch had returned to Sobreira Formosa, have continued their march to the frontier, and, by the last accounts, had entered Spain.

I have not heard that this detachment had any communication with the enemy's troops on the left of the Zezere, from whom they were distant about 3 leagues. I understand, that having lost some prisoners, taken by a patrol and by a party of the Ordenanza, which accompanied Lieut. Col. the Hon. F. Ponsonby on a reconnaissance from Abrantes to the river Codes, they made very particular inquiries respecting the position of Lieut. Gen. Hill's corps, and the means which the allies possessed of crossing the Tagus at Abrantes; and having commenced their march from Cardigos towards the Codes in the morning, they retired about 11 with great precipitation, and continued their retreat in the same manner, till they reached the frontier. They were followed by the Ordenanza, who did them much mischief on the march, and took much baggage from them. The enemy destroyed many horses and mules which could not keep up with them; and this march, if it was ordered by superior authority, and is connected with any other arrangement, had every appearance, and was attended by all the consequences, of a precipitate and forced retreat.

No alteration of any importance has been made in the position of the enemy's troops since I addressed your Lordship on the 1st inst., and I have received no accounts from Cadiz of a later date than the 19th Nov.

G. O.

Cartaxo, 3th Dec. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces having perused the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry, of which Col. Langley was president, has written to the Commissary General a letter on the subject of that inquiry, of which the following is an extract.

'Cartaxo, 3d Dec. 1810.

'I enclose the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry which has been held on a statement made by Mr. Dep. Commissary Dunmore, on the conduct of Mr. —.

'This gentleman was represented to me, in the course of the summer, as having made a great exertion to supply the officers and soldiers of the army with various articles of necessities which they required, and as being likely, according to the appearance of the state of affairs at that moment, to incur very large losses.

'I was induced, therefore, and on account of the very favorable opinion entertained of Mr. —, by Col. —, and others, to give directions that assistance might be given to Mr. —, to enable him to transport his stores to the army, "at his own expense;" and that if the Commissariat should want any of the articles of supply which he had brought out, they might be purchased from him, rather than from other persons, provided he sold them of an equally good quality, and at an equally cheap rate.

'I observe from the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, that a construction has been given to these directions which they were never intended to bear: they were intended to be applied solely to those articles which Mr. — had then at Lisbon, of which it was my wish that he should have an opportunity of disposing, as it had been represented to me that he had been encouraged by different officers of the army to bring them out. It has been understood, however, as it appears, both by Mr. Dep. Commissary Dunmore and Mr. —, that these orders were intended to apply not only to what Mr. — had at the time landed at Lisbon, but to whatever goods of any description which he might hereafter import into Portugal; thus giving Mr. — a description of monopoly of the consumption of the British army; and this gentleman has in fact taken advantage of this erroneous construction given to these orders, by importing wines and other articles, to which they were never intended to apply, and offering them for sale to the Commissariat.

'I now desire that it may be understood that these orders are entirely countermanded, and I will have nothing to do with Mr. —.

'I beg also that you will inform Mr. Dep. Commissary Dunmore, that I approve entirely of his having made the statement respecting the conduct of Mr. —, which has been the subject of inquiry.'

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 8th Dec. 1810.

I enclose some papers put into my hands by Mr. Kennedy. I was always certain of the result of the formation of these depôts of carts. They cannot require the number they seize by embargo, and keep at the depôts, to the great injury of the service. Mr. Kennedy states that we have not a single cart employed, and I know that there is not one with the army.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Cartaxo, 8th Dec. 1810, 9 A.M.

I have just received your letter of the 7th, 2 P.M.; and I am obliged to you for having turned your mind to the attack of the enemy on the left bank of the Zezere.

I am afraid that I have already rendered the enemy's retreat through Lower Beira more difficult and dangerous than I ought, considering, that without incurring the risk of great loss and possible failure, in a general attack upon his position, I cannot attempt to remove him from this country by main force. The destruction of the bridge of the Zezere will increase the difficulties of a march which every view of military policy ought to induce me to wish that the enemy might attempt.

But I have other objections to the plan besides the above stated, re-ferable to its general policy. In the situation in which the enemy is placed at present I can do him no serious mischief on this side. It is impossible to attack the position of Santarem in front; and all movements on its right flank are, and have been, for the last three weeks, prevented by the state in which the rains have rendered the roads. The French know this as well as we do, and they scarcely observe those roads. This being the case, the enemy's whole force, which is pretty well concentrated about Torres Novas, Golegão, &c., might be thrown across the Zezere upon your attacking corps. You have certainly a secure retreat upon Abrantes, and I have no doubt but that you could effect your retreat across the Tagus. But if this retreat were pressed at all (and if they were to throw anything across the Tagus below the Zezere, it must be pressed), the moral effect upon the garrison of Abrantes might have for its consequence the loss of the place. You may depend upon it that this plan of attack upon the enemy's post upon the Zezere has been adverted to and well considered by me, as well as other modes of annoying the enemy; and I have stated to you frankly the considerations which have induced me not to adopt it.

In all cases of this kind we must consider not only the number of our troops, but their description, and the moral effect upon them of the result of any particular operation; and I assure you that I have no doubt that even the whole of Gen. Hill's corps would, under present circumstances, be unequal to the proposed task; that it would be obliged to make its retreat, without loss of time, across the Tagus, in order not to lose its communication with the army; and that the result of this retreat, the cause of which would neither be known nor felt by the troops in the garrison of Abrantes, would probably be the loss of that place.

If there was time, I could state facts to you which would make this consequence as clear to you as it is to me.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Cartaxo, 9th Dec. 1810.

I have this day received your letter of the 25th Nov., informing me of your having detained at Cadiz 5 companies of the Chasseurs Britanniques, arrived from Sicily. You will have learned from mine of the 2d inst., that you had thus anticipated the directions which it contained.

I find from a letter from the Sec. of State, that positive orders have been transmitted to Sir J. Stuart to send the troops from Sicily; and I beg you to detain them all at Cadiz.

Mr. Wellesley will communicate to you all the intelligence from hence.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 9th Dec. 1810.

I have received the directions of the Sec. of State to request that empty horse ships, for the conveyance of 500 horses, may be sent to Plymouth, as soon as may be convenient, together with such store ships and victuallers as may have discharged their cargoes, and are still in the Tagus.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order the Agent of transports to comply with these directions, and to send me a return of the vessels and their tonnage which he will send in consequence of them.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 9th Dec. 1810.

I have desired that every assistance may be given by the engineer at Alhandra to the officer employed to take down the bridge from Villa Franca.

Besides the orders from government respecting horse ships, and store ships, and victuallers, they have directed that some ships for the transport of infantry should be sent to Plymouth. But before I request you to send them, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire the Agent to let me know how we stand in respect to these vessels. Some, I know, are gone for corn to Algiers.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 9th Dec. 1810.

The Sec. of State has consented to my request to be permitted to make an allowance to the officers, petty officers, and seamen of the fleet under your command, employed at the telegraphs in the line of country which has been fortified; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what allowance you think it proper should be made to them, from the period at which they went to the telegraphs.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Cartaxo, 9th Dec. 1810.

As I was desirous of dispatching the mail yesterday at an early hour, I did not answer your letter when I received it.

Our operations depend so much upon those of the enemy, that it is impossible for me to say at what period officers might with propriety go to England; but I should think that the enemy are now waiting for the result of the report to the Emperor sent by Gen. Foy, and that the orders from Paris will decide what they are to do, and whether I can give leave with propriety to anybody.

I shall be very happy to attend to your wishes; but I would beg you to reflect whether, considering the situation in which you stand in the

army, it is desirable that you should go home upon leave. Adverting to the number of General officers senior to you in the army, it has not been an easy task to keep you in your command; and, if you should go, I fear that I should not be able to appoint you to it again, or to one that would be so agreeable to you, or in which you could be so useful.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 9th Dec. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 29th Nov., by O'Lawlor, who arrived this morning.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday to the Sec. of State, which contains all the news that I have.

Lord Liverpool tells me that Sir J. Stuart has been positively ordered to send the troops from Sicily to Portugal, so that you may expect to be in strength again at Cadiz.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Cartaxo, 11th Dec. 1810.

The representation which I send herewith from Lord Aylmer, Lieut. Cols. De Lancey and Elley, will, I fear, not be attended to; but it is possible that the Commander in Chief may think it proper to confer the medal on those officers.

Some of the General officers have applied to me to know whether, upon ordinary occasions, they might not wear the riband of the medal at the button hole, instead of round the neck. This would be a more convenient way of wearing it, and they would wear it consequently more frequently, which would be desirable; and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether there is any objection to what is proposed.

Our last accounts from England are of the 31st Oct. A vessel has come into Lisbon, bringing papers of the 8th; and it is inconceivable how anxious we are all to receive accounts of the good King's health.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 11th Dec. 1810.

I have just received your letter of the 10th inst.; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will send forage on board the cavalry transports which will go to England.

I think you might send 2000 tons of the 6000 tons destined for the Marques de la Romana, which quantity, together with the *Romulus*, and the 2 infantry transports you mention as having proceeded with the empty victuallers, will answer all their purposes in England.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 12th Dec. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 8th, and I assure you that I was much gratified by the perusal of Dr. Nogueira's papers. They contain a strong proof of his good sense, of the just view he has taken of the interests of his country, and of his attachment to his Prince.

The officers who have been sent back from England were stated to me to be persons who ought not to be allowed to remain in this country, and on that account I recommended that they should be sent away; and all that was required from the English government was to allow them to remain in England during the existing crisis in Portugal. As, however,

they have sent them back, it is a matter of indifference to me what becomes of them. The Portuguese government will either allow them to land, and employ them, or they will send them back again to England, or away, elsewhere, as they may think proper, as I consider that I have nothing to say to these persons, or to any subject of this description.

I have given to the Marques de la Romana the letter I got from Azanza to Urquijo. I acknowledge that I wish that we had kept sacred the intercepted letters. As it is, however, these may have some effect. I rather believe that the signatures are not regularly official.

Champagny's ought to be, 'Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Duc de, &c., &c., &c.' 'Champagny.'

Maret's ought to be, 'Le Secrétaire d'Etat, Duc de, &c., &c., &c.' 'H. B. Maret.'

*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

12th Dec. 1810.

I have to acquaint you, in reply to the application you transmitted for Lieuts. — and —, of the — regt., to proceed to England, that so many similar requests, under the like circumstances, have been made to his Excellency, and so many officers who have gone home on the same plea have afterwards applied for leave to the Commander in Chief in England, and have been thus very long detained from the army, that his Excellency has been obliged to determine to refuse all applications of this description.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 13th Dec. 1810.

I enclose to you the letter which I have received from my brother, upon the proposal that the Marques de la Romana and his corps should go to Cadiz, and copies of my answers. Return these papers.

I have not communicated to the Marques your letter of the 12th, or the intelligence it contains; but I asked him this morning whether the Regency had ever entertained or expressed any disapprobation of his junction with us; and he told me that they had, on the contrary, expressed their entire approbation of it. It is difficult to understand the Spaniards exactly, they are such a mixture of haughtiness and low intrigue. The Marques de la Romana and the officers about him are, I believe, perfectly satisfied with their reception here, and the manner in which they have been treated. I have been very civil also to all the other officers, as far as they have come within my reach; and they have been treated with great attention by all the General officers of the army; and their men are as well, if not better off than our own. But I always doubt a Spaniard

G.O.

Cartaxo, 12th Dec. 1810.

2. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to learn, that notwithstanding his repeated orders and the inconvenience which all the officers and soldiers have experienced from the practice of burning doors and windows, and the furniture and materials of houses, it still continues, and within these few days the furniture and doors in the Quinta of the Duque de Lafões, in the neighbourhood of Alcoentrinho and Alcoentre, have been carried off and burnt.

3. The Commander of the Forces is ashamed to acknowledge, that the British troops have, in many instances, done more mischief to the country in this manner, than had been done by the enemy.

4. The necessity of repeating orders is the strongest proof of the want of discipline in the troops, and of attention in the officers, who have it in their power, if they do their duty, to prevent these practices; and the Commander of the Forces declares it to be his intention to report to His Majesty the name of the Commanding officer and officers of any regiment by the soldiers of which these practices may be committed in future.

being satisfied with any thing ; and I should not be surprised if O'Donell particularly, and possibly others, expressed dissatisfaction at being here. However, from the enclosed letters, you will see that the motive for calling the Marques de la Romana is entirely different from what is supposed by the person who gave you the information ; and I think it not unlikely that the dissatisfaction of the government with the Marques' conduct, and the intrigues of officers and others against him, on account of his coming here, have been whispered about, in order to induce him more willingly to go to Cadiz.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 13th Dec. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 2d inst. There is no doubt but that the services of the corps of the Marques de la Romana can now be spared from Portugal ; and as there is no longer any prospect that the British army will be under the necessity of embarking, the other reason which induced the Marques de la Romana to join this army with his troops, viz., that he might save those troops for Spain, no longer exists. But although there is no longer any necessity for the Marques de la Romana's continuance in Portugal, or being joined to this army, it is, in my opinion, essentially necessary that he and his army should remain in this part of the Peninsula.

The Marques de la Romana is the only link by which I communicate with Spain at all. He is at the head of affairs in Estremadura, and he is in constant communication with persons of all descriptions in Castille and in the neighbouring provinces, and is the principal promoter and encourager of the operations of the parties of guerrillas, by whom alone the war is carried on now in these parts of Spain. If the Marques de la Romana and his corps should be called to Cadiz, not only there will be an end to all my communications with Spain, and to the warfare of the guerrillas, but it must be expected that Badajoz will fall, and the province of Estremadura will submit to the enemy upon the first appearance of a second attack.

Mendizabal, who now commands in that province under the Marques, is a valuable officer. He will, I am convinced, do his duty in every situation in which he is placed ; but a very erroneous estimate is formed of the services rendered by the Marques de la Romana, and of the abilities of Mendizabal, or of any of the officers under the command of the Marques de la Romana, if it is supposed that he or any of them can at all supply his place.

I have already informed you and Gen. Graham, that if the positions of the allies on the Isla de Leon should be seriously threatened, I would send troops from hence to Cadiz ; and I have requested Gen. Graham to detain the troops on their passage from Sicily to this country ; and I have no hesitation in declaring that I should consider it less detrimental to the cause of the allies to detach from this army to Cadiz a force equal in number to the corps which the Marques de la Romana commands, and which is now joined to us, than that the Marques should leave this part of the Peninsula himself, with the troops which he commands.

Under these circumstances, I have availed myself of the latitude

afforded me by Don E. de Bardaxi's note of the 2d inst., to prevail upon the Marques de la Romana to wait here for the answer to the representations which we now send to Cadiz, upon the orders which the Regency have transmitted to him.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 13th Dec. 1810.

The Marques de la Romana has communicated to me a private and confidential note which he has received from Don E. de Bardaxi, from which it appears that the real motive for calling him and his corps to Cadiz is very different from that stated in the public notes.

It appears to me that the government are strengthening themselves against the Cortes, or a party in the Cortes. Bardaxi talks of his silencing '*les brailleurs*' by his presence, and of his preventing the mischief which it appears that some persons, ignorant of the public business and of the state of affairs, are disposed and have the power to do. I do not know whether I have a correct notion of Bardaxi's letter to the Marques, but he entertains the same; and it is clear to both of us that the measure of calling him and his troops to Cadiz is founded upon domestic, political expediency, rather than upon military necessity.

The Marques de la Romana therefore sends his confidential aide de camp, —, to Cadiz, who will deliver to you these letters, and who will inform himself of the real state of affairs, and bring back an answer without loss of time.

It may be useful, however, to let you know that the Marques' officers and troops are like others of the same description. Although much attached to him personally, it must not be supposed that he could depend upon their implicit obedience in a contest with the people of Cadiz, much less with a popular assembly. If it is supposed that the Cortes are doing mischief (of which I acknowledge that I have long had no doubt, and I am convinced that they have done no good), the best mode of providing a remedy for that mischief is to keep such men as the Marques de la Romana and the Catalonian O'Donell and their armies clear of the influence of that body, and of the intrigues which must always prevail more or less at the place in which they are assembled.

At all events, I am of opinion that the Marques de la Romana and his troops can do no good in Cadiz, and that they may be entirely destroyed there, if they attempt to interfere with the Cortes; and that in the meantime the absence of the Marques de la Romana, and of his troops, from this part of the Peninsula, will be a fatal blow to the cause of the allies.

P.S. The Marques is anxious that Bardaxi should not know that I have seen his letter.

The A.G. to Major Gen. A. Campbell, 6th division.

13th Dec. 1810.

Although the nature of Capt. —'s business, and the degree of its urgency, have not been stated by you, the Commander of the Forces cannot dispense with such preliminaries on granting leave of absence at this period. But from my communication with Lieut. Col. Campbell, I have ascertained the nature of Capt. —'s situation to be such as absolutely to require his presence in England; and having again represented this to his Excellency, he has consented to his having the leave you recommended, although previously refused.

*The A. G. to Officers obtaining leave of absence to England.*

14th Dec. 1810.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to require of you, previous to your departure on the leave of absence that his Excellency has granted, that you do send in a written declaration, upon your honor, that you will not apply to have the leave prolonged in England, or make any application, except to his Excellency, through the office of the Adj. Gen. in this country.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Cartaxo, 15th Dec. 1810, 4 P.M.

I have received your note, containing the suggestion regarding the bridge of Abrantes. As the bridge is taken up, preparatory measures may as well be adopted to enable us to fit it at any other part of the river; but I have boats and materials for a bridge near Salvaterra, which I had intended to throw over the Zezere, and which might be used to cross Gen. Hill's corps over the Tagus, below the Zezere, if expedient.

I have no idea that the enemy will make any movement of importance till they shall receive orders from Paris. They are certainly not moving towards the Alva, and their cavalry have returned from the neighbourhood of Coimbra. They are preparing themselves most on the side of the Zezere.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 15th Dec. 1810.

No alteration has been made in the enemy's position in front of this army since I had the honor of addressing you on the 8th inst., and all the deserters and prisoners continue to report the distress which the troops suffer.

The enemy detached a body of cavalry, consisting of 4 regiments, towards Coimbra; but finding that town occupied by Gen. Bacellar, they have returned again to their station in the rear of the right of this army.

I am concerned to forward the enclosed report from Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, of the death of Capt. Fenwick, the late Commandant of Obidos.\* During the last 2 months he had been engaged more than 20 times with the enemy's foraging parties, and I have had several opportunities of reporting his success. Upon this last occasion he had made an attack upon, and had driven in, a party consisting of 80 grenadiers, in the neighbourhood of Evora, near Alcobaca, who had come there in search of provisions, having under his command a detachment of the same number of the militia of the garrison of Obidos, and was pursuing them when he was mortally wounded, and he died on the 10th. We have thus sustained a great loss; and he is lamented by all who had any knowledge of his gallantry and exertions.

It is generally reported that the battalions composing the 9th corps have marched towards Madrid, where preparations are making for the assembly of a large body of troops; but I have not yet received this

\* Marshal Beresford to Marshal Gen. Viscount Wellington. Cartaxo, 11th Dec. 1810.

It is with much regret that I communicate to you the loss of Capt. Fenwick (Lieutenant in the Buffs), who died the following day of the wounds he received in the attack he made upon the enemy at Evora, on the 8th inst.

Your Lordship will equally feel with me the loss of this enterprising, gallant young officer, who, since the enemy's being in their late and present position, has been of so much service, and who has in such various instances given proofs of his talents and undaunted courage.



report from those channels of intelligence in Castille on which I can rely. It is certain, however, that all these troops, as well as Gardanne's detachment, have retired from the frontiers of Portugal.

The last accounts which I have received from Cadiz are dated the 2d inst. The Chasseurs Britanniques had arrived there from Sicily, and had been detained there by Lieut. Gen. Graham, by my desire.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 15th Dec. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch of the 24th Sept., by Col. Downie of the Spanish service; and I wish to draw your Lordship's attention to what has already passed respecting the legion to be raised by that gentleman.

In the course of the last year I had requested the Central Junta, through His Majesty's minister, to refrain from granting commissions to officers in the service of His Majesty, or to British subjects serving in the army of the Prince Regent of Portugal, without previously consulting me. The commission of Colonel was granted to Mr. Downie, and he was appointed to raise a legion in Estremadura, by the Central Junta, and confirmed by the late Regency; but I had no previous knowledge of this arrangement, and the first intelligence I received of it was from that gentleman himself, after he had received his commission, accompanied by a request that I would permit him to absent himself from his duty as an Assist. Commissary with this army, in order that he might perform his engagements to the Spanish government.

I declined complying with this request, and referred Mr. Downie to the Treasury, and he went home the last summer upon leave of absence on account of his health; and is now come out with the letter from your Lordship of the 24th Sept., and a letter from the Commander in Chief, of the 24th Nov., directing me to give him the assistance of British officers from this army to train and discipline his troops. From the knowledge I have of Mr. Downie's character and qualifications, I have no doubt whatever that the Spanish cause will derive advantage from his being employed to raise in Estremadura and command a legion, but my approbation of the measure of employing him goes no farther. Although Mr. Downie has talents and spirit to qualify him for such an employment, it is not fit, in my opinion, to place British officers under his command; and so far to risk the character of the British army in this concern.

There is no doubt but that the greatest benefit would be derived from the employment of British officers with the Spanish troops; but this measure must be connected with others of reform of the Spanish military system: regular means must be adopted to feed, clothe, discipline, and pay the troops, or the efforts of these officers must fail; at the same time that their characters, as well as that of the British army, and that of the person who should approve of their being thus employed, would suffer for their failure. I should besides think it proper that an officer of the British army should be employed to command that portion of the Spanish army to which these British officers should be attached.

Your Lordship will observe, therefore, that I do not approve of employing British officers with the legion to be raised in Estremadura by

Col. Downie; but even if I did approve of this measure, it would be totally out of my power to give him any assistance of this description from this army.

I enclose a return of the number of officers belonging to this army employed with the Portuguese troops; from which your Lordship will see that the Portuguese army has received but a very small proportion of assistance from other parts of the British army not employed here; and it is impossible to allow the officers of the regiments in Portugal to quit their corps to go and serve in a legion to be raised in Spain.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 15th Dec. 1810.

I enclose a return of horse and infantry transports, and of victuallers, which has been sent to England in consequence of your Lordship's orders of the 24th Nov.

I have sent horse transports for about 530 horses, including the *Trafalgar* (N.E.), in case your Lordship should think proper to send by this occasion a certain proportion of the remount horses for the cavalry; and, besides the 2500 tons of infantry transports (including the *Melantho* and *Langley*), the *Romulus* troop ship has been sent.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 15th Dec. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose the report of two Boards of survey on shoes, issued to the regiments of this army by the Commissariat, which were received from England. It is very desirable that the storekeepers in England should understand that there is no use in sending to this country any articles which are not of the best quality for service. They are of no use to the troops, are an useless expense to the public, and occasion a great disappointment.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 15th Dec. 1810.

I enclose 2 letters which have been written to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, respecting Lieut. L. Victor Künchler, a Swiss officer in the service of France, who was taken prisoner in the spring of 1809, at Chaves in Portugal. Sir W. C. Beresford is desirous that this officer should be exchanged, or should be allowed to go to France from England on his parole not to serve against the allies until exchanged; and I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship if you will give directions that his parole may be taken, and that he may be sent to France accordingly, and that the parole may be sent to this country.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 15th Dec. 1810.

I enclose the weekly state of the 8th, and the weekly return of the sick to the 9th inst.

I am concerned to add, that since this report has been made, an increased degree of sickness has appeared in the 3d batt. of the Royals, the 4th and 9th regts., all of which had been in Walcheren. But I attribute the sickness of these regiments not to that cause alone, but to the irregularity of the soldiers; who, contrary to repeated orders, have burnt as firewood the doors and windows, and, in some instances, the roofs of the

houses in which they have been cantoned; and they have been, consequently, exposed to the weather. The troops of the 5th division, to which these regiments belong, have been less exposed by their duty than any others in the army; and yet they are now the only division in which there is any appearance of sickness.

To Col. Peacocks.

Cartaxo, 16th Dec. 1810.

I have this day written to the Commander in Chief to recommend that you should be appointed a Brigadier General in the Peninsula.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Cartaxo, 16th Dec. 1810, 5 P.M.

As the enemy have certainly gone out of Col. Otway's reach, it is desirable, with a view as well to the subsistence of his troops as that he may be nearer to you if wanted, that he should be drawn back again to the neighbourhood of Chamusca. But as it would be desirable to conceal the movements of this brigade from the enemy, I recommend that they may be cantoned at a distance from the Tagus, unless you should require them on the river.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 16th Dec. 1810.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday to the Sec. of State.

I have had some difficulties lately with the Spanish muleteers attached to the British army, in consequence of the general requisition which is said to be made of all individuals of the military ages for the army. I doubt very much whether this requisition is or can be enforced; and I believe that the magistrates in the different districts are very glad to show the activity and steadiness with which they execute the law, by calling for these people, who they know will quit with reluctance the lucrative business in which they are engaged, to serve as soldiers. However, I cannot encourage them to stay away when they are called for; and I very much apprehend that the army will be reduced to the greatest distress if they should leave us, notwithstanding the pains which I have taken, and the expense which I have incurred, to have it equipped as it ought to be with the means of transport.

It appears to me that the production of a certificate from me, or Col. Alava, or Col. O'Lawlor, that a man is employed as a muleteer with the British army, might exempt him from service as a soldier, without any great violation of principle or any inconvenience. I do not believe that the whole number of persons of this description exceeds 500; and of these many cannot be of the military ages.

I hope some arrangement will be adopted upon this subject; and I can only say that if something is not done, and I am to be deprived of all those persons of this description who have until now been attached to this army, I shall be entirely crippled, and it will be a question whether we ought not to quit the Peninsula entirely. I doubt that even here we could exist one day without their assistance.

P.S. It must be observed that the muleteers who will be obliged to quit the British army will not serve as soldiers. They will prefer to go into the districts occupied by the French, to carry on their trade as muleteers.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Stuart, K.B., Count of Maida.

Cartaxo, 17th Dec. 1810.

Lord Liverpool has directed that tonnage should be sent from this country to Sicily, in order to bring to the Peninsula a detachment amounting to 2500 men; and I have accordingly requested Adm. Berkeley to send to Sicily vessels for that purpose. I imagine, however, that as it is desirable to detain in this part of the world as large a proportion of transport tonnage as may be practicable, the Admiral will either detain the transports which have brought the Chasseurs Britanniques to Cadiz, or if those transports should be found in a condition to return to Sicily, he will send with them additional tonnage for 1500 men; as it is supposed that those transports will be capable of bringing 1000 men. In case you should deem it inconsistent with the safety of the country, with the defence of which you are charged, to make this detachment from your force, I shall be obliged to you if you will give directions that the vessels may return to the Tagus loaded with wheat or flour, or, if neither can be procured, corn of any other description.

You will probably have received an account of the state of affairs in the Peninsula from Gibraltar and Cadiz. Affairs in this country remain nearly in the situation in which they were towards the end of last month. Massena still holds the position of Santarem with the left of his army, and he supports that post with the remainder of his troops. The detachment which attempted to penetrate Lower Beira in November retired into Spain with great precipitation, and suffered great loss in its retreat from the incessant attacks of the peasantry. I cannot understand for what reason it retired, as, when it turned, it was distant from the rear of the French army not more than 3 leagues, and there was nothing to prevent its junction.

The French now occupy the right of the Tagus, from the junction of the Zezere to Santarem; they have their cavalry at Ourem, their head quarters at Torres Novas, and their hospitals at Thomar; and that is the whole of Portugal which they possess. Their loss has been immense since they have been in this country; and it appears to me to be impossible that they should be able to effect their object without drawing into Portugal nearly the whole force which is employed in other parts of the Peninsula. They are much pressed for provisions, and I imagine that Massena maintains his position in this country only because the retreat into Spain is very difficult; and that it will have such an influence on the state of affairs in the Peninsula, that he does not choose to make it without having orders from the Emperor.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 17th Dec. 1810.

I enclose you the copies of a correspondence which I have had with the Sec. of State and the Commander in Chief, relative to a plan for raising a legion in Estremadura, by Col. Downie, who was appointed to perform this service.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Cartaxo, 18th Dec. 1810.

Gen. Hamilton mentioned to me yesterday that the soldiers from Almeirim had been to some place in that neighbourhood for bullocks for

food, and that they had carried away all the bullocks the people had, and had besides plundered the house of silver forks and spoons.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let Gen. Lumley know that I never allow the bullocks used for draft to be consumed for food; that I never allow the British soldiers to be sent out on service of this description, that is, to collect cattle for food, or indeed at all, because I know that they never go out of the sight of their officers without committing an outrage of the description of that referred to; and that I request of him to endeavor to discover who the soldiers were who committed this outrage, and to collect the proofs against them, in order that I may have them brought to trial.

I also request to draw the attention of Mr. Ogilvie to this subject, in order that he may take measures to preclude the necessity of resorting to the means above referred to, to supply Gen. Lumley's brigade with food.

To Col. Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

Cartaxo, 19th Dec. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 19th Nov. (marked private and confidential), to the first part of which I do not conceive it necessary to make any reply.

In respect to the latter part, I believe your object, as well as mine, is the same, viz., that the British Commissariat should be efficient. My opinion agrees entirely with yours respecting the expediency of preventing the offices in the Commissariat from becoming objects of parliamentary patronage; but I am apprehensive that the regulations which have been made are efficient for that purpose only, and will not give you a good Commissariat. I know from experience that the officers who perform exceedingly well the duties of the lower ranks of the Commissariat are not of course, even after the experience of 5 years, equal to those of the higher ranks. A good clerk does not of course make a good Assist. Commissary; and upon this point I could beg to refer you to Mr. Murray for a few anecdotes of Assist. Commissary —, who was promoted because he was a good clerk.

In my last letter I never intended to complain of the incapacity of any gentleman for the duty on which he was employed; but I do not know any of the higher ranks who have talents for the performance of the duty of the Commissary General.

If it be true (and my experience teaches me that it is) that a gentleman in the lower ranks of the Commissariat, even after length of service, does not of course become qualified for the duties of the higher ranks, it follows that the regulation which requires that these gentlemen shall be promoted in their turns, according to a kind of regimental succession, after a certain number of years' service, is not the most likely to give the army an efficient Commissariat. It follows also that this regulation is likely to entail upon the public a large and useless expense, in proportion as it will be carried into execution for persons who will be useless in the higher ranks of the department to which they belong. I give you my opinion very freely upon your regulation, which, however defective, may, I admit, be necessary, in order to prevent the interference of members of parliament in the disposal of offices in the department.

There is another point to which I would refer, and that is the degree of reward for service in the Commissariat. I do not think it fair to compare the reward of any rank in the Commissariat with the reward of the same amount to the officers of the army. I am of opinion, 1st; that all the officers of the British army are paid too little, and much less than the officers of any other army in Europe, adverting to the mode of living in England, to the value of money, and to the reward for talents and exertions in other professions: but, 2dly; officers of the army have rank and other objects to look to, to which not only a Commissary cannot aspire, but from which he is precluded; and indeed I might add that the prejudices of society against a Commissary almost prevent him from receiving the common respect due to the character of a gentleman.

In estimating the length of time which a gentleman ought to serve in the lower ranks of the Commissariat in order to obtain pay, and eventually half pay, equal in amount to that received by certain ranks in the army, we should look a little to the difference of objects and to the difference in the situations of the officers whose length of service and advantages we are comparing. However, my opinion being adverse to the regulation which requires a certain length of service for promotion in the Commissariat, and which places the officers of the Commissariat in a list of succession to claim promotion by seniority, I only advert to this last point, to show you where, in my opinion, you have erred in principle in forming your plan.

My own opinion is, that the Commissariat should be formed, in respect to promotion, on the principle of a civil rather than a military establishment; that the pay and the half pay of the different officers in it should be increased in proportion to the number of years of their service; and that none should be promoted who are not recommended for promotion by the officers in command of the troops. These, being held tolerably severely responsible for the success of their operations, will of course take care not to recommend any for promotion who do not deserve it, and who will not be of service in the higher ranks. You will thus have efficient people in the higher ranks, and no expense will be incurred that is not necessary.

P.S. I have omitted to thank you for your intention expressed in your letter to give me every assistance in your power, of which I assure you I am very sensible.

*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

19th Dec. 1810.

In reply to your letter and enclosures relative to —, you will be pleased forthwith to send him an order not to wear the uniform of an —; and you will be pleased to direct Capt. Tucker to report to me, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, the name of any officer who keeps company with a person who has been found guilty of such nefarious transactions.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 21st Dec. 1810.

I received your letter of the 4th two days ago.

I did not know what to say about the reduction of the number of our transports in the Tagus. I have no apprehension that we shall be obliged to embark, and no idea that the enemy will for a length of time be in a

situation to oblige us to think of such an operation; but I cannot, as an officer, be so certain of the course of events as to tell you that the transports may be withdrawn.

It may be necessary to request your attention for a few moments to explain our situation in reference to that of the enemy, and the general state of affairs in the Peninsula as affecting this question. I have no doubt that the enemy is not, and does not consider himself, able to force the position of the allies in this country. Indeed, I believe I have the means of beating the force now opposed to me, in their own position, of course with the sacrifice of a certain loss of men.

I think that the paper published in the *Moniteur* of the 23d Nov. shows that our position in front of Lisbon is considered so strong, as that it ought not to be attacked in front; and, from the perusal of that paper, I am of opinion that the enemy will endeavor to maintain a position in this country with the troops now in it, probably reinforced by some of those now on the frontier, &c.; will endeavor to dislodge us by occupying the countries north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, and thus distress us for supplies. The accomplishment of this plan will require an enormous force and some length of time; but when I recollect that in the last year the whole of the north of Spain, and of Old Castille, were abandoned by the enemy, even before the battle of Talavera, I cannot doubt that they will abandon those countries likewise upon the existing emergency, which will give them a part of the force they require.

I am also certain that, if the British army should not be obliged to evacuate Portugal, the French army must withdraw from Andalusia. I think it not improbable, therefore, that a large part of it, if not the whole of the French army in Andalusia, will be introduced into the southern parts of this Kingdom.

I don't despair of holding my ground against this accumulation of force, and I have taken measures to prevent the only inconvenience which it can produce, viz., a deficiency of supplies. But as these troops are all within a few marches of me, and an order from Paris would not only put them in motion, but they could be in this country almost before the transports could arrive in England, I cannot think it advisable, in the existing situation of affairs, to send them out of my reach.

The question whether I should attack the enemy in the position which he now occupies has been well considered by me. I have a superior army, I think, by 10,000 men, or one sixth, including the Spaniards; and, notwithstanding some defects in its composition, I think I should succeed. But the loss must necessarily be very great in killed and wounded; and the necessity which would exist of exposing the troops to the weather for some days and nights would throw a great proportion of this convalescent army into the hospital. Then what is to be gained in this action, in which failure would be the loss of the whole cause? Nothing at present that I know of, excepting to relieve the northern provinces and Andalusia from the presence of the enemy; which relief it is probable that the course of events will bring about, without the risk and loss of an action.

But there is another view of this question, which is a very serious one,

and has made much impression upon my mind. If the northern provinces of Spain and Andalusia should be relieved from the pressure and presence of the enemy by the course of events, or by exertions in Portugal, what will the cause gain by this relief? In the last year I cannot forget that I brought upon myself and Gen. Cuesta not less than 5 *corps d'armée*, and the King's guards and reserve, more than equal to a sixth corps; and that when the whole of Castille and the north of Spain was cleared of the enemy, not a man was put in the field by those provinces, nor even one raised!

In this year I have had 3 *corps d'armée*, the most numerous and efficient in Spain, upon my hands for 8 months. The kingdom of Galicia has been entirely free from the enemy, and Castille partially relieved. The Spanish army in Galicia have made no movement whatever, as Gen. Mahy says, for want of great coats; but in fact, because they want pay, clothing, means of subsistence, transport, discipline, and every thing which can keep a body of men together in an operation. In Castille nothing has been done, excepting that the guerrillas have been more daring and successful in their robberies.

The relief of Andalusia would, I fear, make no difference in the situation of affairs there. I do not think it quite certain that the enemy would be obliged to raise the siege of Cadiz, although it is probable that he would. But if the siege of Cadiz were not raised, the general cause would derive no advantage from the relief of Andalusia; and even if the raising the siege of Cadiz were the consequence of the relief of Andalusia, I doubt that there are means at Cadiz of putting into the field the troops now composing the garrison of that place, so as to render them a disposable force for the cause of the allies, or that any benefit would be derived from that event, excepting that it would place at the disposal of the allies the means which the enemy have collected for the siege of Cadiz, and retard, and probably prevent, the operation.

Your Lordship will probably deem this a melancholy picture of prospects in the Peninsula, but you may rely upon its truth. This state of affairs in Spain is the result of some defects in the national character, aggravated by the false principles on which all the affairs of that country have been conducted since it attempted to shake off the yoke of France. The Spaniards have consequently no army; no means of raising one; no authority to discipline an army if they could raise one; no means to arm, equip, clothe, or feed any thing which could be collected under that name. The war in the Peninsula, therefore, as far as the Spaniards are concerned in it, cannot take a regular shape. It must be confined to the operations of the guerrillas, upon which the calculations are very different from those which would be made in respect to the operations of a more regular force.

If all this be true, our business is not to fight the French army, which we certainly cannot beat out of the Peninsula, but to give occupation to as large a portion of it as we can manage, and to leave the war in Spain to the guerrillas. As long as the French do not interfere with our supplies, or the resources of the Portuguese government, or any point of our security, I think it very immaterial whether they are in Spain or



Portugal. Indeed, adverting to the greater difficulties they have in subsisting in the latter country and in keeping up their communications, I believe it is more advantageous that they should be where they are. Their numbers are certainly diminishing daily, while they do us no mischief; on the contrary, we are nearer to our resources than ever we were, and they leave the whole of the north of Spain open to the operations of the guerrillas.

But if the army now in Portugal is to be assisted by other corps, operating north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, before I can have secured the supplies of provisions I require, I must then seek to dislodge them by more determined means than I have tried hitherto. These means, God knows, may fail; or I may be prevented from trying them by the weather, or by other circumstances over which I can have no control. In all these cases it would be terrible not to have transports at hand, and I cannot advise that they should be sent away.

It is certainly astonishing that the enemy have been able to remain in this country so long; and it is an extraordinary instance of what a French army can do. It is positively a fact that they brought no provisions with them, and they have not received even a letter since they entered Portugal. With all our money, and having in our favor the good inclinations of the country, I assure you that I could not maintain one division in the district in which they have maintained not less than 60,000 men and 20,000 animals for more than two months! This time last year I was obliged to move the British cavalry only from the district which they now occupy with their whole army, because it could not be subsisted. But they take every thing, and leave the unfortunate inhabitants to starve.

I have heard this day, but not from good authority, that Gardanne's division had again crossed the Coa on the 14th, and had made a march towards Celorico on the 17th. My last letter from Silveira is of the 13th, and he does not mention the enemy being in any shape to make this movement. However, it is possible, and indeed probable, that some attempt will be made to communicate with Massena from the frontier.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. —.*

21st Dec. 1810.

The Commissary Gen. having referred to me your letter to him of the 18th inst. for the consideration of the Commander of the Forces, I am directed to acquaint you that you will be pleased to let the Commissary Gen.'s orders respecting provisions in no case be interfered with; and again to remind you that he alone is responsible to the Commander of the Forces for the supplies of every part of this army, in all situations where the troops may be placed.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 22d Dec. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th inst., and as there are still a large number of prisoners at Oporto who have been ordered to Lisbon, I am concerned to find that the Lords of the Admiralty object to their being sent to England. It will be necessary that they shall be removed from Lisbon, and I shall communicate with the Portuguese government regarding the mode of disposing of them.

Major-Gen. Seritag does not recollect the sums allowed at Walcheren

to officers and seamen employed at the telegraphs on that island; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know what sum I shall allow to those employed with the army in Portugal.

To Major Gen. Leith.

Cartaxo, 22d Dec. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 21st inst. I sincerely wish that the war was over, that I might take leave myself, and give leave to all those that are desirous of taking it. But as that is not the case, I have been obliged to regulate my own discretion, and to make rules by which I am guided in the grant of leaves of absence. Those who are obliged to go for the recovery of their health are compelled to appear before a Medical board, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will go through that ceremony, and I shall be happy to comply with your wishes.

To Lord Mulgrave, Master General of the Ordnance.

Cartaxo, 22d Dec. 1810.

I received by the last post your letter of the 30th ult., and I am very much obliged to you for your attention to our wants. I sent some transports home for the horses about a fortnight ago.

Capt. Chapman goes home by this occasion, and will make you acquainted with our situation. He is a very valuable officer, and I shall regret the loss of his services much; but it was impossible to detain him any longer from the situation to which you had appointed him.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 22d Dec. 1810.

I have the honor to enclose some papers which I have received from Col. Peacocke, regarding the murder of a Portuguese woman, by ———, private soldier in the — regt., which I request you to transmit to be laid before the Governors of the Kingdom, and to request that they will let me know what they wish should be done with the prisoner.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 22d Dec. 1810.

I enclose an extract of a letter, and its enclosure, from Adm. Berkeley, relative to an expense incurred by Col. Trant, the Governor of Oporto, in erecting a telegraph at that place to communicate with the shipping. I request you to lay these papers before the Portuguese government, with my recommendation that this expense may be defrayed, and that Col. Trant may be authorised to defray the expense of supplying with provisions, and of paying, the officer and seamen attached to this telegraph.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 22d Dec. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 18th, 19th, and 20th, and I am obliged to you for the steps you have taken in respect to Senhor Botelho. From the state of confusion, however, in which every department of the Portuguese government is at present, I apprehend that we shall not be able to do any thing with him here. Your copyist has copied the letters transmitted from Madrid badly, or I am so bad a Spaniard that I cannot understand their meaning. They were sent to you by your correspondent at Madrid; but where and from whom did he get these letters?

The Commissary Gen. will take and pay for the supplies contained in

Mr. Wellesley's list, transmitted in your letter of the 20th, and he will take and pay for any supplies which may be sent to Lisbon, which he may require for the use of the British army. But it is impossible for him to engage to pay for supplies ordered either for the Portuguese army or the people of Lisbon, to which I imagine that the letter from Gen. Graham to you of the 8th inst. refers. It appears to me, from all accounts, that the Portuguese government are becoming daily more inefficient: advertising to the large sums of money which there are in the town of Lisbon, and to the means of all kinds which are collected there, it is shameful that the inhabitants of the town should continue to be in want. The harvest in Minho and Tras os Montes has been most abundant, and the weather for the last 3 weeks has been most favorable for importations from thence; but I have not heard that any supplies have been imported.

I request your attention to the publication in the *Moniteur* of the 23d Nov., as translated in the last newspapers, relative to affairs in this country, from which you will see what the designs of the enemy are. It appears to me that our position is considered invulnerable; but it is obvious that the enemy will endeavor to operate upon our supplies. The navigation of the harbour is secured: but have the government taken any and what steps to draw supplies for the town and for the army from the northern or the southern provinces of the Kingdom, in which there is abundance?

If orders should be sent from Paris to raise the siege of Cadiz, or to march Mortier's and Sebastiani's corps into Alentejo, continuing the siege of Cadiz by the others, are the properties of individuals in the province of Alentejo secured by removal or by being buried? Have the provisions and means of transport been removed out of the reach of the enemy, or are they in readiness to be removed out of his reach upon the first alarm? In respect to the northern provinces, my opinion is that they are secure during the winter. But when a country, rich as Portugal is now in money and valuables, is invaded solely for the sake of plunder, the inhabitants should be warned to remove to a place of security, or bury their money and valuable property, in order that it may not fall into the hands of the enemy.

I hear from Beresford melancholy accounts of the desperately reduced state of all the departments of the army, to which it appears that as little attention has been paid as to other objects. Indeed he informed me this morning, that the Portuguese officers were paid only the British gratuity, which, if it be true regarding those corps which form the 30,000 men subsidized by Great Britain, is a breach of engagement with the British government, as the pay of the officers is estimated in the amount paid by Great Britain.

In short, unless the government will act upon a more vigorous system, and raise and realise a revenue from the country, which I am convinced they may do, the cause is gone. It is useless to expect more money from England, as the desire of economy has overcome even the fears of the ministers, and they have gone so far as to desire me to send home the transports in order to save money! The Portuguese government must levy the real tenth of all incomes, particularly mercantile incomes, and enforce the regulations of the customs, and punish dishonest custom house

officers, or they cannot go on. Pray inquire how much income tax Quintella, and Bandeira, and Sampayo, pay!\*

I think a tax upon male servants kept at Lisbon and Oporto, increasing in proportion to the numbers kept, levied in the way of our assessed taxes, would give them a good sum, provided it is really levied.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 22d Dec. 1810.

The enemy still continue in their position at Santarem, in which no alteration of consequence has been made since I addressed your Lordship on the 15th inst. They continue to collect boats on the Zezere, over which river they have now either 2 or 3 bridges.

The enemy have shown themselves on the Lower Coa, according to the last accounts from Gen. Silveira, but not, in his opinion, in such force as to pass that river. The reports which I had received of the march of the troops of the 9th corps towards Madrid have not been confirmed.

The last accounts which I have received from Cadiz are of the 8th inst.

To Major Gen. Fane.

Cartaxo, 23d Dec. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 22d, and I am exceedingly concerned that you have suffered, and are still suffering so much; but I hope that your voyage to England, with tranquillity and the society of your friends, will re-establish your health in a much shorter period of time than you expect. You may go to England; but I wish you would appear before a Medical board according to the order of the army, and you may stay for 3 months.

I shall apply to the Admiral to give you a passage in a ship of war; but I shall be much obliged to you not to mention that I do so, as others will require that I should make the same application for them, although their cases, fortunately for them, are not of a nature to require this accommodation, which involves the public in a sort of expense; and the Admiralty are very particular in their inquiries respecting the causes for the application for a ship of war for a General officer.

I don't know what I shall do with your command during your absence.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 23d Dec. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 8th; and I now enclose my dispatch of yesterday to the Sec. of State.

I have received a report that the troops on the Lower Coa have crossed that river; but I have no confirmation of it, although it must be expected that some attempt will be made from Castille to communicate with Massena; and as the troops fared so ill in their late attempt in Lower Beira, it is not improbable that they will try the valley of the Mondego. If the weather holds up, however, our situation on the right of that river will annoy them much.

You will have seen the paper published in the *Moniteur* of the 23d Nov., which I think contains a hint of the intentions of the Emperor in respect to this country. Our position is evidently considered invulnerable.

\* Three rich merchants of Lisbon. The titles of Conde do Farrobo, Conde de Porto Covo de Bandeira, and Conde da Povoia were subsequently conferred upon them or upon their descendants.

nable; but they intend to endeavor to operate upon our supplies. They will probably, therefore, enter Estremadura and Alentejo from Andalusia, with Mortier's corps and Sebastiani's; and it is not impossible but that they may raise the siege of Cadiz. In either case, what will, or rather, what can the Spanish government do?

Since April last I have had upon my hands the 3 strongest and most efficient *corps d'armée* in Spain. Galicia and Estremadura have been relieved entirely, and Castille partially; but these provinces have done nothing; and those more distant, in which there are no French troops, have made no exertion. I admit that none of these provinces could be expected to be in a situation to make any exertion in one, 2, or 3 months after the enemy should have withdrawn from them, but they might in 7 or 8 months, during which they have been freed from the enemy, in which time we last year formed the Portuguese army. If Andalusia should be evacuated, and, besides the 9th, I should have the 4th and 5th corps upon me; and even if the siege of Cadiz should be raised; and, in addition to all, I should have the 1st corps upon me, what will the Spanish government do? I am afraid, nothing! And this is the part of the subject which gives me the greatest concern, and really grieves me.

I think I may be able to stand out against every thing; but the people of England will never bear that the affairs of the people of Spain should have been so mismanaged as that, when 7 parts out of 9 of the French army, and those the most efficient, should have been brought into Portugal, the people of Spain should be able to do nothing for our relief. And yet I declare I believe they can do nothing for our relief!

In order to show you how the Spanish armies are going on, I enclose you a report which Sir W. Beresford has received from Gen. Madden, the officer commanding the brigade of Portuguese cavalry in Estremadura. I am convinced that there is not one word in this letter that is not true. Yet these are the soldiers who are to beat the French out of the Peninsula!!! If you should make known the contents of this letter to any body, do not allow it to be known that it came from Madden.

There is no remedy for these evils, excepting a vigorous system of government, by which a revenue of some kind or other can be raised to pay and find resources for an army in which discipline can be established, which this vigorous government will maintain. It is nonsense to talk of rooting out the French, or of carrying on the war in any other manner. Indeed, if the destruction occasioned by the guerrillas and by the Spanish

G. O.

Cartaxo, 23d Dec. 1810.

1. The Commander of the Forces has frequently been obliged to request the officers of the army would not shoot the deer in the Royal or other parks, without having leave to do so; but he is concerned to learn, that the practice still continues in a great degree in the Duque de Lafões' park, near the cantonments of the army.

2. The Commander of the Forces will avoid to name the regiments, by the officers of which this has been done; but he requests those officers to reflect, that their continuing to shoot the deer in these parks is not only a breach of military discipline, but shows an entire forgetfulness of the rights of property, which they would be obliged to respect in their own country, and which they ought to respect in this, where every individual of the British army has been so well treated.

3. The Commander of the Forces is not desirous of preventing the officers of the army from amusing themselves, in any manner they may think proper, or which may be consistent with their duty, but he requests them to respect the parks and preserves of the Prince, and other inhabitants.

armies, and the expense incurred by maintaining the French armies are calculated, it will be obvious that it will be much cheaper for the country to maintain 80,000 or 100,000 regular troops in the field; and if they had that number of troops, properly equipped, I have no doubt that the French would be obliged to quit the Peninsula. But the Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to produce an effect at a future period. Their courage, and even their activity, is of a passive nature, and must be forced upon them by the necessity of their circumstances, and is never a matter of choice nor of foresight.

I shall speak to Romana about the arms which I have here; and will send you all that he does not think are required in this part of the Peninsula.

I doubt that British officers would be of much use in forming the Spanish troops, unless the persons in the supreme command of them were British officers likewise. British officers of inferior rank, to be of any use, would require the support of authority to enforce their discipline: they would also require the control of authority (and that of no ordinary kind) to keep themselves in order. We have both in Portugal; and, above all, we have pay and resources for the troops, and have formed an excellent army.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 23d Dec. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 25th Nov., conveying the copy of the decree of the Cortes of the 19th Nov., and of the letter which you had received of the same date from Don E. de Bardaxi.

I request you to take an opportunity of assuring the Regency that I have perused their papers with the greatest satisfaction, and that nothing can be more gratifying to me than to find that the government and Cortes of Spain have approved of my conduct in the interesting cause in which we have been engaged.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 24th Dec. 1810.

Having received the orders of the Sec. of State to fix the pay of the officers, petty officers, and seamen employed at the military telegraphs near Lisbon, I have fixed upon the sum of 10*s. per diem* for the lieutenants, 6*s. per diem* for the midshipmen, 1*s. 6d. per diem* for the petty officers, and 1*s. per diem* for the seamen; and if the senior officer will send an abstract for the whole number, made up for each month separately, from the period at which they were first employed to the end of this month, to my Military secretary, I will sign a warrant for the whole amount, which he will receive from the Commissary Gen.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Cartaxo, 24th Dec. 1810, 10 A.M.

I have received your letter of yesterday, and the papers contained in that which you wrote to Lord FitzRoy Somerset, at 4 P.M. yesterday. They write these reports at Abrantes in such a hand that it is difficult to make them out, and I shall be obliged to you to communicate this observation to Col. Lobo.

I have long considered the probability that the enemy might attempt to throw a bridge over the Tagus; and the intention to make this attempt

appears confirmed by the accounts which we have of the description of equipment that the troops have brought which have recently passed the Coa.

I do not think that, even with the addition of their reinforcements, the enemy will be in sufficient force to attempt to establish themselves on the other side of the Tagus, unless they should be further reinforced by a corps from Estremadura, or should establish their line on the right bank of the Tagus, behind the Zezere, in which country they cannot subsist. However, it is as well to be prepared for all events. I do not think it probable that they entertain any intention of attacking Abrantes. They have no means of carrying on this operation, and they must retire behind the Zezere in order to attempt it. With all this, however, this great collection of boats at Punhete, and the further preparations which are making of the same description, look very like it.

For the present, I concur in the manner you propose of strengthening Don Carlos de España's post. But I think we ought to make other arrangements on the other side of the Tagus.

1st; Your troops should be rather more concentrated; that is, the Portuguese corps ought to be moved to their right, and nearer to the British.

2dly; The brigades at Chamusca, as well as the Portuguese brigades, which will be moved nearer to you, should be kept out of sight, so that you may move them without the enemy's knowledge. In this case, it would be still necessary to keep your piquets, &c. upon the river, and some red coats in Chamusca, in order that the enemy might not perceive the alteration, which ought to be made in the morning before daylight. The brigade of Almeirim cannot be moved, I am afraid, without being perceived by the troops on the heights of Santarem.

3dly; As the enemy have made the collection of boats on the Zezere, it would be advisable to have some artillery opposite to that point. Indeed, if the boats are within the range of field pieces, and any mischief can be done to them decidedly by the fire of field pieces, it is desirable that as much injury as possible should be done to them.

4thly; The passage of the Tagus by the enemy must be resisted as far as may be practicable; and every effort made to prevent them from establishing themselves on the left of the Tagus.

If they should pass in such force as that to attack them will be matter of risk, and it should be impossible to wait for instructions from me, your retreat should be upon Salvaterra.

P.S. You had better look out for cantonments at a little distance from the river; and alter your position according to the directions in this letter as soon as you please, reporting the detail to the Q. M. G.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.*

24th Dec. 1810.

In reply to Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton's renewed application for leave of absence for Brigade Major —, and enclosures, I have to acquaint you that the Brigade Major had leave of absence last year to England; and that an application for a similar indulgence to be so soon repeated cannot be attended to by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, in justice to other officers who profess to have equally strong reasons with himself. Besides which, I am to remark that there is no statement made of the imperious circumstances which demand Brigade Major —'s presence, and which make him declare they are paramount to every other

consideration in life; but the nature of which should have been in some measure laid before his Excellency, to justify a request for a leave of absence, he having so lately obtained a similar favor.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 25th Dec. 1810.

From the accounts which I have received from the frontier, it appears that a reinforcement is on its march to join the enemy which is not inconsiderable in number; and it is probable that they will soon join. I am doubtful whether, when this reinforcement joins, Massena will manœuvre upon our left, so as to oblige us to resume our position, which he will then attack; or will endeavor to extend his own left into the Alentejo, so as to acquire for himself and deprive us of the resources of that province.

Under these circumstances it is necessary that I should leave Gen. Hill's corps in Alentejo till the line of the enemy's operations shall be decided; and this corps is now disposed of to defend the passage of the Tagus, and it will not be easy to put it in motion, and get it into the lines as soon as might be wished.

Under these circumstances I send orders by this post that the 2d batt. 88th regt. may be collected and sent to Loures, as soon as it can be relieved by one battalion of the marines; and I should wish the other battalion of the marines to come up to Loures likewise. I have not yet received any official intimation from you respecting these marines; but I understand that the marines of the squadron would form one battalion; that which I shall wish should take the duty of Lisbon and the forts, particularly our works at S. Julian; and that the marines lately arrived should form the other, which is the one I should wish to have at Loures.

If I should order Gen. Hill's corps to cross the Tagus, the troops will march from Salvaterra, across the island of Lyceria, and embark at N<sup>a</sup> S<sup>a</sup> de Conceição, to be landed on the right of the lines at Alhandra. When, therefore, I shall request you to send up the boats, it will be to N<sup>a</sup> S<sup>a</sup> de Conceição, and it is desirable that that point should be reconnoitred by one of the Officers of the navy.

We have pulled down the walls, and laid open the road from Villa Franca to Alhandra to the fire of the gun boats, which still further strengthen that point.

I shall order back again to Lisbon the boats and materials for the bridge, which it is very obvious we shall not now require immediately.

P.S. Gen. Hill's infantry, the men's camp kettles, and officers' canteens only, will cross by Lyceria; the cavalry, artillery, and baggage, by Alden Galega.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Cartaxo, 25th Dec. 1810, 11 A.M.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received a letter from Gen. Silveira of the 19th, and from Gen. Bacellar from Coimbra, of the 21st.

It appears that the advanced guard of the enemy's corps, which had crossed the Coa, entered Celorico on the 18th, in the evening. Silveira and all the troops in Upper Beira were hanging upon their flank; and I should suppose that their advance from thence had not been very rapid, as Gen. Bacellar had not heard of their being in advance of Celorico. Silveira states this body to be Gardanne's division, which he calls 9000



infantry and 3000 cavalry. I doubt their having that number of cavalry; and if they have 9000 infantry, there are more than Gardanne's division.

I have received accounts from Estremadura, that the French division which was at Llerena has retired towards Cordova; so that the design of crossing the Tagus will not be facilitated by any movement from that side at present.

If you should deem it expedient to open a fire upon the boats, you had better let it be from the 3 brigades at once, so as to settle the matter.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Cartaxo, 25th Dec. 1810, 3 P.M.

Since I wrote to you this morning I have received further intelligence of the enemy's reinforcements, from which it is clear that the whole of the 9th corps are about to enter Portugal.

I think it a matter of doubt whether the enemy will endeavor, when joined by this reinforcement, to force the position of the allies in front of Lisbon, or will endeavor to extend beyond the Tagus, so as to open the Alentejo to himself and deprive us of the resources of that province. This is very certain, however, that if the enemy should make an attempt upon the position of the allies, he will lose no time about it after the plan is formed. The position has been sufficiently reconnoitred, and the day after we shall have retired to it, we may expect that it will be attacked.

I mention this, in order that you may bear it in mind in your arrangements for the defence of the Tagus. I think that for the present you had better leave Col. Campbell's brigade of Portuguese infantry at Salvaterra; Gen. Lumley's will of course stay at Almeirim, according to my letter of yesterday. You might bring the other brigade of Portuguese infantry nearer to yourself, with a view to the object referred to in my letter of yesterday, and your artillery.

Any part of the corps which shall cross the Tagus will be ordered to march across the island of Lyceria from Salvaterra; and I request you to have the dyke roads on the island well ascertained and known to the leaders of the columns. The baggage (with the exception of soldiers' camp kettles and officers' canteens), and the artillery and cavalry, will be ordered to Aldea Galega.

I recommend to you to make some cover for your artillery on the ground opposite the mouth of the Zezere, in order to give Don Carlos every advantage in defending it. It appears to me, also, that it would be desirable to bring near that point the whole of the 5th caçadores, with the exception of one company, which would be sufficient to guard the boats on the river opposite Abrantes. The officer to be left in command of this company, however, must be made to understand thoroughly what he has to do.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 25th Dec. 1810.

I have received letters which leave no doubt in my mind that Drouet's corps, as well as Gardanne's division, are entering Portugal, and I think you had better come up as soon as you can.

I don't think it quite clear whether the enemy will endeavor to extend beyond the Tagus, or to carry the position, when Drouet's people

come, which ought to be soon. This is very certain, that if they should attack the position, they will lose no time about it after they shall have once put themselves in motion, as the whole ground has been sufficiently reconnoitred, and must be well known. It is desirable, therefore, that the Ordenanza and volunteer artillery and infantry, and the militia, should be warned to be in readiness to go back to their old stations at the shortest notice.

I have sent to have the 2d batt. of your regiment, and one batt. of marines, brought to Loures, to be in readiness to occupy part of the space which must be left vacant by a part of Hill's corps being on the left of the Tagus.

To Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.

Cartaxo, 27th Dec. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you are the President, on the trial of Surgeon —, of the — batt. — regt.; and as I differ with the General Court Martial on the conclusions which they have drawn from the evidence which has been before them, and think that the case has not been sufficiently investigated in some points, I have to request that the Court will revise both their proceedings and their sentence.

In respect to the proceedings, I observe that Germano Baretto states, that *'after he had been in the guard house a certain time, a grenadier of the regiment came to him from Surgeon —, telling him that if he chose to pay 60 dollars he might be set at liberty.'*

Private C —, of the — regt., states that he was sent to Germano Baretto by Surgeon —, and it is desirable to ascertain by evidence whether private C — is the grenadier referred to in Baretto's evidence.

I then observe in Surgeon —'s written defence, that he states, that *'considering the mare my property, a proposition was made that, on a deposit of 60 dollars, he (Baretto) should be at liberty.'* Again, in another part of the statement before the Court, he says, *'I valued the mare at 60 dollars; and as she was likely to suit my purpose, and by putting the additional price which I was recommended to do, I was in hopes to get her back again.'*

In the original statement written to Gen. Sontag on the 29th Oct., on which Surgeon — says, in his statement before the Court, he means to rest his defence, the words are, *'I proposed to him (which I thought the proper mode of recovering the mare), that if he made a deposit of 60 dollars he might be at liberty.'*

Adverting to these statements in the defence, which amount to an acknowledgment of the fact alleged in the second charge, to which Baretto gives positive evidence, it is desirable to question private C — still further upon the nature of the communication he made to Baretto by desire of Surgeon —, if he should be the soldier who has carried on the communication between Surgeon — and Baretto.

So far as to the proceedings: then, in respect to the sentence, I observe that the Court Martial have excused Surgeon — in the first charge, on the plea, 1st, that *'he acted under the conviction that Baretto had stolen the mare;'* and, secondly, that *'he considered himself justified by the opinion given, and presence, of the Provost Marshal.'*

I would beg to observe in respect to the first plea, that there is no ground in evidence for any belief that Germano Baretti had stolen the mare, which could have justified his detention by any authority whatever. 2dly; that if there had been any ground for such belief, Surgeon — was not justifiable in confining him in a military guard house, particularly as the magistrates of Torres Vedras were on the spot; and, at all events, without the orders of his superior officers, likewise on the spot. I request the General Court Martial to consider what would be the situation of any officer who should, on such grounds, have confined to a military guard house in Great Britain any one of His Majesty's subjects.

I have to observe, in respect to the second plea, that the officer styled 'Provost Marshal' in the sentence of the Court is the Assistant Provost attached to the division (whose evidence, by the bye, Surgeon — might have produced to the Court preferably to that of his trumpeter), whose business it is to enforce the orders of the army, and preserve discipline among the soldiers and their followers, and not to administer justice between the officers of the army and the inhabitants of the country, nor to act as counsel to the officers of the army. The Assist. Provosts are not commissioned officers; and the General Court Martial will, by this part of their sentence, give them an authority in the concerns of the officers of the army which they certainly do not otherwise possess.

The revival of the proceedings which I have recommended on the second charge will throw more light upon it; but I wish to draw the attention of the Court particularly to the evidence of Baretti, and to the acknowledgment of Surgeon — in his defence as above quoted; and then I request them to consider whether it is probable that a man who must have known that justice would be done in his case (as I believe all the natives of this country know, who have had any dealings with the British army), would have offered 60 dollars to be released from the confinement in which he had been unjustly placed.

Whatever may be the opinion of the General Court Martial on the question of the guilt or innocence of the prisoner of the crime stated in this charge, after the revision of the proceedings and a consideration of what I have stated in this letter, I would suggest to them that it is not an honourable transaction to take money from a supposed thief, even upon his own offer, in order to compromise a prosecution for a robbery, much less is it honorable to take more money than the article or animal stolen is worth; and that there is nothing in such a transaction which entitles Surgeon — to the distinction of an honorable acquittal.

I request the Court to consider that Surgeon — confined Germano Baretti in the guard house for the purposes of justice, or to force him to pay a sum of money. If he confined him for the purposes of justice, he abandoned his purpose, and made a compromise with a supposed thief for the sum of 60 dollars, which is not an honorable transaction; and Surgeon — cannot be entitled to an honorable acquittal. If the Court conceived that he confined Germano Baretti to force him to pay a sum of money, the charge is proved, and the Court should sentence accordingly.

It gives me much concern to differ with this General Court Martial; and, as several of the officers composing it have but lately joined this

army, I shall conclude this address by assuring them that I have no personal knowledge of Surgeon —; that I brought him to trial before a General Court Martial, as an act of duty, almost exclusively upon his own statement; and that, as far as he is concerned, I am indifferent as to the result. I have a feeling, however, for the honor of the army and for the character of the country for justice; and I hope that the members of this General Court Martial will see the necessity of supporting the discipline and character of the army, by marking their own disapprobation of the transaction which has been brought under their consideration.

To Major Gen. A. Campbell.

Cartaxo, 27th Dec. 1810.

I enclose a letter from the Vicar of Alemquer, requesting to have the use of one church in Alemquer for divine service, with which request I wish you to comply; at the same time it is advisable that the inhabitants of Alemquer should not *settle* themselves in the town yet.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Cartaxo, 27th Dec. 1810.

I have just received your letter of the 26th.

You will have heard that a considerable reinforcement, it is said the 9th corps, is advancing by the road of the Ponte da Murcella. It is certain that the enemy will take a decided line one way or the other as soon as they join, which will be in a day or two. Under these circumstances, you will judge for yourself whether to go or to stay, without further reference to me, and will act accordingly. Let me know what you determine; and at all events send up Elley.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 27th Dec. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th inst.

I conceive it would be best not to land the seamen of the squadron, according to the wishes of the Admiralty; but Major Williams' battalion of marines had better proceed to Loures, and the other battalion do the duty of Lisbon and S. Julian. I have no doubt but that it will be found sufficient for the duties when Col. Peacocke shall have diminished the guards, and shall have got the Portuguese troops to take some of them. The troops should not have less than 2 nights in bed.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 27th Dec. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 25th and 26th. I did not write to you yesterday, as there was nothing new, and I expected you in the evening.

I now enclose a letter from Trant, stating the progress of the enemy, from which it appears that they will be about Thomar this day.

There is a report from Abrantes of a detachment having marched from the Zezere towards Castello Branco.

You will have heard that we have here the officer who was sent by Massena. The principal thing he says is, that Massena will not attack us unless he receives a reinforcement of 30,000 men. I do not think the 9th corps, with Gardanne, can be more than 20,000.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 27th Dec. 1810.

I enclose a letter and its enclosures which I have received from Lieut.

Col. Fletcher, of the Royal Engineers, reporting the death of a carpenter employed on the public works near Mafra by an accident; and as the widow left by this man is entitled to a provision from the Portuguese government, according to the rules of the service, as I am informed, I request you to lay these papers before the Sec. of State, that the provision to which she is entitled may be granted to her accordingly.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 27th Dec. 1810.

I have received your letter of the 24th Dec. I am convinced there is but one remedy for the inconveniences experienced respecting means of transport, and that is, that the old rule should be adopted of referring to the register, and that the magistrates should be obliged to do their duty, and punish the inhabitants who do not bring forward the means which are registered.

The difference of the hire paid by us might be a reason why the Portuguese army should want means of transport, but can afford none why we should experience the same inconvenience; but the government is the cause of this, as well as of every other failure; and the same inconveniences will continue as long as they continue to act upon the system of courting popularity.

The list of imports into the port of Lisbon is the strongest proof which can be afforded of the truth of what I have stated, viz., that they have drawn almost no resource from the northern and southern provinces of the Kingdom. They take willingly what you have got for them; but their own exertions have produced nothing.

You are quite right in tracing all the failures of the government to the want of money, which want could be supplied, I am convinced, by the means in their own power; but they will do nothing unless forced. I am very much dissatisfied with them; and unless they adopt a new system entirely, I shall state my opinion to our own government that the war cannot be carried on as long as things remain as they are.

The objection I have to the income tax is not that the rich merchants do not pay as much as they ought, according to the system, but that the system is so radically bad, that no person in Portugal pays one thousandth, instead of a tenth of his income. The tax is laid upon classes; that is to say, the incomes of the clergy, the nobility, merchants, lawyers, &c., are supposed to amount to certain gross sums, of which the government require a tenth, which the several classes divide among themselves; the rate of income supposed for no one class is equal to the real amount of the income of all the individuals; and then the people of Portugal talk of paying a 10 *per cent.* income tax as we do! Do they know that there is not an officer of this army from whose pay the tenth part is not now subtracted for the state? It is really too bad, and cannot be borne.

*The A.G. to Col. Peacocke, Lisbon.*

27th Dec. 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint you that 6 officers of the — regt. who have been tried by a General Court Martial at Chamusca, on charges of a very heinous and flagrant nature, have been ordered to proceed, under charge of an officer, to Lisbon, from the — division. On their arrival, you will direct them to be sent to Belem, where they are to remain under an arrest, at large, inasmuch as taking

the air for their health. But I am directed to remark to you, that it is expected by the Commander of the Forces that they shall neither appear in public at Lisbon, or at any place of amusement, nor associate with the other officers of the army; for the charges against them are of that nature that call for this prohibition on the part of his Excellency; and if it is not acceded to, you will be pleased to acquaint me, that further steps may be taken concerning them. They will remain at Belem, under the orders and superintendence of the Commandant, until such time as His Majesty's pleasure is known with regard to them.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Cartaxo, 28th Dec. 1810, 11 A.M.

I have just received your letter of 4 P.M. yesterday. I desired Col. Murray to write to you yesterday evening, to say that I wished Gen. Lumley's brigade to remain at Almeirim, or to be removed to Almeirim if it had marched from thence, and Col. Campbell's brigade of Portuguese infantry to Salvaterra, which disposition I beg may be carried into execution as soon as may be convenient, and if possible that the enemy may not observe it. Brig. Gen. Fonseca's brigade of Portuguese infantry may be cantoned at Chamusca, in the quarters occupied by Major Gen. Lumley's brigade; and those for whom there may not be room at Chamusca may be at Almeirim.

In respect to the disposition which you have detailed, it appears to me to answer well; excepting that it would have been desirable to keep the British infantry on the left of the Spaniards, or lower down the Tagus than the junction of the Zezere, by which measure this part of the force would be more collected.

I am concerned that you should conceive that I have directed you to keep in view objects 'in which you are almost sure of failing.' I am responsible, however, for these objects, and I hope they will not fail.

By the accounts which I have of the enemy's progress in the valley of the Mondego, he does not appear to me to move with great celerity. From the first accounts I thought it probable that the head of the column would be at Thomar yesterday. I do not think now it will be there till to-morrow.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Cartaxo, 29th Dec. 1810.

I have considered the papers from Mr. — which you left with me yesterday, and I am of opinion that, as Commander of the British army, I ought not to object to allow a letter to be forwarded to the Commander in Chief of the French army, which has for its object the attainment of a commercial advantage for a British subject. If, therefore, Mr. — continues to desire that his letter should be sent to Massena, it shall go through our advanced posts. I think, however, that there are some points which are worthy of the further consideration of Mr. —.

1st; It is not clear to me that the troops under the command of Massena have prevented the passage of Mr. —'s sheep. He commands the army of Portugal, which consists exclusively of the troops now in Portugal, and none others. These cannot have stopped Mr. —'s sheep.

2dly; Supposing Massena to be inclined to aid Mr. — in his speculations, he has not the power. His passport would not be regarded by the French officers not under his command, much less by the Spanish guerrillas, and the Portuguese commanders of militia and ordenanza. Indeed,

I doubt if the troops in Massena's own head quarters would allow a flock of Merinos to pass through them, although protected by his passport. These reasonings are founded upon the supposition that Massena would be inclined to attend to Mr. —'s application.

But 3dly; Adverting to the decrees, particularly those lately issued by Massena's master against all English commerce, can it be believed that Massena would venture to facilitate the commerce of a British subject in an article so valuable as Merino sheep, upon which so much jealousy is already entertained in France?

It may be said that all this may be true, and the only consequence of the application may be a refusal; but I would observe, that the failure of all advantage from the application being certain, it ought not to be made; and more particularly it ought not to be made and founded upon the documents which Mr. — has enclosed, the whole of which, with the application and the answer, will be published.

In this view of the subject, it might become a question whether I ought to allow the papers to pass through my post. The application supposes the French armies to be in possession of a much larger proportion of Spain than I believe them to be; and we may depend upon it that the Spanish government and people, and particularly the Cortes, who know that every sheep which is in the possession or power of the French is in their possession by robbery, or in their power by the effect of a usurpation, will not be pleased to see British subjects purchasing from their oppressors, and those who have robbed them of the animals which they value most, and thus furnishing the enemy with means, as far as they go, of carrying on the war.

However, I waive this consideration as affecting my decision on Mr. —'s application; but I think it well deserving his serious attention. I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate these opinions to Mr. —.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Cartaxo, 29th Dec. 1810.

In consequence of your expressing in your last letter to me so anxious a desire that Gen. Hill should relieve you in your command, and your apprehensions that the objects which I had in view might fail, I have requested Sir W. Beresford to go over and take the command of the troops on the left of the Tagus, till Gen. Hill's health shall be sufficiently re-established to enable him to resume his command.

I have heard no more from the Mondego or Alva of the progress of the enemy. The accounts which I had already received state that their advanced guard were at Maceira on the 22d, which is 6 leagues short of Moita, where Lobo's correspondent informs him they were on the same night.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 29th Dec. 1810.

Since I addressed you on the 22d inst. I have received reports that the enemy's troops, which had retired from Lower Beira in the end of last and the beginning of this month, had crossed the Coa at Almeida on the 15th and 16th inst., and had moved into Upper Beira by the roads of

Pinhel and Trancoso, and of Alverca and Celorico. I have not been able to ascertain exactly the strength of the body of troops which have entered by this frontier; but it is stated to be 16,000 or 17,000 men, and consists, I should imagine, not only of Gardanne's division, but of some, if not the whole, of the troops of the 9th corps. By the last accounts I have of these troops, their advanced guard had arrived at Maceira, in the valley of the Mondego, on the 22d, and their progress had not been rapid. But if they have continued their march, they ought by this time to be in communication with the enemy's posts in the neighbourhood of Thomar.

Gen. Silveira had retired his division of troops to Moimenta da Beira; but he, Gen. Miller, and Col. Wilson, were expected to act across the Mondego upon the flanks and rear of the enemy's troops, the whole of which, it appears, were marching on the left of that river.

No alteration has been made in the position of the enemy's troops in front of this army, excepting that a detachment of between 2000 and 3000, cavalry and infantry, had moved into Lower Beira across the Zezere, towards Castello Branco, probably with a view to gain intelligence.

By accounts from Estremadura it appears that Generals Mendizabal and Ballesteros have had some success in their operations against a French division belonging to Mortier's corps, which had been stationed at Llerena. They have obliged this division to retire to Guadalcanal with some loss.

It appears that Massena has till this moment had no communication with France, or even with the frontier of Spain, excepting that sent by Gen. Foy; and that he was ignorant of the march into Lower Beira of Gen. Gardanne's division in November. One of his aides de camp has lately been taken in Lower Beira in the disguise of a peasant, having upon him a paper, of which I enclose the copy.\* This person reports that the army still consists of the number of men which I had supposed, viz., 50,000; but that they are distressed for provisions, and in want of shoes and of every article of equipment. There has been lately no want of meat; but there had been no regular deliveries of bread to the soldiers since they entered Portugal. They received a certain quantity of the flour of Indian corn, or of Indian corn which they ground and made use of as they could. Their loss has been very severe, and they have still a very large number of sick.

When this person left Torres Novas on the 12th inst., he did not think it possible for them to remain in their position many days longer. The object of his mission was to urge forward the march of the reinforcements, which he said Massena expected would consist of the 9th and the 5th corps (Mortier's), and of the division under the command of Gardanne. He understood, that unless the reinforcements amounted to 30,000 men, Massena would retire to the frontiers of Spain across the Zezere, and by the road of Castello Branco; and that for this purpose he had established his bridges upon the Zezere; but from what he stated of the wants of the French army, of pay and resources of every description, and from the opinion which he said was generally entertained by the General officers, that to gain possession of Lisbon was an object worth the

\* See Appendix, No. XIV., and No. XXVI.



loss of half of their army, it appears they are reduced to those desperate circumstances, that there is no risk which they will not incur which affords any chance of attaining their object.

I have before informed your Lordship that it was my opinion that plunder was the original motive for the expedition into Portugal; and it is that for its continuance against every military principle, and at an immense sacrifice of men. Whatever may be Massena's opinion of his chance of success in an attack upon the allied army, I am convinced he will make it if he receives the order from Paris, whatever may be the amount of the reinforcement which will be sent to him. Under these circumstances, and having such an enemy to contend with, and knowing as I do, that there is no army in the Peninsula capable of contending with the enemy, excepting that under my command; that there are no means of repairing any large losses I may sustain; and that any success acquired by a large sacrifice of men would be followed by the most disastrous consequences to the cause of the allies, I have determined to persevere in the system which has hitherto saved all, and which I hope must end in the defeat of the enemy. Parts of Portugal have suffered, and continue to suffer from the invasion; but their sufferings have been occasioned in a great degree, and have been aggravated in every case, by the neglect or delay to adopt measures which I had recommended; and, at all events, it is better that a part of the country should suffer than that the whole should be lost.

I believe that the people of Lisbon and the neighbourhood have generally been supported by importations of provisions from foreign countries; and His Majesty's minister adopted measures some time ago, of which the effect must soon be felt, to secure large importations of provisions. The prices have been, and will probably continue to be high; but adverting to the large sums of money which the inhabitants of Lisbon have received, and are daily receiving for supplies, and for labor performed for the army, they are well able to pay these prices. Upon the whole, I entertain no doubt of the final success of the measures which I am carrying on; and, at all events, I am certain that they are the only measures which can be entirely successful.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 29th Dec. 1810.

My dispatch of this day will give you nearly all the information I have. Since I wrote it, however, I have an account from my posts on the Tagus, that the enemy commenced another bridge on the Zezere, on the night of the 27th. It is possible that at that time they had not received the account of the march of the reinforcement, though not very probable. I am not quite sure that they are not going to retire; but of this we may be certain, that they are going to do whatever has been ordered from Paris.

I have heard from Madrid to-day, that Gen. Foy had passed through that town on his way to Andalusia with orders for Soult. If this be true, it is probable that Mortier's corps, or even more troops, are directed to co-operate with Massena. I do not mind even that reinforcement; but as I believe you have some regiments of infantry in readiness to reinforce us, I think you will do well to send them out. If I should find that they

retire, which must be decided now in a few days, I can send them or others back; and I shall send home nearly all the transports.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. —.*

29th Dec. 1810.

In reply to your letter of the 26th inst., I have the honor to acquaint you that there is no General officer who has, as yet, received leave of absence to England on his private affairs; and the Commander of the Forces cannot, under the actual circumstances of the army, comply with your request. As his Excellency arranged, at your particular desire, that you should be removed from the staff of Cadiz to this army, the utmost that his Excellency can agree to is that you should return there, if your application for leave of absence from this country is renewed.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Cartaxo, 30th Dec. 1810.

In consequence of Major Gen. Stewart having repeated his anxiety that you should return to resume your command, and stated his opinion that certain objects which I had held out to his attention must fail, I have prevailed upon Sir W. C. Beresford to go over the Tagus and take charge of affairs there till you shall be sufficiently recovered to join the army. Although I am anxious that you should join again, I beg you will not think of moving until your health shall be firmly re-established; as, however important it is in every view to have you back with your command, it is more important that you should be sufficiently well to remain when you do come.

You will have heard that the enemy have got in a reinforcement, which I believe must have joined them. By the accounts which we got last night it would appear that this reinforcement consists of only one division of the 9th corps; and if this be true, all other appearances look like a retreat. However, it is impossible to form any judgment of transactions which have been carried on with no fixed principle, and are in the unnatural state in which the French are at present.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 30th Dec. 1810.

I enclose my dispatch written yesterday, which contains nearly all the news from hence. Since writing it I have heard further of the progress of the French reinforcements, which must have communicated with their posts on the 26th; yet, strange to say, the prisoners taken yesterday know nothing of it.

From what Silveira writes I should think that only one division had moved forward. If that be true, it is probable that the whole will retire.

I hear from Madrid that Gen. Foy passed through that city before the 16th, on his road to Andalusia, with orders to Soult.

*The A.G. to Col. Arentschildt, 1st hussars, K.G.L.*

30th Dec. 1810.

I have the honor to acquaint you, in reply to your letter of the 29th inst., that there is no doubt that verbal wills made by naval and military persons are considered as valid by the law of England. You will therefore have the circumstances stated in your letter, regarding the desire of the dying man to see his brother, put in the form of an affidavit; you will then swear to the truth of it; and the surgeon and the old man should write down and swear to the wishes of the dying man respecting his property. With these documents there will be no difficulty in securing the property to his brother.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. —, — regt.

30th Dec. 1810.

I was under the necessity of communicating your private letter of your return to your regiment, to the Commander of the Forces; and he has directed me to acquaint you that he is very glad you join your regiment again; but that he fears you have forgotten the circumstances under which your leave of absence was granted. They were a declaration on your part that you had business of the most urgent nature, and an assertion from Col. Mackinnon that he had seen the letters from your family which warranted *him* in making the application.

The Commander of the Forces applauds the zeal which induces an officer to return to his regiment when there is a prospect of its being called into fire; but he cannot avoid observing, that the duties and discipline of the army in their cantonments and on their marches are as important as any other which an officer in your situation has to perform; and if you could postpone your business in order to resume the command of your regiment in one instance, it ought to have been postponed in order to remain in command of it 'when employed in a campaign,' in the other.

To Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.

Cartaxo, 31st Dec. 1810.

I have received your 2 letters of this day's date, and I am very much concerned that I was out yesterday when you did me the favor to call.

The proceedings of the General Court Martial on private — of the — regt. have been sent to England to be laid before His Majesty, as it was necessary that his pleasure should be taken respecting the place to which — should be transported. I considered it most respectful to ask for his commands upon the sentence which had been passed upon him. I shall be obliged to you to let me know whether you wish that your letter respecting — should be transmitted to be laid before His Majesty.

In respect to the sentence on the trial of Surgeon — I am concerned that I cannot concur in it, although I shall confirm it. Surgeon —'s own words in his statement to Gen. Sontag, as well as in his defence, proved, in my opinion, the case of the prosecution on the second charge; and I am further of opinion that if private C — had not been led in his examination by Surgeon —, and if he had been asked whether he carried a message to Baretti, and what that message was, the result would have been the same, and would have equally supported the prosecution: as he was examined, Surgeon — put the words of the answer with the question; for this reason I wished him to be examined by the Court. I do not think what Mr. Nelson said is at all material to the case.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 31st Dec. 1810.

I have just received letters from Cadiz to the 23d, and I enclose the copy of a letter which the Admiral has received from Sir R. Keats, and a copy of one which Sir R. Keats has written to my brother, stating that troops had marched with Soult from the siege of Cadiz; so that I think it probable that we shall soon hear of their movements towards the frontiers of Portugal.

It is desirable that, as soon as you shall receive this letter, you should send directions to have all the *barcas* on the Guadiana secured on this side of the river, or probably destroyed, in order to force them at all events to go round by the bridge of Merida.

The prospect of the advance of a corps from the south into Alentejo is a new case in your situation on the left of the Tagus, upon which I will communicate to you my opinion.

You will have seen the description given of the boats collected in the Zezere, and the accounts of the manufacture of oars; from which it is obvious that they are intended for the passage of the Tagus. I have nothing more from the Mondego or Alva; and it is very extraordinary that the prisoners taken on the 29th did not know of the arrival of the reinforcements, which must have been in communication on the 26th, and must have joined on the 27th. The corps mentioned by Keats amounted, according to the last return I had of them, to 4480.

The provisioning of Abrantes will now be a most interesting point. Pray write to Lisbon to have the utmost exertion made to supply workmen to complete our works on the left of the Tagus.

P.S. I find that the letter from Madrid, mentioning Foy's journey, is dated the 16th, so that it is not impossible that he carried the orders to Soult.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Cartaxo, 31st Dec. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th inst., and at the same time one from Mr. Wellesley of the 23d, conveying the intelligence that a detachment of the enemy's troops, hitherto employed in the siege of Cadiz, had marched to the northward under Soult, probably to co-operate with Massena against the allies in Portugal. This intelligence receives corroboration from the accounts which we have received here of the passage of Gen. Foy through Madrid before the 16th, from Paris, with orders for Soult.

Under these circumstances it is not probable that a serious attack will be immediately made upon Cadiz; and if you should be decidedly of opinion, from the intelligence received at Cadiz, that these troops and Mortier's corps have marched into Portugal, I request you to have the Chasseurs Britanniques embarked in the ships which will sail from the Tagus at the same time with this letter, and send this regiment round to the Tagus. If, however, you should think it expedient to detain the Chasseurs Britanniques, I beg you to send back the ships. I also request you will send on the troops expected from Sicily, if they should arrive at Cadiz. It is desirable not to send the German deserters, who have been attached to the Chasseurs Britanniques.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 31st Dec. 1810.

I have received your letters of the 18th and 23d inst., and although I sent you yesterday all the intelligence I had to communicate, I do not delay sending you an answer to those letters by the ships which I send to Cadiz, eventually to bring away the Chasseurs Britanniques.

The conduct of the Cortes, in respect to the late Regency, is shocking; and I much fear, from all that I see and hear, that unless I can defeat the enemy, and hold my ground in this country, the whole game in Spain is at an end.

I have no doubt of the truth of the intelligence sent you by Adm. Keats, forwarded in your letter of the 23d; and I have written to Gen. Graham, to request him to send round the Chasseurs Britanniques, and the

remainder of the Sicilian reinforcement when it shall arrive, if he should believe it to be true.

I have no intelligence from Silveira which can throw light upon the movements of the other troops.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 31st Dec. 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th inst., in answer to which I have to inform you that, under the circumstances of the moment, there can exist no necessity for sending vessels to remove the troops from Cadiz.

The information brought from Cadiz of the 23d inst. shows that the Cortes have either repealed or modified their decree for the removal from Cadiz of the members of the late Regency; and so much dissatisfaction is not now felt upon the subject.

It is desirable, however, that we should have the services of the Chasseurs Britanniques in this country from Cadiz; and I write by this opportunity to Lieut. Gen. Graham, to request that this corps may be sent here, if he should believe that the troops in Andalusia have actually marched for Portugal. You will be better informed than I can be whether Sir R. Keats possesses the means of transporting this regiment; but if you should think he does not possess them, I request you to send to Cadiz troop ships of war, if there are any in the Tagus, if not, coppered transports to convey 1000 men. If Gen. Graham should not think proper to send this regiment, it is desirable that these ships should return to the Tagus.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 31st Dec. 1810.

I enclose a letter from Gen. Campbell, which shows that before he had received my letter, containing the representation of the wish of the inhabitants of Alemquer, to have the use of one of their churches, which you had transmitted, he had already given them what they required, and they had used it.

I have received your letter of the 30th Dec. I have already had great difficulty in arranging the business of quartering the officers of the army at Lisbon, and have given orders upon this subject in respect to that town and other parts of Portugal, of which I enclose copies. I cannot be certain that these orders have in every instance been obeyed; but it is difficult to have orders obeyed by the officers which affect their own convenience, when the inhabitants of the towns do not attend to any regulations upon the same subject; and I receive innumerable complaints, particularly of the conduct of the inhabitants of Lisbon.

In respect to Dom M. Forjaz's regulations, they look very well upon paper, but who will attend to them? The officers of the British army in England are not billeted upon private houses, but upon inns. There is not an inn in Portugal, in which an officer could be billeted, and it would follow that, owing to the deficiency of inns, the officers must go into the streets. The soldiers also, where there are no convents to cover them, must be exposed to the open air, because there are no public houses in which they can be billeted: but Dom M. Forjaz will probably have no objection to their being billeted where we like in the country,

contrary to the proposed regulation and our own law, which is to be introduced here, provided Lisbon is not disturbed by either officers or soldiers! I do not see what further steps I can take in the business; and I only desire that when my order is disobeyed complaint may be made, stating the name of the person, and that the complainant may be prepared to prove his story before a Court Martial.

I declare that I think it disgraceful to the Portuguese government, and to the people of Lisbon in particular, that such a proposition should have been made as has come from Dom M. Forjaz. They have now part of one battalion in Lisbon, and some convalescents at Belem; some of the officers attached to whom must be lodged in the town. They have besides some sick and wounded officers there, and occasionally a regiment passes a night or two in Lisbon, when it lands from England or from Cadiz. Are the people of Lisbon so inhospitable that the officers of these corps must be put, on their landing, into cold, damp, and dark empty houses, without the chance of getting anything to eat? Is there an inn or tavern at Lisbon to which an officer can go in such circumstances?

But I forgot, the General officers of the army, those upon the staff, the officers of the Guards (for the others can but ill afford the expense), do occasionally go to Lisbon for a day or two for their amusement. Is Dom M. Forjaz serious in expressing a wish that officers of this description should go into empty houses, or into the street? Is this the mode in which the cause of Portugal is to be made popular in the British army? Is every consideration to be sacrificed to the caprice and ease of the people of Lisbon? Are officers of this class, am I and Marshal Beresford, to be provided with a lodging upon billet; but the others who go there upon duty, and who can less afford, or bear the hardship, be put into the empty houses or into the street? For my part, I do not go often to Lisbon; but if the rule is made for one class it must for all, and I will have no lodging upon billet any more than any other officer of the army. The circumstances stated by Dom M. Forjaz respecting the mode of lodging the British officers formerly, suit neither the circumstances of the army nor of the times. I declare that I have no patience with the constant efforts which I see made by the government to indulge the caprice and ease of the people of Lisbon, at the expense of every other consideration; and they prefer to have recourse to any expedients rather than oblige them to do what they dislike, which is, when they make a complaint of an officer, to appear before a Court and prove it.

You will have seen the intelligence contained in my brother's letter of the 23d, respecting the breaking up of some battalions from the army of the siege of Cadiz. I am certain that we are about to have another grand advance of the enemy. The works on the left of the Tagus are not going on near so fast as they ought, for want of hands. Capt. Goldfinch has lately had only 200 men instead of 4000. It is curious that, notwithstanding the people are said to be starving, and we are ready to give them work, and money and bread in payment, the government and their officers are unable to collect them for us!

The French will be in Alentejo before those works will be prepared, and then there will be a fine breeze in Lisbon.

To Brig. Don M. Alava.

Cartaxo, ce 1 Janvier, 1811.

Je vous suis bien obligé de vos deux lettres. Les affaires Espagnoles n'ont pas prospéré dernièrement; mais quand elles seraient au pire, il faut toujours espérer qu'elles deviendront meilleures.

J'ai écrit au Général Virnes pour lui dire ce qu'il faudrait faire pour ouvrir la communication entre Badajoz et Elvas. Il a au moins 10,000 hommes, dont 1500 de cavalerie; et si j'avais 10,000 Anglais ou Portugais disponibles au lieu de 10,000 Espagnols, je crois que Sout ne pourrait pas faire le siège de Badajoz. Mais on a si mal arrangé les troupes Espagnoles qu'on ne peut compter sur rien, et voilà la grande difficulté. En tout cas, je ne puis faire plus pour Badajoz que quand les renforts arriveront de l'Angleterre.

J'ai écrit au Général Ballesteros pour lui dire le secret qu'on comptait faire une sortie de Cadiz le 28; et pour le prier de se porter sur Seville aussitôt que Gazan marcherait vers Cadiz, ce qu'il fera sûrement à la première alarme. Alors on détachera de la troupe de Badajoz, ou de Cadiz vers Seville; et si on fait l'un ou l'autre la cause y gagnera quelque chose.

J'ai prié Ballesteros de ne pas se compromettre dans une mauvaise affaire; mais que si l'ennemi marchait vers Seville de Badajoz il devait repasser la Guadiana et joindre la troupe auprès d'Elvas, afin de faire relever le siège entièrement. Je ne sais pas si toute cette combinaison réussirait, mais c'est tout ce que je pourrai faire à présent.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 1st Jan. 1811.

I have just received your letter of yesterday. There is really no reason for fagging Otway's brigade of cavalry. A few videttes upon the river are all that can be required from him.

Chamusca formerly held 2 British regiments of infantry. It has now one of British infantry, and I should think might hold the whole, or at all events a great part, of Fonseca's Portuguese brigade. That part of Fonseca's brigade which cannot be in Chamusca should be in the nearest place in which, down the river, it is possible to put them; and if they cannot be put elsewhere, they should be in Almeirim, and if there should not be room there, besides, for Gen. Lumley's brigade of British infantry, some of the regiments of this brigade should be moved lower down to Mugem or elsewhere.

I see no objection to the occupation of Arripeado. It would be better if all the troops could be not only out of reach, but also out of sight from the right of the river; but as this cannot be, they must only occupy those points in which they can be cantoned with convenience, till the enemy shall oblige them to withdraw from them; but I should think they would have the worst of a system of annoyance to cantonments.

I enclose a letter from Austin, and one which I have received this day from Stewart, and my answer. Nothing has come from Coimbra since you went away. The 14 battalions must be Claparède's division, and can-

G. O.

Cartaxo, 1st Jan. 1811.

Capt. Lord FitzRoy Somerset is appointed Military Secretary to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, from the 25th ult.

not be more than 8000 men, and the cavalry and artillery and gendarmes may be 500 or 600 more.

P.S. Return the enclosed letters.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 1st Jan. 1811.

I enclose the letters just received from Bacellar. I keep that to D'Urban, as being of the same date and to the same purport with that to Lemos, and it will be useful to me as a memorandum.

I likewise enclose Silveira's letters of the 22d and 23d, enclosing a letter from Salamanca of the 14th. In this you will observe that 3 battalions of the 8th, 24th, and 45th, are stated to be at Salamanca on the 14th, whereas they are, in Wilson's list, sent to Bacellar. The sentence, however, in the Spanish letter, may be construed as meaning that the 2 pieces of cannon which remain at Salamanca came from Valladolid with the 8th, 24th, and 45th regts.; and I think Wilson is not mistaken in his battalions, which are 11 of those of the 9th corps, and are in one division in my book.

It is unlucky that our correspondents, when they state a circumstance one day, and find themselves mistaken in it the next, do not correct themselves and state their error; and owing to this omission our accounts are never consistent. Wilson talks, in his letter to Bacellar of the 25th, of another division crossing the Alva higher up. In his letter to D'Urban of the 27th, he says only one division has crossed the Alva, and the others are following; and he talks of the division which has crossed consisting of 14 battalions, of which he has given Bacellar the list, whereas he has given Bacellar the list of only 11. The other division of the 9th corps consists of 15 battalions, of which I have not got the account of the arrival in Castille of more than 12. The halt of the 4000 men at Pinhel is a curious circumstance.

P.S. In Grant's letter of the 27th, he says that the enemy's division which left Celorico marched by Arganil and Goes; and as Wilson mentions that 10 battalions passed the Alva, and in his second letter talks of 14 battalions, I am inclined to think that both divisions have come in, one of 11, the other of 14 battalions; and that one has passed the Alva at Murcella, the other at Arganil; and that the prisoners taken on the first day belonged to the first, and on the second day to the second. However, this depends upon the truth of Grant's report.

To Col. Peacocke.

Cartaxo, 1st Jan. 1811.

You were President of a General Court Martial, which tried a driver of the artillery, in the month of February last, for robbing a chapel. The sentence of the Court Martial was not put in orders; and, as well as I recollect, I sent it for the confirmation of His Majesty; but I have no document to show what I did with it. I shall know whether I sent it for His Majesty's confirmation when I see what the sentence of the Court was; and I shall be obliged to you if you will endeavor to recollect it, and inform me of it. Lieut. Crampton was the Judge Advocate, and could possibly assist your memory.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 1st Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of yesterday, and I acknowledge that I do



not understand the object in view in bringing forward the papers of which you have enclosed copies.

They are memorandums of arrangements between the government and Beresford, when he assumed the command of the Portuguese army; and I doubt whether they are the whole that passed between the government and Beresford upon that occasion; and he is not here to give me the information. But the arrangement, or understanding, by which the general operations of both armies were placed in the hands of the British Commander in Chief was, I believe, made by the Secretary of State through His Majesty's minister at Lisbon. I was so informed when I left England in April, 1809; and I think it certain that, when the King's ministers sent a British General to take the command of the Portuguese army, they took care to stipulate for such an arrangement, as that there should be no difference between him and the Commander in Chief of the British army in the Peninsula. Beresford could not, of course, have made such a stipulation; it must have been made by some superior authority, and is merely referred to and acknowledged by him.

In respect to me, I arrived in April, and was immediately appointed by the government to be Marshal General of the army. This appointment was made partly by way of compliment to me, and partly, as I understood, to provide for my having the general control over the operations of both armies, without reference to the arrangement which had been made on that subject by the King's government for their own Commander in Chief.

I was afterwards appointed Marshal General of the army by the Prince Regent, with the same powers and privileges as the Duque de Lafoës; and, indeed, it was intended by that appointment, which was the result of an intrigue (of the Principal Sousa I believe), that I should conduct not only the general operations, but the detail of the Portuguese army; and, upon conference with the Regency, I declined to do more than conduct the general operations, as connected with those of the British army; and, by their desire, wrote them a letter in Oct. 1809, in which I recommended that the separate command of the Portuguese army should be continued to Beresford: so this question stands. I conduct the operations of the Portuguese army as Marshal General, without any reference to the Secretariat, and as Commander in Chief of the British army under the stipulation, which I believe was made by the British Government when they allowed a British General to be appointed to the chief command of the Portuguese army.

I agree with you in thinking that it is best not to give any answer to Dom M. Forjaz's note, at least till you shall be informed whether the stipulation, which I suppose, was really made by the King's government. It certainly ought to have been made, otherwise the Commander in Chief of the King's army could not be responsible for the operations, nor the King's government for any thing more than the employment of an army in this country. But I think it as well to apprise you of these facts, and this reasoning, in case there should be any further discussion on this subject in the Regency.

There is one point on which I think you are mistaken, and that is, my .

being a member of the Regency. You will not see my name in any commission of the government, nor is there any appointment of the kind that I know of. The government are only desired to consult me, and to act according to my opinion on all military and financial subjects, even when I am absent from Lisbon. But I do not conceive that I have any right to act or deliberate as a Regent. I refer you to the different *Carta Regia* upon this subject.

The conduct of the Patriarch and of the Principal is very improper. I am convinced, from this conduct, as well as from other circumstances which have come to my knowledge, that these persons are endeavoring to form an Anti-English party; which affords another reason for removing the Principal from Lisbon.

The accounts from Austin, of the 27th, confirm those from Cadiz of the 23d, of the assembly of a body of troops from Seville, and of the march of Soult from Cadiz. It is possible, however, that, as the accounts from Cadiz come by Faro, Austin may have received them from Cadiz likewise.

*The A.G. to A.A.Gs. of divisions.* (Circular.)

1st Jan. 1811.

I have to call your particular attention to the inaccuracy which prevails in many of the returns called for by this department from the different divisions of the army. I need not impress on your mind what infinite trouble this gives in this office, and what extreme delay it causes in the making up the general returns. This difficulty might be so easily obviated by a little more attention in the examinations of all returns in your division, that I must beg leave earnestly to press it on your attention and consideration; and should you have any difficulty at any time, either in the form of the return that is required, or the accuracy with which it is expected to be filled up, I would entreat of you to refer for every information on these heads, or any other embarrassment that may arise, to this office, which would put you in possession of what is required, and prevent those endless embarrassments and delays which arise from the too hasty examination of the divisional returns of this army.

My object in this letter is by no means to underrate your zeal or abilities, but if possible to accomplish an accurate examination, in every division, of the returns called for by the G. O. of this army, agreeably to the forms with each division, by each A. A. G., as takes place at this office. This would not only lessen the trouble here excessively, but, in proportion as the army becomes more numerous, would lessen considerably the weight of business and the responsibility to the person at the head of the department.

*The A.G. to Col. Paucotte, Lisbon.*

1st Jan. 1811.

I have the honor to acquaint you that a French officer who was taken up in the disguise of a peasant near Sabugal, was yesterday sent under charge of an Assist. Provost to Lisbon. You will be pleased to have him detained in custody, without permitting any persons to communicate with him, until you shall receive his Excellency's further pleasure concerning him. He is to have such money advanced to him as is necessary for his comfort and subsistence.

There is also a person who deserted from the enemy, and who was employed in the French Commissariat department; as he states himself to be a Portuguese, you will be pleased to have inquiry made about him, and communicate to me in what way it may be best to dispose of him.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 2d Jan. 1811.

The letters which I now send, including one from Silveira of the 24th Dec., would tend to show that the 2d division of the 9th corps had not yet come in: but it still appears that some troops passed by Arganil and Goes; and it is unfortunate that Col. Wilson has not either explained or

contradicted the report in his letter of the 25th, stating that the 2d division was passing the Alva higher up. The Marques de la Romana had yesterday a letter from Mendizabal, from Llerena, of the 26th, and one from the superintendent of the posts at Badajoz, of the 29th; neither of them mentioning the assembly of troops at Seville.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 2d Jan. 1811.

I enclose a letter from the Marques de la Romana to Mendizabal, which it is desirable should be sent forward as soon as possible, by the shortest road, which appears to be direct from Abrantes. Will you be so kind as to forward it? It contains directions to him to be prepared to break the bridges of Merida and Medellin, and to prevent the enemy from crossing the Guadiana if possible.

*The A.G. to Capt. Craig, D.A.A.G., Lisbon.*

2d Jan. 1811.

A battalion of Royal marines has landed, and has marched to Loures for the present. You will be pleased to wait on Major Williams, the commanding officer at that place, and acquaint him that you are attached as D.A.A.G. to such marines, &c., as may be landed, and act with the army. You will acquaint him with the necessary returns to be transmitted, and the G. O. shall be forwarded as soon as I understand that the head quarters of these corps is at Alhandra or Loures, which you will acquaint me of. You will also assist Major Williams in all other particulars in which you can be of service.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 3d Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of yesterday's date. I cannot find in my map the place mentioned by Dom M. Forjaz's correspondent at Mourão, that of the assembly of the enemy's army. But I thought it most probable that they would enter Alentejo by one of the lower fords or ferries of the Guadiana, and they might have assembled some troops in the neighbourhood of Mourão.

I am afraid that we shall be mistaken, if we reckon upon the French not quitting Andalusia on account of the operations of the Spaniards. They will carry on no operations, excepting by their guerrillas; and I am sorry to say that I observe, in several letters which the Marques de la Romana has shown me lately, complaints of the conduct of the guerrillas towards the inhabitants of the villages near which they happen to come.

G. O.

Cartaxo, 2d Jan. 1811.

2. The Commander of the Forces experiences great difficulty in expressing his sense of the conduct of Surgeon —, consistently with the respect which is due to the opinion of the General Court Martial by which he was tried.

3. The Commander of the Forces has frequently urged the officers and soldiers of the army to treat kindly the inhabitants of this country, from whom they have received every assistance, and upon every occasion the most cordial good treatment. But Surgeon —, forgetful of these orders, and of the common justice due from one man to another, confined — in the regimental guard house, contrary to the orders of the army, and the laws of this and every other civilised country.

4. The officers and soldiers of the army are again warned, that they have no more right to confine in a military guard an inhabitant of Portugal, than they would have to confine one of His Majesty's subjects in Great Britain; and he forbids the practice.

5. The release of —, without orders from the Commanding officer of the regiment, was as unmilitary a proceeding as his confinement in the guard house was improper; and for the whole of this conduct the Commander of the Forces directs that this reprimand may be read to Surgeon — at the head of the troops stationed at Torres Vedras.

I enclose a letter from Austin of the 29th. The Marques has one of the 31st from Badajoz, which does not notice any assembly of troops at Badajoz.

I have considered Lieut. Foster's report as all that we have referrible to the subject of the passage of the troops to Alhandra from the left bank of the Tagus. It is obvious that the road described by Lieut. Foster will not answer; nor will it answer to depend upon embarking the troops immediately below Salvaterra, where we have been coursing, to carry them to Lyceria, on account of the time that operation will take, which will not leave a sufficiency of daylight for the other operations which the troops will have to perform on the same day that they will leave Salvaterra. The next thing to do is to construct a bridge across the south branch of the Tagus, at Çamora Correa, and to make the troops cross there to the island of Lyceria. The troops at Salvaterra would then have to march 9 miles to Çamora, and 8 miles from thence to Alhandra. But in this movement they would have the rivers of Benavente and Çamora to cross, the former of which, in case of rain, is nearly impracticable, unless they go up to Caruxe. In case of such a fall of rain, I might want these two brigades on the right bank of the Tagus; but it is not very likely that I should require them on the left bank, at least in a great hurry, as the enemy would not be likely to make an attempt to pass at such a time, and if he did, the passage would be so difficult that but few men could pass at a time, and so large a body would not be required to oppose him. That, therefore, which I propose, and wish you to carry into execution, is 1st; to order a bridge to be constructed from Çamora Correa to the island of Lyceria, and to have the dyke road marked from the bridge to N<sup>o</sup> S de Conceição. 2dly; to order Campbell's brigade to Benavente and Çamora Correa; and if there should be any serious difficulty in crossing the river at Çamora Correa in heavy rains, the whole should be there. 3dly; to distribute Gen. Lumley's brigade at the three places of Almeirim, Mugem, and Salvaterra, one battalion at each, with orders that as soon as the river at Benavente begins to fill, the regiments at Salvaterra should cross to Benavente, and the others to close up to Salvaterra, and to be in readiness to follow.

According to this disposition, I shall be sure of having Campbell's brigade on the right of the Tagus the first day, and the other on the second day; while they will be nearly as conveniently situated for your purposes as they are at present, excepting in case of heavy rains, when you will not require them.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 3d Jan. 1811.

I have this day received your letter of the 1st inst.

In respect to quartering the officers at Lisbon, I recommended that the G. O. should be either published or circulated there among the inhabitants, from which they will see the degree in which the officers of the army are in their power; and that they should be informed that they must not refuse to receive an officer who has a billet on their house, under pain of punishment by fine, to be really levied upon complaint of the officer.

They should also be encouraged to complain of any officer who treats them ill, or who requires more from his landlord than the G. O. entitles him to demand; but they must be prepared to substantiate their complaints by proof upon oath before a General Court Martial, otherwise I have it not in my power to give them redress. If all this be done, I shall draw the attention of the officers again to the G. O. upon this subject, and I shall desire the acting Q. M. G. at Lisbon to take care that every regiment which arrives gets a copy of them, and that every officer who goes down from the army and obtains a billet shall read them upon receiving his billet.

All this would answer any where but in Portugal. But here I know that the police will not levy the fines; that the landlords will make difficulties about receiving the officers billeted upon them; that the officers will commit outrages; and that there will be no want of complaints, but no names will be mentioned, nor any descriptions given, nor any proofs adduced.

I am glad to see that government have drawn so much grain from Alentejo; but I am very certain that they have not drawn from that province one third of what it can afford. The want of money, however, must have prevented them from drawing supplies both from the northern and southern provinces in the quantities which both could afford. But though the government have not money to advance to purchase supplies for the consumption of the capital, there are persons there who have capitals which they would lay out in this manner, if the government would encourage them. They might require our credit and influence to prevail upon persons of this description to embark in those speculations, with which I have always been willing to assist them as far as I have had any thing to say to the subject. But since the Principal Sousa has been in the government there has been a coldness towards us, and a want of confidence in all their proceedings, which, if it continue, must end in the loss of the country.

I observe that Dom M. Forjaz's letters upon the removal of property to places of safety in Alentejo are dated, some of them, as far back as July, and others in September. These orders, and I fear those regarding the laborers on the left of the Tagus, are just so much waste paper. I never entertained a doubt that Dom M. Forjaz would make the best arrangement, and give all the necessary orders for the performance of any service; but there exists in the people of Portugal an unconquerable love of their ease, which is superior even to their fear and detestation of the enemy. Neither will they, or their magistrates, or the government, see that the temporary indulgence of this passion for tranquillity must occasion the greatest misfortunes to the state and hardships to the individuals themselves; and no person in the country likes to have his tranquillity and habits disturbed for any purpose, however important, or to be the instrument of disturbing those of others. Thus every arrangement is defeated, and every order disobeyed with impunity. The magistrate will not force the inhabitants to adopt a measure, however beneficial to the state and himself, which will disturb his old habits; and the government will not force the magistrate to do that which will be disagreeable to him and to the people: thus we shall go on to the end of time.

*The A.G. to A.A.Gs. of divisions. (Circular.)*

3d Jan. 1811.

As much irregularity has prevailed in sending in the contingent accounts of the officers belonging to this department, and as in some instances they have been sent to the Military Secretary direct, and in others forwarded to me, to include in my contingent account, a considerable period after they ought to have been given in, I have to request you will attend to the following instructions in future, in regard to the accounts of your contingent expenses in your division, and I beg they may be strictly adhered to. The contingent accounts to be made up on the 25th of every second month, commencing from 25th Dec. 1810. They will then arrive at this office by the 1st of the following month, and be examined and included in the general return of the Adj. Gen. All expenses within that period to be included, and all receipts for disbursements must be obtained and annexed. Copies of the forms of clerks' receipts, &c., that are necessary, are herewith annexed.

You will perceive by the receipts sent herewith that the stationery is to be taken up generally in the name of the Adj. Gen. of the Forces, although your account is to be accompanied by separate vouchers that the stationery has been used for the public service only, which will enable me to pass a general voucher to the same purport.

It also appears to me necessary to acquaint you that an allowance for a clerk of 2s. per day is all that can in any instance be allowed to an A. A. G. or a D. A. A. G. with a division; and where there has been a larger allowance granted, it must in future be discontinued, as all the clerks must appear on the same allowance, and it is considered this is ample remuneration for the trouble they have.

I must also acquaint you that if the regular accounts are not sent in as directed, or satisfactory reasons given of the complete inability to do so, from unforeseen accidents or circumstances, the contingent account will not be admitted or sent to the Military Secretary.

To P. Rawlings, Esq., Dep. Commissary General.

Cartaxo, 4th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 2d inst., and I have repeatedly told Mr. Kennedy, that if he would recommend that you should have leave of absence, I would grant it; but, as he did not think proper to recommend that your application should be complied with, I desired that it might be referred to the Commissary in Chief.

It is expected from every officer at the head of an army, that he will oblige the officers attached to the several departments to do their duty, and that he will not allow them to absent themselves excepting for sufficient cause. The public acknowledge no cause sufficient for the absence of any officer from his duty, excepting health, which must be certified by the regular medical authorities. Besides this cause of absence, I have admitted of another in this army, which I believe never before was admitted in an army upon actual service, and for which I am scarcely justifiable; and that is, business, the settlement of which requires the presence of the officer in England, and is paramount to every other consideration in life.

As the head of the Commissariat department in England is responsible that this army shall be well supplied with officers to perform the duty, it is still more doubtful whether I am justifiable in allowing an officer of the Commissariat to quit his duty on that plea, without the consent of the Commissary in Chief; and it is certainly not justifiable without the consent of the Commissary Gen. of this army. I must, therefore, refer you to Mr. Kennedy.

I have thought proper to enter into this explanation upon this subject,

which it appears to me that you have misunderstood; and I assure you that I have no desire to apply this, or any other rule of the service, to your case, in a manner different from that in which it is applied to the case of every other officer in a similar situation in the army.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 4th Jan. 1811, 10 A.M.

I enclose a letter from Sir W. Erskine, enclosing one from Pack.

I shall speak to the Commissary Gen. regarding the assistance to be given to Pack; but I fear that we cannot supply mules to carry forage for the mules attached to his brigade, and they must supply themselves, or we must withdraw his brigade altogether nearer to the forage. Some of the dragoons of this army send 3 leagues for straw.

The militia employed at work on our lines were to be paid 2 *vintems per diem*, according to the arrangement which you made when the works were begun; and I recollect perfectly to have given orders that the militia of Le Cor's brigade, employed in the Alhandra district, should be paid for their work, (although it was strictly for their own defence, and contrary to rule to pay for it,) in consequence of the unfortunate situation of the country. These orders were given to Col. Fletcher, who says he gave them, I suppose, to Capt. Squire. But Capt. Squire has gone with Gen. Hill's corps from the lines, in consequence of which this order has not been obeyed, and other irregularities have occurred. But I will have this matter set right.

Col. Oliver's report is very clear, and there is no doubt that the road along the left bank of the Tagus should be put in repair, and those who put it in repair should be paid for their trouble. But I fear it will be going a little too far for me to pay for this work. Indeed, I do not know, that, in these days of economy, I shall not be brought over the coals for having paid for all works superintended by British engineers. There is a fund in all the districts in Portugal for works of this description, which the government are now thinking of laying their hands upon, but which might as well be applied to the purpose for which it was intended on this road.

In respect to the use of the road, it appears to me very clear that no repair we can give it will make it a practicable communication for our army in the heavy rains. If we are obliged to alter our position when these shall fall, the artillery, at least, must go from Almeirim to Caruxe, thence to Canha and Pegoes, for Aldea Galega, which road is not much about, for any thing else, and they would not be longer on the road, which is what is required.

I am very much afraid, after all, that it is quite impracticable to march troops across the island of Lyceria in the wet weather. The roads upon it were examined, and reported upon by Capt. —, who is a very fine young man, educated at Wycombe, who was appointed to the staff of this army by the Commander in Chief, on account of the abilities he showed there; but he has no experience, and I can have no reliance upon his report; and I have sent over Scovell,\* taking with him an English officer from Campbell's brigade, to examine the island, and decide whether it is prac-

\* Major Gen. Sir G. Scovell, K.C.B.

ticable for infantry to march across it in wet weather from Çamora Correa.

I have letters from Cadiz to the 29th; the detachment had certainly marched from thence, but it was not known to what place. Some suppose towards Badajoz, others to attack Algeiras, against which place the French manifestly entertain some design.

To H. S. H. the Duke of Brunswick.

Cartaxo, 4th Jan. 1811.

I am much concerned to have to report to your Highness the death of Col. Horfe, of your Highness' legion; and I request your Highness to recommend to His Majesty an officer to succeed to his situation.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. —, — regt.*

4th Jan. 1811.

In reply to your letter of the 2d inst., the Commander of the Forces entertains no doubt you applied for leave of absence on account of your private affairs; but it would not have been granted if his Excellency had not supposed it was paramount to every other consideration, or if he had understood it could have been deferred for any cause. Whatever may be the experience and ability of the officer left in command of the —th, your presence with it is still necessary.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 5th Jan. 1811, 11½ A.M.

I received in the night your letters of the 4th. I shall write to the Admiral to have 4 boats for the bridge over the creek at Aldea Galega, and I shall send over to ascertain the number and capacity of the boats for a bridge in charge of the Lieutenant at Salvaterra. It is impossible, however, to do business in this way.

I have no objection to your bringing 12 pounders from Abrantes to the ground opposite Punhete, if you think any can be spared from that place. I think, however, that this is deserving of some further consideration.

1st; I observe that Capt. Squire's report on the relative state of things at Punhete is so far defective that he has not stated at what distance from the right bank of the river the enemy's ground rises, and becomes superior to ours: I believe close to the bank.

2dly; What is our object in establishing a heavy battery on the ground opposite the Zezere?

Unless we make it more formidable than I believe we have the means of making it, we shall not have it in our power to destroy the bridge and depôt of boats before the enemy will have it in their power to take them out of our reach. Then the question is, whether our 9 and 6 pounders are not guns of sufficient capacity to enable us to command, from the highest ground on the left bank, the communication from the Zezere to the Tagus? I think, from the account of the distances, the 9 pounders certainly would, and that the 6 pounders would be very formidable. I do not mean to say that the enemy might not, in dark nights, slip out of the Zezere into the Tagus with their boats; but they would equally effect this object in the night if we had guns of heavier metal in our batteries on the left bank; and we should be obliged to leave in our batteries the heavier guns, whereas the 9 pounders and 6 pounders could be moved with the troops.



I therefore think that we should confine ourselves to commanding with our cannon the communication between the two rivers; and that if we attempt more, it should be by a more powerful fire of artillery, which should be opened at once upon the bridge and boats, and continued as long as any of them swim or can be seen.

I enclose a letter from Fririon, to which I propose to send for answer that I shall make no arrangement for an exchange till that shall be carried into execution which was before made; and that I have no prisoner of war by name Mascarenhas, but that a Portuguese of that name had been taken in the disguise of a Spanish peasant, having in his possession dispatches from the Prince d'Essling to the Prince de Wagram. Before I send this answer, however, I wish to know from you in what manner, and where, Capt. Pinto was taken.

The packet is arrived, and Burgh is come up. He has brought papers to the 17th. The King was still very unwell, and the physicians were under examination before the two Houses of Parliament. Your letters are not come up yet; but I think I shall detain this letter till they arrive.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 5th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter dated the 3d; and I now enclose a letter from Sir W. Beresford on the same subject.

My opinion is, that there is a plot on foot against the English, at the head of which are the Bishop and Sousa; and that they want to be able to show that they protested against our pretensions to command their army. I think also that the continued absence of the Bishop and Sousa from the council is in consequence, or rather a branch, of this plot. The Bishop has, I understand, absented himself since the day on which it was agreed to new model and increase the taxes, and to introduce various economical reforms into the different departments of the government. We may depend upon it that neither the one nor the other, however beneficial to the country, can be effected without creating much discontent, particularly among those who will be the objects of the reforms, or from whose pockets the increased taxes will be taken. This discontent will spread to those who (although they may not feel the effects of these measures, excepting in the general good they will do) feel the distresses of the times, or pretend they suffer from the existing situation of affairs.

The Bishop and Sousa, and the anti-Anglican party, will take advantage of this discontent to point out their own differences with us upon military and other measures. They desire to prevent us from assuming the exclusive control over the national army; and their absence from the council, after they found that we were determined to increase the burthens of the people, and to dismiss the old servants of the government: all this will go to the ruin of the country, I acknowledge; but what is there that ambition and folly will not meditate and undertake!

Now, I recommend to you, 1st; to have a letter written to the Patriarch and the Principal, drawing their attention to the different orders from the Prince, directing improvements in the revenue and reforms in the expenditure, and pointing out the existing state of the finances, the

large deficit, &c. &c., and informing them that the Regency were employed in deliberating upon the means of increasing the revenue and diminishing the expenditure, and inviting them, in the name of their colleagues, to assist in the deliberations upon these subjects.

2dly; Adverting to the discontent which always follows reform of expenditure, I recommend to you to proceed with caution in the reform of the different juntas and boards. Let no man, or, at all events, a number of men, be discharged from the service without having some visible means of livelihood left. There are, I believe, some members of these juntas and boards who have fortunes besides their salaries, of which last they may be deprived, and still continue members of the junta. In the inferior departments of the Customs also, of which it may be necessary to discharge many officers, either the half or a third of their salary should be continued to those not otherwise provided for. If these measures are not adopted there will be serious discontent in Lisbon, which will be encouraged by these people; and it will be worse than an additional 20,000 men to the enemy.

P.S. Return Sir W. Beresford's letter, &c.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 5th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 3d, in which you have transmitted the answer of the Sec. of the government of Portugal to the communication made in my letter of the 22d Dec., regarding the murder of a woman by ———, a British soldier.

I consider this soldier to be amenable to the laws and civil tribunals of this country for this offence; and I shall give orders that he may be delivered over to the civil power, as soon as the requisition may be made for him through you.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 5th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 4th, in which you have enclosed one from the Spanish minister at Lisbon, respecting Spanish subjects who may endeavor to avoid the military service, by seeking employment in the train of the British army. I have already had a correspondence with his Majesty's minister at Cadiz upon this subject; and I enclose the copy of a letter which Don E. de Bardaxi wrote to him, which I conceive puts an end to this discussion, as far as those Spanish subjects are concerned who have employment in the train of this army.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 5th Jan. 1811.

I enclose a letter which Gen. Stewart has received from Adm. Berkeley, regarding certain orders sent from England, to prevent officers of the army, or others (with the exception of Mr. Downie), from sending Merino sheep home in the transports which may be going to England. I do not believe that your Lordship has any knowledge of this order, and at all events of the exceptions of its provisions in favor of Mr. Downie only; and therefore I venture upon it. I can assure you that I have no Merino sheep, and do not intend to have any. I never had but one, which Lord Wellesley gave me at Cadiz, and took home for me; but there are several

officers of rank in this army who have got them, either for themselves or their friends, and it surely would not be desirable to prevent their sending home these sheep at their own expense, for food, &c., in the transports which may be going home from time to time on the public service.

The opportunity of obliging persons of this description seldom occurs; and, from the various arrangements of the service which have been made within these few years, the Commander of the army abroad, however large the concern he has to manage, has it not in his power to gratify or oblige an officer under his command. But it is quite new that he should be precluded, by orders from the Transport board to an inferior officer, from allowing the officers of the army to send to England that which it is desirable should go to England, provided it can be sent with perfect convenience to the service; and that at the same time the Transport board should give to one individual of this army the exclusive privilege of sending to England this same property.

I endeavor, as much as possible, to carry on the service, notwithstanding the various and discordant authorities with which I am concerned; but I am convinced that your Lordship, and His Majesty's government, do not expect that I can continue to carry it on as it has been, if I am to be deprived of all the power of gratifying any body; or that I can submit to allow any board to interfere with those powers, the means of gratifying the officers of the army, which all my predecessors in command have enjoyed, and without which not one of them would have continued so long to carry on the business of the country. It may be a regulation of economy to make the officers of the army pay freight for what they send home in the transports, although that regulation is quite new; but surely there should be no exclusion of the property of those who are willing to pay the freight.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 5th Jan. 1811.

I have received your Lordship's duplicate of the 8th Dec., regarding the French prisoners in this country, and the directions which it contains will of course be attended to; but I am apprehensive that we shall experience much inconvenience in having so many prisoners to take care of, at the same time that we have other important objects to attend to.

It is in vain to expect any assistance, either in money or otherwise, from the Portuguese government, to provide for the removal of these prisoners, or for the care of them at Lisbon, or in any distant part of the world. That, as well as every thing else, must fall upon me; and I must take the best care of them I can.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 5th Jan. 1811.

The reinforcements to the enemy's army in this country, which I informed your Lordship, in my dispatch of the 29th Dec., were on their march in the valley of the Mondego, arrived upon the Alva at Murella on the 24th, which river they crossed by a ford on the following day, and continued their march to join the army.

Col. Wilson, who had retired from Espinhal and crossed the Mondego upon hearing of the advance of these troops, lest he should be involved in

an unequal contest in front and rear at the same time, re-passed the Moudogo on the 25th, and annoyed the enemy's rear on his march of the 25th and 26th, from the Alva towards Espinhal. He took some prisoners, and cut off some of their small detachments, which fell into the hands of the Ordenanza. He learnt from the prisoners that this force consisted of 11 battalions of the 9th *corps d'armée*, which are the same that were assembled at Nantes during the summer.

I have not been able to ascertain whether more have joined them since in the division, which was followed by Col. Wilson; but I believe, from all the intelligence, that these 11 battalions compose the whole reinforcement which has yet advanced, and that they are about 8000 men.

The division which had marched to Pinhel, and the advanced guard of which had been at Trancoso, when I last addressed your Lordship, was still at Pinhel on the 26th Dec., when I last heard from Gen. Silveira, whose head quarters were at Torrinha. This division is either the 2d division of the 9th corps, or is the division of troops which marched to Cardigos and returned again in November, under Gen. Gardanne.

I have letters from Cadiz of the 23d and 29th Dec., stating that Marshal Soult had marched from the army engaged in the operations against that place, with 4000 or 5000 men, on the 20th and 21st Dec.; but I have not yet learnt the object of this march.

The accounts from the south of Portugal to the 29th, state that a considerable corps was assembling at Seville, in order to check the operations of Gen. Ballesteros; while at Cadiz it is supposed that it is the intention of the enemy to make an attack upon and establish himself at Algeiras, and in the Sierra de Ronda, for which purpose Sebastiani's *corps d'armée* had been brought to the westward, and had taken the castle of Marvella. Gens. Mendizabal and Ballesteros are still at Llerena and the neighbourhood of Monasterio, and Girard's division of Mortier's corps at Guadalcanal.

No notice is taken of the supposed collection of troops at Seville, in the recent letters from these officers, or from Badajoz. I think it probable, however, either that Soult has received orders, or is making preparations to carry into execution orders which he expects to receive, to march a considerable body of troops from Andalusia into Estremadura, and eventually Alentejo; and I am very apprehensive, not only that the Spanish troops in Estremadura will make no serious opposition to this movement, but that the siege of Cadiz will receive no interruption.

I have requested Lieut. Gen. Graham to send to the Tagus the Chasseurs Britanniques, and any other troops which may arrive from Sicily, if he should have reason to believe that Mortier's corps, and the troops lately detached from the siege of Cadiz, have moved into Portugal; as although, from the state of the Spanish armies and military resources, and of the war in Andalusia, there is no reason to believe that any interruption will be given to the siege or blockade of Cadiz, in consequence of this large detachment from the enemy's force in that part of Spain, it cannot be expected that the remainder of the force will be able to make any attack upon the positions of the allies.

No material alteration has been made in the position of the enemy's army since I addressed your Lordship last. The detachment which

marched to Castello Branco returned immediately, and was sent either for the purpose of escorting a messenger, or to obtain intelligence.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Cartaxo, 6th Jan. 1811.

I think you may discontinue the morning reports in this bad weather.

I am very sorry you are obliged to send so far for forage, but we have consumed all upon the near part of the plain. I believe the Commissary Gen. has made an arrangement for supplying forage here to the dragoons at Almoester and Atalaia, and probably some of the others.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 6th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 5th. It is quite clear that it is impracticable to cross the island of Lyceria with troops in rainy weather, and we must depend upon crossing the Tagus at Aldea Galega alone.

I find also that the causeway at Benavente is quite impracticable in rainy weather. The disposition which we must make of Campbell's and Lumley's brigade is as follows: Campbell's at Caruxe, and Lumley's at Mugem and Almeirim. But as the weather is now very bad, and as it is very obvious that the enemy is not now in a situation to attack us on any side, I think you will do well to delay making any movement of these troops, from the quarters which they now occupy, for the present.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 6th Jan. 1811.

The examination which we have given to the island of Lyceria in these rains, and to the communication with that island from the left bank of the Tagus, either from Salvaterra, or Camora Correia, or elsewhere, proves, in the clearest manner, that if we should be obliged to withdraw the troops from the left bank to the right bank in rainy weather, they cannot march across the island. We must therefore go to work by the ordinary road, in that case, of Aldea Galega. Of course the troops must embark at Aldea Galega, or more properly at the point of land at the entrance of the river, about 4 miles below Aldea Galega, at high water; and it would be very desirable if you could let me have some calculation of the tides at that point, so that I might time the marches of the troops accordingly, when I shall have to bring them across. I shall also be much obliged to you if you will let me know where the troops could with convenience be landed on the right bank, supposing them to embark at high water, or at any other time of tide you might think best, at Aldea Galega, or at the point below Aldea Galega.

The knowledge which you can give me on these points, and of the length of time which the passage will probably take, will enable me to form a disposition of the troops on the left of the Tagus, which, at the same time that it will secure objects there, will make it certain that I shall not want them in the lines, if the enemy should think of making another movement upon us.

I have received your letter of the 5th. The government and Marshal Beresford settled that the requisition for all ordnance and stores, required by Lieut. Col. Fletcher, should be made by him upon Gen. Rosa, who is responsible for their being supplied and properly equipped. I imagine

that the 17 guns are required in the works on the right of the Tagus, viz., 10 at Enxara dos Cavalleiros, and 7 at Mafra.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 6th Jan. 1811.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday to the Sec. of State. I entertain scarcely a doubt that Soult has either received or expects to receive orders to detach troops to the assistance of Massena. I see that the *Moniteur* mentions the 5th corps as under Massena's orders. However, his first blow may be at Ronda.

I believe there is no foundation for the report that it is Buonaparte's intention to marry Ferdinand to an Austrian Princess; and the Cortes will do well not to pledge themselves on questions till they shall be regularly before them.

Romana has communicated to me a horrible libel against him, written by a vagabond of the name of Calvo; and you can form no idea how much he is disturbed by this and other circumstances of the same kind, and disgusted with the violent proceedings of the Cortes. I have recommended him to prosecute Calvo for a libel, and, if he cannot obtain justice against him, to petition the Cortes for redress.

You will see that the King was still unwell in the middle of last month. A vessel has arrived in the Tagus which left Cork on the 29th ult.; and it is reported that she has brought an account that Perceval had proposed the establishment of a Regency, which should have limited powers only for 6 months, and that this proposition had been agreed to unanimously. I believe part of this story; but that part which refers to the unanimity of the proceedings is, I am sure, not true, if *this* House is at all like what it was in our time.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, 2d division.*

6th Jan. 1811.

In reply to your letter of the 3d inst., I have the honor to acquaint you that the case of serj. — is not one in which the Commander of the Forces thinks it necessary to interfere. This non-commissioned officer has been guilty of flagrant offences, intoxication, breach of trust, and has proved himself wholly unworthy, in his Excellency's opinion, of the situation he held. At the same time, the Commanding officer of the regiment can re-appoint him to the situation of a non-commissioned officer when he pleases. But it is to be observed, that the discipline of a regiment will be but badly enforced if a man guilty of such offences as serj. — is reinstated in his rank immediately, from any former character whatsoever.

To Dr. Franck.

Cartaxo, 7th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of this day's date, and I had read one of the paragraphs to which you refer, as reflecting upon the medical department in this army, which was stated to be extracted from a letter from an officer. This may be so; but I believe that no officer of the army would write any thing to his friends so false as the contents of that supposed letter. You have my opinion of your conduct, and of that of the medical department in general, in my letter to you of the 5th Nov., and in the letter written upon the occasion of forwarding to the — regt. the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry on the complaint of Lieut. —; and I do not think I could put my sense of your conduct in more favorable terms.

I hope that the opinions of the people in Great Britain are not influenced by paragraphs in newspapers, and that those paragraphs do not convey the public opinion or sentiment upon any subject. Therefore I (who have more reason than any other public man of the present day to complain of libels of this description) never take the smallest notice of them; and have never authorised any contradiction to be given, or any statement to be made in answer to the innumerable falsehoods, and the heaps of false reasoning, which have been published respecting me and the operations which I have directed. I admit, however, that others may entertain a different opinion of the effect of these libels, and that they may not have nerves or temper to hear or to see their conduct misrepresented and their actions vilified; and if you should not be convinced that these paragraphs have made no impression, and are not the representation of the public opinion in England, I have no objection to your making any use you think proper of this and my former letters; and you may be assured that I shall be happy to avail myself of every opportunity of bearing testimony of the zeal, ability, and success with which the duties of the medical department of this army have been invariably carried on under your superintendence.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 7th Jan. 1811.

I have just received your letter of yesterday which was written first. We understood that there was a bridge over the river at Caruxe. Gen. Stewart had that point examined, and reported that a bridge could be constructed there, and Murray wrote to desire that the work might be done. However, I conclude that other works and the weather prevented it. I have now sent directions to the officer who has the boats at Salvaterra to take them up at Caruxe, which is certainly the most important point of all; and I think it will be found that a bridge can be established there, which will secure your communication at all times.

You did not send Patton's letters. I fear that we can get no more guns, 12 pounders, from Rosa, unless indeed the Admiral's suspicions induce him to produce them.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 7th Jan. 1811, 10 A.M.

I have received your second letter of yesterday, which was dispatched by the Ordenanza at 4 P.M. It arrived here at about daylight this morning; but it is impossible to say that the delay in its arrival is to be attributed to those who carried it on the left of the Tagus. The other letter has not yet arrived.

I recommend to you to make cover for guns in those situations opposite the mouth of the Zezere which are most likely to command the communication between that river and the Tagus, into which you can move your 9 and 6 pounders, and even heavier guns hereafter if it should be necessary. This work should all be done at night; and if that be done, I do not think it will be necessary to adopt any measures to protect the working party, or eventually those who may make use of this cover, from the fire which the enemy may bring upon them from the other side. Indeed, if Capt. Greden is of opinion that we cannot, with our 9 pounders, affect the

communications between the Zezere and the Tagus, from the ground on which I understand the cover is now making for the guns, we shall be *à fortiori* unable to command from a more retired situation the enemy's artillery, which must be a little retired from the mouth of the Zezere, and the bank of the Tagus, and the communication from the one river to the other.

I recommend to you to persevere in making the cover, and put the 9 pounders in it, and let the enemy fire as much as they please; there is no occasion for opening our fire till they commence their operations with their boats; and if the cover is well made and sufficient, I fancy they will then find it very difficult to prevent us by their fire from annoying them. I should think that the effects of the enemy's 8 and 4 pounders must have decided the question of the distance from our ground to the mouth of the Zezere; but the best eye for a distance that I know of is Fletcher's, and I shall send him over to you for a day. I shall also desire him to send to you some intrenching tools.

I am concerned to hear that you have received any intelligence from England that is disagreeable to you.

I enclose a letter from Blunt, and the answer which I have desired Murray to give to the last two paragraphs.

*The A. G. to Gén. Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major Gén. de l'armée Française.* Le 7 Jan. 1811.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre en date le 1<sup>r</sup> Janvier, que j'ai soumise à son Excellence le Vicomte Wellington, K.B., Général en Chef des armées combinées; et je suis chargé de la part de son Excellence de vous prier de représenter à S. A. M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling, qu'il est fort inutile d'entamer aucune autre proposition pour l'échange des prisonniers jusqu'à ce que S. A. M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling voulait de sa part effectuer l'échange qui a été proposé par Son Altesse le 23 du mois d'Octobre.

Quant à la demande particulière dans votre lettre, son Excellence me mande de vous informer, qu'il n'y a pas de prisonnier de guerre nommé Mascarenhas; mais un Portugais, portant ce nom, a été arrêté dans le mois d'Octobre dernier, déguisé comme paysan Espagnol, et portant des dépêches de la part de S. A. M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling à M. le Prince de Wagram.

J'ai l'honneur, M. le Général, de vous renouveler les assurances de ma haute considération.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 8th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letters of the 6th and 7th inst.

In respect to the garrisons of Peniche and Abrantes, nothing more can be done for them. Indeed I am not certain that too much in the way of regular troops has not been done for the latter; one regiment of militia, even a weak one, is full enough for the former at present; and if we continue to hold Obidos, and the remaining recruits will not allow of a detachment from Peniche for that purpose, we must only detach from the lines.

It appears to me that we are drawing to that state in Portugal, that either an effort must be made by the government for the support of their armies and establishments, or the British government must withdraw from the contest; and I shall inform the Sec. of State of my opinion accordingly by the next packet.

We have, or rather had, in Abrantes, 184,000 lbs. of Indian corn,



158,000 of wheat meal, 47,000 of wheat, 4000 of English flour, and 1200 of biscuits, which altogether would make nearly 400,000 rations of bread. But this was on the 24th Oct. I write to Mr. Stuart, however, seriously upon this garrison.

I send you Brito's letter of this day, and a letter from Blunt. I don't know what to make of Blunt's reports. In his letter of yesterday he said we had lost 500 bullocks, whereas the Commissary Gen. receives some by that road every day, and the principal man was here yesterday, and declares they have not lost one.

P. S. I enclose the last report of our magazine at Abrantes. The oats and barley should be struck out, as I have ordered those articles away. You see that they have already used our wheat meal.

To Lieut. Gen. Hill.

Cartaxo, 8th Jan. 1811.

I am concerned to learn from several quarters that you do not regain your strength so fast as you could wish, and therefore I suggest to you another change of air to Cintra, which is, I believe, a very healthy place. You may depend upon it that in such an attack as you have had there is nothing like complete and frequent change of air as a remedy; and I strongly recommend this change for your consideration.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 8th Jan. 1811.

I have, at different times, requested you to draw the attention of the Portuguese government to the probability that the Alentejo might become the seat of war; which I have brought before them likewise in different letters which I have addressed to them. The intelligence received this morning of the advance of another division of Mortier's *corps d'armée*, under the command of Mortier himself, by the high road from Seville into Estremadura, and of other measures adopted by the enemy at Seville, leave no doubt of the early invasion of Alentejo: which province, from the accounts which I have, I believe to be entirely unprepared for this event; notwithstanding the early and repeated warnings which have been given to the government.

1st; I have to apprise you, that in Abrantes there were, 2 days ago, the means of making bread for the garrison for 22 days only, besides the stores belonging to the British army, part of which the garrison had already used. This is an object to which the attention of the government has been repeatedly drawn, but in vain. It is true that stores of provisions have at different times been lodged in Abrantes; but the government forget that unless they provide for the daily subsistence of their garrisons and troops, besides laying in magazines, the troops must draw their daily subsistence from the magazines, which are thus consumed; and then, when the communication with the country becomes difficult or precarious, the troops are in want, and must surrender. There is no reason why the grain of the Alentejo should not have been brought to Abrantes in sufficient quantities for the consumption of the garrison; and I doubt not that, although this has been neglected, we shall soon find that the enemy experience no want in that province. I shall be much obliged to you if you will endeavor to procure for me a decided answer.

whether they will, or will not, throw into Abrantes a sufficient quantity of grain or flour for the consumption of the garrison for a reasonable time; as upon this answer will depend the measures which I must take upon the subject.

2dly; I am informed that the people are living, in the large towns in the Alentejo, as much at their ease as if the enemy were not within a thousand miles of them.

This being the case, notwithstanding my repeated remonstrances, the enemy will find in the towns of Estremoz, Evora, Beja, Alcaccer do Sal, and others, great riches, and means of subsistence for a considerable length of time. He will treat these towns as he has others in Spain: the inhabitants will first be plundered by the soldiery; their provisions will then be taken from them for the use of the enemy's army; and then they will be obliged to pay a heavy contribution in money and other valuable goods. These will be the consequences of neglecting to warn the people of their danger, and to force them to provide against it, by concealing and removing their valuable property, and being prepared to remove their persons; of concealing their danger from the people; and of indulging them in their habits of ease and blind security. The success of the enemy's objects in Portugal will also be promoted, so far as that he will have been enabled to raise contributions in this country, and to subsist for some additional time in the Portuguese territory.

Mr. Kennedy has communicated to me an application which you had forwarded to Mr. Dunmore, from the Conde de Redondo, for supplies of provisions and forage from the British magazines, for the Portuguese army, grounded upon a statement that the provisions expected to be imported by sea had not arrived. I observe that in a former paper forwarded to you by the Conde de Redondo, these same provisions now stated to be expected for the army were stated to be intended for the use of the inhabitants of the city; and he complains of the sum advanced for the purchase of those provisions being charged against the account of the subsidy.

I have always expressed and manifested a readiness to do every thing in my power to assist the Portuguese government and army: but when I see all the departments of the army in distress; when I know that the pay has not lately been regularly issued to the troops, but those in garrison are living upon the magazines, which ought to be kept in deposit for the period at which their communications with the country will be cut off; that the hospitals are unprovided with necessaries; and that the whole machine of the army is falling to pieces, for want of funds to keep it together; I must consider the subject well, before I can venture to give His Majesty's stores, and the funds destined for the support of His Majesty's troops, to be disposed of by the Portuguese government. I request you therefore to let me know whether the government are proceeding seriously to meet the difficulties in which their country is placed, and to increase the resources of the kingdom, so as to render the revenue more nearly equal to the expenditure; and to reform the prevailing abuses in all the departments of the state, so as still further to increase the resources; and if the members are unanimous in this object, which has been so frequently recommended to their attention by the Prince Regent.

If I should find them seriously disposed and unanimous in their endeavors to meet the crisis, which I have no doubt we can get over, I shall give them every assistance in my power. But if things are to go on as they have hitherto, the sooner the serious attention of the King's government is drawn to the state of affairs here the better, and I shall consider it my duty to bring the subject before them.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 9th Jan. 1811, 12 at noon.

I have just received your letter commenced the 7th and finished the 8th.

The letter from La Romana is a production truly Spanish, and it is useless to remonstrate upon the subject, as you will get no horses out of Estremadura; that is to say, they have no cavalry of their own, but want to take the horses they can find in the country, to give to fellows who pretend to be cavalry, and they object to the purchase of them by an ally who furnishes them with the only cavalry they have. It will be impossible to convince them, either that they ought to allow of the purchase of the horses, or that they ought to give the Portuguese cavalry their proportion of the seizures, as they will never admit, even in reasoning, the truth of the fact that their cavalry is not worth one pin. I think, however, that you had better reply to Romana, that Madden's brigade are in want of horses, and that there is no mode of supplying them from this country, and that they must either purchase them, or receive their proportion of the produce of the requisition in Estremadura, or fall away to nothing.

I am concerned to see the state of your depôts. We certainly cannot supply the Portuguese army. However, I have written to Mr. Stuart upon the subject.

While writing the above, I have received your second letter of the 8th. Fletcher is not yet arrived. I recommended, some days ago, that the bridges of the Guadiana should be destroyed, which I hope will have been effected. If not, we shall certainly have the enemy in the Alentejo before long. But I should think it better not to send the regiment of militia, which we shall require in the lines on the left of the Tagus, back to Elvas. This regiment is now at Monte Mór o Novo.

Sir W. Erskine, and our people on the left, think that the enemy are making some great movement either to their rear or to their right. I was yesterday beyond the bridge of Calhariz, and with our vedettes on the high ground which overlooks Alcanhede, and I could perceive no alteration. I rather believe that the division of the 9th corps, which has joined, has moved to Leiria. The prisoners who have been taken of that corps have not yet come to head quarters, and I am not yet able to decide positively whether 2 divisions have entered. But Blunt, and Cocks who is gone there, mention 2 divisions. I wish that Col. Wilson had been a little more accurate in his inquiries and report on this subject.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 9th Jan. 1811.

I enclose a letter from Dr. Franck, stating the number of men who will be to be embarked in the *Gorgon*, respecting whom the A.Q.M.G. at Lisbon will communicate with the Agent for transports.

I understand what you say in your letter of the 6th, respecting the ships which conveyed the Chasseurs Britanniques to Cadiz from Sicily, to be in reply to my letter to you of the 15th Dec.

The plot is thickening upon us here to such a degree, that I really think we ought not to send away any more of our transports.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 10th Jan. 1811.

Fletcher arrived last night, and I am concerned to learn from him so bad an account of the Benavente river. I have, however, sent over De Lancey to ascertain the real state of the case, and whether a bridge can, or cannot, be thrown over it, and the passage be relied upon with certainty.

You will have seen Brito's account of the 7th, and Austin's of the 5th. It appears that the enemy think of the siege of Badajoz. I have seen a prisoner of the 9th corps; he belongs to one of the battalions with which Wilson was engaged. He says that his battalion is in the 2d division; that he has not seen the 1st division since both entered Spain, but he believes it marched 5 leagues to their left, when they approached Ponte da Murcella; that Gardanne and his troops were with his division, and he was in the advanced guard commanded by Gardanne; that the 3d division of the 9th corps are employed in keeping open the communication between Almeida and the army; that his division is at Leiria, and Gardanne with them; that they arrived there the 4th. Drouet is with his division. Now what I believe is, that the 11 battalions of the 9th corps, mentioned by Wilson, and Gardanne's division, entered with Drouet, and these are what Wilson saw; that the 2d division of the 9th corps are the people reported by Silveira to be at Pinhel on the 26th; and that the 3d division of the 9th corps, if it is in existence, is composed of battalions made up of companies belonging to different regiments filled with conscripts, of which I have the list, some stated to be in the rear guard of *l'Armée d'Espagne*.

Gens. Nightingall, Houstoun, and Howard, are arrived from England, which they left on the 29th Dec. The King was then very ill. Parliament had decided by a majority of 279 to 169 to appoint the Prince of Wales Regent by bill, instead of by address; and the bill was to be brought in on Monday the 31st. The restrictions upon the Regent were to be the same as in 1788, excepting that he was to have the power of rewarding naval and military services with the Peerage; and none of the restrictions were to last longer than one year. The Duke of York, and all the Royal Family, had agreed, on the 19th Dec., to a kind of remonstrance against imposing any restrictions on the Regent; and the Prince was excessively displeased with the plan. From all that I have heard of the composition of the majority of 279, I think it doubtful that the ministry will be able to succeed in restraining the power of the Regent, and certain that the ministry will be changed immediately.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Picton, 3d division.

10th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor to submit your letter of the 9th inst., and enclosures, to his Excellency. In reply, I am to communicate, when leave of absence was some time since granted to Lieut. Col. —, of the — regt., it was under the im-

pression that the business which he had to transact was of an importance paramount to every other consideration; it has since, however, been proved to my Lord Wellington that the leave requested was more a convenient than an indispensable indulgence. Under these circumstances, his Lordship, from an opinion that the present application may be equally unnecessary, declines authorising the absence solicited by Lieut. Col. —.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 11th Jan. 1811.

I received last night your letters of the 9th, and this morning 2 of the 10th. You see that the writer from S. Pedro do Sul talks of 2 divisions having entered by the road of the valley of the Mondego, and one entering by Trancoso and Viseu. It is strange that we get no further accounts from the north. It would be worth while to endeavor to send a letter to Wilson by Pedrogão and the Ponte de Cabril.

I have requested the Marques de la Romana to order Mendizabal to defend the Guadiana as long as he can, and to make preparations for the destruction of the bridges at Merida and Medellin, which orders have been received, and the preparations are made. If the French should cross the Guadiana above Badajoz, the troops under Ballesteros and Mendizabal are to retire towards the Sierra de San Mamed, leaving garrisons in the places in which it is necessary they should be, and operating upon the right flank of Mortier's march, while the garrisons will confine his left. If the French should cross the Guadiana below Badajoz, the Spanish troops will annoy their rear as much as possible, and they may be turned afterwards in any way that may be thought proper. Gen. Madden's brigade must remain with them.

I am aware that he is not in a very enviable situation. None of us who have any thing to say to such troops can be very happy. But we cannot abandon the interests of the country, and we must make the best of the concern. Let Gen. Madden act with confidence in himself and his troops, and with conciliation towards the Spanish officers with whom he is concerned, and I will be answerable for all the consequences.

I have not a copy of your letter to me upon the subject of the new mode of clothing the Portuguese troops. But I rather think that the proposal was, that if the British government gave the cloth and materials for the whole army, the Portuguese government would pay the expense of making up; and that thus Great Britain would not pay more than for made clothing for 30,000 men. This proposal appears to have been accepted and acted upon. However, I may not have recollected your proposal correctly.

After I wrote yesterday the packet arrived. The King was very ill before the 31st, but about that time was expected to be better. Croker writes from the House on the 30th, by the *Dottrell*, that he thought the ministers would have had a majority of 20; Arbuthnot expected 40.

P.S. 12 at Noon. I have just received your letter of last night. Trant's communication is a very important one, and I should think they must be going by the valley of the Mondego.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 11th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th inst., containing  
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ing a request from the Portuguese minister to have the use of the transports attached to the army for the removal of cattle and property from different parts of the country to the Tagus. I have no objection to this use of the transports; but it may be advisable that the Portuguese government should be certain of having at the places to which they wish to have the transports sent, the articles, or animals which they wish to have conveyed, before they send the transports from the Tagus.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 11th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th inst., and I conceive that no inconvenience can result from the embarkation of the seamen and marines belonging to the squadron, and from Adm. Sir T. Williams taking the cruise which is proposed. I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know whether the measure of detaching Sir T. Williams is determined upon, as in that case it will be necessary that I should order to Lisbon the battalion of marines which is at Loures.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 11th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th inst.

I do not think that at present it is in our power to make use of the machines which have arrived by the *Dottrell*, as we have no posts on the Zezere above the enemy's establishments; and I conclude that it will be impossible to get the machines across the Tagus, and up the stream of the Zezere, so as to affect the enemy's boats.

I shall have no difficulty in distributing among the enemy's troops the copies of the proposed convention for the exchange of prisoners.

The Commissary Gen. is at present at Lisbon, and will, I am certain, wait upon you whenever you think proper to call for his attendance. In respect to boats, however, I beg to refer you to my letter of the 25th Oct., for my opinion of the best mode of arranging the manner in which they should be procured, which mode is at present the law of the country.

To T. Rowcroft, Esq.

Cartaxo, 11th Jan. 1811.

I received by the last post your letter of the 7th, and I am much obliged to you for the interest which you take in the concerns of this army and of the people of Portugal. Although economy in the use of grain and flour is desirable in every situation, I do not conceive that it is peculiarly necessary to this army or to the people of Lisbon.

The troops have suffered no privations: I believe that no soldier has been unprovided with his regular rations since the army was in Spain in August, 1809; and as the communication with all parts of Portugal has been open, excepting by one road occupied by the enemy, there is no reason why either the troops or inhabitants of Lisbon should have suffered from want of food, excepting that, by the addition of the consumption of the French army from the resources of the country, and from the collection of so many additional mouths in the neighbourhood of the capital, the demand and consumption of grain and flour have been greater than usual. The measures adopted by the Portuguese government had, how-

ever, in some degree provided for the additional demand; and I believe there has never been any want at Lisbon which had not been relieved by abundance as soon as the want had produced the effect of raising prices.

You will observe that this state of things is very different from that which has been represented in the newspapers, which have undoubtedly been the cause that I have been honored with a letter from you. But the British public have been deceived on this, as well as on many other subjects relating to this country, by their newspapers. I am, however, much obliged to you for the interest you take in our concerns; and I shall communicate your letter to the proper authorities, in order that advantage may be taken of the information it affords, if circumstances should change.

To H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G.

Cartaxo, 11th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' letter of the 4th Dec. by the last post; and I have the honor to inform you that I had already consented, on the 25th Dec., to allow Major Gen. *Baron* Low to detach a number of officers from the troops under his command, upon reading the communication of your Royal Highness' wishes to Major Gen. *Baron* Low by Baron Decken.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Cartaxo, 12th Jan. 1811.

You will have heard that the French crossed the Guadiana at Merida on the 8th; and it appears to me that they must immediately undertake some operation or other. You will, however, judge for yourself on the propriety of going home. The first division of the 9th corps is still on the frontier, and it appears, by an intercepted letter, is ordered to Guarda.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 12th Jan. 1811.

You will see by Brito's report of the 9th inst., that the French entered Merida at 6 in the evening of the 8th, notwithstanding the directions given to defend that point, and to destroy that bridge and that of Medellin over the Guadiana. It appears also, from the manner in which the enemy have conducted this operation, that their design is to give up all communication with Andalusia, and we must expect their immediate advance into Alentejo.

My opinion is, that it will be necessary to leave a large part, if not the whole, of the troops now on the left of the Tagus in the Alentejo, at least till our works shall be in some greater degree of forwardness; and the measures I should wish you to pursue are generally to confine the enemy's operations as much as you can, taking advantage for that purpose of the course of the different rivers which fall into the Tagus. The first of these is that which falls into the Tagus at Benavente; the second that which falls into the Tagus at Camora Correa; the third that which falls into the Tagus above Aldea Galega; then the line from Moita to Palmella; and lastly, that from Almada to Traffaria.

If Mortier is as strong as Brito says he is, and there has been any previous concert between him and Massena, the best line for him to take would be from Arronches upon Estremoz, by which he would turn the heads of these rivers, and of all the positions which I have above pointed

out, excepting that which is in front of Aldea Galega, and the others in rear of it; but I think his first object will be to communicate with Massena, and he will get within the Benavente river.

Having thus given you a general idea of the operations which I should wish to have carried on on the left of the Tagus, the next thing to be considered is the detail of the mode of execution. My opinion is, that, if possible, without letting the enemy on the right of the Tagus know it, you ought to begin to lighten yourself on the right of the Benavente river. The cavalry might cross high up the river, either at Montargil or Caruxe; and I would retain no more upon the Tagus than are necessary to keep up the appearance to the enemy, in such numbers as that they could be brought with facility over the bridge of Benavente. The artillery also, with the exception of one brigade, should be sent away; and I would also lighten the infantry, keeping no more than are necessary to continue to observe the river. Some English infantry must still, however, be left, otherwise they will discover immediately what is going forward.

I should request you at once to withdraw to the left of the Benavente river, only that the consequence of that measure would be immediately that the enemy would cross and establish their bridge and communication with Mortier; and he would at once take the road which I have above pointed out, instead of that between the Benavente and the Tagus; and the enemy would thereby gain some valuable time.

I propose to request the Admiral to send some boats up to Salvaterra, in order that you may embark your people there, and send them down to Foz, below the junction of the Benavente with the south branch of the Tagus, in case the Benavente should again overflow its banks. This measure, with the destruction of the passage at Mugem, which I recommend you to prepare, will secure the retreat of your rear guard at all times; and the Admiral's boats will get down the south branch of the Tagus, after having performed this service, without difficulty.

Under these circumstances, and having all these arrangements secured, you will probably look about you a little before you withdraw many of your troops from the Tagus; but having stated to you how important it is that the enemy should not communicate with Mortier till he shall be between the Benavente and the Tagus, I leave it to you when to move the whole, or any portion of your troops.

In respect to Abrantes, I have a letter from Mr. Stuart, stating provisions have been sent for that place, and money to buy provisions in the neighbourhood. Seeing what we have got there of ours, it may be said that they have nearly enough, including their rice. However, you will decide this point; and if you wish that they should have more, and their own should not be arrived, order Mr. Ogilvie to send in whatever he can spare from the immediate consumption of the troops.

As you will of course withdraw with you the 5th caçadores, it will be necessary that Lobo should take charge of the boats himself, and that they should be taken over to the right of the Tagus, and that he should be prepared to bring them. The regiment of militia is at Monte Mór o Novo. In case the rivers should fill again, the bridge on this side of Monte Mór o Novo becomes an important object, and measures should be taken to



destroy it. This regiment should be ordered to retire to Vendas Novas and Venda da Silveira, leaving a detachment in Monte Mór, which should destroy the bridge when it retires, if the river should not be fordable.

I have just received your letter of last night. Madden having retired into Portugal, and separated himself from the Spaniards, who, with the exception of Ballesteros, appear to have taken to their garrisons, it will be desirable that he should hang upon the enemy's left with his brigade, keeping himself of course clear of all the rivers. If from Arronches they go to Monforte and Estremoz, he must go by Villa Viçosa and Evora, and thence join your right either within the stream which runs under Monte Mór o Novo, by Venda da Silveira, if the waters should be out, or by Alcacer do Sal, if they should not.

I have a letter from Downie from Merida on the morning of the 8th, in which he says that Mortier is not in great force. However, it is as well to be prepared for all events.

P.S. Murray says that the Juiz de Fora, at Salvaterra, declares that when the causeway at Benavente is overflowed, as it was the other day, the communication between Salvaterra and Mugem is difficult. This, however, was not the case the other day, when Scovell was there; and the fact, if true, would tell both ways. You will have heard of poor Campbell's death, and of Colman's departure. Have you any body whom you could send to one, at least, of these brigades? I think you will do well to destroy the bridge at Ponte de Sor.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 12th Jan. 1811.

It would appear by the movements of the enemy in Estremadura, and by their having obtained possession of Merida, and the bridge of the Guadiana on the 8th inst., that it is their intention to penetrate into Alentejo; and I judge, from other intelligence which I have received, that their principal effort will at present be made in that province. I have given directions to Marshal Sir W. Beresford respecting the operations which he is to carry on, and to delay to withdraw from his present position on the left bank of the Tagus as long as may be practicable, with a view to prevent, till the last moment, the communication between the enemy's troops advancing from Estremadura and those on the right bank of the Tagus.

Experience, however, has shown us that the passage of the river Zatas, which runs into the south branch of the Tagus at Benaventé, cannot be depended upon in the event of a heavy fall of rain, as that river overflows its banks, and the causeways leading to the bridge at Benavente become impassable. It is therefore desirable, and may enable Sir W. Beresford to hold his ground on the Tagus for some time longer, that it should be made certain that he can pass from one side of the Zatas to the other; and the mode in which I would propose to insure this object for him is to place some boats upon the Tagus, immediately at Salvaterra, in which, in case the Zatas should have overflowed its banks and causeway, the troops might be embarked and carried to Foz, on the left bank of the southern branch of the Tagus, below the point where the Zatas falls into that river. These boats might afterwards proceed down that branch of

the Tagus, even if the enemy should be in possession of the right bank of the northern branch of the river, which is not very probable. I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give directions that boats for the transport of 2000 or 3000 men should be stationed, for the present, near Salvaterra.

Adverting to the probability that the enemy will, in a few days, be in the Alentejo, I recommend that the squadron under Sir T. Williams, if it should proceed to sea, should not consist of more than 4 sail.

To T. Humphrey, Esq.

Cartaxo, 12th Jan. 1811.

I received, by the last post, your letter of the 26th Dec., in answer to which I have to inform you that if Mr. Pole will recommend your brother in law, Mr. Colman, to me, as a fit person to be appointed an ensign in the army, I will recommend him for an ensign when an opportunity shall offer; but I cannot venture to recommend that any person should be appointed an officer of the army with whom I am not acquainted, or who is not recommended to me by an acquaintance.

To ———, Esq.

Cartaxo, 12th Jan. 1811.

I received by the last post your letter of the 8th Dec. A gentleman with the qualifications which you state are possessed by Mr. ——— would be an acquisition to the army, and I shall have great pleasure in recommending him to His Majesty, if Lord Fingall should recommend him to me. But I cannot venture to recommend any gentleman for a commission unless I shall be assured of his fitness for the station of an officer, by a gentleman with whom I have the honor to be acquainted, or unless I should know him myself. It is not improbable that I may have had the satisfaction of being acquainted with you, but I hope that you will excuse me for saying that I have no recollection of my acquaintance with you; and that you will attribute this want of memory, upon this occasion, to the variety of employments in which I have been engaged, and to the number of persons I have seen and with whom I have been acquainted.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 12th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th Dec.; and the return showing the quantities of arms, accoutrements, and other warlike stores, distributed in Portugal and Spain during the year 1810, shall be sent by the next post. The 20,000 stands of arms, &c., sent to the Tagus in the *Sovereign* and *Flora* transports, have been disposed of as follows: 16,000 stands of arms, and corresponding equipments, have been sent to Cadiz, upon the requisition of His Majesty's minister there, to be disposed of to the Spanish armies on the eastern side of the Peninsula; and 4000 stands of arms, and corresponding equipments, have been kept in the Tagus, to be delivered, according to your Lordship's directions, to the troops to be raised by Mr. Downie.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 12th Jan. 1811.

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 5th inst., I have learnt that the detachment of the enemy's troops which joined the army in the end of

last month consisted of 11 battalions of the 9th corps, and of a body of troops which, under the command of Gen. Gardanne, had before attempted to penetrate through Lower Beira. The whole are stated to be 8000 men by some of the officers who saw them; but I should think that they must be more. The other division of the 9th corps had not passed the frontier when I last received accounts of them; but I learn from an intercepted letter from Gen. Drouet to Gen. Claparède that this division has been ordered to take a position at Guarda. Their advanced guard broke up from the neighbourhood of Trancoso in the night of the 3d inst., and I have not yet heard where they have gone.

There has been no alteration in the position of the enemy's army since I last addressed you, excepting that Gen. Drouet's head quarters have been fixed at Leiria, with the troops which joined with him. The enemy continue to construct boats in the Zézere, and have shown much jealousy of the measures adopted by our troops on the left of the Tagus to command by their fire the communication between the Zézere and the Tagus.

In my last dispatch I apprised your Lordship of the collection of the enemy's troops at Seville; and I have now to inform you, that Marshal Mortier arrived at Ronquillo with a division of the corps under his command on the 3d inst. He has since continued to advance into Estremadura, having formed a junction with the division which had been at Guadalcanal under the command of Gen. Girard; and I am concerned to add that I have just learnt that he obtained possession of Merida, and of the bridge over the Guadiana at that place, on the evening of the 8th inst., the Spanish troops having retired.

My former dispatch will have informed your Lordship that I was apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would not make any serious opposition to the progress which it was my opinion the enemy would attempt to make in that province; but as they had been directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, at Merida and Medellín, and preparations had been ordered for that purpose, and to defend the passage of the Guadiana as long as was practicable, I was in hopes that the enemy would have been delayed, at least for some days, before he should be allowed to pass that river. But I have been disappointed in that expectation, and the town and bridge of Merida appear to have been given up to an advanced guard of cavalry; and, from the line of operation which the enemy have adopted in Estremadura, I have no doubt that they intend to abandon the communication between the troops now on the Guadiana and those which will remain in Andalusia, and to penetrate into the Alentejo. They have left Gen. Ballesteros' division on their left flank, between Xerez de los Caballeros and Olivença, with his communication open with Badajoz; and it is reported that Mortier's corps is followed by other troops. My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 31st Dec.

*The A.G. to the Commissary General.*

12th Jan. 1811.

By my Lord Wellington's command, I have the honor to put you in possession of the annexed representation from Lieut. Col. Clifton, of the 1st dragoons, transmitted to this office by the A. A. G. of cavalry, and complaining of soldiers of that corps being detained at the hospital station, Villa Nova, by the officer of Commissariat resident there. His Excellency is desirous you should cause the

dragoon instanced in the enclosure, viz. ———, to be dismissed from his present employment; and further to give a general instruction that no soldier be henceforward detained on any account by officers of your department, without previously having obtained special authority to that effect.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 13th Jan. 1811, 10 A.M.

I have just received your letter of the 12th, by the Conde de Lumiares.

My opinion is that you cannot oppose the advance of Mortier and the passage of the enemy over the Tagus at the same time, even though Mortier's force should not be what Brito states it. We must look to get your corps across the Benavente river, which in my maps is called the Zatas, and which you call the Sor. I do not see any occasion for being in a hurry with that operation unless Mortier is advancing; and I am convinced it will be effected without difficulty, if the waters should not be out. Even if they should be out, I believe it might be effected.

If the bridge and causeway of Benavente should be impassable, it is not **very** probable that the passage of the Tagus will be very practicable. The strength of the current will be such that the enemy cannot depend upon getting their boats back to any particular point which they might fix upon: and 40 boats containing 40 men each are not an armament to be trusted on the left bank of the river without risk, unsupported by an early reinforcement. I would observe, also, that, if the floods should render the causeway of Benavente impassable, it is probable that the stream at Mugem would be impassable also, supposing the causeway there to be destroyed; and the stream at Salvaterra would likewise be another obstacle, which would delay a superior enemy till the causeway at Benavente should become passable for your horses. Your horses and carriages alone are what it would be necessary to pass over this causeway, as your infantry would be embarked in the boats, or passed over the river at Caruxo or elsewhere.

I would also observe that, if the floods of the Benavente river should prevent you from passing the causeway, the same floods would prevent Mortier from crossing the river at Monte Mór o Novo, the bridge there being destroyed, supposing that he were to take the road by Estremoz instead of that by Portalegre, which is the most probable.

From all this you will observe that my opinion is that there is no occasion to hurry your movement; and as I believe that, if the enemy cannot pass the Tagus, or that they do not hear of Mortier for a few days, they must retire, I am anxious that you should make no movement which can discover to them any weakness on our part on the left of the Tagus. However, you are on the spot, and know best what you can do with your troops, and what roads, bridges, causeways, &c. will permit you to do; and you may depend upon it, that I shall concur in the propriety of any step which you may take.

I enclose letters from Blunt, received in the night. The detachment which he mentions is just one of plunder to Alfeisaráo. Gen. Campbell has mentioned to me Baron Eben's wish to go into Upper Beira, to be employed in commanding the Ordenanza. What do you say to it?

It appears by the Marques de la Romana's account that the engineer did not destroy the bridge at Merida, for many reasons, every one of

which ought to have induced him to destroy it. Mendizabal mentions that Madden quitted him in consequence of instructions from me which had never been communicated to him (the Marques). Madden says that he marched to Elvas with Mendizabal's consent. It is very desirable to have this point clearly established, as we must not on any account lose our character for candor and fair dealing.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 13th Jan. 1811, 2 P.M.

Since I wrote to you this morning I have perused, with attention, Baccellar's and the other reports on the enemy's proceedings in Beira Alta; and, adverting to those proceedings, coupled with the orders to Claparède to take up his position at Guarda, given by Drouet after Drouet had had his interview with Massena; and observing that, notwithstanding their want of ammunition and stores, and their ignorance of Mortier's movements, they have left their ammunition upon the frontier, I am more than ever impressed with a notion that they directed Claparède to take the position at Guarda with a view to their own retreat by the valley of the Mondego. Under these circumstances I think it very desirable that you should conceal from them, as long as you can, any knowledge of Mortier's movements, which they might derive from yours; and I send this letter by Lord Clinton, to impress again upon you what I stated in my letter of this morning.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 13th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th inst., and in reply to the assertion of the government, that the scarcity in the fortress of Abrantes is to be attributed to the supplies furnished from those magazines to Don Carlos de España, I beg to assure you that they are misinformed. But if they have furnished supplies to Don Carlos de España, I conclude they have vouchers to show what quantities; and I believe it will be found that the quantities are trifling.

At all events, if Don Carlos de España's troops had been supplied by the magazines of Abrantes, it was the duty of the *Junta de Viveres*, who I conclude received returns of the consumption from those magazines, to replenish them in time. That is the neglect of duty of which I complain, and which, in the usual course, remains unpunished and even unnoticed.

The danger which I have long foreseen, and of which I have frequently warned the Portuguese government, is now approaching the province of Alentejo, and I am apprehensive that it is but little prepared for it.

It is really impossible for me to send British officers to perform the duties of the officers of the civil government. All that I can do is to form the best military system I can, for the defence of the country, with the means which are in my power, and to suggest to the government those measures to be carried into execution by the civil authorities to correspond with the military operations, either in the way of supplying our own troops, or of withdrawing supplies from the grasp of the enemy, or of saving the persons and moveable and valuable property of the inhabitants of the country, whose safety would be exposed by the course of the operations. It rests with the civil government to adopt or reject these sug-

gestions, and to carry them into execution by their own officers, if they adopt them. It is quite impossible for me to interfere in any manner in the execution of these measures, notwithstanding that the neglect of them must give me the greatest concern.

The state of the military operations in Estremadura induces me again to request you to draw the attention of the government to the want of workmen at the works on the left of the Tagus, so interesting at the present moment, particularly to the city of Lisbon, and so earnestly desired by the government themselves. The number has never yet exceeded 800 men, and we could employ with advantage 4000.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Cartaxo, 13th Jan. 1811.

Mr. Wellesley will communicate to you the accounts of the state of affairs in this quarter.

I think it probable that you will have ordered the Chasseurs Britanniques to the Tagus, from the accounts which you will probably have received of the enemy's movements into Estremadura.

I have received a letter from Col. Lord Aylmer, who is an A. A. G. with this army, attached to the 1st division of infantry, under Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, in which he expresses a desire to be removed to Cadiz, in case of the departure of Lieut. Col. Macdonald for England. I understand from Lieut. Col. Ponsonby that he wishes to return to Portugal; and, if that is the case, I assure you that you could not have an officer at the head of the department of the Adj. Gen. at Cadiz more fit for the situation, and better calculated to give you satisfaction, than Lord Aylmer. I mention him to you at his desire, which he had already expressed to me when the troops were detached to Cadiz from this country in the month of Feb. 1809; and I am convinced that if you should think it proper to recommend that he should be sent to you, you will find him a most useful Staff officer.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 13th Jan. 1811.

I enclose my report to the Sec. of State of yesterday.

The conduct of the Spaniards in Estremadura surpasses every thing they have yet done. They were particularly desired to defend the Guadiana and to destroy the bridges of Medellin and Merida, which orders they had received, and the engineer went to Merida to execute this work. Instead of executing it, he makes a report, stating objections to the measure, every word of which proves that it ought to be executed, and he refers for orders. Mendizabal, who is at Badajoz, does the same; and in the meantime the French, who were supposed by Mendizabal not to have advanced further than Zafra, drive the Spanish cavalry from Merida and obtain possession of the bridge!

Be it remembered that 400 French infantry, in the year 1808, held this same post and bridge of Merida against the whole of Cuesta's army for one month, in the summer when the Guadiana was fordable! I really believe that if they would have defended Merida and Medellin for a few days only, so as to impede for that period the passage of Mortier's corps across the Guadiana, the French must have retired from this country: and

I think that Claparède's division has been ordered to Guarda to protect the movement by the valley of the Mondego.

I send you by this occasion the — transport with 6000 stands of arms and sets of accoutrements. We shall now see whether *boasting* will relieve the siege of Cadiz.

P.S. From the accounts which I have from England, I have no doubt but that the Regency is established by this time, and that the Ministry will be changed.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 14th Jan. 1811, 10 A.M.

I received last night 2 letters from you of the 12th, and this morning 3 of the 13th. It would be convenient if you would either number your letters of each day, or date the hour at which you write them.

I gave directions that Romana should have some shoes; but I do not recollect saying that any were to be delivered at Chamusca. That is, I believe, an addition of Don Carlos. It is desirable that upon all these applications he should be referred to the Marques de la Romana.

I will speak to Murray about your tracing. I must order a new General Court Martial on Lieut. —.

Murray has just been here, and tells me that he sent after you, on the day you left this, a tracing of a large part of Alentejo, and that Waller and Doyle have got nearly all the rest.

The shoes for Don Carlos were to have been delivered at Valada, but are not yet come up. You may give him the 450 pairs of shoes which are at Chamusca. If you have moved, the disposition by which you have moved, and that of your troops after moving, is as good as can be made; but I think it most probable you will not have moved.

P.S. Half-past 11. I have just received your letter of the 13th, written after the arrival of Lumières. You will have seen by Mendizabal's letter to Don Carlos, that the French are occupied in the blockade of Olivença rather than in passing the Guadiana; and this being the case, I think it desirable that you should replace matters as they were, and even draw Campbell's and Lumley's brigade nearer to you. We must either do that, or determine to give up Alentejo.

The Marques de la Romana sends an order to Don Carlos to march, as directed by Mendizabal, as soon as his troops shall be relieved in their station by some of those under your command.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 14th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th inst., and I beg to refer you to my letter of the 12th inst., for a statement of the nature of the difficulties in passing the Zatas in case that river should overflow its banks, and of the mode in which I propose to overcome those difficulties; that is, by embarking the troops in the boats in the Tagus at Salvaterra, and moving them down the southern branch of the Tagus, below the point of junction of the Zatas, and landing them on the left bank of the south branch of the Tagus. When the Zatas overflows its banks, boats cannot be used upon it for the passage of troops, either in the way of bridge or to ferry them over.

*The A.G. to Capt. Currie, A.D.C. to Lieut. Gen. Hill.*

14th Jan. 1811.

His Excellency much regrets the necessity of the application contained in your letter of the 13th inst., yet fully approves of Lieut. Gen. Hill's departure for England by the earliest opportunity.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.*

14th Jan. 1811.

In consequence of frequent delays in the correspondence between the head quarters of the army and the 2d division, the Commander of the Forces, attributing these delays to neglects in the passage of the Tagus, has directed the following arrangements: viz., the non-commissioned officer in charge of the letter post at each bank shall send one of their soldiers, on all occasions, to the opposite side with the dispatches. A soldier is constantly to be at the ferry to receive and bear the letters to the nearest party; but should any unforeseen circumstance cause the absence of that soldier so supposed on duty, the soldier who may have passed the river is in person to bear the dispatches to the nearest letter post.

As similar instructions will be given at the other side, I see nothing that can prevent the establishment of the plan. Overcome any difficulties arising, if possible; at all events report on the effect of these directions.

To Capt. —, H.M.S. —.

Cartaxo, 15th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter; and although it would give me great satisfaction to forward the objects of an officer who I doubt not is deserving of every favor he solicits from the First Lord of the Admiralty, it would be most presumptuous in me to venture to recommend to Mr. Yorke the application of any gentleman with whom, and with the nature of whose services, I am entirely unacquainted.

To Dr. Halliday.

Cartaxo, 15th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 13th inst., and I am highly flattered by your desire to write the history of the war in Portugal.

The events in this country of the last 3 years are fit subjects for the historian, and, if well and truly related, may be deemed deserving the consideration of politicians and military men. But I am apprehensive that the time is not yet arrived in which either the facts themselves can be stated with accuracy or truth, or the motives for the different occurrences be stated.

I feel that I could not give an answer to many of the questions which it is probable you would be desirous of asking, without disclosing facts, opinions, and reasonings, which are not yet before the public, and which could not be disclosed by me without a breach of confidence. I would therefore recommend to you to postpone the execution of your design to some future period.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 15th Jan. 1811.

I received yesterday evening from Gordon your letter of yesterday: I now enclose some reports from Blunt. There is nothing new on this side, excepting that the beams of wood, which I desired Gordon to tell you had been brought down to the neighbourhood of the causeway, have been made into *chevalets* to form bridges, in the most impudent manner, in the face of day under our own guns.

You will see from Brito's reports of the 12th, that the enemy are feeling about Badajoz, and are about establishing a communication by small



posts with Seville. This does not look like entering Portugal in aid of Massena. I think that, if this is their line of operations, Madden's brigade of cavalry should remain with Mendizabal, particularly as there is a misunderstanding respecting the separation of this brigade from the Spanish corps. I admit that it is a bad bargain for Madden, and every thing that can may be said against the Spaniards; but we must either cut them entirely, which is a point on which the British nation must decide, or we must give them this assistance.

It is not impossible that, if the enemy should endeavor to force the passage of the Tagus, they will at the same time manœuvre upon our left flank, so as to endeavor to draw us from hence, and oblige us to resume our positions in the rear, with a view to make us withdraw the troops from the left bank of the Tagus. I do not mean to give up this position in a hurry; but even if I should withdraw to the lines, I do not propose to bring your troops, or any of them, to the right of the Tagus: we are so much narrowed at present that I think I shall be able to do without them; and, at all events, it would not answer to lose the Alentejo by a manœuvre of this description.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 15th Jan. 1811.

Since I wrote my other letter I have seen the Marques de la Romana, who has shown me accounts from Estremadura, which tend to prove that Mortier, with about 14,300 infantry, and a large train of carriages, and his bridge, marched from Merida towards Miajadas, on the road to Truxillo and Almaraz, on the morning of the 9th. The cavalry belonging to this corps, and about 4000 infantry, I conclude, belonging to the troops still in Andalusia, made the show about Badajoz and Olivença referred to in Brito's reports. Thus is the Alentejo once more in safety. Madden ought now certainly to rejoin Mendizabal.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 15th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 13th. I don't think it quite fair in Dom M. Forjaz to conclude that the officer employed on the works on the left of the Tagus has all the assistance he requires, because he has not troubled Dom M. Forjaz with further applications. It might as well be supposed by a gentleman that his duns do not require payment, or rather that he has paid his duns, because they may have discontinued their visits for a day or two.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 16th Jan. 1811.

I enclose a letter from Mr. Kennedy about Mr. Ogilvie's drafts.

I return the letter from Santarem, which contains some curious intelligence; the writer must be a fellow of some sense. I likewise enclose a letter from Adm. Berkeley, which I beg you will return, respecting the collection of boats at Salvaterra for the use of your corps. My notion was that you should embark your infantry under Salvaterra, near where we used to kill our hares, and pass them down the south branch of the Tagus, below the junction of the Zatas, and then disembark them somewhere about Foz, on the left of the Zatas. This would have been neces-

sary, even supposing that the causeways of the bridge of Benavente should have been in such a state as to enable the cavalry, the artillery, and the baggage to pass them. The Admiral, however, conceived that the matter might be done otherwise, and that the Lieutenants of the navy could, with flats, &c., make a bridge over the inundations of the Zatas. I repeated my former request to him, and this is his answer; and now I request you to send an officer of the Staff to Salvaterra and Benavente, and ascertain what means there are really there, and give your own orders respecting them. I also think that it would be very desirable to have the causeways of the Benavente river marked with good posts, for I understand that if they had been so marked when the river lately overflowed its banks, the water was not so deep as that a horse could not pass the causeways, and a great danger consisted in the facility with which people could miss the causeway.

Mortier's march, which is I think confirmed by our not hearing of his approach to Arronches, shows the nature of the attack which we may shortly expect. I calculate that he may be on the Zezere in the first days of February. I think it would be desirable to have notice sent round to the Ordenanza, volunteers, and all who are fit for duty in the lines, apprising them that they are likely to be called upon to be at their posts in a short time, and desiring that they may be ready to repair to them at a moment's warning. This general notice would probably be more effectual, and answer our purpose better, than now to fix a particular distant day.

There is nothing new on this side this morning. The enemy did not appear yesterday to be working at their *chevalets*, nor to have made any progress towards their completion since the day before. The orders to Clapartède are now explained by Mortier's march.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 16th Jan. 1811.

I have had some more conversation with Mr. Kennedy respecting the expediency of sending some transports to Oporto to bring down cattle. Mr. Kennedy considers it desirable that as many as 30 sail should be employed on this service, and, as we shall always have them within reach, I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that 15 sail may go to Oporto every week for this purpose.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 16th Jan. 1811.

You will have seen the accounts of Mortier's movements received from Brito, the truth of which is confirmed by the fact that we have not heard of his appearance on the frontier about Arronches. The passage of the Tagus by Mortier removes to a distant period, if not entirely, the danger of Alentejo; but it shows clearly that we shall be attacked at an early period in our positions. I reckon that Mortier, supposing him to march by Almaraz, can be on the Zezere in the first days in February; and I think it probable that the battle for the possession of this country, and probably the fate of the Peninsula, will be fought in less than a month from this time.

I wrote to Lord Liverpool, on the 29th of last month, to request him to

send me out any troops that might be destined to reinforce this army ; and I should think that they ought to arrive by the beginning of next month ; but if the packet should not have sailed, I request you to mention to Lord Wellesley that I expect these reinforcements.

My aide de camp, Major Gordon, was at Abrantes 2 or 3 days ago, and he says that the only apprehension they have there is of want of provisions : they already feel some distress, although the place is open ; and Gordon says that the country abounds in corn, cattle, and provisions of all descriptions. There is something very extraordinary in the nature of the people of the Peninsula. I really believe them, those of Portugal particularly, to be the most loyal and best disposed, and the most cordial haters of the French, that ever existed : but there is an indolence and a want even of the power of exertion in their disposition and habits, either for their own security, that of their country, or of their allies, which baffle all our calculations and efforts. You will scarcely believe that the troops which I now have in the Alentejo, in which province the French would find and seize resources for months, are supplied for one half of their consumption by the magazines on the right of the Tagus. The people will not sell us what they have, and what they have been repeatedly told will fall into the hands of the enemy, because they will not incur the risk of being obliged, at a later period of the year, to take the trouble of sending to Lisbon to replace for their own consumption that which might now be sold to us.

In the same manner I might now collect at Elvas, from Estremadura, quantities of corn of all descriptions ; but we cannot get in Alentejo (a country untouched) carriages for its conveyance to Lisbon, because the lower orders will not work for hire, and the magistrates will not take the trouble of making them work. Can such a people be saved ? Are they worth saving ?

I propose to keep Beresford's corps, or at all events a part of it, on the left of the Tagus as long as possible, in order, if I can, to save the Alentejo, though I shall not be surprised if the French were to make a great attempt to pass the Tagus before, or at the same time that they should attack us on the right of the river. The government, therefore, should still persevere in their endeavors to prevail upon the inhabitants of the Alentejo to remove their property within the lines, and out of the enemy's reach.

It is also very desirable that they should take measures to draw within the lines, on this side of the Tagus, all the inhabitants and their property. A proclamation is nothing : nobody obeys it ; and there is nothing to enforce obedience to it. But persons should be sent into the different districts to apprise the people of their danger, and to urge them to remove from it. After all, however, it is very difficult to get them to move, or to send in their property, as they have no confidence in the government ; and they are as apprehensive that their cattle, &c. will fall into the hands of the Portuguese troops as they are that they will fall into the hands of the French. I must add also that this difficulty was not in my way in Beira.

Another circumstance also, to which it is desirable that the attention of the government should be drawn, is the necessity that the Lisbon militia,

artillery, Ordenanza, &c. should be prepared to resume their posts in the lines when I shall call for them. I have written to Beresford upon this subject; but it is desirable that the government should likewise attend to it.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 17th Jan. 1811.

I enclose two letters which Mr. Kennedy has put into my hands, on the subject of measures adopted under the authority of the Portuguese government, by soldiers of the Portuguese marine, to seize boats.

When the Portuguese government made the law by which the boats in the Tagus were numbered and registered, and an officer was appointed, under their authority, to superintend those boats in each part of the Tagus, to which law I refer you, I understood that the system of what is termed *embargo* was to cease, and that all applications for boats, when they could not be hired by private contract from the owners in sufficient numbers for the service, were to be made to the officer employed to superintend those boats in each division of the river.

I have directed the Commissary Gen. of the British army to adhere to the system thus established by law in every instance; but if it is to be understood as being no longer in use, I beg that I may know it from authority, in order that I also may give orders to seize and *embargo* the boats which are necessary for the service of the British army. As, however, the system established by law has been found to answer perfectly, I would recommend that the law should not be altered, but that it should be enforced; and I profess my readiness to order the Commissary Gen. to give every assistance to the Portuguese Commissariat in boats, if it should be found that the latter are in want of this description of conveyance, and that the British Commissary Gen. has more than his due proportion.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 18th Jan. 1811.

I am just returned from Benavente with Fletcher, and I enclose a sketch of the causeway, &c. there: A is a causeway, over which there may be at the highest floods about one foot of water. The pavement on this part requires some repairs, particularly at its commencement near Salvaterra, and at the end near the bridge. The whole should be well staked out. After passing the bridge there are two roads; one leading to the right over the bridge of Benavente, the other an unfinished causeway. The first, marked C, has about 3 feet or  $3\frac{1}{2}$  feet water in the highest floods. The pavement requires repairs, and the causeway to be staked out. The current on this part is very strong. The second, marked B, is never overflowed; but it is completed no further than the bank of the river.

Fletcher is of opinion that there will be no difficulty in laying a bridge of boats from the end of the causeway B to the point D, at the entrance of Benavente, nor in making a road from the bridge up into the town; the distance is 100 yards; and I write for boats, &c., for the purpose. I acknowledge, however, that I doubt the practicability of making this bridge: but of this I am very certain, that, if the bridge cannot be made, there can be no difficulty in making use of boats from the end of B to the point D, guiding them across the stream by the ropes to be passed over

for the bridges, if it should not be practicable to complete the bridge. Thus the difficulty of Benavente will be got over. Fletcher will meet Lieut. Foster at Benavente on the morning of the 20th, to give him the directions for this work, if you will send him there. It will be necessary, however, that the Juiz should be ordered, under pain of punishment for neglect, 1st; to put the causeways, A and C, in complete repair: 2dly; to find men to cut wood to stake them out: 3dly; to find men with tools to make the road from D up into the town of Benavente, and to supply any materials that may be required to make a platform from the end of B to the boats, supposing one should be necessary.

I wish you would inquire from your friend at Santarem, whether the enemy have any boats in the little stream which runs into the Tagus immediately above the town, over which the road to Golegão passes.

I don't know what to make of the enemy's movements in Estremadura. They first told us one story, then contradicted it, without stating on what grounds, and they have not told where the enemy is. Even Downie, who says he counted them, does not say where; so that all we know is that they are in possession of Merida since the 8th, that is 10 days!!!

In respect to Madden, I think it would be best to join him again to the Spaniards, till they shall take to their garrisons; he must not shut himself up in a Spanish garrison positively.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 18th Jan. 1811.

I received your letter of the 16th yesterday, by Mr. Brown; and I have been this day to Benavente, where I have seen the causeway. Lieut. Col. Fletcher is of opinion that a bridge of boats can be thrown from the end of the unfinished causeway to Benavente, the distance being 100 yards. I doubt it; but at all events I am convinced that troops, &c. can pass there in boats, which can be guided across the stream by the ropes which will be laid for the bridge, even if it should be found impracticable to construct the bridge.

There are materials at the mouth of the Benavente river for a bridge of 150 feet. This will require 300 feet; and it is very desirable that the remainder of the materials should be sent up. The number of boats required for the whole will be 17.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 18th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th inst., to the greater part of which I shall give an answer at a future opportunity; but it is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the Portuguese government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments which have dropped from the Patriarch, in recent discussions at the meetings of the Regency.

It appears that his Eminence has expatiated on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, 'which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the Kingdom.' It must be recollected that these discussions are not those of a popular assembly: they can scarcely be deemed of the nature of those of a ministerial council; but they are those of the persons whom H. R. H. the Prince Regent has

called to govern his Kingdom, in the existing crisis of his affairs. I have always been in the habit of considering his Eminence the Patriarch as one of those in Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices ought to be made, provided the Kingdom could preserve its independence; and I think it most important that the British government, and the government of the Prince Regent, and the world, should be undeceived if we have been hitherto mistaken.

His Eminence objects to the adoption of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds for the maintenance of His Royal Highness' armies, because a war may exist in the heart of the Kingdom; but I am apprehensive that the Patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered this Kingdom in the year 1807; that in which they were expelled from it, having had complete possession of it, in 1808; and that they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two most valuable provinces of the Kingdom, in 1809; and the mode in which they were expelled from those provinces.

He forgets that it was stated to him, in the month of Feb. 1810, in presence of the Marquez d'Olhão, of Senhor Dom M. Forjaz, and of Senhor Dom J. A. Salter e Mendoça, and of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, that it was probable that the enemy would invade this Kingdom with such an army as that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose him with any chance of success; and that this concentration could be made with safety in the neighbourhood of the capital only; and that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him, which went to bring the enemy into the heart of the Kingdom; and that he expressed before these persons his high approbation of it.

If he recollected these circumstances, he would observe that nothing had occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, whose consequences he now disapproves.

The Portuguese nation are involved in a war, not of aggression or even defence on their part, not of alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political system; for they abandoned all alliances and all political systems, in order to propitiate the enemy. The inhabitants of Portugal made war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant, whose government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and properties. They chose this lot for themselves, principally at the instigation of his Eminence the Patriarch; and they called upon His Majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal (whose alliance had been relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy), to aid them in the glorious effort which they wished to make to restore the independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties of its inhabitants.

I shall not state the manner in which His Majesty has answered this call, nor enumerate the services rendered to this nation by his army. Whatever may be the result of the contest, nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever forget them: but when a nation have adopted the line of resistance to the tyrant, under the circumstances under which it was unanimously adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer

none of the miseries of war, or that their government act consistently with their sentiments when they expatiate on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, 'which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the Kingdom.' The Patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions, which have principally involved his country in this contest, when he talks of discontinuing it, because it has again, for the third time, been brought 'into the heart of the Kingdom.'

Although the Patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing government approved of the plan which I explained to them in Feb. 1810, according to which it was probable that this Kingdom would be made the seat of the war, which has since occurred, I admit that his Eminence, or any of those members, may fairly disapprove of the operations of the campaign and of the continuance of the enemy in Portugal.

I have pointed out to the Portuguese government, in more than one dispatch, the difficulties and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy's position in this country; and the probable success, not only to ourselves, but to our allies, of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that the allies have literally sustained no loss of any description; and their army is at this moment more complete than it was at the opening of the campaign in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have suffered, and are continuing to suffer: but, without entering into discussions, which I wish to avoid upon this occasion, I repeat that, if my counsel had been followed, those sufferings would at least have been alleviated; and I observe that it is the first time that I have heard that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part, of any nation have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which has for its object the deliverance of the whole.

The Patriarch may, however, disapprove of the system which I have followed; and I conceive that he is fully justified in desiring His Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of their armies. This would be a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion; but this measure is entirely distinct from his refusal to concur in laying those burthens on the people, which are necessary to carry on and secure the objects of the war.

It must be obvious to his Eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of the affairs of Portugal, that, unless a great effort is made by the government to render the resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure, all plans and systems of operations will be alike; for the Portuguese army will be able to carry on none. At this moment, although all the corps are concentrated in the neighbourhood of their magazines, with means of transport easy by the Tagus, the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions, because there is no money to defray the expenses of transport; and all the departments of the Portuguese army, including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary expenditure and to perform their duty. These deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have

known the Portuguese army ; and it is well known that it must have been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the provisions, stores, and funds destined for the maintenance of the British army. It may likewise occur to his Eminence, that, in proportion as the operations of the armies would be more extended, the expense would increase ; and the necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become more urgent, unless indeed the course of those operations should annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure. The objections, then, to adopt measures to improve the resources of the government, go to decide the question whether the war shall be carried on, or not, in any manner.

By desiring His Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of their armies his Eminence would endeavor to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of the country he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up the independence of his country, and the security of the lives and properties of the Portuguese nation.

In my opinion, the Patriarch is in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon, on the part of His Majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the funds to enable this country to carry on the war. At all events, I request that this letter may be communicated to him in the Regency ; and that a copy of it may be forwarded to H. R. H. the Prince Regent, in order that His Royal Highness may see that I have given his Eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives, either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes in respect to the independence of his country.

To Dr. Halliday.

Cartaxo, 19th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 16th inst. ; and I am much concerned that it is not in my power to remove you from the Portuguese service, to which you are now attached, in order to attach you to the British army ; nor is it in my power to give you leave to absent yourself from your duties in the Portuguese army.

I refer you to my last letter for my opinion on the other points to which yours relates.

To Col. Kemmis.

Cartaxo, 19th Jan. 1811.

I have perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of private — — —, of the — regt. ; and, as I do not agree in opinion with the Court that the prisoner ought to be acquitted, I request them to revise their sentence.

There is no contradiction of the evidence which has been produced that this soldier quitted the company to which he belonged without leave. He may afterwards have been taken prisoner by the enemy ; and it appears that he has been exchanged as a prisoner of war. The crime of which he has been guilty may not be deemed of the worst description, viz., desertion with an intention of joining the enemy ; but in my opinion the evidence tends directly to prove that he was guilty of deserting, and the



Court should find accordingly, and sentence such punishment as they may think proper.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 19th Jan. 1811.

The enemy moved about 3000 infantry, and 8 or 10 squadrons of cavalry, this day about noon, upon Rio Maior, from whence our troops retired. I have not yet heard whether they are gone back again; but I should not be surprised if this movement were followed by a general one in the morning, as I think they must have imagined that we had sent more troops to the left of the Tagus than we really have. Whatever movement I may make, I should wish you to continue in the position you now occupy till you shall hear further from me. I shall write again, as soon as I know what the enemy have done from Rio Maior.

Accounts from Estremadura are just as contradictory as usual. Romana, however, who is very ill, is alarmed for the safety of Olivença, and is about to send off the divisions of O'Donell and Carrera. They will cross at Aldea Galega.

I am very apprehensive that, after all, Badajoz is not supplied with provisions; and Mendizabal has desired Romana to send him 600,000 rations of biscuit. Mr. Kennedy is going to send him 100,000 rations; but Alava has proposed from the Marques that these 100,000 rations should be sent from Elvas, and that ours should go to Elvas. Can this be done? Can Elvas spare the 100,000 rations of biscuit, taking all the chances of the other not reaching the place?

P.S. I am not quite secure on the score of Bacellar's movement of Wilson's and Miller's divisions. I think that, considering that part of Claparède's division remained in the rear, and that in fact the French are very indifferent about their communication, it would have been better to have thrown those divisions in front of Claparède.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 19th Jan. 1811.

In answer to your letter of the 17th I have to refer you to mine to the Sec. of State of this day, from which you will see how impossible it is for me to form any decisive opinion regarding the operations of the enemy from Estremadura. I can rely upon nothing from the Spaniards, and I therefore say decidedly, that the Alentejo ought to be put in a state to receive the enemy at a moment's notice. The sooner the inhabitants begin to move the less inconvenience they will experience in making the movement. As for putting cattle upon the island of Lyceria, I am perfectly aware that they can be drawn from thence when we please: but I know the inhabitants of Portugal better than Dom M. Forjaz. The moment the enemy appear on the left of the Tagus they will fly, and leave the cattle behind them. But they must do as they please.

I have written you a letter upon the Bishop's conduct in the Regency, which you will either produce or not, as you may think best. The utility of it will depend entirely upon the effect it is likely to have upon his mind: but I think it gets him into a dilemma which he will be glad to avoid by supporting in the Regency the measures necessary for carrying on the war. I have received your letter of the 18th.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 19th Jan. 1811.

I have the honor to transmit a letter from Col. Peacocke, with its enclosures, respecting the improper state in which some detachments have been sent from England, and I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will give such directions as may prevent the recurrence of such irregularities.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 19th Jan. 1811.

Since the enemy obtained possession of the bridge over the Guadiana at Merida, the accounts of their progress have been so various and contradictory that I am not enabled to form an opinion of their designs or numbers.

It was first reported from Badajoz, from authority, that about 14,000 infantry, with a large convoy of carriages, &c., had marched on the 9th by the road of Miajadas towards the bridge of Almaraz; and I have since received a report from the banks of the Elja, that the enemy's head quarters were at Cáceres, while other reports from Badajoz would tend to prove that the enemy's whole force, with the exception of a small body of cavalry, were still on the left bank of the Guadiana.

When Gen. Mendizabal retired across the Guadiana he threw a small corps of about 3000 infantry into Olivença, which place was but ill supplied with provisions and stores. A body of infantry, which has at times been stated to be 4000, and others 7000, with about 1500 cavalry, has blockaded Olivença; and I imagine that the consternation which prevails in all the towns in Estremadura, in consequence of this event, is the reason that no positive intelligence of the enemy's movements, or position, or numbers, can be procured.

At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from Seville, Gen. Ballesteros received an order from the Regency, dated the 21st Dec. last, directing him to proceed with the troops under his command into the Condado de Niebla. The force in Estremadura was thus diminished by one half, and the remainder are considered insufficient to attempt the relief of the troops in Olivença. Gen. Mendizabal has consequently called for assistance from this quarter, and the Marques de la Romana immediately directed the troops under Don Carlos de España to march, for which Gen. Mendizabal had made a requisition; and I imagine that the remainder of the Spanish corps hitherto attached to this army will likewise move in that direction.

The circumstances which I have above related will show your Lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine, or regulate, operations with a corps so ill organized, in possession of so little intelligence, and upon whose actions so little reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited, that the first intelligence which Gen. Mendizabal received of the assembly of the enemy's troops at Seville was from hence; and if any combination was then made, either of retreat or defence, it was rendered useless, or destroyed, by the orders from the Regency to detach Gen. Ballesteros into the Condado de Niebla, which were dated the 21st Dec., the very day on which Soult broke up from Cadiz with a detachment of infantry, and marched to Seville.

There has been no alteration in the position of the enemy's troops in front of this army. I imagine that Gen. Claparède has not received the orders from Gen. Drouet to take up his position upon Guarda, of which I reported to your Lordship in my last dispatch that we had intercepted the duplicate. He attacked Gen. Silveira with the advanced guard of his division near Trancoso, at the Ponte do Abade, on the 30th Dec., and obliged him to retire with some loss. Lieut. Col. MacBean,\* of the 24th regt., was wounded in this affair. Gen. Claparède attacked Gen. Silveira again with the advanced guard of his division at Villa da Ponte on the 11th inst., and obliged him to retire, but without material loss, excepting that of Major Cooksey, of the 24th Portuguese regt., who was unfortunately killed, and the officer commanding the 1st brigade of militia, who was wounded.

Gen. Bacellar, who commands in the north, has moved the divisions commanded by Gen. Miller and Col. Wilson upon the flank and rear of the enemy, which it is expected will check this movement, and oblige him to fall back again towards the frontier. A part of Claparède's division was still at Pinhel.

I enclose copies of the letters which I have received from Marshal Beresford on these transactions.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 19th Jan. 1811.

I enclose the weekly state. My dispatch of this date will show you the situation of affairs. The Spaniards have outdone themselves even in their late transactions in Estremadura, and I expect to hear at every moment that they have lost their corps in Olivença. I shall send you the reasons stated for not breaking the bridge of Merida, if I can get the paper from La Romana. It is really worth preserving.

I hope that you will have sent me the troops upon receiving my letter of the 29th Dec. I am sorry to give you bad accounts of the Brunswick Legion. They continue to desert in large numbers; and on the night before last 14 deserted to go to the enemy; 11 were caught, one was shot while making the attempt, and only 2 got off. These were men who had only joined the army 2 days before. I find they were prisoners enlisted; but it is desirable not to have in this army enlisted deserters.

I enclose a newspaper giving an account of our works, the number of guns and men in each, and for what purpose constructed. Surely it must be admitted, that those who carry on operations against an enemy possessed of all the information which our newspapers give to the French do so under singular disadvantages.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 20th Jan. 1811, 10 A.M.

I received in the night your letter of yesterday. The French retired again from Rio Maior yesterday evening, and our troops re-entered the place, and all is quiet this morning, at least as far as I have heard. Their force was strong, but only a reconnoitring party. Fletcher is gone over to meet Lieut. Foster.

\* Lieut. Gen. Sir W. MacBean, K.C.B.

P.S. I observe that Silveira attacked the enemy on the day MacBean was wounded, which I do not think was exactly conformable to instructions. Madame la Duchesse d'Abrantes' letter is capital. I hope that she and the young one will arrive safe in France, to tell the story of her afflictions in Spain.

Memorandum to the Marques de la Romana.

Cartaxo, 20th Jan. 1811.

The situation of affairs in Estremadura becomes very critical and important, and will be doubly so if it be true that Badajoz is not supplied with provisions. It is very difficult, in consequence of the defective state of the information which we have received from Estremadura, to decide upon the positions which the enemy have occupied, or upon the plan of operations which ought to be adopted for the relief of Olivença.

The Spanish generals should bear in mind, however, that the last body of troops which their country possesses is that under the command of the Marques de la Romana, and that it should not be risked in operations of difficult or doubtful result. The relief of the battalions in Olivença is the first subject for consideration. If it be true, as has been stated, that the enemy have a considerable force on the right as well as on the left bank of the Guadiana, the operation to be performed becomes critical, and may involve not only the loss of the troops employed in it, but may have for its consequence the blockade of Badajoz itself.

In order to put this possibility in a clearer light, I must observe that there is no passage now for the Spanish troops over the Guadiana, excepting Badajoz itself. If then the whole of the disposable force in Estremadura should be thrown over the Guadiana at Badajoz, and the enemy's corps on the right of the Guadiana should take up a position on the high grounds between that place and the river Caya, not only Olivença would remain blockaded, if the measures for its relief should not succeed, but Badajoz also, with this additional inconvenience, that the number of mouths to feed in the place would be increased by the amount of the force which should have been employed to relieve Olivença, and which it is supposed, in the event of failure, would retire upon Badajoz.

The mode of proceeding which I would recommend, as a remedy for this inconvenience, would be, if possible, to attack the enemy's troops on the right of the Guadiana, at the same time that an attempt should be made to relieve Olivença. If they should be so weak as to be obliged to retire from the right bank, then the bridges of Merida and Medellin should be destroyed, as before recommended.

If the Spanish force is not strong enough to attack the enemy on the right bank at the same time that an attempt is made to relieve Olivença, at all events the Ponte d'Evora ought to be destroyed, and the heights should be occupied by a part of the garrison of Badajoz, which communicate with the fort of San Christoval, and run from Badajoz to Campo Maior. These measures would delay the operations of the enemy, and would enable the relieving troops to return, and pass through Badajoz before the enemy could occupy his position, as supposed, between Badajoz and the Caya. But the relief of Olivença, and the operations to be carried on with a view to that measure, however important, are trifling in im-

portance in comparison with the consideration of those which must be adopted for the safety of Badajoz itself, most particularly if that place is not supplied with provisions.

If the enemy are in the force supposed, and propose to remain in Estremadura, these provisions must be drawn from Portugal; and, at all events, the Spanish army must keep up its communication with this. I would therefore recommend the following measures to the consideration of the Spanish General officers.

1st; If possible, to get possession of the right bank of the Guadiana again, and to destroy the bridges of Merida and Medellin. If this measure answers no other purpose, it will gain time at all events, even if the bridges can be repaired; but if they cannot be repaired, it will oblige the enemy to make use of his own bridge for the passage of the river, and will confine him to one passage only.

2dly; An intrenched camp should be marked out, and prepared for the disposable force of the Marqués de la Romana's army, on the heights between Badajoz and Campo Maior, having its right upon San Christoval.

3dly; Gen. Ballesteros' division ought again to be joined to the army of the Marqués de la Romana.

4thly; The boats for a bridge now at Badajoz ought to be sent to Elvas, in order to give the Marques de la Romana a facility of crossing the Guadiana under Jurumenha, to give him a choice of attacking the enemy upon the left bank of the Guadiana, supposing that the enemy should fix their bridge below Badajoz, between that place and Elvas, and thus dislodge him from his intrenched position.

All these measures are very simple and practicable if they are immediately commenced in earnest; but if this plan, or some other of this description, is not adopted at an early period, and it forms part of the enemy's plan to blockade Badajoz with the force he now has in Estremadura, he will succeed in obtaining possession of the place, which has no chance of being preserved, unless Massena should be obliged to withdraw from his position in Portugal.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 20th Jan. 1811.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday. They have settled their concerns finely in Estremadura; and no arrangement was ever more completely Spanish than to have sent between 3000 and 4000 of their best men into Olivença, a place without artillery, ammunition, or provisions, under circumstances in which it was impossible, if they should be attacked, that they could be relieved! Then, as usual, they halloo to the whole world for assistance, and abuse if it is not immediately given to them. Mendizabal has desired that I would place under his command all the troops in the garrisons on the frontier, and all the cavalry. The Marqués de la Romana has indeed asked for the latter, which they would lose, and then abuse them.

Don Carlos de España went some days ago to Campo Maior, where he is by this time, upon Mendizabal's requisition; and the Marqués de la Romana, who is very ill, settled yesterday that the divisions of Carrera and O'Donell, which are with this army, should cross the Tagus, and pro-

ceed to the relief of Olivença. However, it is nonsense to talk of these people as troops, or to reckon upon their operations in any manner whatever, excepting in defence of a strong post, from which they have no retreat. In this view the loss of their numbers is a serious one to me.

You will observe the state of Olivença for want of provisions, and I am sadly afraid that Badajoz is not much better; for Mendizabal has applied to the Marques de la Romana for 600,000 rations of biscuit, in a letter received only yesterday. They have had the whole province of Estremadura open to them since the beginning of July; and it was particularly settled between the Marques de la Romana and me, not only that the abundant harvest of Estremadura should supply his garrisons, but that a large magazine should be formed for this army!!! To form these magazines, however, required arrangement, foresight, and activity; and there our allies invariably fail us. If it be true that there are no provisions in Badajoz, the French will undoubtedly get that place, if they only approach it; and then there will be a fine breeze! Mendizabal, &c., have sent us so many false reports, that I cannot make out what the French are doing.

To Col. Kemmis.

Cartaxo, 21st Jan. 1811.

I return the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you are President, in order to have inserted in the proceedings my letter to you, directing the revival of the sentence. This is usual upon all occasions; and I wish to show to those who will see the proceedings of this General Court Martial that I, at least, did my duty.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 21st Jan. 1811, 1 P.M.

I have perused Madden's letter; and I think there is only one part of it which ought to be given to the Marques de la Romana, viz., that part of it not marked by me. The other parts may be very true and correct accounts of the state of affairs in the Spanish army, indeed I am sure they are true, but I don't think it would answer any good purpose to communicate Gen. Madden's accounts to the Marques. However, I would not extract his letter without your consent, and therefore I return it to you.

There is nothing new on this side, excepting that they say Junot was wounded at Rio Maior on Saturday. Cocks has been very successful in taking prisoners of the 2d and 6th corps, near Alcobaca, in search of provisions, who say they have 150 boats at Punhete. They double the number every day.

P.S. I enclose an anonymous letter, which ought to be directed to you instead of me. I have not read it.

To Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, Bart.

Cartaxo, 21st Jan. 1811.

I am very sorry I did not see you this day, for I wanted to tell you how much I was satisfied with the mode in which you conducted our matters on Saturday at Rio Maior. I thought it best, as I could not go out, to send you no orders.

I hope to put you in orders for the command of the 5th division of infantry, if it should be agreeable to you; but, as that division is not at present actively employed, I should wish, if it is not disagreeable to you,

that you should remain in your present situation, and I will appoint Gen. Howard\* to command your brigade in the 1st division, which will still remain under your orders. Let me know if this will suit you.

I am thinking of making an arrangement for holding Alcoentre, at least for a time, in case the enemy attempt any thing on the left of our position.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 21st Jan. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which Lieut. Col. Fletcher has just put into my hands. As it is quite impossible that all the details of boats upon the river Tagus can be carried on between you and me, it is very desirable that the river boats in the Tagus should be left under the authorities placed over them by the Portuguese government, with whom the Commissary Gen. and Q. M. G. can communicate; and that, when British boats are required for any service, I should have the honor of applying to you for them; and that you should give such orders for their being supplied as you may deem expedient.

When a Lieutenant of the navy is employed to command or take charge of these boats, it is desirable that he should receive instructions to attend to the directions he may receive from me, or any Staff officer acting under my orders; for it is obvious that much time must be lost if, after the necessity for a service occurs, I am to apply to you to issue orders to an officer to perform it, which application would be made, as in this instance, many hours after the necessity would occur. Besides this inconvenience, it throws upon you and me the details of the service, into which we cannot enter without devoting to them time which might be better employed otherwise. In stating this, I don't mean to complain of Lieut. —, or of any officer of the navy, of whose zeal and anxiety to forward the service upon every occasion I cannot express my acknowledgments in too strong terms.

I beg leave to draw your attention to the statement in Capt. Squire's letter, regarding the necessity of having English flat bottomed boats for the bridge at Benavente, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send up the number required.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 21st Jan. 1811.

By this time you will have received my letter on the Patriarch's speech, about which you will do as you like. But I think it contains some truths which ought, in some manner or other, to be brought to the recollection of all the ruling authorities in Portugal; and it places the Patriarch's conduct in such a light that he will tremble when he shall see the lamp post. However, you will judge of the necessity of bringing it forward, and of the time and manner of producing it, if produced at all.

I must write to you, however, officially, in a very serious manner, upon answers lately received from Col. Fava and from Gen. Rosa, to requisitions for work to be done in their departments, in which they say they cannot perform the work till they shall know who is to pay for it. The work in Col. Fava's department was portable magazines for the redoubts in the

\* General the Earl of Effingham, G.C.B.

lines, and that in Gen. Rosa's was made up ammunition for the same, for which Great Britain has supplied the powder.

I believe that I have gone beyond my power in defraying all the expenses of constructing all the works, and also of improving the defences of Peniche; but it is really carrying matters too far, if Great Britain is not only to pay the expense of constructing the works for the defence of Portugal, but likewise the expense incurred by the ordinary disbursements in the Portuguese arsenals and establishments, in arming the works after they are constructed. I shall be sorry to bring this question to a decision; but it may be depended upon that the British government will fly off upon it.

I think also (but that may be prejudice) that I see in these new claims, of Fava and Rosa, for payment for the work done by their departments respectively, that spirit of anti-Anglican party which I am convinced is encouraged at Lisbon. I am therefore desirous that these demands should be set aside by authority at once. I am so entirely of opinion that we can do nothing for this country, if the anti-Anglican party is not suppressed, that I shall recommend to government either to suppress it, and to have banished from Portugal all those concerned in it, or to withdraw their army. They now go so far with their demands as to call upon me for payment for the repair of roads, for which there are funds in all parts of Portugal. This was done yesterday at Benavente.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 22d Jan. 1811.

I enclose a letter, and its enclosure, from Gen. Cole. I have sent the extract regarding the magazines at Villa Franca to Mr. Stuart, to be laid before the government.

P.S. There is nothing new here this day.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 22d Jan. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from the Commissary Gen., requesting that a supply of salt provisions, amounting to 30,000 lbs., should be landed, for the use of the army, from the transports in the Tagus; and I request you to give directions that this quantity of provisions may be landed from the several transports, in proportion to the number of troops each is calculated to carry.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 22d Jan. 1811.

Since I had the honor of addressing you last night, on the subject of the boats at Benavente, I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st inst., upon the subject of the want of boats to transport the army under the Marques de la Romana to the left of the Tagus. I beg leave to refer you to my letter of the 25th Oct., for the statement of the mode in which a transaction of this kind is carried on in the army. This transaction has been carried on strictly according to that mode.

When Mr. Dunmore found he could not procure a sufficient number of country boats for the required service he ought to have made his report; and to have suggested either to me, or to the officer of the Q. M. G.'s



department at Lisbon, if you are so kind as to allow that officer to communicate with you upon the service, to request you to order the transport boats to supply the deficiency. This would have been the regular mode of proceeding, and Mr. Dunmore's error shall be made known to him; but I am convinced he never intended to do any thing disrespectful by you.

I can have no knowledge of the verbal orders of the minister in the War department to the officer in charge of the boats on the river, by the appointment of the government. The Commissary Gen. and his officer have orders to apply to this officer to supply boats when they cannot procure them by private contract; and the confusion, when there is any, arises from the government omitting to enforce their own regulation, or their officers giving verbal orders contradictory to it. If the regulation should be altered, and I am told that we are either to seize boats when we want them, or that we are to apply at the Admiralty for the boats which we shall require for the ordinary service upon the river, I shall give directions that we should act accordingly; but, till the government alter their law, it is impossible for me to act otherwise than as pointed out in my letter of the 26th Oct.

The proceedings in regard to English boats, and all assistance required from the fleet, are entirely different. Application for these must be made to you by me, unless you should continue to allow the officers of the Q. M. G.'s department to apply for them; and in that case it would be desirable that the officers of the navy, employed in command or in charge of the boats, should have the instructions suggested in my letter of last night.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 22d Jan. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose letters received from Col. Fava and from Brig. Gen. Rosa, to which I beg you to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom. The former states that he has received the directions of the Governors of the Kingdom to ascertain who is to pay for certain work which he had been required by Col. Fletcher, the Chief Engineer, to perform; and he intimates that, unless he should be paid for the work he had before performed of the same description for the service of the redoubts near Torres Vedras, he can do no more. Brig. Gen. Rosa states, that he cannot make up the cartridges required for the works on the left of the Tagus for want of money. These works are intended for the defence of Lisbon; and I request that the Governors of the Kingdom will state, whether they propose that His Majesty should defray all the expense, not only of labor and materials in their construction, but likewise the expenses which may be incurred in the Portuguese arsenals and other establishments, in arming and equipping them.

Having already incurred so large an expense on this account, the trifling expense of constructing these portable magazines in Col. Fava's establishment, and making up a few cartridges wanted from the arsenal, would not be worthy of consideration; but I object to the principle, that every effort is not to be made and every assistance given, by every Portuguese department, to carry on the operations of the war, and to the temper and mode in which these communications are made by order of the Governors of the

Kingdom. I therefore request that this letter may be laid before the Governors of the Kingdom, with a request that they will state, for His Majesty's information, whether they do adopt the principle that no assistance is to be given by the Portuguese arsenals and other establishments, for the works going on in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, without being paid for by His Majesty.

I likewise enclose the extract of a letter from Col. Harvey, commanding a brigade of Portuguese infantry, to Major Gen. Cole, on the subject of the deficiencies of the magazines at Villa Franca to supply the demands of the troops. I beg you to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to this subject.

There is no want of flour, or grain, or wheat, at Lisbon; the want consists in money to buy those articles, and in arrangement to convey them to the troops.

To M. Honoré Charlaro.

Au Quartier Général, ce 23 Janvier, 1811.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 20 Janvier. J'ai toujours fait ce qui était en mon pouvoir pour adoucir le sort des prisonniers Français qui sont tombés dans mes mains, et j'en ai sauvé la vie à plusieurs: et je serais bien content s'il était en mon pouvoir de faire plus pour eux que je n'ai déjà fait. Mais ni les Généraux des armées Françaises, ni le gouvernement Français, ne paraissent avoir le moindre désir ou d'adoucir le sort, ou de voir finir les malheurs, des prisonniers Français, soit en consentant à un cartel d'échange pour mettre un terme à leurs malheurs, soit en adoptant aucun autre arrangement.

Il n'est pas juste donc d'attendre de moi que je ferai plus que je n'ai déjà fait pour les prisonniers, et que j'oublierai en faveur des prisonniers Français ce que je dois aux officiers et soldats de l'armée Anglaise, et aux officiers et marins de la marine Anglaise, qui languissent dans les prisons en France, tandis que le gouvernement et les Généraux Français montrent une indifférence si décidée sur le sort de ceux de leurs compatriotes qui sont dans nos mains.

Je suis fâché que je ne peux pas prêter l'oreille à votre demande.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 23d Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 22d inst., containing the copy of one from Dr. — of the 14th inst., with charges against Mr. \* \* \* \* and Mr. † † † †. It appears that these three gentlemen carried on a very active private correspondence in the course of the last summer, in which each of them appears to have delivered his opinion in very free terms of his neighbour. This conduct is very blameable, and these gentlemen might as well have spent their time in a manner more advantageous to the public.

But, excepting for having written private letters at all on the characters of others, I don't see what crime Mr. \* \* \* \* and Mr. † † † † have been guilty of; and I am apprehensive that if we were to begin to bring persons to trial for this crime, we ought not to stop at those gentlemen, nor even at Dr. —, but that too many have been guilty of this idle, foolish, and mischievous amusement.

I don't think it proper to employ the time of the officers of the army

in investigating the truth or falsehood of all the nonsense which these letters contain, nor even whether Dr. ——— deserved the appellation of a ‘Judas’ among the doctors attached to the Portuguese army, which has been applied to him; nor do I think it expedient to expose to the Portuguese army and to the world in Portugal, by such an investigation, the weakness and the little futility of the disputes of those who, to be of any use to them, or to do credit to the British army and to their own country, must command the respect of the natives of this.

In my opinion, these gentlemen should be desired to reconcile their differences, and to carry on the service together as men ought who make the good of the service their object. I am also of opinion that you should recommend to the Prince Regent to dismiss from his service the gentleman who does not attend to this admonition; and you may depend upon it, that I will take care not to admit such a firebrand into the medical department attached to this army.

Although I do not deem it expedient to assemble a General Court Martial for the investigation of these charges, I cannot pass them by without animadverting upon the presumption of Dr. ———, in bringing as a charge against Mr. \*\*\*\* that he had not taken immediate steps to bring Dr. ———’s conduct to an investigation for a supposed offence. Does Dr. ——— pretend to know all that passed between you and Mr. \*\*\*\*? Does he pretend to know whether you decided at all, or what your decision was, upon the expediency or necessity of an investigation into the conduct of Dr. ———? Does he propose to arraign your conduct, as well as that of Mr. \*\*\*\*, before a General Court Martial, because you might have deemed it inexpedient or unnecessary to investigate the conduct of Dr. ———? or does his rage for justice extend only to Mr. \*\*\*\*?

The want of recollection of these obvious considerations, which might have occurred to any body, shows the spirit with which these charges have been formed, and how necessary it is that they should be crushed, if we do not wish to expose to the curiosity of the public in this country a scene of vindictive but childish slander, such as perhaps has never before come out before a General Court Martial. I return Dr. ———’s letter and his charges.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 23d Jan. 1811.

You will be concerned at the unfortunate event which occurred this day in the death of the Marques de la Romana. It is very desirable that the account should be sent to Cadiz as soon as possible, and that a vessel should be sent there with the letters I have enclosed to Mr. Stuart.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 23d Jan. 1811.

I am much concerned to inform you that the Marques de la Romana died this day. He was attacked some days ago with spasms in his chest, and he had since been very unwell; but I had seen him every day: and yesterday he was much better. This morning he was so well as to talk of coming out to see me; but he was attacked again with these spasms, and died at about 2 o’clock. His secretary had left him, and had gone to Villa Franca, to receive him there to-morrow, when he intended to set out.

Under existing circumstances, his loss is the greatest which the cause could sustain ; and I don't know how we are to replace him.

P.S. Be so kind as to forward the enclosed. I have applied to the Admiral for a vessel to go to Cadiz.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 23d Jan. 1811.

Before I can decide upon the note from Dom M. Forjaz of the 20th Jan., marked A, in your private letter of the 21st inst., it is desirable that I should know what the demand for the boats is ; and I shall be obliged to you if you will request Dom M. Forjaz to send it to me.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 23d Jan. 1811.

I have perused the note from Dom M. Forjaz of the 20th inst., marked C, in your private letter of the 21st Jan., regarding the employment of boats on the river Tagus.

The object of the regulation of the Portuguese government upon this subject, and that of every regulation which I have recommended, has been to put an end to the system of *embargo*; the literal meaning of which word is to press by military force any article or animal which is required by any body who has the command of a military force, whether as a means of transport or as an article of use or consumption.

I proposed, and it was made law, that every boat, as well as every carriage in the country, should be numbered, and the owner's name and place of abode, and the number of his boat and its capacity, should be registered ; and that the boats in each particular part of each river in the country should be under the control of an officer appointed by the government to make and keep the registers ; while the magistrates in their several villages were to make and keep the registers of the carriages, and were to have the control over them. The consequence of this regulation was to be, that when boats were required for the military service, and could not be obtained by private contract, the Commissary, whether British or Portuguese, requiring them, was to apply to the person who kept the register and controlled the boats in the district, who was to issue his orders (not to *embargo* boats, but) to certain boat owners to attend for the service with their boats, under the penalties of the law for disobedience. Carriages were to be procured in the same manner.

The British Commissariat have, I know, obeyed this law ; and the way in which I know it is, that they have not the power of employing, and have not employed, one British soldier to *embargo* any article of any description. The Commissary Gen. hires boats most commonly by private contract, and when more are required for the service than he can readily hire, he applies to the superintendent for his assistance to procure them.

I doubt the truth of the fact that a soldier is placed in each boat in the employment of the Commissary Gen. : but into this I will inquire. If there is any foundation for the assertion it is probable that he has been obliged to place a driver of the Commissariat in each boat which he has hired (which, after all, is perfectly harmless), in order to prevent the forcible *embargo* of the boats in his employment by the officers of the Portuguese government.

But although, as I have above stated, the regulations which had for

their objects the prevention of *embargo* (and which were suggested by me) have been rigidly observed by all the British authorities, the same unfortunate circumstances which prevent the execution of any of the many salutary laws of Portugal prevent the execution of this law by the Portuguese officers.

Boats are wanted for the service of the Portuguese army; but the Portuguese Commissary can get none by private contract, because the Portuguese government never pay for the hire. Then the Portuguese Commissary applies to the Superintendent, Major Pernet, who ought to issue his orders to certain owners of certain boats, stating their numbers, to attend the service. But these boat owners either refuse to attend or go out of the way, as they are well aware that they will never be paid; and the penalty of the law is not put in force against them, or they very probably go and hire themselves in the service of the British army, where they know they will be paid. Major Pernet, the Superintendent, has then no resource but the old system of *embargo*; and he seizes by military force every boat he can find to be employed, not for payment for the Portuguese army, but as long as the owners can be detained under a military guard.

This is the history of the execution of this law and of the law respecting land transport, and this history will point out to you the real and principal cause of the confusion which has existed. It has been aggravated in some degree by the interference of the Portuguese Admiralty with the boats of the river, in a manner in which they were not authorised to interfere, in my opinion, under the law to which I have above referred. I have, however, written three letters, of which I enclose copies, to Adm. Berkeley upon this subject, on the 25th Oct., and 21st and 22d Jan., which I hope will settle that matter entirely.

In order to remedy the inconveniences now felt under this law, Dom M. Forjaz, with his usual zeal and ingenuity, is prepared to suggest a new one. It is useless, however, to expect to be able to carry into execution any system of any description, for any branch of the service, till the government shall have provided resources to enable them to carry on the war, shall have introduced order and regularity into their affairs, and shall have determined to punish in the most exemplary manner all those who transgress or disobey the law.

But before they carry this determination into execution, it is necessary to be just: it is necessary to put a stop to the system of violence, which unfortunately prevails under the authority of the government, and to provide means of paying the poor man whose boat, whose cart, or whose mule is required for the public service, and whose time might otherwise be profitably employed.

My own opinion is, that the existing law is the best and fairest that could be devised; and I declare most solemnly that I believe it has not in any one instance been infringed by the British Commissariat, and that we have practically got rid of the odious system of *embargo*. When it is considered that the British Commissary Gen. feeds the Spanish army and the Portuguese militia in the lines, besides the whole British army, and that he affords not a little occasional assistance to the Portuguese

regular troops, it may be doubted whether he employs more boats than are necessary to him. I shall, however, make inquiry upon this subject, and shall direct him to discharge from the service as many as can be spared.

I cannot conclude this subject without reflecting upon the practical proof, which this discussion affords, of the impracticability of carrying on the war elsewhere than in the heart of the Kingdom. The records of Dom M. Forjaz's office must contain many discussions on this same subject. When the army was on the Mondego the same difficulties occurred, the Portuguese troops were frequently in want, and the same discussions took place.

The troops are now upon the Tagus, with the supplies of the whole world open to them, and with water communication almost to their cantonments, and yet difficulties are experienced, and the Portuguese troops are not regularly supplied. It must occur to any man who has any knowledge of military affairs, that, till resources are found to defray the necessary expenses of the army, these difficulties must occur; and must increase in proportion as the troops are further removed from their magazines and from the convenience of water carriage.

I request that this letter and enclosures may be laid before the Governors of the Kingdom, as my answer to Dom M. Forjaz's note.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 23d Jan. 1811.

I am concerned to inform you that the Marques de la Romana died here this day. He was attacked some days ago with spasms in his chest, and he had since been very unwell. But I have seen him every day, and yesterday he was much better: he was so well this morning as to talk of coming to see me, and he intended to set out for Lisbon on his return to Estremadura; and his secretary had left him to prepare for his reception to-morrow at Villa Franca, and for his passage down the Tagus: but he was again attacked with spasms, and he died about 2 o'clock. His loss is irreparable: under existing circumstances I know not how he can be replaced; and we may expect that it will be followed by the fall of Badajoz. It will be necessary that the Regency should select a person, as soon as possible, to take the command of the Marques de la Romana's army; and I hope he will be one of a conciliating disposition.

The French are still blockading Olivença. The divisions of the Spanish army that were here have marched; and I enclose the copy of a memorandum that I gave to the Marques de la Romana, which he forwarded to Mendizabal some days ago. If they are not too late, and will act according to the plan suggested in that memorandum, they will save the troops in Olivença and the place of Badajoz, and probably the cause. But I tremble for any thing that depends upon Spanish exertions and foresight and Spanish prudence.

To Col. Duckworth.

Cartaxo, 24th Jan. 1811.

I have observed, on perusing the proceedings of the General Court Martial on the trial of Lieut. —, that it had been generally understood in the 48th regt. that Lieut. — had the means of being appointed to serve with the Portuguese army, by some interest or influence indepen-

dent from that of the Commanding officer of his regiment; I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether you ever heard what that influence or interest was, or upon whom it was to operate.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 24th Jan. 1811, 9½ A.M.

I received last night your letters of yesterday, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and this morning No. 5.

We have heard of no movement by the enemy on this side. On the night of the 21st they threw up rockets, and showed blue lights at Pernes, Tremes, and Alorna, but I have not heard that any movement was made. It would appear, however, that they began to move the boats about the same time. A man of the poor Marques writes to him, I don't know from whence, on the 21st, that the troops at Thomar and Cabaços had moved to Pombal and Leiria; but I don't think that great credit can be given to this statement. We should have heard it from other quarters.

I think it probable that, finding your preparations to oppose their coming out of the Zezere were becoming very formidable, they have moved the boats to the other little streams, of which one comes out under Santarem, which can certainly carry boats; another runs by Pernes, and comes out nearly opposite to Alpiça; and a third by Torres Novas, and comes out a little lower down than Chamusca: I cannot say whether these two last carry boats.

Of the corps mentioned by your prisoners, the 76th regt. is in the 1st division, 6th corps. The battalions mentioned by the 6 prisoners are the 11 battalions of the 2d division of the 9th corps.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 24th Jan. 1811, 11 A.M.

Since I wrote to you this morning I have read over Madden's letter of the 21st. Notwithstanding that Gen. Madden's situation is not a very agreeable one, I think that he does not make the best of it, or rather that he makes the worst of it. We have the accounts of all his marches and countermarches since the 6th inst., and in my opinion it is not too much for his or any other horses. Whether they might not as well have remained in their stables is another question, with which Gen. Madden has nothing to do. Want of food for man and horse is indeed a good ground of complaint, and upon that subject I desire Alava to write to Gen. Mendizabal.

It is not true that there has been any alteration in the instructions or terms under which the Portuguese brigade of cavalry has been attached to the Spanish army; but I now desire Alava to let Gen. Mendizabal know that I do make the following alterations:

1st; That the men and horses are to receive their rations regularly, and that if they do not, Brig. Gen. Madden is to complain to Gen. Mendizabal.

2dly; If the irregularity or deficiency should continue after the complaint made, Gen. Madden is to withdraw the brigade to Elvas.

Gen. Madden is to understand, however, that it will be expected from him to prove that he has made the complaint, and has received no redress,

and that the deficiency is one of so serious a nature as that its duration would go to the destruction of the horses.

I must observe upon all this, that if nobody is to remain in a situation which he does not like, or is to do only what he likes, we have undertaken a task which is too great for us. But I declare that, notwithstanding all my practice, I have not health or spirits to go through all the difficulties of carrying on the service, crossed and thwarted as it is by the wants of the Portuguese and Spanish armies; the obstinacy with which they persevere in opposing and rendering fruitless all measures to set them right or save them; and the difficulties thrown in the way by our own government and officers.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 24th Jan. 1811.

Upon perusing the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which Major Gen. the Hon. W. Lumley was President, I observed that Major Gen. Hoghton is considered and has acted as the Commanding officer of the garrison of Chamusca, without the command of the brigade of infantry placed under his orders by the G. O. of the army; and that Col. Inglis, of the 57th regt., is considered and has acted as the Commanding officer of the brigade of infantry which had been placed under the command of Major Gen. Hoghton by the G. O. of the army.

The organization of this army has been formed upon certain principles of general convenience, as I believe you are aware, and it is desirable that it should not be altered upon light grounds, particularly without reference to head quarters. Chamusca is one of the cantonments of the army. I don't know that, in any view of it, that town can be considered a garrison to require a Commanding officer, who should be taken from the duties of the brigade placed under his command to exercise the duties of this new command. At all events, this arrangement should not have been made without reference to head quarters; and I beg that in future the troops may continue organized, and officers may continue with the commands as ordered by the General Orders.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 24th Jan. 1811.

Our conversations upon the state of affairs on the left of the Tagus before you went there will explain the reason for my writing you the enclosed letter, of which you will make such use as you may think proper. I have a Major Gen. now to spare (—), whom I can send you, but I will not do it if you think it would be inconvenient to you to have — superseded.

To Gen. Mendizabal.

Cartaxo, 24th Jan. 1811.

You will have been made acquainted with the irreparable loss sustained by the Spanish army, by your country, and the world, by the unexpected death of the Marques de la Romana yesterday, after a short illness. I have lost a colleague, a friend, and an adviser, with whom I had lived on the happiest terms, of friendship, intimacy, and confidence; and I shall revere and regret his memory to the last moment of my existence. During his indisposition I had frequent conversations with him on the



situation of affairs in Estremadura, and by his desire I put my opinions in writing in the form of a memorandum, in order to give him a more convenient opportunity of considering them. He transmitted this memorandum to you, and I earnestly recommend it to your attention.

Although we are both placed in an arduous situation, I have no doubt that, by prudent management and by a cordial union of views and actions, we shall extricate ourselves from all our difficulties; and you may depend upon my disposition to communicate with you with the same frankness and sincerity as I did with your respectable predecessor, and to give you such assistance as the means in my power will enable me to afford.

To Col. Le Cor.

A Cartaxo, ce 25 Janvier, 1811.

Vous aurez eu les nouvelles de la mort du Marquis de la Romana, qui doit être enseveli à Lisbonne après demain. Je vous envoie l'ordre pour que le 12<sup>e</sup> régt. marche à Lisbonne demain, pour assister à ses funérailles; et je vous prie de donner ordre à l'officier qui commandera ce corps, qu'il fasse un rapport de son arrivée au Col. Peacocke, le Commandant des troupes Anglaises à Lisbonne, et à Don Soares de Noronha. Le 12<sup>e</sup> régt. retournera à Alhandra le 28.

To Col. Peacocke.

Cartaxo, 25th Jan. 1811.

You will have heard of the misfortune which has occurred by the unexpected death of the Marques de la Romana, after a short illness. His body will leave this place for Lisbon this day, where it is to be interred: and I am desirous that every honor which it is in our power to pay should be paid to his remains.

In order to enable you to carry my intentions into execution, in a manner suitable to the occasion, I have ordered to Lisbon the 2d batt. 88th regt. and the 12th Portuguese regt.; and you will take measures, immediately on the receipt of this letter, to have these troops properly quartered while they shall remain at Lisbon. You will then consult the Spanish minister at Lisbon, regarding the time and mode in which he proposes to have the late Marques de la Romana buried; and you will dispose of the troops under your command on this occasion, in such a manner as will be most proper to mark the sincere respect and regard which we all feel for his memory, and to do him most honor.

If there should be any cavalry in the dépôt, who can attend upon this occasion, I beg that they may be brought out. I desire that all the Staff officers will attend the funeral, and I hope that the officers on leave at Lisbon will attend likewise. After the ceremony shall be concluded the troops above mentioned will return to their stations.

I beg that you will communicate this letter to Gen. Don Ant. Soares de Noronha, and inform him that the directions which it contains are understood as addressed to him, but are sent to you under the terms of my original instructions to you.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Cartaxo, 25th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st Dec., enclosing one from Mr. —, Paymaster of the — batt. — regt., to the Sec. at

War, which I return; and I beg to have the instructions of the Commander in Chief, regarding the mode in which I am to proceed in order to have Mr. —'s charges against Majors — and —, and Capt. —, accurately defined, and afterwards investigated. If those against Major, now Lieut. Col. —, are to be investigated in this country, it will be necessary that Lieut. Col. — should be sent back here.

My own opinion is, that there is not the smallest foundation for any of these charges, which are alleged to be founded upon the proceedings of 2 boards which have investigated the accounts of the — batt. of the — regt., under orders from the War office, which proceedings have been transmitted to the Sec. at War. From the perusal of these proceedings, and other circumstances, likewise known to the Sec. at War, the character of Mr. — will appear in its true point of view; and the Commander in Chief will be able to judge whether it is expedient to place officers in arrest, and to put them on their trial upon such vague charges, brought forward by a person of very doubtful character, and bankrupt in circumstances, as will appear by the investigation to which I have above referred.

I would wish to draw the attention of the Commander in Chief to the extreme unfairness of receiving charges of this description against officers, which are not transmitted through the regular prescribed channel. There was nothing to prevent Mr. — from sending his complaint through the channel of his Commanding officer, Lieut. Col. —, who, if he had thought proper, would have forwarded it to be laid before the Commander in Chief, with the replies and justification of the officers accused: and probably the most convenient and fairest mode of proceeding with complaints of this description would be to send them back to the person who makes them, with directions to forward them in the prescribed channel. The complaint and justification would then come together before the Commander in Chief, who would be enabled to judge whether it was expedient to have a further investigation.

As the complaint of Lieut. —, and even parts of the enclosed letter, refer to acts of mine, it would be an invidious proceeding in me to bring these gentlemen to trial for a breach of the orders and regulations of the army; and I therefore do not propose to take any notice of their conduct, leaving it to the Commander in Chief to decide what shall be done with these officers.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 25th Jan. 1811.

I received your letters, 1, 2, 3, of yesterday, last night; and this morning that written at 8 P.M. We have reports of Junot's death, but I don't give credit to them.

I don't know what to do about your means of transport, or indeed about any thing for the Portuguese army. The government have not a shilling of money, and no credit; and although there are provisions in Lisbon now for a year, the Conde de Redondo cannot find out how to make biscuit, and wishes the Commissary Gen. to supply him. Then the Bishop objects to increase the resources of the country; but I have written a letter upon that subject, which I hope will make that gentleman reflect upon his conduct. I have also had a discussion with government

and the Admiral about boats, I fear without much effect. The remedy for the evil, as it depends upon government, is money, and that they cannot or will not procure.

Within these last few days there has been some difficulty about boats, in consequence of the demand for them to pass over the Spanish army and all their baggage, which was aggravated by the Admiral's interference, and the trouble and correspondence infinitely increased. Mr. Kennedy tells me, consequently, that he had not been able to get as many as he wanted latterly. Indeed, when it is considered that, including the Spaniards and militia in the lines, he issued 70,000 rations daily, it is not astonishing that he should be pressed for means of transport. However, I will speak to him again on the subject. He has no land transport, or very little, excepting his Spanish mules, and those would not serve you.

But it is useless to make any arrangement of this description till the government shall have money. We should deprive ourselves of a permanent resource, to give it to you only for a day; as, without money, there is nothing we could give you, whether boat, cart, or mule, that would not leave you as soon as the guard in charge should turn their eyes another way.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 25th Jan. 1811.

I request you to represent to the Portuguese government, that the regular Portuguese troops, stationed on this side of the river Tagus, are in the greatest distress for provisions of all descriptions. Some of them have not received any for 2 days; others are plundering the country in the neighbourhood of Torres Vedras for subsistence, and taking from the inhabitants the grain and cattle which, in the faith and hope of protection from military violence, they were driving within the line of the fortified positions.

It will be necessary that immediate measures should be adopted to secure to the troops their regular subsistence, in their several cantonments; otherwise I shall be obliged to order the Portuguese army to Lisbon, where alone it appears that the Portuguese establishments can supply them. The government will see the consequences which must result from their omitting to adopt efficient measures to find resources for the supply of food and other necessities to their army.

To Gen. Don Carlos O'Donell.

Cartaxo, 26th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 25th inst.; and I enclose the copy of a letter of the 24th inst., which I wrote to Gen. Mendizabal, which will apprise you of the misfortune which has recently happened in this town.

The enemy having possession of Olivença,\* and Gen. Mendizabal having desired that the divisions commanded by Gen. Carrera and yourself should halt in the situations in which those orders should find you, I conceive that you cannot do better than halt.

I should imagine, however, that those orders are given because Gen. Mendizabal is uncertain respecting the plan and line of the enemy's operations, whether it will be to enter Portugal by crossing the Guadiana below Jurumenha, or to attack Badajoz. In the former case, the halting

\* See Appendix, No. XXVIII. and No. XXIX.

of your divisions, and their eventual co-operation with the troops under my command, would be expedient. In the latter case, Gen. Mendizabal may wish you to move with all celerity upon Elvas. That, therefore, which I would recommend to you is to put your divisions in such a situation as that you will be able to do either the one or the other, as may be necessary; and, accordingly, that the division of Carrera should go to Monte Mór o Novo, and that under your immediate command to Vendas Novas, in which cantonments each will be better accommodated.

You will of course obey the orders you will receive from Gen. Mendizabal; but if you should find that the enemy crosses the Guadiana in force at or about Jurumenha, and you should think it necessary to retire, I request you to fall back gradually upon Aldea Galega, communicating with Marshal Beresford at Chamusca. I also recommend that you should communicate with Gen. Leite at Elvas, and adopt every measure in your power to ascertain what is going on upon the Guadiana.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd

Cartaxo, 26th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 25th, which I answer by post, as I understand that the packet will not be in a state to sail for a day or two.

Although we were deceived in the line of march stated to be followed by Mortier's corps, when I last saw you, I don't conceive that it is still clear that those troops will not enter Portugal at an early period. They have taken Olivença, and their next step will show what their design is. I cannot believe that, having 20,000 men upon the Guadiana, and from 7000 to 10,000 men upon the Coa and the sources of the Mondego, which the French can draw in, they mean to leave Massena where he is till death shall have swept away his whole army; and therefore my opinion is that they will attack us.

However, you are as capable of forming an opinion upon this subject as I am; and as I have frequently told you, when an officer in your situation tells me that he has business to settle in England of paramount importance to him, I cannot object to his going there, if he thinks proper; and you will therefore go, if you wish it, by the packet, and take Capt. Cotton with you. I will just observe to you, however, that 7 Generals have gone, or are going, home from this army, and that there is not now one remaining in it, who came out with the army, excepting Gen. Alex. Campbell, who has been in England.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 26th Jan. 1811.

I received last night your letters of yesterday, marked private, and Nos. 1 and 2. Perhaps I ought not to allow myself to feel the difficulties of our situation; but owing to the inertness of these miserable governments, and the recent counteraction of that of Portugal, and the terribly deficient state of the Spanish military system, and the determination of our government to give neither Spaniards nor Portuguese any extraordinary assistance, they are accumulating and increasing upon us so fast, that I cannot avoid feeling them; and seeing that, unless I can in some manner or other produce an alteration of system, the cause must be lost in our hands, notwithstanding our advantageous military situation.

Although the habit in which I am of opening my mind to you, upon all occasions and subjects, in the freest and fullest manner, may induce me to express my apprehensions in strong terms, you may depend upon it, not only that I am sensible of the real and cordial assistance which I have invariably received from you, but of the necessity that I should be informed in time of all the difficulties which occur, in order that we may apply a remedy to them. However, there is enough upon this subject for the present.

I intend, if circumstances on this side permit, to go over to Almeirim to-morrow. I shall leave this after dark, and shall be there probably by 12 o'clock, and should be glad to meet you there at daylight. Send me word if you should not come, and I will send to you if I should not. Mr. Stuart tells me that they have accounts at Lisbon, by telegraph from Elvas, that the French took Olivença on the 24th.

To the Marquis Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 26th Jan. 1811.

Some time has elapsed since I have written to you; and as I know that you have full information of all that occurs here from my public and private letters to Lord Liverpool, I should not now trouble you with a letter, if the subject to which this letter relates did not appear to me to belong to your department, although its importance deserves the serious consideration of the whole government.

You will have had before you, from Mr. Stuart, accounts of the discussions which I have had with the Portuguese, ever since the change effected here by the exertion of —, in Brazil. You will have seen the state of those discussions, detailed in my letter to the Prince Regent, of which I sent the draft to Lord Liverpool. By the accounts that Mr. Stuart will send by the packet which takes this letter you will see the state in which these discussions are at present, and the degree of counteraction, and in some instances of opposition, which we meet with in every proposition that we make for improving the resources of the country, in order to enable it to carry on the war.

Although the letter which I have written to the Prince Regent, and the line which I have taken in these discussions, have been in the character of the Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army, it would have been desirable to me to know whether the King's government approved of my entering into them at all, of the line I had taken, or of the conduct of the campaign which is the subject of them, and which is founded upon my understanding of the instructions from the King's government. But the principal object to which I wish to draw your attention is the state of the pecuniary resources of the government of Portugal, as they appear upon the face of what has lately passed in writing upon this subject. But this will not give you an accurate idea of the distress which all the departments of the army are in. In a letter received last night from Beresford, he tells me that 'their difficulties are increasing so fast, that matters are, in his opinion, coming to a crisis; and he is in the greatest alarm about them. He is afraid to look at the state of things, as far as any Portuguese authority is concerned.'

Although there are, I understand, provisions in Lisbon in sufficient

quantities to last the inhabitants and army for a year, about 12,000 or 14,000 Portuguese troops, which I have on the right of the Tagus, are literally starving. Even those in the cantonments on the Tagus cannot get bread, because the government have not money to pay for the means of transport. The soldiers in the hospitals die, because the government have not money to pay for the hospital necessaries for them; and it is really disgusting to reflect upon the details of the distresses occasioned by the lamentable want of funds to support the machine which we have put in motion. The Portuguese government are deliberating upon the means of improving their resources, and I am convinced that a great deal will be done; and a great deal more might be done if we could bring back the Governors to the state of temper in which they were before the recent changes.

It is impossible to say how far the improvement of the resources of this country might go; but my own opinion has always been, that if Great Britain should have taken this country up with a determination to carry her through the war, and to make the territory of Portugal the basis of all the military operations of the Peninsula, according to this plan, we ought to have controlled actively all the departments of the state; to have carried their resources to the highest pitch; to have seen them honestly applied exclusively to the objects of the war; and to have made up the deficiency, whatever it might be.

I think it probable that by this time our expense would not be equal to what we now pay in a subsidy, the amount of which has been calculated on erroneous principles, and occasions constant discussions and ill temper on the part of the government. I am not certain that we might not yet bring matters to this state; but our influence in this country is not what it was in 1808, when I recommended this system to the ministers of the day. It will be absolutely necessary, if we do not adopt this system, that we should adopt the other, and increase the subsidy to the real amount of the expense of 30,000 men, which we have engaged to maintain; and that the Prince Regent should mark his displeasure at the conduct of Principal Sousa. Even these measures will, I fear, not do all that ought to be done in this country.

Another object to which I wish to draw your attention is the state of the Spanish government and army. I don't know what the agents of government, in different parts of Spain, may represent to them; but I assure you that the Cortes have yet done nothing, either to raise, discipline, pay, or support an army. The distresses of the Spaniards are worse even than those of the Portuguese. The army of the poor Marques de la Romana has not a shilling, excepting what I give them; nor a magazine; nor an article of any description that is to keep them together, or to enable them to act as a military body. The operations of these troops are approaching to the Portuguese frontier; and I foresee what is going to happen, viz., a war between them and the inhabitants of Portugal for the provisions, clothes, doors and windows, and beams of the houses of the latter. This will be a new era in this extraordinary war. Then the corps of Mahy, in Galicia, either from similar deficiencies, or disinclination on the part of Mahy, does nothing.

All this forms a subject for serious consideration. Either Great Britain is interested in maintaining the war upon the Peninsula, or is not. If she is, there can be no doubt of the expediency of making an effort to put in motion against the enemy the largest force which the Peninsula can produce. The Spaniards would not, I believe, allow of that active interference by us in their affairs which might effect an amelioration of their circumstances; but that cannot be a reason for doing nothing. Subsidy given, without stipulation for the performance of specific services, would, in my opinion, answer no purpose; but I am convinced that, in the next campaign, I may derive great assistance from Gen. Mahy, as I should in this, if I could have put his troops in movement; and I am also convinced that I may derive great assistance from the corps of the Marques de la Romana, and shall prevent its being mischievous in the way which I have above pointed out, if I am allowed to assist it with provisions, and with money occasionally. But then I must have the power to tell the Spanish government, that, unless these troops co-operate strictly with me, the assistance shall be withdrawn from them. The amount of the expense of this assistance may be settled monthly, and may be in the form of a loan, to be repaid by drafts on the government of Mexico, or in any other manner that government may think proper. Upon all this a question may be asked, viz., What good will it produce? I shall answer, for nothing but to maintain the war in the Peninsula.

I have seen too much of the troops of the Peninsula, even the Portuguese when not united with our own, to form any calculation of the effect of any operation of theirs. Even when the troops are encouraged and inclined to behave well, the impatience, inexperience, and unconquerable vanity of the officers lead them into errors, as appear strongly in —'s recent operations, who, if he had obeyed his instructions and remained quiet, would have kept Claparède in check; but he chose to attack him, even with an inferior force, and was defeated; and Claparède was enabled to overrun Upper Beira, even to Lamego.

It may also be asked why we should spend our money, and why these troops should not go on as the French troops do, without pay, provisions, magazines, or any thing? The answer to this question is as long as what I have already written. The French army is certainly a wonderful machine; but if we are to form such a one, we must form such a government as exists in France, which can with impunity lose one half of the troops employed in the field every year, only by the privations and hardships imposed upon them. Next, we must compose our army of soldiers drawn from all classes of the population of the country; from the good and middling, as well in rank as in education, as from the bad, and not as all other nations, and we in particular, do, from the bad only. 3dly, we must establish such a system of discipline as the French have; a system founded upon the strength of the tyranny of the government, which operates upon an army composed of soldiers, the majority of whom are sober, well disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated.

When we shall have done all this, and shall have made these armies of the strength of those employed by the French, we may require of them to live as the French do, viz., by authorised and regulated plunder of the

country and its inhabitants, if any should remain; and we may expose them to the labor, hardships, and privations which the French soldier suffers every day; and we must expect the same proportion of loss every campaign, viz., one half of those who take the field.

This plan is not proposed for the British army, nor has it yet been practised in any great degree by the Portuguese; but I shall state the effect which, in my opinion, the attempt has had upon the Spaniards.

There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army, among either officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as, indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. It has, in my opinion, been the cause of the dastardly conduct which we have so frequently witnessed in the Spanish troops; and they have become odious to their country; and the peaceable inhabitants, much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the establishment of Joseph's government, to be protected from the outrages of their own troops. These armies, therefore, must be paid and supported, if any service is expected from them; and at present, at least, I see no chance of their being paid, except by British assistance.

There is but little that is new in this letter; but the subject to which it relates requires the early consideration, decision, and interference of the British government, or the cause must suffer.

To Gen. Don Carlos O'Donnell.

Cartaxo, 26th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 25th inst., and I enclose the copy of a letter of the 24th inst., which I wrote to Gen. Mendizabal, which will apprise you of the misfortune which has recently happened in this town.

The enemy having possession of Olivença, and Gen. Mendizabal having deemed that the divisions commanded by Gen. Carrera and yourself should halt in the situations in which those orders should find you, I conceive that you cannot do better than halt. I should imagine, however, that those orders are given because Gen. Mendizabal is uncertain respecting the plan and line of the enemy's operations; whether it will be to enter Portugal by crossing the Guadiana below Jurumenha, or to attack Badajoz. In the former case, the halting of your divisions, and the eventual co-operation with the troops under my command, would be expedient. In the latter case, Gen. Mendizabal may wish you to move with all celerity upon Elvas. That, therefore, which I would recommend to you is, to put your divisions in such a situation as that you will be able to do either the one or the other, as may be necessary; and accordingly, that the division of Carrera should go to Monte Mór o Novo, and that under your immediate command to Vendas Novas, in which cantonments each will be better accommodated.

You will of course obey the orders you will receive from Gen. Mendizabal; but if you should find that the enemy crosses the Guadiana, and you should think it necessary to retire, I request you to fall back gradually upon Aldea Galega, communicating with Marshal Beresford at Chamusca. I also recommend that you should communicate with Gen. Leite, and adopt every measure in your power to ascertain what is going on upon the Guadiana.



To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 26th Jan. 1811.

Referring to my dispatch to your Lordship of the 27th Oct. (marked K), regarding the promises of assistance which I am supposed to have made to the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, I enclose the copy of a letter from a late member of the Junta of Ciudad Rodrigo, written to Brig. Gen. Don M. Alava,\* and which the latter has put into my hands, explaining the sense which the Governor and Junta entertained of what passed between them and me.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 26th Jan. 1811.

The enemy has continued the blockade of Olivença, and obtained possession of that place, either on the 22d or 23d inst. Notwithstanding the positive assertions that a large body had crossed the bridge of Merida on the 9th, and had proceeded as reported in my dispatch of the 19th, it does not appear that the French have yet had any large body on the right of the Guadiana. They have a train, six 24 pounders, and other ordnance of large calibre, and a large quantity of stores and carriages, on the left of the Guadiana; but it is not yet considered decided that they propose to attack Badajoz.

I am concerned to have to report to your Lordship that the Marques de la Romana died in this town on the 23d inst., after a short illness. His talents, his virtues, and his patriotism were well known to His Majesty's government. In him the Spanish army have lost their brightest ornament, his country their most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall always acknowledge with gratitude the assistance which I received from him, as well by his operations as by his counsel, since he had been joined with this army.

Upon receiving accounts of the movements of the French troops in Estremadura, of the difficulties experienced in the relief of Olivença, and of the possibility that Badajoz might be attacked, he ordered the Spanish troops which had been joined to us to march towards the frontier, and they commenced their march on the 20th inst. Gen. Mendizabal has since ordered them to halt on the road.

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 19th inst. I have received the detailed accounts of Gen. Silveira's affairs with the enemy in Upper Beira. In the affair at the Ponte do Abbade, on the 30th Dec., which was the most serious, and in which the greatest loss was sustained, the General attacked the French, and was repulsed. In the last affair, of the 11th inst., the French attacked Gen. Silveira at Villa da Ponte, and he was obliged to retire upon Lamego. He was followed by the French division, and was obliged to evacuate Lamego, and to retire across the Douro on the 13th. Gen. Bacellar then took up a position on the Pavia, on the enemy's left flank, while Col. Wilson was upon their rear at Castro Dairo; and Gen. Silveira prevented them from crossing the Douro. These positions appear to have induced Gen. Claparède to retire again, as I have heard from another channel of his arrival at Trancoso.

The enemy have made no material alteration in their position in front

\* See Appendix, No. XXVII.

of this army since I last addressed your Lordship. They appear still to entertain a great jealousy of all our movements on the left of the Tagus; and they have recently removed some of the boats which were in the Zezere. They detached a body of about 2000 men from the rear of their army into Lower Beira on the 22d inst., apparently to escort a courier towards the frontier.

They drove our piquets through the town of Rio Maior on the 19th inst. with a strong body of cavalry and infantry, but retired again immediately. It is reported that Gen. Junot was wounded upon this occasion. Our light detachments, under Capt. the Hon. C. Cocks, of the 16th, and others, still continue their operations with success and send in many prisoners.

My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 15th inst.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 27th, and I see no reason why I should depart from the rule which I have laid down for myself in these cases. Officers (General officers in particular) are the best judges of their own private concerns; and, although my own opinion is that there is no private concern that cannot be settled by instruction and power of attorney, and that after all is not settled in this manner, I cannot refuse leave of absence to those who come to say that their business is of a nature that requires their personal superintendence. But entertaining these opinions, it is rather too much that I should not only give leave of absence, but approve of the absence of any, particularly a General officer, from the army.

It is certainly the greatest inconvenience to the service that officers should absent themselves as they do, each of them requiring at the same time that when it shall be convenient to return he shall find himself in the same situation as when he left the army. In the meantime, who is to do the duty? How am I to be responsible for the army? Is Col. — a proper substitute for Gen. Craufurd in the command of our advanced posts? or Gen. — for Sir S. Cotton in command of the cavalry?

I may be obliged to consent to the absence of an officer, but I cannot approve of it. I repeat that you know the situation of affairs as well as I do, and you have my leave to go to England if you think proper, as also Capt. Cotton.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811, 12 at noon.

I return Dom M. Forjaz's letter. I likewise enclose a letter from Roche; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that he may receive his pay, and bāt and forage from Mr. Bell.

I don't exactly recollect the situation in which the boats are described to be in the enclosed paper, nor do I know the degree of reliance which can be placed upon the information. If the story is positively true, I should think that we have an opportunity of striking a blow which would relieve us from all anxiety respecting the Alentejo, and would give us a disposable force and the upper hand. I don't think, however, that we

can rely implicitly upon the information which we have received; and, at all events, some boats are still to be seen on the Zezere, by means of which enterprises may be attempted, which must be guarded against. But though we may not have information to enable you to use the whole, or the greater part, of your force in an enterprise upon the boats at Montalvão, I think that you might assist without much risk, and, according to what I understand of the enemy's force on the left of the Zezere, with a prospect of success. I think that you might detach to Abrantes, in order to make an attempt on the boats at Montalvão, one brigade of British infantry, the caçadores, one brigade of Portuguese cavalry, and 2 squadrons of the 13th, and a brigade of 6 pounders. This force would not be missed from your cantonments if you spread the rest a little; and it would effect the object, which is to burn the boats, unless the enemy have more troops on the left of the Zezere.

I wish you would turn the subject over in your mind; and, if you think that the enterprise has any prospect of success, you might attempt it.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811, 10 P.M.

I have just received your letters, Nos. 1 and 2, and lastly 3, of this day's date; and I enclose Sir W. Erskine's report of this day's date. The substance of it (for you will not be able to read it) is that he has heard that the enemy have weakened themselves along their front in that quarter, although their outposts are as usual, excepting that at Pero Filho (which I will look at in the morning); also that 3 prisoners of the *train* state that they moved yesterday one half of the reserve artillery from Santarem to Punhete.

I send you this intelligence without loss of time, as I see that Col. Colborne suspects some movements. But I am inclined to think that the movements reported to Sir William are principally to look for provisions. You will have seen by Major Kitcher's reports that they have resumed their position at Alcobaça. The gentleman who writes from Portalegre appears to be in a terrible alarm, equally with the students from Valencia de Alcantara and the Spanish cavalry.

I think the French are going to make the siege of Badajoz, from present appearances.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give directions that the *Sovereign* store ship may proceed to Cadiz, with directions to the master to report his arrival there to His Majesty's minister with the Regency of Spain. This vessel is laden with 6000 stands of arms and accoutrements, and it is desirable that it should proceed with convoy. I enclose a letter for the master, to be delivered to Mr. Wellesley.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 23d, and I have perused Senhor Salter's\* paper on the revenue. I think the Portuguese government are still looking to assistance from England, and I have written to the King's

\* Dom Antonio Salter e Mendonça, Secretary of State.

government strongly upon the subject in their favor. But I should deceive myself if I believed we should get any thing, and then if I were to tell them we should. They must, therefore, look to their own resources. I shall not enter upon the political crisis now existing in England; but I believe you will agree with me that, if the change which is probable should be made, their chance is less than it was.

It is quite nonsense their quarrelling with me, whether the system of operations I have followed was the best or not. I believe I am not only the best, but the only friend they have ever had, who has had the power of supporting them for a moment in England; and I now tell them that the only chance they have is to endeavor to bring their revenue equal to their expenses. It is ridiculous to talk of the efforts they have made. They have, hitherto, produced neither men in proportion to their population, nor money in proportion to their commerce and riches, nor by any means in proportion to their gains by the war. They talk of the war in their country: was Portugal ever involved seriously in any war without having it in the heart of the country? I think I can save them from their enemy, if they will make an exertion to maintain their army; but they are now come to that situation between the enemy, the people, and us, that they must decide either to raise an adequate revenue from the people, in earnest, or to give themselves over to the enemy.

Now, upon this point, I can only tell them one thing; and that is, that although they may find causes for not levying a revenue upon the people to continue the contest against the enemy, the enemy will allow of none for not raising every shilling that can be drawn from the people, when they may come into possession. They should have thought of the miseries endured by the people, which they describe so feelingly, before they commenced the war; though, by the bye, I would observe upon these miseries, that the enemy occupy only a part of one province, and that they had only passed through another: this is bad enough, God knows! but is better than that the whole should be in their possession, as it was, and as it will be, if a real effort is not made.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 3d inst., and I think you are mistaken respecting Gen. Walker. He, as was always the practice with the General officers employed on missions in Spain, was attached to the British army in the Peninsula; and on this ground the officers whom I recommended claim their rank. However, the favor of the Commander in Chief is as good as their claim at any time.

In respect to recruiting the army, my own opinion is that the government have never taken an enlarged view of the subject. It is expected that people will become soldiers in the line, and leave their families to starve, when, if they become soldiers in the militia, their families are provided for. This is an inconsistency that must strike the mind of even the least reflecting of mankind. What is the consequence? That none but the worst description of men enter the regular service.

The omission to provide for the families of soldiers operates particularly upon the recruiting in Ireland. It is the custom in Ireland for the lower

orders to marry when very young, and it will be found that in the Irish militia nearly every soldier is married. But when they volunteer from the militia to the line they lose the provision for their families; the women, therefore, always object to the volunteering, and none but the worst members of society ever offer their services. This is one of the causes of the increase of desertion in the army on foreign service, and of the frequency and enormity of the crimes committed by the soldiers. Then what chance has the recruiting for the line in Ireland against the recruiting for the militia? There is not much difference in the amount of bounty, and the family of the soldier in the militia is provided for, while that of the soldier in the line starves! Who then but the worst member of society will become the soldier in the line?

But it is said the state cannot afford the expense. In the first place, if the expense of double bounties is considered, the expense of bounties to deserters, and the enormous expense of bounties for substitutes, I doubt that the expense would be found to exceed that incurred at present. But why incur the expense for the families of militia men? Why not stop that expense for all soldiers enlisted in the militia after a certain time, and incur it for the regular army? Would not this saving go far to cover the expense to be incurred?

But admitting the truth of the expense, I say that the country has not a choice between army and no army, between peace or war. They must have a large and efficient army, one capable of meeting the enemy abroad, or they must expect to meet him at home; and then farewell to all considerations of measures of greater or lesser expense, and to the ease, the luxury, and happiness of England. God forbid that I should see the day on which hostile armies should contend within the United Kingdom; but I am very certain that I shall not only see that day, but shall be a party in the contest, unless we alter our system, and the public feel in time the real nature of the contest in which we are at present engaged, and determine to meet its expense. I have gone a little beyond the question of recruiting; but depend upon it that you will get men when you provide for the families of soldiers in the line and not in the militia, and not before.

Do you mean the postscript of your letter of the 3d as an answer to mine of the 1st Dec.?

I wish we had the reinforcements out here now. I think I should save Badajoz, at all events, and possibly entirely alter the state of the war in the Peninsula.

P. S. I am much annoyed by the General and other officers of the army going home. They come to me to ask leave of absence, under pretence of business, which they say it is important to them to transact; and indeed I go so far as to make them declare that it is paramount to every other consideration in life. At the same time, I know that many of them have no business, and that there is no business which cannot be, and that every business is, transacted by instruction and power of attorney. But how is leave to be refused upon such an application?

I shall be very much obliged to you, however, if you will tell any General officer who may come out in future, to settle all his business before he comes out, for that he will get no leave to go home. The m-

convenience of their going is terrible, and the detail it throws upon me greater than I can well manage; for I am first to instruct one, then a second, and afterwards, upon his return, the first again, upon every duty. At this moment we have seven General officers gone or going home; and, excepting myself, there is not one in the country who came out with the army, excepting Gen. Alex. Campbell, who was all last winter in England.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811.

I have requested Adm. Berkeley to send to Cadiz the *Sovereign* store ship, the master of which vessel will deliver you this letter. She is laden with 6000 stands of arms and sets of accoutrements, and a corresponding quantity of ammunition and stores. I have retained 4000 stands of arms and sets of accoutrements which were in her, and ammunition, to be delivered to the Spanish troops late under the command of the Marques de la Romana, and 9 pieces of ordnance and their stores, to be delivered to the guerrillas in Castille.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letters of the 14th and 19th, and I now enclose the copy of my dispatch of the 26th to government.

The French are certainly in possession of Olivença, but we do not know yet on what terms, nor whether the garrison are prisoners of war or not.

I have not heard from Carrera nor O'Donnell since Mendizabal had ordered them to halt.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811.

The Marques de la Romana was opened; and I enclose the copy of the report of the medical people on the cause of his death, from which it appears that it would have been impossible to have saved him. The first spasm he felt is supposed to have been the effort of the blood to circulate, when the artery was first stopped; the second effort burst the artery.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 28th Jan. 1811.

As the packet does not sail till Wednesday morning, I write just to let you know that I have not yet heard of the movement of the enemy after he had obtained possession of Olivença.

It is reported that Junot is dead, but I am not certain that it is true. The Chasseurs Britanniques are arrived, and, in a letter of the 19th, Gen. Graham informs me they intended to attempt to raise the siege of Cadiz on this day. If this enterprise should succeed, or if the siege of Cadiz should be raised by other causes, and the greater part of the British force at that place should be brought round here, I beg to have your Lordship's directions as soon as possible what I am to do with Gen. Graham. He expresses an anxious desire to come here.

I assure your Lordship, in answer to your official letter of the 31st Dec. last, that my approbation of the plan of raising a legion in Estremadura by Col. Downie went no farther than what the plan itself specified, and by no means to the employment of British officers under Col. Downie. I

know that British officers require the support of authority to enable them to be of any service with Spanish or Portuguese troops, and the control of authority, and that of no ordinary kind, to keep themselves in order and in a state of subordination. I know that Col. Downie cannot, and I fear that neither Whittingham nor Roche can, ever have the authority requisite for either the one purpose or the other.

I observe that — has made use of my name in a way in which he was not authorised to use it, and he has misled government on this as well as other points. It is not true that there were either officers or men for the legion waiting for arms and accoutrements. He has no men now, at least very few (not quite 300, who have been recruited since he arrived last in the Peninsula), and he had none when he made this report to government.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 29th Jan. 1811, 11½ A.M.

Since I wrote last night, the prisoners of the *train* mentioned by Sir W. Erskine have been examined by the Adj. Gen.; and it appears that the artillery which they mention moved from Santarem on Sunday morning at 9 o'clock.

Government are really in earnest in sending officers to serve with the Spaniards under Col. Downie; and they appear inclined to say that this measure is adopted in consequence of my approbation of it, notwithstanding my protest, which I showed you.

I think it also certain that the people of Badajoz will be disinclined to defend the place, particularly when they shall hear of the death of the Marques de la Romana. Do you think the garrisons of Elvas, &c., are in that case sufficient? In my opinion they are; but if you should think they are not, order on the militia of Lagos to Elvas; though I should be sorry to part with that corps, as we shall require it in the lines on the left of the Tagus. I reckon that they have 7000 men, exclusive of the 5th regt., and the Lagos militia, of which 1000 in Mourão, 600 in Jurumenha, will leave 5400 for Elvas and La Lippe, of which 400 might be in La Lippe. However, the returns which I have, and enclose, may include sick, of which there are always a good number in a Portuguese garrison.

I enclose the statement of the expense of the arsenal for two years; but it has not been incurred exclusively on our account.

P.S. The day is so dark, that I don't propose to go to Calhariz, at least till late in the afternoon.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 29th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 28th inst., enclosing one of the 4th, from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, containing their Lordships' 'positive directions that you do not send another French prisoner to England on any consideration;' and of course I can make no request to have them sent home. When they shall accumulate to such numbers as that it will become inconvenient to guard them, we must only send them back again to the enemy. This event is not unlikely to occur, as not a day passes that some are not taken by the light detachments of the army.

I am obliged to you for your intention of sending a large number of ships for cattle.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 29th Jan. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 28th. The Sec. of State has sent me also the orders respecting the French prisoners, upon which I have remonstrated, but have received no answer. In the meantime, I don't see any necessity for sending home immediately the 600 prisoners. The 30 officers might go whenever you please.

I believe that only one sail of the line returned to port of those which sailed from Toulon; at least it does not appear that they know at Cadiz that more had returned. I have settled Major Westropp's bat and forage concerns for him.

P.S. Upon examining the Admiralty letter, enclosed in yours of the 28th, I find it is different from and much more positive than that which I had received.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 29th Jan. 1811.

I think it very immaterial at what time the dispatch of Saturday goes to England; but there is in the bag a private letter from me to Lord Wellesley, detailing the state and distresses of the Portuguese and Spanish governments, which it is desirable should go home soon. If, therefore, the Admiral can, without inconvenience, give a vessel to carry the mails, I think it desirable they should go.

I have called for Mr. Dalrymple's answer to the complaint against him.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Lord Bluntyre, 42d regt.*

29th Jan. 1811.

Your Lordship's communication of the 24th inst. has been submitted to the Commander of the Forces. In reference thereto, I am directed to observe, that there is no doubt, when an officer is appointed to a duty under a G. O., he cannot be called upon in the usual course of regimental employment, because it is supposed the first will occupy his time and attention. This is the general principle, but its operation must be limited by reason as here further explained. There should be no risk of impeding the public service; but in no instance can public duty act as a total liberation from regimental attentions. Applying then these principles to the case of Capt. —, of the 42d regt., it appears he ought not to be called upon to perform any regimental duty which could possibly interfere with his attendance upon the General Court Martial; but the invariable custom of the army, and the limits assigned to the operation of the principle which admits that he may be excused from every other duty when expedient, also require that he should perform every regimental duty, while member of a General Court Martial, which he could execute consistently with the performance of his task as member of a General Court Martial. It is also to be observed that the particular duties from which Capt. — was intentionally absent were those of all others to which he might have attended without inconvenience, and from them therefore he was wrong in being absent, viz. the roll call of his company, and subsequent muster of the regiment. Capt. — might as well neglect to settle his men's accounts as ordered, under the plea of being a member of a General Court Martial.

His Excellency is willing to attribute this case to misapprehension of military rule, as it otherwise would appear a painful instance of want of zeal.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 30th Jan. 1811, 10 A.M.

I was about to send you last night the enclosed from Sir W. Erskine, and the accompanying plans, when I received your letter of 10 A.M. of yesterday.



I agree entirely in opinion with you upon the enterprise which I had suggested. We are not sure that the boats have left the Zezere; and even if they have, the place where they are described to be is too near Punhete and the head quarters of Loison's division to attempt an enterprise upon them with a small force. This plan must be given up for the present, therefore, and in the meantime this rain will settle the concern.

I don't know what to make of these movements described by Sir W. Erskine, unless they are movements for the purpose of looking for provisions, or to put a stop to sickness. Gordon had a long interview yesterday with Regnier's aide de camp, who told him, among other things, that they had been very unhealthy, and that they made the troops move about and work, as a remedy, and, I suppose, to distract their attention from reflecting on their situation.

I have a letter from Salamanca of the 13th. Foy arrived there on the 11th from Paris. At Salamanca they say that the *Moniteur* of the 20th contains decrees annexing the Spanish provinces north of the Ebro to France.

To Gen. Mendizabal.

Cartaxo, 30th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 26th and 27th, and I assure you that I am not surprised that you feel the sorrow and regret which you so feelingly describe upon the loss which we have sustained. That to which we must now direct our attention is to save Badajoz; and it appears to me quite impossible that that place should fall, if the communication with the right of the Guadiana is kept open. The memorandum which was lately transmitted to you by the late Marques de la Romana had for its object the adoption of measures to keep open the communication with the right bank of the Guadiana; and if those measures, or others of the same description, are adopted, it will be impossible for the enemy, with the force he now has, or even one larger, to prevent that communication.

When you sent orders on the 24th inst. to Gen. O'Donnell to halt wherever those orders might find him, it appeared to me probable that you were not certain that the enemy intended to attack Badajoz; and that you expected that he might cross the Guadiana below Jurumenha, and, by a rapid march upon Estremoz, cut off the communication between the right of this army and the troops under the command of Gen. O'Donnell, if that General had continued his march towards Badajoz, according to the orders which he had received from the Marques de la Romana. But it being now obvious that the enemy intend to attempt the siege of Badajoz, it is clear that the plan which had been recommended, and adopted and ordered by the late Marques, ought to be carried into execution without delay.\*

Accordingly, I recommend to you to order the immediate advance of all the troops which were lately in this quarter, and which are now halted at Estremoz, Monte Mór o Novo, and Vendas Novas. They might be cantoned in the first instance at Villa Boim, S<sup>ta</sup> Olaya, and Campo

\* See this plan or memorandum, p. 536.

Maïor, keeping the cavalry in their front, and from these cantonments they would be in a situation to join, and fall upon the enemy, who must be weak on the right of the Guadiana; and eventually to take up the position ordered by the late Marques de la Romana.

Your Excellency will see the necessity that the troops in these cantonments should be very vigilant, particularly those in Campo Maior. Their communication should be certain, in order that, in case a part should be attacked, the rest might go to their assistance without difficulty. It will also be necessary to have a constant communication with Jurumenha, and to know what passes on the left of the Guadiana.

In answer to your Excellency's letter of the 27th I have to express my concern that it is not in my power to detach any cavalry from this army. We have not more cavalry than are necessary for the duties of the army, and we have detached to the troops under your command the only cavalry which can be spared.

I have less reluctance in declining to send more cavalry, as I observe that there is a large body of cavalry at present with the Spanish army, which, if managed with prudence and discretion, must be sufficient for all the objects in view.

I propose to send a copy of this letter to Gen. Carrera as my suggestions for his conduct, in case he should not be able to receive your Excellency's directions upon the subject to which they relate. It is unfortunate that the Puente de Gevora was not destroyed. The enemy would experience difficulty in repairing it, from the want of materials on the spot.

To Gen. Dou Martin de la Carrera.

Cartaxo, 30th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th inst., and I am much gratified by the polite expressions which it contains.

I now enclose the copy of a letter which I have written this day to Gen. Mendizábal, from whom you will receive orders, if the communication should be still open with Badajoz. If it should not, I recommend to you to carry into execution the measures suggested in the enclosed letter; and, when you shall arrive in the neighbourhood of Elvas, you will have an opportunity of ascertaining the position and numbers of the enemy on the right of the Guadiana, and their means of reinforcing it; and you can attack the enemy, and re-establish the communication with the place, if you should be of opinion that you are likely to be successful.

The British Commissary has orders to attend your troops as long as they shall be within the Portuguese frontier. I think it proper to mention to you, that if the enemy have taken a position on the Caya, between Badajoz and Elvas, you will attack that position with advantage, by advancing by the high road from Elvas towards Badajoz. The Caya must in that case be passed higher up, between Elvas and Campo Maior.

I earnestly recommend to you the greatest attention to preserve good order among your troops. There is no reason why they should plunder the country under existing circumstances; and the warfare between them and the Portuguese peasantry, which will be the consequence of such conduct, will be the greatest misfortune that can happen to us.

*The A.G. to the Commissary General.*

30th Jan. 1811.

I have the commands of my Lord Wellington to transmit to you, for perusal, the proceedings of a General Court Martial on quarter master —, — light dragoons. His Excellency is satisfied that you will see the propriety of removing from your department store keepers — and —, from the report the Court has made of the highly discreditable conduct of those petty officers as witnesses on the above trial; and it will further appear to you necessary, from the facts ascertained by the Court, and the substantiated guilt of quarter master —, of the — light dragoons, to cause an inquiry into what extent the looseness of system apparent in this case, on the head of issues, has been admitted in that branch of the Commissariat.

The enclosure to be returned.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Alex. Campbell, 6th division.*

30th Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor to receive and submit your letter of the 29th inst., and enclosure, which I am to observe my Lord Wellington in no way considers an apology on the part of Major —, of the — regt. The conduct of Major — was in positive breach, not only of the orders of this army, but the laws of this, of his own, and every civilized country. No officer has the right, under any pretence or in any country, to seize a cart and put his baggage in it, even though unattended by a driver or sentry; and it but ill excuses Major —'s proceedings that Mr. Oliveira appeared rude, when the national manners and language were equally unknown to that officer.

The well grounded and frequent complaints of the Portuguese troops being irregularly supplied with provisions are known to you, and it must be therefore obvious that they cannot possibly be supplied if the officers of the British army are allowed with impunity to conduct themselves as Major — has done, under any pretence whatever.

It is finally my duty to communicate to you, his Excellency has decided on making this case subject of consideration for a General Court Martial, in the event of Major — not submitting, through you, a most full and explicit apology for his transgression.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 31st Jan. 1811.

I enclose a letter from Gen. Blunt. I don't believe the intelligence which he mentions regarding the march of so large a body. There has been some movement certainly, but it has, according to all accounts, been the other way, that is, from the enemy's right, instead of towards his right.

You see how affairs stand on the frontier. Ballesteros defeated, the communication with Badajoz cut off, and what I apprehend is, the junction of Gazan's corps with the troops before Cadiz, and the consequent repulse of the *sortie*. However, the *sortie* will have one good effect; it will make the French consider their situation a little before they involve themselves too much at the same time. I write to Ballesteros to apprise him of the probability that the troops in Cadiz will make a *sortie*, and that Gazan will have marched to the support of the besiegers, and to urge him to try his hand on Seville in that case. Then, to add to our bad news on this side, Tortosa surrendered almost before it was attacked! and Alava informs me that the whole of Peru is in a state of revolution.

G. O.

Cartaxo, 31st Jan. 1811.

2. The Commandant at Lisbon is requested to send for Lieut. — of the —, immediately on the receipt of this order, and send him from his presence to join his regiment.

I have a letter from my brother of the 25th, in which he tells me that they were thinking at Cadiz of appointing me to be the Generalissimo of their troops. If they had made some arrangement with our government a year and a half ago all would now have been well. I fear that it is now too late.

I wrote to Carrera yesterday, to tell him that I thought he ought to move forward to the frontier with the Spanish troops under his command, to endeavor to open the communication with Badajoz. If he does no other good by this movement, he will at least oblige Soult to weaken himself on the left of the Guadiana, and no progress can be made in the siege. The communication between Badajoz and Elvas is now cut off by cavalry only. Since I wrote to Carrera I find that Gen. Virues, who is at Estremoz, commands, and I write to him this day.

To Gen. Virues.

Cartaxo, 31st Jan. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th Jan.; and I beg to refer you to the letters which I wrote on the 25th inst. to Gen. O'Donnell, and yesterday to Gen. Mendizabal and Gen. Carrera, for my opinion on the measures to be adopted in the existing situation of affairs. As it appears by the accounts which I have received this morning, that the enemy have actually cut off the communication between Badajoz and Elvas, I recommend that you should now carry into execution the measures and make the marches suggested in those letters. I recommend to you, however, not to throw away any of your troops destined for operations in the field into Campo Maior; but to occupy as your cantonments, in the first instance, Villa Boim, Barbacena, and S<sup>a</sup> Olaya, and take care to secure the bridge over the Caya between Elvas and Campo Maior. Be assured, that the only mode by which the communication with Badajoz can be opened is by a direct movement upon the enemy's troops which are on the right of the Guadiana. This movement is perfectly safe if your numbers should be sufficient, as your rear and left flank will be covered by Elvas and Campo Maior. The enemy will see with indifference all movements upon La Roca, which will have no effect whatever upon his situation, and these movements may expose your own troops.

I am concerned that it is not in my power to detach troops to your assistance. You will observe that, except the cavalry, all those which you have under your command have been detached from this army, while the enemy in my front have received a reinforcement. If I were to weaken the corps under Marshal Beresford the enemy would have it in his power to cross the Tagus: the communication between you and me would then be cut off, and would not easily be re-established; and your corps, and the troops which I should detach to you, would be exposed to loss. I am concerned to learn from you that the places of Badajoz and Campo Maior are ill supplied with provisions. I had hoped that, Estremadura having been free from the enemy since July last, measures had been adopted to remove the possibility of want: but, if we should be able to open the communication with these places, I should be glad to know whether any and what measures have been adopted to procure and throw a supply of provisions into them.

To Gen. Ballesteros.

Cartaxo, 31st Jan. 1811.

You will have heard of the misfortune which has recently occurred in this town, by the unexpected death of the Marques de la Romana. I will not renew the distress you must have felt upon receiving this intelligence by enlarging upon the subject. His loss must be ever considered a misfortune of the greatest magnitude to the army under his command, to his country, and to all the friends of the cause in which we are engaged.

You will likewise have heard of the surrender of Olivença, and of the subsequent investment of Badajoz, of which place Gen. Mendizabal has taken the command; and Gen. O'Donnell having been removed to the army in Catalonia, the command of the troops which were lately joined with this army, and of the other Spanish troops not in the garrisons of Badajoz and Campo Maior, has devolved upon Gen. Virues. These troops are at present cantoned at Estremoz, Monte Mór o Novo, and Vendas Novas, in Portugal; and I have recommended to Gen. Virues to move forward to the neighbourhood of Elvas, and to endeavor to open the communication with Badajoz by the right of the Guadiana. This measure, if it will have no other good effect, will oblige Marshal Soult to station more troops on the right of the Guadiana, and will weaken his means of carrying on the siege.

I have heard from Col. Austin of your action with the enemy on the 25th inst., and of your subsequent movement across the Guadiana. I have now to inform you, that it was intended to attack the troops engaged in the blockade of Cadiz from Cadiz and the Isla on the 28th inst. I request you to keep this intelligence secret. If this intention should be carried into execution, or if the enemy, which is probable, should gain intelligence of it, the troops with which you were engaged under Gazan will probably be drawn towards Cadiz. In that case, I recommend to you to recross the Guadiana, and move upon Seville.

This movement of yours will most probably induce the enemy to weaken his corps before Badajoz, in order to detach to Seville; and, if that should be the case, I recommend to you to retire again across the Guadiana, not risking an action with the enemy, unless you should have some certain ground to hope for success; and to march to join the remainder of the Spanish army, which, by your junction and by the decrease of the enemy's force engaged in the siege, will be in a situation entirely to relieve Badajoz.

You will, I am convinced, excuse the liberty which I take in making these suggestions to you. But the affairs of your nation have become so critical, that it is necessary that every friend to the cause should co-operate in their re-establishment. I am apprehensive that you will have a difficult and tedious march along the right of the Guadiana, if you should attend to this suggestion, and should cross that river so low down as Mertola. But I am not certain that you will find the means of crossing that river higher up than Mertola, as, unfortunately, the bridge of boats was not removed from Badajoz, as recommended: and if you should attempt a march by the left of the Guadiana towards Badajoz, and should have no means of crossing, you will be involved in a situation of great difficulty. However, you must have more knowledge than I can have at this distance of the means of crossing the Guadiana.

To Gen. Leite.

Cartaxo, 1st Feb. 1811.

Marshal Beresford has communicated to me your letter to him of the 27th Jan., in which you mention that you had received one from Don Carlos de España, informing you of the probability that the Spanish troops will commit irregularities from the want of provisions. I herewith enclose the copy of a letter which I have addressed upon this subject to Gen. Virues; and I now request you to give no provisions whatever to the Spanish troops, and to inform me in case they should commit irregularities in the province of Alentejo. I request you, however, to give every assistance in your power to enable the British Commissary to purchase provisions for their supply.

To Gen. Virues.

Cartaxo, 1st Feb. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency the extract of a letter which has been received by Marshal Beresford from Gen. Leite, the Governor of the province of Alentejo and of Elvas, dated the 27th ult., in which that General states that Brigadier Don Carlos de España has apprised him of the probability that the Spanish troops would commit irregularities on account of the want of provisions. This intimation from Don Carlos de España surprises me not a little, as your Excellency informed me, in a letter received yesterday, that the British Commissary at Estremoz had informed you that he had received directions to supply the Spanish troops with provisions.

I have now to inform your Excellency, that I have given these directions to the British Commissary solely in order to prevent the irregularities on the part of the Spanish troops of which Don Carlos has given notice to Gen. Leite, and the consequent retaliation on the part of the injured and plundered people of Portugal. I am in no manner whatever bound to give this assistance to the Spanish troops. And, in answer to the notification of Don Carlos de España to Gen. Leite, I now apprise you, that if I shall receive any complaint of the irregularities committed by the Spanish troops in Portugal I shall withdraw the British Commissaries from them, and discontinue all supplies and assistance, and I shall forward to the Spanish government the complaints which such conduct will deserve.

I know that the Spanish troops, like all others, are to be kept in order if their officers choose it, when they are supplied with provisions; and on this account, and on that of the evils which the cause, and your own country in particular, will suffer from these continued irregularities, I trust that you will excuse the freedom with which I have communicated to you my intentions. I have transmitted a copy of this letter to Gen. Leite.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 1st Feb. 1811.

I received last night two letters from you of the 30th, and your letters, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, of the 31st.

The sickness at Abrantes is very distressing. Would it not be desirable to put at the head of your convalescent dépôt an English officer of some rank, making all convalescent officers at Lisbon do duty at the dépôt under him, as I have arranged mine? Mine is now in tolerable order;

and I am sure that the only mode of arranging yours is by intrusting an English officer with the management of it.

I write to Gen. Leite, regarding the demand for provisions for Gen. Virues, to desire him positively to give no provisions to the Spanish troops. The British Commissaries are employed to provision them; and I shall send you my letters to be forwarded. Don Carlos de España has written to Gen. Leite, only as an excuse beforehand for the outrages which will be committed by his troops.

I think that you had better order the regiment of Lagos to Elvas, and we will take the regiment of Tavira for our purposes when it arrives. Urge Leite, however, to keep himself complete in Ordenanza.

There is nothing new on this side. The rivers are more swelled than I have yet seen them.

*The A.G. to Major —, — regt.*

1st Feb. 1811.

I have submitted your letter, proposed to be forwarded through Brig. Gen. Craufurd, to the Commander of the Forces. Should your business to England be of that urgency to enable your declaring it is felt by you to be paramount to every other consideration in life, it is to be forwarded to the Commander in Chief. It is, however, his Excellency's opinion, which will accompany your application to the Horse Guards, that there is no business whatever which cannot be done by power of attorney and instruction, equally well as by personal interference.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Cartaxo, 2d Feb. 1811.

I enclose a letter from Major —, of the — regt., in which he desires to have leave of absence on account of his private affairs.

I have uniformly refused leave of absence to the officers of the army, excepting for the recovery of their health, or for the arrangement of private affairs, the settlement of which should be stated to be paramount to every other consideration in life. The number of officers who have applied and obtained leave on this plea lately is so considerable, that I have been obliged to decline giving leave to any one, and to refer their applications to the Commander in Chief. If his Excellency should think proper to grant the leave which they request, I hope that he will be so kind as to send officers to the army to do their duty while absent; as the number of officers present with the army is very much reduced, owing to those absent on leave on account of their health and private affairs, and employed with the Portuguese army.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 2d Feb. 1811.

I return the paper you sent me last night, which is very interesting. It appears by Lumley's account that there was some movement in Santarem the night before last and yesterday morning; but I have heard nothing of it on this side. I could not get over the rivers the day before yesterday to see how matters were behind the hills beyond the Rio Maior river; but one camp was removed, which was on the left of Elder's post; and it appeared to me that there were more people in the villages and quintas than there had been, and the piquets were in the same positions and as numerous as ever. There was a piquet on the ground which the camp had quitted.

I enclose an anonymous letter from Coimbra. It goes further than these productions do in general, for it names the witnesses to prove the facts stated.

I think you must send the Lagos militia to Elvas, whether we get the Tavira militia or not. It would not answer to lose that place for want of numbers of men we know to be necessary to defend it. We can get men from the north, by sea probably, when the time comes when we shall want them in the lines.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 2d Feb. 1811.

If the Admiral will show you the orders which he has received from England, you will see that they prohibit him from sending any more French prisoners to England, on any account whatever. I send Dom M. Forjaz's representation on this subject to England.

Unfortunately, answers and returns from the *Junta de Viveres* are not provisions! I have never yet made a complaint to the Portuguese government that I did not receive in answer volumes of papers. If they mean to dispute the facts stated, by the officers commanding the troops through me, by these returns, which do not bear upon the question at all, it is useless for me, and I shall discontinue, to give myself any further trouble about the matter. They might just as well pretend that the paper was provision as that it contained any reasonable answer to the complaints; and the framing and writing them only takes up the time of the clerks, and increases your trouble and mine.

P.S. Upon looking at Dom M. Forjaz's note to you of the 29th Jan., upon the prisoners, I observe that he says that '*esta convencionado*' with me to remove the prisoners. I must contradict that assertion; and unless the note is withdrawn and altered I shall not interfere with the business. I did say that I would send to England certain prisoners taken at Chaves in 1809, and they and many thousand others have been sent to England since that period. I have done this, as I have many other thankless offices for the Portuguese government, out of pure good will, and have taken upon myself in this, as in many other matters, an authority which I did not possess, because I knew that they could neither defray the expense of maintaining nor of removing the prisoners.

But I never entered into an agreement to send to England their prisoners. I could not enter into such an agreement without the authority of government, and I have no such authority. In the present case, as I have above told you, it is positively forbidden to send any more home, and I shall not even apply to have them sent home, under the notion that any agreement exists.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 2d Feb. 1811.

I enclose an account of sums advanced and expenses incurred on account of the Spanish troops, under the late Marques de la Romana, by the Commissary Gen. of this army, from the 25th Nov. 1810, to the 24th Jan. 1811, which I request you to lay before the Spanish government, and to obtain payment of the same.



To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 2d Feb. 1811

I have the honor to enclose copies of the drafts of the letters written by me to Gens. Mendizabal, O'Donell, Virues, Carrera, and Ballesteros, and copies of the letters received from those officers respectively, which I request you to lay before the Spanish government, as being the best mode of bringing under their view the situation of affairs on the frontiers of Estremadura, and the measures which I have recommended those officers to adopt. I also request you to lay before them the memorandum which I gave to the late Marques de la Romana on the —, transmitted in my letter of the 23d ult.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 2d Feb. 1811.

In obedience to your Lordship's directions, in your dispatch of the 18th Dec., I have the honor to enclose a letter and returns from Brig. Gen. Howorth, containing accounts of all the issues made to the Portuguese and Spanish troops in the year 1810; and a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford of the 1st inst., containing an account of the issues of arms and stores; and an estimate of the probable demands for the year 1811.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 2d Feb. 1811.

I enclose two accounts of sums advanced, and expenses incurred by the Commissary Gen., on account of the troops under the late Marques de la Romana, to the 24th Jan. last, which I have sent to His Majesty's minister at Cadiz, with a request that he would obtain payment of them from the Spanish government.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 2d Feb. 1811.

From the accounts which I have received from Gen. Mendizabal, who commands in the province of Estremadura since the death of the Marques de la Romana, it appears that the garrison of Olivença, when it surrendered, was not pressed by want of any description. There were provisions in the town in sufficient quantities to last the garrison and inhabitants for some time; and only on the day previous to the surrender the Commanding officer had written to Gen. Mendizabal, declaring his intention to hold out, and assuring him of the good disposition which prevailed among the inhabitants and troops. The surrender of this place, therefore, is unaccountable, excepting by attributing it to causes discreditable to the character of the Commanding officer.

Olivença had been dismantled; and, when occupied as a cantonment by the British army in 1809, there was a breach in the walls, and it was incapable of making any defence. Since that time the breach had been repaired, so as to secure the place against a *coup de main*; and I had frequently recommended to the late Marques de la Romana either to destroy the place effectually, or to garrison it sufficiently, and to provide it with the ordnance, and stores, and provisions necessary for its defence. He had latterly determined that the place should be destroyed; and he had given directions that the troops should be withdrawn which entered it on

their retreat towards the Guadiana, on the recent advance of the enemy into Estremadura. It is unfortunate that these measures were not carried into execution, as I understand they were some of the best of the Spanish battalions; and the loss of their services at the present moment is a serious misfortune. In other respects, the possession of Olivença by the enemy, whether in a better or worse state of defence, is not a consideration of much importance. Since the enemy have obtained possession of this place, they have approached Badajoz in strength on the left of the Guadiana, but have had cavalry only on the right of that river. They have, however, with their cavalry, interrupted the communication between Elvas and Badajoz.

I have recommended to Gen. Virues, who commands the Spanish troops which were lately with this army and all those upon the frontier, to move forward to the neighbourhood of Elvas, and to endeavor to re-establish the communication, if he should find himself sufficiently strong; and to carry into execution the plan for preserving the communication which I had recommended to the late Marques de la Romana, and which he had adopted and ordered to be executed.

The various events of the war will have shown your Lordship that no calculation can be made on the result of any operation in which the Spanish troops are engaged; but if the same number of troops of any other nation (10,000) were to be employed on this operation, I should have no doubt of their success, or of their ability to prevent the French from attacking Badajoz with the force which they have now employed on this service.

Gen. Ballesteros, who, I informed your Lordship in my dispatch of the 19th ult., had been moved into the Condado de Niebla, by orders from the Spanish government, was defeated on the 25th Jan. in an action fought at Castillejos. His troops retired in good order, however, and crossed the Guadiana into Algarve, at Alcoutim and Mertola. The Spanish General, Copons, who had commanded a detachment in the Condado de Niebla for some time, had been ordered, with his detachment, to Cadiz, and was embarked at Ayamonte in readiness to sail on the 26th, when the wind should become fair.

Since I last addressed your Lordship I have received accounts that Gen. Claparède had retired from Lamego on the 17th ult.; and Gen. Silveira crossed the Douro again, and occupied that city on the 20th ult. Gen. Claparède had continued his retreat to Almeida; but he has since advanced again; and on the 28th Jan., in the evening, his advanced guard arrived at Colorico. I have not yet learned whether he is about to approach the main body of the army, or to take the position upon Guarda in which, in my dispatch of the 12th ult., I informed your Lordship he had been directed to place himself.

Within these few days the enemy have made several movements in the interior of the position which they occupy, but I have not yet discovered with what object. Their outposts, and the strength of the several corps which occupy the several points of their position, continue the same; and I should imagine that the movements which have been made are only those of relief.\* I receive accounts of the distress which they suffer from

\* See Appendix, No. XXXI.

the want of provisions, and of their increasing difficulties in procuring any sustenance. They have certainly hitherto received none from Spain; and they have no communication with the frontier, even for a courier, excepting when escorted by a large detachment.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 2d Feb. 1811.

I have received a letter from Mr. Wellesley, in which he informs me that it is probable the Spanish government will offer me the command of their armies, of which I apprise your Lordship by the earliest opportunity, in order that the King's government may take the subject into consideration. If such an arrangement had been made about a year and a half ago, and the Spanish government had set seriously to work to find means to feed and pay their army, the cause would have been saved. Nay, I will go further, and say that the cause would have been saved without such an arrangement, if the battle of Ocaña had not been fought in Nov. 1809.

It is impossible for me to say what will be the effect of such an arrangement now. It will certainly not answer any purpose whatever, excepting to throw upon me additional trouble, and the blame and odium of certain ultimate failure, if measures are not taken to feed and pay the Spanish troops. If these measures are taken, some advantage would undoubtedly be derived to the cause, from combining in one system, at least, all the troops on this side of the Peninsula.

I shall answer, if this offer should be made, that I cannot take upon me such a charge without the consent of His Majesty; and that, at all events, I am convinced that no good can result from the arrangement, unless effectual measures should be adopted to feed, pay, clothe, and discipline the Spanish troops; that I have been in the habit of constant communication with the General officers commanding the Spanish troops, and have obtruded my opinions upon them occasionally; that I shall continue to do so; and that the offer which has been made to me of the command by the government will probably give more weight to my recommendations than they have had hitherto; but that the acceptance of the command must depend upon His Majesty's commands. This will leave the question open for the decision of government; and in the meantime I request to have, by return of post, your Lordship's direction what I shall do if this offer should be made.

To the General officers who have lately received the Medal. Cartaxo, 3d Feb. 1811.

Having made a reference to the Commander in Chief, respecting the mode in which the General officers should wear the distinction with which His Majesty has recently honored them by his orders of the 30th Sept., I have received an answer from Lieut. Col. Torrens, stating 'that the General officers should wear the riband of the medal at their button hole, the same as the Field officers, in undress; but when the medal is worn itself, it should be round the neck.'

To Brig. Don M. Alava.

A Cartaxo, ce 3 Février, 1811.

Je suis fâché de vous dire des vérités qui sont dures; mais vous savez

bien que c'est inutile de cacher la vérité ; et que si je ne fais pas savoir la vérité, le blame des malheurs qui arrivent retombe sur moi.

Pour la cavalerie, on m'a déjà presque perdu deux régimens ; et comment voulez vous que j'en envoie encore, pour être perdus de la même manière et pour ne rien faire ? Vos officiers ne savent pas leur devoir, et ne veulent pas l'apprendre : ils détruisent tout et ne font pas de mal à l'ennemi. Si j'envoie 100 chevaux ils seront perdus, et ne tueront ni ne prendront un seul Français !

J'ai de très mauvaises nouvelles de l'état des affaires de Badajoz. Ils n'ont pas de provisions pour la troupe de la place ; femmes, enfans, et réfugiés de toute espèce y sont restés. Si je trouve moyen de rouvrir la communication, il n'y a pas un sou pour acheter des provisions, ni autres moyens pour en procurer pour les jeter dans la place. Pauvre pays ! Pauvre cause ! Tous deux sont perdus par la faute et l'imprévoyance de ceux qui, sans moyens quelconques, se sont mis dans la tête de diriger les affaires, et qui n'ont jamais voulu écouter les conseils.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 3d Feb. 1811.

I return Madden's letter, which contains a curious statement, and affords but slender hopes of being able to effect any thing for these miserable people. I have recommended Virues to move up to the neighbourhood of Elvas direct, with his whole corps, and to attempt to re-open the communication with Badajoz if he should think his force sufficient.

I enclose a letter from Blunt ; likewise a most curious dispatch from Lord Liverpool. I believe they are gone mad. Some days ago they ordered Adm. Berkeley on no account whatever to send home any more prisoners ; and he is this day ordered in the same terms not to send home any more deserters. This is the way we go on. They are sending me out between 5000 and 6000 men however.

I went yesterday to look at the enemy's position all along their front. There was no alteration since the last day I looked at them, excepting that I thought they had not so many guns on the great hill. There is a report here, from a priest come from Torres Novas, stating that a day or two ago a detachment of 6000 men marched for Almeida.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 3d Feb. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 2d inst., in which you have enclosed the copy of the letter from the Admiralty of the 14th Jan., prohibiting you from sending to England any deserters from the enemy's army on any account whatever ; and the copy of the letter from the Admiralty of the 16th Jan., announcing the intended departure of Sir J. Yorke, with a squadron having troops on board, and directing the arrangements to be made in consequence.

I have directed Col. Peacocke not to apply for passages for deserters in future, and I conclude that I shall receive directions from the Sec. of State in what manner I am to dispose of these people. Circumstances do not allow of my sending any troops to England at present ; and I see no reason why Sir J. Yorke should not return to England, according to his orders, as soon as you please, after the troops shall be disembarked.

I have received orders from the Sec. of State to send to Portsmouth cavalry transports for 600 horses, which may as well be sent under the convoy of Sir J. Yorke, if you should think proper.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 3d Feb. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 25th inst.

I think that if the Spanish government had made the arrangement for the command of their armies 18 months ago, which they now propose to make, the cause would have been safe; and I think much might be done yet to save it, if this arrangement were made, provided it is connected with others for disciplining, paying, feeding, and clothing the troops. If the offer should be made to me, I propose to answer that I cannot accept it without the consent of His Majesty; and that it is useless to expect any benefit from this or any other arrangement of this description, unless connected with others to secure the object to which I have above referred; that I have been constantly in the habit of communicating with the officers in command of the different corps, with whom circumstances enabled me to communicate, and have given them my opinions on the plans which they ought to pursue; that I shall continue this communication, and to recommend operations to them, to which recommendations I hope they will be induced to pay more attention than they have hitherto, when they find that the government intended that I should command the army. I enclose in an official form the correspondence which I have had with the Spanish officers since the death of the Marques de la Romana, which you will of course lay before the Spanish government, and I should wish it to go to England.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday. I have a miserable account of affairs from Badajoz. There is not a grain of provision in the public magazines: the town is full of women and children, and refugees of all descriptions, and nothing can be in a worse state than the public mind in that place. There is no chance I fear of ever opening a communication, excepting by British troops, and those I can't send. Unfortunate cause! how has it been frittered away!

We have newspapers here to the 21st Jan. The King had been worse about the 15th, and was worse again on the 19th; and I think the late bulletins are worded in an unusually cautious manner. The Regency bill was to be sent to the Lords on the 23d, and I think would be passed on the 28th or 29th. I believe that the ministry are to be changed immediately; but I have had no letter which mentions the probability of such an occurrence.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 4th Feb. 1811, 10 A.M.

I received your 3 letters of the 3d, 10 A.M., yesterday evening. Lieut. Col. Taylor and Major Macgregor shall have leave to go to England on the duty which you propose, whenever application shall be made for it.

Lieut. — did apply for the leave he informed you he had, and I desired Pakenham to tell him that his being suspended from rank and pay did not relieve him from the necessity of attending to all the rules and orders of the service, one of which was that his application must be

made through the channel of his Commanding officer. He is an impudent fellow. I don't know whether it is worth while to take any further notice of him. However, this shall be as you think best. Upon second thoughts, it would be better to notice his letter, and it shall be done officially.

I think it probable that the enemy are endeavoring to send some cavalry from Soult to Massena by some of the *barcas* on the Tagus. I should recommend you to put one of your brigades of cavalry on your right, some of them as far as Gavião; let them patrol occasionally up to Gafete, and observe what passes in that quarter.

I believe I told you that I had desired Virues to move to S<sup>ra</sup> Olaya, Barbacena, and Villa Boim, which, with the cavalry at Elvas, ought to clear the right of the Guadiana entirely; but we can reckon upon nothing that the Spaniards undertake.

The red coats at Punhete are the Hanoverian Legion, in Loison's division.

It would be very desirable to make some endeavor at Abrantes to prevent the enemy getting intelligence through that town. I should think that this might be effected. Nobody should be allowed to leave the town towards the evening whose business is not known. I am trying to stop their communication with Lisbon on this side, of which I fear they have had too much.

I send you two letters which I have received this morning by the *Shamrock*, which will show you how things are in England. I think that when the Regent is appointed the ministers will resign, because it will be apparent that they do not possess his confidence. Return the letters.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 4th Feb. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3d inst., enclosing a correspondence between Lieut. Col. Arbuthnot\* and Lieut. —, of the — regt., upon the wish of the latter officer to have leave of absence. He had already applied to me for leave, and I referred him to the regular channel of his Commanding officers.

As I consider the opinion of a General Court Martial of the guilt of an officer, and the sentence that he should be suspended from rank and pay, a disgrace from which the officer can be relieved only by subsequent good conduct and attention to his duty, I should not have been unwilling, any more than yourself, to attend to the application of Lieut. — for leave of absence from his regiment during the period of his suspension from rank and pay, in order to alleviate the distress which every well constituted mind must naturally feel upon such an occasion.

But when I observe, in Lieut. —'s letters to Col. Arbuthnot\* of the 26th Jan. and 2d Feb., and that to the Adj. Gen. of the latter date, a disposition, unrestrained by what had recently passed, to repeat the offence which it had been the object of the sentence of the General Court Martial to punish, I cannot think Lieut. — is an officer entitled to any indulgence or encouragement. Indeed, it would appear that the opinion

\* Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Arbuthnot, K.C.B., then Military Secretary to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford.

of the General Court Martial of his guilt and their sentence is considered by him as no disgrace.

A very trifling degree of education and practice will enable an officer to string together a few words in a letter, in a manner and conveying a meaning which a superior cannot and an inferior will be unwilling to bear. But this ability is a most dangerous qualification to the possessor, unless he has sense to guide his pen, and discretion to restrain him from the use of intemperate and improper language. As the sentence of the General Court Martial has not had the wished for effect upon Lieut. —, I hope that the refusal to grant him an indulgence, which probably would not have been refused if applied for in those terms of civility in which indulgences are usually asked, will correct a disposition in Lieut. — which can never tend to his advantage. He must remain at the head quarters of his regiment till the term of his suspension from rank and pay is concluded.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 4th Feb. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter from Capt. Tucker, commanding the detachments, complaining that masters of transports in the Tagus are in the habit of receiving on board their ships deserters from the enemy, to which I request to draw your notice.

To Col. Peacocke.

Cartaxo, 4th Feb. 1811.

I beg that you will see the Commanding officer of the Chasseurs Britanniques, regarding the recruits of that corps recently arrived from Gibraltar, and inquire from him what he proposes to do with them, and in what mode to clothe and equip them for the service.

The Admiral has received an order not to send any more deserters to England, and you must not apply to him for passages for this description of men in future. I apprehend that this rule will apply to these recruits, as well as to deserters before enlistment, and therefore I believe these men must remain here.

To Col. Peacocke.

Cartaxo, 5th Feb. 1811.

Adm. Berkeley will have informed you of the expected arrival at Lisbon of a considerable body of troops, for whose reception I beg you will be prepared. I beg you to have copies prepared of the several orders necessary for the immediate information of the General and other officers, particularly those regarding quartering of the officers and soldiers, to which I desire that particular attention may be paid.

To the Supreme Junta of Aragon.

Cartaxo, 5th Feb. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving the letter from the Supreme Junta of Aragon, dated the 28th Nov., and I am highly flattered by the testimony of their approbation which it contains.

I sent some time ago to His Majesty's minister residing at Cadiz all the arms which His Majesty's government had sent to me for the use of the Spanish armies, in order that he might distribute them in such manner as might be most expedient to the troops on the eastern side of the Penin-

sula; and I have no doubt whatever but that he has attended to the wants of the army in Aragon: but I write to him upon the subject by this occasion.

To Brig. Don Carlos de España.

A Cartaxo, ce 5 Février, 1811.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 1<sup>r</sup> de ce mois. Le corps du feu Marquis de la Romana est déposé à Lisbonne jusqu'à ce que ses parens puissent décider où il sera enseveli; et s'ils décident qu'il sera enseveli à Majorque, on le fera passer dans cette île sans difficulté, et j'y donnerai toutes les facilités qui sont en mon pouvoir.

Je vous suis bien obligé pour les lettres que vous m'avez envoyées.

To Gen. Virues.

Cartaxo, 5th Feb. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d inst., and you will of course act as you have been directed to act by your Commanding officer, Gen. Mendizabal.

I cannot avoid drawing your attention again to the subject of the subsistence of your troops, and the irregularities which they commit. A heavy responsibility to your country hangs upon you, as I have no excuse for continuing to assist them with provisions if the irregularities which they commit are continued. I have besides to observe to you, that there are with the cavalry many horses unfit for service, as well as many officers and men with the infantry who do not perform any duty. You should send all these horses and men to Alburquerque, or to Valencia de Alcantara, or to Alcantara, in order to relieve the Commissary attached to the active army from the necessity of finding subsistence for more than those who do duty. If this is not done the British Commissary will experience difficulty in procuring subsistence for your effective force.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 5th Feb. 1811.

I enclose the list received from Murray of his officers of guides, some

G O.

Cartaxo, 5th Feb. 1811.

1. In order to remedy the inconvenience which results from the officers of the army who are sick absent, being returned 'absent without leave,' after the expiration of the term specified in the original sick certificate, and order for leave of absence, the Commander of the Forces desires that a Medical board may be assembled at each of the hospital stations, at which there may be sick officers, on the 5th, the 12th, and the 20th of every month.

2. Any officer who is absent from his duty on leave, forwarded upon a sick certificate, whose term of leave will expire by the time the next state will be made up, and sent in from his regiment, after any of those days, is to take care to attend this Medical board, and to obtain their opinion and certificate of his case.

3. The Commander of the Forces refers the officers of the army to the letter from the Adj. Gen. to the Secretary at War, of the 19th April, 1800, (page 507 of the collection of Regulations,) conveying His Majesty's orders regarding the pay of officers returned absent from their regiment without leave; in which they will see there is no power, excepting an order from His Majesty, which can restore them their pay, after it shall have been stopped from them.

4. The Commander of the Forces trusts therefore that officers will take measures to avoid the inconvenience which they must feel under the operation of these orders; and that those who shall have recovered sufficiently to return to their duty before the expiration of the period of their leave of absence will take care to return in time; and that those whose health shall require a longer stay at the hospital station will take care to appear before the Medical board and obtain a certified copy of their certificate, and transmit it by the earliest opportunity to the Commanding officer of their regiment.



of whom have been appointed *alferes*, and wish for promotion, and others wish for commissions.

There is nothing new here. I desired Lord FitzRoy to send you the deposition of a deserter who was brought in yesterday. I don't think he knows any thing positively himself. He was only told that some of the boats had gone towards Santarem, and that a road was making for others to go up the river.

I have not heard from Virues since I wrote to him to move forward. If he was now at Elvas he might clear the road to Badajoz with great ease.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 5th Feb. 1811, noon.

Since I wrote to you this morning, I have received yours of the 4th, enclosing one from Leite. I enclose one open for your perusal to Virues, in which you will see what I say to him. Forward it to Elvas, near which place he will be. Tell Leite that every effort must be made to get provisions for our Commissary for these people. Tell him that he should endeavor to prevail upon the useless mouths to quit Elvas, and go to Lisbon, or Setuval, or into Algarve.

P. S. Either take care of, or send to me, all Madden's letters respecting the treatment of his cavalry; for I see, as usual, they are going to lay upon me the fall of Badajoz, because I would not send them more cavalry to be lost.

There is a report here that the King is so far recovered as to sign his name, and that there is consequently an end to the Regency arrangements.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 5th Feb. 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Col. Fletcher, on the distresses of the people employed in repairing the roads and bridge in the neighbourhood of Benavente, from their not being paid for their work by the magistrates who employed them. As there are funds in all parts of Portugal for these works, I request you to apply to the government to give directions that these people may be paid.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 5th Feb. 1811.

I am afraid that my dispatch of the 7th Dec. did not sufficiently explain my meaning in the proposition which I made for the purchase of horses for the officers of the cavalry. I wished that a remount of 50 or 60 horses of a better description than usual might be purchased on the account of any one or of the whole of the regiments at a larger price, £40 or £50 each. These I intend to allow the officers to take, of course, at a price which should cover all the expense to government, and those which should not be taken could go into the ranks of the cavalry. Thus government would sustain no loss, excepting, possibly, the difference of price of a few horses which should go into the ranks, costing £40 instead of 30 guineas, which would be more than counterbalanced by their superior quality, and which expense might be covered by the price to be paid for the other horses.

The plan you propose will certainly not answer; and the consequence will be, either that the officers of the cavalry will be dismounted entirely, or I must allow them to take horses from the ranks.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 6th Feb. 1811, 10 A.M.

I enclose a note which Stuart has sent to me regarding one of your bridges, which it appears, in its present form, prevents the arrival of wood at Lisbon; and the want of wood to bake biscuit is now the reason that the Portuguese troops can get no provisions! It is like the house that Jack built. The want of money, I believe, is the foundation and cause of all the other wants. However, there can be no inconvenience in taking a boat or two out of the centre of the bridge complained of. There is nothing new on this side.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 6th Feb. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 5th inst. Although Capt. Tucker's letter on the subject of the masters of transports was written in general terms, I am not quite certain that he intended to make a general complaint of the masters of transports, and particularly not even to hint that any encouragement of this conduct had been given by authority, or that in any instance the most cordial and ready assistance or redress had been refused by the officers of the navy.

Although you are so kind as to permit the inferior officers and departments of the army to communicate directly with you, in order to save the time which would elapse by their sending their applications here in the first instance, it would expose you to the inconvenience of too much detail, if every trifling application upon every subject not requiring immediate decision and action should be taken directly to you; and I am convinced that Capt. Tucker adopted the channel in which he made his complaint of the masters of transports, supposing that he intended to make it generally, only because he thought it most regular and most respectful to you.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 6th Feb. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 5th. Do you wish that I should write to England respecting the prisoners?

I send to Marshal Beresford the representation regarding the bridge over the stream on the left of the Tagus. It is one of his bridges that is alluded to.

In respect to Brussini, I have no doubt whatever that he was guilty of buying barley from quarter master Connor, knowing it to be purloined. However, if it is wished to pardon him, I have no desire that he should be tried, notwithstanding that he and his wife, and all his servants, were perjured before the Court Martial. The government act very foolishly in this transaction, if they have encouraged the application. The exemplary punishment of one receiver of stolen goods is better than the punishment of a hundred thieves.

Notwithstanding the recent large importations of corn at Lisbon, it is very desirable that we should attend to this subject, and look forward to

G. O.

Cartaxo, 6th Feb. 1811.

1. Major Gen. Sir William Erskine is to command the 5th division of infantry till further orders.

2. Major Gen. Howard is to command the brigade of infantry in the 1st division, hitherto under the command of Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, till further orders.

3. Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine will be so kind as to continue to conduct the duties of the outpost on the left of the army till further orders.

the constant and regular supply from abroad of this article, by importations into the Tagus, as, if we do not attend to it, nobody else will; and whatever may become of the enemy, it is very clear, not only that Lisbon can draw no supply from this part of the country this year, but that this part will require a supply from Lisbon. I shall be very much obliged to you, therefore, if you will ascertain what is the usual consumption of the town; what supply of corn there is now in the river; and what the expectations are for the future, founded upon orders actually given, or money actually sent, or upon more loose and general grounds.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 6th Feb. 1811.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will draw the attention of the government to the communication which I know is carried on between Lisbon and the enemy's head quarters at Torres Novas. The person who manages this concern for them is Gen. Pamplona, and he corresponds with persons at Lisbon; and the *Fidalgos*, in the French party now at Torres Novas, likewise correspond with their friends and families. This correspondence has been carried on principally through the means of persons who go into the enemy's lines with coffee, sugar, &c., to sell, which goods they dispose of at large prices; and they generally carry a letter either to or fro. Then there are others employed purposely to carry on the correspondence, who are inhabitants of Torres Novas; but these have been so badly paid, and so ill treated, that they do not do the business with great alacrity, or with much regularity, and they seldom return the second time.

I have endeavored to put a stop to these operations, as well by means of the outposts of this army, as by giving the people in the villages on the several roads rewards for stopping all strangers passing through their villages, and all persons carrying on the trade which I have above described, whose goods are taken from them, and disposed of for the benefit of the discoverer. But much assistance may be given to our endeavors by the police of Lisbon: 1st; by their attending particularly to the persons related to, or connected in friendship with, Pamplona, or any of the Portuguese *Fidalgos* now at Torres Novas, and observing and obtaining an accurate description of the persons who go to them from the country; and, 2dly; by observing particularly any persons at Lisbon from Torres Novas and Thomar, which are the only towns in which the inhabitants have stayed, and from whom the enemy could get this description of assistance.

It is astonishing how accurately informed we find the enemy of every thing. The Marques de la Romana's death, the King's illness, and the prospect of the Regency, and the probable change of the ministry, were well known to them; and these events were considered likely to be productive of great benefit to the French cause. They say they get the newspapers; but I rather doubted that, till I found out the traffic in sugar and coffee, &c. If they can get these articles, they can get not only newspapers, but any thing else they please. It becomes more desirable every day to put a stop to this system of intelligence; and I request you to draw the attention of the government to the subject.

To Lieut. Gen. Calvert, Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

Cartaxo, 6th Feb. 1811.

I believe that you have attended a good deal to the establishment of the Chaplains to the army, upon which I am now about to trouble you.

Notwithstanding all that has been done upon the subject, with a view to making these situations such as to induce respectable persons to accept of them, I fear that they are not yet sufficiently advantageous to insure the object. I believe the income, while they are employed abroad, to be sufficiently good, but that of retired Chaplains, after service, is not; and the period of service required of them is too long. You will observe that a man can scarcely be eligible to be an army Chaplain till he is 26 or 28, after an expensive education; and it can scarcely be said that the pay of a retired Chaplain, at 36 years of age, is what a respectable person would have acquired if he had followed any other line of the clerical profession besides the army. In my opinion, the period of service ought to be reduced from 10 to 6 years; but they ought to be years of service, without leave of absence, excepting on account of health; and the pay of the retired Chaplain ought to be augmented.

My reason for making these suggestions is, that really we do not get respectable men for the service. I have one excellent young man in this army, Mr. Briscall,\* who is attached to head quarters, who has never been one moment absent from his duty; but I have not yet seen another who has not applied, and made a pitiable case, for leave of absence immediately after his arrival; and, excepting Mr. Denis at Lisbon, who was absent all last year, I believe Mr. Briscall is the only Chaplain doing duty.

I am very anxious upon this subject, not only from the desire which every man must have, that so many persons as there are in this army should have the advantage of religious instruction, but from a knowledge that it is the greatest support and aid to military discipline and order.

It has besides come to my knowledge that Methodism is spreading very fast in the army. There are two, if not three, Methodist meetings in this town, of which one is in the Guards. The men meet in the evening, and sing psalms; and I believe a serjeant (Stephens) now and then gives them a sermon. Mr. Briscall has his eye upon these transactions, and would give me notice were they growing into any thing which ought to be put a stop to; and the respectability of his character and conduct has given him an influence over these people which will prevent them from going wrong.

These meetings likewise prevail in other parts of the army. In the 9th regt. there is one, at which 2 officers attend, Lieut. — and Dr. —; and the Commanding officer of the regiment has not yet been able to prevail upon them to discontinue this practice. Here, and in similar circumstances, we want the assistance of a respectable clergyman. By his personal influence and advice, and by that of true religion, he would moderate the zeal and enthusiasm of these gentlemen, and would prevent their meetings from being mischievous, if he did not prevail upon them to discontinue them entirely.

\* Mr. Briscall remained with the army till the end of the war. He was also with the army in the Low Countries and France from 1815 to 1818, and was afterwards curate at Strathfieldsaye.

This is the only mode in which, in my opinion, we can touch these meetings. The meeting of soldiers in their cantonments to sing psalms, or hear a sermon read by one of their comrades, is, in the abstract, perfectly innocent; and it is a better way of spending their time than many others to which they are addicted; but it may become otherwise: and yet, till the abuse has made some progress, the Commanding officer would have no knowledge of it, nor could he interfere. Even at last his interference must be guided by discretion, otherwise he will do more harm than good; and it can in no case be so effectual as that of a respectable clergyman.

I wish, therefore, you would turn your mind a little more to this subject, and arrange some plan by which the number of respectable and efficient clergymen with the army may be increased.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B., 1st division.*

6th Feb. 1811.

I am directed to communicate to you, in answer to the honor of your letter, 5th inst., and enclosures, that my Lord Wellington is concerned in not being able to give leave of absence to Capt. —, of the — Guards; the most that could be done, under the present circumstances of the army, would be to refer that desire to the Commander in Chief. His Lordship requests you will take the trouble, on this occasion, to explain to Capt. —, that Col. Stopford, as commanding the brigade of Guards, had a perfect right to refuse to forward his application for leave of absence; and that, if there was no other reason for declining to grant it, the fact of Col. Stopford having refused his concurrence would have sufficiently decided his Excellency to withhold that indulgence.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 7th Feb. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 5th, 10 A.M., and 6th, 2 P.M. I think it would be desirable, when the weather becomes fair, to put one of your brigades of cavalry out of sight, either to the right or to the rear. This arrangement will give us the command of its movements if occasion should render it expedient, without giving the enemy a knowledge of what we are about, or a suspicion of the cause.

I have taken means to prevent the enemy from getting intelligence, which I hope will be effectual. They have certainly a knowledge of events, but I doubt their knowing as much as we suppose, even of that description; for instance, I do not believe they know that the Spanish troops have marched.

The passage at Abrantes must not be stopped, of course; but nobody should be allowed to pass the river who is not going to the town; and the communication between the town and country should be rendered very difficult.

I shall speak to Murray about his officers of guides. I send a letter from Blunt.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 8th Feb. 1811.

I have received your letter enclosing one from Col. Head, of the 13th light dragoons, desiring to have my opinion upon a letter he has received from the agents of the 13th light dragoons, notifying to him that Gen. Craig had deputed Major Gen. Bolton to act for him in all respects as if he were the Colonel of the regiment; and another letter from the Adj.

Gen. to Gen. Craig, announcing to him that the Commander in Chief would not object to his 'deputing the superintendence and management of the 13th light dragoons to Major Gen. Bolton.'

It is difficult for me to give my opinion upon these papers, which appear not exactly to correspond with each other. I imagine that that which the Commander in Chief has permitted should be deputed to Major Gen. Bolton is the management of the clothing and saddling concerns of the regiment, although the letter from Messrs. Collyear's would show that the deputation went to all the duties of the Colonel. However, all that Col. Head is called upon to do is to send a monthly return to Major Gen. Bolton, and to correspond with him upon any articles which he may require from the depôt of the regiment, which he might have been directed to do without reference to the more general deputation; and he must obey these orders, and refer to the Adj. Gen. for an explanation of the Commander in Chief's intentions in the letter from the Adj. Gen. of the 26th Dec.

Excepting upon the money and clothing concerns of the regiment, I believe it is not the regular practice that orders should be sent to a regiment either from the Horse Guards or the Colonel through the agent.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 8th Feb. 1811.

I think that the disposition which you propose for the brigade of cavalry will answer very well.

Money is again the great want, in respect to means of transport for the government. The 6 boats you refer to are part of the Admiral's concern, and were taken to make a bridge for us over the Zezere. As it does not appear very probable that we shall want boats for this purpose just at present, I write to the Admiral to beg that they may be all destroyed; but the Portuguese government will not get one of them without money.

I wish that Grant had sent us the examination of some of his prisoners, what regiments, and what battalions they belonged to, &c. This information would have been of use. All the battalions of the 70th (5) are with the army; but it appears from the papers that Lieut. Col. Besson was an invalid; and I conclude the whole party are convalescents.

Claparède appears at last to have taken up his position at Guarda, and I should not think it unlikely that they propose to ransack the Estrella pretty well.

I wrote some days ago to Mr. Stuart upon the subject of the intelligence which the enemy get from Lisbon, to desire him to try whether the police of Lisbon could not do something to put a stop to or discover the channels of communication. It is certainly carried on under the superintendence of Pamplona; but there are inferior agents in it, whose names are as follows. There is a Portuguese Captain in the French service, who frequents Pedrogão with a patrol occasionally; and he communicates with Senhor Manoel Caetano, an attorney, or lawyer, who resides in that place. This person corresponds with Lisbon, through Caldas, and he has a father, Joaquim Cartano, at Colombeira, near Caldas; this last I have taken measures to have seized. There is, besides, a Doctor Pindente at Torres Novas, in whose house Pamplona is said to

live, who conducts the correspondence. I should think it would be possible either to communicate with Manoel Caetano and Pindente, and to make them spies for us, or at all events Grant might make some of his Ordenanza go into Pedrogão, when the French are not there, and seize Caetano and his papers. I wish you would turn this subject over in your mind.

P.S. Murray does not wish to press Andrade upon you, although he says that he is a very clever fellow, who would be of use to you. He has left the guides. In respect to the promotion of the officers of the guides, I am afraid we shall lose them if they have no chance of promotion. However, you must stick to your rule, if you think that their service in the guides does not form a special case, and is not likely to render them fit for service hereafter in the Portuguese army.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 8th Feb. 1811.

I am concerned to inform you that the Portuguese troops on this side of the Tagus are again in want of provisions, and are coming upon the British magazines for supplies; which information I request you to lay before the Portuguese government.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 8th Feb. 1811.

I enclose an extract of a letter, and its enclosures, which I have received from Major Gen. Slade, regarding an inhabitant shot, apparently by accident, by a soldier of the 16th light dragoons, which I beg you to lay before the government, with my request that they will let me know whether they wish that the man should be given up, to be brought to trial before the civil tribunal of the country.

I also request to have their decision regarding ———, referred to in my letters to you of the 22d and 23d Dec. last.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 8th Feb. 1811.

In reference to my letter to you of the 6th, regarding the enemy's communication with Lisbon, I have since discovered that it is carried on with a man by the name of Pindente, who resides at Torres Novas, in whose house it is said that Pamplona is quartered. There are also two brothers by the name of Manoel and Joaquim Caetano concerned, one residing at Pedrogão, the other at Colombeira, near Caldas. He has been seized once, and the foolish officer let him go; but I have directed that he may be seized again. It is stated to me that correspondence goes through Caldas, thence over the Sierra either to Torres Novas or Pedrogão.

To Don Juan de Castillo, Minister of Spain at Lisbon.

Cartaxo, 9th Feb. 1811.

I have had the satisfaction of receiving your letter of the 8th inst.; and the horse of the late Marques de la Romana has been presented to me, which you have done me the honor to send me. I received this mark of your attention with sentiments which correspond with my regard and respect for the memory of his late master, whose irreparable loss to his country and the cause in which we are engaged every day's experience gives us fresh cause to lament.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 9th Feb. 1811.

It has been stated to me that some boats have got up the Tagus to Santarem, to which I acknowledge that I don't give credit; but as I have adopted measures to put a stop to the traffic in sugar, coffee, &c., and to the communication which was carried on by land, I think it not unlikely that a communication may be attempted by water.

It is very difficult to prevent this communication by means of our posts, particularly on this side of the river; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will station a gun boat as high up as Mugem, on the other side, in order to prevent vessels getting up beyond the point at which the supplies for Chamusca are received.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Cartaxo, 9th Feb. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 18th Jan., regarding our reinforcements, and the Generals who are to come with the troops.

In respect to Gen. Murray, I think him a very able officer; and there is no man whose assistance I should have been more desirous of retaining than his, or of having upon any service, excepting in this country. You are aware that he is senior to Marshal Beresford, and that he left us on a question arising out of that seniority. The Commander in Chief's decisions upon that subject have settled all questions that can arise; and I take care, and probably may be able to continue, to provide against their arising; and I have hitherto gone on perfectly well, without having to decide one question of rank between the two services.

I attribute this good fortune as well to the temper of the army as to my own management; but if a General officer, of the station and talents of Gen. Murray, comes here, who appeared, when he was here before, disposed not to avoid these questions, but to bring them into discussion and decision unnecessarily, the difficulties of managing this intricate machine will be vastly increased; and I don't know whether the service and I shall not suffer more from this disposition than I should gain by the undoubted talents and zeal of Gen. Murray. I would therefore prefer to pass *sub silentio* his desire to be employed here. Gen. — is also a very able officer, whose assistance would be very useful; but why is a man to volunteer his services in a situation in which he does not approve of what is going on? at the same time that he cannot, or will not, avoid acting with the army, as if it were necessary that he should produce an alteration of plan by his conduct and conversations, &c. &c. I have men enough of this description here already.

I have ordered the riband to be worn by the General officers according to your letter of the 18th.

P.S. I wish to God the reinforcements were arrived. If I had had them here a week ago, I could have struck an important blow; and I hope it is not yet too late.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 9th Feb. 1811, 10 A.M.

I received last night your letter of yesterday.

My letters from Silveira go to the 30th only, when he says that Clapartede's division had all gone to Pinhel. The next accounts from Grant



will show really what troops there are upon Guarda, and whether these are there in consequence of the orders of the 5th Jan. from Drouet, or are so far on their road on any other plan.

How will Silveira stand without the 24th regt.? Would it not be possible to assemble either one battalion, or the half of each battalion, at Lamego or Oporto, as in a depôt, and get them set to rights, and then to bring them the clothing, &c., for those which will remain with Silveira, forward to his corps, when the whole would join with their equipments? I suggest this, because I fear that Silveira will become too weak for any thing without this regiment, and that the militia would be disheartened by their absence. It will be very desirable in some mode or other to get the regiment into strength and condition by the opening of the fine weather; and probably the months of March and April would be as good a time for the whole to be in the rear as any other, if you think that necessary.

In respect to the militia of Tavira, I don't see any thing upon the frontier which should induce you to keep it in Algarve. It may be necessary to retain it in that province to quiet the apprehensions of the inhabitants; but the French will never attempt to cross the Guadiana lower down than Mertola; and if they do, it will only be a plundering excursion, or to pass through it; and this regiment could not prevent either, or make its retreat towards us. On the other hand, we shall certainly want every man we can get together. In this view of the subject it has occurred to me that we might get 2000 militia from the Western Islands, upon an engagement to send them back. Do you think we could get them? The greater number of this description of men we have, the greater number of the better description we should have to dispose of.

I enclose a letter upon the affairs in Asturias, which I beg you to return; likewise from our friend at Salamanca. You see that we are right about the reinforcements which came in with Drouet; and depend upon it that the French have no other troops on the frontier excepting Clapartède's division, and a few convalescents and Swiss.

I don't like the way they are settling their affairs at Badajoz. I desired them to clear the right of the Guadiana, and to break the bridges of Merida and of the Gevora, before they attempted to cross to the left. With their usual ignorance and presumption they have thrown their troops into Badajoz, without taking the previous steps to secure their retreat upon Elvas, if they should fail in beating off Mortier. If the French have force upon the left bank to drive in the cavalry, the whole will be shut up in Badajoz; and then Badajoz and the army of the left will be settled by the same blow.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 9th Feb. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of articles of camp equipage required for the use of this army; and I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will give such directions as may ensure the arrival in Portugal of these articles at an early period.

To Major Gen. Hoghton.

Cartaxo, 9th Feb. 1811.

I have received and perused the proceedings of the General Court

Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of — —, private soldier of the — light dragoons, which I return; and I request the General Court Martial to revise their sentence on this soldier, as I do not find that the Mutiny Act, to which I refer them, gives them the power of passing a sentence of transportation, as a felon, for life, upon any soldier, for any crime excepting desertion.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 9th Feb. 1811.

The enemy have continued in the neighbourhood of Badajoz, and have broke ground before the place on the left of the Guadiana, and have thrown some shells into the town. The bad weather, however, has obliged them to draw in the greatest part of their cavalry from the ground between Badajoz and Elvas; and the communication has been re-established.

Gen. Mendizabal sent orders to Gen. Virues to advance, which measure I had before recommended to him; and Gen. Mendizabal himself met the troops at Elvas on the morning of the 6th inst.; they marched on and passed the Caya, and the infantry entered Badajoz, and the fort of San Christoval, on the right of the Guadiana, on the afternoon of the 6th. The French cavalry retired and passed the Gevora, and were pursued some distance by the Spanish cavalry, and the brigade of Portuguese cavalry, under Brig. Gen. Madden, who took some cattle, baggage, &c. But the attack, if any was intended to be made upon the French troops on the left of the Guadiana, was deferred till the following day.

Gen. Mendizabal has not adhered to the plan which was ordered by the late Marques de la Romana, which provided for the security of the communication with Elvas before the troops should be thrown to the left of the Guadiana. I do not believe that the strength of the enemy on either side of the Guadiana is accurately known; but if they should be in strength on the right of that river, it is to be apprehended that the whole of the troops will be shut up in Badajoz; and I have reason to believe that this place is entirely unprovided with provisions, notwithstanding that the siege of it has been expected for the last year.

I have received from Gen. Ballesteros a letter, dated the 27th Jan., from which it appears that his action of the 25th was very well contested; that the loss of the enemy, who were much superior in numbers, was 2000 men killed and wounded; and that the retreat of the Spanish detachment was made in good order.

By the last accounts from the frontiers of Beira it appears that a part of Claparède's division of the 9th corps was still upon Guarda on the 4th inst., with an advanced guard upon Belmonte. This was the position he was ordered to take on the 5th Jan. by Gen. Drouet, referred to in my dispatch of the 12th ult.

Gen. Foy arrived at Salamanca from Paris, with letters for Massena, on the 13th Jan., and I imagine that he yesterday reached the head quarters of the army. He had with him an escort of between 2000 and 3000 men.

Col. Grant, who commands the Ordenanza in Lower Beira, had followed to the neighbourhood of Sabugal the detachment which escorted the courier that marched from the Zezere on the 22d Jan., and had taken

much baggage from them and several prisoners. On his return he attacked Gen. Foy's escort, with a fresh detachment of Ordenanza, at Enxabarda, at the entrance of the Estrada Nova; and I enclose his report of the 2d inst. on this affair, and an extract of his report of the 4th inst. to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford,\* and the Marshal's letter to me. I hear from the enemy's head quarters that they state they lost 500 men in this affair.

There has been no movement of any importance in the enemy's army since I addressed your Lordship on the 2d inst.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 10th Feb. 1811, 11 A.M.

I have received your letter of the 8th. I have not heard one word from the Marquez de Tancos about his brother. The arrangement which he has directed was certainly not that agreed upon.

I had intended to put the 88th into Mackinnon's brigade, with the 1st batt.; but the boys must of course be kept in the rear. I see that Taylor is apprehensive of getting into the G. O.

I am anxious to hear of the boat mentioned in your letter, No. 1, of yesterday.

In respect to Col. —'s leave, I must mention to you that I have been obliged, in consequence of the numerous applications lately, to determine that I would give leave to no more, and that all must apply to the Commander in Chief: and I have written to the Commander in Chief, that if he gives leave to any officer, he must send one out to do his duty in his absence: of course this does not apply to leave of absence for health; this must be granted, but on the usual certificate.

\* Lieut. Col. Grant to Col. D'Urban, Q.M.G.

Enxabarda, entrance of the Estrada Nova, 2d Feb. 1811.

Be pleased to state to his Excellency the Commander in Chief that yesterday, the 1st, a column of the enemy under the command of Gen. Foy, consisting of 3000 cavalry and infantry from Ciudad Rodrigo, passed for the Estrada Nova to join Marshal Massena. They slept on the 31st at Alcaria, near Fundão. On the 1st, with 80 of the Ordenanza, I took possession of a height near this village, by which they must pass. A well directed fire was kept up for 2 hours, and only terminated by the night. The result was 18 killed on the road, a very considerable number wounded, and 10 prisoners. Several of the wounded were found dead this morning from the extreme inclemency of the weather. Several cars with grain, and a considerable number of bullocks, were also taken; and having sent parties to annoy their front and rear, I have reason to think they must suffer considerably ere they quit the Estrada Nova. We lost only 1 man, with a few horses wounded; amongst them my own.

Lieut. Col. Grant to Col. D'Urban, Q.M.G.

Fundão, 4th Feb. 1811.

Have the goodness to state to his Excellency the Marshal that the result of the affair of the 1st inst. near Enxabarda has been more complete than I at first stated, 207 of the enemy having been found dead in the space of 4 leagues, a number of whom died in consequence of their wounds and the inclemency of the weather. 18 prisoners are also in my power, and 4 Englishmen who had entered the French service in the Irish legion to effect their escape, having been 5 years prisoners: one of them is of the 30th regt., the others had been sailors. I have also to state that the colonel of the 70th regt. (French), and also the quarter-master, were found among the dead. The enemy lost the greatest part of their baggage and cattle. I transmit some of their papers and letters.

The Spaniards have done exactly what I recommended them not to do, and have omitted that which I recommended them to do, and that has happened to them which I foretold. If the French have 2000 or 3000 infantry on the right of the Guadiana to support the cavalry, the army of the left and Badajoz will both be lost.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 10th Feb. 1811.

I enclose 2 letters which I have received from Mr. Kennedy, in which he requests that 6 transports may be sent to Oporto, 10 to Vigo, and 8 to Coruña, every week, to bring cattle for the use of the army; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will make arrangements and give directions accordingly.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 10th Feb. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose to you the copies of letters which I have received from Gens. Mendizabal and Virues since I wrote to you last, and the copy of a letter which I have written to Gen. Virues. I likewise enclose reports of the 6th and 7th inst., which I have received from Elvas, of what is going on at Badajoz.

I beg of you to compare the actions of the Spanish army and their consequences with the memorandum\* which I gave to the Marques de la Romana, of which I transmitted a copy in my letter of the 23d Jan., and with my repeated recommendations to Gen. Mendizabal and Gen. Virues since.

I don't believe that it is known what force of the enemy is on the right of the Guadiana; and it is impossible to form a judgment whether the troops can or cannot get back to Elvas. The communication between the two places was obviously cut off on the evening of the 7th, the whole Spanish army and a brigade of Portuguese cavalry being in Badajoz, from which place it was also obvious that they could not drive the enemy on the left side of the river, although the enemy had only 7000 or 8000 men before it, and they had not less than 16,000 men within the place.

After the perusal of these papers, you will perhaps think it unnecessary that I should give any reasons for not detaching cavalry to the assistance of Gen. Mendizabal. I almost doubt whether I shall be justifiable in having left Gen. Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry at his disposal, in the eye of all those who will judge of my conduct; but knowing the manner in which Gen. Mendizabal was likely to use any cavalry which I might send him, from the accounts which I had received of his former operations, particularly with that arm, and with the experience which I have of the operations of the Spanish officers, and the suspicions which it is obvious that I have entertained of what would be their conduct in this operation, from the memorandum above referred to, and the repeated warnings in my several letters to Gen. Mendizabal and Gen. Virues, I should have been quite unjustifiable if I had put more of the troops intrusted to my charge at their disposal.

I likewise enclose a letter from Gen. Ballesteros, and its enclosure, which I received yesterday. The Spanish minister at Lisbon has a store

\* See this memorandum, p. 536.

there of articles of different descriptions for the equipment of the troops, and I have drawn his attention to the wants of Gen. Ballesteros.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 10th Feb. 1811.

I enclose a copy of my dispatch of yesterday.

I am very much afraid that my next dispatch will bring you accounts of the surrender of Badajoz and of the army of the left! The presumption, the ignorance, and the misconduct of these people are really too bad. They have not done any thing they were ordered to do, and have done exactly that against which they were warned.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 11th Feb. 1811, 7 A.M.

I received last night your letter of the 9th, No. 3, and another of the 9th and 10th.

It is a matter of indifference to me whether Lieut. — has a copy of my letter or not.\* If it is likely to lead to further litigation, it would be better not to send it to him, and to give that as a reason for receiving no more letters from him.

In respect to the 24th regt., and affairs in general, I think we ought to put them in such a train as to have our force there complete by the opening of the fair season. That should be our object. As far as is consistent with this object, we ought to keep up not only the appearance but the real existence of a force in that quarter throughout the next 2 months. If, therefore, the 24th cannot be set to rights without going bodily to the rear, it should go to the rear: if it can, we should keep a part with

\* See p. 577.

G. O.

Cartaxo, 11th Feb. 1811.

2. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be under the necessity of pardoning this soldier, notwithstanding the enormity of the crime he has committed; for it appears that owing to the irregularity of the mode in which the interior duty of the Buffs was conducted at that period, not only was this soldier brought to trial for this crime before a Regimental Court Martial, as a matter of course, but owing to similar irregularity and want of attention, he was released from confinement, and actually engaged with the enemy.

Evidence of these facts appearing upon the minutes, it is quite impossible for the Commander of the Forces to order the execution of the sentence of the General Court Martial; but nothing but these circumstances should have induced the Commander of the Forces to pardon the prisoner, who is to be released and return to his duty.

The Commander of the Forces has directed that an extract of the minutes of the General Court Martial may be sent to the General officer commanding the 2d division of infantry, in which he will see an account of the irregularities which have prevailed in the Buffs, both in the mode of guarding prisoners, and of bringing them to trial before a Regimental Court Martial.

It appears that for a considerable period while Major — commanded the regiment, prisoners were not left in charge of a guard, but were sent to the companies on a march, or when the regiment should fall in for any service, and that when a Regimental Court Martial was assembled, for the trial of prisoners, they were brought before it, not in consequence of any order from the Commanding officer, founded upon the consideration of each individual case, but apparently as a matter of course, and without any authority whatever. Where such irregularities and want of attention prevail, acts of disorder, and even mutiny, must be expected, and they cannot be punished if the soldiers should have been released from confinement, and particularly not if they should have been on duty and engaged with the enemy.

3. The Commander of the Forces desires that the proceedings and sentence of the General Court Martial on —, and this order, may be read to the — regiment or Buffs on every occasion on which the Articles of War may be read while the army may remain in this country.

Silveira, as I much fear that the militia will be off as soon as they find the 24th are going.

You have had the offers of my Captains for the rank of Major, and you may take any that you please.

All the reports look as if something was intended immediately. It would be very desirable to endeavor to find out if Foy brought with him any stores or ammunition, or any thing to eat or drink. One of our patrols carried off a piquet in a fine style, without the loss of a man, the night before last, near Alcanhede. The officer says they are in the greatest distress. He knew of Foy's arrival, but nothing more.

P.S. We heard firing here yesterday, and I am inclined to believe that the reinforcements are arrived at Lisbon.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 12th Feb. 1811.

I received yesterday evening your official letter of the 10th, regarding promotions, and two letters of the 11th.

I have written frequently to the Portuguese government lately about provisions for the troops on this side of the Tagus, and I shall write again this day. The cause of the state of deficiency is the old want of money to pay for carriage. There is plenty at Lisbon, nay, the Commissary Gen. lately offered them a large quantity of wheat, which they refuse to accept; and I have now ordered it to be sold in the market.

In respect to the promotion of officers, my own opinion is that you should avoid, if possible, to promote English officers. Promote such of the Portuguese as you may think proper, and if you should find that his promotion will put such officer over the head of an English officer now his superior, that English officer ought to be promoted likewise. But, without referring to the jealousies and discussions about rank which will be introduced into the army by these promotions, they will be otherwise extremely inconvenient.

The situation of *Baron Eben* in the 6th division is now very inconvenient. I cannot trust him with the command of the division, and in the existing dearth of General officers of any experience or firmness, I cannot take from the division for other employments almost the only General officer who does possess these qualities. In the same way Col. Otway is a very clever, good officer, but there can be no reason why he should be promoted, excepting in his turn, more particularly as he is thinking of going to England.

Recollect that I cannot make an English Brigadier, and with every respect for these officers, I don't know that I should like to trust them, as a matter of course, with the command of large bodies of troops which must devolve upon them. I have no objection to abide by all the consequences of their promotion when it comes to their turn, not that I would recommend you to introduce into the Portuguese service promotion by rotation. But, for instance, if you wish to promote Champelmond, I think that all the British officers above Champelmond as Colonels ought to be Brigadiers also above him; but that the question of their promotion ought in every case to depend upon the necessity of promoting the Portuguese officers below them, excepting in a case of a very extraordinary nature which has not yet occurred.

I don't recollect the arms delivered to the Junta of Seville from the Portuguese stores; but, if you will send me the receipt, you shall have some of the arms I have in store for the Spaniards.

Send Lieut. — and Lieut. — to their regiments. Signify to them that H.R.H. the Prince Regent has no further occasion for their services, and apprise me officially that you have done so, and I shall order them to join their regiments.

I have great hopes that Badajoz will hold out. They have asked me for assistance, which, under existing circumstances, I cannot give to them; but if they do what I have advised them, it is quite impossible that the place should be taken or distressed for subsistence, even though Mortier's corps should have double the force he has.

It is impossible to say what the French are about. It is obvious, however, that as long as they have their troops extended in Lower Beira, and do not bring up Claparède, they do not mean to make any offensive movement.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 12th Feb. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th inst., and I entirely concur in all the reasoning which it contains. I have arranged with the Commissary Gen., 1st; that no cattle shall be purchased further north than Vigo: 2dly; that it shall be understood that the whole number of vessels that you can with convenience send for cattle shall go to Vigo: unless, 3dly; upon their passing Oporto, it shall be found convenient for them to go in there, in which case cattle will always be in readiness there to put on board them. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire your secretary to give notice to the A.Q.M.G. at Lisbon, whenever any vessels shall go upon this service.

The Commissary Gen. has frequently issued pork to the troops, and he proposes to continue and increase the issue of that description of meat as long as it will be practicable to procure it.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 12th Feb. 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Marshal Beresford, regarding the miserable wants of the troops, to which I beg you, in this manner, to draw the attention of the government. I omit to bring it before them in an official form, because I am unwilling to have such an account of the state of things (however true) go home to England.

According to the last returns, the Portuguese regular army have not less than 9000 sick, upon a gross army of 43,000 or 44,000 men, being above one fifth of the whole; while the British have but little more than a tenth of their gross numbers not doing duty, notwithstanding that so many of the regiments have been in Walcheren, and have not yet recovered from the effects of the disorder contracted there. Of those not doing duty above half are not sick. This difference can be owing to one cause only, the want of food for the troops, and the want of funds to pay the expenses of taking care in the hospital of those who fall sick. If the government will only look at this question coolly and deliberately, they will see the enormous loss they are suffering, and the enormous expense

they are incurring, by the expense of the pay of these useless soldiers. It is obvious, however, that, if this system continues much longer, the whole army will be sick, or must disband; and I hope that some efficient measures will be adopted to apply some remedy to it.

I have now before me the complaint of a Commanding officer of a brigade near Torres Vedras, whose men, for 4 days, had received only half an allowance of bread and no meat. Surely means of transport are not required to carry meat to them. Let me have the enclosed letter again.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 13th Feb. 1811, Noon.

I have received your letter of the 11th, and 5 of the 12th. I shall inquire of the Commissary Gen. respecting Col. Ashworth's complaint. I have perused Gen. Madden's letter, which I shall keep. If he finds it difficult to exercise a discretionary power given to him, to withdraw to Elvas in case he should not be supplied with provisions, when the circumstance has occurred on which he is to exercise his discretion, how much more difficult must it be for me to give him any orders, at this distance, which can be of any service to him, consistently with the notion of making use of his brigade at all!

The truth is, that Gen. Madden, very naturally, does not like the service, and he makes the worst, instead of the best, of every thing. He talks of his marches, when the total amount of them, to my knowledge, in the last month, that is, from the 9th Jan., does not amount to more than every regiment of cavalry in this army marches every 3 days for their forage; a circumstance which is certainly much complained of by the cavalry officers; but they do it, notwithstanding. Then his want of forage ought not exactly to be attributed to Gen. Mendizabal. If Gen. Madden were to go out upon a service from Elvas with you or with me, I suppose he would carry with him, as other people do, 2 or 3 days' corn, and probably one day's or at least half a day's straw; and, being only 3 leagues from Elvas, if the desire to see the service out existed, it would not be impossible to get out provisions for the men and some fodder for the horses.

We must keep open the communication with Badajoz, or make up our minds to lose the place. We can keep open the communication with Badajoz only by having the troops, the cavalry in particular, supported by the infantry at no great distance from the Gevora, at those periods of the season when that river will be fordable; and the whole might be withdrawn when the rains will fall and the Gevora will rise. This is what I have proposed to Mendizabal,\* and to break the bridge of the Gevora, instead of filling it with rubbish; and to make an intrenched camp for the troops, to be occupied as the season will come about, on the high grounds between the Gevora, the Caya, and the Guadiana. This arrangement would at least give us time till the troops should arrive from England. But if, on the one hand, Mendizabal will not do what is recommended to him, and, on the other, the troops cannot stay out in the fair weather as well as the French troops, and cannot get their food at three leagues' distance, and men in the situation of Gen. Madden make

\* See Addenda, p. 803.



difficulties instead of aiding the service, we can neither save this place nor any thing else.

I admit that his situation is a most unpleasant one; but some of the complaints in his last letter are entirely without foundation, and others are to be attributed to himself. I also admit, that not only his situation is most unpleasant, but that it cannot be very agreeable to be out much in this season; but if the service requires it we must all go out; and in this case the service certainly does require that he should be out, at least during the fair weather.

They ought to line the parapet of the bridge with sand bags; and in my opinion they ought to make an emplacement for their field pieces on the right of the Guadiana, on the left and rear of this French battery and communication with it. They ought likewise to intrench the strip of ground between the place and the river, otherwise the French will make a rush along the rivers and destroy the bridge. If you should write to Madden, desire him to hint these objects to Mendizabal. The object of the French in this siege is obvious; it is to cut off the communication of the place with the right of the Guadiana; and it is equally ours to keep it open, in which if we succeed, the place cannot fall.

Do as you think best with the 24th regt. It would be better to fix it at Oporto than at Braganza; but I should think that Lamego would be better than either.

The officers at the head of the several divisions of militia appear to have got into very good quarters; and they should only not disturb their troops unnecessarily, and set seriously to work to refit them. Would it not be possible to organize and put in activity the Ordenanza along the Mondego and in the Serra d'Estrella?

Upon comparing the intelligence from Santarem with that of Colborne, I am inclined to doubt that the French get much intelligence from our part of the country. The man at Santarem says that Soult and Mortier were to invest Badajoz on the 12th Jan., which they would have done if the Spaniards had not made them a present of 3000 men at Olivença, when they should come and take them; and this intelligence must certainly have been brought by Foy, and must have been the result of a communication from Soult of his designs. Then the officer says they broke ground 3 days ago. In fact, they broke ground more than 6 days before he spoke. The paper from Santarem is a very curious document.

It would be worth while to give Gen. Lumley a caution respecting the plans against his post, mentioned in the intelligence of the 3d. I should think that he might repair that bridge over the Alpiça, so as to make it passable at all times; and it is hardly to be supposed that the overflow of the river can be such as to render the water on the road so deep as that the troops could not march upon it for the relief of the piquets, if the road were staked out. If this cannot be done, he should take care to get plenty of boats upon the Alpiça, when he finds the river rising, so as to be able to support his piquets in time.

I think it is very clear that the French were going, till Foy came. It is not so clear that they will go now. Indeed they cannot go without reinforcing

Mortier. A deserter of the 2d corps reports that 5 regiments of infantry, and all their cavalry, marched the day before yesterday to Torres Novas, on their march to Coimbra and Oporto.

I was yesterday beyond the bridge of Calhariz, but saw no difference, excepting an infantry piquet instead of a vedette, on a height in front of Pero Filho. The intelligence respecting peace is curious. I am convinced that a proposal for peace will be made.

Col. Lobo has made an application to our Commissary at Abrantes for all he has; and indeed there is not much remaining, as he has had it nearly all. But this application shows the result of the effort of government to supply that place; and, under these circumstances, it is desirable that we should consider what we shall do with it. Sooner or later the communication of the army with that place will certainly be cut off; and if it be attacked, notwithstanding the advantages it possesses for defence, there can be no doubt but that it will be taken and the garrison lost. Under these circumstances, and adverting to the supplies, it becomes a question whether we ought not to make our arrangements to abandon the place, and withdraw the garrison at the time we shall be obliged to withdraw from our present position in communication with the place on the left of the Tagus. Turn this subject over in your mind, and let me have your opinion upon it. There is one thing to be done, which is, to provision the place ourselves; but then the probable defence of it comes to be considered, and the loss of the garrison.

I wish you would let me know whether the government have really done any thing to provision that place since my last remonstrance upon that subject.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 14th Feb. 1811, noon.

I received yesterday evening your letter of 10 A.M. I am rather glad that Leite gave Mendizabal the tents, as it will probably induce the Spaniards to stay in their position. In respect to the powder, we have 5000 barrels at Lisbon, and I will give for Elvas whatever is required. I think it is probable that Mendizabal wants it for Badajoz; and if that be the case, I wish Leite to assist him, if he can do so without incurring the risk of leaving himself unprovided with a sufficient quantity. Not only I will replace what he may give, but I will pay the expense of sending it up to Elvas.

I am anxious to hear the result of the enemy's movement upon Montalvão.

I send you the report of 2 deserters, who contradict one another most handsomely. I believe the infantry gentleman. I think it probable that the dismounted dragoons only have marched. Some of the others were certainly yesterday upon the outposts in front of Santarem.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 14th Feb. 1811.

Madame Mascarenhas and her daughter (not the handsome) have been here this morning, to talk to me of the fate of young Mascarenhas; and, although I told them that I could not interfere in any concern of the kind, I cannot resist stating to you my sense of the injustice which the Portuguese government are about to commit.

In the first place, I cannot get over my sense of the right which every subject of Portugal had to take which line he pleased, under the proclamation of the Prince Regent when he withdrew from Portugal. In the next place, I must observe that, under the 18th article of the Convention, the safety of the persons who served the French is guaranteed to them on the very ground above stated, that the Prince had withdrawn himself from the country.

I rather believe that Mr. Canning instructed Mr. Villiers not to interfere in obliging the Portuguese government to execute any article of the Convention; but whether we interfere or not, I cannot but think that the government will be guilty of a gross injustice and murder if they put this young man to death, upon the ground of his having served the French, these circumstances being before them. If they hang him at all, it should be as a spy; and I send you the draft of the answer which was sent by my directions to an application lately made by the French Commander in Chief to have him exchanged, in which answer I have laid the ground of his being hanged. I shall be obliged to you if you will bring this subject again under the consideration of the government in a private form.

I entirely agree with you as to what we ought to do for the Portuguese government; and I enclose you the copy of a letter which I wrote some time ago to Lord Wellesley upon this subject, which you sent home for me, and which I beg of you to return.

I shall speak to the Commissary Gen. to see whether we can give the Portuguese government any boats. As for carts, I believe we have none, or at all events very few. What they want is certainly money.

They have done nothing, I believe, for Abrantes. The fact is, that their inferior agents of the *Junta de Viveres* deceive them. The Governor of Abrantes, having consumed about four fifths of our stores at Abrantes, has at last desired our Commissary there to make over to him the remainder of them in one lump; and the question of Abrantes is becoming so critical, that I am thinking of destroying the works which we have constructed at great expense, and of withdrawing the garrison for want of provisions to feed them. I must either do that, or send provisions to the place at the British expense. Then, in answer to my representations upon this subject, they will give you a volume of papers which will not contain one word of truth. How can all this end? Will it bear one moment's discussion in England?

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 15th Feb. 1811, 10 A.M.

I have received your two letters of yesterday. I don't know what to say to Massena's remaining. The difficulty of remaining without supplies increases daily, as well as the expediency, or indeed almost necessity, that he should remain in order to support Soult's operations. If he should be obliged to go, he ought to detach to Soult a large force, otherwise Soult is gone. At present we can do nothing. Even if your force were sufficient, the roads are in such a state on this side that they cannot be worse.

It is more than a month since the reinforcements were ordered from England in men of war, and it is most extraordinary that they are not yet arrived.

I believe the destruction of Gen. Madden's brigade is to be attributed in some degree to Gen. Leite. Gen. Miller is a great loss under present circumstances.

In respect to Abrantes, I don't think we could expect that it could make a long defence; though if it contained Spanish troops it would, and is admirably calculated for a very protracted defence. I acknowledge that I don't think bomb proof absolutely necessary for any place in this climate after the season of rains. The question is, whether it can be provisioned; and if it can, whether the garrison is employed as beneficially there as elsewhere: 100 carts would go a long way, both in provisioning the garrison and in removing the sick; and I should think that the government might continue to collect that number in Alentejo.

If the post is to be abandoned, I would not abandon it till the moment at which it should be necessary to withdraw the troops from their present position on the left of the Tagus.

The Pardaleras is an outwork, or rather detached redoubt, of not very great importance, excepting on account of the command which the ground has which it occupies. After all, however, that command is not great, as well as I recollect it. I have a perfect recollection of the spot described by Mozinho, as that at which the enemy have fixed their *place d'armes*; and I was of opinion that it was so little defended by fire from any particular part of the fort, or work itself, that the enemy might commence his operations by lodging himself upon it.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 15th Feb. 1811.

I have read Dr. Nogueiras' paper upon the finance, which, as far as it goes, is a very good one. I have no doubt that much may be done by exertion. In the customs, particularly, I know that frauds are committed to an immense amount. The misfortune is, that there is no exertion in these people. You will scarcely believe that, although Quintella might gain such immense sums of money by selling tobacco and soap to the troops, under his monopoly, in which I have promised to support him, he has not yet taken the trouble of sending his people to the different divisions of the army to conduct his business; and the troops are paying double the price for contraband articles.

I have spoken to Mr. Kennedy about the means of transport for the Portuguese Commissariat. Instead of 289, he has 140 boats; and he will direct that 49 should be made over to the Portuguese Commissariat. Be it recollected that he does not only supply the whole British army, which alone is nearly twice as strong as the Portuguese army in this part of the country, particularly in cavalry, but likewise all the Portuguese militia and Ordenanza in the lines, which ought to be supplied by the Portuguese government, and for supplying which I shall be hanged! He says he does not believe he has 30 bullock carts in the service, of which number 24 are employed by the engineers in the lines.

Dom M. Forjaz cannot pronounce a more severe condemnation of the system on which the government act than in the declaration that they cannot get the 130 carts which they require. Are there no laws? Cannot a man be punished for refusing to supply his cart and oxen for the public

service, upon receiving the order of the magistrate to supply them? Are the government to execute the laws? or are the laws made only to restrain the government, and for the subjects to laugh at? The system of seeking popularity, to indulge the indolence of the people of Lisbon, will occasion the loss of the country.

I enclose an extract of a letter from Marshal Beresford, which shows how the fact really stands in respect to the provisioning of Abrantes. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will endeavor to procure for me, without loss of time, an answer whether they will, or not, supply that place with provisions, for four months, and take measures to keep up that stock, in order that I may determine what I shall do with the garrison. We are coming to that crisis in the affairs of the Portuguese government, that I fear I shall be inexcusable if I don't call the serious attention of the King's ministers to what is going on here, and ask for their orders upon the state of affairs.

*The A.G. to Col. Darroch, A.A.G., Lisbon.*

15th Feb. 1811.

I am directed to request you will deliver over to M. Drojeot, the French officer of the 9th regt. of dragoons lately sent prisoner to Lisbon, the saddle bag which accompanies this letter, yesterday received at our advanced posts by a flag of truce, and containing articles as per inventory, a paper said to enclose 7 Spanish doubloons, and a letter addressed to that officer. You will request M. Drojeot to write to his correspondent, acknowledging the correct receipt of the property mentioned, which, on transmission to this office, shall be duly forwarded.

To Don Nicolas de Campo y Jacome.

Cartaxo, 16th Feb. 1811.

I had last night the honor to receive your letter of the 12th inst., which contained the first intelligence I have received of your march. You will be so kind as to remain with your detachment at Aldea Galega till I shall hear from Col. Downie for what object you are sent into this country.

I have directed the Commissary Gen. of the British army to supply your troops with provisions; and I beg you to understand that I hold you responsible for any disorders which they may commit.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 16th Feb. 1811, 11 A.M.

I have received one letter from you of the 14th, and 3 of the 15th.

I shall write to Ballesteros upon the conduct of his troops, and I shall inform him that I propose sending a copy of my letter to be laid before the Spanish government.

The reports from Mozinho, which you send me, reach me sometimes 2 days, at others one day, before my own; and it is desirable that you should continue to send them.

I send to you the memorandum which I gave to the Marques de la Romana before he died, from which you will see the measures which I had recommended to the Spanish Generals in respect to Badajoz.

I think you had better order the Lagos regiment to fall back again upon Monte Mór o Novo, as soon as the regiment of Tavira shall arrive at Elvas.

I have not heard any thing of the boat which came down on the night of the 14th; nor, indeed, has that which arrived at Lisbon been reported to me.

I return the letter from Santarem, which is very interesting. I think it clear that this person knows exactly what the French Generals know. They get all their information from the Portuguese officers with whom he is in communication; and these officers tell him all they know. If my notion is correct, it is very clear, from the perusal of this paper, that they have not so much information as we imagined. They do not yet know that the Spanish troops have marched, which is extraordinary. However, it is desirable that we should take pains to prevent them from getting any information; and with this view I have authorised Sir W. Erskine to collect and feed 200 Ordenanza, to watch the different roads on our left, and to prevent all persons from passing on them; and I recommend something of the same kind to your attention in front of Abrantes and on the river above Abrantes.

In consequence of information that I received, that a boat had gone up to Santarem (which, however, I don't believe), I requested the Admiral to place a boat on the river, to examine all boats attempting to pass above the point at which the provision boats for the troops on the left of the river discharge their cargoes. The boats which have lately come down show that something more is necessary, and that we must have a boat constantly in the river as high up as possible; and I write to him for some gun boats for this service. This may interfere with your communication with our friend at Santarem, and if this should be the case you can arrange it with the officer who will command the boats.

P.S. I am thinking of going over the river to Almeirim to-morrow, and should be glad to meet you there. I propose to cross the Alpiça as low down as I can, and to go along the Tagus, so that I should meet you about the battery. I shall send, if I should not be able to go; and if I do not send, I shall be at Almeirim between 1 and 2 o'clock.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 16th Feb. 1811.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 15th inst., and the intelligence which it contains, of which I have heard some part before.

I write to Major Berkeley to desire him to go to Lisbon at the end of next week, and I beg leave most sincerely to congratulate you, and Lady Emily, upon the occasion which takes him there. I will send March down at the same time.

In respect to your official letter on the subject of the bridges, I believe that the best mode of settling that concern would be, that the naval store-keeper should let me know what he supplies, and that I should then write and request you to give him authority to supply the articles mentioned in the list for the service of the army.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 16th Feb. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th inst., regarding gun boats up the Tagus; in answer to which I have to inform you that I think it would be very desirable to station 2 or 3 in an advanced station up the river.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 16th Feb. 1811.

I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford, containing an account of articles of provision received at Abrantes from S<sup>a</sup> Marta. I beg you to return these papers.

I shall say no more about young Mascarenhas; they have my opinion upon their proceedings, and they will do as they please.

I have read the decrees marked A in your letter, which I am convinced will not answer. The *barqueros* will desert from the Portuguese government with their certificates; and, having the certificates, they will avoid any other service. I don't see what right the Portuguese government have to legislate or regulate matters concerning our transports.

I am exceedingly hurt at the contents of Dom M. Forjaz's note, marked B in your letter. It contains statements which are absolutely false, and attributes to me and the British Commissariat the distresses of the Portuguese army, which Dom M. Forjaz knows ought to be attributed to the want of arrangement by the *Junta de Viveres*, and to the want of money by the government: and he also knows that if I had not relieved those distresses the army would have disbanded. In the present situation of affairs I shall give no answer to this note, as I could not answer it without detailing facts which, under existing circumstances, I don't think proper to detail officially. But I have done with the Portuguese army. They shall starve before they receive any further assistance from me.

To Gen. Ballesteros.

Cartaxo, 16th Feb. 1811.

I am concerned to be under the necessity of forwarding to your Excellency the enclosed letter, which has been sent to me, regarding the conduct of the troops under your command.

Whatever may be the military qualities of any body of troops, there is no doubt whatever, that if they commit disorders they are a curse instead of a benefit to the nation which they are employed to defend. In the cause in which we are engaged, above all others, it is incumbent upon us to show the people of the country the difference between the conduct of their defenders and of their oppressors; and we should take care to avoid doing them unnecessary injury, lest we should weaken their attachment to the cause and its defenders, and decrease their hatred of the enemy.

These motives, exclusive of those which have a reference to the discipline, subordination, and good order of the soldiers, which qualities are invariably deteriorated by their being permitted to commit disorders with impunity, should induce any officer who is charged with the command of a body of troops to do every thing in his power to repress and punish such acts as those complained of in the enclosed letter. I trust, therefore, that your Excellency will have adopted the measures which never fail to prevent the recurrence of similar disorders. Their repetition will lead to a contest between your troops and the inhabitants of the country, which will infallibly bring disgrace and disaster upon the cause in which we are engaged; and I have now to inform you, that I send copies of this letter, and the enclosed communication, to be laid before the Spanish government, in order that the influence of their authority may be added to the reasoning and entreaties which this letter contains, to induce your Excellency to keep the troops under your command in order.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 16th Feb. 1811.

Since I addressed your Lordship, on the 9th inst., I have received further details of the affairs at and near Badajoz, from which it appears that the Portuguese cavalry having been unsupported in their passage of the Gevora on the 6th inst., were obliged to retire across the Gevora, in which operation they sustained some loss. The whole of the cavalry and infantry were then drawn into the fort of Badajoz; and on the 7th inst. they made a sortie upon the enemy, in which they succeeded in obtaining possession of one of the enemy's batteries, but they were obliged to retire again; and unfortunately the guns in the battery were not spiked, or otherwise destroyed or injured. Their loss was not less than 85 officers, and 500 soldiers killed and wounded, as I am informed, including the Brig. Don Carlos de España among the latter.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Capt. Mallet,\* from whose report it appears that the Spanish troops behaved remarkably well upon this occasion.

While the troops were in Badajoz the French cavalry again crossed the Gevora, and interrupted the communication between that place and Elvas and Campo Maior. They came out of Badajoz on the morning of the 9th inst., and the French cavalry were obliged to retire across the Gevora. The troops have since taken up a position on the heights between the Caya, the Gevora, and the Guadiana, by which they will keep open the communication between Badajoz and the country on the right of the latter river. The enemy have continued the siege; and on the night of

\* Capt. Mallet to Col. Murray, Q.M.G.

Badajoz, 8th Feb. 1811.

I have the honor to inform you that the division of Spanish troops and Brig. Gen. Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, the whole under the orders of Gen. Mendizabal, marched from Elvas on the morning of the 5th. On the march the division was joined by about 2000 men from Campo Maior, and the whole arrived in this town at daybreak on the 6th. The advanced guard skirmished with the enemy's cavalry on crossing the plain in the neighbourhood of Badajoz.

On the morning of the 7th, about 5000 men, under the command of Gen. Carrera, were ordered out for the purpose of attacking the enemy's batteries. The right column, under the command of Brig. Don. Carlos de España, advanced under a heavy fire and carried the first battery in a most gallant manner, but unfortunately they did not succeed in spiking the guns, as they forgot to take spikes for the purpose with them. The Spaniards were a very short time in the battery when the enemy advanced in great force and obliged them to retire; they retreated in tolerably good order. The other column failed in their object: they had not advanced far when the enemy opened a destructive fire on them from their batteries, and pushing forward some strong columns of infantry, the Spaniards were forced to retreat. At 3 o'clock they retired into the town under cover of the guns from the works.

The Spaniards have lost 5 field officers, 80 officers, and upwards of 500 men killed and wounded. The enemy's loss we could not ascertain, but I believe it is trifling. I never witnessed greater bravery than on the part of the Spanish troops. No men could have behaved better; but with respect to their Generals, there seemed to be a total want of arrangement.

The enemy's works before this place are in a forward state, which will soon enable them to open their batteries. They annoy the town by shells, but do very little damage, and few lives have been lost. The enemy's force is supposed to be about 1500 cavalry and 18,000 infantry.

There are sufficient provisions here for several months for a garrison of 6000 men, but if the present number of troops are kept here, amounting to nearly 16,000 men, the place cannot hold out long. The enemy's cavalry have cut off the communication with Elvas.



the 11th inst. they attacked the redoubt of Pardaleras, which they carried; but they had not, on the 13th, been able to establish themselves within the redoubt, on account of the fire from the body of the place. They have likewise constructed a work on the left bank of the Guadiana, below the place, to fire upon the bridge of communication with the right bank; but the fire from this work had had but little effect. A great number of the inhabitants have taken advantage of the communication being open to leave the place; but I understand that it is not ill supplied with provisions; and I believe that the enemy will find it difficult to take it with the means which he has employed in the operation.

Gen. Claparède's division of the 9th corps was still upon Guarda on the 10th inst., when I last heard from that part of the country.

Although I have observed and heard of various movements by the enemy in the interior of their position, I have not found upon the whole any material alteration; and I imagine that these movements have been made principally to endeavor to obtain subsistence. The difficulty in finding any increases daily; and the inhabitants of Torres Novas and Thomar, who alone had generally remained in their habitations upon the enemy's invasion, are now coming to this part of the country, nearly starving.

I have the pleasure to forward a report which I have received of the conduct of Cornet V. Strenuwitz, of the 1st hussars,\* who surprised a piquet of the enemy on the night of the 9th inst., with a small detachment of hussars, and brought in more prisoners than his detachment consisted of, without the loss of a man.

P.S. I enclose a return of the loss of the Portuguese cavalry in the affair at the bridge of the Gevora, on the 6th inst.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 16th Feb. 1811.

I enclose the last weekly state, with the last return of the sick. I never

\* Lieut. Col. Arentschildt to Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, Bart.

S. João de Ribeira, 10th Feb. 1811.

It is with great pleasure I have the honor to report to you the gallant conduct of Cornet Strenuwitz, of the 1st hussars. Having previously reconnoitred all roads and ways, and being officer of the Malhaquejo piquet, he went last night at 12 o'clock, with 2 non-commissioned officers and 18 men, to surprise the enemy's piquet in front of Alcanhede: after a march of 3 hours he came unperceived to their dismounted double sentinel; they challenged him, when he answered that he was an orderly (for he had gone round, and came in their rear); they were now taken care of, and he had his way open to the piquet itself. Having detached several side posts and a small support, he charged the cavalry piquet, that tried to mount their horses, consisting of an officer and 20 men, with only about 9 or 10 of his men. The greater part were cut down, and many horses taken; but now he was informed, by one of the prisoners, that an infantry piquet was in their rear to support; he collected what men he could, advanced, and found them formed in line; he charged while receiving a volley, cut down about 8 or 10, and made the rest prisoners.

The 3d piquet of the enemy, consisting, as they say, of 50 infantry, took to their heels, and Cornet Strenuwitz says the drumming and trumpet sounding in Alcanhede exceeded all belief. He then withdrew, and had the satisfaction to find that he had lost no man or horse, nor even one wounded. He has been able to bring off a French officer, 3 dragoons and 11 horses of the 9th regt., and 8 men of the 22d infantry.†

† See Appendix, No. XXX.

saw an army so healthy as this. Indeed I may say that we have scarcely any sick, excepting in the Walcheren regiments. In these, however, there are very few; and I hope they will recover in this delightful climate.

I have every reason to believe, both from observation and intelligence, that the enemy were on the move last week, and would have retired, had they not received Buonaparte's orders by Foy to remain. They are now anxiously looking to the siege of Badajoz (of the course of which, however, they have no intelligence, excepting from Foy, that it was to be undertaken), and, strange to say, to peace. They have a report among them, that Foy states that the Emperor has declared that the political situation of the world is such that he thinks it will be possible to have a general peace, and this intelligence has delighted them. They know also from Foy the state of the King's health, and the consequent state of affairs in England.

I wish that our reinforcements were here.

I enclose a letter which the Commissary Gen. has put into my hands. I hope that I have not been induced, by the encouragement I have received to act in the confidence that the King's ministers would approve of the measures I should adopt, to make temporary appointments, required for the service, of gentlemen, to whom any body in London can prevent, by his orders, their salaries from being paid. If this be the case, I am sincerely desirous that the King's government would consider of the appointment of some other officer to conduct their concerns in this country, as I am utterly incapable of managing them, if I am to be treated in such a manner.

To Col. Downie.

Cartaxo, 17th Feb. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from, and of my answer to, Don Nicolas de Campo y Jacome; and I beg to know for what purpose the troops in question are sent into this country. In future, when any troops are sent into Portugal from Estremadura, I request you to let me know it, in order that regular measures may be adopted for their subsistence.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 17th Feb. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose copies of the correspondence which I have had with Gens. Mendizabal and Virues since I addressed you on the 10th inst., which will show you what has passed, and the state of affairs at Badajoz, according to the last accounts. I likewise enclose the report of the 12th and 13th, which I have received from Col. Brito.

It is now said that the enemy have no guns of a larger calibre than 12 pounders at Badajoz; but I am inclined to believe that they have 24 pounders, which they have not used, and will not use until they shall be in a situation to breach the wall of the place, as I believe they have but little ammunition. It appears that they first intended to frighten the inhabitants, and to induce them to force the surrender of the place; and it is obvious that their principal object is to interrupt the communication with the north bank of the Guadiana, in which they will not succeed, if Gen. Mendizabal should have intrenched his camp.

I have besides recommended to him, through Brig. Alava, to lay sand bags behind the parapet of the bridge, which will secure the communication by it, notwithstanding the fire of the enemy; and to construct a work for the heaviest of his field pieces on the right bank of the Guadiana, to fire across the river on the flank and rear of the enemy's battery constructed against the bridge and the communication with that battery. I have likewise recommended to him other measures, with a view to the security of the bridge, to which there is a road from the enemy's battery, between the body of the place and the river.

I likewise enclose the copy of a letter and its enclosure, which I have addressed to Gen. Ballesteros, which I beg you to lay before the Spanish government.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 17th Feb. 1811.

I enclose the copy of my dispatch of yesterday.

The accounts from Badajoz are better than I expected to send you. I believe they are getting into the right way, and I hope we shall save the place.

I believe, indeed I may say I am almost certain, that the French were about to retire when Foy arrived with the account that Soult was to attack Badajoz. However, if they do not bring up Claparède, the place will not fall.

*The A.G. to Capt. Egerton, D.A.A.G. 2d division.*

17th Feb. 1811.

In reference to a communication from Lieut. Col. —, of the 9th inst., reporting the inconvenience suffered by the — regt. from the delay at times of receiving money to lay in comforts for the soldiers, which, by the annexed statement of the paymaster, every regular means has been constantly taken to procure, I have only to observe, that the Commander of the Forces has given much attention to overcome the difficulties that in the course of service have delayed the regular issue of subsistence to the troops, and that, whatever may be the obstructions now remaining, they are equally felt by the army at large; nor can his Excellency be requested to make an arrangement for the exclusive accommodation of any corps.

To Major Gen. Hoghton.

Cartaxo, 18th Feb. 1811.

I have received the proceedings, and revised the sentence, of the General Court Martial of which you are President, on the trial of —; and, as the difference of opinion between the Court and me turns entirely upon the powers which the law has given to the Court of passing such a sentence, I don't hesitate in requesting them again to reconsider their sentence, although I must admit that they are at least as likely as I am to have given the law its true construction.

The General Court Martial will find, upon reference to the Mutiny act, that there is no power given to them to sentence transportation, excepting under the 4th section of the Mutiny act, only for the crime of desertion; and they will find that they have the power, under the 21st section of the Mutiny act, to inflict corporal punishment not extending to life or limb, on any soldier for immoralities, misbehavior, or neglect of duty.

The 4th article of the 24th section of the Articles of War enables the General Court Martial to try offenders in foreign parts, for offences

for which, if committed within His Majesty's dominions, they must have been delivered to the civil magistrates, and would have been tried in the Courts of common law, and to sentence of death if the Court should be of opinion that the nature and degree of the offence deserves that punishment, or 'such other punishment' as the Court may award, according to the nature and degree of the offence.

According to my view of this article, it does not convey to the Court the power of passing a sentence upon a criminal, which has not been given to the Court by the Articles of War, or Act of Parliament. Then comes the question, what power has been given to them by the Articles of War, or Act of Parliament, in respect to an immorality, not of the nature and degree to deserve the sentence of death, under the 4th section of the 24th article of the Articles of War, not to sentence transportation, because under the Mutiny act they have no power to sentence transportation, excepting for desertion, but to sentence corporal punishment not extending to life or limb? If the Court have the power of sentencing transportation for this immorality, they have the same power for any, and all, even of the most trifling nature; and you will see how far this undefined power would go. You will be the best judge whether the General Court Martial can reconsider their sentence, or whether the reasoning in this letter is likely to have any effect upon them. At all events I cannot confirm this sentence, with the opinions which I hold upon the subject.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 18th Feb. 1811, 10 A.M.

I have read Silveira's letters and Bacellar's reports. I think it would be desirable to send Silveira's force avowedly into cantonments of refreshment. The others might remain, keeping a good look out on the valley of the Mondego, and endeavor to make a hit at any convoy that may attempt to get in.

P.S. I don't know whether you have received Silveira's journal of his operations in January. I enclose it, lest you should not; and I am inclined to write to him, to tell him I approve of every thing excepting his attack upon the enemy, if that opinion concurs with yours. Return the paper, for I have noticed it.

I enclose 2 letters for Mendizabal, which I beg of you to forward.\* I also request you to write to Leite, to urge him to give every assistance to our Commissaries in obtaining provisions for these people.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 18th Feb. 1811.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give Gen. O'Donnell a passage in any ship of war which you may be about to send to Cadiz, as he has been serving with the Spanish troops joined to this army, and has recently been appointed second in command of the army in Catalonia, and he is desirous of proceeding to his station.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 18th Feb. 1811.

I enclose the report of the Engineer officer who was sent by Marshal Beresford to examine the repairs of the causeway of Benavente, from which it appears that the person who gave you the information regarding the nature of these repairs was mistaken.

\* See Addenda, p. 804.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 18th Feb. 1811.

I have received your letter of yesterday. The note enclosed by Dom M. Forjaz contains just as fallacious a statement of the resources in Abrantes as all the others; but the whole case is now very clear. The truth, when laid before the government, is not to be acknowledged. On the contrary, falsehoods, known to be such, are to be written in answer to those statements, in order to keep a colleague in good humor, in whose department the failure lies. The worst of all these discussions is that they will be made the groundwork of undoing all that we have been doing in this country.

I have frequently considered the expediency of taking the Portuguese army entirely out of the hands of the government, without taking the government itself. In the detail of this arrangement there would be hundreds of difficulties which cannot be easily surmounted. The whole of our transport is conducted by Spaniards, not one of whom, I believe, would carry an ounce for the Portuguese troops; and we could get no other means, excepting by the authority of government, which must be exerted by us, or it will not be exerted at all. Depend upon it, that if we begin we must take the whole civil and military and financial government of the country into our own hands, and provide for the payment of the civil and judicial departments, as well as the military; and then we can force the inferior magistrates to do their duty; we can put the laws into execution, and can bring forward the resources of the country for its deliverance and defence. I have no doubt that this system, closely carried into execution upon an enlarged plan, would defray its own expense; and that in a short time Great Britain would not have to spend so much for Portugal as at present. But I am apprehensive that the adoption of any system of this description, upon any but the most enlarged scale, or, in other words, to take upon ourselves the duties of any part of the executive government, without taking the whole, will only shift the blame from the Portuguese government to ourselves, and involve our army and its departments in the consequences of the failures from which the Portuguese army alone now suffer.

I have not much information of what is going on at Lisbon; but, from what I have heard lately, I have no doubt of what I formerly wrote to you. Indeed it appears that both the Patriarch and the Principal are most indiscreet in their language and conduct upon this subject. I think also that they will be supported in Brazil; and I have no reason to believe that I shall be supported in England.

I shall let you know the alterations which it would be expedient to make in the laws which you have sent me; but it does not much signify what the law is, as nobody thinks of obeying it.

P.S. Since writing the above Mr. Kennedy has been with me, and has given me the enclosed paper, which I beg you to return. When the articles of claim, not included, are included in the return, it will appear that, after deducting about £100,000 received in Jan. and Feb. 1811, the Portuguese government have received, in 1810, very nearly double the amount of their subsidy!! This cannot go on. You should really bring the subject under the consideration of the King's government.

Mr. Kennedy has just told me that, on the 8th, the day on which Dom M. Forjaz asserts that there were 180 boats at Vallada, there were 80, of which number he gave 14 of the largest to the Portuguese Commissary sent to ask for them! So much for the falsehood written to please the Conde de Redondo.

Application is now made again by Gen. Pack's brigade for provisions; but I shall certainly give them none.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 19th Feb. 1811, 10 A.M.

I received yesterday evening your letters of the 13th, including that of 2 P.M. I also received one from Lumley, communicating the intelligence of the noise heard, and the lights seen, in Santarem, on the night of the 17th. It is obvious that they are making some movement, but it is not yet clear of what nature. We have observed no change on this side yet; but I shall go and look at all the points in the course of the morning.

You did not send Grant's letter, only the extract. He appears to be going on capitally, and is likely to save some valuable property in the Estrella. I shall be much obliged to you if you will tell him how gratified I am upon reading the account of his operations.

P.S. I got yesterday the accounts of money, &c., received by the Portuguese government since Jan. 1810; and it is £1,820,000 sterling to the 14th Feb., or, in other words, nearly double the subsidy, without including the pay of the 24th regt., the subsidiary beef, the food of the caçadores in the Light division, and, I believe, the stores at Abrantes, and other little articles, which will make up the two millions in one year and 6 weeks!!!

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Picton, 3d division.*

19th Feb. 1811.

Capt. —, of the — regt., is to have 2 months' leave to England; will you, however, direct that officer may be called on previously to draw up a statement of the causes which led to his application, the Commander of the Forces desiring to transmit that document to the Horse Guards, to account for in this instance being induced to depart from the lately established regulation of referring all such appeals to the Commander in Chief's decision.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 20th Feb. 1811, 10 A.M.

I received last night your letters of the 18th and 19th, 10 A.M. I shall write to Silveira as you suggest.

There is positively no change along this front. I examined it accurately yesterday, and every thing was in the same state. I still think, however, that Regnier's corps is about to move from Santarem.

I have letters from Cadiz to the 6th. Nothing new.

G. O.

Cartaxo, 19th Feb. 1811.

1. \* \* \* \* \*
2. In consideration of the good character which the Commander of the Forces has heard of Mr. —, and in consequence of the satisfaction which he has received from the mode in which the duty of the Medical department of this army is done in general, and in hopes that the crime of which Mr. — has been found guilty will not be repeated, the Commander of the Forces remits that part of the sentence of the General Court Martial which suspends Mr. — from rank and pay for 3 months; and that officer is to be released from his arrest and return to his duty.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 20th Feb. 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Col. Peacocke, regarding a soldier of the — regt., who is in confinement at Lisbon, having been now 23 months in jail. I perfectly recollect to have heard, when at Oporto in May, 1809, of the horrible and atrocious ingratitude of a British soldier, in having committed the act related by Col. Peacocke; but I understood that the soldier had gone off with the French army.

I don't trouble you now upon this subject in order to justify this soldier, or to obtain any mitigation of any punishment he ought to receive, as no punishment can, in my opinion, be at all adequate to the offence he has committed; but to point out to you how very improper it is, and indeed unfriendly, and contrary to the principles of the alliance, that British subjects and soldiers, put in jail without notice to any officer, should be detained in jail, as this man has been, for nearly 2 years, without any intimation being given to any body of his being in existence. In the same manner I found a soldier in jail last January, who had been there nearly 8 months.

I request you to draw the attention of the government to this subject, and to know what has been done respecting the soldier of the — regt., and what they propose to do with him.

I am also anxious to have their answer respecting the cases of the 2 soldiers some time ago referred to them. Whatever may be the custom in Portugal, it is entirely inconsistent with any well regulated system of justice to delay the trial of those charged with the commission of crimes; and if I should not receive the answer in a week, I shall order — to be tried by a General Court Martial, and —, of the — light dragoons, to be relieved from his confinement.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 20th Feb. 1811.

I enclose an extract of a letter from Beresford on the eternal subject of Abrantes, and a return of provisions in that place.

I have considered the pecuniary account since I sent it to you, and I rather think, upon the whole, that it is not quite so bad as we at first supposed. The Treasury received, or were to receive, from Sousa, the amount of the drafts for £200,000, given by Mr. Villiers. The £330,000 and the £15,000 on account of supplies ordered from England are in advance: but we shall have in our power the supplies for repayment; and either the government will receive the money for the sale of the supplies, and can hand it over to us, or they will apply it to their own purposes, in which case we may stop the payment of the subsidy. After the striking out of the account of the payments since the 31st Dec., the total charge to that day is £1,661,961, from which £545,000, above accounted for, being deducted, the balance will be £1,116,961; to this will be to be added about £100,000 more, of which I will send you the account in a few days; so that we shall not have overpaid them much more than £250,000. I think, therefore, that you need not be very uneasy upon the subject.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 22d Feb. 1811, 10 A.M.

The *Denmark* is arrived with 150 men of the 51st regt. The fleet sailed on the 9th.

There is nothing new here excepting that Cornet Strenuwitz took, on the 19th, Clause's aide de camp and 22 men, and killed and wounded as many more. They had been lying in ambuscade for the patrols from Rio Maior for some days: but he contrived to draw them to an ambuscade which he had laid, and took and destroyed the whole party, with the loss only of one horse wounded.

Would it not be possible to undertake something against the 5 boats down the river? Lieut. Claxton, R.N., and 2 gun boats and some seamen, are just below Almeirim, and will assist either with his seamen or boats, if they can be got above Santarem.

P.S. I have a letter from Mendizabal, in which he does not mention the extent of his loss.

To Col. Peacocke.

Cartaxo, 22d Feb. 1811.

Adm. Berkeley will deliver over to you a person whose name he has not stated, but who appears to have been employed in giving medical aid to the seamen of the transports. He was confined by Capt. Tucker for tampering with some of the people of the transports, and endeavoring to prevail upon them to carry information to the French; and Capt. Tucker handed him over to the Admiral, as he belonged to the fleet. I request you to have an inquiry into the circumstances which occasioned his confinement, and send the proceedings of the inquiry to me.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 22d Feb. 1811.

I received your letter of the 19th yesterday. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give directions that the person mentioned by you may be delivered over to Col. Peacocke; and I shall have an inquiry made into the circumstances for which he was detained, and will ascertain whether it is in my power to punish him.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 22d Feb. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a list of stores, &c., required for the construction of bridges; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that the different articles may be delivered on a requisition being made to that effect.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 22d Feb. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 21st. I rather believe that you are mistaken respecting the £100,000 you mention. The amount I sent you was of the sums paid to the chest of 'the Aids,' &c., by the Commissariat, from which chest the officers are paid. You cannot therefore have given the full sum which has been received by the chest to the Portuguese government.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 23d Feb. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 22d inst. It is scarcely worth while



to consider any paper coming from the Portuguese government, after the avowal made by Dom M. Forjaz the other day.

However, it is as well that they should know that there is no use in attempting to deceive themselves, or us, respecting the state of provisions in Abrantes; and that in a few days probably I shall be called upon to decide whether I shall keep the garrison in the place or not, and that I should decide according to the state of provisions in the place, and not upon false returns sent up by the *Junta de Viveres*, or notes written by the minister for Foreign Affairs, to please a colleague and to conceal the faults of the department under his charge. The Portuguese ministers are seriously responsible to their country and to the world for the fate of this place.

To Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, Bart.

Cartaxo, 23d Feb. 1811.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let Cornet Strenuwitz know how much I have been gratified by the accounts which I have received of his conduct in his two recent affairs with the enemy. I have not failed to report both in the most favorable terms to the King's government, the former last week, and the latter this day.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 23d Feb. 1811, 9½ A.M.

I received last night your two letters of the 22d. Campo Maior is a place that could not stand a regular attack for half an hour. There was, when I knew it, no ordnance in it, and I believe there is none, nor stores, in it at present. That which ought to be done is to secure it from a *coup de main*, and to oblige the enemy to break ground regularly before the place, if they want to have it; and that is the principle that I stated to Leite, at the time the Marques de la Romana wished to have the place, in a letter, of which I enclose you an extract, and of which I sent you an extract before. When Mendizabal was in his camp at San Christoval he withdrew the garrison from Campo Maior, leaving only a few men to save it from a *coup de main*. In my opinion Campo Maior ought never to have had more; but his ideas and mine may differ upon the number sufficient for that purpose, and there may be (although I believe there are not) ordnance and stores in the place, which ought not to be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy. There is also a considerable difference in the degree of danger to be apprehended from a *coup de main* on this place, now that Mendizabal has been defeated. It is difficult to know what to do in this case. Mendizabal will not put a single man into the place, and Leite cannot spare any, and cannot feed them if he could spare them. However, I have desired Alava to write to Mendizabal, to inform him that the preservation of Campo Maior was an honorable engagement on the part of the Marques de la Romana, and that I beg him to put into the place 500 men upon whom he can depend. In the meantime Leite should put in it some Ordenanza, to prevent its being surprised.

In respect to your letter, No. 2, Gen. Hill had authority to employ officers to get intelligence for him, as we employ Ruman, and did employ Grant and others, and as he employed Lieut. Heathcote; and all these are paid, by warrants from me, 3 dollars *per diem*, while so employed. I don't

recollect that Major White was so employed. I rather think that, however important his service was, it was strictly in execution of his duty as an officer of cavalry at the head of a patrol, however small, and that it was of the same description as that recently rendered by Owen. If this is the case, he ought not to be paid. And I think it must have been the case, as, if I recollect rightly, I wrote, but if I did not, I desired Hill verbally, not to employ officers in the Portuguese service on these duties, which would take them away from the service with their own men. If, however, Major White has been employed on this description of extra duty, whether by Gen. Hill or by you, he shall be paid as others have been; but I should think that this employment has neither lasted the time nor has been of that description to distinguish it from the duty on which officers of cavalry are employed every day.

I enclose you a letter that Mr. Stuart has sent me, which he has received from Lord Strangford, upon which I congratulate you. I likewise enclose, in case you should not have seen it, a copy of the recent *Carta Regia* to this government.

P.S. Brotherton, of the 14th, was employed alone in the Estrella and not paid. Badcock, of the same regiment, is now on the left of the army, either alone or with 2 men, and is not paid; and Cocks, Krauchenberg, and Cordemann have been employed in the same manner, either alone or with small parties, and have never been paid.

Return the enclosed letters.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 23d Feb. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 22d inst., regarding provender for the cattle coming from Vigo; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will direct the agent to supply them from the stores of hay on board the transports, and to state from time to time the quantity issued for this service, which will be replaced from the stores of the army. The Commissary Gen. has written to Vigo to accelerate the purchase of cattle.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Cartaxo, 23d Feb. 1811.

I have received your letters (No. 2, of the 1st, private of the 5th, and separate of the 6th). I shall take measures to send Mr. Souper to Sicily immediately, according to Lord Forbes' desire.

I have not written to you lately, as I know my brother communicates to you all my letters to him, and you will readily believe that I have not too much time to write two letters upon the same subject, and containing the same information.

In case your sortie should succeed (which will place the war on its legs again in the best manner), I have again written to Lord Liverpool to request that you might join this army. You shall know his answer as soon as I receive it. I shall be glad to hear from you respecting Lord Aylmer's wish to go to Cadiz.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 23d Feb. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose you copies of the correspondence which I have had with Gen. Mendizabal up to this day,\* since I last addressed you,

\* See Addenda, pp. 804 and 805.

and copies of 2 letters of the 19th and 20th from Capt. Mallet, and of 2 papers of intelligence of the 19th and 20th from Col. Brito, which will inform you of the unfortunate defeat of the Spanish army upon the heights of San Christoval on the 19th inst., and its immediate consequences. This is the greatest misfortune which has fallen upon the allies since the battle of Ocaña, and in the existing state of the war more likely than that event to affect their interests vitally; and it was not to be expected.

I could not imagine that an army having two rivers between it and the enemy, and knowing that the enemy was endeavoring to pass one of them, could have been surprised in a strong position; and actually nothing but the surprise could have enabled so inferior a force as that employed by the French upon this occasion to carry the heights of San Christoval, the strength of which is well known, even though the recommendations to fortify them had not been attended to. It is impossible to speculate upon the consequences of this misfortune upon the garrison of Badajoz; but you will observe that I have requested Gen. Mendizabal to urge them to hold out to the last extremity.

I have likewise the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Gen. Ballesteros in answer to that which I addressed to him on the 16th Feb.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 23d Feb. 1811.

I have received your letter of the 4th Feb., and I can easily conceive your surprise and concern upon the recent transactions in Estremadura; but both will not be a little increased by the accounts which I forward this day.

I now enclose my dispatch to the Secretary of State of this day, giving an account of the defeat of the Spaniards at Badajoz; and I enclose for your private information copies of 2 letters from Madden, who, you will observe, is not better pleased with the Portuguese cavalry than he is with the Spanish troops. Few troops will bear a surprise and a general panic; and at all events young cavalry are much more easily affected by these circumstances, and the effect upon them is much more extensive and more sensibly felt by the whole army, than similar circumstances operating upon infantry in the same state of discipline. Their horses afford them means of flight, and when once cavalry lose their order it is impossible to restore it. For this reason I am always inclined to keep the cavalry out of action as long as possible.

The defeat of Mendizabal is the greatest misfortune, which was not previously expected, that has yet occurred to us. As soon as our reinforcements would have arrived I intended to have detached a British force to Badajoz, with which the Spaniards would have been sufficient to have beaten Soult and raise the siege; which event, without exposing matters to a general action in a position chosen by the enemy, would have had the most important consequences throughout the Peninsula. As it is, I cannot venture to detach a sufficient force to do the business alone, and I must try something else of greater risk and more doubtful result. In short, this defeat goes to the vitals of the cause, and it would certainly have been avoided if the Spaniards had been any thing but Spaniards. But Mendizabal, knowing that the French force were preparing means to cross the

Guadiana, was surprised in his camp, which he had neglected to fortify, although repeatedly advised to fortify it, and which he delayed to quit. If he had not been surprised, although he had not been intrenched; if he had been intrenched, and still had been surprised; or if he had withdrawn from the position, as he said he would, this misfortune could not have happened. I know the ground as well as I know my own room. It is really the strongest position in the country!

I have no objection to your making any use you please of the contents of my letters to you (the dispatches and their enclosures must of course go to England); but I recommend to you to avoid urging the Minister to communicate your notes to the Cortes. The Spanish minister is not likely to notice this desire, but the opposition in England will. Recollect the breeze which there was upon this subject upon a similar demand from Chauvelin to Lord Grenville, when the war broke out in 1792. I imagine that the King's government never allow any reference to be made by foreign ministers to any authority excepting the King.

We have no packet since the 21st Jan.; but the *Denmark* is arrived, which left England (Torbay) on the 9th. It was then reported that the Regent had sent for Lord Grenville and Lord Grey; but that, finding the King was so much better, he had informed Mr. Perceval that he should not change the ministry. This is the only report; but I think that if the ministers find that they have not his confidence, they must quit their offices. It will not answer to have him running to the opposition upon every communication he receives from ministers. This would be quite a new situation of affairs.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 23d Feb. 1811.

I am much concerned to have to inform you that the French attacked Gen. Mendizabal on the 19th inst., in the position which he had taken on the heights of San Christoval, near Badajoz, and totally defeated him, having destroyed, taken, or dispersed the whole army, with the exception of 2000 infantry, who have been collected at Elvas, and Brig. Gen. Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, and about 500 Spanish cavalry. The enemy had to cross the Guadiana and the Gevora; but surprised the Spanish army in their camp, which was standing, and is taken, with baggage and artillery. According to all accounts, the enemy had not more than 6000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. The Spanish army must have consisted of 10,000 infantry, and 1500 cavalry, including the Portuguese brigade; and they were posted in one of the strongest positions in the country, with their right under the fort of San Christoval (one of the outworks of Badajoz), Campo Maior in the rear of their left, and Elvas immediately in their rear.\*

I had suggested to the late Marques de la Romana to occupy this position, which I had requested him, and have since repeatedly urged Gen. Mendizabal, to intrench. This precaution was neglected; but still the position was of that description that it ought not to have been carried; and as long as it was held, it was impracticable for the enemy to obtain possession of Badajoz, or to interrupt the communication with that place. The enemy have not been able to establish themselves within the redoubt

\* See Appendix, No. XXXII.

of Pardaleras since they carried it on the 11th inst., and have made no progress in the operations of the siege. Their position, however, on the right of the Guadiana, gives them great advantages, of which they well know how to avail themselves; and they actually commenced to intrench it on the evening of the day on which they obtained possession of it.

Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon the effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding the frequent instances of their bravery, I acknowledge that this recent disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss of this army, and its probable consequence, the fall of Badajoz, have materially altered the situation of the allies in this part of the Peninsula; and it will not be an easy task to place them in the situation in which they were, much less in that in which they would have been, if this misfortune had not occurred. I am concerned to add to this melancholy history, that the Portuguese brigade of cavalry did not behave much better than the other troops. Brig. Gen. Madden did every thing in his power to induce them to charge, but in vain; and Lieut. Col. Brown was wounded, but not dangerously. This circumstance shows the effect of surprise and of general panic upon troops, as this brigade have, upon former occasions, behaved remarkably well.

I am informed that there are 9000 good troops in Badajoz, some having retired into that fortress from the field of battle, and that the garrison is well supplied with provisions, which have been left there by the inhabitants, who quitted the place when the communication with it was recently opened. The works are still untouched, and the enemy's fire has hitherto done but little damage to the town.

Gen. Clapartède's division of the 9th corps still continued upon Guarda, with their advanced guard at Belmonte, when I last heard from that part of the country. They had made an attempt to obtain possession of Covilhão on the 12th, but were repulsed with some loss by Col. Grant, who had occupied the town with a party of Ordenanzas of Lower Beira. I enclose a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford,\* and a report from

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\* Marshal Beresford to Marshal Gen. Visc. Wellington. Chamusca, 18th Feb. 1811.

I have the honor to annex for your Lordship's information an extract of a letter from Lieut. Col. Grant, dated the 14th, from Covilhão, by which your Lordship will see he continues to be most advantageously employed, and is a considerable check to the objects of the enemy in that quarter.

(Extract.)

Covilhão, 14th Feb. 1811.

The division of the enemy who arrived at Guarda detached 2500 men to Belmonte, 3 leagues from the village.

The small places round have been sacked and plundered. They at the same time sent to Covilhão to inform the people that it was their intention to establish head quarters there, and that they would put to death those who fled.

In order to attempt to counteract their intentions, and save the principal place in this part of the country, I marched from Fundão on the night of the 8th, with 400 Ordenanza (chiefly of Alpedrinha and Castello Branco), with 1 piece of artillery (calibre 6), and arrived here at 3 the following morning.

On the morning of the 12th, at 8 o'clock, 1500 of the French from Belmonte, in 2 columns, attempted the place. Having stationed the people to the best advantage, I allowed the enemy to approach to within grape shot; in 10 minutes they were thrown into confusion, and retreated in disorder, facing and manœuvring 3 hours in our front, 2 companies of the best Ordenanza annoying their flank and

Lieut. Col. Grant of this affair. From later reports I am apprehensive, however, that he has since been obliged to withdraw from thence.

I likewise enclose reports from Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine,\* who commands the outposts on the left of the army, of the capture of Gen. Clausel's aide-de camp, and a detachment of the enemy's cavalry and infantry, on the 19th inst., by Cornet Strenuwitz, of the Hussars, to whose conduct, in an enterprise of a similar nature, I drew your Lordship's attention in my last dispatch. In this instance he has acquitted himself with great judgment and boldness.

The operations of the guerrillas continue throughout the interior; and I have proofs that the political hostility of the people of Spain towards the enemy is increasing rather than diminishing; but I have not yet heard of any measure being adopted to supply the regular funds to pay and support an army, or to raise one. Don J. Sanchez, whom I have frequently mentioned to your Lordship, has recently captured a large convoy of biscuit on its march from Ledesma to Ciudad Rodrigo, which had come from Palencia; and another party has recently done the enemy a considerable injury near the bridge of Arzobispo. It is said that Gen. La Houssaye has been killed in an affair at that place.

The enemy have made no movement of importance in front of this army since I addressed your Lordship on the 16th inst.

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rear. At 2 P.M. they retired by Teixoso to Belmonte. 7 of the enemy were found killed; some others, with the wounded, were carried off. We had only 4 men wounded. Gen. Claparède commands in Guarda; and a Brigadier in Belmonte; the former has 3000 men and 5 pieces of artillery, with but few cavalry.

\* Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine to Col. Murray, Q. M. G. Marmeleira, 21st Feb. 1811.

The enemy having, for some time past, been in the custom of making a strong patrolle almost every night up to Arruda, I sent Cornet Strenuwitz, of the 1st hussars, with 30 men of the 16th light dragoons and hussars, to place himself in ambuscade, in the vicinity of Ferragoas, on the morning of the 19th, in order to cut off this patrolle if it should appear, and likewise to watch the movements of the enemy, who are reported to be on the eve of making some considerable movements.

The piquet of Malhaquejo was reinforced and kept in readiness to support the party. The enemy's patrolle not appearing, as was expected, during the night of the 19th or of the 20th, on the evening of that day Cornet Strenuwitz (not having forage to enable him to remain longer) sent a small party up to the enemy's piquet at Alcanhede to invite them out, which had the desired effect, the enemy following this patrolle with an officer and 20 infantry, and an officer and the same number of dragoons, who were led by the patrolle within reach of the ambuscade, when Cornet Strenuwitz fell upon them; the officer, with the whole of the infantry, were taken or cut down: 3 dragoons were likewise taken, and several cut down. The remainder escaped by dispersing and being near to their post. The officer of the infantry who is taken is wounded; 17 prisoners in all have been brought in: we had 1 horse wounded.

Cornet Strenuwitz conducted himself on this occasion with much ability, and I have to request you will be so good as to mention him to the Commander in Chief.

Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine to Col. Murray, Q. M. G. Marmeleira, 21st Feb. 1811.

The officer who is taken is Gen. Clausel's aide-de camp. He has been with different parties in ambuscade for this week past, to catch some of our patrolles from Rio Maior, but seeing the small patrolle on the Ferragoas road, he thought to cut it off, and in consequence fell into our ambuscade. He is so badly wounded that he cannot proceed from this place to-day. One of the dragoons taken is dead of his wounds; most of the prisoners are wounded but slightly.

A considerable quantity of baggage has been sent out of Santarem; but I am inclined to believe that it belongs to sick officers and soldiers who have been removed from thence to the rear of the army.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 23d Feb. 1811.

I enclose a weekly state. We are becoming a more efficient and better army every day.

If this misfortune had not happened at Badajoz, I intended, as soon as the reinforcements should arrive, to detach a force to Badajoz, which, with the Spaniards, would have been sufficient to defeat Soult, and raise the siege of that place, if Massena had not called in Claparède's division from Guarda. This operation would have put an end to all apprehension for the provinces south of the Tagus, and would probably have had more important consequences.

As it is, I cannot venture to detach so many troops, even after the reinforcements shall arrive, as will be able to effect this operation; and if the weather should hold up a little, I must first try something else of greater extent, but more doubtful result. In short, this defeat is the greatest, and indeed the only misfortune that has yet happened to us which was not expected; and it ought not to have occurred.

#### MEMORANDUM OF OPERATIONS IN 1810.

[The Notes to this Memorandum are in the Manuscript.]

23d Feb. 1811.

The last memorandum,\* on the operations of the British army in the Peninsula, ended with the breaking up of the British army from its position on the frontiers of Estremadura and Alentejo, and its march to a position in Upper Beira, between the Mondego and the Tagus, in the middle of December, 1809.

The reasons for this movement were the following:

1st; It was believed that the French were aware that, till they could dislodge the British army from Lisbon and the Tagus, they could not hope to make any successful invasion of Andalusia, or any progress in obtaining possession of that country. This belief was confirmed by their conduct after the battle of Ocaña, in the month of November. The events of that battle, and the state to which it reduced the Spanish army, afforded them the best opportunity of entering Andalusia unopposed, and of taking possession even of Cadiz itself; but instead of pursuing their advantages, they turned their troops back immediately into Old Castille, and gave ground for belief that their line of operations would be in that quarter.

2dly; There was every reason to believe that large reinforcements would enter Spain during the winter, which might be thrown immediately upon the frontier of Portugal.

3dly; The swelling of the rivers Tagus and Guadiana, which had occurred in some degree, had opposed a material obstacle to the advance of the French through Estremadura, and the expected rains were likely to render the roads quite impracticable; which, added to the means of defence remaining in the province, under the Duque de Alburquerque, left it in a state of apparent safety from invasion.

\* See vol. iii. p. 631.

The British army had completed its march by the 15th Jan., and had taken up its cantonments with their right at Guarda, their left extending towards the Douro, and the advanced posts on the Coa. The head quarters were placed at Viseu. At this time the strength of the British army was 19,500 R. and F.; 2800 of that number were cavalry, leaving 16,700 infantry, of which 800 were at Lisbon. A division of infantry of 4400 men had been left on the Tagus at Abrantes, under the command of Lieut. Gen. Hill, as the foundation of the corps to be formed under his command, to carry on operations on the frontiers of Alentejo and Estremadura, if, contrary to all appearances and expectation, the enemy should invade that part of the country.\* With the exception of the hussars the cavalry also were left upon the Tagus for the convenience of receiving forage, which we were informed that the province of Upper Beira could not supply.

The Portuguese army was at this time in a state not fit for service,† owing principally to the want of clothing, and those equipments which are necessary to all soldiers in a winter campaign. Their discipline, organization, and equipment had been in some degree thrown back by their operations in the preceding summer; and it was determined, if possible, not to move them from the cantonments which they occupied in the interior of the country till the last moment, in order to give them as much time to be formed and equipped as might be possible, while the British troops should occupy the frontiers.

The force and position of the allies at that time were as follows: about 24,000 men, which had been collected of the fugitives from the battle of Ocaña, were at La Carolina, occupying the principal passes of the Sierra Morena;‡ about 12,000 men, under the Duque de Albuquerque, were at Medellin, upon the Guadiana; and about 20,000 men,§ which had been collected together after the Duque del Parque's action at Alba, were at San Martín de Trebejo, in the Sierra de Gata. There were 6000 or 8000 men, under Gen. Mahy, at Astorga and Villa Franca, in Galicia; and there was a garrison in Ciudad Rodrigo. It had been repeatedly recommended to the Spanish government to reinforce the corps under the Duque de Albuquerque. If this corps had been stronger, and the operations of the Spanish troops could have been reckoned upon, it could have defended the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz; and if the enemy, instead of attempting that operation, had pushed their whole force through La Mancha, as they afterwards did, this corps might have been thrown upon their right flank by the valley of the Guadiana. The enemy's force consisted of, and was disposed as follows: the corps of Sebastiani (the 4th), Victor (the 1st), and Mortier (the 5th), were disposed of about the Tagus and Madrid;|| and Soult, the King's guards, and Dessolle's reserve, composed an army of about 65,000 men. Soult's corps was at Talavera de la Reyna and in that neighbourhood, and consisted of about

\* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, 15th Jan. 1810.

† See letter of 4th Jan. to Lord Liverpool, and letter to Mr. Frere, 30th Jan., enclosed to Lord Liverpool.

‡ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of Dec. 1809, and Jan. 1810.

§ They were stated to be 20,000 men, but I doubt that they ever collected 15,000.

|| See letters to Lord Liverpool, of the 14th, 21st, and 28th Dec. 1809, and 4th, 15th, 24th, and 31st Jan.



12,000 men. Ney's corps (the 6th) was in Old Castille; and, by the time the British army arrived in Beira, it had been joined by the reinforcements, and consisted of 32,000 men;\* and towards the middle of the month of January, the Duc d'Abantes, or the 8th corps, consisting of 27,000 men, also entered Spain.†

Besides these corps, which are immediately the subject of this memorandum, there was the 3d corps, under Suchet, in Aragon, and the army of Catalonia, first under Augereau, and then under Macdonald, in Catalonia, which have been engaged in the operations of the campaign against the Spanish armies of Valencia and Catalonia; but the operations are quite distinct from those which have been carried on on the western and southern side of the Peninsula, and they will not be noticed any further.

The first operation which the enemy undertook, as soon as their reinforcements entered Spain, was to force the passes of the Sierra Morena.‡ After manœuvring for some days at the foot of the mountains, they carried the passes almost without opposition on the part of the Spanish army, which retired in several directions. The greater part, under Gen. Areyza himself, retired to Jaen, and thence to Granada, which towns they successively abandoned, and thence into Murcia; and this body has since formed the army of Murcia. A part retired into the Sierra de Ronda, and thence to Gibraltar, from whence it was removed to Cadiz; and a part, under the Visconde de Gand, retired to Seville, and thence into the Condado de Niebla, where it has since remained, under the command of Gen. Copons; and one division, and the artillery, crossed the Guadalquivir at Seville, and went to Monasterio, in Estremadura; from whence the artillery was sent to Badajoz, and the troops went and embarked at Ayamonte. After passing the Sierra Morena the French pushed their left, the corps of Sebastiani, towards Jaen; and the 1st corps, with the King's guards and reserve, went, under the King, to Seville and Cadiz. The Duque de Alburquerque, however, passed the Sierra Morena from his position on the Guadiana, by Guadalcanal, nearly at the same time with the French, and arrived at Xerez, and occupied the Isla de Leon, before the French approached the place.

While these movements were making the Central Junta was dissolved. Previous to the dissolution of that body they had ordered the march of the corps under the command of the Duque del Parque, from Castille into Estremadura; and, with the exception of 3000 men under Gen. Carrera, it marched on the .§ Nearly at the same time the Marques de la Romana was appointed to resume the command of this corps.

The wants and the situation of the Portuguese army at that period of time have been already pointed out. It would have been impossible to move them, without incurring the risk of rendering them useless during

\* See letter of 21st Feb. to Lord Liverpool.

† We had no knowledge of the arrival of reinforcements till a later period; but see letter to Lord Liverpool, of 24th Jan., and to Mr. Frere, 30th Jan., that their arrival was suspected. It was supposed at that time that the enemy could bring together in Old Castille about 40,000 men, including Soult's corps from Talavera.

‡ See letter of 31st Jan. to Lord Liverpool.

§ The Duque del Parque stated that he should march on the 24th Jan. See letter, &c., to Mr. Frere, 30th Jan.; but they did not march till later in the month, and the beginning of February.

the campaign. Including the cavalry (with the exception of Gen. Slade's brigade, attached to Gen. Hill's corps), the whole British army that could be brought into operation on the frontiers of Castille, between the middle and end of January, was less than 15,000 men, to which the Portuguese army might have added 10,000 or 12,000 men, if it had been deemed expedient to draw these troops into the field at that time, notwithstanding the considerations above referred to. Against this force was Ney's corps at Salamanca; and Junot's, or the 8th, was on its march within the Spanish frontier; and, at all events, it was known in the end of January that the effect had been produced in Andalusia, which it would have been the object of any diversion to prevent. The passes of the Sierra had been carried without opposition; the Spanish army had been dispersed; Seville, the seat of government, with its arsenals and establishments, was in the possession of the French; and Cadiz itself was threatened. No operation, which should not have been performed by a most powerful and superior body of troops well supported, could have produced any diversion to avert the consequences of this state of things.

It was obvious that the French were in an error when they entered Andalusia. They should have begun by turning their great force against the English in Portugal, holding in check the Spanish force in Andalusia, as they had done in the preceding spring. Andalusia would then have fallen an easy conquest to them; but in the manner in which they have proceeded, they have been obliged to bring corps after corps out of Andalusia against Portugal; Cadiz, &c., have in the meantime become strengthened, as has Portugal; and it is doubtful whether they will ever obtain possession of either.

This view of the subject, and the knowledge that the cause would eventually be fought for in Portugal, and the certainty that the enemy had the means of collecting a superior force to ours, even if he had not already been reinforced, prevented us from incurring any risk to create a diversion in January. Besides, the weather was such as to prevent all operations; and the suspicion which was always entertained that the reinforcements were within reach when the enemy made their movements to the southward, were the principal reasons.

As soon as it was known in Portugal that the French had entered Andalusia, and that the Spanish government desired to have assistance to defend Cadiz, the 79th, 87th, and 94th regts., and 2 companies of artillery, were detached there in the beginning of February, under Major Gen. Stewart, and the 20th Portuguese regt. Nearly at the same time accounts were received that the 2d corps of the French army were entering Estremadura, in concert with, and supported by, the 5th corps (Mortier's), from Andalusia. The 5th corps had left Seville on the 2d and 3d Feb., apparently to disperse a fugitive division of Areyzaga's army, which had crossed the Guadalquivir; but these retired towards Ayamonte, sending their artillery to Badajoz.

It appears that the French government had imagined that the invasion of Andalusia, the possession of Seville and its arsenals, &c., and the dissolution of the Central Junta, would be deemed misfortunes of such magnitude, as that all resistance would cease; and on the same day, the 12th

Feb., they summoned the places of Cadiz, Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Astorga.

Immediately upon receiving information of the entry of the French into Estremadura, Gen. Hill was put in motion on the 12th Feb., with his own British division; 2 brigades of Portuguese infantry, about 4000 strong, under Major Gen. Hamilton; one brigade of British cavalry, about 1000, under Major Gen. Slade; and the 4th regt. of Portuguese cavalry; and one brigade of German, and 2 of Portuguese, artillery. This corps was ordered, in the first instance, to Portalegre; and Gen. Hill was directed to co-operate with the Spanish troops lately under the command of the Duque del Parque, then supposed to have crossed the Tagus; and to prevent the enemy, if possible, from carrying on any serious operation against Badajoz. The enemy retired from Badajoz when they heard of Gen. Hill's arrival at Portalegre. Ciudad Rodrigo was summoned by Marshal Ney with 2 divisions of his corps, and he retired again upon the Tormes, upon finding the advanced guard of the British army crossing the Coa;\* and Astorga was summoned by Gen. Loison, with the 3d division of Ney's corps, who remained in that neighbourhood for some time. Loison was afterwards relieved by the 8th corps, under Junot; and he approached nearer to Salamanca.

From this time no movement of importance was made by either party, till towards the middle of March, when the French corps in Estremadura broke up, and Mortier marched to the southward; and Regnier, with Soult's corps, remained in the neighbourhood of Merida. The allied British and Spanish troops on the frontiers of Portugal and Estremadura were then in some degree superior in numbers to the French corps remaining in Estremadura, and the question whether the latter should be attacked or not was then well considered. In the consideration of every question of this description there are certain topics which must be reviewed, and the following are of the number:

1st; The object in this case would have been, if possible, to cripple, or entirely destroy, the 2d corps of the army which remained in Estremadura; but it is apprehended that this object would have been impracticable. Even supposing that Gen. Hill's and the Marques de la Romana's corps joined had been deemed sufficiently strong to attempt to remove the 2d corps from its position on the Guadiana, they could not have prevented its retreat either to the Sierra Morena, or along the valley of the Guadiana to Ciudad Real, or between the Tagus and the Guadiana towards Arzobispo. The attack must have been made in one concentrated body, on one side or the other of the Guadiana; and the allies would have been able only to choose which way the enemy should retreat, supposing them to have been able to force his retreat.

2dly; The means to effect this object consisted in about 12,000 men, cavalry and infantry, half British and half Portuguese, under Gen. Hill, and about 10,000 Spanish troops, under the Marques de la Romana, whose corps had been much reduced by sickness and want; and Gen. Carrera, with 3000 men, had remained in Old Castille. Against these

\* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of 21st Feb.

the enemy had not less than 16,000 men; for the 2d corps, as well as the others, had received reinforcements.

3dly; The risks to be incurred in this expedition consisted in the probability that the 2d corps would be joined by the 5th corps again, before any serious impression could have been made upon the 2d corps. The Marques de la Romana had at this time but little if any cavalry, and the Spanish cavalry is notoriously bad. The Portuguese cavalry was but newly formed; and the reliance in respect to that arm, in that open country, would have been upon the 1100 British cavalry. The 2d corps was always stronger in cavalry than the allies in Estremadura; but if the 2d corps had been rejoined by the 5th, not only would the enemy's superiority in cavalry have been increased, but in infantry also; and the retreat of the allies to the strong places would have been hurried at least, if not difficult.

4thly; The difficulties in the undertaking, besides those of the season, are of the same description with those which have attended, and invariably must attend, every operation which has been attempted in the Peninsula.

There is an old military proverb respecting these operations which is strictly and invariably true, and that is, that 'if they are attempted with small numbers they must fail; if with large, the army must starve.' The inhabitants of Spain and Portugal will not part with their provisions, even for money. There are no great markets for corn in any part of the Peninsula, excepting the seaports, and some of the very large and populous cities, and the inhabitants subsist generally upon stores formed in their own houses, or buried under ground; and if they are deprived of any considerable portion of their supply for the year, they must either starve or must go to seek for a fresh supply at a great distance, as no neighbour has any to sell. These circumstances account at the same time for the difficulties which the allied armies experienced, while the enemy can subsist with facility. The force used by the allies to obtain subsistence from the country consists in the influence of the civil magistrates: that used by the French is terror. They force from the inhabitants, under pain of death, all that they have in their houses for the consumption of the year, without payment, and are indifferent respecting the consequences to the unfortunate people. The British armies cannot, and the natives will not, follow this example, although the latter go nearest to it. Still, however, no Spanish officer could venture to carry his requisitions for provisions on any town much further than the influence of the civil magistrates would go to procure them; and the Spanish troops have always been in want, where the French armies have afterwards found subsistence. When the Marques de la Romana and his officers were asked whether they would insure the subsistence of the troops upon this expedition, supposing it were undertaken, they answered that they could not; and indeed their own army was at this moment in the utmost distress in their cantonments, and literally perishing for want.\* Upon the whole, then, comparing the only object which could be acquired by this expedition with the risk to be incurred, and the difficulty of the undertaking, it was thought best not to attempt it.

\* See the instruction from Lord Liverpool, of the 2d Jan. 1810, marked 'Secret.'

The next event of any importance that occurred was in the commencement of April; the formal attack of Astorga by the 8th corps, under the Duc d'Abrantes. At this time the expediency of attempting a diversion in favor of the Spaniards, by making a forward movement into Castille, was again considered. In the end of March the British army in Portugal consisted of about 22,000 R. and F., of which 2733 were cavalry. Of the cavalry, 1072, and of the infantry, 5112, were with Gen. Hill in Alentejo, and 400 men at Lisbon, leaving in Beira about 15,000 effective R. and F., cavalry and infantry. About this time the Portuguese army were becoming in a better state of equipment, and we might have drawn 12 regiments of regular infantry, and 4 of chasseurs, making about 14,000 effective R. and F., to the army, exclusive of the Portuguese troops with Gen. Hill. This would have made the allied army in Beira about 30,000 men.

With this force we should have had to attack Marshal Ney at the head of his own corps, which was more numerous than ours\* (infinitely superior in cavalry), in a strong position at Salamanca; having it in his power to draw towards him either the whole or any part of Junot's corps, or of the body of troops under Kellermann in Old Castille, between the time at which he would have heard of our passing the Agueda and that of our arrival at Salamanca, supposing that he had ever allowed us to reach that place. It may be supposed that we might have drawn a part, if not the whole, of Hill's corps into Beira for this operation;† but even with the whole of that corps we were not equal to the operation, and should not have succeeded in obliging the French to raise the siege of Astorga. But if the whole of that corps had been brought from the frontiers of Alentejo to those of Beira,‡ the enemy would have entered the former province, and there was nothing between them and Lisbon.§ To this add, that all the arguments respecting the difficulties for subsistence in the proposed expedition into Estremadura in March were stronger in respect to that in contemplation into Castille in the end of that month and beginning of April, and the weather rendered all operations at that time impracticable. Astorga fell on the 22d April, the magazine having been kept in a church, and it blew up.|| On the 24th the 3d division of Marshal Ney's corps was put in motion from its cantonments towards Ciudad Rodrigo; and it took up its ground on the 26th, and blockaded the place, on the right of the Agueda. On the same day the British advanced guard went to Gallegos, and the communication with the place was open from that time till the 10th June.¶

The British army in Beira was put in motion on the 26th April, and

\* Ney's corps, according to the returns, was 32,000 men.

† Upon more than one occasion, after Mortier withdrew from Estremadura, Gen. Hill was obliged to move to protect Badajoz, and the divisions of the Marques de la Romana's troops, from the operations of Regnier's corps. These movements invariably succeeded. See letters to Lord Liverpool, of the 2d and 23d May.

‡ If Gen. Hill had been withdrawn, the Marques de la Romana would have been entirely destroyed.

§ See the instructions, marked A, from Lord Liverpool, of the 27th Feb. 1810.

|| It is ridiculous to talk of Astorga as a fortified place. It was a walled town, which, excepting in these times, could not have stood one day against a regular attack.

¶ See letter to Lord Liverpool, of the 11th July.

their cantonments were closed up to the front. The head quarters were moved on that day to Celorico from Viseu. There is no doubt but that if the British army had been moved forward to the Agueda in the end of April, Loison's division must have moved from its position in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, or the whole of the 6th corps must have been brought up to its support. But the temporary removal of Loison's division could not prevent the French from making the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, when the state of the weather and rivers would permit them. They had then 57,000 effective men in the 6th and 8th corps in Castille, besides the troops under Kellermann, and some under Seras; and if Loison had been obliged to retire by our troops, it would have only been for a time. Ciudad Rodrigo would have gained nothing by this retreat, for the communication with the town by the left of the Agueda was open as long as it could be under any circumstances;\* while our troops would have suffered all the inconvenience and sickness which would have resulted from drawing them out of their cantonments before the rains were over. Ciudad Rodrigo could have been saved only by such a diversion on the part of Gen. Mahy in Galicia, and of the inhabitants and guerrillas of Castille, when the French armies were drawn together for the siege, as should have obliged the French to detach troops to quell the insurrection, or to force Mahy to retreat again to his mountains, and thus render the besieging army of such a strength as that we might have ventured to attack it. But Gen. Mahy made no movement; the inhabitants looked on with apathy, only abusing us that we did not involve ourselves in the same peril with Ciudad Rodrigo.

The British army in Portugal, on the 1st June, consisted of 25,000 R. and F., of which number 3261 were cavalry; 5381 infantry, and 449 cavalry, were with Gen. Hill; and about 2000 infantry were at Lisbon; leaving in Beira about 17,000 men, of which number about 14,000 were infantry. Of the 2000 men at Lisbon about 1500 belonged to the royals, the 9th and 38th regts., which regiments had been in Walcheren, and it was not deemed expedient to move them from Lisbon till the season should have entirely settled; and they were not moved till the end of June.

The Portuguese army, on the 1st June, consisted of 29,200 effective R. and F., cavalry, infantry, and artillery. Of this number about 1200 cavalry, and 5000 infantry, and 300 artillery, were with Gen. Hill, leaving about 23,000 effective men. There were 5 regiments of infantry in garrisons, one at Cadiz, 3 regiments and 2 battalions of the Lusitanian legion unfit to be brought into the field; making, with the cavalry, also unfit, not less than 10,000 effective men, which would leave about 14,000 in Beira; making, in June, our army in Beira, including artillery, about 32,000 effective men, which was the largest we were ever able to collect upon that frontier.

The 3 Walcheren regiments, the 3 inefficient regiments of Portuguese infantry, the 2 battalions of the Lusitanian legion, and 3 battalions of

\* We sent ammunition and stores into Ciudad Rodrigo to the last moment; I believe as late as the 9th, or even the 10th June, at night.

militia, and 3 brigades of Portuguese artillery, were collected as a reserve upon the Zezere in the beginning of July, under the command of Gen. Leith; but these corps were not fit to be joined to the army till the end of September. I had sent Col. M'Mahon's brigade of infantry away from it in May, as being unfit.

On the 25th June the head quarters were removed to Almeida, in order to be nearer the scene of action; and on the 1st July they were moved to Alverca, as being more centrally situated in respect to our own troops. Every thing was done which could enable the British army to save Ciudad Rodrigo, if it had been practicable; but it was impracticable to attempt it, unless it could be supposed that we should beat an army nearly double the strength of the allied army, having nearly four times the number of cavalry, in a country admirably adapted to the use of that arm. The place surrendered on the 11th July. After the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, the enemy's movements were for some time uncertain, and we could not learn from them his intentions. We knew that Regnier had been ordered to cross the Tagus; and to manœuvre upon Alcantara, with a view to support the attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo. But he did not carry that measure into execution till about the 18th July; and his movement was followed immediately by that of Gen. Hill, who crossed the Tagus likewise at Villa Velha, and took up a position in Regnier's front, in Lower Beira.

At length, on the 24th July, the enemy attacked Gen. Craufurd's division, near Almeida, with the whole of Ney's corps, and obliged it to cross the Coa with some loss. It had been desirable to maintain our posts beyond the Coa as long as possible, as well to observe the movements of the enemy as to keep up the communication with Almeida; but it was not intended to fight an action beyond the Coa. It was necessary to withdraw the troops from the bridge of Almeida that night; and the enemy's advanced guard passed it in the morning, and Almeida was invested. The enemy having passed the Coa in force, it was necessary to withdraw the division of infantry which was at Pinhel, which was liable to be attacked in front by the 8th corps, and on its flank by the 6th; and on the 26th the advanced guard was drawn back to Freixedas, and the army was concentrated between Guarda and Trancoso.

The enemy's designs were still uncertain. From the movements of the 2d and 8th corps, and from the delay to make any preparations for the siege of Almeida, and from the advanced state of the season,\* it was thought most probable that he could not attempt that operation, but would advance into Portugal by the roads which lead through Lower Beira, forcing back Gen. Hill's corps, and turning the right of that under my command; or that he would fall with his concentrated force upon both the flanks and the centre of the corps under my command, and hurry them in their retreat, which must have been made by one road only. The infantry of the army was therefore thrown back one march into the valley of the Mondego, still keeping a division upon Guarda; and Gen. Hill was ordered to Sarzedas, in Lower Beira; Col. Le Cor's division of militia keeping the communication between Gen. Hill and the army.

\* See letters to Lord Liverpool in July and August.

At length, on the 15th Aug., the enemy's design to attack Almeida became manifest; and the army was concentrated again between Trancoso and Guarda; and the advanced guard was moved to Freixedas, as well to oblige the enemy to concentrate his army for the siege, and thus give scope and opportunity to the guerrillas and other troops in Spain to carry on their operations, as to be in a situation to take advantage of any opportunity which offered to strike a blow against the enemy. The place surrendered on the 27th Aug., owing to the magazine having been blown up; and on the 28th the infantry of the army was again thrown into the valley of the Mondego.

In order to render more clear the nature of these and the subsequent operations, it is necessary to point out that the two great entrances into Portugal, between the Tagus and the Douro, are on different sides of the great range of mountains called the Estrella. The rivers Zezere and Mondego rise in the Estrella, and take their course on different sides of that mountain. The former runs a considerable distance to the southward and westward, and then to the southward, and falls into the Tagus at Punhete; the latter runs first to the northward as far as Celorico, where it turns to the westward and falls into the sea at Figueira. Guarda stands upon the eastern extremity of the Estrella, and there the mountain can be passed; and there is no road by which troops can pass the mountains from the valley of the Zezere and the valley of the Mondego, excepting nearly as far to the westward as the Ponte da Murcella, over the Alva. This river likewise rises in the Estrella, and runs in a north westerly direction into the Mondego, into which it falls about 5 leagues above Coimbra.

From this general description, it will be obvious that the British army could not be concentrated for any operation to the eastward of the Alva, without laying open to the enemy one of the great entrances into the country. Gen. Hill's corps could not have joined that under my command, without passing by or to the eastward of Guarda. Regnier was always in his front, and he might immediately have occupied the passes of Lower Beira; and then the safety of the army, and of the capital, would have depended upon the operations of the reserve on the Zezere.

If the reserve had been joined to the army, it would not have been sufficiently strong to undertake any operation of importance; and any accident to Gen. Hill, who was not so strong as Regnier, would have exposed all our interests to ruin. If we could have collected the reserve, which consisted of about 1500 British infantry and 4000 Portuguese troops, and Gen. Hill's corps of about 12,000 men, and the corps in Beira of about 32,000, making a total of less than 50,000 men, we should have had less by 7000 men than the 6th and 8th corps, without including Seras, Bonet, or Kellermann; and the 2d corps, consisting of 16,000 or 17,000, might either have been thrown upon us, or might have been moved through Lower Beira at once upon Lisbon, as there would have been nothing between them and Lisbon in the supposed case. It was therefore determined to observe the movements of the enemy, and to concentrate the army in the first favorable situation that should be found, after they should manifest their line of attack. If they had made their attack by two lines, most probably the army could not have been concentrated till



it reached the neighbourhood of Lisbon; but it was thought probable, from their movements, that they were to make it in one concentrated body by the valley of the Mondego, and measures were taken to concentrate the army on the Serra da Murcella, on the Alva. It was never imagined that they could make the march they did across the Mondego, through Upper Beira. The ground, however, on the north of the Mondego, was not unknown; and the measures which had been taken, with a view to the concentration of the British army on the Alva, facilitated the movement of the troops across the Mondego and their concentration on Busaco.

On the 4th Sept. the head quarters, which had been moved to Celorico on the 28th Aug., were moved to Gouvea, in consequence of the collection of the enemy's force upon the Upper Coa and his movements towards Alverca. They remained there till the 16th, on which day the heads of two corps (the 2d and 6th) of the enemy entered Celorico, and the third (the 8th) Trancoso; the former crossed the Mondego again to Fornos.\* The army was then put in motion, and took up a position, and was concentrated upon the position of Busaco.

The British army in Portugal, at the time of the battle of Busaco, consisted of 27,188 R. and F., of which number 2839 were cavalry: 2200 infantry were at Lisbon, 1900 of which had just arrived: 1350 infantry were on their march to join, leaving in the battle not quite 24,000 men. The Portuguese army at the same time consisted of 26,800 effective R. and F. of infantry, and 3375 cavalry. Of the infantry, 1350 were at Elvas, 1142 at Cadiz, and 563 at Abrantes; leaving 23,800 infantry in the battle. Of the cavalry, 500 were at Elvas, 600 at Badajoz, 500 north of the Douro, and 200 at Lisbon, leaving 1375 with the army; making a total of 25,175. The two armies amounting to about 49,000 men, besides artillery, of which there were 4 brigades and 2 troops of British, and 6 brigades of Portuguese.

The French army consisted of 89 battalions of infantry, which, according to the latest returns, consisted of 56,000 men; 54 squadrons of cavalry, of 8000 men; and about 6000 artillery. The whole army, including sappers, &c., was not less than 72,000 men.

It would have been impossible to detach a corps from the army to occupy the Serra de Caramula after the action of the 27th Sept., when it was found that Col. Trant had not arrived at Sardão. But that corps might have been hard pressed, and obliged to retreat, in which case it must have made its retreat upon Sardão and the north of Portugal.† It could not have rejoined the army; and its services would have been wanting in the fortified position near Lisbon. It was therefore determined to rely upon Col. Trant to occupy the Serra de Caramula, whose line of operations and of retreat was to the northward. Nothing that could have been done (excepting to detach a large corps) could have prevented the French from throwing a large force into the Serra de Caramula. Even after their loss on the 27th, they had at least 12,000 or 14,000 men more than we had, and, good as our position was, theirs was equally good.

\* See letters to Lord Liverpool, of the 20th and 30th Sept.

† This is the great difficulty in Portugal. The frontier is very long, and the country very narrow. The whole country is frontier; and every road in it leads to Lisbon.

When they took the road of the Serra de Caramula, therefore, there was nothing for it but to withdraw from Busaco. After quitting Busaco, there was no position which we could take up with advantage, in which we could be certain that we could prevent the enemy from getting to Lisbon before us, till we reached the fortified positions in front of that place, in which we arrived on the 8th Oct.; and we finally took up our ground on the 15th. Shortly after we arrived, the Marques de la Romana joined us with about 5000 effective R. and F.

In the beginning of the month of November the British army in Portugal consisted of 29,497 R. and F., of which 2479 were cavalry; and 465 infantry were at Lisbon. The effectives of the Portuguese army consisted as follows: infantry 26,500, of which were at Elvas 1500, at Cadiz 1173, and at Abrantes 1500, leaving 22,400 with the army. The effective cavalry consisted of 2637, of which were at Elvas 163, Abrantes 76, in the north 130, and Estremadura 600;\* leaving about 1500 cavalry with the army and at Lisbon; making the Portuguese army about 24,000 men. The British army was 29,000, and the Spanish army 5000, and the artillery made altogether about 60,000 men of the allies.

The French army, at this time, could not have consisted of more than from 50,000 to 55,000 effective men. Their losses by death, desertion, and sickness, must have been considerable; but still they could not, in the beginning of November, be reduced lower than the numbers above stated.

The question of attacking them was then well considered, and it was determined not to carry the measure into execution.† In fact, the chances of success were much against us. The enemy's force, but little inferior in numbers, was much superior in quality to a large part of ours. Their position, as is the case in all strong countries, was nearly as good as our own. We could not have used our artillery against it. We could not have attempted to turn it without laying open some of the roads to Lisbon, of which the enemy would infallibly have taken advantage. The French have shown, throughout the war in the Peninsula, but particularly in the last campaign in Portugal, that they invariably operate upon the flanks and rear, and communications of their enemy, never having any anxiety about their own; and in fact, till they have beaten their enemy in the field they never possess more than the ground they stand upon. This fact is proved in Portugal by their having lost their hospital and every thing belonging to it at Coimbra, only on the day their head quarters left that place; by the difficulty they have, and the constant losses they incur, in sending officers and messengers *en courier*, and by their total want of intelligence.

This system is the consequence of the mode in which they subsist their armies. They plunder every thing they find in the country. Every article, whether of food or raiment, and every animal, and vehicle of

\* In these numbers the present fit for duty only are included. There were of course many cavalry detached from Elvas, Abrantes, and the head quarters of the corps in the north, but they had nothing to do with the operating army; and as the total of the fit for duty was 2637, they are accounted for accordingly.

† See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 3d Nov., for the state of the different armies, and for the reasoning upon an attack.

every description, is considered to belong of right, and without payment, to the French army; and they require a communication with their rear only for the purpose of conveying intelligence and receiving orders from the Emperor.

Other armies cannot exist without a communication with their rear. The British army, in particular, must not lose its communication with its port of embarkation; and this is the principal cause of the great difficulties experienced in a contest with the French.

On the 14th Nov. the French broke up from their position in front of the allies, with their right upon Sobral, and their left upon the Tagus, and retired by different routes to Santarem.\* They here took a strong position, occupying the hill of Santarem with the 2d corps as the head of their cantonments, having the 8th corps to support it on its right; and the 6th corps, in a second line, at Torres Novas, Golegão, or towards the Zezere, over which river they had bridges; and they occupied Punhete as a *tête de pont*. They were followed closely by the allied army; and from the intelligence received on the 17th from the left of the Tagus, of the movements of the enemy from Santarem, it was believed that the army was in full retreat; and that nothing remained at Santarem excepting, at the utmost, the 2d corps as a rear guard. The intelligence (which was received from Major Gen. Fane) was confirmed by the probability that a retreat was the enemy's intention. It was obvious that, as a military body, it was the measure which it was most expedient for them to adopt.

By a retreat into Spain, they would, 1st; have been able to provide their army with plenty of food during the winter.

2dly; They would have been able to put them into good and quiet cantonments.

3dly; They would have been able to provide their numerous sick with surgeons, medicines, &c., the whole of which they had lost.

4thly; They would have been able to clothe and re-equip their troops with shoes, &c., which they required.

5thly; They must have been perfectly aware that even should they be of insufficient strength to hope to make any impression upon the position of the allies in Portugal, they would experience no difficulty in regaining the position of Santarem from the frontier.

And 6thly; They must have been aware that as long as they remained in the country, its cultivation would be impeded: and that by remaining they cut up by the roots the resources which were to enable them to attack the allies upon a future occasion.

These reflections confirmed the intelligence which had been received, that the enemy were in full retreat; and it was believed that the only troops on Santarem were of the 2d corps.

Gen. Hill was therefore detached across the Tagus with the corps which had been under his command on the 18th, and head quarters were moved to Cartaxo;† and, on the 19th, when a sufficient body of troops to support the advanced guard had arrived, the orders were given, not, as is supposed, to attack the position of Santarem, but to cross Rio Maior

\* See letter to Lord Liverpool, of the 21st Nov.

† See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 21st Nov.

river at different points, and attack the enemy's outposts upon it, to enable us to reconnoitre more closely the position of Santarem, and see whether it was practicable to attack the post, and what the enemy's real object was in maintaining himself there. Owing to a mistake of the road by a brigade of guns, the attack could not be made as was intended, and in fact ordered; and in the course of that night and the following morning so much rain had fallen as to render it impracticable to cross the Rio Maior, or indeed scarcely to move the troops at all. We still, however, continued to work on with our troops on the right of the position of Santarem, on which side it appeared most practicable to approach it, till the 22d, when the enemy brought up troops of the 8th corps from their rear, and drove in our piquets beyond the bridge of Calhariz.\*

From this circumstance, and others of which we obtained a knowledge at about the same time, it was then obvious that they had their whole army between Santarem and the Zezere. The question of attacking the enemy on Santarem was then well considered; and the notion was relinquished, as the plan was impracticable at that moment, on account of the state of the roads and rivulets, as well as because it was obvious that the enemy had their whole army collected in certainly the strongest position in Portugal. We could not succeed without immense loss; and we could not make the attempt at that time without incurring the risk of having some of our detachments insulated and cut off from all communication with the others.

About this time we heard of the movements of the enemy's reinforcements on the frontier; and Gen. Silveira had, in November, been successful in an affair with an advanced guard which had been pushed across the Coa.† This was the advanced guard of a division formed under Gen. Gardanne, consisting of convalescents belonging to the 3 corps in Portugal, of 1500 men, which had been sent into Spain in October as an escort to Gen. Foy; and of 2 or 3 battalions belonging to the 8th corps, which had been detached to Gen. Seras by order of the Emperor, and were exclusive of the 89 battalions which entered Portugal. The whole were supposed to amount to 8000 men.

After the affair with Silveira the enemy retired across the Coa again, and went by the Upper Coa by Sabugal, and entered Portugal through Lower Beira, leaving the Estrella to the north on their right hand.‡ They advanced till they reached the Tagus, when they suddenly turned about, on the 25th Nov., and retired into Spain, more in the manner of

\* See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 24th Nov.

† See letter to Lord Liverpool, of the 30th Nov. When the disposition was formed for the defence of Portugal the troops of the line and British troops were brought to the most vulnerable points between the Douro and the Tagus, and to the south of the Tagus. The northern provinces were intrusted to the northern militia, about 15,000 in number, which were the best in Portugal; and they were divided into 3 divisions, one under Gen. Silveira, another under Gen. Miller, and a third under Col. Trant, each division being aided by a body of regular cavalry and artillery; and the whole under the command of Gen. Bacellar. When the enemy's attack upon Portugal was decided upon between the Douro and the Tagus these corps all crossed the Douro, and have continued ever since on this side of that river, engaged in various operations on the enemy's communications; but their principal object is to defend the northern provinces.

‡ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 8th Dec.

the flight of a mob than of the march of troops. The Ordenanza of Lower Beira followed them and did them much mischief; and they suffered much from the badness of the weather.

On the 13th Dec. a division of the 9th corps (which consisted of about 26 battalions of infantry, and had entered Spain in September) broke up from Ciudad Rodrigo with this same division of Gardanne, in consequence of an order received from Paris, to make another attempt to enter Portugal. This division consisted of 11 battalions, and, with Gardanne's, was supposed to be from 13,000 to 16,000 men: they must have been at least 10,000 men.\* They reached the army about the 27th or 29th Dec., having been attacked by Col. Wilson's division of militia on their passage of the Alva, and suffered some loss. They brought no provisions or stores with them.

Since that period, and indeed ever since they took up the position of Santarem, the attention of the enemy has been principally devoted to discover the means of passing the Tagus; and they view our corps on the left of the Tagus, which has continued there, with the utmost jealousy. The general report in their army, when they retired from Sobral, was, and my opinion is, that they intended immediately to cross the Tagus, and establish themselves in Alentejo, from which they were prevented by the passage of Gen. Hill over that river on the 18th Nov.; and they are still prevented by the position of his corps, now under the command of Sir W. Beresford, on the left of the Tagus.

From this memorandum, which applies to events up to the close of the year 1810, it will appear that we had done every thing in our power for the allies. Till lately, we have always been inferior in number, and infinitely inferior in description of troops to the enemy; and, adverting to the instructions which I received, and their spirit and meaning as explained by other letters, I do not think that I should have been justified in attempting more than I have done. Indeed, since the enemy have occupied the position of Santarem, it would have been impossible to attempt any thing, owing to the bad state of the roads and the swelling of the rivulets by the rain.

*Note.* When Regnier passed the Tagus in July, we were aware that Mortier would replace him in Estremadura; but the Marques de la Romana considered his corps to be sufficient not only to keep him in check, but to beat him out of the province. In this last expectation he was disappointed very much by the misconduct of his officers; and a large part of his army was defeated by Mortier on the 11th Aug.† The Marques, however, still continued to hold his ground; and a brigade of Portuguese dragoons soon joined him, which had been detached to reinforce him in cavalry from the reserve which I had formed on the Tagus.‡

After Mortier had defeated this corps he withdrew again into Andalusia, and the Marques de la Romana followed him, and had some successes against his small posts. Mortier then advanced again into Estremadura, and the Marques de la Romana retired; and on the 14th Sept.

\* See dispatches to Lord Liverpool, 15th, 21st, and 28th Dec.

† See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 22d Aug.

‡ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 11th Aug.

the Portuguese cavalry defeated that of the enemy near Fuente de Cantos.\*

The state of affairs in Portugal had induced the Marques de la Romana to turn his attention to this side at about this time; and he had determined to join the allied army with a part of his corps, leaving the divisions of Mendizabal and Ballesteros, and the cavalry, and all the garrisons, in Estremadura.

Mortier, upon hearing of the battle of Busaco, retired again into Andalusia on the 8th Oct.; and the Marques de la Romana was entirely at liberty to break up in Estremadura, and to join the allies without risk to the interests of that province.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, 4th division.*

23d Feb. 1811.

I have had the honor to receive and submit to my Lord Wellington your letter of the 18th inst., and enclosure, from Lieut. Col. —, containing Capt. —'s application for an inquiry. I am to observe, on the purport of those documents, that that officer is not in arrest, no charge has been given in against him, and therefore there is no ground for admitting of a trial. It, however, appears to his Lordship that Capt. — acted in the field in a most extraordinary manner towards his senior officer, Major —, who was responsible to his superior for any fault which might have occurred within his superintendence. It was his duty therefore to correct that fault; and no reply whatever should have been made to him whilst in the performance of that duty.

It has further appeared to the Commander of the Forces that Capt. — has been treated with extraordinary lenity and forbearance; that no charge has been given in against him; and that certainly, till a charge is officially submitted, his Excellency feels in no way disposed to gratify that officer by a useless investigation into his conduct.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 24th Feb. 1811, 7½ A.M.

A deserter came in yesterday from Santarem, a Spanish creole, belonging to the marine, who has been attached to the 2d corps, which he joined about two months ago with Gardanne. He says that the enemy have in a wood, just above Santarem, 2 bridges, as he calls them; and another at Santarem, at which he says he had been employed at work. He could not speak any language very well, and I could not make him understand me; but I rather think that what he calls bridges are rafts. He also says that they have brought down from the Zezere 6 gun boats, in which they passed over to an island the other day 300 men, and brought away 13 bullocks and some pigs. He, as all the deserters whom I have seen, who have been employed at work, says that they have not been badly off for meat, but that the bread is very bad, and that they do not get a quarter of a pound a day, but that they have plenty of vegetables.

I will send this fellow over to you, to point out where the rafts are, and the 6 boats, which I suppose they have armed; and I think it would be worth while to risk a few men to endeavor to bring them off or destroy them.

This boat equipment at Santarem is certainly collected with a view to plunder. There are many cattle on Lumley's plain below Almeirim, which must tempt them vastly; and he should have strong piquets at the Quinta de Leite, &c.; and Lient. Claxton should watch the stream well at night.

Clausel's aide de camp is so badly wounded that I have not seen him;

\* See dispatch of the 20th Sept.

but I understand that he swears he will not lie for any body, and says that each regiment in the army has in its possession biscuit for at least 3 weeks, besides large magazines of grain; that they had many sick about 2 months ago, but were becoming more healthy; that the 9th corps consists of 3 divisions, or 45 battalions.

I was going to Sobral to-day, to sleep at Alemquer to-night, but the day is so bad that I should only get wet and see nothing.

P.S. I am going to Sobral, as the day appears better, and I shall be back to-morrow.

To Capt. the Hon. C. S. Cocks.

Cartaxo, 26th Feb. 1811.

I enclose you a letter which I have received from Lord Somers, and one for yourself, containing his desire that you should return to England.

You must be as well aware as any impression of mine can make you, how severely we shall feel here the loss of your assistance and services; and I am convinced that you will not desire to go if the occasion for your going is not of that urgent nature which would render your remaining any longer with us an injury to your family and yourself. I therefore leave it to you to determine what you will do; and although I have lately referred all applications for leave of absence to the Commander in Chief, I will give you leave if you wish it.

If you do go, I only hope that you will return to us as soon as you can.

P.S. I have received the account of your last success, which is very satisfactory.

To Don Martin de la Carrera.

Cartaxo, 26th Feb. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of this day's date, to which I proceed to reply.

It is desirable, nay necessary, that the army should be relieved as much as possible from the difficulty of providing for, and the trouble and difficulty of taking care of, the persons, as well officers as soldiers, who can render no service, and the animals, as well sick and unserviceable horses of the cavalry, and mules of the same description of the artillery, and both belonging to officers, &c.

I have already stated, in my letter to Gen. Virues of the 5th inst., that all persons, or animals, of this description, ought to be sent to Alburquerque, Valencia de Alcantara, and Alcantara, to be kept there till they are fit to serve, or till their services shall be called for; and I repeat this recommendation, as the condition on which alone I can venture to afford the assistance of my government to the re-establishment of the 5th army. Accordingly, I request to have,

1st; A return, specifying the numbers of cavalry, men and horses, including officers, and their horses belonging to the cavalry, in a state fit for service.

2dly; A return of the numbers of General and other officers of the Staff, and their horses, in a state fit for service, and whose services are necessarily required with the army.

3dly; A return of the number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, with each regiment of infantry, fit for duty.

4thly ; A return of the number of pieces of cannon with the army, the number of mules or horses necessary, and in a state of condition, to draw the same ; and the number of officers, and their horses, non-commissioned officers, and privates required, and able to do duty with the artillery.

5thly ; A return of the number of animals belonging to the *Real Hacienda*, and the animals belonging to the baggage of the army, which it may be necessary to retain with the army.

I shall give directions that all these officers, and soldiers, and animals, shall be regularly supplied with provisions, on condition that the others, which are useless, and a burthen, shall be sent to the places which I have above pointed out, where they can recover, and from whence they can be brought as their services will be required.

The troops cannot be in a better situation for their re-organization than Villa Viçosa, or Estremoz ; and they should send the *Real Hacienda*, and the baggage, mentioned above in the 5th article, not immediately required for the use of the troops, or to aid in procuring them subsistence, to Monte Mór o Novo. The artillery might, with advantage, be brought up to the same place.

I shall give an order that 1000 stands of arms, and sets of accoutrements, shall at present be delivered to the Spanish minister at Lisbon for the use of the 5th army, and 1000 pairs of shoes. In regard to clothing, I don't know that I have any at my disposal. I have it not in my power to make any advance of money to the 5th army. At all events, it would not be reasonable to require the same sum to pay the troops in their existing condition which they required when they were joined with this army. In respect to the Portuguese cavalry, the whole that remains of the army having now retired within the Portuguese territory, in order to collect and refit, it is necessary that that brigade should remain at my disposition, till some progress shall have been made in refitting the army, and some other arrangements shall have been made.

I again call your attention, and that of Gen. Mendizabal, to the situation of Campo Maior, and request to know what quantity of ordnance, and stores, and of what calibre, are in that place. It is most important for Badajoz that the enemy should not obtain possession of Campo Maior. It would give him all that he requires for the siege of Badajoz.

I cannot conclude this letter without again endeavoring seriously to impress upon your mind the necessity of enforcing discipline among the officers and soldiers of the army, and obliging them not to injure the property of the inhabitants of the country. The most serious misfortunes will be the consequence of not attending to my repeated recommendations on this subject.

To the Junta of Estremadura.

Cartaxo, 26th Feb. 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th inst., and I assure you that I am perfectly sensible of the importance to the cause of saving Badajoz. I am very desirous of having it in my power to contribute to the salvation of that place ; and I shall not lose any opportunity of doing so of which the means at my disposal may enable me to avail myself.



To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 26th Feb. 1811.

I have received your letters of the 24th and 25th inst. The former contains as many curious documents as any letter that I have ever seen. How little these people know of us, and how much less of the business of war, in which they are so desirous of meddling! The Bishop's plan of caricaturing and libelling me is admirable. If Lord Wellesley chooses it, however, he may bring that gentleman to his senses, by insisting upon his giving a decided answer to my letter of the 18th Jan.

In respect to the want of provisions at Abrantes, and other wants on which I write to you this day, I repeat what I told you on the 16th; and till Dom M. Forjaz contradicts, or recalls in an equally formal manner, the assertions in his note of the 14th, I shall give no assistance whatever to the Portuguese army from the stores of the British army, let the consequences be what they may. I am instructed by the government to give no assistance of this description, and yet I have been in the habit of giving it daily; and, after all, I am to be held up to the world as the cause of the failures of the Portuguese government, and the consequent disbanding of the army, in libels, &c., founded upon notes acknowledged to contain falsehoods to please a colleague. Till these notes are recalled or contradicted I shall discontinue to give any assistance whatever. Of course I concur in whatever has been done under your sanction to obtain the intelligence which you have sent me.

P.S. I beg you to send the enclosed letter by the packet if it should not have sailed.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 26th Feb. 1811.

I have the honor to enclose you a report from Sir W. Erskine, of the want of bread by the Portuguese brigade of infantry at Marmeleira, under the command of Brig. Gen. Pack, which I request you to lay before the Portuguese government. It was settled by Marshal Sir W. Beresford that there should always be 6 days' bread for the troops in their cantonments, especially those on the advanced post, as these are; but instead of that they have not one day's bread, and in every week receive none for 2 or 3 days. I have also a complaint from 2 companies of caçadores at Rio Maior, who have received no bread for a week. The Portuguese government, however, will expect that these troops should march whenever an opportunity shall offer for them to make an exertion.

It is impossible for me to authorise the British Commissariat to hand over rice to the Portuguese government. Rice is to be purchased for money, at a cheap rate, in the markets of Lisbon. The British Commissariat can purchase what they require; and the officers and soldiers of the British army have subscribed to purchase rice, with which they make soup, to deliver out in all their cantonments to the starving inhabitants who fly from that part of the country in which the enemy are stationed; and I should think that the government can experience no difficulty in procuring what they require of the same article for the use of their armies.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 26th Feb. 1811, 8½ A.M.

I received yesterday, upon my return, your letter of the 23d, at night,

and in the evening your letters of the 24th and 25th. I hope you received my letter of the 24th, enclosing one from Mendizabal about Campo Maior.

If you make a dash at the boats, I recommend, should it be made in the night, that the party should be small, not more than 50 or 60 men perhaps.

I did not receive the second letter mentioned by Hardinge, containing the enclosures for Romana. The dragoon who brings the letters should have a cloth to roll them up in, as the cover is generally torn off them.

I saw yesterday the Lusitanian legion, and the 8th regt., and a brigade of 6 pounders in Campbell's division, and the 2 brigades of 3 pounders. There were about 2000 men under arms in the legion and the 8th regt. altogether. The legion marched better than I expected: but they did not stand very well under arms, and they are a miserable body of men. One third of them at least are too small and too weak to carry arms. The 8th are all boys without one exception; but they are very fine boys. They marched well, and stood tolerably well in the ranks. I cannot give my opinion upon the manœuvring of either, as my friend Campbell appears to have neglected that branch in the whole division; and I don't think that either English or Portuguese marched or formed according to principles. However, that will be remedied.

The mules in all the brigades are in working condition, and that is all; by no means in the state in which they ought to have been, after so much rest, and at the commencement of a campaign. I observed that almost all the artillerymen wore mustachios, which I think is contrary to your orders.

Whilst writing to you upon this subject, I may mention that I have heard that the 12th regt., at Alhandra, is in very bad order. I think it would be desirable that Gen. Hamilton should go over for a day or two and take a look at them.

P.S. I learn from England, by a letter of the 5th, that the ministry are not to be changed. The King is better, and has in some degree recovered his sight.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 27th Feb. 1811.

I received yesterday evening your 2 letters of the 26th. My opinion has always been, that the enemy construct works for the employment, as well as to afford conversation, to their troops. I believe their engineers, as well as ours, are always willing to construct a work which costs nothing but the labor of the soldiers.

I will lend you transports for any purpose for which you may require them. You have only to state where you want to send them, and for how many.

I enclose the duplicate of my letter of yesterday, which we fear the guide who carried it took to the enemy, as we have not heard of his taking it to Muguem.

P.S. I still send the duplicate, although I have reason to hope that the guide crossed at Vallada.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 27th Feb. 1811.

I always considered that, although we might have a claim to salvage for

the British ships and cargoes saved at Oporto, we had none for the Danish ships. This was, however, merely a private opinion, in which I was very likely to be wrong; and I am glad to find that the government have decided otherwise. I understand that the appeal on the salvage question was *decided* in our favor on the 26th Jan.; and I have been desired to send home lists of claimants, which I shall do immediately. I never had a doubt of the claim of yourself, the *Semiramis*, and *Nautilus*, to share in any benefit resulting from the capture of Oporto, and I understand from my letter that all the lawyers co-operated on the appeal.

I enclose the only orders which I have received regarding prisoners or deserters by the last post. I never received those prohibiting their being sent home.

It will give me great pleasure to see you and Sir J. Yorke, when he shall arrive.

P.S. I enclose the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry on — —, which I request you to peruse, and send me your opinion of him. I beg you to return the enclosed papers.

*The A.G. to the Officer commanding — dragoons.*

27th Feb. 1811.

I beg leave to acquaint you that his Excellency the Commander of the Forces has been pleased to direct that Major — should be discontinued as A. A. G. on the staff of this army, in consequence of that officer not returning to his duty at the expiration of the leave granted to him by his Lordship. I have therefore to request you will be pleased to cause an alteration with respect to the Major to be made in the monthly return, which is herewith returned.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 28th Feb. 1811.

I received last night only yours dated the 26th and 27th A.M. I enclose the state of the 6th division, from which you will see how the corps stand.

Stopford, Kemmis, and Peacocke are made Brig. Generals, and all have brigades or commands already. I think, however, that I can remove —.

G. O.

Cartaxo, 28th Feb. 1811.

1. The exclusive privilege of selling tobacco, snuff, and soap, is vested by the law of Portugal in certain contractors, who are bound to sell those articles of the best quality at certain prices, regulated by their contract.

2. The contractors for the sale of tobacco, snuff, and soap, having called upon the Commander of the Forces for his protection and assistance, to enable them to avail themselves of the contract in the cantonments occupied by the troops, he has consented to their request, on condition that they will always have in the cantonments of the troops a sufficient quantity of the articles specified to answer the demand, which shall be sold to the troops at the prices stated in the contract.

The Commander of the Forces requests the General officers commanding divisions and brigades, the Commanding and other officers of the regiments, will assist the agents of the contractors in the enjoyment and performance of this contract.

The Provost Marshal and the Assist. Provosts, with the several divisions, are to prevent the sale of the articles which are specified in the contract in the cantonments of the troops, by persons not authorised by the contractors or their agents to sell them, provided, 1st; that the contractors and their agents take care that the supply of the articles is sufficient for the demand of the troops: and 2d; that the troops can always purchase them at the rates specified in the contract.

If these two conditions are not strictly complied with, the Commander of the Forces requests the General and other officers not only not to protect the contractors, but to encourage dealers of all descriptions to attend the troops with these articles.

Now that you have mentioned it, I believe I recollect that there was an old breeze between Gen. — and —, when both were in the 82d. I am not astonished at it, as — was certainly the most inattentive regimental officer that ever was seen; and I should doubt that attention to his duty was his style even as a General officer.

The best way of settling the communication is to arrange how long the dragoons shall be going each stage, and make the officer at each stage mark the hours of arrival and departure; and then we shall see whether the delay, which is enormous (for I arrived here from where I left you in less than 3 hours), is to be attributed to the dragoons on this or the other side of the water, or to both, or to the seamen. Your letters scarcely ever arrive till 8 o'clock at night.

The regulations about post horses are like every thing else done by the Portuguese government. They first make a regulation, and then complain that we break it; then I adopt measures to insure obedience to it; and at last it ends in nobody obeying it excepting the British army.

— is as harsh about passports as he is about every thing else, and never gives one; I scarcely ever give one; and nobody else has any to give. I believe, however, that officers can get the post mules without posting orders, because the government order in that respect is not obeyed; and besides, as you say, I believe that every clerk in office has the power of giving posting orders, about which we are so careful.

There is nothing new here. I was yesterday beyond Calhariz. Every thing is in the same state; but I thought I saw more soldiers walking about. The cavalry vedette was replaced upon the hill in front of Pero Filho. By the bye, Regnier's aide de camp said yesterday that the man who deserted lately in a boat is a robber and a murderer. He is the Spanish creole whom I sent to you. He is, at all events, a liar of the first magnitude. He told Lumley, it appears, that he was brought round from Cadiz to Figueira two months ago, with 5000 men!

I found the road at Calhariz rather dryer yesterday than usual, notwithstanding the recent rains, but still difficult for carriages.

*The A.G. to General Officers commg. divisions. (Circular.)*

28th Feb. 1811.

I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to draw your attention to the expediency of availing yourself of the present opportunity of exercising together the several brigades and battalions of which the division under your command is composed, as far as local circumstances will permit. His Excellency has further commanded me to call your attention particularly to the movements, manœuvres, and formations, and the detail of them, pointed out in the enclosed memorandum.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 1st March, 1811, 1 oon.

I received your letter of the 27th at night. Mr. Aymer acted by the orders of the Commissary Gen., in carrying away the straw from the lower part of the left of the Tagus. However, as it is inconvenient to the troops there, I have given him directions to stop the removal of any more. I imagine, however, that there is now there more than you can consume. Mr. Kennedy is removing the straw from Benavente and that part of the river. I have received your letter of the 28th.

If you think you have too many troops close to the river left, and more than is necessary, and that the number in that part will render it difficult to move without the enemy's knowledge, you had better draw them in again; I should think, however, the frequent changes and reliefs of the troops thereabouts would have the effect of inducing the enemy to doubt whether there was any great change, even if they should perceive a diminution of numbers.

I had yesterday a telegraph communication from Elvas, that the French made a brisk attack upon Badajoz, about half past 3; but I did not hear how it ended, or whether it was with cannon, or an assault. This morning I have no intelligence.

I am sorry to tell you that an officer, Lieut. Burke,\* 45th, has deserted to the enemy, and has arrived at Santarem.

If the officer who writes the enclosed will state what his rank is, you may desire Mr. Ogilvie to give him a month's pay.

P.S. I am not certain that, if you make the attempt on the boats, it would not be better to do it in a few smaller boats than in one large.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 1st March, 1811.

Col. Peacocke has been desired to send ——— on board the *Bar-fleur*, to be disposed of as you may think proper.

Capt. Cocks, of the 16th light dragoons, is going home; and, as I understand that you propose to send a ship of war with the mail on Sunday, I shall be obliged to you if you will allow him to have a passage in her.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 1st March, 1811.

I received this morning your letter of the 27th. I have perused the paper on the grain at Lisbon, &c. It is satisfactory as far as it goes; but there is one material omission in it, and that is, what measures have been taken, or are in contemplation to adopt, to secure the supply for the remainder of the year.

You will observe that the ports of America will have been shut against us on the 1st Feb. It is possible, nay, probable, that the grain for which you sent the £400,000 may not have quitted the ports of America at that time, and it is at all events desirable not to neglect any means which can be adopted to secure so important an object.

P.S. I have lately received several anonymous letters, which I suspect have been written under the directions of the Principal, the Bishop, &c., and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send me any papers you have in the handwriting of either of those persons or their secretaries, &c.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B., 1st division.

1st March, 1811.

I have to report that the Commander of the Forces proposes to inspect the 3d division of infantry on Monday the 4th inst.; and his Lordship has expressed a desire that the brigade of Major Gen. Howard should, from its contiguity to the cantonments of the former division, be annexed to it, and attend the directed inspection. Under this arrangement, I have the honor to request you will cause instructions to be transmitted to Major Gen. Howard to place himself under the

\* This officer was mad, and was left behind by Marshal Massena when he retreated.

command of Major Gen. Picton on that occasion, who has been directed to give him the hour and place of rendezvous.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Picton, 3d division.*

1st March, 1811.

I am directed to communicate to you that the Commander of the Forces proposes to inspect the 3d division of infantry on Monday next, the 4th inst. It is also the desire of my Lord Wellington that Major Gen. Howard's brigade of the 1st division should form a part of your force. I have in consequence reported this arrangement to Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, requesting that orders should be transmitted to Major Gen. Howard to place himself under your command on that occasion.

It is his Lordship's wish that you should form on the open or common ground in the vicinity of Alcoentre, at your own hour, which you will be so good as to mention to Major Gen. Howard, and communicate to me for his Excellency's information.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Picton, 3d division.*

1st March, 1811.

I am to inform you that on the 27th ult. a French officer, with a flag of truce, informed the officer commanding the outposts that an English officer of the 45th regt. had deserted and reached Santarem; but to this report my Lord Wellington attached no credit, till his Lordship heard from me that Lieut. Burke, of the 45th regt., had been absent and unaccounted for since the 23d ult.

Although my Lord Wellington thinks there is no reason to doubt that Lieut. Burke has committed this crime, which hitherto has been unknown among the officers of the British army, it is desirable that, as far as possible, light should be thrown on the possible causes of this conduct, and that Lieut. Burke's actions at and immediately previous to the period of his desertion should be ascertained and recorded. It is his Lordship's wish therefore that a Court of Inquiry, composed of officers of the 45th regt., should be assembled to investigate this circumstance. They will write down all that occurred, referring to the occasion of Lieut. Burke's quitting the regiment, the hour at which he went, and where he was last seen, where he said he was going, and his alleged motives. The Court will endeavor to ascertain whether any grounds of suspicion were manifested or were entertained lately that he had had correspondence with the enemy. They will learn whether he had any acquaintance in the country or at Lisbon; and if so, who they were; whether he was capable of taking any plans of the works at Alcoentre, or was curious respecting them. In short, it is to be their object to throw light upon this occurrence; and they will for that purpose record on their proceedings whatever information may appear to deserve attention, or likely to lead to a knowledge of the motives of Lieut. Burke's conduct.

To Gen. Don Gabriel de Mendizabal.

Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

I had the honor of receiving this morning the letter of your Excellency, dated the 26th Feb., and Gen. Leite has transmitted me a copy of that which you addressed to him on the —.

When I addressed your Excellency on the 23d inst, my wish was to draw your attention to the serious consequences to the town of Badajoz of the probable loss of Campo Maior, if that place should not be secure from an attack by *coup de main*; and I stated to you that the place had been delivered over to the late Marques de la Romana at his request, and under an honorable engagement to defend it. In your answer to me, your Excellency has informed me that the place has already in it the number of men which I stated to be necessary for its defence against a *coup de main*, and in your letter to Gen. Leite of the —, you called upon him

G. O.

Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

*Memorandum.* Divine service at the usual hour to-morrow morning.

to assist in its defence, and for his opinion upon its defence; which opinion, by a reference to my letter, your Excellency will find you were requested to ask only after Badajoz should fall, whether it was expedient, or otherwise, still to retain possession of Campo Maior. My opinion is, that at all events the place must be kept till Badajoz shall fall; and when Badajoz shall fall, it will become a question whether the garrison should be kept in Campo Maior, upon which I requested your Excellency to consult the opinion of Gen. Leite.

In respect to the statement in your Excellency's letter of the 26th Feb., that there was already a garrison in Campo Maior more numerous than that which I had stated to be necessary for its defence, I have to inform your Excellency that Gen. Carrera informed me that there were in Campo Maior 600 men, but 400 of them recruits without arms. I stated to your Excellency that 500 good infantry under a good Commanding officer were necessary to preserve this place against an attack by *coup de main* by the enemy.

I have already informed your Excellency of my opinion of the importance of the preservation of Campo Maior and Badajoz, and of the honorable engagement entered into by the Marques de la Romana, when he obtained possession of that place at his own desire. Your Excellency will decide immediately whether you will, or will not, perform that engagement in the manner pointed out in my letter of the 23d Feb., and will inform Gen. Leite of your determination. If you should determine not to comply with the suggestions contained in that letter, I will then request you to deliver over the place to the charge of Gen. Leite, as soon as he shall have troops prepared to take possession of Campo Maior, according to instructions which will be sent to him.

I am concerned to learn that Badajoz is already distressed for provisions. I had understood from Gen. Carrera that there were in Badajoz sufficient quantities of grain to last the garrison for 6 months, and meat to last the garrison for 4 months.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st inst., and its enclosure from Gen. Leite, which I return together with Gen. Leite's to you of the ——. I likewise enclose a letter to Gen. Mendizabal, which I request you to peruse, and to forward open to Gen. Leite for his perusal.

My own opinion of Campo Maior is that neither the fort, nor what is called the citadel, can be defended against a regular attack. In its present state (at least in the state in which it was in 1809), the citadel could not be defended at all against an enemy in possession of the town, without material improvements, which there are not means or time to make. The plan proposed by Gen. Leite therefore will not answer. When Campo Maior was given over to the Marques de la Romana, it was particularly stated to him that it was desirable not to place in that garrison any ordnance, or stores, which could be used in the attack of Badajoz or Elvas. I am apprehensive, however, that this desire was not attended to, and that there are ordnance in the place, and stores, of which the enemy are in

want for the attack of Badajoz. In this view, therefore, the preservation of the place is important to Badajoz. It is also important in another view, as, if the enemy have possession of Campo Maior, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to make any movement across the Caya for the relief of Badajoz, particularly if that river should be full. I do not consider the place to be of any importance in respect to Elvas. If Badajoz should fall, there will be no want of ordnance and stores for the attack of Elvas.

Campo Maior is beyond the Caya, and all movements for the relief of Elvas must be made within that river. It is not probable that a garrison of 500 men, which would keep the place against an attack by *coup de main*, would do much good to Elvas upon the enemy's communications with Badajoz, from which they would be at some distance, if the Caya should not be full. Still, however, there is a considerable population at Campo Maior, whom it is desirable to save from the ravages of the enemy, and in this view it might be desirable to risk 500 men in Campo Maior. It might also be desirable in another view, viz., in case the enemy, after having obtained possession of Badajoz, should be desirous of entering the Alentejo, without attacking Elvas. Campo Maior would then stand upon his communications, and he must either break ground before the place, which would create an important delay, or he must incur all the inconvenience of leaving that place in our possession behind him. In these two views it might be desirable to risk the loss of 500 men, to save the place, or to delay the enemy.

I request you to communicate these opinions to Gen. Leite, and desire him to determine whether he will endeavor to save the place, according to his own view of his means. From the correspondence which has already taken place with the Spanish Generals, he will observe that there is but little chance that they will attempt to hold the place after Badajoz shall fall, and indeed it is doubtful whether Gen. Mendizabal will put in it the garrison which I deem necessary to defend it against a *coup de main*, even till Badajoz shall fall. If Gen. Leite should find that to be the case, he cannot in my opinion do better than to send to Campo Maior the detachment he proposes of the Portalegre militia, sending out of the place all the Spaniards and their establishments. If he finds Gen. Mendizabal determined to hold the place, as recommended by me, till Badajoz shall fall, but not disposed to hold it any longer, and if Gen. Leite should wish to hold it any longer upon the grounds of the reasoning contained in this letter, it would then be desirable that he should send there the Portalegre militia immediately, and allow Gen. Mendizabal to withdraw the Spanish troops and establishments by degrees.

I agree in opinion with Gen. Leite that it is not probable that the enemy will attack Marvão. At all events, 300 or 400 men are sufficient to defend that place against any attack; and he may safely send the remainder of the Portalegre militia to Campo Maior.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

I return Leite's letters upon Campo Maior, and I enclose you an official letter upon that subject, which contains one for Gen. Mendizabal. I have received one from him, in which, among other things, he now informs



me, that Badajoz wants provisions; fortunately, however, I believe the fact to be, as before stated by Gen. Mendizabal, that, having seized all the provisions in the houses of the inhabitants who had fled, the troops have enough to last for some months. Carrera so stated in an official letter I had from him the day before yesterday, when he was here. Badajoz was warmly engaged again yesterday morning.

A brig arrived yesterday, which spoke with Sir Joseph Yorke off Cape Finisterre, and I expect he will arrive this day. The island of Mauritius is taken.

P.S. The report from Badajoz of this morning is that there is a heavy fire there, and the defence very vigorous.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 1st inst. I beg you to advert to my letter to you on the subject of our taking charge of the Portuguese commissariat. I am apprehensive that it is impracticable to effect that object, without entering into all the details of the government.

I believe that the answer to my letters respecting the soldiers has been dictated by the Bishop and Principal, as it is not in the friendly terms in which those letters were written formerly.

Upon the subject of the duties on our consumption, I request you to advert particularly to a memorandum which I sent Mr. Dunmore, through the Commissary Gen., some days ago.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st inst.

There has been no demand from the Portuguese government, that I have heard of, for the delivery of ——— to the Portuguese authorities; when that demand shall be made it will be complied with. You are the best judge of the propriety of any foreign government passing a sentence upon one of His Majesty's subjects, that he shall serve for 5 years on board His Majesty's fleet.

I conclude that the soldier of the 16th light dragoons is given over to me, to be dealt with as I may think proper.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

I have the honor to transmit, for your Lordship's information, a return of supplies remaining in the British stores in Portugal on the 28th ult.

P.S. I also enclose an estimate of the probable receipt and expenditure from 25th Feb. to 24th March.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

I have received your Lordship's dispatch, No. 7, of the 28th Jan., regarding prisoners of war.

Adm. Berkeley had previously communicated to me the orders which he had received from the Admiralty, dated the 5th Jan., not to send any more French prisoners or deserters to England; and I conceive that, till those orders are countermanded, the suggestions contained in Mr. Barrow's letter to Col. Bunbury, and those contained in former communica-

tions, are unnecessary, as of course the Admiral will refuse to attend to any request from me to send home prisoners or deserters. Indeed it would be improper to make such a request, as long as the orders of the 5th Jan. are in existence.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

No event of importance has occurred since I addressed you on the 23d Feb.

The enemy have continued their operations against Badajoz, but without much effect; and the fire of the place is well kept up, and the garrison in good spirits.

Gen. Mendizabal is endeavoring to collect and reorganise his corps at Villa Viçosa, in Portugal.

The enemy moved a large force, with cannon, upon Lient. Col. Grant, at Covilhão, on the 18th Feb.; and he was obliged to withdraw the Ordenanza from thence, and retire to Alpedrinha, where he was, according to the last accounts.

The enemy have made no movement of any importance in front of this army.

I am concerned to inform your Lordship that Lieut. R. Burke, of the 45th regt., deserted on the 23d Feb., and went over to the enemy at Santarem. The 45th are stationed in the neighbourhood of Alcoentre; and he must have crossed the Rio Maior river within our posts at Rio Maior, and must have joined the enemy by some of the roads which lead into the right of their position.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811, 11 A.M.

I received last night your letters of yesterday, Nos. 1, 2, and 3.

I will speak to the Commissary Gen. respecting the straw, and the Commissariat arrangement mentioned in No. 3, upon both of which I will request him to write to Mr. Ogilvie.

Our correspondent of Salamanca is certainly well informed of every thing. I should think that Claparède has been very desirous of coming down from Guarda, at least if the climate is what it was last year.

The desire of the government to appoint Le Cor to the government of the Minho is consistent with their other recent proceedings, to form a separate Portuguese interest in this country. My opinion is that if we cannot get Massena out of his present situation, and alter the whole state of the war, Bessières will invade Tras os Montes and the Minho at an early period of the season; and I would depend upon Col. Wilson in Minho much rather than upon Le Cor, who, as you observe, could not well be replaced where he is. But you will find that the government will not yield this point, and I should not be surprised if the Bishop and Principal made their stand upon it.

Baron Eben has made some curious discoveries at Lisbon, and has given Mr. Stuart some papers written by those personages, which tend to show their folly, equally with their mischievous dispositions. Among other plans, they have one for libelling and caricaturing me in England! They complain that you and I have had hunting parties! and that I eat a

good dinner at Oporto, instead of pursuing Soult! I have this day discovered that some of the anonymous letters to me are written by the Principal, and I suspect others by the Bishop. But this last is not quite so clear. These are men to govern a nation in difficult circumstances!

There was a very brisk attack upon Badajoz yesterday; and I was apprehensive, by the last report in the evening, that the enemy had got into the covered way. But the report of this morning is that the place continues to defend itself, and that there was a heavy fire of musketry on the esplanade: so that the enemy are not in the covered way.

I enclose letters from Blunt. It is almost useless to write to the government upon any subject; they will not do what we desire them. Indeed I doubt if they can. Cocks has already informed me of this disorder at Caldas, and I have removed the dragoons from thence. You will also see another letter from Blunt, which Murray has, upon the subject of cattle seized by the 21st regt., upon which I write to Mr. Stuart. But it is all useless. Gen. Lumley appears to have been on the alert last night. What do you think of his alarm?

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811.

I enclose a letter from Col. Ellis of the 23d regt., and its enclosures, containing a request that 60 pieces of Russia duck, consigned to him from England for the use of the 23d regt., under his command, may be passed through the Custom house, duty free, which I beg to lay before the Governors of the Kingdom, with my request that this application may be complied with. I beg you to return the enclosures.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 2d inst. One of the anonymous letters to me is positively written by Principal Sousa. Two others are, I think, written by the Bishop; but of this last I cannot be so certain, as his note to *Baron Eben* is written upon good paper, with a good pen; the letters written by the same person to me are upon bad brown paper, with a bad pen. The characters in both are very similar; and I have but little doubt that the letters are written by the Bishop. It would be very desirable to see more of his writing, if you can get some for me. If I can prove the fact clearly, I shall send the letters to the Prince Regent, that he may see what clever fellows the Governors of the Kingdom are.

The British army are now nearly 2 months in arrears of the usual mode of payment, and I believe there is no money now in the military chest. I will, however, speak to the Commissary Gen.; but is it not desirable to come to a settlement with the Portuguese government, at least up to the close of the last year?

You don't mention the dates of the accounts from Sampayo from Alexandria.

We must think of some means of getting more grain, otherwise this miserable people will starve.

P.S. I sent you, on the 25th Aug., a letter from Principal Sousa to me, of the 15th Aug., which you never returned to me; but which would be likely to throw more light on the anonymous letter, and probably enable me to do with it what I wish.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811.

I enclose the extract of a letter from Brig. Gen. Blunt, containing a complaint of an officer and party of the 21st regt., for seizing and carrying off the cattle of the inhabitants.

I have repeatedly represented to the government the necessity of providing for the wants of their troops, if they intended that their discipline should be preserved, or that they should exist in the state of a military body at all. It is impossible to punish soldiers, who are left to starve, for outrages committed in order to procure food; and, at all events, no punishment, however severe, will have the desired effect of preventing the troops from seizing what they can get to satisfy their appetite, when neglected by those whose duty it is to supply their wants. There is certainly no want of cattle, but the government will not adopt the measures to procure funds to purchase them; and the troops are left to plunder any property which may unfortunately fall in their way.

I have also to mention that Sir W. Erskine again, yesterday, reported to me the wants of Gen. Pack's brigade, and their consequent sickness. This is the fifth day that they have been without bread.

The season is now approaching, during which it may be expected that the roads will become practicable, and that the troops may move. Whatever the enemy may have done, it has never been possible to move either the Portuguese or British troops in Portugal without supplies of provisions; and of course it cannot be expected that any will be found in any part of the country under existing circumstances. I request the government to advert seriously to this fact, and to turn their minds to measures which shall provide their operating troops at least with the supply of a few days.

If any opportunity were now to offer, as it probably will soon, of making an advantageous movement, I declare that I don't know how I can move the Portuguese troops, as they are entirely destitute of all means of supply. This is a subject which must be brought under the consideration of the King's government. His Majesty supplies not only the pay, but money to pay for the provisions of 30,000 men; yet these men are not better provided than others, for the whole army is absolutely without food. I would also beg to observe, that in consequence of the want of food, and the want of means in the hospitals, the effective strength of the Portuguese army diminishes every month, while that of His Majesty's troops increases.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811.

I beg that you will draw the attention of the government to a fact that has come to my knowledge, viz., that there is a very dangerous contagious fever among the inhabitants at Caldas, and suggest to them the expediency of sending medical aid to Caldas. It is desirable that, if the government should determine to adopt any measure on this subject, no time should be lost.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811.

I enclose a letter from Don Martin de la Carrera, and the answer to it, which will explain to you the state of the 5th Spanish army, and the measures to be adopted to collect and refit it. It is very desirable, on many accounts, that the officer appointed to command this army should

join it, and that the government should make an exertion to send here some money for its use.

I likewise enclose a correspondence which I have had with the Junta of Estremadura. I likewise enclose 2 letters which I have received from Gen. Mendizabal, in answer to letters from me, of which I enclosed copies in my last dispatch. I beg you to observe that in the first the misfortune which occurred at Badajoz on the 19th inst. is attributed to me, because I did not send cavalry to reinforce Gen. Mendizabal. I believe it is more necessary for me to justify myself for having trusted Gen. Madden's brigade to the direction of Gen. Mendizabal, than for having omitted to reinforce Gen. Mendizabal with British cavalry. Till it can be shown that 10,000 Spanish infantry, and 1500 cavalry, with cannon, in a good position, having one flank resting upon the outworks of Badajoz, ought not to be expected to defend themselves against 4000 French infantry and 1800 cavalry, for that is the whole of the French force employed upon this occasion, this misfortune will not be attributed to me.

The second letter is an answer to mine of the 23d, a copy of which went to you by the last post, relating to Campo Maior; and I refer you to my answer to it, in which you will find an exposition of the want of candor of Gen. Mendizabal, in assuring me that there was a garrison in Campo Maior, more numerous than that which I had suggested should be left there, as in fact two thirds of them were recruits without arms. I also beg leave to refer you to Gen. Mendizabal's letter to Gen. Leite, upon the subject of this fortress, which is referred to in my letter to Gen. Mendizabal of yesterday.

I have reason to believe that there is no want of provisions at Badajoz. It is certainly true that none had been provided; but when the communication with the place was opened in the beginning of February, after the enemy had invested it, the inhabitants were obliged to quit the place; and they left behind them their provisions, which have been seized for the troops. I understand that they had, as the inhabitants of the Peninsula in general have, a supply in their houses to last them for the year.

I likewise enclose a letter from Gen. Ballesteros, giving an account of a success he has had against the enemy. I understand that Gen. Ballesteros has since received orders to approach nearer to Cadiz.

The enemy have continued their attack upon Badajoz, and commenced a heavy fire upon the place on the 28th inst. They have intrenched one battalion on the heights of San Christoval, and have some cavalry upon the Caya and upon the Gevora.

They appear inclined to construct a bridge over the Guadiana, below Badajoz, and have commenced a *tête de pont*. They have got possession of some of the pontoons belonging to the bridge which was in Badajoz, and which were removing to Elvas, in consequence of my repeated suggestion, when the Spanish army was surprised and defeated. I was assured that these pontoons were destroyed; but it now appears that the enemy have possession of them.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811.

I enclose my dispatch of yesterday. We have a telegraph communi-

cation with Elvas; and there has been hard fighting at Badajoz for the last 3 days. There was a heavy fire there this morning; and it appears that the enemy had not yet established themselves on the glacis.

Sir J. Yorke is not yet arrived, but he was spoken to off Cape Finisterre 3 days ago. Accounts had been received in England before he left it, that the island of Mauritius had surrendered, the inhabitants having refused to co-operate in its defence.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 4th March, 1811.

I received last night your letters, Nos. 4 and 5, of the 2d, one of 10 A.M., and one of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  P.M. of yesterday. Madden must act according to his former instructions, separate from the Spaniards, in case the French should enter the Alentejo. Otway must fall back upon you, losing no time if the enemy should take the Estremoz road, which he certainly will not.

By the last telegraph of yesterday it appears that Badajoz had the best of it. The enemy's fire had ceased, and the fort's continued. I will order transports for your recruits; but if the intelligence of the enemy's movements be true, I conclude that you would prefer that they should march. To whom is the Agent of transports to communicate at Oporto? Would you wish the recruits to land at Peniche? Have they any officer to take charge of them in the transports, or to draw their provisions for them?

The regiments of Arganil, &c., had better be collected at Oporto, and we will eventually bring them down to the lines.

I think it likely that the enemy are about some move; but we have so frequently been disappointed that it is impossible to be certain. There is no alteration whatever in front. I have the report of this morning, and I was yesterday evening on the left of Elder's post. I am going to look at the 3d division.

P.S. The *Ethalion* is arrived, but the three-deckers are supposed to be blown off by the easterly wind. It is now 5 days since they were spoken to. I understand that the ships are now off the bar.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Lumley.

Cartaxo, 4th March, 1811,  $6\frac{1}{2}$  P.M.

I received your note of this morning. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know at an early hour to-morrow morning, if you should perceive any difference at Santarem in the course of this night or in the morning.

G. O.

Cartaxo, 4th March, 1811.

1. As the object in assembling the troops in any station, to witness a punishment, is to deter others from the commission of the crime for which the criminal is about to suffer, the Commander of the Forces requests, that upon every occasion on which the troops are assembled for this purpose, the order may be distinctly read and explained to them, and that every man may understand the reason for which the punishment is inflicted.

2. As during the two years during which the brigade of Guards have been under the command of the Commander of the Forces, not only no soldier has been brought to trial before a Gen. Court Martial, but no one has been confined in a public guard; the Commander of the Forces desires that the attendance of this brigade, at the execution to-morrow, may be dispensed with.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 5th March, 1811, 6 A.M.

I received last night your letter of the 3d at night, and that of the 4th, 10 in the morning.

I went to the front yesterday, after returning from the review, and I could perceive no difference, excepting that there were no howitzers in the work or in the low ground. There were 2 guns of small calibre in the work, and one in the *flèche* in the low ground. The other *flèche* was masked. I could not perceive any guns on the heights. Bushes had been laid to cover the stations which they had occupied, and I conclude that these have been removed. The outposts were the same; and I did not observe any other alteration on the great heights, excepting that all the people I saw were fully accoutred.

I have not yet received the report of this morning; but I should think that the movement of the troops has not yet been made, at least generally. It is probable that the baggage, stores, and the heavier part of the artillery have been sent off, but that the effective part of the army still remains. There was no alteration on the outposts on our left yesterday. I have, however, closed up Cole's division to this place this morning; and I have ordered Sir W. Erskine to Azambujeira, &c., in case matters should be found this morning in such a state as to render it expedient to make an attack upon the position.

In respect to your corps, the former plan, in case of the retreat of the enemy, was, that it should cross the Tagus at Abrantes, and annoy the enemy on his supposed march through Lower Beira. It is not probable that he is going that way. However, I think that if you find the movement in your front to be decided, you should detach a brigade of infantry, with some cavalry and artillery, to Abrantes, to obtain possession of the right bank of the Tagus as low as the Zézere; and then bring the bridge of Abrantes down, and place it upon the Tagus, in such a situation as will give us a short communication between the 2 corps. This will be an object, whatever may be the future line of our operations.

The reinforcements have arrived, and we shall be able in a few days to attack the enemy if he retains this position, or possibly to attack him in any other which he may take; or, if he quits the Tagus, to detach sufficiently to Abrantes. The bridges at the places which I have pointed out will facilitate the execution of any measure which it may be expedient to adopt, if the enemy should retreat.

The most efficient measure, if the enemy should retire from the Tagus with a view to take up another position in Portugal, would be to follow and attack him; but there are positions, for instance that on the Alva, which he might take, which it would be equally impossible to attack, as it has been hitherto that in which he is.

In the meantime, we cannot rely upon Badajoz holding out, or that the besieging army will not receive another reinforcement; and I am therefore inclined to be of opinion that we ought to take advantage of the enemy's quitting the Tagus to relieve that place, and set up again the army of the left. In this case also the bridge will be necessary.

There is another inducement to adopt this last measure, which is, that the further the enemy goes back, the nearer he will be to Clapartède, by

the addition of whose force he will again counterbalance our reinforcement.

The 9th and 21st were very weak yesterday, but in very good order, and they manœuvred and marched well. The artillery mules attached to the 3d division were not very good, nor in very good condition; scarcely so well as those I had seen at Quinta da Torre.

Badajoz made two sorties yesterday, and, it is said, destroyed a battery. The fire of the place was superior to that of the besiegers throughout the day.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 5th March, 1811, noon.

All the accounts which I have received this morning tend to confirm the notion which I communicated to you this morning, that nothing had yet moved, except baggage and sick.

The increasing inefficiency of the Portuguese army, and the certainty that when we move, the burthen of supplying their troops will fall upon us, or that the troops must starve, have induced me to turn my attention seriously to the mode of supplying them; and I enclose a memorandum which I have communicated to the Commissary Gen., with notes upon it, according to which I think the business can be done. Let me know whether you concur in this plan, and if you do I will have it laid before the Portuguese government. I should have wished to include in this arrangement a plan for supplying the militia in the lines, which is an intolerable burthen upon us; but I fear that if the Portuguese government undertake it, they will not feed them, and then we shall lose the services of all the militia and Ordenanza.

The complaint against the Portuguese hospitals and *depositos* continues to be general. Pack told me yesterday that when their men return to him, which is but seldom, they have neither arms, accoutrements, clothing, nor necessaries, and are really worse than useless. Gen. Picton says the same. Do your men carry to the hospitals with them a list of their necessaries, &c.? and is a register kept at the hospital of what each brings? with what marks, &c. &c.? Is there an officer responsible for the men's things while they are in hospital, as our Purveyor is? All this is worthy of consideration, and requires regulation.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Cartaxo, 5th March, 1811.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you can make it convenient to send to Oporto infantry transports to carry 800 men, in order to remove to Lisbon that number of recruits belonging to the Portuguese army who are at that place.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 5th March, 1811.

I enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from a correspondent at Santarem, stating the reasons given by 2 deserters from the Portuguese army for their desertion. I beg you to draw the attention of the government to this paper, and particularly to that part of it which relates to the satisfaction shown by the enemy upon any prospect of disunion among the allies.

The state of want in which the Portuguese troops are kept must occa-



sion desertion, as well as other evils; and it is an extraordinary proof of the attachment of the Portuguese soldiers to their country that this crime has not been more frequent, considering the privations which they endure. These privations, however, are thinning the ranks of the army in a lamentable degree; and in fact every soldier produced in the ranks costs as much as two. I yesterday inspected the 9th and 21st Portuguese regts., and there were under arms only 1319 men, whereas the strength of these two regiments, by the last returns, was 2476. A few days ago I inspected the Lusitanian legion, and the 2 battalions produced only 1100 men: their strength, according to the last return, was 1765. The 8th regt., in like manner, produced under arms only 856: their strength, according to the last return, was 1150.

From these circumstances the government will see what an enormous expense is incurred for the small number of men produced in the field, owing to defective arrangements, and their omission to adopt measures repeatedly recommended to their attention, and ordered by H.R.H. the Prince Regent, to augment the resources of the country.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Cartaxo, 5th March, 1811.

The great inefficiency of the Portuguese Commissariat, and the increasing evils which are the consequence of it, have induced me to endeavor to discover some mode by which some assistance might be given to the Portuguese government in this branch of their concerns; and, having consulted with Sir W. Beresford and the Commissary Gen., I enclose a memorandum of an arrangement, according to which a large part of the Portuguese army will be fed by the British Commissariat, at the expense of the Portuguese government; and it is to be hoped that, being relieved from the necessity of supplying so large a proportion of the operating army, the Portuguese government will supply the remainder in an efficient and satisfactory manner.

I beg you to let me know, as soon as possible, whether this plan will be adopted.

Memorandum.

Cartaxo, 5th March, 1811.

In order, if possible, to render the Portuguese army more efficient, and to provide more effectually for the subsistence of the Portuguese troops, it is proposed:

1st; That the British Commissariat shall supply with provisions the Portuguese troops serving in British divisions, that is to say, Col. Champelmond's, Col. Harvey's, Gen. Spry's, *Baron Eben's*, and Gen. Colman's brigades, besides the 1st and 3d caçadores in the Light division, which will be supplied as usual.

2dly; This arrangement will include the supply of provisions for the artillerymen, and forage for the mules attached to the brigades of Portuguese artillery serving with these several divisions, and forage for the mules attached to the regiments for the carriage of baggage and musket ammunition; and it must be understood that these animals must go a reasonable distance to the magazines for their forage, in the same manner as those belonging to the British army.

3dly ; The ration for each officer and soldier is to continue the same as it has been heretofore ; that is to say, half a pound of meat, and wine, and a pound of biscuit, or a pound and a half of bread. The arrangement for beef issued to the Portuguese troops by the British Commissariat, made in May last, is to continue as heretofore ; and the troops are to receive in the whole either three quarters of a pound of meat, and wine or spirits, or a pound of meat without wine or spirits, for one quarter of a pound of which they are to be under stoppages, and for the whole of which the Portuguese government are to pay the British Commissariat, as settled by that arrangement.

4thly ; The detail of the deliveries of the rations is to be made to the troops by the Portuguese Commissariat ; and the British Commissariat with the several divisions will have nothing to do but to supply the Portuguese Commissary attached to the brigade in the division with the quantities of bread, meat, and forage, which he will require daily for the Portuguese troops, for which he will take the Portuguese Commissary's receipts.

5thly ; The British Commissariat is to keep a separate account of the issues under the head of the arrangement of 1810, and arrangement of March, 1811, which he will forward on the 24th of every month to the Commissary Gen.

6thly ; The Portuguese government are to pay for the supplies thus delivered to the Portuguese troops, according to the 6th article of the arrangement of June, 1809 ; that is to say, the full price which those articles will have cost the British Commissary Gen., with a reasonable addition for the expense of transport from the magazines, with the exception of beef issued under the arrangements of May, 1810, which is to be paid for at the rate then settled.

7thly ; It is to be clearly understood that the British Commissariat have nothing to say to the replacing of mules lost or knocked up in the service of the artillery, or in the carriage of ammunition and baggage, or with any of the details of the Portuguese Commissariat, beyond the issue to the Portuguese Commissariat of the quantity of provisions and forage necessary for the consumption of the troops.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Dufaure, Chasseurs Britanniques.*

5th March, 1811.

The 4 soldiers of Chasseurs Britanniques named in the margin, arraigned at Lisbon on the 28th Feb. and 1st March, have severally been sentenced death by the General Court Martial before which they were caused to appear. His Excellency, willing to believe the object of example may be attained without the sacrifice of so many lives, has commanded me, in communicating these his Lordship's sentiments, to inquire of you whether any of these men merit your recommendation as objects deserving of mercy, and which are the most worthy of consideration.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.*

5th March, 1811.

Your letter of the 3d inst., and enclosures, have, in compliance with Sir W. C. Beresford's desire, therein contained, been submitted to the Commander of the Forces. In reply, you will be pleased to report to the Marshal that my Lord Wellington, in consequence of the wish expressed by the commanding and other officers of the 2d regt. of Portuguese infantry, and in further consideration of the long confinement of the prisoner —, of the — regt., is induced to pardon the

crime of his having struck an officer, an offence undeniable, although stated to be accidental. It appears this offence was committed while the prisoner was batman to Major —, of that corps: his Lordship desires that — may not be so employed in future, but return to his duty in the ranks.

His Excellency requests the present favorable opportunity may be taken to impress on the minds of the soldiers the necessity of paying due respect and attention to officers of every nation on all occasions; by which habit even a suspicion would be avoided that accident, such as pleaded by the prisoner, and for which he has been so long confined, could have an offensive intention; which plea, however, though now admitted, it would be difficult to establish in justification before a General Court Martial.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 6th March, 1811, 5 A.M.

I have received an account from Lumley that the enemy have evacuated Santarem, and from our advanced posts that they have withdrawn from Ponte d'Asseca. I am just going up to Santarem, where I shall move head quarters this day. I shall desire Lumley to move the boats up, in order that we may communicate this way.

The directions in my letter of yesterday are applicable to the state of affairs at present. Let us have the bridge down as soon as you can.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Santarem, 6th March, 1811, 4 P.M.

I am just now returned from Pernes. All is clear on this side of that river, over which the enemy have destroyed both bridges, that at Pernes and that at Ponte Velha. The Light division is at the former, Gen. Nightingall's brigade at the latter, and the 1st, 4th, and 6th divisions either are or will be here this evening. Sir W. Erskine is at Alcanhede, and will be at Torres Novas to-morrow. The 3d division is at Rio Maior; but the 5th, and Gen. Campbell's brigade, do not move till to-morrow. I shall have head quarters to-morrow at Torres Novas, with the 1st division; the 4th and 6th will be on the right, either at or well on towards Golegão.

I shall be obliged to you if you will send an express to Gen. Leite, and

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

\* Cartaxo, 6th March, 1811, 5 A.M.

\* Reports having come in that the enemy have quitted the position of Santarem, Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade of Portuguese infantry, Major Gen. Stewart's brigade of British infantry, and Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, will march immediately upon Alcanhede, it being supposed that the enemy must have moved likewise from that place.

\* 6th March, 1811, 6 A.M.

\* The German Legion will move from Almoester with as little delay as possible, and will pass through Azambujeira, and cross the ravine beyond it by the Ponte de Callhariz. The legion will then march through Pero Filho to Santarem, unless other orders should previously be received; but Major Gen. Baron Low will provide himself with guides for Tremes also, in case he should be directed to move to-morrow upon that place from Callhariz instead of upon Santarem.

\* The 6th division will march without delay to Cartaxo. The Brunswick battalion is to march with the 6th division, and continue attached to it till further orders.

\* Major Gen. Picton will be pleased to march the 3d division without delay to Rio Maior, and there remain till further orders. He will be so good as order the 3 pounder brigade of Portuguese artillery at Quinta da Torre to march to Rio Maior also, and continue with the 3d division until further orders.

\* The two brigades of Portuguese artillery, under Major Arentschildt, will march without delay from S. Antonio do Tojal to Carregado.

desire him to tell the Governor of Badajoz by telegraph that he must hold out to the last extremity, that Massena has begun to retire, and that he may expect assistance as soon as it is in my power to give it him. Desire Leite to warn him to keep that communication secret.

Castaños is arrived at Lisbon. The expedition had sailed from Cadiz. I doubt their success.

I cannot do more for you in the Commissariat way than I proposed to you. Mr. Kennedy and I considered the matter well; and the truth is, that our Spaniards would not attend your troops, and I should not like to undertake any thing for the Portuguese government that I could not perform. I know that we could not depend upon the Portuguese mules and carriages.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Torres Novas, 7th March, 1811, 11½ A.M.\*

It is said here that the French have taken the road of Chão de Maçães and Coimbra, and that Massena went and slept at the former last night, and was to be at Pombal this day. I cannot believe these rascals, who appear very unwilling to give any intelligence. If Coimbra was their object, the movement would have been shorter, more easy, and more easily concealed by a march direct from Santarem upon Porto de Moz and Leiria, although Capt. Todd says that road is very bad. At all events Junot's corps at Alcanhede might have moved that way, and yet all have come here. I send the advanced guard on to Payalvo, at all events, from whence I shall get further intelligence.

The head quarters will be here this day, and the 1st division; the 4th and 6th at Golegão.

I should be very glad to see you if you could come over here.

P.S. I have just received your letter of 6½ A.M. Until I know where you will have the bridge, it is difficult to point out where your troops should be; but I think if you can get one brigade over it, it should be at Tancos.

P.S. 6 P.M. Since writing the above, I find that Massena slept at Chão de Maçães last night; and there was, besides, some baggage there. They may still, however, be going there. Sir Brent has stopped at Pernes, and I shall halt him there to-morrow if the enemy's line should not be clear.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Torres Novas, 7th March, 1811.

I was out all day, or should have written to you.

The enemy have quitted the Tagus and Zezere, and have burnt their boats, and retired to Thomar and Chão de Maçães. Their movement to this last place, and the report of the country that they are going to Coimbra, induce me to defer moving the troops from Pernes and Alcanhede till I shall have ascertained their designs more clearly than I have as yet. Some of our people were near them this day, but they showed no signs of a desire to turn upon us. They were reported to be in strength. Two of Beresford's brigades are on this side of the Tagus.

You shall hear from me again in the morning, if I should learn any thing in the night. In the meantime it is desirable that the troops at Pernes should be ready to march, and that the guns should be got over the river.

P.S. Nightingall is at Atalaya; Sir W. Erskine here.

\* See Appendix, No. XXXIV.

To Major Gen. Nightingall.

Torres Novas, 7th March, 1811, at noon.

The enemy have retired from hence, and I have ordered the Light division upon Lamaroza, and the cavalry to Payalvo; and I wish you would move upon Atalaya, and communicate with the Light division.

P.S. Send the enclosed over to Beresford.

To Gen. Bacellar.

Thomar, 8th March, 1811.

I have to inform you that the enemy retired from their position at Santarem, &c., on the night of the 5th inst., and I have only this day been made certain that they were directing their march upon the Mondego with a view to cross that river, probably at Coimbra; and the report given out in this part of the country is, that they intend to endeavor to obtain possession of Oporto. I am following them closely with the allied army. I request you, however, to advert to your instructions, and to consider the safety of Oporto as the primary object of your attention.

If you should find that the enemy turn towards Viseu, you will of course do every thing in your power to annoy them in their march; but send your baggage, &c., across the Douro, and have all the means prepared of crossing over all your troops at Lamego; which troops I rely upon to defend the passage of the Douro against the enemy, as well at Oporto as at Lamego or elsewhere. I conclude that Col. Trant will have retired from Coimbra upon the bridge of the Vouga, which he should destroy, and from thence upon Oporto.

The enemy have no boats with them; and I hope to be able to press them so hard that they can get none in the Mondego. One of the first objects of your attention therefore should be to secure the boats in the Douro all on the right bank; also those at Aveiro and in the Vouga.

Marshal Sir W. Beresford not being with me, I send you this letter direct.

To Major Gen. Sontag.

Thomar, 8th March, 1811.

When I appointed you to command at Torres Vedras, I knew that I gave you charge of the most important point in our position; and I have detained you there contrary to your inclination, because I conceived the public service still required your stay. As, however, the enemy have retired, and the war is now likely to assume a new shape, it is but justice to you to remove you to a situation of more activity, according to your desire; and accordingly, when you shall be recovered (of which I hope soon to hear) I shall appoint you to one which I hope will be agreeable to you.

G. O.

Thomar, 8th March, 1811.

1. The sick of the several divisions are to be left at this station in charge of an Assist. Surgeon, to be furnished by each, and having 2 days' provisions cooked: these men are to be sent to the rear in the forage carts, and by other means to be furnished by the Commissariat.

2. General officers commanding divisions are requested to cause frequent patrols to be made, through the parts of the cantonments their regiments respectively may occupy, to preserve order.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Thomar, 8th March, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 6th, and I agree in opinion respecting sending the troop ships to Oporto. We must mind our hits at that place, however, for a short time, as we hear that the enemy talk of going there, which is scarcely possible; but they are in such a state of distress, that it may be expected that they will try any thing, however desperate. But I follow them closely; and they will find it difficult to stop any where, for any purpose, till they shall draw near the frontier.

I refer you to my letter to Mr. Stuart for the news. I shall write to my brother and Mr. Duff upon the subject to which you have referred.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Thomar, 8th March, 1811.

Having been on horseback almost ever since the morning of the 6th, I have not been able to write to you.

The French retired from their position on that morning, and they literally march night and day.

I was misled by Trant's letter of the 27th Feb., and by some information I received at Santarem, which the enemy's movements aided a little; and I conceived that they were going to the frontier by the road of the Ponte da Murcella; but I think it certain now that they are going by Coimbra. We are close at their heels, and have taken some prisoners; and I mean to continue to press them so hard that they will not have time to do much harm, or, I hope, to undertake any thing serious against the northern provinces. I detach a large force, under Sir W. Beresford, for the assistance of Badajoz, which I propose to join as soon as I shall have settled matters on this side.

It is fortunate for us that the French have retired; for I assure you that, upon inspection, I find that I did not form an erroneous opinion of the risk and difficulty of attacking their position. Indeed, if the rain which has fallen this day had fallen 4 days ago, we could not have followed them with our artillery through the country, even though unopposed. Theirs was sent off, excepting what they have destroyed, and a few light pieces which they kept in their position to the last moment.

I have received your letters of the 6th. The returns from the *Junta de Viveres* are of the same description with all those received from them. There is not one line of truth in them. The Portuguese troops have not a particle of provisions, and I am obliged to supply them, which will, before long, bring us all to a stand still; and then the government will cry out against me as usual.

In respect to Stockler's book, the best thing to do with it would be to publish, as a preface to it, Stockler's adulatory address to Junot. This would settle him and his nonsense.

P.S. I have not time to write to England; and it would probably be as well to detain the packet.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Thomar, 8th March, 1811, 2 P.M.

I think it almost certain, from the enemy's movements, of which I have obtained a knowledge since I saw you, that they are going for Coimbra; but I learn here that they have destroyed many carriages, and much am-

munition, and it is said even some guns; and I should therefore conclude that whatever their first step may be, their second will be towards the Spanish frontier. I have ordered Gen. Cole, and the brigade of heavy cavalry, to halt here to-morrow; and I will see Gen. Stewart, and ascertain whether it is desirable for him to halt likewise. You will lose no time by this halt, which will be of use to the men; and I conclude that the bridge of Tancos will not be ready till late to-morrow.

Let me have the brigade of dragoons as soon as you can. I shall appoint Gen. Long to command the cavalry with you. Col. De Grey commands the brigade of heavy cavalry.

I enclose a letter for Bacellar, of which I have sent copies in duplicate and triplicate to Lobo, to be sent to him through Col. Grant, or by any other safe conveyance. I have not leisure now to write to you upon the other subject on which we spoke this morning; but I hope to be able to do so to-morrow.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Thomar, 8th March, 1811, 7½ P.M.

I have just received your letter of 10 A.M.

These demands from Badajoz, for which I am convinced the Governor has no want, have alarmed me much. Leite may send him powder if he wants it; but he should first point out to him the danger that it may fall into the hands of the enemy, who wants it more; he must not send biscuit, for he should tell him that I have desired him to give him none, as I learn he has plenty of corn; but he may send him artillerymen, if he has any to spare.

Pray write to Leite to desire him to give every assistance to our Commissaries to complete our stores there. I ordered 50,000 rations of biscuit to be prepared there some time ago; and they can make these only at the rate of 2000 a day, for want of his assistance. I mean to order the store to be trebled, besides large quantities of forage corn to be laid in, none of which can be done without his most active assistance.

*The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Long.*

8th March, 1811.

I have the honor to communicate to you my Lord Wellington's pleasure that you should repair with all convenient dispatch to Chamusca, or wherever the head quarters of Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford may have removed, to whom you will report your arrival, as appointed to the command of the cavalry in the Alentejo, of which you are to consider yourself now placed in charge.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Thomar, 9th March, 1811, 6 A.M.

I have seen Gen. Stewart this morning, and have desired him, if it is convenient to him, to stretch his division out towards Tancos, which he will do.

You will send your own orders to Gen. Cole's division, and Col. De Grey's brigade of cavalry, both of which are here. The pontoons are ordered to Elvas, and Capt. Mallet has been desired to look at the Guadiana below the junction of the Caya, to see whether there is any place at which, by the assistance of chevalets, a bridge might be thrown across the river. Murray seems to think there is. I think you should immediately put your corps in march upon Portalegre, and there collect it.

In the mean time you might acquire information about fords, positions for bridges, &c. &c., and other information which it would be necessary for you to have. If I can find time, I will write your instructions this day. I have ordered an hospital to be prepared for you at Elvas.

By Mendizabal's letter, which the Colonel brought me, it appears that the place is still entire, and very capable of holding out. They do not want provisions, but they will want powder; and they say they want artillerymen; although a peasant who has come out says there are many people in the place capable of serving the artillery, who have not been called upon.

I have ordered 500 barrels of powder to Elvas; and Gen. Leite will judge whether he can give the assistance of artillerymen.

P.S. Hawker had an affair with the enemy yesterday evening, in which he cut up a few and took 19 prisoners. There is a supply of musket ammunition of ours at Elvas. I have desired Mendizabal to send to Portalegre, to meet you, any officer who might have a knowledge of some convenient place for fixing a bridge on the Guadiana, first showing the place to Capt. Mallet.

Kennedy proposes to take from Gen. Cole's division, and Col. De Grey's cavalry, some of the provisions which they have brought here with them, and to supply them with similar quantities upon the Tagus. It would be convenient, therefore, if it should meet your other arrangements, that they should move to-morrow.

The misery of the country will occasion some difficulty in re-establishing our communications. I have guides here who will carry my letters to opposite Punhete. Lobo should place a party at Punhete to carry yours here and mine to Abrantes. From Abrantes there will be no difficulty, I conclude. I have other arrangements in view upon this subject, on which I shall write hereafter.

To Gen. Don Gabriel de Mendizabal.

Thomar, 9th March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th inst.; and I have to inform you that, the enemy having retired from the Tagus, I have ordered a large corps to proceed to the relief of Badajoz, which corps has already commenced its march. Gen. Leite also has directions to give Badajoz assistance in powder.

In case there should be any officer in the Spanish army under your command who has a knowledge of the fords of the Guadiana, or of the places in which a bridge can be laid with the smallest means, I beg that

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Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

<sup>a</sup> Perucha, 9th March, 1811.

<sup>a</sup> Notwithstanding the former order of this day's date, the arrangement for the march of the troops composing the right column will be as follows:

<sup>b</sup> The 6th division, with the 14th and 16th light dragoons (excepting 1 squadron), will proceed to Perucha.

<sup>c</sup> Major Gen. Nightingall, with his own brigade of infantry and 1 squadron of cavalry, will continue on the Espinhal road; he will follow as the enemy retires, but will not, under any circumstances, proceed beyond Espinhal; and wherever he is obliged to halt, he will take up the most favorable position which the ground offers, and will endeavor to prevent the enemy from becoming aware of the diminution of the force on that road.

<sup>d</sup> Major Gen. Nightingall will report to head quarters through Perucha.



you will send him to Portalegre, to wait upon Marshal Sir W. Beresford, and, in the mean time, to show Capt. Mallet the place, in order that he may examine it. The best situation would be between the junction of the Caya and Jurumenha. The want of the bridge will now be seriously felt; but I have ordered 6 boats from Lisbon.

It is scarcely necessary to recommend to your Excellency to keep secret as long as possible the arrival of this corps.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Perucha, 9th March, 1811, 8 p.m.

I am just come in from our advanced guard, and find the enemy's whole army nearly formed in front of Pombal. I wish you would make your troops march to Cacharias early, and let them cook as soon as they arrive, and you shall hear from me early in the day.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Perucha, 9th March, 1811, 8 p.m.

Our advanced guard found the whole army this day in front of Pombal, with the exception, I believe, of Regnier's corps, which is at Anção; whether offering battle, or waiting for an opportunity to cross the Mondego, I cannot tell. However, as it is desirable that in this case I should be a little stronger; and as Badajoz is certainly not pressed; and as, at all events, it would be desirable that you should not commence your operations there till the boats shall have arrived at Elvas, I have sent to Cole to desire that his division and the dragoons would march to-morrow morning to Cacharias: I shall then be as strong as the enemy, very nearly.

I wish that you would come here; bring horses with you, and nothing else. I think it not unlikely that we may settle our concerns on the 11th. You might put your troops in motion, not letting their rear pass farther than Abrantes, and come here yourself.

P.S. I understand that Gen. Hoghton's brigade, and some Portuguese troops, remain at Thomar, and I think it desirable that they should stay there, at least to-morrow; and order accordingly, as I have called Campbell's division off the Espinhal road.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Perucha, 10th March, 1811.

The enemy still continue on their ground in front of Pombal, but not, I think, in the strength in which they were yesterday. They are still, however, very strong; and my own opinion is, that they will draw off the corps which they have there in the course of this night. If they do not, I propose to attack them there to-morrow. I think it most likely that they will go back as far as Condeixa, where they will collect their force with more ease than they can at Pombal.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villa Secca, 14th March, 1811.

The enemy retired from the position which they had occupied at San-

G. O.

Redinha, 12th March, 1811.

The wounded of the several divisions are to be sent forthwith to Pombal, on commissariat mules; those who cannot walk must be conveyed. Staff Surgeon Irvine, of the 6th division, is to take charge of these men till further orders.

Returns of the killed and wounded to be sent in to the Adj. Gen.'s office as soon as possible.

tarem and the neighbourhood on the night of the 5th inst. I put the British army in motion to follow them on the morning of the 6th. Their first movements indicated an intention to collect a force at Thomar; and I therefore marched upon that town, on the 8th, a considerable body of troops, formed of a part of Marshal Sir W. Beresford's corps, under Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, which had crossed the Tagus at Abrantes, and afterwards the Zézere, and of the 4th and 6th, and part of the 1st, divisions of infantry, and 2 brigades of British cavalry.

The enemy, however, continued his march towards the Mondego, having one corps, the 2d, on the road of Espinhal, Gen. Loison's division on the road of Ançã, and the remainder of the army towards Pombal. These

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Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q.M.G.

'Orders of movement on the 11th March, 1811:

'ADVANCED GUARD under Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine.

1st hussars, Royals (dragoons).	Light division, Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade.
	COLUMN.
3d dragoon guards.	4th division.
4th dragoons.	Guards and German Legion.
Capt. Bull's troop of horse artillery.	6th division.
16th light dragoons.	Baggage of head quarters.
14th ..	Troops under Major Gen. Hoghton.
Major Gen. Howard's brigade.	5th division.
3d division.	

'The baggage of the army will follow the column in the same order as the troops, but it must be kept entirely clear of the road everywhere, until the troops have passed.'

Extracts from the instructions for the attack of the enemy's position beyond Pombal, on the afternoon of the 11th March.

'The Light division will turn the left of that part of the enemy's position which is *en potence*, and which fronts towards Pombal.

'Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade will attack the same part of the position in front.

'The hussars, Royals, and Capt. Ross's troop of artillery, will be near the bridge of Pombal, prepared to move forward, when ordered to do so by Sir W. Erskine; and the artillery will place itself, as soon as possible, in a situation to cannonade the angle of the enemy's position, and to enfilade the Coimbra road.

'Brig. Gen. Pack will not press his attack, however, until the Light division has made some progress in its movement to turn the enemy's left.

'The attack of the 4th division will be directed against that part of the enemy's position which extends along the Coimbra road, leaving the angle which is formed by the enemy's troops *en potence* a little to the right; and thus threatening the rear of that part of his force. A part of the artillery of the division should also be directed to enfilade that part of the enemy's line which fronts towards Pombal.

'The 3d division will make its attack about half a mile to the left of that of the 4th division. The attack of the latter is to be made, however, so as to precede a little that of the 3d division. As the exact points where these two attacks are to be made will depend upon where the river is found to be most easily fordable, a few light dragoons from the 14th and 16th regts., and some infantry tirailleurs, must be in advance of each column, to ascertain and point out the best fords, in addition to the information which has been already furnished by the people of the country.

'When these 2 columns of attack have occasion to form, each division will deploy into 2 lines, one batt. of each being also in a third line in reserve.

'The 14th and 16th light dragoons will support these 2 columns.

'Capt. Bull's troop of horse artillery will act with the 3d division.

'The 1st division will be in reserve on the top of the bank opposite to Pombal; and it will send tirailleurs down to the river to assist the attack of Brig. Gen. Pack's left.

'Col. de Grey's brigade of cavalry will be in reserve on the top of the bank near the point from which the 4th division advances.

'The 6th division, and the troops under Major Gen. Hoghton, will be in column upon the great road where it begins to descend towards the bridge of Pombal, prepared either to move forward by the great road, or to turn off towards the left, as circumstances may require.'

last were followed, and never lost sight of, by the Light division, and the Royal dragoons and 1st hussars, who took from them about 200 prisoners.

On the 9th, the enemy having collected in front of Pombal the 6th corps, with the exception of Gen. Loison's division, the 8th corps, and the 9th corps, and Gen. Montbrun's division of cavalry, the hussars, which, with the Royal dragoons and Light division, were immediately in

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

'Arrangements for the movement of the army on the 12th March, 1811:

'Should it appear, at daybreak to-morrow morning, that the enemy has retired, the army will move forward by the Coimbra road in the following order:

ADVANCED GUARD.

Hussars.

Light division.

Royals.

Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade.

COLUMN.

14th light dragoons.

4th division.

16th "

1st division.

Capt. Bull's troop of horse artillery.

6th division.

3d dragoon guards.

Troops under Major Gen. Hoghton.

4th dragoons.

Baggage of the divisions near Pombal in the order of the column.

Staff corps.

5th division.

3d division.

'The divisions will move right in front. The brigades of cavalry under Col. Hawker, Capt. Bull's troop of horse artillery, the 3d division, the 4th division, and Col. de Grey's brigade of cavalry, will move into the Coimbra road by fording the river below Pombal.

'The other troops on the left bank of the river will pass by the bridge of Pombal.'

The Q. M. G. to Major Gen. Nightingall.

'Pombal, 12th March, 1811.

'I received, yesterday afternoon, your letter of the same date from Vendas dos Moinhos.

'There is no other instruction for you at present, but to continue to observe the enemy on the Espinhal road; and if he retires, you will take up a position near Espinhal.

'There is a troop of the 16th light dragoons upon the road passing through Perucha to Anção, which will, I hope, be able to enter the latter place this day, and to open, by that means, a communication from Pombal through Anção to your corps. It has orders to continue to move forward towards Rabaçal.'

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

'Redinha, 12th March, 1811.

'The General commanding the cavalry will send an officer's patrol to-morrow morning at daybreak to Rabaçal. A report from that patrol is to be sent back *through Redinha* to the head of the column of march of the army. If the enemy is not found in Rabaçal, the patrol will, however, move forward from thence towards Condeixa.

'A guide for this patrol will be in waiting at the Q. M. G.'s office in Redinha at daybreak to-morrow morning.'

'Redinha, 12th March, 1811.

'Arrangements for the movement of the army on the 13th March:

ADVANCED GUARD.

Light division.

Hussars.

Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade.

16th light dragoons.

COLUMN.

3d division.

Royal Staff corps.

4th division.

1st division.

14th light dragoons.

5th division.

Royals.

Troops under Major Gen. Hoghton.

4th dragoons.

The baggage in the order of the column.

'The 6th division and 3d dragoon guards have been ordered to move from Soure towards Condeixa at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning; and Major Gen. Campbell has been instructed to send out patrols during the march to communicate with the right column. Sir B. Spencer will be so good as order patrols to the left from that column to communicate with Major Gen. Campbell.

'If the enemy is found in position at Condeixa, or at any other point during the march, an operation for dislodging him will be combined by the two columns of the army, and Major Gen. Campbell will be instructed accordingly.'

front of the enemy's lines, distinguished themselves in a charge which they made on this occasion, under the command of Col. Arentschildt. A detachment of the 16th light dragoons, under Lieut. Weyland,\* which had been in observation of the enemy near Leiria, made prisoners a detachment consisting of 30 dragoons on that morning, and had followed the enemy from Leiria, and arrived on the ground just in time to assist their friends, the hussars, in this charge.

I could not collect a sufficient body of troops to commence an operation upon the enemy till the 11th. On that day the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th, and the Light divisions of infantry, and Gen. Pack's brigade, and all the British cavalry, joined upon the ground immediately in front of the enemy, who had commenced their retreat from their position during the

\* Lieut. Col. Weyland, late M.P. for Oxfordshire.

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Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

' Disposition for the attack of the enemy at Condeixa on the 13th March, 1811 :

' The 3d division will move along the face of the Serra which runs parallel to the great road on the right hand. It will move right in front, and will direct its march so as to threaten the left of the enemy's corps at Condeixa, by turning the ravine which covers his position on that side. Gen. Picton's movement will, at the same time, threaten the road by which the enemy's troops appear to be retiring from their left towards Miranda do Corvo.

' Gen. Picton will send parties up the Serra sufficiently high to be enabled to observe the line of march the enemy is taking beyond the hills, and to watch all his movements.

' Gen. Picton will take care to secure the right of the army by keeping hold of the commanding ground during the whole of his movement. The Light division and Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade (right in front) are to be thrown to the right of the great road when moved forward from the ground on which they are now halted, and are to connect the right flank of their attack with the left flank of the 3d division. The operation of the two divisions will therefore be in a diagonal line, the right of which will be the most forward.

' As the ravine which the Light division will have opposite to it appears to be difficult, both on account of the rugged and rocky nature of its banks and by reason of the rivulet which flows in it, a large proportion of tirailleurs should be thrown forward to cover the front of the division, and, to get possession of and reconnoitre the passes. And the division should not be pushed too much forward under the fire of the enemy on the opposite bank, until these previous steps have been taken.

' Some guns should be got up to the ground allotted for the Light division as soon as possible, to cannonade the enemy on the opposite bank of the ravine; these guns are to continue, however, in the position allotted to them on this side of the ravine, even after the attack has succeeded; and the artillery which has remained on the great road is to be moved forward to follow the enemy.

' The 4th division (right in front) will attack in the direction of the great road, connecting its right with the left of the Light division, and its left with the right of the 6th division. It will attack in two lines, with tirailleurs in front.

' The 6th division (left in front) will move in such a direction as to turn the right flank of the enemy's position, and it will attack up the slopes that lead to the town of Condeixa. The attack of this division should be more forward than that of the troops which are on its right; and Major Gen. Campbell will throw some infantry forward from his left towards the ravine into which the great road descends on leaving Condeixa to go to Coimbra.

' The 3d dragoon guards will support the 6th division in rear of its left, and the 4th dragoons will be sent to Ega to follow and support the division behind its right flank.

' The 6th division will attack in 2 lines, with tirailleurs in front and on its left flank.

' The 1st division will be in reserve, prepared to support the attack of the 4th division if necessary. It will form in contiguous columns of brigades on the ground where the Light division is at present halted. The Royals, and 14th light dragoons, will be with the 1st division.

' The 5th division will follow the route taken by the 3d division (without artillery), and will support it.

' The troops under Major Gen. Hoghton will move out to the left of the great road when they have closed up, and will take post at Ega.

' The hussars, and the 16th light dragoons, will be prepared to act with the Light division and 4th division; the greater part being in reserve behind the latter.

' The 9 pounders will act in aid of the attack of the 4th division.'

night. They were followed by the Light division, the hussars and Royals, and Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade, under the command of Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine and Major Gen. Slade, and made an attempt to hold the antient castle of Pombal, from which they were driven; but the 6th corps, and Gen. Montbrun's cavalry, which formed the rear guard, supported by the 8th corps, held the ground on the other side of the town, the troops not having arrived in time to complete the dispositions to attack them before it was dark. Upon this occasion Lieut. Col. Elder's battalion of Portuguese caçadores distinguished themselves.

The enemy retired in the night; and on the 12th the 6th corps, with Gen. Montbrun's cavalry, took up a strong position at the end of a defile,

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

Ega, 18th March, 1811.

'Arrangement for the movement of the army on the 14th March :

'Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine will put the advanced guard in motion soon after day-break, and will follow the enemy along the road towards Miranda do Corvo.

'The 3d division will be prepared to take its place in the column immediately behind the advanced guard; but Major Gen. Picton will not move into the line of march until it has been ascertained that the enemy has retired to such a distance, and in such a direction, as renders it no longer necessary to occupy in force the heights connected with the Serra where the division now is.

'The Royals and the 14th light dragoons will follow the advanced guard under Sir W. Erskine, leaving room, however, for the 3d division in their front, if it should be ordered to enter the column.

'The 6th division will follow the Royals and 14th light dragoons; and the 4th division, and the other troops in rear of it, will follow in the same order as they have taken up their ground this evening along the great road.

'Capt. Lawson's brigade of 9 pounders will take its place in the line of march at the head of the 1st division.

'The baggage of the front divisions of the column will move in rear of the 5th division in the order of the column; and the baggage of the troops behind the 5th division will move in rear of the whole of the column.

'The baggage of each division, or separate regiment, must be collected together and kept clear of the road until its turn comes to enter the line of march in the situation above pointed out. The reserve of ammunition which was attached during this day's march to the troops under Major Gen. Hoghton will move, till further orders, with the 5th division.

'The Royal Staff corps will march from Redinha at daybreak, and will proceed towards the head of the column. It is to be allowed to pass, as also the mules attached to the corps.'

Separate instructions to Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole :

Ega, 14th March, 1811.

'After passing Condeixa about two miles, the 4th division will move out of the main road to the right hand, and will march by Fonte Coberta and Zambujal to Penella. Major Gen. Cole will leave the artillery of the division at the entrance to that road until he has ascertained whether or not it can pass that way; and if it cannot, it must be ordered to return into the great road, and report the circumstance to the Q. M. G., as also into what part of the column it has entered. When Gen. Cole has reached Penella, he will endeavor to communicate with Major Gen. Nightingall, who was yesterday morning at Venda de Figuerô, on the Espinhal road.

'The enemy's troops were yesterday morning still in possession of Espinhal. If they have quitted it, or have an inconsiderable rear guard only in it, Major Gen. Cole will march there, and take possession of Espinhal, or he may combine his movement, for that purpose, with Major Gen. Nightingall, if necessary.

'Gen. Cole will be so good as send reports, from time to time, to the head of the principal column, of what is passing in the quarter to which his march is directed. A guard of the 4th division must be left at the entrance of the road leading to Penella, until to-morrow morning, to direct the baggage, &c. of the 4th division, and to prevent any other troops or baggage taking that route; a party of cavalry will be stationed at the same point, to carry forward the reports transmitted by Gen. Cole.'

between Redinha and Pombal, with their right in a wood upon the Soure river, and their left extending towards the high ground above the river of Redinha. This town was in their rear. I attacked them in this position on the 12th, with the 3d and 4th divisions of infantry, and Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade, and the cavalry, the other troops being in reserve.

The post in the wood upon their right was first forced by Sir W. Erskine, with the Light division. We were then able to form the troops in the plain beyond the defile; and the 3d division, under Major Gen. Picton, were formed in 2 lines, in the skirts of the wood, upon the right; the 4th division, under Major Gen. Cole, in 2 lines, in the centre, having Gen. Pack's brigade supporting their right, and communicating with the 3d division; and the Light division, in 2 lines, on the left. These troops were supported in the rear by the British cavalry; and the 1st, 5th, and 6th divisions were in reserve. The troops were formed with great accuracy and celerity; and Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer led the line against the enemy's position on the heights, from which they were immediately driven, with the loss of many men killed and wounded, and some prisoners.

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Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

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' Villa Secca, 14th March, 1811.

' Arrangement for the movements of the army on the 15th March :

' The troops will be in readiness to march forward to-morrow morning, an hour after daybreak; but will not move from their ground until further orders.

' The order of the column will be as follows :

' The troops under Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine.	
The 3d division.	The 6th division.
The British 9 pounder brigade.	The 1st division.
Royal Staff corps.	The 5th division.

' Major Gen. Cole will be in readiness to march towards Thomar, with the division under his orders, but he will not pass beyond Espinhal till ordered to do so.

' Major Gen. Nightingall will move forward exactly at daybreak, by the road which leads from Espinhal towards Miranda do Corvo. He will not press the enemy if a superior force is opposed to him; but, if that is not the case, he will continue to advance, and will put himself in communication, as soon as possible, with the troops on his left. Col. Hawker's brigade of cavalry will pass the river Deixa, if possible, and join Major Gen. Nightingall, as soon as the latter has made sufficient progress towards Miranda do Corvo to enable Col. Hawker to do so.

' As soon as a communication is established with Col. Hawker, Gen. Nightingall will be so good as report to the Q. M. G. what progress he has made, and what force the enemy appears to have in his front.

' Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade of infantry, with one squadron of light cavalry, and half a brigade of mountain guns, will ford the river Deixa, below Miranda do Corvo, at daybreak, and ascend the ridge of N. S. da Serra, on the opposite side of the river.

' If the enemy still continues to hold, with his rear guard, the position which he took up this evening to cover the bridge of Miranda do Corvo, Brig. Gen. Pack will direct his march so as to threaten the right and rear of the enemy's position, on the great road beyond that bridge; and the troops which are in march under Major Gen. Nightingall, from Espinhal, will be ordered to threaten the enemy in like manner, on his left flank.

' But should the enemy not continue to hold, with his rear-guard, the heights on this side of the bridge of Miranda do Corvo, but pass that bridge, and proceed along the great road towards Foz d'Arouce, Brig. Gen. Pack will, in that case, direct his march through the hilly country to the left of that road, keeping hold always of the ridges, and marching on the left flank of the enemy's column, whilst it continues its movement along the great road towards Foz d'Arouce.

' Gen. Pack will take care, however, to have his retreat always open towards the river Deixa, in case the enemy should send a superior force to drive him from the hills; and if it should be found necessary to reinforce him, more troops will be sent, either by the same road Gen. Pack has taken, or from Miranda do Corvo, after the column has passed the river.'

Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine particularly mentioned the conduct of the 52d regt., and Col. Elder's *caçadores*, in the attack of the wood; and I must add that I have never seen the French infantry driven from a wood in a more gallant style.

There was but one narrow bridge, and a ford close to it, over the Redinha river, over which our light troops passed with the enemy; but as the enemy commanded these passages with cannon, some time elapsed before we could pass over a sufficient body of troops, and make a fresh disposition to attack the heights on which they had again taken post. The 3d division crossed, however, and manœuvred again upon the enemy's left flank, while the light infantry and cavalry, supported by the Light division, drove them upon their main body at Condeixa.

The light infantry of Gen. Picton's division, under Col. Williams, and the 4th *caçadores*, under Col. do Rego, were principally concerned in this operation.

We found the whole army yesterday, with the exception of the 2d corps, which was still at Espinhal, in a very strong position, at Condeixa; and I observed that they were sending off their baggage by the road of Ponte da Murcella. From this circumstance I concluded that Col. Trant had not given up Coimbra, and that they had been so pressed in their retreat, that they had not been able to detach troops to force him from that place. I therefore marched the 3d division, under Major Gen. Picton, through the mountains upon the enemy's left, towards the only road open for their retreat, which had the immediate effect of dislodging them from the strong position of Condeixa; and the enemy encamped last night at Casal Novo, in the mountains, about a league from Condeixa.

We immediately communicated with Coimbra, and made prisoners a detachment of the enemy's cavalry which were upon the road. We found the 6th and 8th corps formed in a very strong position near Casal Novo, this morning, and the Light division attacked and drove in the outposts. But we could dislodge them from their positions only by movements on their flanks. Accordingly I moved the 4th division, under Major Gen. Cole, upon Panella, in order to secure the passage of the river Deixa and the communication with Espinhal, to which place Major Gen. Nightingall had been in observation of the movements of the enemy's corps since the 10th; and the 3d division, under Major Gen. Picton, moved immediately round the enemy's left; while the Light division, and Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade, under Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, turned their right; and Major

G. O.

Ega, 14th March, 1811.

2. Officers commanding Portuguese brigades, and regiments attached to the 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions of infantry, will send to Coimbra such sick belonging to their respective corps as are unequal to accompany the movements of the troops.

An officer will command each detachment, having the assistance of one non-commissioned officer for every 20 men, and is to be furnished with a return of numbers, addressed to Col. Trant, who will make further arrangements on this head of service.

3. Staff Surgeon Emery, of the 5th division, will forthwith proceed to Condeixa, to take charge of the sick and wounded till further orders.

4. The 1st division will send an assist. surgeon to attend the wounded at that station.

5. Each division of infantry, and brigade of cavalry, will send out a fatigue party, consisting of 1 subaltern, 2 serjeants, and 30 rank and file, to collect the wounded; those found are to be brought to the nearest part of the road leading from the respective divisions to Condeixa.

Gen. Alex. Campbell, with the 6th division, supported the light troops, by which they were attacked in front. These troops were supported by the cavalry, and by the 1st and 5th divisions, and Col. Ashworth's brigade in reserve. These movements obliged the enemy to abandon all the positions which they successively took in the mountains, and the *corps d'armée* composing the rear guard were flung back upon the main body, at Miranda do Corvo, upon the river Deixa, with considerable loss of killed, wounded, and prisoners.

In the operations of this day, the 43d, 52d, and 95th regts., and 3d caçadores, under the command of Cols. Drummond and Beckwith, and Major Patrickson, Lieut. Col. Ross, and Majors Gilmour and Stewart, and Lieut. Col. Elder, particularly distinguished themselves; as also the light infantry of Gen. Picton's division, under Lieut. Col. Williams, and the 4th caçadores, under Col. do Rego; and the troops of horse artillery under the command of Cpts. Ross and Bull.

The result of these operations has been that we have saved Coimbra and Upper Beira from the enemy's ravages; we have opened the communications with the northern provinces; and we have obliged the enemy to take for their retreat the road by Ponte da Murcella, on which they may be annoyed by the militia acting in security upon their flank, while the allied army will press upon their rear. The whole country, however, affords many advantageous positions to a retreating army, of which the enemy have shown that they know how to avail themselves. They are retreating from the country, as they entered it, in one solid mass, covering their rear on every march by the operations of either one or two *corps d'armée* in the strong positions which the country affords; which *corps d'armée* are closely supported by the main body. Before they quitted their position they destroyed a part of their cannon and ammunition, and they have since blown up whatever the horses were unable to draw away. They have no provisions, excepting what they plunder on the spot, or, having plundered, what the soldiers carry on their backs, and live cattle.

I am concerned to be obliged to add to this account, that their conduct throughout this retreat has been marked by a barbarity seldom equalled, and never surpassed. Even in the towns of Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, in which the head quarters of some of the corps had been for 4 months, and in which the inhabitants had been invited, by promises of good treatment, to remain, they were plundered, and many of their houses destroyed, on the night the enemy withdrew from their position, and they have since burnt every town and village through which they have passed. The convent of Alcobaça was burnt by order from the French head quarters. The Bishop's palace, and the whole town of Leiria, in which Gen. Drouet had had his head quarters, shared the same fate; and there is not an inhabitant of the country, of any class or description, who has had any dealing or communication with the French army, who has not had reason to repent of it and to complain of them. This is the mode in which the promises have been performed, and the assurances have been fulfilled, which were held out in the proclamation of the French Commander in Chief, in which he told the inhabitants of Portugal that he was not come to make war upon them, but with a powerful army of 110,000 men to



drive the English into the sea. It is to be hoped that the example of what has occurred in this country will teach the people of this and of other nations what value they ought to place on such promises and assurances; and that there is no security for life, or for any thing which makes life valuable, excepting in decided resistance to the enemy.\*

I have the honor to enclose returns of killed and wounded in the several affairs with the enemy since they commenced their retreat.

I have received the most able and cordial assistance throughout these operations from Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, and Marshal Sir W. Beresford, whom I had requested to cross the Tagus, and who has been with me since the 11th inst.; from Major Gens. Sir W. Erskine, Picton, Cole, Campbell; Major Gen. Slade, and Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville, and the General and other officers commanding brigades under their orders respectively. I am particularly indebted to the Q. M. G., Col. Murray, for the assistance I have received from him, and to the D. A. G., Col. the Hon. E. Pakenham; and the officers of the Adj. Gen. and Q. M. Gen.'s departments, as also those of my personal staff, have given me every assistance in their power.

I am sorry to inform your Lordship that Badajoz surrendered on the 11th inst.† I have not yet received the particulars of this event, but I have no doubt of the fact. Since the enemy entered Estremadura, and has directed his efforts against that place, my attention has been drawn to the means of saving it; and Mr. Wellesley will have transmitted to England the copies of the correspondence which I have had with the Spanish officers upon this subject.

Before the unfortunate battle of the 19th Feb. I had intended to reinforce the Spanish army with about 14,000 men from that under my command; and thus to force the enemy to raise the siege, as soon as I should have been joined by the reinforcement which I expected would arrive in the Tagus by the end of January. I could not detach with safety till that reinforcement should arrive.

The battle of the 19th Feb. destroyed the Spanish troops upon whose assistance and co-operation I relied; and then it would have been impossible to detach a body of troops sufficient to effect the purpose, even after the arrival of the reinforcements, till the enemy should be removed from the Tagus. I had therefore determined to attack the enemy in his positions as soon as the reinforcements should arrive, if the weather should be such as to render the roads at all passable.

The reinforcements arrived in the first days of March, but have not yet joined the army; and on the 5th, at night, the enemy withdrew from their positions.

On the 6th, Gen. Leite, the governor of Elvas, began to inform the governor of Badajoz, by signal or otherwise, that Massena had retired, and that he might expect assistance as soon as it was in my power to give it to him; and that he must hold out till the last extremity. I had made all the arrangements for detaching the force immediately upon the enemy's quitting the Tagus and Zezere, and some of the troops actually marched from Thomar on the morning of the 9th; and others, that part of Sir W. Beresford's corps which had not crossed the Tagus, were put in motion; and their head has arrived within three marches of Elvas.

\* See Appendix, No. XXXVI.

† See Appendix, No. XXXIII.

I received at Thomar, on the morning of the 9th, accounts of a most favorable nature from Badajoz, from which I was induced to believe, not only that the place was in no danger, but that it was in fact untouched; that its fire was superior to that of the enemy, and that it was in no want of provisions or ammunition, had sustained no loss, excepting that of the governor, Menacho, and was able and likely to hold out for a month. Gen. Imaz, a person of equally good reputation, succeeded to the command; and the greatest confidence was reposed in him. On the same afternoon of the 9th I was with the British advanced guard at Pombal, and saw in front of that town the collection of the enemy's troops which I have above recited to your Lordship. It appeared to me then, that I must decide either to allow the enemy to retreat from Portugal unmolested, by the road he should prefer, and expose Coimbra and Upper Beira to be ravaged; or that I must draw to the army some of the troops, cavalry particularly, which I had allotted for the expedition to Badajoz, and which still remained at Thomar. I accordingly called to the army the 4th division of infantry and a brigade of heavy cavalry, under the conviction that Badajoz would hold out for the time during which it should be necessary to employ them. Experience has shown me that I could not have done without these troops; and it is also very clear, that if I had left them behind, they could not have saved Badajoz, which place the governor surrendered on the day after he received my assurances that he should be relieved and my entreaty that he would hold out to the last moment.

It is useless to add any reflection to these facts. The Spanish nation have lost Tortosa, Olivença, and Badajoz, in the course of two months, without sufficient cause; and in the same period, Marshal Soult, with a corps never supposed to be more than 20,000 men, has taken, besides the last two places, or destroyed above 22,000 Spanish troops.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 12th; and as we have now opened the communication with the north, it is not necessary to send any more

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

‘Arrangement for the attack of the enemy's rear guard, at Foz d'Arouce, 15th March, 1811:

‘The Light division (left in front) will move by the high ground on the left of the great road, slanting up to it, so as to gain possession of the heights near Foz d'Arouce. One troop of horse artillery will accompany the division. The 3d division (right in front) will continue its march, in the first instance, along the great road, and will afterwards incline to the right, so as to gain possession of, and hold the wooded hills in that direction in sufficient force to secure the right flank of the attack.

‘The 1st division, including Major Gen. Nightingall's brigade, will follow the 3d, and the 6th will follow the Light division, and both will act as circumstances may require in support of the troops preceding them.

‘Col. Hawker's brigade of cavalry, and 1 troop of horse artillery, will remain in reserve in the open ground to the right of the great road.

‘Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry will move to the open ground upon the heights, behind the Light division.

‘The 5th division, when it has got a little way beyond Miranda do Corvo, will move up the hills on the left of the great road, to be a support, if required, to the Light division.

‘Brig. Gen. Pack will observe the fords of the Ceira, below Foz d'Arouce, and act also against the right of the enemy's rear guard at that place, should circumstances admit of his doing so.

‘It is not intended to attempt any thing against the enemy's position beyond the Ceira, but only to drive the troops on the left bank across the river.

transports to Vigo. I have spoken to the Commissary Gen. regarding the treatment of those recently arrived.

I refer you to my dispatch for the news.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Loução, 16th March, 1811.

In consequence of directions which I have received from the Sec. of State, I have to request that you will send to Plymouth, as soon as may be convenient, horse transports to convey to this country 700 horses.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Loução, 16th March, 1811.

I enclose a paper of articles which ought to be prepared at Elvas for the bridge, which I ought to have given you 2 or 3 days ago; but it is not yet too late, I hope.

I likewise enclose a letter on the state of Campo Maior. Collect your corps at Portalegre.

There is nothing new since you went. The enemy is in small force on the other side the bridge, which they have destroyed.

Au Capt. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

À Loução, ce 16 Mars, 1811.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre, et je vous suis bien obligé de la franchise dont vous me faites l'offre. Vous pouvez être sur que j'agirai de même envers vous, et que je vous ferai part de mes intentions et de mes opinions sans aucune réserve quand je croirai qu'elles pourront vous être utiles.

Vous recevrez d'Alava les nouvelles de ce côté ci. Aussitôt que j'ai eu rétabli la communication avec Coimbra et le nord du Portugal, j'ai mis en marche les troupes que j'avais empruntées, pendant un moment, du service de Badajoz; et le Maréchal Beresford sera demain à son quartier général de Chamusca, et tout son corps sur le Tage.

Si le malheureux gouverneur de Badajoz eut tenu la place comme je

G. A. O.

Loução, 16th March, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the General and Staff officers, and troops, for their excellent conduct in the operations of the last 10 days against the enemy.

He requests the Commanding officers of the 43d, 52d, and 95th regts. to name a sergeant of each regiment, to be recommended for promotion to an ensigncy, as a testimony of the particular approbation of the Commander of the Forces, of these three regiments.

4. The Commander of the Forces is unwilling, at this moment, to order the punishment of any soldier of the 1st Hussars, but he desires private ——— may be discharged from the 1st Hussars, as being unworthy to serve in the ranks of that regiment.

5. \* \* \* \*

6. The Commander of the Forces is happy to avail himself of this opportunity to pardon on these three soldiers, who are to be released from confinement and return to their duty; he hopes that the sentence which has been passed upon them will have the effect of deterring them and others from committing similar crimes in future.

7. The Commander of the Forces requests that for route marches each company in every battalion of infantry may be told off in threes; when the column is to be formed for the march the companies must be wheeled up or backward by threes, and each stand in column of three men in front, which is as large a number as the greater proportion of the roads in Portugal will admit. This front can easily be increased or diminished as circumstances may render expedient.

8. The Commander of the Forces refers the officers particularly to his orders regarding the march of companies or smaller divisions through a defile or any other difficulty; the soldiers cannot make the march with ease to themselves, if they are obliged or allowed to close up intervals the difficulties of the road may occasion, by running.

The same orders are applicable to the cavalry.

lui avais dit, nous avions beau jeu, nous aurions sauvé l'Espagne. Malheureusement, je n'avais jamais auparavant fait une promesse, et quand j'en ai fait une, on n'a pas voulu me croire. Mais la place est perdue, et il faut tacher de faire quelqu'autre chose.

Faites moi savoir, je vous en prie, combien de troupes disponibles il reste de l'armée Espagnole, et vos opinions sur ce que nous devons entreprendre. Le Maréchal Beresford a près de 22,000 hommes, dont plus de 2000 sont de cavalerie, non compris la brigade à Elvas. Je compte aller de ce côté là moi-même, aussitôt que j'aurai tout à fait arrangé les affaires de ce côté ci.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th inst., on a complaint said by Dom M. Forjaz to be made of the conduct of the British troops at Salvaterra; which complaint you will observe refers not to the conduct of the British troops, but to that of the Portuguese regiments Nos. 4 and 10.

In respect to the charge of cutting barren wood in the Royal parks for firewood, I have to reply that I suppose His Royal Highness does not propose that His Majesty's troops shall want firewood in Portugal. It is reasonable that His Royal Highness, as well as other proprietors, should be paid for the wood cut upon his demesnes; but either the troops must be allowed to cut firewood, paying for the same, wherever the defence of His Royal Highness' dominions renders it necessary that they should be stationed, or they must be removed to the places where they can cut firewood, by which His Royal Highness' interests must suffer.

I cannot avoid adverting to the disposition recently manifested by the government to complain of the conduct of the British troops, certainly, in this instance, without foundation. Acts of misconduct, and even outrage, I admit, have been committed, but never with impunity in any instance in which the complaint could be substantiated; and I have not yet been able to obtain the punishment of any individual of this country, be his crimes what they may.

If the British soldiers have committed, as all soldiers do commit, acts of misconduct, they have at least fought bravely for the country. They have besides recently shown that commiseration for the misfortunes of the people of this country which I am convinced will be equally felt by their countrymen at home, and actually fed the poor inhabitants of all the towns in which they were cantoned on the Rio Maior river. Yet I have not heard that the Portuguese government have expressed their approbation of this conduct, very unusual in people of this class and description; nor do I find that either their bravery in the field, or their humanity, or their generosity, can induce those whom they are serving to look with indulgence at their failings, or to draw a veil over the faults of the few, in consideration of the military and other virtues of the many.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

When the enemy recently retired from their positions on the Rio Maior river I had the bridge of Abrantes taken up and brought down to Tancos,

and there established, in order to keep up the communication between the corps of the army on the left and on the right bank of the Tagus. It is expedient, for many reasons, that this bridge should be taken again to its old station at Abrantes; but, before that is done, it will be necessary to have a new bridge over the Zézere at Punhete. As I do not exactly understand in whose department the recent regulation on the subject of boats has placed the boats for the construction of bridges, I request you to apply to the government to order a bridge to be laid over the Zézere by the proper authority. When that is done, the bridge now at Tancos may be removed to Abrantes.

I also request you to inform the government that the bridges laid over the different streams on the left of the Tagus, for the communication of the troops stationed on the left bank of that river, may be removed.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Loução, 16th March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th inst., containing a complaint of the Conde de Castello Melhor, that olive trees are cut on his estate near Bucellas, for the purpose of making abattis.

I beg that the government will be pleased to determine:

1st; Whether the works which have once saved Lisbon shall be rendered as complete as they can be made before the enemy may approach them again, or whether we are to wait till the last moment to complete what may be done beforehand.

2dly; That they will determine whether any, and what, sums of money shall be paid to individuals for the damage done to their property by these works; and

3dly; That they will order payment to be made to all the individuals in this situation, as well as to the Conde de Castello Melhor.

Considering that this gentleman is a man of high family, who it is supposed will save his property from robbery and confiscation, and his person from slavery, and his family from violation and outrage, by the measures adopted for the salvation of the country, it might have been expected that he would not have been the first to demand from the government payment for the damage which those measures do to him.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Loução, 16th March, 1811.

I return Stockler's paper, which I have not had leisure to read. The government may publish any nonsense they please. It is entirely a matter of indifference to me; but I think they had better take care how they endeavor to set the people of the country against those who have saved them. They are much mistaken if they think they can do me any harm by such nonsense, or that they can themselves stand for a moment after they shall have convinced the people that the English, and I in particular, have not done my best for them. You know best whether these opinions can be brought forth. I am entirely indifferent whether they can or not, or what becomes of Stockler and his book.

You will see in my dispatch the state of affairs here. If the Governor of Badajoz had not sold the place, the Peninsula would have been safe.

The government having first starved their troops on the Rio Maior

river, and then sent to Villa Franca above 200,000 rations after they had marched, and when they had no means, and knew that the troops had none, of moving forward any thing, is exactly like every thing else they have done.

The sending provisions to the Mondego is right; but I will lay a wager that half of it will be bread, not biscuit.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

Louzaõ, 16th March, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the report of a Board of Survey on horses recently arrived in Portugal for the regiments of dragoons serving in this country, to which I beg you to draw the notice of the Commander in Chief. I am convinced that it was never the intention of his Excellency, or of government, that the Commanding officers of regiments on the same service should have taken advantage of the order to send drafts of 5 and 6 year old horses to the regiments in this country, in order to get rid of the old and unserviceable horses in their regiments.

To Gen. Sir D. Dundas, Commander in Chief.

Louzaõ, 16th March, 1811.

I beg leave to transmit, for your information, extracts of 2 dispatches to the Earl of Liverpool, detailing the operations of the army since the retreat of the enemy from their positions on the Rio Maior river; and I have much pleasure in acquainting you that I am highly satisfied with the conduct of the troops upon these occasions.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Louzaõ, 16th March, 1811.

I refer you to my dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 14th and this day for an account of the state of affairs here.

If it had not been for the treachery of the Governor of Badajoz, Spain would have been out of the fire, notwithstanding former treachery, blunders, and cowardice. The siege of Cadiz would certainly have been raised if Graham had not already succeeded in that object. As it is, I am doubtful whether I shall be able to do more than protect the Alentejo; but I will do all I can.

Something, however, must be done to obtain funds for these governments. We are brought up at every turn for want of money, and I am really at a loss what to do with them.

P. S. Nobody entertains a doubt that Imaz sold Badajoz. He appears to have surrendered as soon as he could after he knew that relief was coming to him, lest his garrison should prevent the surrender when they should be certain of the truth of the intelligence of Massena's retreat.

To the Rt. Hon. Lady S. Napier.

Louzaõ, 16th March, 1811.

I am sorry to have to inform you that your two sons were again wounded in an action with the enemy the day before yesterday, but neither of them, I hope, seriously. William is wounded in the back, and this is supposed to be only a flesh wound; George in the right arm, which is broken. Both are doing remarkably well, and will, I hope, soon recover to return to their duty.

Your Ladyship has so often received accounts of the same description

with that which I am now writing to you, and your feelings upon the subject are so just and proper, that it is needless for me to trouble you further. Your sons are brave fellows, and an honor to the army; and I hope that God will preserve them to you and their country.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Louza, 16th March, 1811.

In consequence of the directions contained in your Lordship's dispatch of the 30th Jan. (No. 8), I have requested Adm. Berkeley to send to England horse transports for the conveyance to this country of 700 horses of the 11th light dragoons.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Louza, 16th March, 1811.

I have the honor to inform you, that, as soon as I opened the communication with Coimbra on the 13th inst., I ordered off the troops destined to relieve Badajoz, some of which commenced their march on that evening.

I heard of the fall of Badajoz in the night of the 13th and 14th; Major Gen. Cole's division was moved on Espinhal on the 14th, in order afterwards to continue its route into the Alentejo; and it marched in that direction yesterday. We shall have in that province nearly 22,000 men, of which nearly 2200 will be cavalry. Marshal Sir W. Beresford has returned to take the command there; and I propose to proceed to that quarter myself, as soon as I shall have brought the operations on this side to a close.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Louza, 16th March, 1811.

In answer to your letter of the 16th Feb., regarding publications in the newspapers, I assure you that I did not mean to say that the information in the newspapers, to which I referred, was received either from your Lordship's office or from that of the Commander in Chief; for I know that neither have the information, at least from me. But I wished to point out to you under what disadvantages we carried on our operations. Foy brought from Paris not only the paper containing that information, but copies of all my dispatches; from which Massena knew all that I had intended to do in November against his positions, and he knew accurately every inch of mine, by how many guns defended, for what purpose, &c. It may be very right to give the British public this information; but if they choose to have it, they ought to know the price they pay for it, and the advantages it gives to the enemy in all their operations.\*

I am sure your Lordship does not expect that I, or any other officer in command of a British army, can pretend to prevent the correspondence of the officers with their friends. It could not be done if attempted, and the attempt would be considered an endeavor by an individual to deprive the British public of intelligence, of which the government and Parliament do not choose to deprive them. I have done every thing in my power by way of remonstrance, and have been very handsomely abused for it; but I cannot think of preventing officers from writing to their friends. This intelligence must certainly have gone from some officer of this army, by whom it was confidentially communicated to his friends in England; and I have heard that it was circulated from one of the officers with a plan.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Loução, 16th March, 1811.

I have the honor to inform you that Lieut. R. Burke, of the 45th regt., who I reported to your Lordship on the 2d inst. had deserted to the enemy, rejoined the army on the 8th inst. between Torres Novas and Thomar, declaring that he had been taken prisoner. I have, however, placed him in close arrest, and propose to bring him to trial before a General Court Martial.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Loução, 16th March, 1811.

Major Gen. Cole joined Major Gen. Nightingall at Espinhal on the afternoon of the 13th; and this movement, by which the Deixa was passed, and which gave us the power of turning the strong position of Miranda do Corvo, induced the enemy to abandon it on that night. They destroyed at this place a great number of carriages, and burned and otherwise destroyed, or consumed, the ammunition which they had carried; they likewise burned much of their baggage; and the road throughout the march from Miranda is strewn with the carcasses of men and animals, and destroyed carriages and baggage.

We found the enemy's whole army yesterday in a very strong position on the Ceira, having one corps as an advanced guard in front of Foz d'Arouce, on this side of the river. I immediately made arrangements to drive in the advanced guard, preparatory to the movements which it might be expedient to make to cross the Ceira this morning.

Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade had been detached in the morning through the mountains to the left, as well to turn the enemy in his position at Miranda do Corvo as in view to any others they might take up on this side of the Ceira. The Light division, under Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, was ordered to possess some heights immediately above Foz d'Arouce, while Major Gen. Picton's division was moved along the great road to attack the left of the enemy's position and of the village. The 6th division, under Major Gen. Campbell, and the hussars and 16th dragoons supported the Light division; and the 1st division, and the 14th, and Royal dragoons, the 3d.

These movements succeeded in forcing the enemy to abandon his strong positions on this side of the Ceira with considerable loss. The Colonel of the 39th regt. was made prisoner.

The light troops of Gen. Picton's division under Col. Williams, and those of Gen. Nightingall's brigade, were principally engaged on the right; and the 95th regt. in front of the Light division. The troops behaved in the most gallant manner. The horse artillery likewise, under Capt. Ross and Bull, distinguished themselves upon this occasion. The troops took much baggage and some ammunition carriages in Foz d'Arouce.

I had been prevented from moving till a late hour in the morning by the fog; and it was dark by the time we gained possession of the last position of the enemy's advanced guard. In the night the enemy destroyed the bridge on the Ceira, and retreated, leaving a small rear guard on the river. The destruction of the bridge at Foz d'Arouce, the fatigue which the troops have undergone for several days, and the want of supplies, have induced me to halt the army this day.



Marshal Sir W. Beresford and I had repeatedly urged the Governors of the Kingdom to adopt measures to supply the troops with regularity, and to keep up the establishments while the army was in cantonments on the Rio Maior river; which representations were not attended to; and when the army was to move forward, the Portuguese troops had no provisions, nor any means of conveying any to them. They were to move through a country ravaged and exhausted by the enemy; and it is literally true, that Gen. Pack's brigade, and Col. Ashworth's, had nothing to eat for 4 days, although constantly marching or engaged with the enemy.

I was obliged either to direct the British Commissary Gen. to supply the Portuguese troops, or to see them perish for want; and the consequence is, that the supplies intended for the British troops are exhausted, and we must halt till more come up, which I hope will be this day.

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

'Louzão, 17th March, 1811, 5 A.M.

'Arrangement for passing the river Ceira:

'Col. Hawker's brigade of cavalry will march immediately, by its right, to Serpins, and will pass the Ceira by the bridge at that place.

'After having passed the river the brigade will advance about a mile, inclining a little towards the left; and it will throw out parties to the front, and also to the left, to bring itself into communication with the troops that are to pass at the fords of the Ceira, lower down.

'The 3d division, with 1 brigade of Portuguese 6 pounders, will also march immediately to Serpins, and cross the river there. Should there be any difficulty, owing to the badness of the road, the division will not wait for the artillery, but will leave a working party to assist in bringing it forward. The 1st division will pass the Ceira at the ford near the village of Ceira, and the British 9 pounders with it will be placed upon some high ground there is to the left of the village, in order to cover the passage of the troops, if it should be opposed.

'Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade (left in front) will pass the Ceira at a ford near his present position on the left of the army, and will afterwards move forward towards the road leading from Foz d'Arouce to Ponte da Murcella.

'The Light division (left in front) will pass at a ford immediately below the village of Alça Perna, which is on the right bank of the river, a little lower down than Foz d'Arouce.

'Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, and the two troops of horse artillery, will pass the river at the ford above the bridge of Foz d'Arouce, and Sir W. Erskine will send forward that brigade 2 or 3 miles upon the road towards Ponte da Murcella to reconnoitre.

'The divisions that first pass the river will be prepared to form, should it be necessary, to cover the passage of the rest of the army.

'All the troops not mentioned above, and all the baggage of the army, will remain upon the left bank of the Ceira till further orders.'

'17th March, 1811, 7 A.M.

'The 6th division will pass the Ceira at the ford of Alça Perna, following the Light division.

'The 5th division and Col. Ashworth's brigade of Portuguese infantry will pass at the village of Ceira, following the 1st division.

'The baggage of the several columns will pass the river, when all the troops have crossed, in the order of the columns, and that of each division by the same ford by which the division has passed to which it belongs.

'The 3d division will take up its ground at the village of Furcado, having Col. Hawker's brigade of cavalry a little in its front.

'The 1st division will take up its ground on the left of the 3d division, and the Light division upon the great road to the left of the 1st division, and about one mile behind S. Miguel de Poyares.

'Gen. Pack's brigade of infantry, and Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, will be in front of the Light division at S. Miguel de Poyares.

'The 5th division and Col. Ashworth's brigade will be in second line to the 1st division, and the 6th division will be in second line to the Light division.

'The cavalry of the left will have a post upon the top of the hill of Murcella, and the cavalry of the right a post at Chapinhira.

'Head-quarters will remain at Louzão.'

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 14th inst. I have heard further particulars respecting the surrender of Badajoz. It appears that, on the 9th, the enemy had made a breach in the place about 18 feet wide, but which was by no means practicable. On the same day the Governor acknowledged by signal the receipt of the message which I had sent him; on the 10th he suspended hostilities, and on the 11th surrendered the place, the garrison being prisoners of war, and marching out with the honors of war, to the number of 9000, to an army which at the period of the surrender amounted only to 9600 infantry, and 2000 cavalry. The garrison wanted neither ammunition nor provisions.

In my letter of the 6th I had desired the Governor of Elvas to urge the Governor of Badajoz to keep secret the intelligence of Massena's retreat, lest, by means of deserters, it should reach the enemy, whom I was in hopes that I should have found engaged in this siege. But he published the intelligence as soon as he received it, stating at the same time that he did not believe it. He likewise communicated it to the French General.

Since the fall of Badajoz the enemy have turned their attention to Campo Maior, and have moved in that direction.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B. Pombeiro, on the Alva, 18th March, 1811, 4 p.m.

I have just received yours of the 17th. You had better lose no time in moving up to Portalegre, and attack Soult, if you can, at Campo Maior. I will come to you if I can; but if I cannot, don't wait for me. Get Castaños to join you, from Estremoz, with any Spanish troops he can bring with him. You must be 2 days marching from Portalegre to Campo Maior, I believe.

G. O.

Lousão, 17th March, 1811.

2. It has been reported to the Commander of the Forces that the — regt. plundered a village in the neighbourhood of the camp, yesterday, of 112 alqueirs of Indian corn.

The Commander of the Forces desires that the rolls of the — regt. may be called every hour, every officer being present, till further orders. The obedience of this order must be reported daily to head quarters.

3. The Commander of the Forces will not allow the soldiers of the army to plunder, which they ought to know by this time.

If Indian corn or any other article is wanted from the country, the G. O. of the army point out the mode in which it is to be procured without plunder or violence, or the loss of property to the inhabitants.

G. O.

Pombeiro, 18th March, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the General officers commanding divisions will place safeguards in the villages in the neighbourhood of their encampments, to prevent the soldiers from carrying off the furniture, poles of the vines, and other property of the inhabitants. The Commander of the Forces desires that at the same time with this order, the Articles of War regarding forcing safeguards may be read to the troops.

2. Some instances have occurred lately of delay in obeying orders issued, and in some instances the mode of execution has been altered. Exact obedience to orders issued is the foundation of military discipline. It is impossible to carry on any operation with certainty, or to attempt any movement, if all the parts into which the army is divided do not execute exactly what is ordered, in the mode, by the route, and at the hour appointed. It may be depended on that the relative inconveniences of each mode of execution are weighed by the Commander of the Forces, and that what is ordered for each part of the army is to make the whole combine in one general operation and movement.

It is also very important that the departure and placing of the baggage of the troops, as directed, should be accurately attended to; unless this is done, the officers and troops must frequently suffer personal inconvenience.

The enemy had, this morning, Ney's corps *en position* behind Ponte da Murcella: we moved 3 divisions on Pombeiro, and this put them all in a bustle. They have assembled a large force upon the Serra de Moita, brought back from the rear, and Ney is now moving off towards the same point.

I enclose a letter from Austin. The intelligence it contains will make Soult look about him a little.

P.S. Graham has stopped the Sicilian troops, nearly 2000. He had 4000, so that he has still nearly 6000. Victor, it is said, only 8000 infantry.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Pombeiro, 18th March, 1811.

I am concerned to be under the necessity of troubling you again upon the old subject, the subsistence of the Portuguese troops.

When I lately proposed an arrangement, with a view to facilitate their means of subsistence, I particularly specified that these troops, not serving in the same divisions with British troops, should be really fed by the Portuguese government. There are 2 brigades of infantry and one of cavalry with this part of the army in that situation, viz., Brig. Gen. Pack's and Col. Ashworth's of infantry, and the Visconde de Barbacena's of cavalry, none of whom have received any provisions since the troops marched from the Rio Maior river, excepting what have been issued to them by the British Commissary Gen., and the consequence has been, that the army has been obliged to halt; and I am unable to carry into execution the arrangement which I lately proposed.

It is useless to propose any arrangement for this or any other purpose, if the Portuguese government will execute nothing. I repeat, that matters cannot go on as they are; there must be a radical change in the whole of the system of the government, in respect to the resources for carrying on the war, or I shall recommend to His Majesty's government to withdraw his army.

It is a favorite notion with some members of the government, that the Portuguese troops can do with very little or no food. Among other good qualities, they possess that of being patient under privations in an extraordinary degree. But men cannot perform the labor of soldiers without food. Three of Gen. Pack's brigade died of famine yesterday on their march, and above 150 have fallen out from weakness, many of whom must have died from the same cause.

The government neglected both establishments and troops when they were on the Rio Maior river, and neither are in the state in which they ought to be at the commencement of a campaign. The mules of the artillery are unable to draw the guns for want of food, for any length of time; the baggage mules of the army are nearly all dead of famine; and the drivers have neither been paid nor fed.

This is the state of the army at the commencement of the campaign; and I see clearly that, unless the government should change their system, no remedy will be applied, and the whole burthen of defending this country will fall upon Great Britain.

I have this day told Gen. Pack and Col. Ashworth that, if they cannot procure food for their troops with the army, they must go to Coimbra, or

elsewhere where they can, as I cannot bear to see and hear of brave soldiers dying for want of common care.

One consequence, therefore, of omitting to feed the troops, will be to throw us again upon the defensive in this part of the country; another consequence, also, which I seriously apprehend, is, that the British officers serving with the Portuguese troops will resign their situations: one of them spoke to me seriously upon the subject of the state of the troops this day, and declared his intention to resign if a remedy was not applied.

I beg you to lay this letter before the Portuguese government, and to forward it to be laid before H. R. H. the Regent, and H. R. H. the Prince Régent of Portugal.

*The A.G. to the Commissary General.*

18th March, 1811.

A report having reached the Commander of the Forces that the —th regt., in an unauthorised manner, took 112 alqueirs of Indian corn from — and —, at Villareiuho, I am directed to request you will cause inquiry to be made into the complaint, and, if well founded, cause compensation to be made to the above mentioned sufferers.

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

‘Arrangement for the movement of the army on the 18th March, 1811 :

Right column	{	Col. Hawker's brigade of cavalry.
		3d division.
		1st division.
		5th division.

‘This column will march (divisions by the right) through Furcado, Alvete-Pequen, and by the chapel of Tilhada (called Almas de Tilhada), and will halt and wait for further orders when it comes in a line with the village of Pombeiro, which is on the Alva, about a mile and a half from the bridge of Val d'Espinho. The Portuguese brigade of 9 pounders, under the orders of Major Arentschildt, is to move with the right column, and be at the head of the 1st division.

Left column	{	Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry	} Under Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine.
		Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade . . . .	
		The Light division . . . . .	
		6th division.	

Col. Ashworth's brigade of Portuguese infantry.

‘The British brigade of 9 pounders is to move with the left column, and be at the head of the 6th division.

‘The left column will march (divisions by the right) by the great road leading towards Ponte da Murcella; but it will halt before descending to the bridge, and wait for further orders.

‘If, however, the enemy has abandoned the ground on the opposite side of the bridge, the advanced guard of the left column will take possession of it, and the General officer at the head of the column will cause the bridge to be repaired without delay.

‘The columns are to be put in motion an hour after daybreak, and the baggage of each column is to follow, in rear of the troops, in the order of the column.

‘The baggage of head quarters will move, in the first instance, to the village of Pombeiro.’

On the 19th March the allied army was placed as follows :

Col. Hawker's brigade of cavalry, at Morunho.

Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, at Venda da Serra.

The 3d division, at Saccarias.

The 1st and 5th divisions, near Sarzedo.

The Light division . . . . .

Col. Barbacena's brigade of Portuguese cavalry . . . . .

Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade of Portuguese infantry . . . . .

The 6th division . . . . .

Col. Ashworth's brigade of Portuguese infantry . . . . .

The 7th division . . . . .

} In the neighbourhood of Moita and Carrapichana.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G.*

19th March, 1811.

Referring to the G. O. of the 16th inst., in the 2d number of which, —, of the 1st hussars, K.G.L., stands acquitted of the charge, viz. conspiring to desert, alleged against him, I have to request you will apprise Major Gen. Slade that my Lord Wellington, as a further mark of favor to the 1st hussars, leaves it to the option of Col. Arentschildt to discharge the said —, should continued suspicion of that soldier's intention, though unsubstantiated, leave doubts as to his integrity. In the event of —'s discharge, a report must be made to this office, and orders will be sent to Lisbon for that man's further disposal.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811, 9 A.M.

I received last night your letter of the 17th. Mine of the 18th, of which I send you a duplicate, will have removed the doubt which you have entertained whether you should attack Soult. I send you likewise by this opportunity a report on the frontier of the Alentejo, likewise a map of the frontier, which will, I believe, be of more use to you, both of which I beg you to return. I believe you should manoeuvre upon Soult's right, throwing your own left towards the Gevora. The country is hilly on the left from Arronches towards Campo Maior. The Caya is fordable, I believe, everywhere for infantry; but as well as I recollect, the bottom is of a description to allow of the passage of horses and carriages only in a few places. There are fords, as well as a bridge at Arronches. The Caya, it is said, gives a good position for a defensive for the Alentejo about Arronches; but I had not time when I was there to examine it.

The character of Soult's operations, I think, is to detach a good deal.

G. O.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

1. The 6th division will furnish a party, consisting of 1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, and 20 R. and F., to proceed immediately to the Ponte da Murcella, with such prisoners as may be collected from the several divisions.
2. Such prisoners as are not delivered over to this detachment must be sent this day by divisional escorts to the Ponte da Murcella.
3. The Commander of the Forces requests that the Commanding officers of the regiments of cavalry will take particular care, when they send out parties for forage, to send an officer or commissary with them, or if there should be no commissary, a quarter master, or some person authorised to give a receipt to the inhabitant for the quantity taken, otherwise it must be obvious that what is taken is positively lost to the owners.
4. The Commander of the Forces likewise requests the attention of the officers of the cavalry particularly, and of the officers at the head of columns, to a discrimination between what is taken from the enemy, and what has been left by the enemy, and the inhabitants of the country, and is still their property.
5. The Commander of the Forces has always given to the soldiers that which they take from the enemy, such as horses, cattle, &c.; but they must not take cattle or sheep, or other property which they find on the road along which they are marching in pursuit of the enemy. This property belongs to the people of the country, and if taken for the use of the troops, it must be in the regular manner, and the owners must have a receipt and must be paid for it.

G. A. O.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to hear that some of the regiments coming up in the rear have forcibly seized on the supplies on the march for those in front, in consequence of which these last have been deprived of them.
2. Those who stopped and seized those supplies should reflect that it is most easy to supply the troops nearest to the magazine, while those nearest the enemy require the supplies with the greatest urgency. It is besides quite irregular, and positively contrary to the orders of this army, for any Commanding officer to seize supplies of any description; there is a commissary attached to every part of the army, and there is no individual, much less regiment, for whom some commissary is not obliged to provide.
3. It is necessary that this practice should be avoided in future, otherwise it will become impossible to carry on any regular operation.

I recommend to you to keep your troops very much *en masse*. I have always considered the cavalry to be the most delicate arm that we possess. We have few officers who have practical knowledge of the mode of using it, or who have ever seen more than 2 regiments together; and all our troops, cavalry as well as infantry, are a little inclined to get out of order in battle. To these circumstances add, that the defeat of, or any great loss sustained by, our cavalry, in these open grounds, would be a misfortune amounting almost to a defeat of the whole; and you will see the necessity of keeping the cavalry as much as possible *en masse*, and in reserve, to be thrown in at the moment when an opportunity may offer of striking a decisive blow.

If Soult goes to the south of the Guadiana, which I think likely, lay down your bridge, and make a *tête de pont* opposite Jurumenha; and in the first instance invest Badajoz on the left of the Guadiana, doing the same with cavalry only, or Spanish troops, or militia, on the right. You might also make the Spaniards seize the bridges of Merida and Medellin.

The French retired from Moita to beyond Galizes the night before last and yesterday. We took yesterday 3 officers and 600 prisoners. Our divisions and their baggage make their marches (however short) so very ill, that I am obliged to halt the greatest part of the army again to-day. However, I have now begun a new system with them, which is, to state in the orders at what hour each is to start and is to arrive at each place. By degrees I shall bring them to some system.

I am afraid that I shall be obliged to throw into some valley all the Portuguese artillery, as the mules are so much reduced as to be quite incapable of moving the guns, and we must endeavor to put some flesh on their bones. This is really too bad.

I request you to order all the Lisbon militia in the lines, and all the Ordenanza, artillery, &c., to their homes, desiring, however, that they will be ready to return at the shortest notice. The regiments of Covilhão, Castello Branco, and Idanha, which you mention in your letter of the 17th, might also march into Lower Beira, either to act as a military body or to return to their homes for the present, as circumstances might render necessary. But in either case it will be necessary that the government

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

‘Arrangement for the 20th March:

‘The want of supplies will prevent any general movement of the army taking place to-morrow; but Major Gen. Slade will march at daybreak with 2 brigades of cavalry and one troop of horse artillery, in pursuit of the enemy.

‘Gen. Slade will advance by the great road leading to Pinhanços, and will follow the enemy as far as circumstances permit, taking care, however, to avoid committing the cavalry against any considerable body of infantry, in case the enemy should oppose his progress.

‘Gen. Slade will be so good as send back reports from time to time during his march; and he will take care to station such parties of dragoons along the road as may secure the speedy conveyance of his reports, and the transmission of such further orders as may be forwarded to him from head quarters.

‘Should Gen. Slade find that there are any straggling parties of the enemy’s soldiers still remaining in the country, on either side of the great road, he will, of course, use greater precautions to secure his communication to the rear.

‘If supplies can be procured in the course of to-night, one division of infantry will be pushed forward a short march to-morrow, as a support for the cavalry to fall back upon in case it should become necessary.’

should provide for them on the march, as I neither can nor will; and if no provision should be made for them they must starve. The regiments of Torres Vedras, Santarem, Leiria, and Thomar might go to their homes, or at all events to the chief towns of their districts, and be in readiness to march again at the shortest notice: the regiment of Setuval to Palmella, and the regiment of Viseu to Viseu, to remain embodied or not according to circumstances, when they shall arrive there. I shall desire the Commissary Gen. to give each man 3 days' provisions when they march. Let me have the routes of each regiment, that I may know where to send orders to them.

When I shall have got Massena to the Coa I shall send the northern militia across the Douro. They may at least go each of them to their stations, if they may not be disembodied. In respect to Le Cor, he is now in command of Colman's brigade, and I should think will not like to give up that command. However, I will send for him and speak to him. Do you mean to remove Grant, or that Le Cor should supersede him?

I enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote to Mr. Stuart about the bridges, which will, I conclude, settle every thing upon that subject. Pray keep an eye on the provisions in Abrantes. Remember that there is a store of musket ammunition in Abrantes, and another in Elvas. I have ordered the hospital equipment to halt at Estremoz till you shall order it forward. The bridge was to be at Elvas on the 20th.

P.S. Order all the militia to complete their numbers, and the requisition to be made to complete the regiments of the line.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811, 1½ P.M.

I have received your letter of this day, and have issued an order on the subject it relates to. We certainly want a little practice in marching in large bodies, as at present no calculation can be made of the arrival of any troops at their station, much less of their baggage.

The order for the march yesterday was sent by Reynett, who reported that he had delivered it at 20 minutes past 11; the whole distance to be marched was not 5 miles, and yet the head of the column did not reach its ground till sunset. Seeing how late it was before the head had arrived at the turn of the road, I desired Murray to request you to halt any that had not crossed the river on this side of it. I conclude this order has miscarried, although it was sent from hence some time before sunset. In future I propose to order the period of departure and arrival of each division of the army, by which means I shall know exactly how all stands, and by degrees the troops will become more accustomed to march in large bodies on the same road.

I am concerned to hear you are badly off for provisions. I think we shall have a large supply of all kinds up this evening; if we have not, however inconvenient and disadvantageous it is to halt again, I shall send an order to countermand the march to-morrow, as it will not do to destroy the troops. We took a great number of prisoners yesterday; I have not heard of what has happened this day.

To Capt. Knox, H.M.S. *S. Fiorenzo*, off Oporto.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

I have received information from Adm. Berkeley, that you had been

ordered to Oporto, in order to take to Lisbon by sea certain Portuguese recruits which are at the former place. As, from the recent alteration of circumstances in this part of the country, it is no longer necessary that these recruits should go by sea, I request you to proceed to carry into execution any further orders which you may have received from Adm. Berkeley.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 13th, and am obliged to you for the intelligence which it contains.

I have no doubt but that Gen. Graham has detained the Sicilian regiments.

I have written to Capt. Knox to request him to proceed to carry into execution your ulterior orders, as the recruits, &c., may as well march.

We are going on well. We took 600 prisoners yesterday.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Dr. Franck, relative to the inconvenience which is experienced by the medical department in sending home the invalids of the army, in consequence of their receiving notice of the sailing of the ships at but a late period previous to their sailing.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will direct the Agent of transports to give notice, from time to time, to the A. Q. M. G., of the intention that the transports should sail, for the information of all departments concerned, as soon as you shall have determined that they shall go.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

I have given directions to the A. Q. M. G. at Lisbon to apply to you, from time to time, for vessels to convey from the Tagus to Figueira such detachments of recruits, or recovered men, as there may be at Lisbon for the regiments in this part of the army; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will attend to his requests upon this subject.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

I received the orders of government, some time ago, to send home to England the largest proportion of the transports attached to the army, as soon as affairs in this country should be in such a situation as no longer to require them.

I have this day given directions that the baggage of each division of infantry, and of the cavalry, respectively, may be removed into one transport, which ought to be sufficient to contain it; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will direct the Agent of transports to concert matters with the A. Q. M. G. for that object.

It is my opinion also that, besides the ships of war fitted for the conveyance of troops, we ought to detain in the Tagus coppered transports for the conveyance of 3000 infantry, the best of the horse transports for the conveyance of 300 cavalry, all the hospital ships, and the baggage ships above referred to; and I beg you to send all the remainder to England as soon as it may be convenient to you. Besides these ships, there are others in the Tagus containing ordnance and military stores, respecting



which I will make an arrangement as soon as I shall have got, from the Commanding officer of the artillery, an exact return of them.

I think it proper also at this moment to communicate to you my opinion that the circumstances of the army no longer require the assistance of the squadron which arrived under Sir T. Williams. It is desirable, however, that the battalion of marines which arrived in the *Abercrombie* should still continue at Lisbon.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

In order to get rid of at least 25 vessels, I propose to disembark the ordnance stores (with the exception of the battering train and its stores) and to place them all at S. Julian. I have fixed upon that place for them, as I propose to make it our ordnance depôt, where I shall keep every thing belonging to that department. My reason for this arrangement is, that in case it should be necessary or desirable, at any time, and for any reason, to embark our stores, I am desirous of avoiding coming to blows with the people of Lisbon. This I should not otherwise avoid, as since the formation of the last government some members of it have taken pains to inflame the minds of the people against us, by libels and other means; and I should not now think any thing safe in Lisbon, in case the British government should think it proper, or advisable, to withdraw their army.

In order to facilitate the embarkation or disembarkation of stores at Fort S. Julian I have ordered Col. Fletcher to construct 4 jetties in that bay, on piles; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give your opinion to the officer of engineers ordered to construct them as to the best place for them. He is directed to wait upon you.

I keep the battering train on board, because, whenever we may want it, it will be convenient to transport it part of the way by sea, and the trouble and inconvenience of embarking and disembarking it would be very great, and the expense of its tonnage is not very great. I shall write to you officially respecting the ordnance store ships, as soon as Gen. Howorth shall have got his stores out of them.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a letter, and its enclosure, just received from Gen. Mendizabal, which contains the Governor Imaz's account of the state of affairs at Badajoz on the 8th inst., and the capitulation of the 10th. I beg you to observe that he does not complain of the situation of the place on the 8th: on the 9th he acknowledged the receipt of my message to him: and on the 10th he capitulated!

I shall hereafter address you on that part of Gen. Mendizabal's letter which relates to Campo Maior.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the copies of my dispatches to the Sec. of State of the 14th and 16th inst., as the best mode of making you acquainted with the situation of affairs in this quarter since I addressed you on the 3d inst.

I likewise enclose a letter which I received on the morning of the 9th inst. from Gen. Mendizabal, and its answer; and I enclose copies of letters received from Gen. Leite, and reports from Col. Brito de Mozinho on the state of Badajoz before, and at the time, the place surrendered, and the account of occurrences at that time, from all which the government will judge of the conduct of Gen. Imaz.

However unfortunate the Spanish armies have been in the field, the defences which they have made of several places were calculated to inspire confidence in the exertions of the troops at Badajoz; particularly considering their numbers relatively with those of the enemy; the little progress made by the enemy in making a practicable breach; that they had plenty of provisions and ammunition; their cannon still mounted on the works; and, above all, that they were certain of being relieved. This confidence has, however, been disappointed; and this place, the third so surrendered in 2 months, has been surrendered without sufficient cause. It is useless now to speculate upon the consequences which would have resulted from a more determined and protracted resistance at Badajoz. Sir W. Beresford is at Portalegre, and his troops will be collected there on the 22d. Soult cannot remain north of the Guadiana, even under existing circumstances. If Badajoz were still in the possession of the allies, we might expect to free from the enemy not only Estremadura, but Andalusia.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Gen. Ballesteros, in answer to one which I before transmitted to you. I propose to give no reply to this letter; nor do I propose to take any steps to have the person punished who is supposed to have made an unfounded complaint against Gen. Ballesteros and his troops. The rule according to which I have always proceeded is to encourage complaint, and in my opinion the complaints in question are not without foundation.

Those who know the Spanish soldiers are aware that it is not a novel crime to plunder a magazine, even though destined for their own consumption; and as I am aware that the Capitão Mor had no troops under his orders to place as guards over the magazines, I cannot conceive that he is to blame for not having them guarded.

I don't know whether the Spanish government, or any other authority, have the power of inducing Gen. Ballesteros to keep his troops in order. If they have, it is desirable that they should exert it, if those troops are again to retreat into Portugal; otherwise I am apprehensive that they will obtain but little subsistence, and that they will find the people of Portugal to be an enemy even more formidable than that one which will have obliged them to retire from their own country.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

Since I wrote to you last, I have received yours of the 23d Feb.; and I now send you copies of my dispatches to government, &c., which will show you how things stand here.

If Imaz had not sold Badajoz, I think the Peninsula would have been safe. I should have relieved the south of Spain at all events, and the war would have been placed on a new footing. I am not certain that I shall

not be able to do something of the kind even now; but I wait to decide what plan I shall adopt till I shall hear the result of Gen. Graham's operations against Victor.

All is going on well here. We took 600 prisoners yesterday. The French are in a bad way. They suffered much in the last attack we made upon them on the 15th; and I am told are much annoyed at having their advanced guard beat in, almost within musket shot of their whole army.

P.S. Show the dispatches, &c., to Gen. Graham.

*The A.G. to Capt. Kipping, 4th or King's own, Coimbra.*

20th March, 1811.

I do myself the honor to transmit some extracted rules on the head of service upon which you are detached, for your guidance.

You are to consider yourself military commandant of the hospital establishment at Coimbra; and, without any undue interference with the medical officers there stationed, are to consider yourself responsible for the regularity of the dépôt.

When soldiers shall become convalescents, they are to be put into squads and divisions; soldiers of the same regiments being placed in the 1st, and of the same division in the 2d class; posting the officers you may have at the station in the manner most expedient for the objects of the service.

You will every Saturday send in a state to this office, and report by every opportunity the death of any soldier, the name at full length, the regiment, the company, and period of disease being particularly specified, which casualties you will recapitulate on the back of the weekly state, as also the names of officers remaining at the station.

You are allowed a clerk; and your stationery charge, vouched by duplicate, will be reimbursed every 2 months, by transmission to this office: the first documents are to be forwarded so as to reach head quarters the 24th April.

An Assist. Provost shall be sent to Coimbra under your immediate direction.

Under any circumstances of difficulty you will be pleased to refer to me, when I shall be most happy to afford you any attention in my power.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Dunlop, 5th division.*

20th March, 1811.

In reply to the honor of your letter, and enclosure, from Col. Barns, commanding the 3d batt. of the Royal regt., communicating H.R.H. the Duke of Kent's desire that Mr. F. Russel should come as a volunteer with that battalion, I have to acquaint you his Excellency fully accedes to the proposed arrangement; and Mr. F. Russel may accordingly be placed on the strength of the 3d batt. of the Royal regt. as a volunteer.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Oliveira do Hospital, 21st March, 1811.

The enemy suffered much more in the affair of the 15th than I was aware of when I addressed you on the 16th inst. The firing was not over till dark; and it appears that great numbers were drowned in attempting to ford the Ceira.\*

The enemy withdrew his rear guard from that river in the course of the 16th, and we crossed it on the 17th, and had our posts on the Serra da Murcella; the enemy's army being in a strong position on the right of the Alva. They moved a part of their army on that night, but still maintained their position on the Alva, of which river they destroyed the bridges. We turned their left by the Serra de Sta Quiteria, with the 1st, 3d, and 5th divisions, on the 18th, while the Light division and the 6th manœuvred in their front from the Serra da Murcella. These movements induced the enemy to bring back to the Serra da Moita the troops which had marched the preceding night, at the same time that they withdrew their corps from the Alva; and in the evening their whole army were assembled upon Moita; and the advanced posts of our right were near Arganil, those

\* See Appendix, No. XXXVI.

of our left across the Alva. The enemy retired from the position of Moita in the night of the 18th, and have continued their retreat with the utmost rapidity ever since: I imagine their rear guard will be at Celorico this day. We assembled the army upon the Serra da Moita on the 19th, and our advanced posts are this day beyond Pinhanços. The militia, under Cols. Wilson and Trant, are at Fornos. We have taken great numbers of prisoners, and the enemy have continued to destroy their carriages and their cannon, and whatever would impede their progress. As the greatest number of the prisoners taken on the 19th had been sent out on foraging parties towards the Mondego, and had been ordered to return to the position on the Alva, I conclude that the enemy had intended to remain in it for some days.

Since I wrote last to your Lordship I have received letters from Gen. Mendizabal and others, on the fall of Badajoz. The Governor wrote on the 8th to the Spanish Minister at War, and did not express any apprehension that the place was in danger. He stated that the fire of the place was well kept up, and that one out of 6 battering guns the enemy had had been dismounted on that day. On the 9th he acknowledged to Gen. Leite the receipt of my message. There was no firing on that day till the evening; and on the 10th, instead of the 11th, as I had supposed, the place capitulated.

The 8th article of the capitulation stipulates that the fort of San Christoval and the *tête de pont*, being on the right of the Guadiana, should be given up to the enemy as soon as they should take possession of those works; and this article serves to show the spirit in which the capitulation was made.

Since the fall of Badajoz the enemy, on the 14th, moved towards Campo Maior, and have commenced and broken ground before that place. It had been given over to the charge of the late Marques de la Romana, at his request, last year. But lately the Spanish garrison had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in a manner not very satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the honorable engagement to defend the place into which the Marques entered when it was delivered over to his charge. A Portuguese garrison was, however, thrown into it; and although it is a place of no strength, I am in hopes that it will hold out till Marshal Beresford shall relieve it. His troops will be collected at Portalegre to-morrow.

I have received no letters from Cadiz since the 27th of last month, at which time Gen. Graham had sailed upon an expedition which had for its object to attack the enemy's corps which remained before Cadiz. I have received reports that the expedition had so far answered, that, on the 3d, the communication between the allied troops in the field and the Isla de Leon, by S<sup>a</sup> Petri, had been opened, and that Gen. Zayas had joined the former with a detachment from Cadiz. I have also heard that one of the enemy's posts, at or near Chiclana, was attacked on the 4th or 5th, and carried, with some loss on our side, principally of British and Portuguese troops; and that Gen. Ruffin and 5 pieces of cannon were taken.

I believe also, from the same reports, that the troops for which I had sent vessels to Sicily had arrived at Tarifa, and had been landed by Gen. Graham since the action of the 4th or 5th.

As Gen. Graham reports direct to your Lordship, you will of course receive the details from him; but as the winds which have probably prevented my hearing from him may likewise prevent his dispatches from reaching your Lordship, I think it proper to communicate to you the reports which I have received, which I believe to be founded on fact.

Soult has gone to Seville since the fall of Badajoz; and it is reported that about 3000 French troops had been seen on their march through Barcarrota to the southward.

Your Lordship will probably have seen the Imperial Decree, appointing Marshal Bessières to command in the 6th government of Spain, which includes with Castille all the northern provinces. The troops allotted to this General are not a very efficient body, or at all disposable, with the exception of the Imperial Guard, a detachment of which has been in Spain for more than a year, probably to be in readiness to attend the Emperor, if it should suit his purpose to visit the Peninsula.

I am informed, however, that Marshal Bessières has collected at Zamora about 7000 men, composed principally of the Imperial Guard and of troops taken from all the garrisons in Castille. He thus threatens an attack upon Galicia, in which province there are, I understand, 16,000 men, under Gen. Mahy; but from all that I hear I am apprehensive that that General will make no defence, and that Galicia will fall into the hands of the enemy.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Oliveira do Hospital, 21st March, 1811.

I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the necessity of removing the French prisoners from Lisbon and Oporto. There are now some thousands at those places, particularly at the former; and it is inconvenient and difficult to guard them, and to feed them very expensive. I therefore recommend that they should be removed to England.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Oliveira do Hospital, 21st March, 1811.

As, from the present state of the contest in the Peninsula, I consider it very improbable that the British army can be under the necessity of embarking, I have thought it proper, in obedience to your Lordship's former orders, to request Adm. Berkeley to send to England all the transports and other vessels attached to the army, with the exception of the troop ships of war, and coppered transport tonnage sufficient to contain 3000 men, and horse transports for 300 horses; and a certain number of vessels to contain the regimental baggage of the regiments which I propose should be kept afloat.

The ordnance store ships will not go for some time, as it will be necessary to land the ordnance stores. I also propose to retain about 2500 tons of ordnance transports to keep afloat the battering train.

I have not yet fixed upon any regiments to be sent back to England in consequence of the enemy's retreat; and I beg to know from your Lordship, whether you still desire that the force here should be reduced, and to what extent.

I have also apprised the Admiral of my opinion, that the squadron which came to the Tagus, under Sir T. Williams, may be allowed to return to England.

To Gen. Bacellar.

Oliveira do Hospital, 22d March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 21st.

The advanced guard of the British army will be this day between Sampaio and Celorico, and I imagine that the enemy will have passed Celorico. I beg you to direct Col. Wilson's advanced posts to communicate with those of the army. I have been obliged to halt the army this day to wait for supplies of provisions which they had outmarched; but I hope to be able to move the whole to-morrow.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Oliveira do Hospital, 22d March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th, relative to requisitions on the country in the neighbourhood of Santarem and Vallada for carriages and grain, &c., for the British troops; in answer to which I have to inform you, that the British troops have not had a carriage, or any provisions, from that part of the country for many months past. I recommend to the government to adopt some effectual measures to prevent the possibility, or necessity, of these requisitions for the service of the Portuguese troops.

In answer to your other letter of the 16th inst., containing a complaint against Capt. — of the Engineers, I have to inform you that I have referred it to the chief engineer, and I shall decide upon the subject as soon as I shall receive his answer to my reference.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Oliveira do Hospital, 22d March, 1811.

I enclose a letter which I received last night from Lord Liverpool, upon the subject of the additions to be made to the Portuguese subsidy.

My opinion is, that our government should assist the Portuguese government with flour, medical stores, barley or oats, or Indian corn, purchased in America with bills upon England, &c. &c.; but I am certain that, unless large supplies are sent from England, we cannot give them any money in addition to what we now give them.

We have outrun our supplies so much, that we have been a little distressed for a day or two, and I have been obliged to halt all but the advanced guard this day; but the distress will be only momentary, and I shall, I hope, be able to march the whole army to-morrow.

P.S. Return the enclosed. I have just heard that the vessels arrived for the Portuguese troops at Figueira contained, one sardinias, one *bacalhão*, the third rice!!

The A.G. to Major Gen. Dunlop, 5th division.

22d March, 1811.

The Commander of the Forces has directed me to acquaint you that the soldiers of the 2d batt. —th regt., named in the margin, were, under the plea of being sent for forage by officers, also there specified, found plundering the inhabitants and village of Moreiras, on the 21st inst., and those soldiers being but a part of a disorganised crew of that regiment, who were then nearly 6 miles from their camp without an officer. These men were, on the spot, made to unload their mules of the produce which they had collected in an unauthorised manner.

In referring you to the orders of the 20th inst., and all previous instructions on the subject of foraging, which on the occasion alluded to have been disobeyed, I am to communicate to you his Excellency's wish you should institute an immediate inquiry into the fact of the officers named detaching soldiers in so irregular

a manner, so often prohibited by every instruction; and should you find these officers as responsible as they appear to be, you will cause them to be placed in arrest, as it will be absolutely necessary, by the example of public investigation, to deter others from similar negligence.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

S<sup>ta</sup> Marinha, 23d March, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 20th Feb., to which I should not have troubled you with a reply, if I did not conceive that government have taken an erroneous view of their expenditure and their situation in this country. You tell me that the campaign of 1810, in the Peninsula, has cost 9 millions sterling, including the transports, and 6 millions exclusive of transports, &c.; and you compare the expense of this campaign with that of 1808, which cost £2,778,000, and with that of 1809, which cost £2,639,000. The very statement of this comparison, without adverting to the error of omitting the transports and stores, &c., sent in kind in 1808 and 1809, points out the error of all calculations of this description.

The British army in the Peninsula, in 1808, was larger and more expensive than any that has been here since, and attended by an equal fleet of transports; but it began to arrive only in August, and the expense incurred was in the last 5 months of the year. Many of those expenses, viz., 2 months' advanced pay to the troops, &c., debts left unpaid in Spain and Portugal, were not paid in the Peninsula, or if paid in the Peninsula, not within the period of the account.

Now, in order to show a fair comparison between the years 1808 and 1810, the charges of the same troops which were in the Peninsula in the latter end of 1808, for the first 7 months of the year, should be added to the £2,778,000, and I believe it would be found that the amount would not be much less than the 6 millions, which is the stated amount of the expense of 1810.

During a great part of 1809 no subsidy was paid to the Portuguese government, and the total amount of the subsidy was not half what has been paid in 1810.

The British army also, for more than half the year, did not consist of 20,000 men; but if to the £2,639,000 are to be added the expenses of the troops in America, in Walcheren, &c. &c., which joined the army in Portugal, and swelled the expense here in 1810, it will be found that their expense would not fall far short of 6 millions sterling.

In my opinion, government are not aware, and have it not in their power at present to form an opinion, of the exact expense of the war in the Peninsula. The first step to ascertain it would be to analyse the charge, and then to see what the same army would cost them elsewhere, at home for instance; for I suppose that if the army should be withdrawn from the Peninsula, it will not be disbanded.

I conclude that the amount of 6 millions is made up from the payments at the Treasury on account of the Commissary Gen., and the payments on account of Mr. Stuart's drafts for the Portuguese government; but if these sums are analysed, there will be found one million in round numbers for the Portuguese subsidy; £200,000 advanced to the Portuguese government, and repaid to the Treasury by the Portuguese Ambassador;

£300,000 advanced to purchase provisions in Ireland, to be repaid in this year's subsidy; £400,000 advanced to buy provisions in America, for the repayment of which the provisions themselves will provide; making nearly 2 millions, of which one million either has been or will be repaid this year. Then it has cost one million, or 20 per cent. nearly, to find specie for the army.

Let us now see, generally, what this army would cost in England. The advances in Portugal only have been lately £80,000 *per mensem*: they will now be £100,000 *per mensem*. If the army was in England, the advances would be nearly double: at all events for the army now in the Peninsula, they would amount to £2,000,000 *per annum*, without beer money, marching money, barrack allowances, forage for the cavalry, ordnance expenses, hospitals, &c. &c., all of which are covered by the amount of the 6 millions.

I request your Lordship, then, just to consider what is the real amount of the late expense incurred by your operations in the Peninsula.

The heavy expense of the army, and one which is peculiar to a British army, is the transports, and to that I have nearly put an end; but I would observe, that of late years the government have seldom been without tonnage in their service for their whole disposable force; and it is not taking a just view of the subject to say that the army in Portugal, in 1810, cost a large sum in transports, when the same regiments had probably the same transports in their suite in 1808 in Sweden, and in 1809 in America or Walcheren.

In the sum of 3 millions stated for transports and stores sent out in kind, I imagine about half would be for transports, the other half for stores. Were no stores sent out to Portugal or Spain in 1808 or 1809? But there is another question upon these stores, which I admit are to be considered as part of the expense of the army, and that is, What is the value of the remains at the present moment? If it be true, as it is, that we have 3 months' supply for this army of many articles now in store, which were sent from England in 1810, it is not a true calculation to state that the stores consumed in 1810 cost £1,500,000.

The establishments of the country are certainly enormous and very expensive, let them be used where they may; but I deny that the use of them is more expensive in the Peninsula than elsewhere, or that because 6 millions have been spent in the Peninsula in 1810, it follows that the whole scale of expense of the empire has been increased to that amount in that year beyond the former years, in any other way, or to any greater amount, than by the expense of the Portuguese subsidy; the expense of having troops in the field abroad, instead of in quarters at home; the expense of procuring specie; and the additional price of some articles of consumption purchased in the Peninsula, which, in all, I don't calculate for the whole Peninsula at more than 3 millions sterling.

In respect to the transports, there is another view of the subject, which would show that a stronger army would be a saving of expense. If I had had 10,000 men more in 1810, I would not have kept the transports; and I send them away now, because I think that the events of the campaign have brought the enemy to such a situation that the necessity for



an embarkation is very remote. The transports (if kept in government pay after being sent away from the Tagus) would cost much more than 10,000 additional troops to this army; and much more than the difference of expense in the employment of 10,000 additional troops here, instead of keeping them at Cadiz, in Sicily, or Gibraltar, or at home.

My opinion has invariably been, that it was the interest of Great Britain to employ in Portugal the largest army that could be spared from other services; and that no more than 2000 or 2500 men ought to have been stationed at Cadiz, which would not have cost a shilling more than their pay. The expense at Cadiz, which I imagine will amount to no trifle, out of the 6 or 9 millions, has been, in my opinion, entirely thrown away, equally with the services of the troops, which would have made a great difference here early in the last summer.

In respect to offensive or defensive operations here, if they are left to me, I shall carry on either the one or the other, according to the means in my power, compared at the time with those of the enemy, and bearing in mind always your Lordship's instructions of the 27th Feb. 1810, marked A.

I would recommend to government to increase the force here as much as possible, putting down the establishments elsewhere, and of course decreasing the expense in those parts of the empire from which they draw the troops. By this measure they will put it in the power of the officer here to avail himself of every opportunity, they will be sure of holding this country as long as they please, and they will save the whole expense of transports.

I shall be sorry if government should think themselves under the necessity of withdrawing from this country on account of the expense of the contest. From what I have seen of the objects of the French government, and the sacrifices they make to accomplish them, I have no doubt that if the British army were for any reason to withdraw from the Peninsula, and the French government were relieved from the pressure of military operations on the continent, they would incur all risks to land an army in His Majesty's dominions. Then, indeed, would commence an expensive contest; then would His Majesty's subjects discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God, they have hitherto had no knowledge; and the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants would be destroyed, whatever might be the result of the military operations. God forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor in the scene; and I only hope that the King's government will consider well what I have above stated to your Lordship; will ascertain as nearly as is in their power the actual expense of employing a certain number of men in this country beyond that of employing them at home or elsewhere; and will keep up their force here on such a footing as will at all events secure their possession without keeping the transports, if it does not enable their Commander to take advantage of events, and assume the offensive.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

St<sup>a</sup> Marinha, 23d March, 1811.

I assure you that the departure of the General officers from the army was as much against my inclination as their arrival in England was in-

jurious to the public interests. I did every thing in my power to prevail upon them not to go, but in vain; and I acknowledge that it has given me satisfaction to find that they have been roughly handled in the newspapers. The consequence of the absence of some of them has been, that in the late operations I have been obliged to be General of cavalry, and of the advanced guard, and the leader of 2 or 3 columns, sometimes on the same day.

I have requested Col. Torrens not to allow any General officer to come out in future, who is not willing to declare that he has no private business to recall him to England, and that he will remain with the army as long as it shall stay in the Peninsula.

*The A.G. to Capt. Kipping, 4th or King's own, Coimbra.*

23d March, 1811.

The French prisoners sent to Coimbra are to be forwarded from thence to Leiria, on route to Lisbon, in detachments of from 250 to 300 men each; the first of these detachments to be ordered to march immediately after you shall learn that a force has arrived at Leiria from Lisbon to act on the escort duty. The escorts to consist of an officer, serjeant, and 12 men each; and the principal object of this guard is to prevent the prisoners of war being maltreated by the natives, which, without this precaution, might be expected. It is, at the same time, to be understood as intended to impress upon the prisoners a sense of their situation in reference to the people of the country, and to prevent straggling, which would only occasion the useless loss of lives. You will give a copy of the enclosed instructions to the officer in charge of the escort.

The prisoners are to be provisioned from one commissariat station to another, which supply they are to carry. Should there be a dépôt at Leiria, they will take provisions at Coimbra, Leiria, and Villa Franca; if not, they must be provisioned at Coimbra to serve to the latter place. The Colonel, a prisoner, is to be supplied with a commissariat mule; the others, under present circumstances, must do the best they can.

For this proposed service it appears to me 2 officers and 36 R. and F. will answer. You will be pleased to forward to the army the other detachments now at Coimbra, if I recollect right, of the 2d regt. and German Legion, directing their march on Pinhanços, where instructions will be left in the event of a move.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Sta Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

The French retired from Celorico yeste day, and they appear to intend

G. O.

Sta Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

2. The Commander of the Forces trusts that Capt. —, Lieuts. — and —, will take warning by the events which occurred on the night of the 4th Dec., and will avoid to be in a state in which men are unaware of the nature or effect of their actions, and are incapable of performing any duty.

He desires Lieut. — to attend in particular to that part of the letter of the Commander in Chief which contains the sentiments of H. R. H. the Prince Regent on his conduct, and he is admonished and warned accordingly.

Capt. — and Lieuts. — and — are to be released from their arrest and to join their battalion; and the Commanding officer at Lisbon is to report on what day the sentence of the Gen. Court Martial will be communicated to the other three prisoners.

3. The Commander of the Forces has had frequent occasion to advert to the conduct of officers remaining sick at Lisbon, and he now requests the Commandant at Lisbon to forbid all officers of the British army, absent from their corps on account of their health, to frequent the theatres at Lisbon, if cause of complaint should again be given similar to that reported in his letter of the 20th March. The guards and sentries in the theatres are placed there to preserve good order, and to ensure obedience to the rules of the theatre.

The officers of the British army know that they dare not insult an audience in their own country by any irregularity of conduct, or breach of rule, and the Commander of the Forces cannot allow those who are absent from their duty to be guilty of those irregularities at Lisbon, and to add to them the military offence of violating the public authority of a sentry and a guard.

to take up a line on the Coa. Their left has gone by Guarda, apparently for Sabugal. I enclose Graham's dispatches on his action.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

S<sup>ra</sup> Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 19th, and I will take care that in future there shall be no difficulty about your seeing the dispatches. I have written to government respecting the number of our prisoners.

I should be very happy to forward your wishes for your son, who has, in my opinion, every claim for promotion. I am afraid, however, I could not send him home with dispatches written by me, which could give the bearer of them a claim to promotion, as he is not in my family, and it is the invariable practice of the army to send dispatches of that description by an aide de camp.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

S<sup>ra</sup> Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

I received last night your letters of the 19th and 21st, and I am very uneasy at your not having received my letter of the 18th, which I sent you again in duplicate on the 20th. Unfortunately the magistrate at Goes stopped the guide on the 20th from an excess of zeal, as his horse was shod in the French mode, although the guide was Portuguese. I still hope that you will save Campo Maior. If so, the first thing to do will be to drive Mortier across the Guadiana, and shut up Badajoz.

The possession which the French have got of Albuquerque and Valencia de Alcantara may render it necessary for you to alter the course of proceeding, the general outlines of which were chalked out in my letter of the 20th. You must get these places from Mortier again; and it will be necessary to cover the operation against them by a respectable force on the right of the Guadiana, close to Badajoz. When you have cleared Estremadura between the Tagus and the Guadiana, then will be the time to make your arrangements for crossing the latter, and closing in Badajoz on the left of that river.

The French have gone towards the Coa. Their left will cross at Sabugal, I should think, and their right about Pinhel and Almeida. We have been a little distressed for provisions, which has prevented us from pressing them so hard for these last days as I should have wished. We are getting right now, however.

Gen. Graham has returned to the Isla, after having fought the hardest action that has been fought yet. The Spaniards left him very much to his own exertions. The Spanish General is to be brought to a court martial. Graham took 2 General officers, 6 pieces of cannon, an eagle, and 500 prisoners. He lost 1100, principally wounded. The 2 Portuguese companies of the 20th behaved remarkably well; Bushe is wounded. I will send you the dispatches as soon as Sir Brent shall return them.

I am sorry to tell you that the Portuguese troops here are diminishing in numbers terribly. Pack's brigade has only 1700; the 21st regt. but little more than 500; Pakenham tells me either the 3d or 15th only 300; but I have not seen this return. They are fed, and indeed have been ever since they marched, by our Commissaries, except Pack's, Ashworth's, and Barbacena's cavalry.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

S<sup>a</sup>, Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th, and its enclosures;\* likewise one of the 13th, which you enclosed to Lieut. Col. Jackson,† although the Lieut. Colonel is not yet arrived.

I beg to congratulate you, and the brave troops under your command, on the signal victory which you gained on the 5th inst. I have no doubt

\* Lieut. Gen. Graham to the Earl of Liverpool.

Isla de Leon, 6th March, 1811.

Capt. Hope, my first aide de camp, will have the honor of delivering this dispatch, to inform your Lordship of the glorious issue of an action fought yesterday by the division under my command, against the army commanded by Marshal Victor, composed of the two divisions, Ruffin's and Leval's.

The circumstances were such as compelled me to attack this very superior force. In order as well to explain to your Lordship the circumstances of peculiar disadvantage under which the action was begun, as to justify myself from the imputation of rashness in the attempt, I must state to your Lordship, that the allied army, after a night march of 16 hours from the camp near Vejer, arrived in the morning of the 5th on the low ridge of Barrosa, about 4 miles to the southward of the mouth of the S<sup>a</sup> Petri river. This height extends inland about a mile and a half, continuing on the north the extensive heathy plain of Chiclana. A great pine forest skirts the plain, and circles round the height at some distance, terminating down to S<sup>a</sup> Petri; the intermediate space between the north side of the height and the forest being uneven and broken.

A well conducted and successful attack on the rear of the enemy's lines near S<sup>a</sup> Petri, by the vanguard of the Spanish army, under Brig. Gen. Lardizabal, having opened the communication with the Isla de Leon, I received Gen. La Peña's directions to move down from the position of Barrosa to that of the Torre Bermeja, about half way to the S<sup>a</sup> Petri river, in order to secure the communication across the river, over which a bridge had been lately established. This latter position occupies a narrow woody ridge, the right on the sea cliff, the left falling down to the Almanza creek, on the edge of the marsh. A hard sandy beach gives an easy communication between the western points of these two positions.

My division, being halted on the eastern slope of the Barrosa height, was marched about 12 o'clock through the wood towards the Bermeja (cavalry patrols having previously been sent towards Chiclana, without meeting with the enemy). On the march I received notice that the enemy had appeared in force on the plain, and was advancing towards the heights of Barrosa.

As I considered that position as the key of that of S<sup>a</sup> Petri, I immediately counter-marched, in order to support the troops left for its defence; and the alacrity with which this manœuvre was executed served as a favorable omen. It was, however, impossible in such intricate and difficult ground to preserve order in the columns, and there never was time to restore it entirely.

But before we could get ourselves quite disentangled from the wood, the troops on the Barrosa hill were seen returning from it, while the enemy's left wing was rapidly ascending. At the same time his right wing stood on the plain, on the edge of the wood, within cannon shot. A retreat in the face of such an enemy, already within reach of the easy communication by the sea beach, must have involved the whole allied army in all the danger of being attacked during the unavoidable confusion of the different corps arriving on the narrow ridge of Bermeja nearly at the same time.

Trusting to the known heroism of British troops, regardless of the numbers and position of their enemy, an immediate attack was determined on. Major Duncan soon opened a powerful battery of 10 guns in the centre. Brig. Gen. Dilkes, with the brigade of Guards, Lieut. Col. Browne's (of the 28th) flank battalion, Lieut. Col. Norcott's 2 companies of the 2d rifle corps, and Major Acheson, with a part of the 67th foot (separated from the regiment in the wood), formed on the right.

Col. Wheatley's brigade, with 3 companies of the Coldstream Guards under Lieut. Col. Jackson (separated likewise from his battalion in the wood), and Lieut. Col. Barnard's flank battalion, formed on the left.

As soon as the infantry was thus hastily got together, the guns advanced to a more favorable position, and kept up a most destructive fire.

The right wing proceeded to the attack of Gen. Ruffin's division on the hill, while Lieut. Col. Barnard's battalion, and Lieut. Col. Bushe's detachment of the 20th Portuguese, were warmly engaged with the enemy's tirailleurs on our left.

Gen. Leval's division, notwithstanding the havoc made by Major Duncan's battery,

whatever that their success would have had the effect of raising the siege of Cadiz, if the Spanish corps had made any effort to assist them; and I am equally certain, from your account of the ground, that if you had not decided with the utmost promptitude to attack the enemy, and if your attack had not been a most vigorous one, the whole allied army would have been lost. You have to regret that such a victory should not have

continued to advance in very imposing masses, opening his fire of musketry, and was only checked by that of the left wing. The left wing now advanced firing. A most determined charge by the 3 companies of Guards and the 87th regt, supported by all the remainder of the wing, decided the defeat of Gen. Leval's division.

The eagle of the 8th regt. of light infantry, which suffered immensely, and a howitzer, rewarded this charge, and remained in possession of Major Gough, of the 87th regt. These attacks were zealously supported by Col. Belson with the 28th regt., and Lieut. Col. Prevost with a part of the 67th.

A reserve formed beyond the narrow valley, across which the enemy was closely pursued, next shared the same fate, and was routed by the same means.

Meanwhile, the right wing was not less successful. The enemy, confident of success, met Gen. Dilkes on the ascent of the hill, and the contest was sanguinary; but the undaunted perseverance of the brigade of Guards, of Lieut. Col. Browne's battalion, and of Lieut. Col. Norcott's, and Major Acheson's detachment, overcame every obstacle, and Gen. Ruffin's division was driven from the heights in confusion, leaving 2 pieces of cannon.

No expressions of mine could do justice to the conduct of the troops throughout. Nothing less than the almost unparalleled exertions of every officer, the invincible bravery of every soldier, and the most determined devotion to the honor of His Majesty's arms in all, could have achieved this brilliant success against such a formidable enemy so posted.

In less than an hour and a half from the commencement of the action the enemy was in full retreat. The retiring divisions met, halted, and seemed inclined to form; a new and more advanced position of our artillery quickly dispersed them.

The exhausted state of the troops made pursuit impossible. A position was taken on the eastern side of the hill; and we were strengthened on our right by the return of the 2 Spanish battalions that had been attached before to my division, but which I had left on the hill, and which had been ordered to retire. These battalions (Wallon guards and Ciudad Real) made every effort to come back in time, when it was known that we were engaged.

I understand, too, from Gen. Whittingham, that, with 3 squadrons of cavalry, he kept in check a corps of infantry and cavalry that attempted to turn the Barrosa height by the sea. One squadron of the 2d hussars, K.G.L., under Capt. Busche, and directed by Lieut. Col. Ponsonby (both had been attached to the Spanish cavalry), joined in time to make a brilliant and most successful charge against a squadron of French dragoons, which were entirely routed.

An eagle, 6 pieces of cannon, the Gen. of Division Ruffin, and the Gen. of Brigade Rousseau, wounded and taken; the chief of the staff, Gen. Bellegarde, an aide de camp of Marshal Victor, and the Colonel of the 8th regt., with many other officers, killed; and several wounded and taken prisoners; the field covered with the dead bodies and arms of the enemy attests that my confidence in this division was nobly repaid.

Where all have so distinguished themselves, it is scarcely possible to discriminate any as the most deserving of praise. Your Lordship will, however, observe how gloriously the brigade of Guards, under Brig. Gen. Dilkes, with the commanders of the battalions, Lieut. Col. the Hon. C. Onslow, and Lieut. Col. Sebright (wounded), as well as the three separated companies under Lieut. Col. Jackson, maintained the high character of His Majesty's household troops. Lieut. Col. Browne, with his flank battalion, Lieut. Col. Norcott, and Major Acheson, deserve equal praise. And I must equally recommend to your Lordship's notice Col. Wheatley with Col. Belson, Lieut. Col. Prevost, and Major Gough, and the officers of the respective corps composing his brigade.

The animated charges of the 87th regt. were most conspicuous; Lieut. Col. Barnard (twice wounded) and the officers of his flank battalion executed the duty of skirmishing in advance with the enemy in a masterly manner, and were ably seconded by Lieut. Col. Busche, of the 20th Portuguese, who (likewise twice wounded fell into the enemy's hands,) but was afterwards rescued. The detachment of this Portuguese regiment behaved admirably throughout the whole affair.

I owe too much to Major Duncan, and the officers and corps of the Royal artillery, not to mention them in terms of the highest approbation: never was artillery better served.

The assistance I received from the unwearied exertions of Lieut. Col. Macdonald, and the officers of the Adj. Gen.'s department; of Lieut. Col. the Hon. C. Cathcart, and the officers of the Q. M. Gen.'s department; of Capt. Birch and Capt. Nicholas, and the officers of the Royal Engineers; of Capt. Hope, and the officers of my personal staff (all

been followed by all the consequences which might reasonably be expected from it; but you may console yourself with the reflection that you did your utmost, and, at all events, saved the allied army; and that the failure in the extent of benefit to be derived from your exertions is to be attributed to those who would have derived most advantage from them.

animating by their example), will ever be most gratefully remembered. Our loss has been severe: as soon as it can be ascertained by the proper return, I shall have the honor of transmitting it; but much as it is to be lamented, I trust it will be considered as a necessary sacrifice, for the safety of the whole allied army.

Having remained some hours on the Barrosa heights, without being able to procure any supplies for the exhausted troops, the Commissariat mules having been dispersed on the enemy's first attack on the hill, I left Major Ross, with the detachment of the 3d batt. of the 95th, and withdrew the rest of the division, which crossed the S<sup>a</sup> Petri river early the next morning.

I cannot conclude this dispatch without earnestly recommending to His Majesty's gracious notice for promotion, Brevet Lieut. Col. Browne, Major of the 28th foot; Brevet Lieut. Col. Norcott, Major of the 95th; Major Duncan, Royal artillery; Major Gough, of the 87th; Major the Hon. E. Acheson, of the 67th; and Capt. Birch, of the Royal Engineers, all in the command of corps or detachments on this memorable service; and I confidently trust that the bearer of this dispatch, Capt. Hope (to whom I refer your Lordship for further details), will be promoted, on being permitted to lay the eagle at His Majesty's feet.

P.S. I beg leave to add, that two Spanish officers, Capts. Miranda and Naughton, attached to my staff, behaved with the utmost intrepidity.

Lieut. Gen. Graham to the Earl of Liverpool.

Isla de Leon, 10th March, 1811.

I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship the return of the killed and wounded in the action of the 5th inst.; and I have the satisfaction to add, that the wounded in general are doing well. By the best account that can be collected from the wounded French officers, the enemy had about 8000 men engaged. Their loss, by reports from Chiclana, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, is supposed to amount to 3000: I have no doubt of its being very great.

I transmit, too, a return of the ordnance in our possession, and also the most accurate note that can be obtained of prisoners, most of whom are wounded. They are so dispersed in different hospitals, that an exact return has not yet been obtained.

P.S. Detachments of cavalry and infantry have been daily employed in carrying off the wounded, and burying the dead, till the evening of the 8th inst., by which time all the enemy's wounded that could be found among the brushwood and heath were brought in.

Return of the nature and number of pieces of Ordnance taken in the action of Barrosa, on the 5th March, 1811.

Two 7 inch howitzers, three heavy 8 pounders, one 4 pounder, with their ammunition waggons, and a proportion of horses.

Return of Prisoners of War taken in the action of Barrosa, on the 5th March, 1811.

Two General officers, 1 Field officer, 9 Captains, 8 Subalterns, 420 R. and F.

N.B. The General of Brigade Rousseau, and 2 Captains, since dead of their wounds.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the troops under the command of Lieut. Gen. Graham, in the action of Barrosa, with the French *corps d'armée* commanded by Marshal Victor, on the 5th March, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers & drummers.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. and F.
Killed . . . . .	7	6	189	24	202
Wounded . . . . .	55	45	940	42	1040

\* See Appendix, No. XXXV.

The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be. They march the troops night and day, without provisions or rest, and abusing every body who proposes a moment's delay to afford either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any exertion, or to execute any plan, even if any plan had been formed; and then, when the moment of action arrives, they are totally incapable of movement, and they stand by to see their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them because they do not continue, unsupported, exertions to which human nature is not equal.

I concur in the propriety of your withdrawing to the Isla on the 6th, as much as I admire the promptitude and determination of your attack of the 5th; and I most sincerely congratulate you, and the brave troops under your command, on your success.

Mr. Wellesley will communicate to you the state of affairs here.

To ———.

S<sup>ra</sup> Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

I had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th Jan. in duplicate by the last post.

I beg to inform you that I have nothing to say to the accounts of the Lusitanian legion, or to your demands as an officer belonging to that corps; and I forward your letter to Sir W. Beresford, with a copy of this.

I perfectly recollect that you applied to me for leave of absence at Talavera, and I answered you that your application ought to be recommended by your Commanding officer, ———, who was on the spot, and that, at all events, as you were in the Portuguese service, I could not give you leave without reference to Marshal Beresford.

You quitted the army without any leave from me, or any further communication with me, and you went to the south of Spain. Upon an application from Marshal Beresford that you should be sent back to Portugal to arrange with the government some Portuguese unsettled accounts of the Lusitanian legion, I endeavored to have you sent back from Cadiz, but you went to England, certainly without any leave from me, or from any other authority that I know of.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

S<sup>ra</sup> Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st inst., regarding the number of French prisoners at Lisbon. I have applied to government for permission to send them to England, and it is necessary that I should wait for their decision before I incur any expense for their detention.

The Commissary Gen. will be ordered to disembark the corn from His Majesty's troop ships.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

S<sup>ra</sup> Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

I have received your private letter of the 19th, and your official letter of the 21st; and I yesterday received one from Dom M. Forjaz of the

19th, to which I have sent a reply. In that letter I have explained to what department of the state I attributed blame. The first want is money, and the next is an efficient and active commissariat, and punishment for neglect. The Portuguese army are really falling off to an alarming degree, and much time will elapse, and much care must be given to them to bring them about again. Some of the regiments which ought to be 1400 men have not 500 in the ranks.

The orders respecting the countries evacuated by the enemy are like every thing else the government do: they sound well to the ear, and look well to the eye; but there is the want in them of the practical experience which is to carry them into execution. Our soldiers, who fed the people in their cantonments, were better legislators than Principal Sousa. They should open markets of provisions at every point on the Tagus, and on the coast, as high up as the Mondego: nothing but that measure will save the people, who are in a very miserable state.

I have written to England about the prisoners; the officers should be sent home at all events. The French are crossing the Coa; but we have not been able to press them since they passed Cea, from the want of supplies for the army. We are getting them now, however.

I have begun to supply the Portuguese troops in our divisions.

P.S. This part of the country has received but little damage.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

S<sup>ra</sup> Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st Feb., and I have called for the returns of arms and accoutrements in possession of the several battalions of the army. In the course of an extensive service, in a country but ill provided with means of transport, some arms must be broken, and others and accoutrements lost, belonging to every battalion in the army. The consequence is that when recruits come out, there are no arms or accoutrements for them. The returns called for, however, will show what the state of the several battalions will be in this respect.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 25th March, 1811.

Col. Campbell arrived last night, and has given me a note from your Lordship, enclosing an abstract of the military operations in Portugal, drawn up for the use of His Majesty's ministers, I imagine, by Col. Bunbury. I think that Col. Bunbury has in every instance overrated the British and Portuguese force. He has taken the total of the returns without adverting to the deductions of the effective strength for sick, prisoners of war, on duty in garrisons, on command at Lisbon, &c.; and as, in stating the French force opposed to us, he has mentioned only the effectives in the field, he has given those to whom he communicated his paper an erroneous notion of the comparative strength of the contending armies. Even the column fit for duty exceeds the number to be reckoned upon for any operation, because the troops at Lisbon and in garrison must be deducted from these numbers; but still those numbers would be much nearer the mark than the statement of the totals. Then, in reckoning the cavalry, the number of men, and not the number of horses, is reckoned.



Just to show you how this mode of statement alters the relative strength of the contending armies, I mention that in April, 1810, Junot's return of the 8th corps was about 25,900 effective. The total was 38,000. Ney's corps was above 40,000 total; the effectives more than 31,000: their returns of July were nearly the same, or rather more. The two together are called in the abstract 57,000 in July, which they were under arms; but our totals against them would have given us an equal army; whereas I never had, British and Portuguese, 32,000 in Beira. The Portuguese regulars in July are called 40,000, including 4000 cavalry, and the British 32,000, and the militia 45,000. Your Lordship has a return of July, which shows you the effective force of the Portuguese regulars, and how disposed of. The militia are called at the same time 45,000; the same return states 36,000 armed, but the fact is, there never have been 25,000 under arms; and of the total militia there were in that month nearly 7000 absent without leave. In October, in the same manner, the totals are stated instead of the effectives. I refer your Lordship to my letter of the 3d Nov.\* for an accurate account of the effective strength of both armies, including Spaniards.

*The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Nugent, 38th regt.*

25th March, 1811.

I have had the honor to submit your letter of the 25th inst. to the Commander of the Forces, and his Lordship has been gratified by the readiness you have shown to redress the injury sustained by inhabitants from the irregular foraging of the battalion under your command. Inasmuch as my Lord Wellington has regretted the necessity of noticing this case as relating to the 38th regt., his Lordship has had the same feeling towards other corps, very possibly equally concerned, but who were not reported.

There is nothing unreasonable in the foraging instructions, which, far from denying, provide for the supply of all parts of the army entitled to rations, at the same time that the inhabitants are to be required for the produce it may be found necessary to levy; you are therefore authorised to transmit the receipt contained in your letter, and herewith returned, to the Commissary Gen., who has received his Excellency's instructions to repay to you the amount, on that document being presented.

*The A.G. to the Commissary General.*

25th March, 1811.

I do myself the honor to enclose a copy of a receipt transmitted to this office by Lieut. Col. Nugent, being paid by him as compensation to inhabitants whose property was irregularly taken by soldiers of the 38th regt., and the subject of my communication of the 18th inst. My Lord Wellington, in consequence of the proper steps taken by Lieut. Col. Nugent, and to show to that regiment the justice of the foraging system, which equally provides for the troops' supply and the inhabitants' requital, has commanded me to request you will cause the amount, viz. 20 dollars, to be repaid Lieut. Col. Nugent from the public, on his presenting the original voucher of the stated disbursement.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouven, 26th March, 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 22d inst. The supply of the Portuguese troops is certainly an object of very great importance; but it is impossible for me to allow the demands of the Portuguese minister for the stores of the British army to be complied with, without reference to the Commissary Gen. or me; more particularly as, under the arrange-

\* See p. 390.

ment of the 5th inst., we are actually feeding three fourths of the effective army. Mr. Kennedy and I had already settled, upon a view of the state of our supplies and the demand for them, that we would not give the barley demanded; and I have frequently refused to give the flour. The reason for making this demand is that the *Junta de Viveres* don't choose to take the trouble or incur the expense of sending the corn to the mills to be ground.

I don't understand Lord Wellesley's dispatch as authorising any departure from the usual mode of transacting business with the Portuguese government. He only desires that you should adopt measures to insure an effectual control over the expenditure of this large supply.

His order would appear to be founded on a notion that the money already at the disposal of the Portuguese government had been misapplied, which I believe none of us ever suspected. What I have complained of is deficient means to defray the expenses of the government, and a disinclination in the government to increase their means, or to reform abuses, so as to increase the disposable part of the revenue already existing.

As it appears that the government are now setting seriously to work to increase their means, and I think that the letter which I wrote yesterday to Dom M. Forjaz will induce them to hasten their measures upon this subject, I recommend that they should not be informed of this addition to the subsidy till it shall be absolutely necessary, on account of their acquiring a knowledge of it from other quarters. As a preparatory measure for the introduction of any system into the Portuguese army, I then recommend, first, that the *Junta de Viveres* should be abolished, and that in lieu of that Board a commissariat should be appointed, consisting of a Commissary Gen. and a certain number of deputy commissaries and assistant commissaries and clerks, to perform the task of provisioning the Portuguese army.

The commissariat and the medical department to be placed under military law; but it is to be clearly understood that the rise of each individual is not to be regulated on any military principles, but each to be promoted according to his merits.

The Commissary Gen. to receive possession of all the magazines and stores of the *Junta de Viveres*, and to correspond in the same manner with the magistrates in the different districts.

In my opinion it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to increase our payments in specie to the Portuguese government; and considering that we now feed so large a proportion of the army, it will not probably be necessary. I shall direct the Commissary Gen. to furnish you with an account of every thing issued to the Portuguese government up to the 24th March, as soon as possible; and I recommend that you should begin by settling and closing the account with the Portuguese government up to that day. It would not do to allow the quibbles of Joaquim da Costa, or of the Conde de Redondo, to impede this settlement. We are decided upon the justice of the view which we have taken of the intentions of the King's government in regard to past transactions, and the account must be settled and closed according to that view.

We ought then, in my opinion, to insist upon the government finding

funds, 1st; To pay their officers and troops, regulars as well as militia, regularly.

2dly; To pay the *bagajeiros* attached to the several regiments, who, by the bye, have not been paid or fed for the last six months.

3dly; To pay all the departments of their army.

4thly; The medical officer should, on the 1st of every month, give in an estimate of the expense of his department; and the government should be obliged to find funds to discharge it.

5thly; The Commissary Gen. should be obliged to give in an estimate, on the 1st of every month, of the articles and their cost, required for his department, stating for what purpose required, where to be sent, the expense of transport, &c., for which the government should be obliged to find funds.

The Commissary Gen. must show in each estimate the state of his magazines in every part of Portugal, and how far each can be made available for the service.

These are the most important departments, in order to keep an efficient army in the field; and I think that the money which we can afford to supply from time to time, and the assistance which we can give in kind, will enable the Portuguese government to answer the demands of these several departments. The balance of the whole subsidy, if any shall be due after all payments and advances on account of the Portuguese army shall have been carried to account, might be paid to the Portuguese government, either half yearly or yearly, either in specie or in kind.

It must be understood, however, that all useless establishments must be discontinued; the navy, for instance; and every thing must be done to increase to the utmost the disposable revenue of the government.

If Joaquim da Costa is not dismissed, he should be warned of the necessity of honest and upright conduct, and clear accounts and estimates given in at an early period in future.

Our government should be requested to send us as much specie as they can. The next best thing is wheat, barley, or oats, or wheat flour. I cannot say exactly what quantity should be sent in each month, but probably Dom M. Forjaz might be able to let you know what quantity it would be desirable for the Portuguese army to have.

I have written this letter without consultation with Beresford; but I recommend that you should send it to him, for his consideration and opinion on the subject to which it relates.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will observe to Dom M. Forjaz, that the large quantities of provisions which he proposes to send to Figueira will only create there an accumulation of supplies of *bacalhão*, sardinias, and rice, principally, if some measures are not adopted to have the articles brought to the troops. It is certainly a great point gained to get the articles out of Lisbon to Figueira, or to any other deposit; but they will rot in this deposit, unless the *Junta de Viveres* should correspond with the Commissaries of brigades, and find means to forward the articles to the troops, into whose stomachs they are finally to go. It is very necessary to attend to all this detail, and to trace a biscuit from Lisbon into the man's mouth on the frontier, and to provide for its removal from place to

place, by land or by water, or no military operations can be carried on, and the troops must starve.

I had a letter from Beresford of the 22d, in which he tells me that Campo Maior held out at 2 o'clock on the 21st. I therefore do not credit the telegraph.

I can make nothing of the lists of persons who get the newspapers. The Portuguese government must be the best judges who are likely to transmit them to the enemy.

P.S. As the Portuguese government experience great difficulty in baking biscuit, probably a monthly supply of that article from England would be useful to them, as well as wheat, &c.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 26th March, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the copies of 2 letters which I have received from Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Stuart, from which it appears that he has not sent from Sicily the troops for which your Lordship directed that I should send transports to that island, and which I imagined, when I wrote to your Lordship on the 21st, had arrived, and had been landed by Gen. Graham.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 26th March, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a letter of the 9th inst., which I have received this day from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, on the subject of your Lordship's letter to me of the 17th Jan., regarding the clothing of the Portuguese army.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Gouvea, 27th March, 1811, 2 p.m.

I have received your letter of the 23d this morning;\* the fall of Campo Maior is very unfortunate. I conceive that the letters which I have already written to you are applicable to all the cases that can occur. We cannot venture to cross the Guadiana till we get the French out of these small places, and we must begin our operations towards the south with an attack upon Badajoz, for which Elvas must supply the means, if possible: if it has them not, I must send them there; this will take time, but that cannot be avoided.

Mr. Kennedy sent 100,000 dollars, to be at your disposal for ordinaries or extraordinaries; he has now ordered 50,000 more: he had ordered 10,000 pairs of shoes; he now orders 10,000 more to be sent to Abrantes. He desired Mr. Dalrymple to keep the Alentejo supplied with provisions

\* Marshal Beresford to Marshal Gen. Visc. Wellington. Arronches, 23d March, 1811.

I have with regret to communicate to your Lordship the surrender of Campo Maior, which took place by capitulation (of which I annex a copy) on the 22d inst., and consequently before it was possible for the corps placed by your Lordship under my orders to reach it. It is a loss, however, to be regretted more from the spirit and patriotism shown by its governor and the inhabitants than from any advantage it can be of to the enemy under present circumstances. I regret to say the battalion of Portalegre militia put into the place, did not show that spirit in the defence of it which the example of the inhabitants might have inspired them with. The place, your Lordship knows, was not prepared even to have expected any thing like the defence it made, and which certainly does great credit to the spirit of its governor. I annex the governor's diary of the events during the period of the enemy being before it.

for 25,000 men. A Commissary is to be stationed at Abrantes, which had better be, for the present, your depôt.

The French appear to stick about Guarda: they had yesterday some people well on towards Manteigas; but I have heard nothing of them from Grant, and I conclude they were only a patrol. Our troops are on the Mondego, towards its source, and I manœuvre upon Guarda to-morrow or next day. I cannot venture to leave this till concerns here shall be settled, and even then it will be difficult.

The Portuguese troops are falling off terribly; the effectives with me are only 11,586 infantry, and 549 cavalry! The infantry have nearly 5800 sick.

The British government propose to give another million subsidy. Mr. Stuart will send you my letter to him on this subject; in the mean time say nothing about it.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Gouvea, 27th March, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 23d. I can neither send the officers of the army away from their duty to arrange their baggage, nor can I venture to touch it without being arranged by themselves.

All that Dr. Franck requires is the longest notice that can be given to him of the intention to send home the invalids. There is really much business to be done on such an occasion.

I cannot allow any prisoner to be sent to Bordeaux. The French Commander in Chief and government have behaved so ill upon this point, that it is really not fair towards British subjects to allow of any indulgence of any description to French prisoners.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Gouvea, 27th March, 1811.

I enclose a note received last night from Gen. Pack, which shows how matters are going on with him. I also beg you to mention to Dom M. Forjaz, that of a gross force which ought to be 18,572 infantry, which are with this part of the army, there are only 11,586 under arms, and 5800 sick; that is to say, not two thirds of the numbers doing duty, and nearly one third of the numbers sick.

Only the expense of every man produced in the field for service!

P.S. However, since writing the other side, I have heard that Col. Ashworth's brigade of Portuguese infantry are as badly off as Gen. Pack's; they have nothing to eat, and have sent here for it, having before sent to Coimbra and Figueira, where they found nothing!! So much for rice, *bacalhão*, and sardinias!

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Gouvea, 27th March, 1811.

I have received your letter, C, to the 13th inst., and I enclose my dispatches to this day, which I beg you to communicate to Gen. Graham.

I propose to go into Alentejo as soon as I shall have settled matters here, and I shall be able to decide what line I shall take respecting the south.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Gouvea, 27th March, 1811.

When I found that the enemy retired with such celerity from Moita, I continued the pursuit of them with the cavalry, and the Light division under Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine only, supporting these troops with the 6th and 3d divisions of infantry, and by the militia on the right of the Mondego; and I was induced to halt the remainder of the army till the supplies which had been sent round from the Tagus to the Mondego should arrive. This halt was the more desirable, as nothing could be found in the country; every day's march, increasing the distance from the magazines on the Tagus, rendered the supply of the troops more difficult and precarious; and the farther advance of the main body for a few days did not appear to be necessary.

The cavalry and light troops continued to annoy the enemy's rear, and to take prisoners; and the militia under Col. Wilson had an affair with a detachment of the enemy on the 22d, not far from Celorico, in which they

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

Gouvea, 27th March, 1811.

'Arrangement for the movement of the army on the 28th March:

The Light division; Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry; Col. Barbacena's ditto Portuguese; Capt. Bull's troop of horse artillery	} To occupy Maçã do Chão, Barraçal, and Minhocal.
Col. Hawker's brigade of cavalry . . . . .	
The Portuguese troops under Col. Wilson . . . . .	} To occupy Lagios, Açores, and Abloa. To occupy Villares, Villa Franca, and Maçã da Ribeira.
The Portuguese troops under Col. Trant . . . . .	
	} To occupy Povoá do Conselho, Faidal, and neighbourhood.

'The 6th division will move to Celorico, Roteiro, Val das Aras, and Lagios, placing one or two battalions in the villages of Açores and Abloa, and communicating on the right with the 3d division.

'The 3d division will move into the Val de Mondego by the mountain roads from Linhares. The mountain guns to be with the right brigade of the division. The other artillery to proceed by Cortiço to Lagios, and to remain at that place, or between it and the ford of Porto da Carne.

'The 5th division will move to Linhares, Carrapichana, Figueiró, and Freixo. The artillery of the division and the reserve ammunition to Cortiço.

'The 1st division will move to Villa Cortez, Mello, and adjacents, and Sanpaio.

'Capt. Lawson's brigade of 9 pounders, and the Portuguese brigade with it, will move to Vinhó.

'The 7th division, and Col. Ashworth's brigade of Portuguese infantry, will move from Galizes, &c. to Pinhanços, Sta. Marinha, Moinenta, and neighbourhood.'

Instructions communicated by the Q. M. G. to Major Gen. Picton.

Gouvea, 27th March, 1811.

'The movements, ordered to take place to-morrow, are made with the view of acting against Guarda on the following day, should the enemy continue to maintain that post. I think it right to put you in possession of what is intended in that case, with regard to your division, and I therefore enclose an extract from the draft of the general instruction prepared for the 29th inst. I send also a sketch and a report, which I beg you will return to me along with your acknowledgment of the receipt of this letter.'

Instructions communicated by the Q. M. G. to Major Gen. Houston.

Gouvea, 27th March, 1811.

'I suppose your division to be to-day at Galizes and neighbourhood, in conformity with the orders sent to you yesterday from Sta. Marinha.

'In the arrangement for the movements of to-morrow (extract of which is enclosed), you will observe that Col. Ashworth's Portuguese brigade is to move forward with your division. Should you find, however, that Ashworth's brigade is destitute of supplies, and uncertain as to the arrival of any, you will be so good as order it to remain for the present in the cantonments it now occupies, and report the same to me for Lord Wellington's information.'

killed 7, and wounded several, and took 15 prisoners. The militia under Gen. Silveira also took some prisoners on the 25th.

The enemy retired his left, the 2d corps by Gouvea, through the mountains upon Guarda, and the remainder of the army by the high road upon Celorico. They have since moved more troops upon Guarda, which position they still hold in strength. Our advanced guard is in front of Celorico, towards Guarda, and at Alverca; and the 3d division in the mountains, and occupying Miserilha and Prados. The allied troops will be collected in the neighbourhood of Celorico to-morrow.

Marshal Beresford's corps assembled at Portalegre on the 22d; but I have reason to believe that the enemy had made a practicable breach in Campo Maior on the 21st, and that the Spanish garrison was obliged to capitulate. I have not yet heard the details of the capitulation. The enemy, while engaged in the attack of Campo Maior, had also obtained possession of the Spanish forts of Alburquerque and Valencia de Alcantara. They had made prisoners part of the garrison of the former.

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 21st, I have received letters from Cadiz to the 13th inst., from which I have been made acquainted with the details of the proceedings of the expedition which left that place in the latter end of February, and of the glorious action fought on the 5th inst., and of the result of the expedition. I am convinced that H.R.H. the Prince Regent will duly appreciate the promptitude with which Lieut. Gen. Graham decided to attack the enemy in the important position of which they had obtained possession, the vigor with which he carried that decision into execution, and the gallantry displayed by all the officers and troops upon that glorious occasion.

From the accounts which I have received of the ground, and from what I know of the nature and disposition of the allied army, I have no doubt that if Gen. Graham had not determined to make this attack immediately, the allied army would have been lost.

I feel equally confident that His Royal Highness will approve of Lieut. Gen. Graham's decision in retiring to the Isla de Leon on the 6th inst., adverting to the losses which the troops had sustained, the fatigues they had undergone, and the omission of the Spanish Commander in Chief to afford them any support in the action which they had fought on the preceding day.

Your Lordship will observe, from my dispatch of the 26th, that I had been misinformed respecting the arrival of the troops from Sicily.

Gen. Ballesteros surprised Gen. Remond on the 10th at Palma, dispersed his detachment, and took from him 500 prisoners. Gen. Ballesteros has since retired to Valverde, and I hear that Gen. Zayas has been detached from Cadiz with 6000 men, including 400 cavalry, to be disembarked at Huelva to join Gen. Ballesteros.

It is reported from the north of Spain that the Imperial Guard had been ordered back to France.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have received the report of a gallant action of one of our patrols yesterday evening, between Alverca and Guarda, under the command of Lieuts. Persse,\* of the 16th light dragoons,

\* Col. Persse, 16th light dragoons.

and Foster of the Royals, who attacked a detachment of the enemy's cavalry yesterday evening, between Alverca and Guarda, killed and wounded several of them, and took the officer and 37 men prisoners.

The enemy have withdrawn from Pinhel across the Coa.

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Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

'Arrangement for the movement of the army on the 29th March, 1811:

'Celorico, 28th March, 1811.

'The Light division will march at daybreak exactly from Maçã do Chão, along the great road towards Alverca, and will turn off to the right hand when it arrives at the road leading to the village of Recammodo, and proceed to that village. From Recammodo it will move in the direction of Guarda, keeping on the left bank of the rivulet of Maousa, which passes between Recammodo and Avelans d'Imbom, and runs by Avelans da Ribeira towards Alverca. When the division gets about half way from Recammodo to Guarda, it will occupy the heights that look towards the latter place, and wait for further orders, putting itself in communication, however, on the right with the 6th division, and sending out patrols and piquets to the front, and also to the left flank towards the roads that lead from Guarda to Pinhel, and to Almeida. Capt. Bull's troop of horse artillery and Major Gen. Anson's brigade of light cavalry will move with the Light division. Col. Barbacena's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, and the Portuguese troops (militia) under Col. Wilson, will take post at Alverca and at Avelans da Ribeira, and will observe the enemy towards Freixedas, keeping up a communication, also, with the Light division through the village of Recammodo.

'The troops (Portuguese) under the orders of Col. Trant will advance to Granja and Ervas-tendras, and will observe the enemy towards Pinhel, Souropires, and Freixedas, communicating on the right with the troops at Alverca.

'The 6th division will cross the Mondego at the Ponte do Ladrão (near Lagiosa), and at the ford of Porto de Carne, and will move afterwards, partly through Sobral da Serra and partly by Cabadoide, towards Guarda. It will halt upon the high grounds which look towards Guarda, about half a league from that town, and will put itself in communication, on the left, with the Light division, and on the right with the 3d division. If the artillery of the 6th division cannot be got up the hills by either Sobral da Serra or Cabadoide, Major Gen. Campbell will order it to proceed up the great paved road to Guarda, following the artillery of the 3d division; and Gen. Campbell will give to the artillery of his division, in its movement up the paved road, such assistance and protection as may be necessary beyond that afforded by a battalion of the 3d division, which is ordered to march by the same route. The 6th division will begin to move one hour after daybreak.

'The right and centre brigades of the 3d division, with the mountain guns attached to that division, will march at daybreak, the former by Trinda and Crujeiro, the latter by Mazinha towards Guarda, and will endeavor to gain possession, as soon as possible, of the road which leads from the village of Porcos to Guarda, and of the old fort, or redoubt, near that road, called the Fort d'Alorna.

'The left brigade of the 3d division will march one hour after daybreak, and will move by the road which leads from the Ponte de Faya (near Miserelha) through Corvo to Guarda, sending one battalion, however, to accompany the artillery of the division, by the great paved road which goes from Porto de Carne to Guarda.

'The left brigade of the 3d division will be in communication with the battalion which is detached to move with the artillery; and it will also observe the progress of the 6th division, and regulate its own advance accordingly.

'The 5th division will move from Linhares at daybreak, by the mountain roads which lead from thence into the Val de Mondego (the artillery going round, however, by Cortiço and Lagiosa), and the division will be in reserve upon the left bank of the Mondego, at Porco, and at Miserelha.

'The brigade of cavalry, commanded by Col. Hawker, will be in reserve near Sueiro.

'The 1st division will move forward at daybreak, by brigades, from its present cantonments, along the great road towards Celorico, and will halt upon the open ground just before entering that town, and there wait for further orders.

'The 7th division will move at daybreak from the neighbourhood of Pinhanços to Cortiço, Linhares, Mesquitella, and Carrapichana; and if Col. Ashworth's Portuguese brigade is with the 7th division, it will occupy Villa Cortez.

'Capt. Lawson's brigade of 9 pounders, and the Portuguese brigade of 3 pounders along with it, will move from Vinhó to Cortiço.

'The baggage of the Light division, and of Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, will remain at Maçã do Chão till further orders.

'That of the 6th division will, in like manner, remain at Lagiosa; and that of the 3d division in the Val de Mondego.'



To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Celorico, 30th March, 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Fletcher, giving information that the Portuguese chief engineer had directed certain reports to be made to him by the Portuguese engineers employed in our works under Capt. Williams. I shall be obliged to you if you will intimate to the chief engineer, that, as the Portuguese government do not pay any part of the expense, he has nothing to say to them, or nothing to do with the execution of the work, it does not appear to me to be very necessary that he should have this information, and that information of this description, when not necessary to give it, should be withheld from every body.

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Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

Celorico, 28th March, 1811.

'Arrangement for the movements of the army on the 1st April:

'The troops under Col. Trant will cross the Coa at the ford of Porto de Vide, and will occupy the villages upon the right bank of the river, between Porto de Vide and Castello Rodrigo. Col. Trant will take care to keep open his retreat to the left bank of the Coa, in case of being pressed by a superior force; and he will not extend his cantonnements towards Villar Torpin, in the direction of Almeida, nor to Castello Rodrigo, if he finds that the enemy has any considerable body of troops in that part of the country.

'The troops under Col. Wilson will occupy Pinhel, and throw forward their outposts in the direction of Almeida. Col. Wilson will connect his troops with those of Col. Trant, by the bridge over the Coa, between Pinhel and Villar Torpin, if the enemy is not in a situation to hinder that communication; but if he is, it is to be established by the ford of Porto de Vide.

'Col. Barbacena will occupy Carvalhal, Atalaya, and neighbouring villages, upon the left bank of the Pinhel river; and will push forward his outposts and patrols towards the Coa, as far as the situation and force of the enemy permit, particularly in the direction of Almeida, Castello Bom, and Castello Meudo.

'Col. Barbacena will communicate with Col. Wilson, upon the left, and will send a party of dragoons to the village of Parada, near Serdeira, to keep up his communication with the right of the army.

'The 1st division will march from Alverca, &c., by Pinzio, to Parada, Serdeira, Mouselha, and adjacent. It will occupy Seixo upon the right, and Porto da Velha upon the left; placing piquets along the left bank of the Coa, between these two points, and taking possession of the bridge of Sequeiros. If, however, the enemy should be in too great force upon the Coa to admit of the above arrangements being complied with, Sir B. Spencer will place the 1st division upon the Naueme rivulet in the neighbourhood of Serdeira; establishing outposts in the direction of Ponte de Sequeiros, and also on the left from Parada towards Castello Meudo.

'Sir B. Spencer will communicate, through Marmeleiro, with the centre column of the army.

'The 7th division, and Col. Ashworth's brigade, will march from Baraçal, Lagios, &c., through Alverca, and will thence follow the route of the 1st division, as far as Pinzio and neighbourhood, putting itself in communication with the 1st division, and establishing its outposts upon the Pinhel river.

'The baggage of each of the above divisions will move in rear of its own division.

'The 6th division will move through Guarda, and thence by Marmeleiro towards Rapoula de Coa. Major Gen. Campbell will occupy Rapoula de Coa, and will place piquets along the left bank of the Coa, communicating on the left flank with the piquets of the 1st division, and on the right flank with those of the right column of the army. But should the enemy be too much in force upon the Coa to admit of the above arrangement, Major Gen. Campbell will halt his division at Martin de Pega.

'The 5th division will follow the 6th, by the route above mentioned, and will close up to it where it halts.

'The baggage of the two divisions will move in rear of the 5th division.

'The Light division will march by Adao and Pega towards Sabugal. Sir W. Erskine will move as far forward upon that road as circumstances permit, and will occupy the town of Sabugal if it has been evacuated by the enemy. Sir William will communicate on the left with the centre column of the army.

'The 3d division will follow the Light division by the above route, and will close up to it when it halts.

'The two brigades of artillery, under Capt. Lawson, will move with the 3d division.

'The baggage of the 3d and Light divisions will move in rear of the latter.

'Head quarters will be at Marmeleiro.'

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Celorio, 30th March, 1811.

I have received your letters of the 26th, and I congratulate you upon your success of the 25th.

I wish you would call together the officers of the dragoons, and point out to them the mischiefs which must result from the disorder of the troops in action. The undisciplined ardor of the 13th dragoons, and 1st regt. of Portuguese cavalry, is not of the description of the determined bravery and steadiness of soldiers confident in their discipline and in their officers. Their conduct was that of a rabble, galloping as fast as their horses could carry them over a plain, after an enemy to whom they could do no mischief after they were broken; and the pursuit had continued for a limited distance, and sacrificing substantial advantages, and all the objects of your operation, by their want of discipline. To this description of their conduct I add my entire conviction, that if the enemy could have thrown out of Badajoz only 100 men regularly formed, they would have driven back these 2 regiments in equal haste and disorder, and would probably have taken many whose horses would have been knocked up. If the 13th dragoons are again guilty of this conduct, I shall take their horses from them, and send the officers and men to do duty at Lisbon. I beg that you will tell De Grey how well satisfied I was with the conduct of his brigade.

We yesterday manœuvred the French out of Guarda. Massena was there, some say with the whole army, I think certainly with 2 corps; but not a shot was fired. We ascended the hill in 5 columns. The enemy went off towards Sabugal, the rear guard in admirable order. Ney is gone to Salamanca, it is said in arrest. Loison certainly commands the 6th corps, and was at Guarda.

I have accounts that Almeida is very badly supplied with provisions; and it is reported that the enemy think of blowing up the place. It would be a good end to our concerns on this side, to oblige him to adopt that measure, or to give up the place; and I think of trying it, if the Commissary Gen. is sure of our supplies. Silveira was here yesterday, and is gone this day across the Douro, and I shall send there the remainder of the militia, as soon as I shall have determined what I shall do respecting Almeida.

You will have heard from Austin of the reinforcement to Ballesteros. Soult will have to make an option, whether he will try to save Badajoz or Seville; and I think, that having got Campo Maior, and I should suppose Alburquerque and Valencia de Alcantara, you ought to lose no time in closing up Badajoz, and making your arrangements to attack it. If Elvas should want guns, after supplying what will be required for the attack of Badajoz, I can send them from Lisbon easily, as well as powder. I will also send to Elvas all our spare engineers. The breach at Badajoz can scarcely be more than stockaded.

G. O.

Celorio, 30th March, 1811.

2. The Commander of the Forces has received frequent representations from the Agents of transports respecting the great quantity of baggage on board the transports belonging to each of the regiments, much of which, it is stated, consists of old clothing, empty boxes, and packing cases, which take up great space and must be entirely useless.

The Commander of the Forces requests the Commanding officers of regiments will send to Lisbon an officer belonging to each, in order to arrange the baggage and to destroy such as may be useless, or may be of the description above referred to.

I have omitted to answer a question you put to me respecting Capt. Dickson's artillery, because I conceived the garrison order of the 19th decided the matter very fully. But I see in a letter from Dom M. Forjaz to Mr. Stuart, that he considers it still undecided which of the brigades of artillery are to be taken care of by our commissariat. I have always considered Capt. Dickson's artillery as being in Gen. Hamilton's Portuguese division; the mountain 3 pounders in Gen. Pack's brigade, and the carriage 3 pounders in Col. Ashworth's. These, of course, are to be taken care of by the Portuguese commissariat.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Celorigo, 30th March, 1811, 6 p.m.

I have received your letter of the 27th inst. Besides the boats in Elvas there are 15 river boats in Jurumenha, under which place there is an excellent ford. ——— appears to me to be a little inclined to make difficulties about the passages of the rivers; and upon all this I can only say that, if the Guadiana cannot be passed in safety with the means in possession or at command, the troops must remain on the right of the river, and of course can do nothing. Tin pontoons are just as good as others; and whatever ——— may say, they will positively bear field pieces. Between chevalets, boats, Spanish and English pontoons, and a ford, I should hope that the Guadiana may be passed in safety.

I am concerned to hear that the troops are so much distressed for want of shoes; 20,000 pairs have been ordered; but it must be understood that the shoes sent by the British commissariat are for the British troops. 150,000 dollars, also for the British troops only, have been ordered into the Alentejo; and an hospital for 500 men, for British troops only, has been ordered to Estremoz, and I believe has arrived there; and another hospital has been ordered to Abrantes. I believe you will find all this sufficient for the British troops; but if more is wanted it shall be added, although I believe that, of all articles, the troops in the Alentejo have more than their proportion.

I have just seen Mr. Kennedy: the 10,000 pairs of shoes, and the 100,000 dollars, were ordered to be sent to Mr. Thompson on the 9th of this month. The hospital was ordered 6 weeks ago. I think that, considering that only one brigade of Gen. Stewart's division did more than march from the Tagus, and that Cole's division does not amount to 5000 British, 10,000 pairs of shoes would, in the first instance, be a reasonable supply; unless, indeed, the men should have sold their shoes. The second 10,000 pairs have been ordered to Abrantes, and were not ordered till your requisition was received. The order for the gun ammunition went long ago.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorigo, 30th March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 25th March, regarding the baggage in the transports. I have given directions that an officer belonging to each regiment may be sent to Lisbon to arrange the baggage, and to destroy such part as may be useless. In the mean time, I request that a transport, or other vessel, may be allotted to hold the baggage of one, 2, or 3 battalions in the same division, and that the re-

mainder of the transports may be sent to England, according to the request contained in my letter of the 20th.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 30th March, 1811.

It always gives me pleasure to attend to any suggestion of yours; but it is very desirable that, as I am now at a great distance from Lisbon, and the communication is so slow that a reference to me must take 8 days, the directions which I give to the inferior departments of the army should be carried into execution without reference, as I generally consider well the various conveniences and inconveniences of any orders before I give them.

When I know that the present ministers complain of the expense of the war in the Peninsula, that their opponents declare that they would withdraw the army, and that the conduct of the Spaniards affords a good reason for so doing, I consider it my duty not to be unprepared to obey such an order if I should receive it; and to be able to obey it without exposing to insult, by the populace at Lisbon, the King's minister, yourself, and those of His Majesty's officers and subjects who should reside there. On this ground I have determined that the regimental baggage should remain in the transports, or otherwise afloat; and I have directed the Commanding officers of the regiments to send an officer of each down to Lisbon to arrange it, and to destroy such of it as is useless; and I shall be obliged to you if, till that is done, you will allot a transport to hold the baggage of one, 2, or 3 battalions belonging to the same division.

In respect to the ordnance stores, they must be at St. Julian. I am aware of the delay in getting what we shall require from thence, and was aware of it before I made that arrangement; but if I am willing to put up with that inconvenience, Col. Fisher need not complain of it.

I have ordered the 58th regt. to Lisbon to relieve the marines that belong to Sir T. Williams' squadron.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 30th March, 1811.

I received last night your letter of the 25th. We victual the 1st and 3d caçadores in the Light division, and the 2d caçadores in the 7th division, the 1st Lusitanian legion in the 4th division, and the 2d Lusitanian legion in the 5th division.

The 4th caçadores are in Gen. Pack's brigade, the 5th in Gen. Hamilton's Portuguese division, and the 6th in Col. Ashworth's brigade, and these must be victualled by the Portuguese Commissaries.

I enclose a copy of my order of the 19th, which, in my opinion, leaves no difficulty on the subject of what troops are to be victualled by us, and what by the Portuguese commissariat. The difficulty is to get any thing from the latter.

There is a note from Gen. Pack this morning, whom I have been obliged to leave behind. He has had one day's rice, and one day's Indian corn or bread (mentioned in his last note, which I sent to you), since I saw him, 12 days ago!! It is really a joke to talk of carrying on the war with these people.

By your letter of the 25th it would appear that you wish that I should extend the arrangement of the 5th March to the whole Portuguese army. I am perfectly aware of the advantage which I personally should derive from this measure, and you may depend upon it that I limited the operation of the arrangement for good reasons. To find provisions for an army is doing only half what is necessary, as you will see when you recollect that there are plenty of provisions, as Dom M. Forjaz says, at Villa Franca, Figueira, Tojal, and Lisbon; but these provisions are useless to the troops in the field, if there are not means of transport to carry them up to the troops who are to consume them.

The means of transport which I have at my command are Spanish muleteers, and no others. These will not attend the Portuguese troops. When the Portuguese troops are in British divisions, the muleteers believe that the provisions they carry are for the English soldiers, and of course there is no difficulty; but they would refuse to attend Gen. Pack's brigade, for instance, and therefore I cannot pretend to supply them. The government, who can, or pretend they can, command the means of transport of the country, must supply this part of their own army.

I don't know what to make of the French army. They had yesterday, some say, the whole force, but certainly not less than 2 corps, under Massena himself, upon Guarda, which is one of the strongest positions in the country. We manœuvred them out of it, in 5 columns, without firing a shot; and they went off towards the Coa in considerable confusion, except the rear guard, which retired in excellent order. They were much stronger than we. I had only 3 divisions on the hill.

You see that Beresford has retaken Campo Maior; and he would have cut off the troops there, and their artillery, if it had not been for our dragoons, who invariably get out of order, and pursue any little advantage they acquire too far.

I think there is a chance of getting the French out of Almeida.

To Col. Lobo.

Celorigo, 31st March, 1811.

I wrote some time ago to the government to request that a bridge might be laid over the Zezere, at Punhete, and that the bridge belonging to Abrantes, which is now laid over the Tagus, at Tancos, might be removed to its old situation. I beg you to let me know whether any, and what, progress has been made in these services.

I now write to the government to request that a flying bridge may be sent up to Villa Velha; but as some time will necessarily elapse before that can be done, I request you to direct that some of the boats belonging to the other ferries on the Tagus, between Abrantes and the Portuguese frontier, may be taken to Villa Velha, as it is of the utmost importance that the communication between the troops in Beira and those on the Guadiana should be opened by that route as soon as may be practicable.

I request you to report to Marshal Beresford that you have received these directions, and report to him, as well as to me, the progress which may have been made in performing the service directed.

I shall pay the proprietor of the ferry boats any reasonable sum for the time they may be detained at Villa Velha.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

I think it would be advisable that the senior officer with the Portuguese troops with this part of the army should have some general charge of the whole, as far as regards their communication with the civil departments, viz., pay, medical, and commissariat, as it is impossible for me to enter into the details of these departments; and, unless somebody does regulate the communication between the several corps and them, we shall get into sad confusion.

It is very desirable that some steps should be taken to get the Portuguese troops out of the hospitals. To send a soldier to the hospital, under existing circumstances, is tantamount to giving his discharge; and the regiments are terribly reduced in numbers. The 9th regt. have 694 R. and F. for duty; the 21st regt. 496; the 2d batt. Lusitanian legion, 378; 3d infantry, 601; 15th, 460; 8th, 780; 7th, 702; 19th, 856; 2d caçadores, 365; 1st ditto, 352; 1st regt., 749; 16th, 691; 4th caçadores, 352; and 6th ditto, 342. This is but little more than half their strength.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have seen Dr. Franck about your hospitals. He says that the hospital must now be at Estremoz, and another at Abrantes. The former left Aldea Galega on the 18th, and an order went express from Lisbon on the 24th to stop it at Estremoz. The latter is ordered up from Villa Nova. The medical establishment of the former is sufficient for any number of sick you can have. Indeed it was formed in the expectation that you might have a general action. It has 300 beds, which can be increased to 600 or 800 if you like it. The latter has 300 beds. Both are formed on the principle, that all cases likely to be tedious should be sent to Lisbon, and that very slight cases should remain with their regiments. Pakenham wrote to you, by mistake, that I thought the Estremoz hospital ought to go to Crato. You must be the best judge where it ought to be. I think Estremoz the best situation till you have Elvas in the rear of your corps, and then Elvas.

The greatest part of the French army have crossed the Coa. We shall be at that river to-morrow.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th inst. Capt. Holloway, of the Engineers, is the officer charged with the construction of the jetties at S. Julian. The person who requested from you the pile-driving machine is a person to be employed specially in that business; and he will not begin, of course, till he shall receive his instructions from Capt. Holloway.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

In addition to the bridge of boats over the Zezere, and that over the Tagus at Abrantes, respecting which I had the honor of addressing you on the 16th March, it is desirable that a flying bridge should be established over the Tagus, at Villa Velha; and I request you to apply to the Portuguese government to give directions that one may be established there of large dimensions. As it is desirable that the troops may be able to communicate with those on the Guadiana by this route, as soon as may be

practicable, I have sent to the Governor of Abrantes the directions of which I enclose the draft; and I request you to apply to the Portuguese government to aid the performance of this service, by their orders to the civil magistrates, without loss of time.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorigo, 31st March, 1811.

The wants of the Portuguese government of an immediate supply of money induce me to suggest for their consideration the expediency of calling upon the mercantile body of the Kingdom to pay into the treasury, in the course of the month of April, their income tax for the year 1811.

I conclude that the government will have adopted some measure to force this body to pay to the state the real tenth of their incomes; and if they have done so, the measure which I now suggest will give them immediately a very large available resource, which would go far to defray their expenses, till the other improvement in the revenue should take place. At the same time it can be no hardship upon the mercantile body, who, notwithstanding that they have realised such enormous profits by the war, have contributed comparatively nothing to the expenses of the State.

I also request you to draw the attention of the government to the increasing profits of the Oporto Wine company, as to an available resource to a large amount. I understand that this company have recently quadrupled the amount of their purchases under their monopoly.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Celorigo, 31st March, 1811.

I beg you again to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to the want of supplies by Brig. Gen. Pack's and Col Ashworth's brigades of Portuguese infantry. I have been obliged to leave the former in the rear. The latter are in the neighbourhood of this place. The troops comprising it have had 9 days' provisions in 24 days, of which the greatest part of the bread, and nearly all the meat, were supplied by the British commissariat, and the Commanding officer has this day reported that the troops are without subsistence of any description. I have desired them to halt likewise, if they cannot get provisions. This is the assistance I receive from the Portuguese government! I also beg you to draw the attention of the government to the operations on the frontiers of Alentejo. These are becoming of the utmost importance, not only to Portugal, but to the allies in general. It is obvious that they cannot be carried on without a constant communication with the magazines, as well at Abrantes as with those at Lisbon; for the inhabitants of the Alentejo will supply nothing to the troops.

I now request you to give notice to the government, that they must either enforce their own law strictly, and oblige the inhabitants of the Alentejo to give the Commissaries of the army the use of their carriages, for the payment of hire; or that the operations upon that frontier must be discontinued, and I must draw the army back to its magazines. That province has been untouched by the enemy. The carriages must be in it; and yet I have been able to procure only 34, to remove the articles necessary for the establishment of an hospital for Marshal Beresford's corps at Estremoz

If the government are tired of the war, and don't choose to exert themselves to oblige the people to bring forward the means which are required to enable the army to carry on its operations at a distance from its magazines, it is necessary that it should be known to the British government, that they may adopt such measures on the subject as they may think proper.

This is the only letter which I shall write upon this subject; and if I should find that efficient measures are not adopted to force the people to bring forward the means of transport in the province, I shall withdraw the army to the neighbourhood of its magazines.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

The difficulty experienced at different times in this country, in collecting boats and materials for a bridge over the several rivers over which the army may have to pass, induces me to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of sending to this country a bridge consisting of 80 pontoons, with their carriages, &c. complete.

As this description of equipment is not always required with the army, I don't think it necessary to require horses for it; and I propose to move it by bullocks, if it should be wanted. But the harness for the horses might be sent with the carriages, in case at any time it should be expedient to move it with extraordinary celerity, and to use for this purpose horses of the artillery.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

The demand for shoes increases to such a degree that it is desirable that 150,000 pairs should be sent to the Tagus as soon as it may be practicable. It is very desirable that the shoes sent to the army should be of the best quality for wear, and should be made of the largest size. The destruction of this necessary article to a soldier is very much increased by the bad quality of the shoes sent out, and by their being in general too small; and as the operations of the army have now been removed to a distance from Lisbon, the inconvenience and difficulty of supplying their consumption are much increased; at the same time, that, as the soldiers pay for the shoes they receive, it is but just towards them that they should be of the best quality for their purpose, and should fit them.

While writing upon this subject, it is desirable that I should inform your Lordship that the Portuguese troops feel the inconvenience of the want of their shoes, which ought to have arrived at Lisbon in January last; and that it is necessary that the shoes sent for them should be as large in size as those sent for the British troops. It is also desirable that 100,000 pairs of soles and heels should be sent out at the same time with the shoes; and that the Commissary Gen. should be made acquainted with the price of them.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Col. Fletcher of



the Royal Engineers. It is desirable that the corps of Engineers with this army should be increased, if it can be done consistently with other objects.

To Viscount Palmerston.

Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 16th Feb., regarding the bounty given to deserters from the enemy on enlistment into the King's German Legion; in answer to which, I have the honor to inform your Lordship, that the German Legion were never authorised by me to give any bounty to any recruit on enlistment, beyond that stated in the letter from the D. A. G. of the 16th Feb.

The object of the different orders from the Sec. of State was to encourage desertion, with which the King's German Legion had nothing to do. It was my business to encourage soldiers to desert from the enemy by every means in my power, under the orders from the Sec. of State; and that of the Commanding officer of the German Legion to enlist such men as chose to enlist in that corps, likewise under the orders from the Sec. of State, upon a bounty of 4 guineas, which was never altered.

*The A.G. to A.A.Gs. of divisions. (Circular.)*

31st March, 1811.

I do myself the honor to transmit for promulgation a copy of a letter received from Major Gen. Calvert, adverting to the list of absent officers without leave, which appears to have accumulated to the extent it had actually arrived, from the evident want of correspondence, inquiry, and discrimination of the officers commanding regiments, as to the employment of officers, apparently absent without authority, or detached on other duties of the corps.

In a letter of the 18th Jan. 1811, addressed to the A. A. Gs. of those divisions to which it was most applicable, I have already taken occasion to express my desire that commanding officers' attention should be particularly called to the above stated omission.

I have at present, in obedience to the Adj. Gen.'s instructions, to request the alterations may be made in the ensuing returns, in reference to those officers ascertained to be otherwise employed; and that a regular monthly communication may be established between the regimental depot and the commanders of battalions composing the — division of the army.

*The A.G. to Capt. Kipping, Coimbra.*

31st March, 1811.

In reference to that part of your letter of the 26th inst. which related to Col. L'Amour, of the 39th regt., now prisoner of war at Coimbra, and also in reply to that officer's direct communication to the Commander of the Forces, you will be so good as to inform him his letters shall be sent to the head quarters of the French army by the first opportunity. A draft for £20 is now annexed for the use of Col. L'Amour; and I beg you will recall to his recollection that a supply was personally offered to him by me, previous to leaving Louzão, which he declined, under the expectation of immediate reply to his letters, which, however, the nature of operations has not as yet enabled passing over to the French by a flag of truce.

I am further commanded by my Lord Wellington to desire you will request Col. L'Amour to view the outrages committed in this country by the army to which he belongs; and knowing, as he must do, that no prisoner is ever taken by the French who does not lose all his property, and many their lives, his Excellency is astonished the Colonel should complain of apparent neglect, attributable but to circumstances; and further, that he has been robbed; more particularly as his Lordship knew his watches were left in his possession.

*The A.G. to Capt. Kipping, Coimbra.*

31st March, 1811.

Adverting to that part of your communication of the 26th inst. which referred to the command with which you are now charged, I am to observe that the duties usually performed in garrison by an Adjutant must be executed by the duty officer of the day, in the event of your not finding an individual both eligible and willing to continue his exertions in the details of duty you may appoint. The only allowance granted to officers in the temporary charge of establishments is confined to *2s. per diem* for a clerk, and the amount expended for stationery.

The duties of your detachment are arduous and of a responsible nature, but have fallen to you in the course of service, and you must execute them cheerfully.

On the arrival of the Paymaster Gen. £100 will be issued to you on account of the public, from which you are to supply the wants of the convalescents.

You will, to account for the disbursement, make out nominal regimental lists of the expenditure of this money: one copy of which you will send to this office to be forwarded to the head quarters of regiments; the other to the Dep. Paymaster Gen., to enable him to recover regimentally the total amount of the issue.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Celorico, 1st April, 1811.

I have desired that Brig. Gen. C. Alten, with the 2 light battalions of the German Legion, may march into the Alentejo. He will go either by the direct road of Aldea Galega, &c., if he should not have left Lisbon before the orders shall reach him; but if he should have left Lisbon he will cross the Tagus at your bridge at Tancos, and will proceed by Gavião. To these 2 battalions I propose to add the 71st regt.; and I shall place this brigade in the 2d division, from which I shall withdraw Hoghton's brigade, as soon as these troops shall arrive at Elvas.

The French yesterday destroyed the bridge over the Coa at Almeida, upon Waters' patrolling up to the river. All their troops are, on the other side of that river, towards Alfaiates.

We do not move this day as I intended, as Mr. Kennedy was not quite prepared with our supplies, but we shall move to-morrow.

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Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

<sup>6</sup> Celorico, 21st March, 1811, 6 P.M.

'In consequence of a sufficient supply of biscuit for the troops not having come up, the movements ordered for to-morrow are not to take place, except that of the Light division, which is to march to Adão, on the road from Guarda to Sabugal.'

Instructions communicated by the Q. M. G. to Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine.

<sup>6</sup> Celorico, 1st April, 1811.

'The arrangements originally ordered for this day are to take place to-morrow, with the following alteration in regard of the troops under your command:

'If the enemy should have fallen back from Sabugal, you will be so good as occupy that place and neighbourhood, and send patrols after the enemy; but, should he still continue to hold Sabugal, and the country near it, upon the 2d inst., you will move towards your right, to Urgeira.

'In either of the cases above mentioned the 3d division will march, on the 2d inst., to Val Mourisco. It will be ordered to move from Guarda at daybreak, and you will be so good as march off the Light division somewhat later in the morning, that it may not be too distant from the support of the 3d division, in the event of its being required.

'If the enemy attempts to maintain himself near Sabugal, behind the Coa, the troops under your command will be ordered (on the 3d inst.) to turn his left, by marching in the direction of Malcata and Quadrazas, higher up the Coa, or by crossing the river at some intermediate point between Quadrazas and Sabugal. It will be expedient, however, that you should endeavor, as soon as possible, to ascertain positively whether the enemy has any part of his army to your right, in the direction of Sortelha, S. Estevão, Memaô, and Penamacor; as such troops would be in your rear during the movement above mentioned.'

*The A.G. to Col. Darroch, A.A.G., Lisbon.*

1st April, 1811.

In the event of an officer of the staff of Gen. Loison, named ———, prisoner of war, having arrived at Lisbon, you are to cause that officer to be placed in close custody; it being notified to his Excellency that he is a person of designing and dangerous character. You will be so good as to let me hear from you in acknowledgment of this letter.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Marmeleiro, 2d April, 1811.

The allied army were collected in the neighbourhood and in front of Celorico on the 28th, with a view to dislodge the enemy from the position which they had taken upon Guarda, which they still occupied in force, and of which they apparently intended to retain possession. On that day a patrol of light infantry from Major Gen. Alex. Campbell's division,

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

Marmeleiro, 2d April, 1811.

'Arrangement for the attack of the French corps at Sabugal, on the 3d April, 1811:

'Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine will have the troops under his orders formed in close columns behind the top of the heights which form the left bank of the Coa above Sabugal, so as to be prepared at 8 o'clock a.m. to move down towards the river (if so ordered), and to pass it about one mile above the little chapel which there is on the left bank of the Coa a mile higher up than the bridge of Sabugal. If Sir W. Erskine is directed to pass his infantry at the place here mentioned, he will make the cavalry pass farther up the river, so as to cover the right of the infantry and gain the open country, by leaving the woods upon the opposite side of the Coa to their left.

'As circumstances may, however, render it desirable that the cavalry, and the Light division also, should turn the enemy by even a wider circuit, Sir W. Erskine will be prepared, in that case, to move to his right, along the left bank of the Coa, in order to pass it as far up as Quadraznes, or at any intermediate point that may be ordered. He will be so good, therefore, as have the roads in that direction reconnoitred as soon as possible.

'Major Gen. Picton will move forward the 3d division at 6 o'clock in the morning, and will have it in readiness to move down from the heights forming the left bank of the Coa at 8 o'clock (if so ordered), and to cross the river near the little chapel which there is about one mile above the bridge of Sabugal.

'All the artillery with the 3d division will move forward by the road leading towards Sabugal, so that it may be at hand to protect the passage of the troops if necessary, and if not, to move forward and pass the Coa by a ford a little below the bridge.

'The 5th division will move so as to be formed by 8 o'clock, each brigade in close column near the artillery of the 3d division, a little off the great road leading from Pega to Sabugal.

'The 6th division will remain at Martin de Pega till further orders; but Major Gen. Campbell will have the roads to the right reconnoitred, so as to be able to move his division in that direction if ordered, either to Sabugal or to any of the fords of the Coa between Sabugal and Rapoula de Coa.

'The 1st division will move at daybreak by the road from Serdeira to Quinta de Gonzalez Martinez (which is between Marmeleiro and Martin de Pega), and from thence will march to Val Mourisco, which is on the great road from Guarda through Pega to Sabugal.

'The 7th division and Col. Ashworth's Portuguese brigade will move at daybreak to Serdeira, and from thence will follow the route of the 1st division.

'Sir B. Spencer will be so good as leave the posts which he may have established to-day in view of the enemy, near the Ponte Sequeiros, until they can be relieved by a battalion of the 7th division, which Major Gen. Houstoun will allot for that purpose, as soon as his troops have come forward.

'The whole of the cavalry of Major Gen. Anson's and Col. Hawker's brigades, not already with Sir W. Erskine, will move at daybreak to join him; leaving only a party of a serjeant and 12 dragoons with the 6th division at Rapoula de Coa.

'Col. Barbacena will place the head quarters of his brigade at Serdeira, and will observe the passages of the Coa at Castello Bom and Castello Meudo, and in the neighbourhood of the Ponte Sequeiros; he will send his reports to the right of the army in the neighbourhood of Sabugal.

'It is desirable that the columns near Sabugal should be kept as much as possible out of the view of the enemy until they receive orders to move down to the points where they are to pass the river. All the divisions are to move by the right.'

commanded by Col. the Hon. J. Ramsay, had some success against a detachment of the enemy at Avelans; and a patrol of the light cavalry, with a detachment of the 95th, with which was Major Gen. Slade, obliged the enemy to retire from Freixedas. Both took many prisoners; but I am concerned to add, that Brigade Major Stewart, of the 95th, was killed with the last.

On the morning of the 29th the 3d, 6th, and Light divisions, and the 16th light dragoons and hussars, under the command of Major Gen. Picton, Major Gen. Alex. Campbell, and Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, moved upon Guarda in 5 columns, which were supported by the 5th division in the valley of the Mondego, and by the 1st and 7th from Celorico; and the militia, under Col. Trant and Col. Wilson, covered the movement at Alverca, against any attempt which might have been made on that side to disturb it.

The enemy abandoned the position of Guarda without firing a shot, and retired upon Sabugal, on the Coa. They were followed by our cavalry, who took some prisoners. On the 30th Sir W. Erskine, with the cavalry and horse artillery, fell upon the rear guard of the 2d corps, which had been near Belmonte, and had marched for the Coa during the night; and he killed and wounded several and took some prisoners. The enemy have since taken a position upon the Coa, having an advanced guard on this side; and the allied troops have this day been collected on the left of that river.

I have the honor to enclose<sup>e</sup> the copy of a letter which I have received from Marshal Sir W. Beresford,\* containing the terms of the capitulation

\* Marshal Beresford to Marshal Gen. Visc. Wellington. Campo Maior, 26th March, 1811.

I communicated to your Lordship my arrival at Arronches with the whole of my force, except the division of Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, which, from the continued marching it had had, I found necessary to give a day's halt to at Portalegre. On the 14th I moved the post at Arronches to the Quinta de Reguengo, a little more than half way to this town, and Gen. Cole's division to Arronches; and the latter having yesterday at 10 A.M. closed up, I put the whole in motion upon this town. I could not be certain of the enemy's intention regarding this place; but in case he should intend to retain it, I proposed to place myself between him and Badajoz, and cut him off from the latter.

We first discovered the enemy's advance cavalry on the heights of Lapa de Mata, about 1 league from hence; these, however, seeing us manœuvring around their flanks, retired, and a little skirmishing took place round the walls of the town with the advances of cavalry. On coming on the heights over the town I discovered the enemy's force on the outside (I was then ignorant if he kept or not possession of the town). It was 4 regiments of cavalry and the 100th regt. of infantry, of 3 battalions, with some horse artillery. I directed Brig. Gen. Long with the cavalry to turn the enemy's right, keeping out of the reach of the guns of the town, and my object was to delay the enemy's force until some infantry could come up. The Brig. General took rather a wider circuit than was intended, though he thereby more effectually turned them, and which obliged the enemy to retire quicker than he might otherwise have done, and indeed with extraordinary rapidity. The cavalry got upon his right flank, and Brig. Gen. Long seeing a favorable opportunity, directed Col. Head with 2 squadrons of the 13th Light dragoons to charge the enemy's cavalry that, for protection, had got behind the infantry. This charge, followed by Col. Otway with 2 squadrons of the 7th Portuguese and supported by Gen. Long with the remainder of that regiment, the 1st Portuguese, and Col. de Grey's brigade, was made with the utmost gallantry; and the French, advancing to meet it, were completely routed and pursued into

of Campo Maior; and I have likewise the honor of enclosing his report of his first operations against the enemy, from which your Lordship will observe that he has got possession of that place again, and has had considerable success against the enemy's cavalry. This success would have been more complete, and would have been attended by less loss, if the ardor of the 13th light dragoons, and 7th Portuguese regt. of cavalry, in the pursuit of the enemy, could have been kept within reasonable bounds. Some of the men missing of both those regiments were made prisoners on the bridge of Badajoz. The enemy have likewise abandoned Alburquerque. I have received no accounts from Cadiz or from the north since I addressed your Lordship on the 27th March.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Sabugal, 4th April, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th March, regarding the transports prepared to be sent home. I beg to refer for your consideration the expediency of further reducing the number, by sending away the 6 ships of 1276 tons, detained to carry detachments to Figueira, and using for that purpose the 10 ships of 3996 tons; also by sending away that proportion of the victuallers and store ships attached to the army, included in the number of 42 of 9359 tons.

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the town of Badajoz, 2 leagues distant, in which they lost the greater part, being sabred; and the drivers and artillerymen of 16 guns, on the road, shared the same fate. As it was impossible to take prisoners, the guns were abandoned.

This pursuit (however great the loss it occasioned to the enemy) was unfortunate, as, from not knowing, after the charge was made, what became of this part of our cavalry, after continuing the pursuit of the infantry with our remaining cavalry and 2 guns, for a league, to support the detached part that had pushed on, and not having any intelligence of it, nor knowing what fresh force the enemy would send from Badajoz, prudence obliged me to halt my cavalry till my infantry could arrive. The enemy's infantry, although about 1200, though in much confusion, continued in solid column and without halting, though we were all around it within 200 yards; and not knowing any thing of the squadrons of the 13th regt. and 7th Portuguese, I could not risk the loss that must have inevitably occurred, even if successful, by charging it with the heavy brigade under Col. the Hon. G. de Grey. The attention, steadiness, and order of this brigade (viz. 3d dragon guards and 4th dragoons) merit my warmest approbation. Brig. Gen. Long manœuvred with knowledge, and used every effort to moderate the over ardor of the cavalry and to regulate its movements. The gallantry of all was conspicuous, particularly of Cols. Head and Otway, and the squadrons with them; and the only thing to be regretted, which is usual with our troops on their first meeting with the enemy, was too much impetuosity.

The loss of the enemy has been very considerable, not less than 500 or 600 killed, wounded, and prisoners, and a great number of horses and mules were taken. In fact the enemy abandoned every thing. We had only means to bring off according to the annexed return, and even tunbrils, &c. were destroyed. We have also had some loss, a return of which I have the honor to annex. It was not my intention to have passed this town, and was only led to do it from the prospect of capturing or destroying the force of the enemy, incautiously left here, and which must have inevitably occurred, had not our cavalry drove the enemy to so rapid a retreat as to prevent the infantry getting up. After the long marches and wear of necessities consequent to them, I returned to put the troops into cantonments here and at Elvas, to refit and rest them, and to make the preparations necessary to the operations further recommended by your Lordship.

Of the corn and provisions in this town, on its surrender to the enemy, he has not had time to remove any thing, and which become entirely a supply to us. He has even left 8000 rations of biscuit not expecting so early a visit.

P.S. I think it is desirable that the officers of the navy attached to the telegraphs should return to their duty on board the fleet, as you suggest.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Sabugal, 4th April, 1811.

We beat Regnier here yesterday, and forced the passage of the Coa at this place. The enemy retired upon Alfaiates, and this day are either entirely out of Portugal or at most at the frontier villages. I have not yet heard what they have done at Almeida.

I cannot allow either prisoners of war or galley slaves to go into S. Julian. We are going to put our stores there, as I don't like to leave them at the mercy of the people of Lisbon, in the existing temper of the government; and adverting to the impressions which the government have endeavored to give to the people. They should fit out more large ships to receive the prisoners. We did nothing that I know of excepting feed the people, and give them medical assistance and comforts, and subscribe money to feed them.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Sabugal, 4th April, 1811.

Since I wrote to you last I have received your letters of the 28th and 29th; but I have had so much to do, that I have not been able to write to you. I wrote to you on the 25th, 27th, 30th, and 31st March, and 1st April, all of which letters I hope you will have received.

I don't understand by whose orders the shoes and money for you were stopped at Aldea Galega. I believe, however, that Mr. Thompson is very unequal to the management of the great concern now in Alentejo. Mr. Thompson, therefore, is ordered to Abrantes, and Mr. Ogilvie will manage the whole concern in the Alentejo.

The French army were posted on the Coa, with their right at Ponte Sequeiros; their left, the 2d corps, here; Loison at Rovina, opposite Rapoula de Coa; and a considerable body, and the head quarters, at Alfaiates.

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Extracts from the Instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

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‘ 3d April, 1811, near Sabugal.

‘ As soon as the Light division and 3d division have moved down to pass the river, the light infantry of the 5th division will drive in the enemy's posts which are upon the left bank of the Coa opposite Sabugal.

‘ The battalion of the 5th division which is attached to the 9 pounders will assist in this operation by moving forward along the tongue of land that turns the left of the enemy's posts on this side of the Coa; and the 9 pounders will follow that battalion till they can be placed advantageously to cannonade the enemy on the opposite side of the river.

‘ As soon as the enemy begins to give way at the town and the bridge, in consequence of the movements of the Light and 3d divisions round his left and rear, and of the fire of the 9 pounders upon his front, the 5th division will move forward and pass the river.

‘ The infantry of the division will pass the bridge of Sabugal, if it remains entire, and will march round the town, leaving it to the left hand.

‘ The artillery will pass at the ford below the bridge of Sabugal, and will go round the town, leaving it to the right hand.

‘ Major Gen. Dunlop will allow the 2 brigades of 9 pounders to get across the river as soon as they are no longer necessary on this side; and will also get his own brigade of guns across as soon as the infantry of his front brigade has passed. The remainder of the artillery will not pass the river until the whole of the infantry of the 5th division has crossed.

‘ All the baggage of the army is to remain upon the left bank of the Coa until further orders.’

We moved on the 2d, and the British army was formed opposite to them; the divisions of militia, under Trant and Wilson, were sent across the river at Cinco Villas, to alarm Almeida for its communication. Yesterday morning we moved the whole army (with the exception of the 6th division, which remained at Rapoula de Coa, opposite Loison) to the right, in order to turn this position, and force the passage of the river. The 2d corps could not have stood here for a moment; but unfortunately the Light division, which formed the right of the whole, necessarily passed first, and the leading brigade, Beckwith's, drove in the enemy's piquets, which were followed briskly by 4 companies of the 95th, and 3 of Elder's *caçadores*, and supported by the 43d regt. At this time there came on a rain storm, and it was as difficult to see as in the fogs on Busaco, and these troops pushed on too far, and became engaged with the main body of the enemy. The light infantry fell back upon their support, which, instead of halting, moved forward. The French then seeing how weak the body was which had passed, attempted to drive them down to the Coa, and did oblige the 43d to turn. They rallied again, however, and beat in the French; but were attacked by fresh troops and cavalry, and were obliged to retire; but formed again, and beat back the enemy. At this time the 52d joined the 43d, and both moved on upon the enemy, and to be charged and attacked again in the same manner, and beat back. They formed again, moved forward upon the enemy, and established themselves on the top of the hill in an enclosure, and here they beat off the enemy.

But Regnier was placing a body of infantry on their left flank, which must have destroyed them, only that at that moment the head of the 3d division, which had passed the Coa on the left of the Light division, came up, and opened their fire upon this column; and the 5th division, which passed this bridge and through this town, made their appearance. The enemy then retired, having lost in this affair a howitzer, and I should think not less than 1000 men.

Our loss is much less than one would have supposed possible, scarcely 200 men. The 43d have 73 killed and wounded. But really these attacks in columns against our lines are very contemptible.

The contest was latterly entirely for the howitzer, which was taken and retaken twice, and at last remained in our hands. Our cavalry, which ought to have crossed the Coa on the right of the Light division, crossed at the same ford, and therefore could be of no use to them. Besides they went too far to the right. In short, these combinations for engagements do not answer, unless one is upon the spot to direct every trifling movement. I was upon a hill on the left of the Coa, immediately above the town, till the 3d and 5th divisions crossed, whence I could see every movement on both sides, and could communicate with ease with every body; but that was not near enough. We took 6 officers, and between 200 and 300 prisoners, and Soult's\* and Loison's baggage.

After this affair the whole French army retired from the Coa upon

\* General Soult, brother of the Marshal.

Alfaiates,\* and this morning from thence; and if they are not out of Portugal, they are, at the utmost, in the frontier villages of Aldea da Ponte and Aldea Velha. I suspect that they will have destroyed Almeida either last night or this morning.

You will be concerned to hear that Waters is at last taken prisoner. He crossed the Coa alone, I believe, yesterday morning, and was looking at the enemy through a spying glass, when 4 hussars pounced upon him. Nobody has seen him since yesterday morning; and we have the account from the prisoners, who tell the story of an officer attached to the Staff, a Lieut. Colonel, *blond*, with a *petit chapeau*. They saw him with Regnier.

To counterbalance the effect of this bad news, I announce to you the birth of the King of Rome, on the 20th March. This event was announced to the *Armée de Portugal* on the 2d inst., by the firing of 101 pieces of cannon!!!

P.S. I have received Cole's report, &c., upon Campo Maior. Now that you are upon the spot you had better determine what shall be done with that place, and give orders upon it. A good place in that situation would be very useful. Can the place, or the citadel of Campo Maior, be put in such a state as to render it probable that either will hold out so long as to render it worth while to risk the loss of the men who must be left in it?

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Maior, 6th April, 1811.

I received this morning, at Alfaiates, your letters of the 31st March and 1st inst., both under the same cover.

I hope that you will be in time to prevent the supplies from getting into Badajoz. It is very unfortunate that you could not move for that object as soon as the right of the Guadiana was cleared of the enemy.

There was, and I believe there still is, an Assist. Paymaster Gen. attached to the troops in the Alentejo, and Hill signed the warrants for the ordinaries for them. If the Assist. Paymaster is still in the Alentejo, I beg you to sign the warrants for the ordinaries as Hill did, and let the corps be paid according to the proportion of the means you propose to allot to defray the ordinaries. If the Assist. Paymaster is not in the Alentejo, I beg you to desire Mr. Ogilvie to make to the Paymaster of each battalion an advance on account of the Paymaster Gen. equal in amount to the sum which you would propose to allot to the ordinaries. The regiments have received half of the balance of their estimates to the 24th Feb.; those here have lately received the balance of their estimates to the 24th Feb., and half of the balance to the 24th March; and I should think yours might receive the same, or the whole balance to the 24th March. The payment of the båt and forage must be postponed for the present.

In regard to debts incurred at Elvas, I refer Mr. Ogilvie to my orders and proclamation of last year, directing those debts to be settled, and to be paid by bills upon Lisbon.

I have been obliged to act as you recommended in respect to Pack's brigade, that is, I have left it behind to get provisions; and it is now, I believe, near Mangualde. Col. Pamplona's is with the army: we have

\* See Appendix, No. XL.



supplied it with beef; and I have told them repeatedly, if that is not sufficient for them they may go back. I have not communicated personally with Barbacena; but I have no complaints from him, and I conclude that he continues to plunder subsistence. Pamplona's brigade is in full strength; that is to say, on the 20th March it had 2626 men; so that if that brigade can keep with us, it is better that it should stay.

In regard to the others, there is now no excuse of want of provisions, as the whole of the infantry of the army are admirably supplied, and it would be really too ridiculous to send the regiments to the rear to refit after one month's service, they having before had 5 and 6 months' rest.

What is wanted is to get the soldiers out of the hospitals and *depositos*, and from the latter in regular order to the regiments. The regiments cannot be better than with our divisions. But just to show you how much this department of the Portuguese army still wants regulation, I mention that Pack tells me that 100 men for the 1st regt. marched from the *deposito* at Lisbon on the 14th March, under charge of a *Cadete*. Only 50 of them reached the regiment, and these in a very bad state. These men, if belonging to our army, would have had at least 2 officers and a proportion of non-commissioned officers with them, and the officers would have marched by a regular route, and would have answered for every man. We shall never make the army effective till something of the same kind is adopted and enforced in the Portuguese army.

It is very extraordinary that you had not been informed of the 15 boats in Jurumenha. Capt. Mallet mentions them in his report to Murray; and he was desired to attend you at Portalegre, with the information he should acquire respecting the Guadiana.

In respect to Badajoz, the first thing to do is to blockade it strictly, and let it receive nothing: this will not be very difficult if the Guadiana should continue fordable, or in any event with your force and Castaños'. We must then prepare to lay siege to the place at all events; and I am most anxious to receive the accounts of what Elvas can supply for this purpose, that I may order up from our battering train the deficiency. I also beg you to let me know what stores which Elvas will supply it will be most urgent to replace. All the transports from Elvas for this operation must be made by bullock carts, and Gen. Leite should set seriously to work to get together as many as he can. Bullocks must also draw the guns from Elvas.

I have not yet received the reports of the patrols this day. The French were all across the Agueda yesterday, excepting, I believe, a corps at Carpio, &c., on the Azava. They have destroyed all the bridges on the Coa, excepting that at Sabugal; and I am therefore obliged to keep well up the river, and, till I shall have re-established the bridges, to be satisfied with frightening Almeida with the cavalry; otherwise I should take up the position on the Dos Casas, on which I placed Craufurd's advanced guard last year, and should have my advanced guard on the Azava.

P.S. I enclose a Spanish memorandum respecting the murder of 2 soldiers at Ponte de Sor. It would be desirable to have inquiry made into this matter, to ascertain who the soldiers were. I have written to Mr. Stuart to have the murderers tried.

To Major Ridewood,\* 2d batt. 52d regt.

Villar Maior, 6th April, 1811.

I received only yesterday your letter of the 1st April, and I am much concerned that any letter written by me should have given you a moment's uneasiness.

It is impossible for me to enter into an explanation with any body on the contents of a public dispatch; but I am very certain that it is misunderstood by you, if you suppose that it contains any expression which can convey a notion that I was not convinced you had done your duty in the affair to which it relates, or that I was not satisfied with your conduct, or that any expression is omitted by which omission such meaning is conveyed.

I have had more than one occasion to be satisfied with the whole Light division in the late affairs in which they have been engaged; and I have not failed to convey the expression of that satisfaction to the Prince Regent in the manner which I thought most suitable to the occasion, and I have certainly expressed dissatisfaction with none.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Maior, 6th April, 1811.

The French crossed the Agueda yesterday. I am trying to frighten Regnier out of Almeida.

It appears to me that the government neglect several very essential measures to re-settle the country. One is to send to their dioceses all the bishops, and to their parishes all the clergy. A month has now elapsed since the French marched from Santarem, and the post is not yet established. We ought to have it through Lower Beira, in order that I might communicate more directly with Beresford. But the government have sent no mules, and no means to feed those that they have placed even near the capital. They are really going backwards instead of forwards. All this was done in half the time when the country was recovered from the French in 1809.

The troops are still in sad want of provisions. Pack's brigade have been obliged to stay behind. Pamplona's are here; but they get nothing but beef, with which the British Commissary supplies them. Yet the Portuguese government will not bear to hear of their neglect of their army.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Maior, 6th April, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum which has been given to me by a Spanish serjeant, who lately passed by Ponte de Sor, in which he gives an account of the murder by the inhabitants of 2 British soldiers.

I have written to Sir W. Beresford to request that he will take measures to discover what soldiers they were, and the circumstances attending the murder; but as it appears that the criminals are in custody, I trust that the Governors of the Kingdom will consider it expedient to give directions that this murder may be inquired into, and that, if possible, these criminals should be tried, and punished if found guilty.

\* Afterwards Lieut. Col. Ridewood, of the 45th; in command of which regiment he received a mortal wound at the battle of Vitoria.

*The A.G. to Capt. O'Kelly, 11th regt., Celorico.*

7th April, 1811.

Several detachments of prisoners, some of whom are wounded, have marched from Sabugal, with instructions to proceed to Celorico, and to be delivered to your disposal. You will be pleased to forward these men to Coimbra by every opportunity, and according to the circumstances of their cases. To enable this duty being conducted with regularity, you are authorised to detain under your orders the detachments of the 1st and 7th divisions forming the guards of the prisoners above alluded to, commanded by Lieut. D. Cameron, of the 79th regt., and Lieut. Milius, of the Chasseurs Britanniques. The escort which you will send with each detachment of prisoners is to be in proportion to your means; and you must explain to the prisoners that the continuance of the Commander of the Forces' protection towards them depends on their proper conduct in going down to Lisbon.

*The A.G. to General Officers commanding divisions. (Circular.)*

7th April, 1811.

It has been reported to the Commander of the Forces that several of the regiments with this corps of the army have carts in their possession, originally obtained for the accommodation of the several battalions in bringing up supplies, and which should have been returned for the use of the public the moment that service was performed. In requesting you will refer officers commanding regiments to the 2d No. G. O. 29th May, 1809, which admits of but *one* cart for battalion use, I am directed by his Excellency to desire you will be pleased to call for returns of carts and oxen now in possession of the regiments respectively in the division under your command, and cause all the extra carts and oxen forthwith to be delivered over to the divisional commissariat, returns of the number so given over being sent to this office.

To Capt. Chapman, Royal Engineers.

Villar Maior, 8th April, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 7th March this day. I shall recommend you to the Commander in Chief to be made a Major by brevet, in any manner that may be most likely to attain that object for you. I certainly think you are entitled to that reward for your services, adverting to the confidential manner in which you were employed by Col. Fletcher and me, and to the efficient service which you rendered to us both. Consult Col. Torrens upon this subject, and let me know how I can forward your object.

We have given the French a handsome dressing, and I think they will not say again that we are not a manœuvring army. We may not manœuvre so beautifully as they do; but I don't desire better sport than to meet one of their columns *en masse* with our lines. The poor 2d corps received a terrible beating from the 43d and 52d on the 3d.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Villar Maior, 8th April, 1811.

I had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st only yesterday morning.

I have written to the Sec. of State respecting the French prisoners in this country, whose numbers are increasing fast. I expect his answer soon; but in the mean time I recommend that you should send home the officers.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Maior, 8th April, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your private letter of the 31st March, in which you have enclosed the copy of Dom M. Forjaz's note of the 29th March, upon the contents of certain letters recently written by me on the state of the Portuguese army, in consequence of the omission of the govern-

ment to supply the troops regularly with food. Although the facts are clear upon this subject, and the further discussion of it would appear to be unnecessary, I cannot allow this note to pass unnoticed.

Although it is admitted in terms, by Dom M. Forjaz, that there are and have been deficiencies in the supplies to the troops, which he attributes to the deficiencies of the financial resources of the government, he still contends that the troops have been sufficiently supplied, as he endeavors to prove, as usual, by documents from the *Junta de Viveres*. I know from experience that all these documents are false; and it is obvious, upon the face of them, that they don't state the date of departure and arrival of each article of supply sent from Lisbon. Articles sent from Lisbon on the 5th and 6th March could not be available for the Portuguese troops with this army, which marched from their cantonments on the Rio Maior on the 6th; nor could articles shipped at Lisbon and sent to Figueira be of any use to the troops at a later period, unless means of transport were provided to remove them to the station which the army should occupy. Salt meat, and *bacalhão* particularly, which the *Junta de Viveres* have been frequently desired not to send, could be of no use, as these articles are more expensive than fresh meat, and the further expense and inconvenience must be incurred of removing them by means of transport to the troops, as they cannot walk.

While adverting to this part of the subject, I am concerned to add that I have been obliged to leave Gen. Pack's brigade at Mangualde for want of food, and that Col. Pamplona's brigade receives nothing but beef, with which they are supplied by the British Commissaries.

I was in hopes that the arrangement, by which I undertook to supply with food three fourths of the Portuguese effective army, would have given satisfaction to the government, and that at least the remainder of the troops would have been supplied regularly. The last object has failed entirely; and in regard to the first, the government, instead of expressing their satisfaction that I should gratuitously have taken upon myself and the British Commissaries increased trouble and responsibility, have, as usual, complained that I have not done enough for them. To these complaints I answer that I can undertake for no more. The means of transport which we have in the British army generally are Spanish mules and muleteers, and these don't choose to attend the Portuguese troops. When the Portuguese troops are in British divisions, the muleteers don't know that they are carrying provisions for their use, and the business is done; but it would not be done if the muleteers were to be desired to attend a Portuguese brigade.

When supplies are provided, but half the business is done. There must be means of transport to remove them to the station occupied by the troops; and, as the means of transport of which I have the command will not attend the Portuguese troops not in British divisions, I cannot undertake to supply them. I repeat that the Portuguese troops were not regularly fed when they were in the cantonments on the Rio Maior river; that some of the corps were obliged to plunder for food; and, if there is any further discussion on the subject, I shall call for the returns from the corps, which will prove what I have asserted.

In respect to the want of previous information of the movements of the army, complained of by Dom M. Forjaz, I answer,

1st; That the government had all the information that I had.

2dly; That it had been arranged by Marshal Sir W. Beresford and me that the troops should have at all times in their cantonments a reserve of 6 days' provisions, with means of transport for 3 days, in order that they might be in readiness for any movement which circumstances might render expedient.

I am aware that this arrangement was much ridiculed by some of the members of the government, and it certainly was not carried into execution for the Portuguese troops. Not only they had no reserve, but their daily allowance was not provided for them; and the consequence has been, that when they moved the whole were supplied by the British Commissaries, to the great inconvenience of the British army and the manifest disadvantage of the cause.

The consequence of this neglect of the army has been that the following regiments, which ought to be 1400 R. and F. each, have only as follows:

{ 9th, 694 }	{ 3d, 601 }	{ 8th, 780 }	{ 7th, 702 }	{ 1st, 749 }
{ 21st, 496 }	{ 15th, 460 }	{ 12th, 1017 }	{ 19th, 856 }	{ 16th, 691 }

And the 2d batt. Lusitanian legion, which ought to have 1000 R. and F., have only 378 R. and F.; and the following battalions of caçadores, which ought to have 600 each, have only as follows:

2d, 365; 4th, 352; 6th, 342.

Many of the corps produce in the field less than half their numbers; and the whole Portuguese force with this part of the army amounts to less than half what it ought to be.

Under these circumstances, Dom M. Forjaz talks of the Portuguese government paying and maintaining 90,000 men! This assertion makes it my duty to draw your attention to the fact, that the whole Portuguese army employed in the field, as well with this army as with the troops under Sir W. Beresford, don't amount to 20,000 effective men, while His Majesty supposes that he pays for 30,000 men.

I don't mean to assert that there are no more than 20,000 men in the service; but the great proportion of the army unfit for service is alone sufficient to show that the system which has been adopted is as unfavorable to economy as it is to military efficiency.

Then, as to the militia, there have never been 25,000 militia in arms; and all those in the works of Sobral, &c., were fed by the British Commissariat. The divisions of Silveira, Trant, and Wilson don't amount to 8000 men, instead of 15,000, to which number at least they ought to amount.

All this is to be attributed to the system on which the government have acted. It is perfectly true that the demands upon government are enormous, that they undertook their task under great disadvantages, and that many circumstances have tended to decrease the revenues of the state; but, having undertaken the task of governing the country, it was their duty to meet the difficulties under which they labored by adequate resources. They have recently adopted some of the measures recommended to them to provide an increase of revenue; but I would beg to know

why those measures were not adopted in Nov. 1809, when I apprised them of the approaching crisis, and recommended to them to provide for their finances. Why were they not adopted when ordered by H.R.H. the Prince Regent? Why not adopted when repeatedly recommended by yourself and by me? If they had been so adopted, the world would have been convinced that Portugal was straining every nerve in the contest; and the assistance of Great Britain would have been given with increased alacrity to a country whose government was making wise arrangements and great exertions in its own cause.

In respect to the alteration of system, to which I refer in my letter of the 18th March, I beg leave to refer the Governors of the Kingdom to what I have frequently recommended upon this same subject.

1st; I recommend to them to advert seriously to the nature of the task which they have to perform. Popularity, however desirable it may be to individuals, will not form, or feed, or pay an army; will not enable it to march and fight; will not keep it in a state of efficiency for long and arduous services. The resources which a wise government must find for these objects must be drawn from the people, not by measures which will render those popular who undertake to govern a country in critical circumstances, but by measures which must for a moment have the contrary effect. The enthusiasm of the people in favor of any individual never saved any country. They must be obliged, by the restraint of law and regulation, to do those things, and to pay those contributions, which are to enable the government to carry on this necessary contest.

2dly; I recommend to the government to abolish the *Junta de Viveres*, and to appoint a Commissary Gen., under good regulation, to carry on all affairs concerning the provisioning their army.

3dly; I recommend to the government to place under military law the commissariat, the medical department, and the department of the arsenal, and all those connected with the military operations.

4thly; I recommend to the government to alter the military law, according to the repeated suggestion of Marshal Sir W. Beresford and myself.

5thly; I recommend to the government to enforce strictly their own laws and regulations respecting the means of transport to be supplied by the country for the use of the armies.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Maior, 8th April, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th March, regarding a complaint of Capt. — of the —, forwarded by the Governors of the Kingdom.

I enclose a letter of the 5th March, which Capt. — had written to his Commanding officer, under the expectation that his conduct might be complained of; and another letter of the 31st March, written in answer to one which I desired might be sent to him, to inquire whether he wrote the letters enclosed in yours of the 16th inst.

Excepting in cases in which it appears that there has been some gross and flagrant departure from the laws of hospitality, or violence has been used, or gross fraud practised, it does not answer to bring cases of seduction under the cognizance of the military tribunals. It is probable that

Capt. — would be acquitted, and the young lady and family would be disgraced by the sentence.

I acknowledge that, from what I have heard upon this subject, I would recommend to the family to drop it entirely. If, however, they should determine to bring it forward in the Portuguese civil courts, it will be necessary that the government should apply to me to have Capt. — made over to them to answer for his conduct.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Maior, 8th April, 1811.

I write you a letter this day in answer to Dom M. Forjaz's note of the 29th March. I have received your letters of the 1st and 2d. You will observe, from my former letter about Mascarenhas, that I did not think our government would like to urge the Portuguese government to carry into execution the 11th article of the Convention. I believe the King declined to ratify that article, and I am almost certain that Mr. Canning instructed Mr. Villiers not to press the Portuguese government to carry into execution that article. All that I contended for was, that to hang Mascarenhas for serving the French, under all the circumstances of the Prince's proclamation and the 18th article of the Convention, was not consistent with justice.

All the returns of provisions to Figueira are as valuable as so much waste paper. The troops receive none of them, because none are brought up to them. Barbacena's brigade will soon be annihilated. Indeed I am sorry to say that our excellent cavalry are falling off very fast. There are thousands of carts in Upper Beira; but I cannot get one, and the unfortunate mules are obliged to carry our provisions and corn for the horses the whole way, from the Ponte da Murcella to the Agueda. The consequence is that the horses are starving, and I much fear that I shall be obliged to retire.

We knocked a division of the 9th corps, from Almeida, out of Portugal very handsomely yesterday, and I believe the whole army have crossed the Agueda this day. We have cut off all communication with Almeida, where the French are still. But I fear it will not do, and that I shall be obliged to draw in. I cannot afford to lose our cavalry. I don't know what I shall do with these cart people; if the government will not enforce their own law, it is useless to endeavor to defend the country any longer.

I shall send the dispatches from hence to-morrow.

P.S. They tell me that the 2d corps lost 2500 men on the 3d, at Sabugal! Their loss must have been enormous certainly, but I can hardly believe so many.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

Villar Maior, 8th April, 1811.

In answer to your letter of the 6th March, received this day, regarding the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of this army who are prisoners with the enemy, I have the honor to inform you, that I don't think there is the smallest chance of their being exchanged, and that it is desirable the vacancies should be filled up. But very few prisoners have been taken by the enemy this campaign, whereas I have now in my possession many thousands, besides those already sent home.

The greatest number of the prisoners on our returns are the men left

by Gen. Cuesta at Talavera, in August, 1809, and the Prince d'Essling has no power over these. He, however, executed with so little good faith the only agreement for an exchange that I ever made with him, that it is impossible to propose another, to get out of his hands the few prisoners he may have. Upon that occasion, having, as he stated, 120 British soldiers, and Capt. Percy and Lieut. Carden, and a midshipman of the navy, as prisoners, he detained the 3 officers and 60 of the soldiers, and sent instead of them Portuguese militia and Ordenanza to be exchanged for French soldiers. He has since made repeated propositions for the exchange of Portuguese officers, for he has none British, excepting Lieut. Col. Waters (taken by accident on the 3d inst.); but I have refused to attend to any proposition for a cartel, till the plan first proposed by himself, and accepted by me, shall be strictly carried into execution. From this detail you will see, not only that the Prince d'Essling has no control over the greater number of the men returned as prisoners of war in the returns of this army, but that there is no chance of an exchange of any description.

To the Rt. Hon. S. Perceval.

Villar Maior, 8th April, 1811.

I received this day your letter respecting the 2 officers of the 21st regt. That regiment is still in Sicily, and will not, I apprehend, join this army; but if it should, I shall be happy to attend to those gentlemen. I refer you to my dispatches to Lord Liverpool for an account of the state of affairs here.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Maior, 8th April, 1811.

I received this day your note of the 19th March, containing some information regarding a supposed communication from Massena to me, that he intended to fire a *feu de joie* upon the birth of the King of Rome. The fact is that no such communication ever took place, and the whole story is a fabrication of the English newspapers. I believe that in one of the communications which my aide de camp, Major Gordon, had with an aide de camp of Regnier, the conversation turned upon a strong reconnaissance which the enemy had made a day or two before towards our posts on the upper part of the Rio Maior river; and this aide de camp said that we should hear some heavy firing in a day or two when they should receive the news of the birth of the King of Rome, but that it need not create any alarm in our posts on the Rio Maior river. I confess I thought for some time that the intention of this communication was to mislead us when they should make an attack, which I thought not improbable, on Beresford's posts on the Tagus; but I believe the officer was serious, as they did announce the birth of the King of Rome to the army on the 2d, by firing 101 pieces of cannon.

*The A.G. to Col. Pamplona, comm. Portuguese brigade of infantry.* 8th April, 1811.

The soldiers of the 6th Portuguese infantry in your brigade, and named in margin, were on the night of the 7th inst. taken by a patrol in the act of plundering a house in the village of Bismula, which was sent there in consequence of the complaint of the ill treated peasant. The Commander of the Forces has been pleased to direct the men alledged to should, for the crime stated, receive a



punishment of 4 dozen lashes, and be marched as prisoners to the head quarters of the brigade for your further disposal.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Formoso, 9th April, 1811.

When I last addressed your Lordship the enemy occupied the Upper Coa, having his right at Rovina, and guarding the post of Rapoula de Coa with a detachment at the bridge of Ferrerias,\* and his left at Sabugal, and the 8th corps was at Alfaiates.

The right of the British army was opposite Sabugal, and the left at the bridge of Ferrerias. The militia, under Gen. Trant and Col. Wilson, crossed the Coa below Almeida, in order to threaten the communication of that place with Ciudad Rodrigo and the enemy's army.

The river Coa is difficult of access throughout its course; and the position which the enemy had taken was very strong, and could be approached only by its left. The troops were therefore put in motion on the morning of the 3d to turn the enemy's left above Sabugal, and to force the passage of the bridge and town; with the exception of the 6th division, which remained opposite the 6th corps, which were at Rovina, and one battalion of the 7th division, which observed the enemy's detachment at the bridge of Ferrerias.

The 2d corps were in a strong position with their right upon a height immediately above the bridge and town of Sabugal, and their left extending along the road to Alfaiates, to a height which commanded all the approaches to Sabugal from the fords of the Coa above the town. The 2d corps communicated by Rendo with the 6th corps at Rovina. It was intended to turn the left of this corps, and with this view the Light division and the cavalry, under Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine and Major Gen. Slade, were to cross the Coa by two separate fords upon the right; the cavalry upon the right of the Light division; the 3d division, under Major Gen. Picton, at a ford on their left, about a mile above Sabugal; and the 5th division, under Major Gen. Dunlop, and the artillery, at the bridge of Sabugal.

Col. Beckwith's brigade of the Light division was the first that crossed the Coa, with 2 squadrons of cavalry upon their right. 4 companies of the 95th, and 3 companies of Col. Elder's caçadores, drove in the enemy's piquets, and were supported by the 43d regt. At this moment a rain storm came on, which rendered it impossible to see any thing; and these troops, having pushed on in pursuit of the enemy's piquets, came upon the left of their main body, which it had been intended they should turn. The light troops were driven back upon the 43d regt.; and, as soon as the atmosphere became clear, the enemy having perceived that the body which had advanced were not strong, attacked them in a solid column, supported by cavalry and artillery. These troops repulsed this attack, and advanced in pursuit upon the enemy's position, where they were attacked by a fresh column on the left, and were charged by the hussars on their right. They retired, and took post behind a wall, from which post they again repulsed the enemy, and advanced a second time in pursuit of them, and took from them a howitzer. They were, however, again attacked by a fresh column, with cavalry, and retired again to their post,

\* Below the bridge of Sequeiros.

where they were joined by the other brigade of the Light division, consisting of the 2 battalions of the 52d, and the 1st caçadores. These troops repulsed the enemy; and Col. Beckwith's brigade and the 1st batt. 52d again advanced upon them. They were attacked again by a fresh column, supported by cavalry, which charged their right, and they took post in an enclosure upon the top of a height, from whence they could protect the howitzer which the 43d had taken; and they drove back the enemy.

The enemy were making arrangements to attack them again in this post, and had moved a column on their left, when the light infantry of Major Gen. Picton's division, under Lieut. Col. Williams, supported by Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville's brigade, opened their fire upon them.

At the same moment the head of Major Gen. Dunlop's column crossed the bridge of the Coa, and ascended the heights on the right flank of the enemy, and the cavalry appeared on the high ground in rear of the enemy's left; the enemy then retired across the hills towards Rendo, leaving the howitzer in the possession of those who had so gallantly gained and preserved it, and about 200 killed on the ground, 6 officers, and 300 prisoners in our hands.

Although the operations of this day were, by unavoidable accidents, not performed in the manner in which I intended they should be, I consider the action that was fought by the Light division, by Col. Beckwith's brigade principally, with the whole of the 2d corps, to be one of the most glorious that British troops were ever engaged in. The 43d regt., under Major Patrickson, particularly distinguished themselves; as did that part of the 95th regt., in Col. Beckwith's brigade, under the command of Major Gilmour, and Col. Elder's caçadores. The 1st batt. 52d regt., under the command of Lieut. Col. Ross, likewise showed great steadiness and gallantry when they joined Col. Beckwith's brigade. Throughout the action the troops received great advantage from the assistance of 2 guns of Capt. Bull's troop of horse artillery, which crossed at the ford with the Light division, and came up to their support. It was impossible for any officer to conduct himself with more ability and gallantry than Col. Beckwith.

The action was commenced by an unavoidable accident, to which all operations are liable; but having been commenced, it would have been impossible to withdraw from the ground without risking the loss of the object of our movements; and it was desirable to obtain possession, if possible, of the top of the hill, from which the enemy had made so many attacks with advantage on the first position taken by the 43d regt. This was gained before the 3d division came up. I had also great reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Col. Drummond, who commands the other brigade in the Light division.

When the firing commenced the 6th corps broke up from their position at Rovina, and marched towards Rendo. The 2 corps joined at that place, and continued their retreat to Alfaiates, followed by our cavalry, part of which was that night at Soito. The enemy continued their retreat that night and the next morning, and entered the Spanish frontier on the 4th. They have since continued their retreat; and yesterday the last of them crossed the Agueda.

I have the honor to enclose the returns of killed and wounded from the 18th March. I am concerned to have to report that Lieut. Col. Waters was taken prisoner on the 3d, before the action commenced. He had crossed the Coa to reconnoitre the enemy's position, as had been frequently his practice, without having with him any escort; and he was surrounded by some hussars, and taken. He had rendered very important services upon many occasions in the last 2 years, and his loss is sensibly felt.

I sent 6 squadrons of cavalry, under Sir W. Erskine, on the 7th, towards Almeida, to reconnoitre that place, and drive in any parties which might be in that neighbourhood, and to cut off the communication between the garrison and the army. He found a division of the 9th corps at Junça, which he drove before him across the Turones and Dos Casas; and he took from them many prisoners. Capt. Bull's troop of horse artillery did great execution upon this occasion. The enemy withdrew in the night across the Agueda.

The allied army have taken up the position upon the Dos Casas which Brig. Gen. Craufurd occupied with his advanced guard in the latter part of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, having our advanced posts at Gallegos and upon the Agueda. The militia are at Cinco Villas and Malpartida. The enemy have no communication with the garrison of Almeida, from whence they have lately withdrawn the heavy artillery employed in the summer in the siege of that place.

My last report from Cadiz is dated the 13th March. I have not heard from Sir W. Beresford since the 1st inst. At that time he hoped to be able to blockade Badajoz on the 3d.

I learn by letters of the 3d March, received this day from the south of Portugal, that after Gen. Zayas had landed his corps at Huelva and Moguer, the Prince d'Arenberg moved upon Moguer from Seville, with 3000 infantry and 800 cavalry, upon which the Spanish troops embarked again. It is stated that the cavalry had lost some of their equipments.

I have no accounts of a late date from the north of Spain.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing in the several affairs with the French army, from the 16th March to the 7th April, 1811, inclusive.

	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers & drummers.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed . . . . .	3	1	16	8	20
Wounded . . . . .	11	8	128	11	147
Missing . . . . .	1	—	4	1	5

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Formoso, 9th April, 1811.

My dispatch of this date will give you an account of the operations to this day. The enemy's loss in this expedition to Portugal is immense; I should think not less than 45,000 men, including the sick and wounded;

and I think that, including the 9th corps, they may have 40,000 on this frontier.

I enclose a letter which I have received this day from one of my correspondents at Salamanca, which shows the state in which they are. The whole army is dispirited and dissatisfied. Ney left them about a fortnight ago, it is said, in arrest;\* and I understand that the other Generals are equally dissatisfied with Massena's operations. It was reported that they intended to blow up Almeida; and I have taken up this position with the army, because I know the place is ill supplied with provisions; and I am in hopes that I may be able to obtain possession of it in a complete state, by cutting off its communication with this country. It is doubtful, however, that I shall be able to remain here, as I cannot feed the cavalry, owing to the difficulty of procuring means of transport to the army from our magazines on the Mondego, and nothing can be got in the country. I shall remain here, however, as long as I can, and do what I can to obtain possession of this place; but I have recomaitred it this day, and I am very apprehensive that I shall not be able to obtain possession of it, excepting by the wants of the garrison.

I beg your Lordship to send us out more horses, for the cavalry and artillery. We are still in great order; but it must be expected, that after such a march as we have made, and such constant hard service in very bad weather, and with but little food latterly, the horses must fall off; and I am very desirous not to be found in an incomplete state, if we are to be attacked.

I beg that the enclosed letter may not be made public.

Memorandum for Col. Fletcher and the Commissary Gen. Villar Maior, 9th April, 1811.

Col. Fletcher is to give directions that the stores, of which he has given me a list, should be sent by sea to Setuval. I shall write to the Admiral upon the subject. He will make a requisition upon the Commissary Gen. for boats at Setuval, to remove the articles from thence to Alcaccer do Sal, and for carriages to remove them from Alcaccer do Sal to Elvas. The Commissary Gen. will take measures to supply these boats and carriages.

Col. Fletcher will give directions that Marshal Sir W. Beresford may be apprised at what time these articles will arrive at Setuval, Alcaccer do Sal, Evora, and Elvas, respectively. The Marshal is directed to provide an escort for them; but they must not wait for the escort, unless there should be an appearance of danger from their moving without.

To Gen. Bacellar.

Villar Formoso, 10th April, 1811.

I request you to carry into execution the disposition of the division under Col. Wilson, and of your own head quarters, which I communicated to you verbally this morning.

I beg leave to take this opportunity of congratulating you upon the evacuation of your country by the enemy, and to return you my thanks for the assistance which I have received from you in the operations which have been carried on throughout the year, and have been brought to this result.

\* See Appendix, No. XXXVII.

I likewise request you to convey my thanks to Gens. Silveira and Trant, and to Col. Wilson, for the assistance which I have received from each of them; and for the zeal they have manifested in the cause, and the ability with which they have conducted themselves in the arduous situations in which they have severally been placed. I likewise request you to convey to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, who have served under your directions, and under the immediate command of Gens. Silveira and Trant, and Col. Wilson, the expression of the high sense which I entertain of their gallantry and discipline as soldiers, of their patriotism, and of their loyalty to their Sovereign, and my assurances of confidence in the ultimate result of the just cause in which we are engaged, if they, and others in similar situations, continue their exertions, and to act in a manner worthy of the ancient reputation of their country.

As Marshal Sir W. Beresford is at a distance, I make this communication direct to you, and I shall send him a copy of it.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 10th April, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Gen. Bacellar, upon ordering the divisions of militia, and other troops under his command, to cross the Douro, and return to the provinces north of that river.

I recommend that you should insert this letter in the G. O. of the army; and I request you to take the same opportunity of expressing my sense of the services rendered to their country by the several corps of militia, volunteers, and Ordenanza, which did duty in the works constructed between the Tagus and the sea; viz., the militia of Tondella, Viseu, Castello Branco, Covilhã, Idanha, Leiria, Thomar, Santarem, Setuval, Alcacer do Sal, the militia of Lisbon, and the battalions of volunteers of Lisbon.

It is necessary, however, at the same time, to observe upon the conduct of those individuals, both officers and soldiers, who deserted their colors at the period above referred to, when their country was in danger; and I

G. O.

Villar Formoso, 10th April, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the Gen. officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the Commanding officers of regiments, will take pains to prevent the soldiers from committing any depredations in the country.

The soldiers may depend upon it, that the inhabitants will bring nothing for sale, and that they will be deprived of many comforts and conveniences they would otherwise enjoy, if they commit any depredations on the inhabitants.

2. These orders are to be particularly explained to the Portuguese troops, who, the Commander of the Forces is sorry to observe, have been guilty of many acts of plunder. The Portuguese soldiers must be informed that the Commander of the Forces will not allow of this conduct, and that those guilty of it will be punished in the most exemplary manner.

3. The Commander of the Forces desires that the Commanding officers of regiments of Portuguese troops may be directed to oblige their men to keep themselves clean, and to have their clothes and shoes mended. The Commander of the Forces particularly observed the shameful state in which the 3d and 15th regiments are; and he now gives notice that unless there shall be an immediate amendment in the discipline as well as appearance of those two regiments, the Commander of the Forces will turn them out of the army, as being unfit to do duty with the other troops.

4. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers commanding brigades will send one steady soldier as an escort with the mules attached to their brigades, going to the rear for supplies, if the Commissary or Capitaz of the mules should require this protection. The soldier, however, must be made to understand that he goes with them only as a protection, and not to force them to march faster or farther than the Capitaz is inclined to go.

beg you to have the names of the officers, in particular, made public throughout the country, and that those men who have not returned to their regiments, under the amnesty recently published by the government, may be sought for, and punished according to the laws of the country.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 10th April, 1811.

I received your letter of the 2d, and two of the 4th, yesterday evening. I don't understand the subject of either of Blunt's complaints; but I am making inquiries respecting them.

The delay in crossing the Guadiana is most unfortunate, for I see that the French have got plenty of provisions into Badajoz.

I can't understand ——'s division being so reduced in shoes, as I learn that when they marched they had 500 pairs more than they wanted. It is difficult to ascertain which of two roads would wear out shoes fastest; but it is certain that that division has not marched so much in the last month as the whole army on this side; and although these have called out for shoes, they are not yet reduced to the extremity of being unable to make another march, to which ——'s division was reduced on the 22d of last month.

Then, the length of time which the shoes, &c., have been on the road is too bad. Mr. Thompson must be called to account for this delay, for which I shall be held seriously responsible in England, and which may have the most important consequences.

In answer to your letter (No. 2) of the 4th, I agree with you respecting the Lusitanian legion; and I am of opinion that all the new levies ought to be caçadores. I have no doubt whatever, that if the government will exert themselves they might get from the country 50,000 very fine men without difficulty. The villages, in which there are many people, are full of fine young men.

I sent all the arms for the Spaniards to my brother at Seville, excepting some kept for Don Julian, and for Downie's legion. The whole of the latter have been taken by Castaños, excepting 1000 stands, which I am about to give to Downie. But I shall write to England for more arms, and you shall then have those advanced by the arsenal at Lisbon to the Spaniards.

By the routes given to the militia, I rather understand that you mean, not only that they should return to their districts, and remain there embodied, such individuals having leave of absence as require it, but that you have disembodied the whole, and allowed them to return to their homes. I meant no more than the former; because I don't think that affairs are yet in such a decided state as to enable me to say that in the course of 2 or 3 months it may not be necessary to call out the whole again. I am fully aware of the difference of expense to the government; but that can't be avoided, and it is necessary to continue in a formidable state of defence in this country.

It is necessary that measures should be immediately adopted on the following subjects; and I beg you to write your sentiments upon them to the government.

1st; The recruiting the line.

2dly; The recruiting and keeping complete the militia. Trant says

that if this branch were put in the hands of the Capitão Mor, it would succeed better than in the hands of the Colonels of regiments.

3dly; The organisation of the Ordenanza. My opinion upon this subject is, that we ought to revert to the ancient constitution of the country, and make the Capitão Mor the Commanding officer of the Ordenanza. The Capitães Mor ought to be properly selected, and those who have shown themselves unfit for their station dismissed. But in my opinion we gained nothing by changing the title of the Ordenanza into that of guerrilla, and but little by making captains of guerrillas. It was the only expedient at the time by which any assistance could be derived from this class of the population, because the Capitães Mor had fled; but as there is a little leisure now to organise this force, it will be better to place it under the Capitães Mor, according to the ancient practice, and put down those bands of robbers who call themselves guerrillas, and are now plundering the country and our convoys. I will make the government adopt what may be proposed on this subject, provided it does not entail upon them a large expense.

I was in hopes that the return of ordnance at Elvas would have been accompanied by a return of stores in the garrison, by which I should have seen what the garrison could spare for the siege of Badajoz, and we should have been saved the time, the trouble, and expense of sending up the articles of which I enclose the list.

I enclose the list of our ordnance and ammunition at Elvas, which Fletcher thinks ought to be prepared to be taken out for the siege of Badajoz, and a list of stores which I have ordered from Lisbon to Setuval, Alcacér do Sal, and Évora, for that service. It is desirable that you should afford an escort to these stores; and I have directed that you may be apprised when they may be ready to set out from Setuval, and when from Alcacér do Sal.

The French are across the Agueda, and in full march for the Tormes, having left garrisons in Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. I think they intended to attack Trant, &c., on the day before yesterday. They were hanging about the Agueda, and on the 7th, Junot, with the whole, or a large part, of the 8th corps, crossed the Agueda from Ciudad Rodrigo, and came to the Dos Casas above Concepcion. It is said that the 6th corps was there also, and the 2d was certainly at Gallegos. Claparède's division of the 9th was at Junça, and Val de la Mula. I sent a strong patrol of cavalry and light artillery on that day to Almeida, and showed Campbell's division on the high ground above this place. The cavalry fell upon Claparède, who had neither cavalry nor guns, and drove him very handsomely with the light artillery across the Turones and Dos Casas, and then the whole party broke up, and retired in some confusion across the Agueda in the course of that night and the following morning, and they are now all gone from the Agueda.

We have a distant blockade of Almeida, the works of which are as perfect as ever; and I mean that Don Julian should render the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo difficult by the right of the Agueda, while our cavalry shall do it by the left. Both places appear to have small garrisons, and provisions for about a month.

P.S. Fletcher thinks it desirable that fascines and gabions should be prepared for Badajoz.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Villar Formoso, 10th April, 1811.

I have directed the chief engineer to forward to Setuval, in order to be sent from thence to Elvas, certain stores; and I shall be obliged to you if you will afford him the means of removing these stores from the Tagus to Setuval as far as may be in your power, and that you will take such measures as you may think fit to secure their arrival.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 10th April, 1811.

I request you to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to the disobedience of their orders by the civil magistrates, who have not yet returned to their stations.

The whole country is infested by robbers, who plunder my convoys, and have robbed the muleteers attached to the army of their mules. If the civil magistrates don't adopt measures to prevent these outrages, I must, however unwillingly, take upon me to punish those guilty of them.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Villar Formoso, 10th April, 1811.

I enclose copies of my last dispatches to the Sec. of State, which contain all the news from this quarter.

We have given the French some terrible beatings, and they are completely dispirited and disorganised. We have cut off the communication with Almeida, in which place there is a month's provision; and I have desired Don Julian to distress the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, in which there may be as much. I hope we shall be able to stay here, to get at least the first mentioned of these places; but our cavalry are miserably provided with forage, and I cannot afford to lose it.

I enclose a letter which Don Julian has sent me, to which you ought to draw the attention of the Spanish government.

I receive terrible accounts from Col. Walker of Mahy. If it be true, as is stated, that Massena is going to the Douro with his army, Mahy's situation becomes a very important one, and there should be some person in Galicia upon whom some reliance can be placed.

P.S. Arms are wanting to arm Castaños' army, and Downie's legion; and Ballesteros is picking up vagabonds every day, and calling out for arms for them. It would be desirable, therefore, that you should send back to the Tagus some of the arms which I sent to Cadiz, if you should not have disposed of them all.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Villar Formoso, 10th April, 1811.

Since I addressed you on the 20th ult., I have received the proceedings of the council of war at Badajoz, previous to the surrender of that place, which I don't transmit to you, as I conclude that you will receive it from other quarters.

I beg to draw your attention to the extraordinary circumstance, that the Governor Imaz, who called the council of war to deliberate upon the expediency of surrendering the place, delivered his opinion the last, except-



ing Gen. Garcias, and was of opinion that the place ought not to be surrendered. I also request you to observe that my message to Gen. Imaz was not formally communicated to the council of war; and indeed I should doubt if it was communicated to them at all, if one of the members, who voted for the surrender of the place, had not declared that the council had no *official* knowledge of any assistance being likely to be sent to the garrison. I should not trouble you upon this subject, only that as I conceive the surrender of Badajoz at the moment, and in the manner it occurred, to be the most important event of the war in the Peninsula, every circumstance which can throw light upon it is interesting.

Proclamation.\*

10th April, 1811.

The Portuguese nation are informed that the cruel enemy who had invaded Portugal, and had devastated their country, have been obliged to evacuate it, after suffering great losses, and have retired across the Agueda. The inhabitants of the country are therefore at liberty to return to their occupations.

The Marshal General refers them to the Proclamation which he addressed to them in August last, a copy of which will accompany this Proclamation.

The Portuguese nation now know by experience that the Marshal General was not mistaken either in the nature or the amount of the evil with which they were threatened, or respecting the only remedies to avoid it, viz., decided and determined resistance, or removal and the concealment of all property, and every thing which could tend to the subsistence of the enemy, or to facilitate his progress.

Nearly 4 years have now elapsed since the tyrant of Europe invaded Portugal with a powerful army. The cause of this invasion was not self defence; it was not to seek revenge for insults offered or injuries done by the benevolent Sovereign of this Kingdom; it was not even the ambitious desire of augmenting his own political power, as the Portuguese government had, without resistance, yielded to all the demands of the tyrant; but the object was the insatiable desire of plunder, the wish to disturb the tranquillity and to enjoy the riches of a people who had passed nearly half a century in peace.

The same desire occasioned the invasion of the northern provinces of Portugal in 1809, and the same want of plunder the invasion of 1810, now happily defeated; and the Marshal General appeals to the experience of those who have been witnesses of the conduct of the French army during these three invasions, whether confiscation, plunder, and outrage are not the sole objects of their attention, from the General down to the soldier.

Those countries which have submitted to the tyranny have not been better treated than those which have resisted. The inhabitants have lost all their possessions, their families have been dishonoured, their laws overturned, their religion destroyed, and, above all, they have deprived themselves of the honor of that manly resistance to the oppressor of which the people of Portugal have given so signal and so successful an example.

The Marshal General, however, considers it his duty, in announcing

\* See Appendix, No. XL and No. XLL

the intelligence of the result of the last invasion, to warn the people of Portugal, that, although the danger is removed, it is not entirely gone by. They have something to lose, and the tyrant will endeavor to plunder them: they are happy under the mild government of a beneficent Sovereign; and he will endeavor to destroy their happiness; they have successfully resisted him, and he will endeavor to force them to submit to his iron yoke. They should be unremitting in their preparations for decided and steady resistance; those capable of bearing arms should learn the use of them; or those whose age or sex renders them unfit to bear arms should fix upon places of security and concealment, and should make all the arrangements for their easy removal to them when the moment of danger shall approach. Valuable property, which tempts the avarice of the tyrant and his followers, and is the great object of their invasion, should be carefully buried beforehand, each individual concealing his own, and thus not trusting to the weakness of others to keep a secret in which they may not be interested.

Measures should be taken to conceal or destroy provisions which cannot be removed, and every thing which can tend to facilitate the enemy's progress; for this may be depended upon, that the enemy's troops seize upon every thing, and leave nothing for the owner. By these measures, whatever may be the superiority of numbers with which the desire of plunder and of revenge may induce, and his power may enable, the tyrant again to invade this country, the result will be certain; and the independence of Portugal, and the happiness of its inhabitants, will be finally established to their eternal honor.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 11th April, 1811.

I have just received your letters of the 4th and 5th. We are very unlucky certainly in our Guadiana concerns; and I observe that you have still heard nothing of the 15 boats at Jurumenha. In respect to boats from the Tagus, or the Alcacer do Sal river, you surely don't think it necessary to refer to me before you order either the Portuguese authorities, or the British Commissary, to supply any thing of that kind you think the country can furnish.

You have all the pontoons we have, and all that I could prevail upon the Spanish authorities to send out of Badajoz; and I was in hopes that these, with other assistance of *chevalets*, and the boats said to be at Jurumenha, would give you a sufficiently good passage, if the river should not be fordable.

I have always required the Portuguese government to supply boats for the bridges wanted; but if you want them, and prefer to order Mr. Ogilvie to supply them, give him the order.

I have spoken to Mr. Kennedy respecting Mr. Fletcher. He was employed to bake biscuit at Elvas, he being the only person who would undertake this concern for us. If he has not performed that business to your satisfaction, or if he does not conduct himself in any other manner as you wish, let him be deprived of the contract, and of all participation in British concerns.

In respect to your supplies, you are aware of the orders that have been

given; and Abrantes, according to your own desire, has been made your *entrepôt*.

I have ordered carts to be provided in the Alentejo, to be placed in stages on the roads, as I had them when I was on the frontier. I cannot be certain that these will be provided.

I have given notice to the government, and now I give you directions, that if the army cannot be supplied in its operations on the frontier, or in Estremadura, it shall withdraw to its magazines. In respect to Ballesteros, I beg you not to undertake or refrain from any operations in consequence of any movements or designs of his, as he is not to be depended upon for one moment. Be guided by your own view of your own situation, referring to his only as far as it may affect yours, and don't do any thing, or leave any thing undone, because it may affect him or his situation. Depend upon it, he will not operate in conjunction with you.

There is nothing new. The French appear to be off to Salamanca.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 11th April, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th inst., in which you have apprised me that orders have been given by the Portuguese government for the establishment of a flying bridge at Villa Velha. I hope that these orders have been given to somebody who will obey them, as similar orders, given some time ago for the establishment of a bridge upon the Zezere, and the removal of the bridge now at Tancos to Abrantes, have unfortunately been delivered to a person who has not obeyed them, and no steps have yet been taken respecting these bridges.

All the orders referred to in your private letter of the 5th April, to which the enclosed papers refer, have been equally unfortunate. Gen. Pack's brigade are still at Mangualde, waiting for provisions. Col. Pamplona's brigade are near Sabugal, plundering the country and starving; and the Visconde de Barbacena's brigade of cavalry, I may safely say, no longer exist in the shape of cavalry. The horses might as well have been left in the hands of the owners as have been destroyed for want of food. I send this brigade an order this day to go to the rear, as they are absolutely worse than useless, because the Portuguese government have neglected to take measures to provide for the food of the horses or men.

I sent 2 regiments of British dragoons from this army into the Alentejo, in order to render the corps there more efficient, and in the hope that I should have the service in this quarter of 2 efficient regiments of Portuguese dragoons. In this hope I have been disappointed, and this army is deficient in that essential arm, its cavalry; and I have been induced to enter upon a scale of service to which the efficient troops at my disposal are not equal.

I beg that you will inform the Portuguese government that I propose by the next packet to inform His Majesty's ministers that it is my opinion that they cannot with propriety continue to risk a British army in this country, unsupported by any exertion of any description on the part of the Portuguese government.

I beg you also to draw the attention of the Portuguese government to another circumstance in regard to their troops. Their detachments march-

ing through the country have come to the British Commissaries for provisions. I am not authorised to incur these large expenses; and it never was the intention of His Majesty, or of H.R.H. the Prince Regent, that the establishments of Portugal should be allowed by the government to go to ruin, and that no person in the country should do his duty.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 13th April, 1811.

I have received your letters of the 6th and 7th. There must of course be in this part of the country some Commissary to take charge of provisioning the Portuguese troops not fed by our Commissaries, and also of all detachments absent, &c. &c. But besides this, it would be desirable to have some Staff officer through whom I might communicate with the several departments, who would know at least the names of the heads of them, and the orders under which their several duties are to be performed. As things are now, the Portuguese troops with this part of the army, particularly those not fed by our Commissaries, are in a deplorable state; and it is quite impossible for me to enter into the details of their concerns, without having the assistance of one of the Staff of the Portuguese army, which would answer better than the plan I before proposed.

As soon as Arbuthnot comes out, Hardinge ought to come here; and, in the mean time, any native with common intelligence, and a knowledge either of English or French. I see that Fergusson has equipped the Portuguese army, as he did ours, with regimental hospitals, and it is impossible that there can be now a single bed with any corps, or any thing which can enable them to establish any hospital.

There is no movement of this army now, nor can there be any, so long as Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo hold out. As soon as one or other of those places fall, it may be a question what shall be done. In the mean time, there is no reason why the corps should not get their convalescents and recruits. Indeed, if they don't, there will soon be no Portuguese army at all.

From your account of the disposal of the money transmitted to you, I should hope that you will not find it fall short. Mr. Ogilvie must pay for his supplies by bills upon Lisbon, and he must make no difficulties

G. O.

Villar Formoso, 13th April, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that if possible the green corn may not be cut for the horses, &c. belonging to the army, and that they may, if possible, be turned into the grass fields in preference to the green corn. It must be understood, however, that the horses, &c. attached to the army must be fed, and must have the green corn if they cannot get grass.

2. The Commander of the Forces again calls the attention of General officers, commanding divisions and brigades, and the officers commanding regiments, to the necessity of preventing the troops from plundering and molesting the inhabitants of the country bringing articles for sale to the different cantonments.

The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe that the Portuguese troops principally are guilty of this conduct; and if he should receive another complaint of them, he will order that the rolls of every Portuguese regiment in the army may be called over every hour, all officers being present.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the Commanding officers of regiments, will communicate in their several cantonments by patrols constantly going from one to the other, in order to prevent these depredations, which will end in depriving the troops of all the supplies which they now receive from the country.

about doing that which has been the constant practice of this army. The muleteers are equally in arrears with this part of the army. One or two months' pay will, I doubt not, satisfy them, and will not run away with a very large part of the 150,000 dollars already sent. They will not require the whole arrear from October to this time, certainly, and if they did they ought not to get it.

I wrote to you about the boats the other day, and I am glad you have given your own directions on the subject.

I have omitted to mention to you, that some horses for the artillery having arrived, I have ordered to join you 3 English 9 pounders and a heavy howitzer, and four 6 pounders of the horse artillery.

I am very much concerned to hear of the loss sustained by the 13th light dragoons, and particularly of the cause of it.

Gen. Fane will, I fear, not be able to come out again this summer, and I intended Gen. ——— should command the cavalry on the left of the Tagus, conceiving him to be the best we have. He does not appear, however, to have conducted matters much better than others would; and if you think proper to employ Madden with that force, he, as senior, must of course take the command of the whole. I have no General officer to send there, excepting ———, whose presence would not be of much use. I have no arrangement in contemplation for the cavalry on the left of the Tagus, excepting what is now established there.

Waters has made his escape, and is come in; he was ill treated, and would not accept his *parole*.

The French have but little provisions in Ciudad Rodrigo, as well as in Almeida, and I have sent some troops over the Agueda to shut up the former. They certainly, however, will not allow this place to fall, particularly if they keep their army upon the Douro, and I therefore keep nothing on the other side of the Agueda but a light corps, more particularly as that river is not fordable.

I have just seen Mr. Kennedy, and have desired that 30,000 dollars may be sent into the Alentejo for your troops every week.

P.S. I send to Col. Le Cor to go into Lower Beira; but I don't know what he is to do there, till the principle on which the Ordenanza are to be organised shall be established.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 13th April, 1811.

Since I addressed you on the 11th inst. I have received a report from the Governor of Abrantes, that a flying bridge has been placed on the Zezere.

I beg to observe that a standing bridge of boats is required on this river, as specified in my first letter upon that subject.

I request you to urge the government to adopt measures to have the post mules fed at the several stations at which they are fixed. When first the enemy withdrew from their position in Portugal, I gave directions to the British Commissaries to supply the post mules with forage; but it cannot be intended that the British government should defray the expense, or its servants perform the duty of every department of the government in Portugal; and I trust that effectual measures will be adopted by the government to feed the post mules on the several roads, otherwise there must

be an end to all communication between the several armies, and between the armies and the capital.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 13th April, 1811.

I am very much concerned that I cannot allow money to be given by the Commissariat for the use of the Portuguese government without my consent. My first care must be of the British troops, on whom all our hopes depend; and Marshal Beresford is not less ready to cry out when those with him experience any deficiency than he is when the resources of the Portuguese government fail him.

I have but one answer to give to all the statements of the inconveniences resulting from the delays of reference to me, which is, that I cannot be in two or three places at the same time; and if government choose to undertake large services, and not supply us with sufficient pecuniary means, and to leave to me the distribution of the means with which they do supply us, I must exercise my own judgment upon the distribution, for which I am to be responsible. Mr. Dunmore has only to let us know, from time to time, what money he has in his hands, and I shall order issues to be made of it to the chest of 'Aids,' when I find I can do so without inconvenience.

I think that the Portuguese government have misinformed you regarding the tenths upon mercantile property, and regarding the profits of the Wine company. The profits of the latter are, I am told, enormous; and it appears to me that it would be worth while to enter into the details of both subjects.

P.S. I enclose a letter, which Mr. Kennedy put into my hands, regarding the distresses of the people at Barquinha. The Tagus is easily navigable to that place, the Alentejo is only on the other side of the river, and is untouched; surely a good government would not allow the people to starve. It cannot be necessary that I should give the supplies for the army to keep them alive. Mr. Kennedy tells me that he ordered the money to be issued which you had requested to have. The Visconde de Barbacena has just been with me; the magazine from which he is to draw supplies for his brigade is at S. Miguel de Poyares, only 26 leagues distant from hence. This is the notable arrangement by which this brigade is to be kept in order!!

Just direct that a calculation may be made of the quantity of transport that will be required to supply the men and horses of this brigade with their food daily, allowing that a mule will carry 200 lbs., and will go from 12 to 16 miles every day, and see how it is possible that the thing can be done, without the assistance of the carriages of the country. I have desired the Visconde to turn his horses to grass, in order, if possible, to save their lives.

To Major Gen. the Hon. C. Stewart.

Villar Formoso, 14th April, 1811.

I have just received your letter of the 9th, and I am glad to hear of your return. We are blockading Almeida, in which there may be provisions for about a month; and as the French army are gone towards the

Douro, I don't think they are inclined, or able, to interrupt this undertaking.

I am thinking of going to the Guadiana; but I shall certainly return here, and most probably before you could arrive at either place. I hope that you left Lord Castlereagh and Lady Catherine quite well.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Villar Formoso, 14th April, 1811.

I received this morning your letter of the 9th inst. You will find your division in your old quarters, Gallegos, and the sooner you can come up to them the better.

We are blockading Almeida, in which there may be about a month's provisions. The greater part of the French are gone to the Douro.

Memorandum for Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 14th April, 1811.

The enemy having succeeded in getting provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday morning, it is useless to endeavor to blockade that place; and the extension which the attempt would give to the position of the army would invite the enemy to make enterprises upon it. My opinion is, therefore, that we should confine ourselves to the blockade of Almeida, which operation should be given over to Major Gen. Campbell's division and Gen. Pack's brigade; and that the remainder of the army should be so posted as to cover and protect that operation, to get green forage for the horses and cattle of the cavalry and artillery, and to be able to collect the whole in a short space of time, as hereafter pointed out. Orders will be given respecting the positions to be taken by the 6th division, and Gen. Pack's brigade, for this operation.

The enemy have a garrison, it is supposed, of 3000 infantry and artillery, but no cavalry, in Ciudad Rodrigo; being one battalion of the 64th, one of the Irish legion, and the remainder of the 15th of the line, together with some stragglers of different regiments. Before the arrival of the convoy they had a month's provisions.

The main body of the army are gone to the Tormes, and I imagine the larger part to the Duero, about Zamora and Toro, where alone they can be supplied with provisions. A part of the 9th corps still remain upon the Yeltes, and they have barricaded the bridge of Yecla upon that river. It does not appear that they have any thing on this side of it. Although there ought to be no permanent post beyond the Agueda, we should derive great advantage in obtaining intelligence, and drawing supplies from the towns between the Agueda and the Yeltes, if we were to send patrols into that country occasionally of cavalry and infantry, which might stay out a night or two, and then return to this side of the Agueda. Our operations beyond the Agueda ought to be confined to these patrols, which, however, might be made constantly and successively.

In case the enemy should move forward, in order to relieve or interrupt the blockade of Almeida, the following disposition ought, in the first instance, to be adopted.\*

Major Gen. Campbell's division, and Gen. Pack's brigade, to continue in the blockade of Almeida, with the Visconde de Barbacena's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, a part of which should be employed in observation

\* See Appendix, No. XLII.

upon the Aguada, from the point of the junction of the Dos Casas, as far down as its junction with the Douro.

The Light division to defend the passages of the Aguada, viz., the bridge of Barba de Puerco, the ford of Val de Espino, the ford of Sexmiro, the ford of Molino de Flores. The first and last of these only are now practicable for infantry, the last only for infantry and artillery.

The 5th division to remain in its position upon Fort Concepcion, to support the Light division.

The British cavalry, with the exception of those necessary to keep up the communications of the Light division, on the right towards Guinaldo and El Bodon.

The remainder of the army, that is, the 1st, 3d, and 7th divisions, and Col. Pamplona's brigade, in the cantonments near Nave d'Aver.

If the enemy are determined to raise the blockade of Almeida, it is probable that they will move their whole army, or the greatest part of it, upon Ciudad Rodrigo, from whence they would turn the heads of the ravines of the Azava, Dos Casas, and Turon, on which we might take a position to protect the blockade.

If the enemy should make this movement, it would be necessary to raise the blockade of Almeida, so far as to order the 6th division to march by Mealhada Sorda and Villar Maior to Bada-malos, &c.; the 5th division by Nave d'Aver and Aldea da Ponte upon Alfiates; the Light division in different columns by Gallegos, or Aldea del Obispo, upon Nave d'Aver, and thence upon Aldea da Ponte; and the 1st, 3d, and 7th divisions by Aldea Velha, Aldea da Ponte, and Aldea da Ribeira; and the cavalry to a position which has its right upon high ground behind Aldea Velha, and its left extending towards Nave, to which the 5th and Light divisions, and the cavalry, would fall back, as circumstances would render necessary. Gen. Pack's and Barbacena's brigade of cavalry would, in this case, keep up the blockade of Almeida as long as circumstances would permit, and when obliged to retire, they would proceed by the bridge of Cinco Villas across the Coa, &c.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 14th April, 1811.

I return the papers which you sent me from Blunt, which I acknowledge that I don't understand. It appears that he has some complaint against Mr. —, the Commissary; but I don't understand of what nature it is, nor what is the crime of which Mr. — has been guilty, or how the Portuguese government can have lost a large sum of money by the conduct of Mr. —.

In respect to the other complaint regarding the conduct of the master of a ship at Peniche, I beg to observe that I have nothing to say to it. Gen. Blunt should specify whether his complaint is of a King's ship, or a merchant ship, and what authorised rule of the port was infringed. The complaint should then be forwarded to the British minister, who would settle it with the Portuguese minister. I have nothing to say to His Majesty's ships, or even to the merchant ships attending upon this army.

In all these points, however, Gen. Blunt should take care that his rules, if not authorised, are at least reasonable, and have some foundation in



public convenience, as it will not do to call on Mr. —, who is performing a public service at Peniche, or the master of a vessel who may be proceeding on his voyage to Figueira or Oporto with provisions or stores for the army, to attend to rules which have no foundation in reason or public convenience, and are dictated solely by the caprice of an individual.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 14th April, 1811.

I received yesterday evening the copy of your letter of the 9th, which came by Villa Velha, and I am concerned to find that matters are not going on according to your wishes. I had hoped that before you wrote you would have been relieved from Mr. —.

Sir W. Erskine did not send a detachment over the Agueda in time, as I had desired him, and the consequence was that the French got their convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday morning. At all events I was not very sanguine of the result of the blockade of that place, and indeed had determined not to make it in any strength; and now it is useless to keep any body on the other side of the Agueda, excepting for the sake of food and observation. I confine myself, therefore, to the blockade of Almeida; and as this is a simple operation, which I don't think the enemy have the means or inclination to interrupt, I propose to go over to you, and if I can, I shall set off to-morrow morning.

I see that Gens. Stewart and Craufurd and Lieut. Col. Arbuthnot are arrived; as soon as Arbuthnot reaches you, it would be very desirable to send Hardinge here.

To C. W. Flint, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 14th April, 1811.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 12th March. Besides the application from Mr. Keogh, of the 2d Jan., in favor of Mr. Plunket, I received another from him of the 8th Dec. (which I have not got by me) in favor of a Mr. G. Johnston, to obtain an Ensigncy, to which I wrote the answer of which I enclose a copy. To my answer of the 12th Jan., I received the enclosed reply of the 4th Feb., with a letter from Lord Kingsland, recommending Mr. G. Johnston for an Ensigncy.

I suspect that all the letters from Mr. Keogh to me have been forged, and that the recommendation from Lord Kingsland has been forged, as well as the recommendation from Lord Fingall in favor of Mr. Plunket. If that is the case, it is probable that my letter to Mr. Keogh of the 12th Jan., of which I enclose the copy, was opened by the person who forged his letters to me. I request you, therefore, to enclose all these letters to Major Sirr, with this and the letter from Lord Fingall to you of the 7th March, which I return, and desire Major Sirr to see Mr. Keogh, and communicate them to him. Mr. Keogh will then see that his letter to me of the 12th Jan. must have been forged, and consequently that a suspicion attaches to any other letter which he may write to me, or which may be signed by his name; and he will, I am convinced, excuse me for requesting that he will inform Major Sirr whether he wrote to me on the 8th Dec., and on the 4th Feb., forwarding a recommendation of Mr. G. Johnston by Lord Kingsland.

The circumstances which will be disclosed to Mr. Keogh by the perusal of those papers will probably induce him to take measures to prevent his name from being signed to papers of this description in future.

To Brig. Gen. Howorth.

Sabugal, 15th April, 1811.

I received last night your letter applying for leave of absence for Capt. —; and, considering all that has passed respecting officers absent on leave from the army on active service, I was in hopes that I should have been spared the pain of considering whether an officer ought to be allowed leave or not, from any private concern, however important.

However, as I am called upon to decide this application, I answer, that I hold you responsible that there are with the 9 pounder brigade the required number of officers of the proper rank; and as soon as this is the case, I have no objection to your allowing Capt. — to quit his duty with that brigade. He may be absent from the army for 6 weeks, but of course he cannot expect to join the 9 pounder brigade again.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Sabugal, 15th April, 1811.

I am going into the Alentejo, but intend to return to the army in less than 3 weeks.

Your bătman, Smith, has charge of a mare of mine at Celorico, which has had the fever in her feet. I understand that she is nearly well, and if that should be the case, and you want Smith, I shall be obliged to you if you will allow the mare to go with your horses, and allow her to stand in your stables till I shall return.

Au Capt. Gen. Don F. X. Castaños.

À Sabugal, ce 15 Avril, 1811.

Je suis arrivé ici aujourd'hui, et j'ai reçu votre lettre du 13. Je suis en route pour l'Estremadure, et je compte arriver à Elvas le 20, où je serai bien aise de vous rencontrer; mais en attendant que j'aie le plaisir de vous voir, je ne veux pas perdre un moment pour vous prier d'envoyer quelqu'un en Galice qui soit capable, et digne de votre confiance pour remplacer le Général Mahy.

Il y a plusieurs mois que j'ai eu des renseignements sur son compte que j'ai envoyés à Cadix, et sur lesquels j'ai souvent causé avec le Marquis de la Romana et Alava; et nous sommes convenus qu'il était urgent qu'il fut remplacé. J'ai reçu dernièrement encore des lettres de cette partie là,

G. O.

Villar Formoso, 15th April, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers commanding those divisions not employed in investing Almeida or on the duty of the outposts, will exercise the troops under their command occasionally. It is particularly desirable that the soldiers should be kept in the habit of marching, and the Commander of the Forces requests the attention of General officers commanding divisions, to the orders which have been issued regarding route marching.

2. As soon as the states of the stores will admit of it, the Com. General will complete the reserves of biscuit with the several corps, and the Commander of the Forces requests the Commanding officers to adopt some regimental arrangement for taking care of what will be issued by the Commissaries of Brigades for the soldiers, and to deliver to them only the quantity for their daily consumption till they shall be ordered to march.

3. Lieut. Col. Waters is appointed to act as an assistant in the department of the Adj. General till the pleasure of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent shall be known.

dans lesquelles on me dit que tout le monde se méfiait du Général Mahy, et qu'on crie pour qu'il soit bien vite remplacé.

Quoique les Français soient excellens militaires, leurs nécessités et leur politique mensongère les forcent souvent à adopter des plans militaires qui ne conviennent pas du tout à leur situation; par exemple, l'expédition de l'Andalousie, et celle du Portugal.

En pensant à ce qu'ils doivent faire dans les circonstances actuelles, je trouve qu'ils feront l'invasion de la Galice avec le corps de Bessières, pendant que Massena donnera du repos à ses troupes dans les cantonnemens occupés jusqu'à présent par les troupes de Bessières. Ou ils feront cette opération, ou ils se joindront pour tomber sur mon corps sur la frontière de la Castille, ce qui n'est pas très vraisemblable; ou ils ne feront rien jusqu'à ce que les troupes de Massena soient reposées et remises en état, quand ils rassembleront une grande armée dans l'Estremadure.

En tout cas, et surtout dans le premier, qui est le plus vraisemblable, il est urgent d'avoir un bon commandant en Galice sans perdre un moment de temps. Ainsi, nommez le, et envoyez le à Lisbonne; et quand je vous verrai, ou en route, j'écirai à l'Amiral pour lui donner un vaisseau de guerre pour le conduire à la Corogne.

Je vous parlerai d'autres choses quand j'aurai le plaisir de vous voir.

J'ai laissé mes troupes occupées du blocus d'Almeida, qui j'espère va se rendre. J'aurais fait la même chose pour Ciudad Rodrigo avec la droite de l'armée, mais par un malentendu on a laissé entrer un convoi dans cette place. A quelque chose cependant malheur est bon; les Français ne m'auraient pas permis de prendre deux places à la fois, et peut-être m'auraient forcé à lever les deux blocus. En tout cas, je n'aurais pu quitter l'armée dans ce moment ci, et je n'aurais pas eu le plaisir de vous voir de sitôt.

P.S. Je vous suis bien obligé des lettres interceptées. Le chiffre est une grande acquisition.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Sabugal, 15th April, 1811.

I write by a messenger of Castaños, to let you know that I am so far on my way towards you. I shall be at Castello Branco on the 17th, at Portalegre on the 19th, and at Elvas on the 20th.

I enclose a letter from Gen. Picton, which deserves your attention. There is a letter from Pack, whom I have at last got up to the army, proposing to have a brigade hospital near him. Is this consistent with your hospital regulations?

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Sabugal, 15th April, 1811.

I am so far on my way to the Guadiana. I received yesterday your letter of the 10th. The papers which you enclosed contain no particular complaints against our Commissaries; but if they did, I should doubt their being well founded.

We suffer very much now from having had any thing to do with the Portuguese army in the way of river transport last year. Boats and carts were delivered to our Commissaries, and they delivered a proportion to the Portuguese. These were never paid for, and the consequence is increased difficulty in getting any this year. You will see from my official

letter of this day that there is reason to believe that there is misapplication, at least, of the funds supplied by Great Britain for the payment of the army.

I beg that the French prisoners may not be employed on any works on the left of the Tagus.

P.S. I shall send the mail from Castello Branco on Wednesday, or from Niza on Thursday.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Sabugal, 15th April, 1811.

I beg you will inform the Governors of the Kingdom that I have this day received a report from Col. Pamplona, stating that his brigade is still without bread.

I likewise beg leave to draw your attention to a fact which was communicated to me this morning by Col. Le Cor, viz., that the officers of the Portuguese army have not been paid since the month of January last; and those particularly who have not the good fortune to be fed by the British commissariat, are suffering distresses of a description to which officers ought not to be subjected. But this is not the only view in which this subject deserves your attention. His Majesty granted a subsidy to the Prince Regent for the pay of 30,000 men, officers included; and an additional sum of £130,000 *per annum*, to make up certain additional pay, not only to the officers of 30,000 men, but to all the officers of the Portuguese army. Besides the pay of the 30,000 officers and soldiers, the estimate included a certain sum for their provisions. If this statement be correct, it is obvious that the sums paid in subsidy for the months of February and March have been misapplied. This is a subject which requires serious inquiry.

Although I have always been ready to bear testimony to the disinterested and upright views of the Governors of the Kingdom, and sincerely believe that they have no concern in the misapplication of the sums paid in subsidy to purposes different from those for which they were granted, I have not the same good opinion of the person employed in the pay department of the army; and, adverting to the general distresses of the government in all its branches and departments, I don't hesitate to acknowledge that I believe the misapplication of the sums received for the subsidy in February and March to have been corrupt.

At all events, it is absolutely necessary that the whole arrear should be paid forthwith; and I shall hereafter call for a return of the periods to which both officers and soldiers are paid.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Pedrogão, 16th April, 1811.

I arrived here this day, but have not yet heard either from you or from Beresford. I have a letter from Castaños of the 13th, who was appointed to command in Galicia, as well as in Estremadura, &c. Blake was come out of Cadiz to command in the Condado de Niebla.

The inhabitants have returned to this part of the country, and I find that I can go with my own horses from Elvas to any part of our cantonments in 3 days, leaving my baggage behind. So that, supposing a communication from you should be 48 hours going to Elvas, I should be with you in 60 hours after I should receive it.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will tell Waters that I beg him to send trusty people to Zamora and Toro, and likewise to Alba de Tormes, Ledesma, and Salamanca, to bring back information what regiments (stating the number of each) are at each place. It would be desirable that he should station a person at Zamora, to come off to him with all expedition when the troops there should move.

In respect to your position, it is obvious that so long as we can maintain ourselves upon the line of the Dos Casas, the enemy cannot interrupt the blockade of Almeida. But if we move from Nave d'Aver, the enemy has the choice of attacking us in the new position pointed out to you, or of relieving Almeida. I should wish you, therefore, not to be in a hurry to take up the position behind Aldea Velha. The necessity for taking it up at all must depend upon the enemy's strength; and if his strength should be such as to render it desirable that you should take it up, which it is probable that it will, your movement should be delayed till it is quite certain that the enemy propose to turn your right. This delay may be made with great safety, as there are many good roads leading to the ground pointed out.

In case there should be any difficulty in the movements of the 5th and 6th divisions, or of that part of the Light division which will be on the left in consequence of the delay, these troops might cross the Coa at the ford of Junça, or at the bridge of Castello Bom, and proceed along the left bank of the Coa, by the bridge of Sequeiros, or to the ford of Rapoula de Coa, where they could cross again, and take their places in the line. All these roads should be well reconnoitred by the Staff officers, without stating for what object.

I believe it would be necessary that the guns attached to the divisions which might cross the Coa should march along the great road which runs between the Turones and the Coa to Aldea da Ponte, if they should not be in time to be able to march on that which is between the Turones and Dos Casas. If this should be the case, (and it must be observed that the guns with both these divisions are Portuguese 6 pounders,) it will only be necessary to draw them towards Nave d'Aver in time, and to leave the divisions without their guns for a few hours.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

Pedrogão, 16th April, 1811.

As I was coming through Villar Maior yesterday, Col. Le Cor informed me that his Portuguese brigade, in the 7th division, had not received bread for 6 or 7 days till yesterday, when the people of the village of Bismula were baking a day's bread for them. I had understood from you that all the troops were supplied regularly with bread; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will inquire from Mr. Gauntlett how this matter stands.

If there should be hereafter any deficiency in this or any other division, I don't think it ought to fall exclusively upon the Portuguese troops. As we have engaged to supply them, we should do so equally with our own, or alter our arrangements, and throw them back again upon the government. I am in hopes, however, that it will turn out that this deficiency has been exaggerated; and I shall be obliged to you if you will

furnish me with the means of stating what quantity of bread particularly this brigade has had from the 1st to the 15th April.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B. Castello Branco, 17th April, 1811, 2 P.M.

I have not yet heard from you; and I conclude that you did not find it necessary to write to me till last night. I have heard from Beresford, and I hope that by this time he has Olivença.

In case you should wish to communicate any thing to me, and to be quite certain that it reaches me as soon as it can, I recommend to you to send a Staff officer, on his own horses, to Sabugal, and to order him to proceed on with the horses of the guides by the following route from Sabugal:

Memoa, leave Penamacor on the left.	Sarnadas	10 miles.
Pedregão,* from Sabugal about 27 miles.	Villa Velha, across the Tagus	10 ..
S. Miguel d'Arche . . . 8 ..	Niza . . . . .	11 ..
Escalhos de Cima . . . 10 ..	Portalegre . . . . .	24 ..
Castello Branco * . . . 10 ..	Elvas . . . . .	36 ..

\* Thus marked there are guides; and I shall hereafter let you know the detail of the road from Niza, and where the guides will be found. If he should be able to procure mares or post mules, he should not take the horses of the guides; and if he does take them, he should not press them above a league an hour, as they will not be able to carry him these long stages if he does.

P.S. I received last night your letter of the 16th, and am much obliged to you. I conclude that the rain of yesterday has reached you, and puts out of the question all possibility of crossing the Agueda by either side.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B. Castello Branco, 17th April, 1811.

I received this morning the original of your letter of the 9th, that of the 10th, and your letter of the 13th. I have heard nothing from the army since I left it on the 15th.

I shall draw up a memorandum of my notion of the operations of all the armies, from Galicia to the Condado de Niebla, which I will send to Gen. Blake. In the mean time it is desirable that he should not commit his corps; and that Ballesteros should not commit any part of it for him. He ought to move upon Seville, the possession of which place will of itself raise the siege of Cadiz, if Soult should move upon you. Gen. Blake should be prepared with boats, &c., for the passage of the Guadiana.

I recommend to you to construct 2 good redoubts on your ground at Badajoz, as a security to your stores, &c., in case you should be obliged to collect your army in consequence of the movements of the enemy to disturb the siege. These might be executed at the same time with the other works of the siege. I shall be at Elvas on the 20th.

P.S. The 14,000 pairs of shoes should be carried to account against your estimate; they will be charged to the regiments at, I believe, 6s. 6d. each pair.

The detachments of cavalry, &c., which you have out, should be extremely vigilant, and the officers should adopt every measure in their power to procure intelligence, besides those of a military nature, such as

patroles, &c. I am afraid that the Spaniards in Andalusia and Estremadura are very tired of the war, and averse to its continuance and its existence in their own country, if they are not positively attached to the French cause, and we must expect that they will give intelligence to the enemy.

The officers of the Castello Branco militia have just been here, and have informed me that their men are in want of provisions. I understood that the militia never received provisions in their own towns; and if that is the case, it should be explained to this regiment without loss of time.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Niza, 18th April, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose you a letter, and its enclosure, addressed to Lieut. Col. Bathurst, which Lord FitzRoy Somerset has received from Brig. Gen. Blunt. I am concerned to observe that Brig. Gen. Blunt conceives that he has reason to complain of any officer of the British army, and that he should on that account have been induced to make use of intemperate language to Mr. —\*; and although I have hitherto received no complaint from Mr. —, I think it will save trouble, and be most satisfactory, if I consider and decide upon the subject of Brig. Gen. Blunt's statement.

Brig. Gen. Blunt is in the Portuguese service, and as such he commands, under an appointment from Portuguese authority, in the fort of Peniche. His British commission, while he is in the Portuguese service, lies dormant, notwithstanding that his rank in His Majesty's service continues progressive. Mr. — is a Dep. Assist. Commissary, appointed to take care of stores lodged in the fort of Peniche by my order, and he is liable to all the orders of the British army, and of the British government, for the abuse or waste of stores, and every misapplication of them.

It is a difficult and delicate task to define how far a person in Mr. —'s situation is bound to obey the orders of the governor of a Portuguese fort in which he may be stationed. Probably the safest line to be drawn would be to say that Mr. — ought to obey every order which the Portuguese governor was authorised to give him. Here the question arises whether the Portuguese government was authorised in any manner, or by any circumstances, to order Mr. — to make an issue of provisions from the stores under his charge, contrary to the orders of the army, to those of the Treasury, and of all his superiors in the department to which he belongs. I should think that even Brig. Gen. Blunt himself, when he divests himself of his character of a British officer (and even as a British officer he has no such authority), will decide this question in the negative. In fact, if it were otherwise, it would not be in my power, as Commander of the British army, to lodge stores in any fort or place in which a Portuguese officer should command, to the great inconvenience and detriment of the service.

Under these circumstances it is in my opinion desirable that Brig. Gen. Blunt should endeavor to conciliate Mr. —, and to prevent the complaint from coming forward.

\* This Commissariat officer was afterwards dismissed the service.

Cristoval, on the night of the day the materials shall be in deposits on the ground.

7. As soon as the British troops shall be in possession of San Cristoval, the flying bridge placed below the junction of the Caya to be brought to a station above the town, and, if possible, below the junction of the Gevora; and with this view it is recommended that the fords and passages of the river above the town should be well reconnaitred as soon as the place shall be invested.

8. When the British army shall be in possession of San Cristoval, Picurina, and Pardaleras, Marshal Beresford will determine upon the point at which he will attack the body of the place. It is believed, however, that, upon the whole, one of the south faces will be the most advantageous.

Memorandum to the Officers in command of Corps in Estremadura.

Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

The corps of allied British and Portuguese troops, under Marshal Sir W. Beresford, being about to be employed in the siege of Badajoz, it is desirable that the Spanish troops in Estremadura, the Condado de Niebla, and Andalusia, should co-operate in and protect that operation.

It has been reported, and there is reason to believe it to be true, that the enemy have fortified their magazines and establishments at Seville; and therefore no diversion which might be threatened, or even attempted upon that city, will have the effect of drawing off the enemy's attention from the measures which he must adopt to relieve Badajoz. If that relief should be attempted, therefore, it will be by the whole force which the enemy can bring from the blockade of Cadiz, and from his several corps in Andalusia, Granada, &c., and it must be resisted by the whole force of the allies *en masse*; and the following plan is proposed for the consideration of the Spanish General officers.

Sir W. Beresford's corps will carry on the operations of the siege; and it is requested that Gen. Castaños will aid him with 3 battalions to work in the trenches.

In case the enemy should endeavor to interrupt the siege, and Sir W. Beresford should think proper to fight a battle to save it, he will probably collect his troops in the neighbourhood of Albuera. It is proposed that the troops under the Conde de Penne Villemur should observe the enemy towards Guadalcanal, reporting all that passes daily to Marshal Sir W. Beresford. In case the enemy should advance in force, the Conde de Penne Villemur should retire by the road of Usagre, Villa Franca, Almendralejo, &c., to the left of the position of the allied British and Portuguese army, ascertaining and sending daily intelligence of the enemy's force and movements.

It is proposed that the troops under Gen. Morillo shall continue to occupy Merida, and observe all that passes towards Almaraz and the passages of the Tagus. In case of the advance of the enemy, Gen. Morillo should break up, and march by Lobon, and be prepared to join the allied British and Portuguese army, either by Talavera la Real or by a more direct route.

It is proposed that, during the siege of Badajoz, Gen. Ballesteros shall



venient to other services, 2 more companies of the Staff corps may be sent to this country.

As I understand that there are no people of the description of pontoneers belonging to the service, I beg leave to recommend that 10 warrant artificers may be sent with the pontoons which I have requested for the service in this country; who will be employed to superintend the persons who must be hired in Portugal to attend them.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Niza, 18th April, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Major Gen. A. Campbell, the Colonel of the York light infantry volunteers, in which he desires permission to send to England 50 recruits belonging to that regiment enlisted from deserters from the enemy's army.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Niza, 18th April, 1811.

When I was lately making arrangements for sending to England the transports which had been till now attached to this army, I felt myself under the necessity of detaining a certain number to contain the heavy baggage of the several regiments in this country. This consists principally of arm chests, for containing those arms of which the regiments have none in this country, and therefore don't require the arm chests; of the baggage of individual officers, which is useful, and even necessary, to them in stationary services or cantonments, but which they cannot carry with them in the field; and of the overplus of the stores belonging to the Colonels of the regiments after the clothing has been issued to the effectives in Portugal; and for regiments of cavalry of the same articles, and some saddlery. The greatest part of these articles might be sent away, without putting the officers and troops to any inconvenience. There is no doubt but that transports are the most expensive stores that could be found. But adverting to the possibility that the British government might think it proper to order that the army should quit this Kingdom at a time when the troops should be at a distance from Lisbon, I did not think it proper to expose the British subjects residing in that capital to the insults of the mob, and the regimental baggage to the risk of being lost by their resistance to its embarkation.

It is very desirable, however, that this army should be relieved from this baggage; and I beg leave to recommend that a depôt in England may be appointed for receiving the heavy baggage of every regiment in this country, to which it should be sent.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Niza, 18th April, 1811.

Having made arrangements for the blockade of Almeida, and having reason to believe that the enemy's army will not be in a situation for some time to attempt to relieve that place, even if they should be so inclined, I have taken advantage of the momentary discontinuance of active operations in that quarter, to go into Estremadura to the corps under Marshal Sir W. Beresford, and I have got thus far on my way. Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer remains in command of the corps on the frontiers of Castille.

Nothing of importance has occurred in that quarter since I addressed

your Lordship on the 9th inst. The enemy retired entirely from the Agueda; and it is reported that some of their troops had gone back as far as Zamora and Toro, upon the Duero. This report, however, has not been confirmed.

They had sent one convoy from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo; and Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer informs me that the second had since arrived, of whose departure I had heard from Salamanca, before I quitted the army on the 15th. But as I could not pretend to blockade both Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, without crossing the Agueda, and exposing the army to great difficulties for want of subsistence (as the communication across the Coa and Agueda would have been very precarious), and the line which we should have taken up would have been long and weak, and the blockade of both places exposed to be interrupted, I have thought it best to confine my attention principally to the former; and to endeavor to interrupt the enemy's communication with the latter only when circumstances should render it convenient and advantageous. I have also learnt from Sir B. Spencer, that since my departure they have occupied San Felices el Grande with a body of troops; but I imagine it was with the intention of protecting the march of the last convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo.\*

Marshal Sir W. Beresford was not able to effect his passage across the Guadiana as soon as he had expected, and the enemy have introduced some provisions into Badajoz and Olivença. Sir W. Beresford's advanced guard crossed the Guadiana on the 4th, and I am concerned to report that a squadron of the 13th light dragoons, which were on piquet under Major Morris, were surprised on the night of the 6th by a detachment of the enemy's cavalry from Olivença. I have not received the return of the loss upon this occasion; but I am informed that the whole squadron, with the exception of 20 men, were taken prisoners. The enemy have since retired, as I am informed, entirely from Estremadura, leaving small garrisons in Badajoz and Olivença. Marshal Soult is stated to be at Seville, and it is said that Marshal Mortier has gone to Cordova. Marshal Sir W. Beresford has taken a position to invest both Badajoz and Olivença, and by a letter of the 13th, I learn that he expected on the 14th to open his fire upon the latter from six 24 pounders. I hope that Olivença will not be able to hold out long; but the attack of Badajoz, which I intended should be made by Sir W. Beresford's corps, will be a more serious operation.

A detachment from the 5th army, which is now commanded by Gen. Castaños, is, I understand, at Merida.

Since I last addressed your Lordship, Gen. Zayas had again landed the troops under his command, and had again embarked them, and returned to Cadiz. Gen. Ballesteros' division alone, therefore, continues in the Condado de Niebla; but, by a letter from Mr. Wellesley of the 11th, I learn that Gen. Blake was himself about to come into the Condado de Niebla, to take the command of Gen. Ballesteros' division, and the troops which had been under the command of Gen. Zayas, and which were to return to that quarter. The whole corps will amount to 12,000 men, of which 1100 are cavalry; and Gen. Blake had expressed an anxious desire to co-operate

\* See Appendix, No. XLI.

with Marshal Sir W. Beresford. Gen. Castaños has been appointed to command the army in Galicia, as well as the 5th army, lately the army of the left, commanded by the late Marques de la Romana.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Niza, 18th April, 1811.

I don't know exactly what quantity of provisions they have in Almeida. The garrison is said to consist of 1400 men. We shut them up on the 6th, and from all that I have heard, they must have had then about a month or 6 weeks' bread, and from what I have seen of their cattle, fresh meat for the same period. The place had some salt provisions in it when it was surrendered, and I think it probable\* that some may still remain. The French certainly intended to abandon the place and blow it up; and they are now mining it for that purpose. At the same time, I think it probable that they believed that they could never again communicate with the garrison, as they are generally foreigners. Much will be gained to get them out of the place, but still more to get the place entire for the Portuguese government.

In Ciudad Rodrigo there is a good garrison, and we certainly shall not get that place without a siege; for which God knows if we shall have time before the enemy will be reinforced. The first object is certainly Badajoz, and, as soon as I shall know whether any or what part of our train is required for the attack of that place, I shall send the remainder to Oporto, and make all the arrangements for the eventual attack of Ciudad Rodrigo.

I cannot yet tell how matters stand at Badajoz; but I understand that the garrison is very weak, and I should hope that it would not hold out long. It does not appear that there is any chance of the place being relieved, unless the enemy should determine to raise the siege of Cadiz and quit Andalusia.

I propose to be at Elvas on the 20th, and to be back again in Castille by the end of the month, or in the first days of May.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Elvas, 20th April, 1811.

I arrived here this day, as I intended. I have not heard from you since I received your letter of the 16th. Beresford has taken Olivença, and he has since advanced to the south as far as Zafra and Los Santos. At the latter place he had an affair with the enemy's cavalry, in which he took 160 prisoners without sustaining any loss. He has gone too far to the south; and I have written to remind him of his object and to urge his early return.

P.S. Any officer you may send to me will find horses at Castello Branco, Niza, Portalegre, and I believe at Assumar, or at S<sup>a</sup> Olaya. The distances are from Castello Branco to the Tagus,

Villa Velha	. 20 miles.	Assumar	. 12 miles.
Niza	. 11 ..	S <sup>a</sup> Olaya	. 14 ..
Portalegre	. 24 ..	Elvas	. 10 ..

There is an officer of guides, and by this time guides, at Castello Branco, Niza, and Portalegre. But the officer of guides has been left to forward your letters by messengers, if the guides should not have arrived at their stations.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 20th April, 1811, 3 P.M.

I have received your 4 letters of the 18th, for which I am much obliged to you. In regard to the first, I hope that I shall have an opportunity of talking over with you the subjects to which it relates, and it is useless to write upon them at present.

I congratulate you upon the surrender of Olivença, and entirely concur in the directions which you gave that the garrison should have no terms; and I hope that they were well plundered by the 4th division. I shall see Capt. Squire and Major Dickson immediately; and if I can, I shall go to-morrow to Jurumenha, and, if I can get anything to cover me, I shall take a look at Badajoz.

I hope that you will be able to return; but if you cannot, I shall write to you my opinion upon the several points which occur to me, in regard to the siege of Badajoz, which is your principal object. I cannot venture to stay long away from the frontiers of Castille, and I shall return to that quarter as soon as I shall have looked about me here. I cannot pretend to give directions at this distance. My opinion is, that you are too far advanced for your object, and the sooner you come back the better. But it is impossible for me to judge whether you can with propriety come back immediately. I refer you to what I wrote in a late letter respecting Ballesteros. The scrapes into which he or any of them will get themselves must not be suffered to induce you to depart one *iota* from the plan which you will deem the best to secure your object, which is Badajoz.

P.S. I have seen Major Dickson and Capt. Squire. I find from the former that every thing stops in respect to the ordnance, till the army shall invest the place; he would then begin to move the ordnance and stores from Olivença to the park, and, having moved these, he would use the means of transport to move what he should require in addition from hence.

Capt. Squire says that he has intrenching tools in sufficient quantities to begin, and that it is desirable that the place should be invested, as well to commence the work as to obtain possession of a pine wood, about a league and a half from Badajoz, and to set the people to work in it. This is desirable also, in order to fix the bridge in its new situation. There will be no protection for it till the place shall be invested.

Will you let me know whether there are at Lisbon any 24 pounders and carriages, or any 24 pound shot, in order to replace what are taken from hence for the siege? If there should be none, those of our train must be sent up, which will cripple us for other operations.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 21st April, 1811, 8 A.M.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received your letter of the 16th.

Let me know as soon as you can whether the Portuguese arsenal have any 24 pounder shot, and whether your 24 pounder shot will fit their guns; also respecting the 24 pounder guns for Elvas.

It is reported here that the French have again got a post in Talaverilla. I shall sleep at Olivença to-morrow night.

P.S. You will have seen Austin's letter of the 13th. I see that Soult is fortifying Seville, which is a serious event, as affecting our operations at Badajoz. It is therefore more urgent that not a moment should be lost

in commencing them. The mode of co-operation by Blake and Balles-teros becomes a matter of importance.

P.S. Since writing the above I have received your letter of the 20th, from Almendral. Your letter of the 9th certainly put me in movement sooner than I intended; and when I received your letter of the 13th I was on the point of returning, and I should have returned, if I had not thought that, upon the whole, it was better that I should come and see things here myself.

If I can get over the ford to-morrow, I propose to go and look at Badajoz, and to sleep at Olivença. If I can get over the ford I shall go to Olivença by Jurumenha. I shall be at the ford at 7 o'clock. I have sent directions to Gen. Alten to move out of Olivença in the morning, in order to cover the reconnaissance on Badajoz, and to send a squadron of cavalry to meet me at the ford.

2d P.S. Since writing the above I have received your 3 letters of the 19th.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Elvas, 21st April, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th; and, having perused the enclosures, I observe that they consist, as usual, of orders from one department to another, of principal to deputy, and of deputy to his inferior, but no report of obedience or execution.

In respect to the bridges at Abrantes and Punhete, I cannot say, from personal inspection, how they stand; but I write to the Governor of Abrantes, and I expect to have a report immediately. Having had occasion to pass the Tagus at Vilha Velha a few days ago, I can state that there is no bridge there; that a few ferry boats had been collected there from the neighbouring ferries by my desire; and that the boats which had been sent up there by the Governor of Abrantes had been abandoned by their owners.

In answer to Dom M. Forjaz's letter of the 16th inst., I have to observe that, as usual, he has been misinformed of the real state of the affairs on which he has written. The magazines in Upper Beira are not waiting in the Mondego for want of water carriage. As I informed you in my letter of the 13th inst., the magazines are at S. Miguel de Poyares, which is as high as the Mondego can carry them, and they are there waiting for means of land transport to the troops between the Coa and the Agueda.

I conclude that it will now be discovered that the British Commissaries take all the land transport; and any excuse will be admitted and brought forward rather than adopt the only remedy, which is to dismiss and punish those who neglect their duty, and don't bring forward the means of transport which exist in the country, and which are necessary to provide for the subsistence of the army employed in its defence. But I beg to put an end to this excuse, by informing you that the British Commissary Gen. has purchased the means of transport with which he supplies the troops on the frontiers of Beira, and has none from the country.

I observe that the Governors of the Kingdom are now aware of the difficulties which exist in maintaining the war upon the frontier, as they order their minister to declare that it is impossible to supply troops sta-

tioned at such a distance, which troops consist of one brigade of cavalry and 2 brigades of infantry.

The Portuguese translation of the arrangement of the month of June, 1809, regarding the Commissariat affairs of the two nations, is erroneous; and I shall send you a copy of the English original, which you will see does not state that detachments of Portuguese troops passing through the cantonments of the English army shall be provided from the English magazines, but only that when detachments of the troops of one nation are supplied from the magazines of the other, what price shall be paid for each ration.

The demands of which I complained were not for troops passing through British cantonments, but for troops passing through towns in which magazines were forming for the use of the allied army on the frontier; which magazines were so far consumed by detachments starving, because the means had not been provided to supply them on their march. One of the consequences of this mode of transacting business is, that the convalescents from the hospitals, and recruits for the regiments on the frontier, never reach their destination.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Elvas, 21st April, 1811.

I have not written to Lord Liverpool on the subject on which I told you I should, because I was desirous of giving the concern a farther trial before I should communicate an opinion to government which would certainly put an end to it. Besides, I think it not impossible, but that if we adhere strictly to our objects, and carry on our operations in conformity to directions and plans laid down, we shall preserve our superiority over the French throughout the campaign; particularly if they should be involved in disputes in the north of Europe. But I am decidedly of opinion that, unless the Portuguese government alter their system entirely, it will be impossible for the British army to remain in the country, if we are not able to preserve the superiority; and I should incur a very serious responsibility if I did not communicate that opinion to the Regent's ministers. Has any magistrate been yet punished or even dismissed from his office for neglecting his duty? Has any alteration been made of any description in the old system of allowing every booby to do as he pleases, provided only that he cries '*Viva*,' and attends the levees of the members of the government and of the ministers? Have any of the really efficient measures been adopted which have been recommended, either to bring money into the treasury, which is most wanted; to raise recruits for the army or militia; or to render the former a force efficiently equal to its numbers; or to force the latter to attend to their duty? A fresh invasion would find us exactly where we were last year; and I don't think it would be safe to trust the King's army in this country, after such discouraging circumstances, and after the experience which the enemy have acquired of the country, its roads, &c. &c.

However, although affairs are in a very bad state with the Portuguese part of us at present, they are worse with the French, and the opinion would not at this moment be true, and therefore I shall not communicate it; and I will send it to you, to be shown to the Regency when I shall do so.

I am afraid that we have lost some valuable time here; and I am come here principally to put matters in the right road; and to come to an understanding with Castaños, and, if possible, with Blake, respecting our future operations.

*The A.G. to Major Gen. Picton, 3d division.*

22d April, 1811.

In reference to your communication of the 11th inst., and enclosures from Major Gen. Colville and the officer commanding the 5th regt., relative to a prolongation of the leave of absence of Paymaster —, of that battalion, I am to acquaint you that indulgence was granted in consequence of those letters, and in the expectation that Mr. — should avail himself of the time so given to retire, should he continue after that period unequal to perform the duties of the appointment he held in His Majesty's service. The memorial of Paymaster — has, by my Lord Wellington's command, been transmitted to the Commander in Chief's office through the Military secretary.

Memorandum to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B. Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

Marshal Beresford will receive with this memorandum the copy of one drawn for his use, and that of the Chief Engineer, and Commanding officer of Artillery.

During the siege of Badajoz his object will be to place his troops in such situations as that they will be best able to carry on the operations, and to join, in case the enemy should attempt to relieve the place. If the enemy should make the attempt, Marshal Beresford will consider of, and decide upon, the chance of success, according to a view of the relative numbers of both armies, and making a reasonable allowance for the number of Spanish troops which shall co-operate with him in any attack which the enemy may make upon him. If he should think the enemy too strong for him, with the assistance which he will know that he will have from the Spanish troops, he will retire across the Guadiana, and thence, if necessary, towards Portalegre, taking the position of the Caya and Portalegre successively.

If Sir W. Beresford should think his strength sufficient to fight a general action, to save the siege of Badajoz, he will collect his troops to fight it. I believe that, upon the whole, the most central and advantageous place to collect his troops will be at Albuera. If the enemy should attempt to turn his left, in order to march upon Badajoz by Talavera, he has his choice between attacking them in that operation, or marching by his own left, along the Talavera rivulet. If they attempt to turn his right, he has the same choice, or to march by his right upon Valverde, and place his right upon the Valverde rivulet.

All this must of course be left to the decision of Sir W. Beresford. I authorise him to fight the action if he should think proper, or to retire if he should not.

If the enemy should advance, different measures must be adopted in respect to the operations of the siege, according to the state in which they

G. O.

Alameda, 22d April, 1811.

1. Lieut. Gen. Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart., having rejoined, will take the command of the cavalry and the advanced posts of the army. The Lieut. General will be pleased to report the cantonment in which he shall establish his quarters.

2. Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, Bart., will assume the command of the 5th division of infantry.

will be when the enemy shall make the attempt to relieve the place, and according to Sir W. Beresford's intentions of fighting the battle, or not.

Sir W. Beresford is aware of the degree in which Elvas will be dismantled of ordnance and stores, in order to make the siege of Badajoz; and therefore, if he should determine, in consequence of the enemy's strength, not to fight the battle, it will be necessary that he should make every effort to send back the ordnance and stores to Elvas before he shall raise the siege.

If it should be necessary, and he should determine to fight the battle before he shall have obtained possession of Fort San Cristoval, it will be necessary that he should send back from Fort San Cristoval to Elvas all the ordnance and stores collected there, and afterwards by degrees, from the ground on the left of the Guadiana, the ordnance and stores collected there; keeping on the latter, if possible, only what could be drawn away at one trip by the cattle and other means in his possession.

If he should determine to fight the battle after he shall have obtained possession of San Cristoval, he should leave there the ordnance and stores necessary and sufficient to command the passage of the Guadiana by the bridge of Badajoz; and on the left of the Guadiana, what can be removed at one trip by the cattle, or other means in his possession; and all the rest should be moved to Elvas.

If it should be possible, a redoubt, or 2 redoubts, should be constructed on the ground on the left of the Guadiana, in which 1000 men could remain in safety from the attacks of the garrison during the absence of the army, and 200 or 300 men in the works at San Cristoval.

I intend to propose to Gen. Castaños the following plan of co-operation with Sir W. Beresford for the troops composing the 5th army, as well as those under Gen. Ballesteros, and eventually of Gen. Blake; and to request that Sir W. Beresford may be informed whether they will, or not, perform what is herein pointed out.

1st; That, during the siege of Badajoz, the troops under the Conde de Penne Villemur should be pushed as far forward as they can go with safety towards the enemy, taking care not to engage in any affair of importance; and to send Marshal Beresford regular daily reports of their position, numbers, &c., and of all circumstances that may occur. The Conde de Villemur might be towards Llerena, Guadalcanal, &c., and should fall back, in case of the advance in force of the enemy, by the road of Usagre, Villa Franca, Almendralejo, &c., to the left of the position of the army, ascertaining and sending daily intelligence of the enemy's movements.

2dly; That Gen. Morillo should occupy Merida, and observe all that passes towards Almaraz and the passages of the Tagus. In case of the advance of the enemy, he should break up, and march by Lobon, and be prepared to join the army either by Talavera la Real or by a more direct route.

3dly; That Gen. Ballesteros should have his quarters at Burguillos, and communicate with the Conde de Penne Villemur, and observe the roads from the southward through the Sierra by Fregenal and Monasterio, taking care not to involve himself in any serious affair, and sending daily information to Sir W. Beresford of all that passes. In case the enemy



should advance, Gen. Ballesteros should retire by the road of Barcarrota upon Valverde, in order to join upon the right of the army.

4thly; That when Gen. Blake's corps shall land, it should take its station at Xerez de los Caballeros; and if the enemy should advance, it should fall back by the same road as that pointed out for Gen. Ballesteros.

5thly; That the troops of the several nations and *corps d'armée* shall be commanded by their several chiefs, but acting upon this or any other plan of co-operation that may be agreed upon; but that when the whole shall join, in consequence of the advance of the enemy, the whole are to be under the command of the officer of the senior rank in the army.

Memorandum to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B., Col. Fletcher, and Major Dickson.  
Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

1. The cutting tools having been sent to Olivença this morning, a body of troops to be stationed to-morrow morning in the wood between Olivença and Badajoz to cut materials.

2. As soon as a sufficient quantity of materials shall be cut, Badajoz to be invested on the right, as well as on the left, banks of the Guadiana.

3. If the weather should become settled before the materials shall be cut, the place to be invested, as stated in article 2d, as soon as the weather shall be so settled as that the troops may be kept out without inconvenience. The importance of the early investment of the place will be observed from what follows hereafter.

4. On the day the place shall be invested the following measures to be adopted:

i.; The flying bridge to be fixed on the Guadiana, below the junction with the Caya.

ii.; The guns and stores, for which there are conveyance, to be moved up from Olivença to the station fixed upon for the formation of the dépôt on the left of the Guadiana.

iii.; The engineers' stores to be moved from Olivença, Elvas, and Jurumenha, to the same place, and to the place fixed upon for the dépôts on the right of the Guadiana, in their due proportions.

iv.; The materials made at Elvas, Campo Maior, &c., for which there may be conveyance, to be moved to the ground fixed for the dépôt of stores on the ground on the right of the Guadiana.

v.; The materials prepared at Olivença, in the wood, and at all places on the left of the Guadiana, to be moved to the ground on the left of that river.

vi.; The ordnance and stores, which there may be means of moving, to be sent from Elvas to the ground on the right of the Guadiana.

5. On the day after the place shall be invested the carriages and cattle to return to Elvas from the stations on both banks of the Guadiana, for more ordnance and stores, and to go back to those stations respectively with the proportions of ordnance and stores required to complete each, on the 3d day; and the same to be repeated on the 4th and 5th day from the investing of the place, till all the ordnance and stores required shall be collected in the proper deposits.

6. Ground to be broke for attacks on the Pardaleras, Picurina, and San

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

Niza, 18th April, 1811.

I have received your letter, enclosing one from Lord Harcourt, relative to the appointments of the 16th light dragoons; and, having consulted with the General and Commanding officers of regiments of cavalry, I am decidedly of opinion that it is desirable that not only the 16th light dragoons, but all the regiments of cavalry, should be supplied with cloth overalls by the Colonels, instead of leather breeches, the Colonel giving to the dragoon a compensation in money equal to the difference in price between the overalls and the leather breeches to which he is now entitled.

In consequence of communications with the same authorities, I likewise beg leave to recommend that the Colonels of regiments of cavalry, serving in this country, may be directed to supply the men with strap ankle boots, instead of long or hussar boots, particularly after they shall have supplied them with overalls. The dragoons are almost constantly booted, and if they should have an opportunity of taking off their boots to dry them, they can do it without incurring the risk of tearing off the heel. It is besides to be observed, that these boots will not only be more convenient to the dragoon, but a saving to the Colonels of regiments of cavalry, in an article of which the expense of the wear and tear on service must greatly exceed the allowance made for purchasing it.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Niza, 18th April, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Major Gen. *Baron Low*, in which he applies for allowances for Capt. Schlutter, whom I have permitted him to employ as his extra aide de camp.

In order to prevent the growth of expense, and, if possible, the applications of General officers to employ extra aides de camp, I have made it a rule that those extra aides de camp only, who have received the permission of the Commander in Chief to be employed as such, shall receive the allowance of *bât* and forage, &c. It is impossible for me to depart from a rule which I have made myself; and I request the Commander in Chief to decide whether he will give his sanction to the employment of Capt. Schlutter as his extra aide de camp by Gen. Low, otherwise he will not receive the allowance of *bât* and forage, &c.

To Col. Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

Niza, 18th April, 1811.

I beg to inform you, that it is my opinion that Mr. Dep. Commissary Gen. — is not fit to be employed as a Dep. Commissary Gen. with this army, owing, according to my opinion, to his incapacity for the performance of the duties of his office in an active situation, and his want of success.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Niza, 18th April, 1811.

I beg to refer your Lordship to the last weekly statement sent from this country, in which you will see the strength of the detachment of the Staff corps with this army. Adverting to the services on which this army may possibly be employed in the course of this year, and to the great utility of the Staff corps, I beg leave to recommend that, if it should not be incon-

have his quarters at Burguillos, and communicate by his left with the Conde de Penne Villemur, and observe the roads through the Sierra by Fregenal and Monasterio, taking care to involve himself in no serious affair, and sending daily information to Sir W. Beresford of all that passes.

In case the enemy should advance, Gen. Ballesteros should retire by the road of Barcarrota upon Valverde, in order to join upon the right of the army.

When Gen. Blake's corps shall land, it is proposed that it should take its station at Xerez de los Caballeros; and, if the enemy should advance, it should fall back by the same road as that pointed out for Gen. Ballesteros.

It is proposed that the troops of the several nations shall carry on these operations under the command of their several chiefs, of course communicating with each other constantly, as above proposed; but in case of joining for the purpose of giving battle to the enemy, it will be necessary that the whole should be under the orders of the officer of the highest military rank.

The Spanish General officers are requested to state to Sir W. Beresford whether they will, or not, co-operate with him in the manner above proposed in carrying on the siege of Badajoz, and what the number is of the effective men of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, under their several commands.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th inst., in which you have enclosed one of the 15th inst. from Dom M. Forjaz, complaining of the conduct of certain British soldiers near Alemquer, supposed to be employed to press cars. As repeated orders have been given in the British army to prevent the employment of soldiers in this manner, I conclude that these soldiers are marauders from some regiment, or detachments on their march. I have, however, to inform you that, upon inquiry, I find that no British regiments or detachments have been in that neighbourhood since the army broke up from the Rio Maior river; but as I am very desirous of punishing and preventing such conduct, I request that the person who has made this complaint may be called upon to state on what day, or nearly at what time, the occurrences took place of which he complains, and, if possible, the uniform worn by the soldiers.

To Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th inst. I have directed a portion of the officers of the Chasseurs Britanniques to be detached to Cadiz to do duty with the men belonging to that regiment who are there; and I will send to Cadiz clothing, &c., for those men whenever the clothing shall arrive in the Tagus; and I request you to detain at Cadiz this detachment, and to continue to make it do duty with the battalion of detachments which you have formed there, still, however, considering it as part of the Chasseurs Britanniques. Besides this detachment, there is one nearly of the same numbers at Lisbon, belonging to

the same regiment, which I shall send to Cadiz if the Commanding officer of the regiment should be desirous that it should join the regiment with the army. You will do well to keep the recruits, not already attached to the Chasseurs Britanniques by orders from head quarters, disposable for the orders of the Commander in Chief, but doing duty in the battalion of foreign detachments which you have formed.

I am concerned to observe that we have found the deserters from the French army, enlisted into our ranks, very much inclined to return again to the French army, even when they knew that the French soldiers were enduring hardships and privations to which it might have been supposed that the human frame was not equal; and for this reason I think it probable that the Commanding officer of the Chasseurs Britanniques will think it desirable that these recruits, which are now detained at Lisbon for want of clothing and accoutrements, should not join the regiment while employed in a situation near the enemy, from which they may have it in their power easily to desert.

I attribute this disposition of all foreign recruits to desert from our armies to the regularity of system and to the strictness of discipline which exist, and which must be upheld, in order to keep a British army in the field in a state of efficiency for any length of time. They prefer the profits they derive from the plunder they acquire on their marauding parties, even though attended by extreme labor, and hardships, and privations, to the plenty and comfort of the British army, accompanied as these must be by regularity of habit and by the maintenance of strict discipline; and their desertion is frequently very inconvenient, as affording to the enemy the only information which he could acquire.

Under these circumstances, I am not desirous of increasing the number of foreign troops with this army, although I think that every thing ought to be done that is possible to distress the enemy, by enticing his foreign troops to desert; and that when these have deserted they should be equally well treated with our own troops, and formed into battalions, and prepared for service in stations in which they would not be exposed to the same temptations, and would not have the same facilities, to desert again, as they must have in an army close to the enemy in the field.

In respect to prisoners of war, I have already more in Portugal than I know how to take care of; and the Admiral in the Tagus has received positive orders from the Admiralty to send home neither prisoners nor deserters. I have remonstrated to the Sec. of State on the inconvenience of this order; and if I should obtain leave to send any to England, I shall relieve you from some at Cadiz.

I beg to refer you to my letters to Mr. Wellesley for an account of the state of affairs in this quarter.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

I received your letters of the 6th and 10th inst., and I enclose copies of my dispatches to government.

I have come here to set matters going in this quarter, and to endeavor to gain some advantage from the operations of the Spanish troops. Our first object will be the siege of Badajoz, which I hope will begin imme-

diately. I have not yet seen Castaños, but I expect him this day, or early to-morrow morning. As soon as I shall have conversed with him, I propose to set out again for the frontiers of Castille, where the French appear to intend to attempt the relief of Almeida. I shall of course send you a copy of any memorandum, or any other arrangement, which I may make with Castaños, for the support to be given to the troops in the siege of Badajoz.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 6th and 10th inst.

When you first apprised me of the possibility that the command of the Spanish armies might be offered to me, I considered it my duty to inform the Sec. of State of this circumstance, and to request to be made acquainted with the sentiments of His Royal Highness' government respecting the line which I should adopt in regard to this offer, if it should be made. The answer which I received from the Earl of Liverpool disapproved of my acceptance of the offer; and I now lament that the constant occupation which I have had since I received his letter prevented me from making you acquainted with its contents, which would have saved you the pain, which you must have felt in your recent discussions upon this subject with the Spanish government. Besides, I acknowledge that I never imagined that the proposition would be made which you had expected; and it appeared to me to be useless to write to you to convey the opinion of His Royal Highness' ministers upon an offer which it was probable would never be made. I beg you will make the use which you may think proper of this communication.

Although I have not yet had any personal communication with Gen. Castaños, I have had every reason to be satisfied with him, and I hope for the best effects from his appointment.

It is impossible for me to enter into the military convention proposed by the minister of Foreign affairs, having no authority from H. R. H. the Prince Regent to make such a convention. I propose, under the instructions which I have received, to carry on such military operations as may be in my power, adverting to the means of the enemy compared with those at my disposal. I shall communicate confidentially, as I have hitherto invariably done, with the Spanish officers and authorities in the neighbourhood of the seat of the operations of the allied British and Portuguese armies, and shall continue to recommend to them such operations and measures as may accord with my views and may forward the general cause. They will be the best judges of the expediency of attending to the counsels and suggestions which I shall make to them; and I can only say that, whether they do or not, I shall continue to do the enemy all the mischief which the means at my own disposition will enable me to do him.

Au Capt. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

à Elvas, ce 24 Avril, 1811.

J'espérais que j'aurais eu le plaisir de vous voir et d'avoir une conférence avec vous pendant que je serais dans ce pays ci, mais je suis obligé de retourner en Castille demain matin.

J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer un memoire en Anglais, détaillant le

plan d'opérations que je proposais pour le corps allié Anglais et Portugais sous les ordres du Chevalier Beresford, et la manière dans laquelle il me paraissait que la 5<sup>me</sup> armée et les corps Espagnols, sous les ordres du Général Ballesteros et du Général Blake, pourraient co-opérer dans ce plan, pour la considération de votre Excellence et des autres Généraux Espagnols.

Malheureusement, le pont que le Maréchal Beresford avait construit sous Jurumenha a été emporté hier au soir par la crue des eaux de la Guadiana; et comme il n'y a plus de gué dans la rivière, le Maréchal n'a plus de communication avec cette place, sans laquelle il ne pourrait ni subsister en Estrémadure ni faire le siège de Badajoz; et sa position deviendrait fort critique si le résultat d'un combat lui était désavantageux.

Je viens donc de lui envoyer ordre de placer son corps de telle manière qu'il pût avoir sa communication avec la rive droite de la Guadiana par le pont de Merida, tenant toujours la place de Badajoz bloquée autant que les circonstances le lui permettront, et qu'il reprenne le plan du siège de Badajoz aussitôt que la communication avec Elvas serait rétablie ou par un pont ou par de gués de rivière.

C'est malheureux qu'on n'ait pas écouté les suggestions que j'ai souvent faites qu'on envoie le pont de bateaux de Badajoz à Elvas.

Je vous prie de faire savoir à M. le Maréchal Beresford si la 5<sup>me</sup> armée, et les corps du Général Ballesteros et du Général Blake, se conformeront aux opérations indiquées dans le mémoire inclus, quand le Maréchal sera dans le cas d'entreprendre le siège de Badajoz. En attendant, je crois que les troupes de la 5<sup>me</sup> armée feraient bien de se tenir en étroite communication avec celles sous les ordres du Maréchal Beresford, et de suivre les mouvemens de celles ci.

Comme les corps sous les ordres des Généraux Ballesteros et Blake paraissent être destinés au service du Condado de Niebla, je ne sais pas quel plan il faut leur proposer. Comme quelque tems se passera probablement avant que le Maréchal puisse entreprendre le siège de Badajoz, il se pourrait que l'ennemi envoyât des troupes en Estrémadure du côté de Madrid ou de la Vieille Castille; et dans ce cas là il serait nécessaire que le Maréchal Beresford dépassât la Guadiana pour conserver la communication avec le corps allié Anglais et Portugais qui est sur la frontière de la Castille. Ce mouvement pourrait contrarier les vues des Généraux Ballesteros et Blake, à moins que ceux ci ne se déterminent à passer la Guadiana aussi, et puis à reprendre leur position dans le Condado de Niebla en repassant cette rivière à Mertola.

J'écris à votre Excellence ce qui est possible, pas ce qui est très probable; mais dans les opérations militaires il faut tout considérer; et je serais fâché si les vues des Généraux Ballesteros et Blake étaient contrariées par les effets d'un plan que je leur aurais proposé. Il me paraît donc qu'il n'y aurait pas d'inconvénient à ce que ces Généraux conservassent leurs positions dans le Condado de Niebla jusqu'à ce que le Maréchal Beresford soit en état de pouvoir attaquer Badajoz, et qu'alors ils se portent dans les positions indiquées dans le mémoire inclus.

Le Maréchal Beresford m'a montré ce matin une lettre du 23, de la part du Comte de Penne Villemur, dans laquelle cet officier demande le

secours de la cavalerie Anglaise. Si on soutient le Conde de Penne Villemur, il faut le faire en force suffisante, pour ne pas perdre la supériorité que nous avons gagnée; et alors voilà un autre objet pour nos opérations. Dans les opérations militaires il est rarement possible de faire deux choses à la fois: par exemple, de faire le siège de Badajoz, et de donner du secours au Conde de Penne Villemur dans une position avancée qu'il a prise pour couvrir le pays des courses de l'ennemi. Il faut abandonner ou l'un ou l'autre objet; et il vaut mieux retirer un peu le Conde de Penne Villemur, et abandonner pour le moment un peu de pays aux courses de l'ennemi, que d'interrompre les opérations du siège de Badajoz. Je dis qu'il vaut mieux retirer un peu le Conde de Penne Villemur s'il est sérieusement menacé, ce que j'avoue ne me paraît pas.

En même tems que le Conde de Penne Villemur demande du secours à Llerena, le Général Morillo en demande et en a reçu à Merida, qui est un point plus important à conserver que Llerena.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 24th April, 1811.

I enclose 2 memorandums which I had drawn for your attention, pointing out the operations which I wished you to carry on with a view to obtain possession of Badajoz, and in the event of the enemy attempting to relieve that place during your operations against it.

The floods of the Guadiana, however, having last night carried away the bridge which you had constructed under Jurumenha, and as it is probable that some time will elapse before you can construct another, on which you can rely for your communications with the left bank of the river, and before the river will again be fordable, it will be necessary that you should place the troops under your command in such a situation as to keep up their communication with the right bank by the bridge of Merida; and that you should defer your operations against Badajoz till you shall have established a more direct communication across the Guadiana with Elvas, either by bridge or ford.

I request you in the mean time to blockade Badajoz as strictly as may be in your power, consistently with the object of preserving your communication with the bridge of Merida, and continue all your preparations for the siege, and when the period comes when you may have it in your power to undertake it, to attend to the suggestions in the enclosed memorandums, as far as the circumstances of the moment may agree with those which exist at present. It will be necessary that you should place the heavy artillery and stores which are at Olivença out of reach of danger from any movement of the enemy.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have written to Gen. Castaños, with a memorandum for his consideration, which I beg you to peruse and forward to him.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Elvas, 24th April, 1811.

I send you with this the official letter and memorandum, and letter, &c., for Castaños.

I have received a letter from Sir W. Erskine, in which he desires to command your cavalry till Fane comes out. You will find him more

intelligent and useful than any body you have. He is very blind, which is against him at the head of cavalry, but very cautious. Let me know whether you would like to have him, as soon as you can, and send the letter after me.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

Elvas, 24th April, 1811.

I received this day your letter of the 21st, yesterday that of the 20th, and yesterday at 2 A.M. that of the 19th, Capt. Brown having been 80 hours on his journey.

There is nothing new here. I shall set out to-morrow morning on my return; and, as it appears to me that the enemy cannot attempt any thing against you in the existing state of the Agueda, I shall go by the same stages by which I came here.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Elvas, 24th April, 1811.

I write only to let you know that I shall return to head quarters to-morrow, and shall be obliged to you if you will write to me there. I shall send my letters for England from Portalegre to-morrow, and beg you to give charge of them to Col. Reynell.

*The A.G. to Capt. O'Kelly, 11th regt., Celorico.*

24th April, 1811.

By command of Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, I am to acquaint you that 2 Spanish priests, a surgeon, and a servant, who are named in margin and accompany the bearer, are to remain at Celorico till further orders. You will please to cause them to be regularly supplied with rations and properly billeted. These persons are severally to understand that they are not to leave the precincts of the town. They are to be at their quarters at 7 in the morning, 1 P.M., and 9 at night, at which hours they are to be visited by the Provost. In failure of these instructions you are to take such measures as you may think necessary to prevent their escape.

To Vice Adm. the Hon. G. Berkeley.

Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 14th inst., in which you have transmitted one from the Lords of the Admiralty, relative to the return to England of the battalion of Royal Marines doing duty in the citadel of Lisbon, under Major Williams.\* As their Lordships have been pleased to refer you to my opinion whether they can be spared, I have to inform you that their services can be spared from Lisbon, although it will be very inconvenient to part with them just at present; but as I conclude that Sir T. Williams has sailed some time ago, I recommend that you should detain them for some time longer, till I shall receive the orders of the Sec. of State regarding the disposal of the force in this country.

The Royal Marine artillery might be sent away without inconvenience, whenever you please.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

I enclose 2 intercepted letters sent me by Gen. Castaños, which are worth your perusal. I shall send you to-morrow their plan of Badajoz, with the plan of their attack upon the place.

I beg you will not forget to send me, as soon as possible, Hardinge, or

\* The late Col. Sir R. Williams, K.C.B.



some other Staff officer who has intelligence, and to whom I can talk about the concerns of the Portuguese army.

To Lieut. Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

The services which Col. Murray has rendered to the army in their recent operations induce me, most earnestly, to request that you will recommend him to the Commander in Chief, to be made a Brigadier General in the Peninsula.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

I have the honor to inform you that since I last addressed you I have been in Estremadura; from whence I am now on my return to the troops stationed between the Agueda and the Coa.

I have the honor to enclose the report of Marshal Sir W. Beresford on the surprise of a squadron of the 13th light dragoons, on the night of the 6th inst., together with a return of the loss upon that occasion.\*

Sir W. Beresford employed the 4th division, under the command of Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, in the attack of Olivença, which place surrendered at discretion on the 15th inst. I have the honor to enclose the report of Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole† and Sir W. Beresford, together with the terms of capitulation which he had proposed to the Governor, and his answer; and returns of ordnance, arms, &c., and prisoners taken in the place.

As Sir W. Beresford deemed it desirable to oblige the enemy to retire from the province of Estremadura entirely before he should commence his operations against Badajoz, he moved forward with this view, while Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole was engaged in the attack upon Olivença, as well as to give support and protection to Gen. Ballesteros' division of Spanish troops, which had been obliged to retire from Fregenal successively upon Xerez de los Caballeros and Salvatierra on the 13th and 14th inst., by a division of French troops under the command of Gen. Maransin. The Marshal marched on the 15th to S<sup>ta</sup> Marta, and on the 16th to Los Santos,

\* Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B., to Marshal Gen. Visct. Wellington.

Juramenha, 8th April, 1811.

It is with much regret that I transmit to you the enclosed return of the loss of men and horses, on the morning of the 7th inst., a little before 4 o'clock. It was occasioned by the cavalry piquet, composed of the regiment which has suffered the loss, allowing itself to be surprised; and which I cannot account for, as I had and gave information during the preceding evening of the meditated attack. The commanding officer of the piquet being a prisoner, he has it not in his power at present to assign the cause for this surprise, and I can only therefore say that it was so complete, that although fully informed of the probability of such an attempt, even no alarm was given by this piquet; and we had no information of the enemy's advance till he was amongst our infantry piquets, in front of our line. However, we being prepared, and the enemy finding us so, he immediately retired, leaving a few horses killed, and at daylight he was out of sight and had retired to Olivença.

	Major.	Lieut.	Troop serj. major.	Trumpeters.	R. & F.	Horses.	Mules
Prisoners...	1	1	1	2	49	65	2
Wounded...	—	—	—	—	3	—	—

† Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole to Marshal Sir W. Beresford.

Olivença, 16th April, 1811.

My letter of yesterday by my aide de camp, Capt. Roverea, will have informed your Excellency of the surrender of this place, the particulars attending which

where the British and Portuguese cavalry fell upon a body of the enemy's cavalry, took 160 prisoners, and killed and wounded a great many.

I enclose Marshal Sir W. Beresford's report of the 18th inst.\* of these

had deferred stating to prevent any delay in your receiving this information. I have now the honor to report, that on the night of the 12th inst. (the morning of which your Excellency left the camp) we took possession of an enclosed innetta which the enemy had left unoccupied in front of the San Francisco gate, and distant from the curtain about 250 yards. As the only entrance into the work was through a gate in rear of it, much exposed to a fire of musketry from the place, we were under the necessity of making another passage for the artillery at the outward angle, which was executed, and a breaching battery of 4 guns completed on the evening of the 13th, and I had hopes, as I stated in any letter to your Excellency of that day, that we should have been able to have got the guns into it in the course of the night, but in which I was disappointed; for notwithstanding every exertion was made on the part of Major Dickson, of the Portuguese artillery, it was found impossible to effect it, from the badness of the road and the circuit they were obliged to take to avoid the fire of the place. We were, therefore, under the necessity of deferring it until the following night, as the lunette was too much exposed to the fire of the place to attempt it during the day.

Having succeeded in getting the guns into the battery during the night, and got every thing ready before daybreak on the 15th, and also established 2 flanking batteries of field pieces, I sent a summons to the Governor, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose with his answer, which being a refusal to accept the terms I offered, our fire immediately commenced, and was returned with some spirit from the town. At 11 o'clock a white flag was hoisted by the enemy, and an officer came out with a letter from the Governor, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose with my answer and the Governor's reply, to which I sent none, and recommenced our fire. After a few rounds a white flag was again hoisted, and they surrendered at discretion, and the Franciscan gate was taken possession of by the grenadier company of the 11th Portuguese regt.

The choice of the situation of the batteries, and the expedition with which they were completed, do great credit to Capt. Squire's (chief engineer) judgment and activity; and I am free to say that it has been principally owing to his exertions, and those of Major Dickson, that I am indebted for the speedy surrender of the place; and I feel great satisfaction in saying that the conduct of the Portuguese artillery employed in the breaching battery was highly creditable. To the fire kept up by the British light companies, and the Rifle companies of the 60th and Brunswick regts., under Majors Pearson and Birmingham, and the flank companies of Col. Harvey's Portuguese brigade, I principally attribute the trifling loss we sustained. I have the honor to enclose the return of the casualties, as also of the ordnance found in the place, and of the number of prisoners taken.

\* Marshal Beresford to Marshal General Vise. Wellington. Zafra, 18th April, 1811.

I had the honor of communicating to your Lordship from Albuera, in my letter of the 12th, my arrival at that place, and your Lordship will have seen that I was then preparing all things for the attack of Badajoz, the object of your Lordship's instructions; and which place was, by my occupation of Valverde, Albuera, and Talavera, completely shut in from receiving any succours. The division of the enemy which had retired before me was at Llerena, having advances as far as Los Santos, and drawing resources from Zafra and the neighbouring towns.

On the 14th my aide de camp Dom José de Sousa, whom I sent to communicate with Gen. Ballesteros at Fregenal, returned to me with the information that a French division had on the 13th appeared in front of Fregenal, and had obliged Gen. Ballesteros to fall back on Xerez de los Caballeros; and on the 14th he was obliged to quit this place and to retire to Salvatierra, the enemy occupying Xerez. By the movement of this division of the enemy it was obviously uninformed of the change of circumstances in Estremadura, and I determined in consequence to advance on S<sup>ta</sup> Marta and Zafra, to endeavor to cut it off; at all events to prevent its junction with those at Llerena, and in hopes that this forward movement would induce the latter to fall back and leave us Estremadura and its resources during the siege of Badajoz.

On the 15th I marched with the 2 divisions of infantry of Major Gen. the Hon.

operations, in which your Lordship will observe that the cavalry conducted themselves with the utmost steadiness and good order.

The enemy having retired to Guadalcanal, and the corps with Gen.

W. Stewart and Major Gen. Hamilton and the Cavalry division to S<sup>te</sup> Marta; and Olivença surrendering on that day, the 16th, I directed Major Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole to leave a small garrison in Olivença, and Brig. Gen. Madden's brigade of cavalry to prevent any marauding parties from Badajoz, requesting Gen. Castaños to occupy Talavera, and with the remainder to march to S<sup>te</sup> Marta whilst I advanced to this place. The Brig. Conde de Penne Villemur was at Villa Franca with 400 or 500 cavalry, and as many infantry of Gen. Castaños' troops. I arrived here about 11 o'clock A.M., and shortly afterwards I was informed by a Spanish officer of *Tiradores a Cavallo*, that his company was engaged with the enemy's cavalry a little in front of Los Santos, in the rear of which we had halted till the bivouac for the troops could be arranged. The officer reported the number of the enemy to be from 800 to 1000. I immediately mounted my horse, and ordered the cavalry to mount and advance, wishing to prevent the enemy observing us, as our arrival was clearly unknown to him. I went on the hill above Los Santos, and saw distinctly the enemy, and that his force was only cavalry, and not exceeding 600. Gen. Long had orders to advance and attack him. The enemy got possession of Los Santos, from whence he first observed us, and immediately began his retreat. We, however, came up with him a little beyond Los Santos, where, in fact, he had waited, and he was there found in squadrons in close column of a quarter distance. He attempted to make a charge on our first squadrons of the 13th, but it was most faint, indeed ridiculous; and a troop of that regiment that charged drove it back, and the enemy again commenced his retreat in good order, and we were certainly long in arranging formations and for the pursuit, by which he got a little start; however, he was soon pressed pretty hard, and it was not long before he put himself *en débâcle*, and with him it was *saute qui peut*, flying individually as fast as their horses could carry them. I am happy to inform your Lordship that though visibly with the utmost anxiety to overtake the enemy, and going at a pretty smart rate, our cavalry kept in the most regular order, the 13th light dragoons deserving my best commendation, and the heavy brigade not less. The Portuguese of Col. Otway's brigade also kept perfect order. The Spanish company of *Tiradores a Cavallo*, under the orders of Lieut. Col. Soto, remained as skirmishers, and with ours, and I have reason to be satisfied with their conduct. The Conde de Penne Villemur with his cavalry marching on the road from Villa Franca to this place, just as we got sight of the enemy, reported his situation, and requested my orders; and I directed him to get round the right of the enemy, which he used every effort to do, but he was too distant, and the enemy went too fast for him.

We pursued the enemy for a very long distance, but only our skirmishers could come up with him; however, he left in our possession 3 officers and about 160 prisoners, with their horses, and he can scarcely have lost less than half his numbers, there being after the first burst no resistance. The killed and wounded on the part of the enemy are few, and I am happy to inform your Lordship that we have not a man wounded or missing. We returned to occupy this place, Los Santos, and Puebla de Sancho Perez. Gen. Maransin, who commanded the division of the enemy that advanced on Xerez, had, from general report at Fregenal, and confirmed in the same manner at Xerez, begun to be alarmed for his situation (as your Lordship will see by the intercepted letters I have sent you), rumour giving him intimation of the change of circumstances in Portugal and Estremadura, and of the advance of British troops to the latter, and he precipitately retired to Fregenal and Fuente de Leon, and my last advices leave him at Canaveral. Gen. Latour Maubourg, who has succeeded to the command of the division of Mortier, said to be recalled to France, retains his situation at Llerena, keeping his cavalry at Bienvenida and Villa Garcia. Last night the Conde de Penne Villemur, with the Spanish cavalry, obliged him to quit Usagre, which whether the latter will be able to maintain, will depend upon our movements. Gen. Ballesteros has again advanced, and is on my right flank at Burquillos, watching the corps of Maransin which came from the Condado de Niebla, and may be about 4000 men.

Maransin having retired through the Sierra, the troops were put in motion to return to the northward, and to take their stations for the operations of the siege of Badajoz; and the Marshal met me at Elvas on the 21st.

We reconnoitred Badajoz on the 22d, escorted by the 2 light battalions K. G. L. and 2 squadrons of Portuguese cavalry. The enemy have in Badajoz a garrison of about 5 battalions of infantry, with a small body of cavalry, and sufficient artillery for the defence of the place, which is well supplied with provisions. They brought 3 battalions out of the town, which skirmished with our troops; but I have not yet received the return of our loss upon this occasion.

As the preparations for the siege are nearly completed, the place would by this time have been regularly invested, only that, on the night of the 23d, the floods in the Guadiana carried away the bridge which Sir W. Beresford had, with great difficulty, constructed under Jurumenha; and the river was no longer fordable any where. Not only Marshal Beresford could not undertake the operations of the siege, and could not subsist the troops under his command during its continuance, without having a constant communication with Elvas, but his situation would have been very critical if the enemy should have made any attempt to retake the place, and Marshal Beresford should have determined to fight an action to protect the siege. Under these circumstances, I yesterday desired him to delay the operations of the siege till he should have been able to re-establish his bridge, or until the Guadiana should again become fordable; and to place his troops in such a situation as to command the communication with the right bank of the river by the bridge of Merida, still keeping Badajoz blockaded as closely as might be in his power.

I had long been aware of the inconvenience which would be felt in the operations, either for the relief of Badajoz when attacked by the enemy, or for the attack of the place if the enemy should obtain possession of it, from the want of a bridge on the Guadiana; and I had frequently urged the Spanish General officers to remove to Elvas the boats and materials for a bridge which were in store in Badajoz. They commenced to remove them during the siege; but the unfortunate battle of the 19th Feb. was fought when only 5 boats had arrived at Elvas. The enemy consequently obtained possession in Badajoz of the remainder of the bridge; and the bridge which Sir W. Beresford had constructed was formed of casks principally, and of 6 pontoons belonging to the British army, which I had sent to Elvas for the purpose.

When in Estremadura, although I did not see Gen. Castaños, I proposed a plan of operations for his corps and those of Gen. Blake and Ballesteros, in co-operation with Sir W. Beresford, which I hope will be adopted when that officer is able to undertake the siege of Badajoz.

Since I quitted the frontier of Castille the enemy have increased their numbers at Ciudad Rodrigo and along the Agueda; and it is reported that they propose to endeavor to withdraw the garrison from Almeida. The Agueda is not fordable at present; and this operation, which would be very difficult under any circumstances, appears now to be quite impracticable.

I have no late intelligence from the north of Spain; and none from

Cadiz of a later date than the 11th. I understand that Gen. Blake, with part of the troops under his command, has arrived in the mouth of the Guadiana.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

You will see how we stand in Estremadura by my dispatch. We are certainly now superior to the enemy there, and we shall maintain the superiority, and get Badajoz without much difficulty, if the Spaniards will act reasonably. The stores of Elvas are but badly provided for the siege of Badajoz; however, we shall contrive to do the business, I hope.

It is very desirable that you should not publish the details of my dispatches to your Lordship. You cannot conceive how very deficient the French are in information. All the dispatches from me which are published are sent to Massena from Paris, and they thus acquire the information of what is going on.\* When an army is engaged in defensive operations, or in sieges or blockades, or in any other in which it is long in the same position, the enemy acquire all the information they desire if they obtain a knowledge of its position and numbers of the date of a month old. Information of this date Massena can and always does acquire, and it is a serious disadvantage to us.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

In the recent operations in this country I have received very great assistance from Col. Murray, the Q. M. G.; and I have this day written to Col. Torrens to request that he might be made a Brigadier General.

Col. Murray is the D. Q. M. G. in Ireland, and he had hoped that when Gen. Brownrigg should be removed from the head of the department in Great Britain, he should succeed to Gen. Hope as D. Q. M. G. in Great Britain. He has however been informed by good authority, that, when Gen. Brownrigg shall go to Ceylon, Gen. Hope is to be appointed Governor of the Military College, and that Col. Gordon is to be appointed Q. M. G. by the Prince Regent, thus placing aside Col. Murray, and all those of senior rank to Col. Gordon, already in the department.

I don't know whether your Lordship would choose to advise the Prince Regent on this subject; but if you should do so, I earnestly request you to call to his recollection the services of Col. Murray in this country for 2 years; and to his attention the experience which he must have acquired in that situation.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Castello Branco, 27th April, 1811.

I beg you to order that the Juiz and the Escrivão of Villa Velha may be ordered to appear before the special commission at the head quarters of the Portuguese army. The former was written to by Assist. Commissary Haynes, to request that he would give directions that boats might be assembled at the ferry of Villa Velha, to assist in ferrying me over and the gentlemen of the staff who accompanied me, to which he answered, in not very civil terms, that Mr. Haynes might himself write to collect the boats; and afterwards both the Juiz and the Escrivão absented themselves from the town where they expected me, lest they should be called upon to take any trouble to assist in our progress.

\* See Appendix, No. II., No. X., and No. XXXIX

If this conduct towards me and the head quarters of the army passes unnoticed, an officer of inferior rank in charge of a detachment passing this way cannot expect much assistance: I am therefore determined to make an example of these persons, as far as depends upon me.

P.S. 3 P.M. It appears by letters which I have received from Sir Brent of the evening of the 25th, that the enemy are in motion towards the Agueda, apparently intending to attempt to raise the blockade of Almeida. I go on immediately, and shall be with the army to-morrow.

To Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, Bart.

Alameda, 29th April, 1811.

I received upon the road your letter, conveying your wishes to be appointed to command the cavalry on the left of the Tagus, to which I should have sent you an answer, if I had not been certain that I should be here before any messenger could.

It gives me great pleasure to have it in my power to comply with your wishes, and most particularly that you should have yourself attached the condition to my compliance which I should have been anxious to attach to it. If I were ever again to command an army, I should probably settle that, when General officers absent themselves from the army, they should lose their commands in it; but having settled it otherwise, and having invariably placed a General officer, on his return to the army, in the station which he filled before he left it, I am anxious that Gen. Fane, who certainly quitted the army for very sufficient cause, should resume his situation when his health may permit him to return. This, however, I don't think likely to be soon.

P.S. Let me know when you will go, that I may put you in orders. I conclude that you will wish to take Macdonald with you.

To Major Gen. Alex. Campbell.

Alameda, 29th April, 1811, 4 P.M.

I received last night, shortly after my arrival here, your letter of yesterday, with one enclosed from Gen. Brenier.\*

I beg that you will tell him that we generally send off immediately any prisoners who may be taken by us; but that I beg him to let me know whether he has any particular wish for any particular men, or belonging to any particular regiment, or division, or corps, or men recently made prisoners.

The truth is, that this gentleman wants to get a little news. He has found that our men know little, or are but little communicative, and he wants to get some Frenchmen in exchange for them, from whom he thinks he will find out what is going on. It is as well to let him believe that we are good-natured gulls who will easily swallow.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Alameda, 29th April, 1811.

Having heard upon the road that the enemy was collecting upon the Agueda, and seriously threatened to raise the blockade of Almeida, I pushed on, and arrived here last night. The enemy are certainly in force upon the Agueda; but they have till now made no attempt to establish themselves on this side of that river.

I propose to send off the mail for England on Wednesday.

\* The French Governor of Almeida.

P.S. I have many letters from you unanswered, to all of which I shall reply as soon as my baggage shall come up.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 30th April, 1811.

I arrived here on the 28th. The enemy are certainly in strength on the Agueda, their principal force being at Ciudad Rodrigo. The river is not yet fordable, at least not for infantry, and they have hitherto made no movement, excepting two of reconnoissance towards the bridge on the Azava near Marialva.

I am much concerned to be obliged to write to you again upon the continued and increasing inefficiency of the Portuguese regiments with this army, which I am afraid cannot now be attributed to the Portuguese government. The brigade in the 5th division Sir W. Erskine reported yesterday to be only 700 men; Gen. Pack's brigade, Gen. Campbell has just told me, is only 1400; the 9th regt. has 700 men; the 21st 400, as Gen. Picton informed me this morning. All the General officers and the Staff officers of the army are calling out about the Portuguese hospitals.

The recent movements of the enemy of course rendered necessary the removal of all encumbrances from the army; and I saw on Sunday the sick of the 9th and 21st regts. going away in a most shameful state, some men being scarcely able to crawl; others, who were able to walk, plundering the country; and some of them having arms, or accoutrements, or necessities; and there being no carriage for arms or accoutrements with them, of course the arms, and accoutrements, and necessities of all the soldiers sent away upon this occasion will be lost, if the head quarters of the regiment should be moved from their present station. Then upon all these complaints and difficulties I can give no answer, and can apply no remedy, because I don't know upon what principle any of your regula-

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

Villar Formoso, 30th April, 1811.

'In the event of the enemy passing the Agueda, and moving forward in force, the allied army will oppose his progress by occupying the high country, of which the left is between the Dos Casas and the Turones rivulets, and the right extends by Nave d'Aver behind Almedilla, towards Furalbos. The body of the army will be drawn towards the right or towards the left of this line of country, or will be concentrated at any particular part of it, according to the direction which the enemy appears to give to the principal part of his force. It is not intended to dispute the country in front of the line of position above mentioned. When it appears that the enemy is decidedly moving forward in force, therefore, Sir S. Cotton will give orders to the troops in front to retire, the Light division falling back from Gallegos and Espeja, by the direct roads from these two places to Fuentes de Ofiño, and the cavalry falling back towards the line of position in such direction as circumstances may at the time require; continuing, however, to watch and delay the progress of the enemy's columns, but without committing themselves or harassing the troops. The order for the retreat of the 38th regt. from Barba de Puerco is also to be given by Sir S. Cotton, as soon as he finds that the enemy is advancing in such force as to make it expedient to withdraw the troops from Gallegos, and from the posts upon the Agueda, to the left of that village.

'The blockade of Almeida (under the circumstances of the enemy advancing in force) will be intrusted to a greater or less portion of the troops now allotted for that service, according as may appear at the time to be requisite.

'It is very necessary that the staff officers attached to the several divisions should make themselves acquainted with the general line of the position above pointed out, with all the roads in its neighbourhood, and with the names of the villages; in order that no mistake or delay may occur in the execution of any movement that may be directed.'

tions have been framed : indeed, I don't know what your regulations are, and I have no means whatever of acquiring the necessary information. I hope that you will have sent off Hardinge, or somebody, immediately upon your return to Olivença on the 24th.

I assure you that, if some effectual steps are not taken, the Portuguese force with this part of the army will be annihilated ; and I can venture to take no steps till I can get here a Staff officer who understands what has been done, upon what principle, and what is the regulation. Among other complaints which Gen. Picton made this morning, one was of the absence of Mr. Robertson, the Staff surgeon.

I must report to government the state of the Portuguese army. The ministers and the English public believe that we have 30,000 men for whom we pay, and half as many more supported by the Portuguese government. I don't believe that I have here 11,000, or that you have 5000, and of the number many are not fit for service. There is really now no excuse for this inefficiency, excepting the want of order and regularity, which I cannot enforce without the assistance of some of the Staff of the Portuguese army. The men have halted for nearly a month, they have nothing to do, and are as well fed as our own soldiers.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 30th April, 1811.

I have received your letters of the 21st, 23d, and 24th ; and I am concerned to say that I have not leisure to read the voluminous documents to which they relate. I shall read them, however, upon the first opportunity I have, and shall send you answers to them. I can only now say that the British Commissary Gen. can have nothing to say to the Portuguese commissariat, excepting under the arrangement of June, 1809. I have referred to Mr. Kennedy all the complaints respecting the officers of the British commissariat.

I wish that there were no complaints of wants from the Portuguese troops ; but it is really a fact that I have not 11,000 men with this army.

I can't allow French prisoners to work at any works on our account. It is hard upon me that neither the British nor the Portuguese government can or will take care of the prisoners taken by this army. I suppose, therefore, I must send them back to the enemy. I have written to England upon the subject, which is all I can do.

The enemy have as yet made no movement ; they are, however, very strong on the Agueda, particularly at Ciudad Rodrigo.

I have unfortunately lost my keys, and many of your letters are locked up in my boxes. If you should want answers to any, you must send me duplicates.

P.S. I enclose another anonymous letter received this day, which I think comes from the same person.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 30th April, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st inst., conveying the desire of the Portuguese government that larger proportions of specie than have hitherto been paid into the military chest should be paid in future, as a part of the army is in Spain under the command of Sir W. Beresford.



The Portuguese government appear to forget that the British army are in Spain likewise; and that four fifths of the Portuguese army are supplied with provisions by the British Commissary: they have also omitted to notice that the Portuguese troops with this part of the army have not been paid since January last, in consequence of which desertion begins to be very prevalent among them.

In respect to the issue of paper or metal to the chest of the 'Aids' by the Commissary Gen., it is a matter of indifference in respect to the expense. If the Commissary Gen. issues paper, he allows for the discount, and the Portuguese government, I should imagine, are able to purchase the metal in the market as well as the Commissary Gen.

The object of this request, therefore, appears to be to throw upon the British commissariat trouble and responsibility which ought properly to belong to the Portuguese treasury. But to demand metal from the British commissariat, although the common, is not the most efficient mode of procuring specie to pay the armies, and provide for the demands upon the government; some mode should be devised of collecting the taxes, particularly that upon the property of rich merchants, which has frequently been recommended by me, but hitherto without effect.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Formoso, 1st May, 1811.

Having received intelligence from Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, on the 27th April, 2 days after I addressed your Lordship last, that the enemy were increasing their force on the Agueda, I arrived here on the 28th.

The enemy had, on the 23d, attacked our piquets on the Azava, but were repulsed. Capt. Dobbs and Campbell, of the 52d, and Lieut. Eeles of the 95th regt., distinguished themselves upon this occasion, in which the allied troops defended their post against very superior numbers of the enemy. Lieut. Prichard, 1st batt. 52d regt., and 17 soldiers, were wounded. The enemy repeated their attack upon our piquets on the Azava on the 27th, and were again repulsed; and this day again they reconnoitred the banks of this river with 8 squadrons of cavalry, and 3 battalions of infantry. They did not make any attempt to pass the river, nor did they attack the piquets upon the bridge of Marialva.

They have collected a very large force at Ciudad Rodrigo. Marshal Massena, and the head quarters of the army, are at that place; and it is generally reported in the country that they propose to raise the blockade of Almeida. I don't intend to allow them to relieve this place, unless I should be convinced that they have such a superiority of force as to render the result of a contest for this point doubtful. From all the accounts which I have received, I believe that they have still in that place provisions for the garrison, which is stated to consist of 1500 men, for one fortnight.\*

The enemy may be stronger than they were when they were obliged to evacuate Portugal, and they may be reinforced by detachments of troops, particularly the Guard, under the command of Marshal Bessières;† but still I feel confident that they have it not in their power to defeat the allied army in a general action; and I hope to be able to prevent them from relieving this place, unless they should bring the contest to that issue in a situation

\* See Appendix, No. XLIII., No. XLIV., No. XLV., No. XLVI., and No. XLVII.

† See Appendix, No. XLVII.

unfavorable to us. The river Agueda is not yet fordable for infantry, but is so for cavalry.

Sir W. Beresford has taken up the position which I had proposed for him in Estremadura; but I have not yet heard that he had re-established his bridge at Jurumenha.

I have no late intelligence from Cadiz or from the north of Spain.

It has been frequently reported that King Joseph was about to quit Madrid; and I have always considered these reports to be so little founded, excepting in the wishes of those who circulated them, that I have omitted to communicate them to your Lordship. However, at last, I have reason to believe that there is some foundation for a report which I have received, that King Joseph was to be at Valladolid, on his road to France, on the 27th April.\* The guerrillas are all active to intercept his progress; but he has with him a considerable escort, of 1000 French troops; and all the Spanish troops in his cause, called *Juramentados*.

The departure of the King, whatever political effect it may have in Spain, will relieve the French from the necessity of taking care of his person, and will increase their disposable force, particularly in the southern provinces. But if we should be able to obtain possession of Almeida, I hope to have it in my power to reinforce our troops in that quarter to such an extent as to render our operations, at least in Estremadura, free from risk, whatever may be the force which the enemy may be enabled by circumstances to assemble.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Formoso, 1st May, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose the states of the army to the 15th April. Although the number of sick on the return is considerable, I have the satisfaction of informing your Lordship that the soldiers of the army are remarkably healthy, notwithstanding the fatigues which they have undergone in the last two months. Many of those returned sick absent are recovered and on their road to join, or are at the depôts at Lisbon or Coimbra, and waiting for an opportunity to join.

I enclose a letter from Sir W. Beresford, regarding the loss of horses by the 4th dragons in the late service in Estremadura. Your Lordship will observe how few remain of the horses recently sent to that regiment from the 3d dragons.

I am concerned to be obliged to report to your Lordship the very inefficient state of the Portuguese army. His Royal Highness' ministers will have had under their view the complaints which had been made from time to time by Marshal Sir W. Beresford and myself, of the want of provisions by the Portuguese troops while the army were in cantonments on the Rio Maior river. These wants have produced the usual fatal effects. The 12 Portuguese regiments of infantry, 5 battalions of caçadores, one battalion of the Lusitanian Legion, and 2 regiments of cavalry, which are with this part of the army, and which ought to amount to 21,800 R. and F., don't amount to 11,000 fit for duty. Some regiments, which ought to have 1400 men, have only 300 for duty, others 400; and Gen. Pack's brigade, which has always been distinguished on service, and of which the General has taken the utmost care, which ought to have 3400 R. and F.,

\* See Appendix, No. XXXVIII.

has only 1545, by a return sent me this day. The brigade of Portuguese cavalry, which ought to have 1000 R. and F., has only 400! I have not a late return of the Portuguese army, by which I can show your Lordship the state of the whole; but I am certain that, including the garrisons of Elvas and Abrantes, there are not 20,000 R. and F. present and fit for duty.

I am sensible that there must always be a considerable difference in the number of men effective on the establishment and those present for duty; but when the Portuguese government maintain an establishment of nearly 50,000 regular troops, which is nearly complete, it might be expected that more than half would be fit for duty; yet the number is now reduced below 20,000.

The expense of every man produced in the field is therefore enormous; and the Portuguese government is ruined by the failure to keep in order its own departments.

Your Lordship is aware that I have frequently represented this subject to the Portuguese government; and at last I deem it proper to draw to it the attention of H.R.H. the Prince Regent's ministers.

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

'Hill of San Cristoval, behind Espeja, 2d May, 1811, 3 P.M.

'The baggage of the army is to be sent to the rear to-night as follows: That of the troops under Brig. Gen. Pack is to go to Pinhel, that of the 5th and 6th divisions, and of the cavalry, to Castello Mendo; that of the 3d division and of the 7th division, including Col. Ashworth's brigade, is to go to the village of Bismula; and that of the 1st division to Alfaiates. Instructions will be given hereafter respecting the baggage of the Light division. The reserve ammunition of the several divisions is to remain with them.

'The camp kettles are also to remain; and cattle sufficient to furnish 2 days' meat in advance are to be retained near the divisions. Whatever bread there may be in reserve is to be issued to the men, and the Commissariat mules are to be sent to the rear for a fresh supply.

'The baggage of head quarters, is to be in readiness to move to-morrow on the shortest notice.'

'Hill of San Cristoval, 6<sup>th</sup> P.M.

'It does not appear probable that the enemy's army will advance farther to-day than to the ridge between the Azava and the rivulet of Espeja. Sir S. Cotton will be so good, therefore, as to place the cavalry in the country between the Espeja rivulet and Fuentes de Oforo. Col. Beckwith's brigade of the Light division is to be in the woods on the right of the cavalry, and the remainder of the division in the woods on the left of the cavalry. Col. Beckwith will endeavor to keep a piquet on the hill of San Cristoval; and he will have a post at Quinta da Aguila, to enable him to communicate with Nave d'Aver and with Pozo Velho. The left of the Light division will in like manner put itself in communication with the infantry of the 5th division, which occupies the village of Alameda; and also with the troops at Fuentes de Oforo.

'Sir S. Cotton will continue to keep small posts of observation at Puebla de Azava and towards Fuente Guinaldo; and will cause reports to be made from the posts in the latter direction to the officer commanding at Nave d'Aver, as well as to himself. He will also make arrangements for being in direct communication with the officer commanding at Fuentes de Oforo, to which place any further orders there may be for the cavalry or for the Light division will be transmitted.

'Head quarters will remain at Villar Formoso.'

'Villar Formoso, 2d May, 1811, 9<sup>th</sup> P.M.

'Major Gen. Campbell will move the 6th division to-morrow morning at daybreak, and will take post to the right of the 5th division, near that part of the general line of position which overlooks the bridge over the Dos Casas river, coming from the village of Alameda towards S. Pedro. One battalion of the division and 2 guns are to be left, however, near Val de la Mula, as a support to Brig. Gen. Pack.

'Brig. Gen. Pack will take upon himself the blockade of Almeida, with his own brigade of infantry, and 1 regiment of Col. Barbacena's cavalry, having the further support of the battalion and guns above mentioned.'

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 6th May, 1811.

I have not been able to write to you for some days, as we have had the enemy in our front, and on the 3d, and yesterday, we were very warmly, but partially engaged with them. They have a very superior body of

Extracts from the instructions communicated by the Q. M. G.

Villar Formoso, 3d May, 1811, 8 A.M.

'In the event of any advantage being obtained by the enemy, which may induce the Commander of the Forces to order the army to retire, it will fall back as follows, unless other instructions are given at the time :

'The 2 divisions of the right (the 1st and 7th) will fall back by the road leading by Nave d'Aver to Aldea da Ribeira.

'The 2 divisions of the centre (the 3d and the Light division) will fall back by the Caril road to the turn near where the road to Villar Maior branches off from the Caril road; and if necessary to retire farther, these divisions will pass the rivulet behind them by the fords between Aldea da Ribeira and Villar Maior.

'The 2 divisions of the left (the 5th and 6th) will fall back through S. Pedro, Freneda, and Malhada-sorda, to the heights above Villar Maior, upon this side of the rivulet, and they will cross the rivulet to Villar Maior when it becomes necessary to do so.

'The cavalry will retire along the Caril road, following the 2 divisions of the centre, and covering the march of the infantry.

'The 2 brigades of horse artillery will join and move with the cavalry.

'Brig. Gen. Pack will withdraw the troops under his orders either towards Pinhel or by the fords of Junça, and the bridge of Castello Bom, as he may find most expedient under the circumstances of the moment.'

'Heights near Fuentes de Oñoro, 3d May, 1811, 10 A.M.

'The troops which are to occupy that part of the position which looks towards Fuentes de Oñoro are to be formed as follows :

'The 1st division, in 2 lines, is to form the right; and the 3d division and Col. Ashworth's brigade, in 2 lines, are to form the left.

'The 7th division is to be in reserve behind the right of the 1st division, and the Light division is to be in reserve behind the left of the 3d division.

'Each brigade of the 2 divisions in reserve is to be formed in close column where the ground admits of it, that they may be the better prepared to make any movement which may be directed.

'Capt. Lawson's brigade of British 9 pounders is to be with the 1st division; and Major Arentschildt's brigade of Portuguese 9 pounders is to be with the 3d division.

'The light infantry are to dispute the village of Fuentes de Oñoro, and the gardens, enclosures, and broken ground along the left bank of the Dos Casas rivulet.

'The line of infantry is to occupy, and maintain as its position, the higher parts of the ridge which is between the Dos Casas and the Turones rivulets.

'And the officers of the artillery will place their guns in the most advantageous manner for annoying the enemy in his advance up the slopes to attack that position.

'The cavalry will be placed as circumstances may require.'

'Heights above Fuentes de Oñoro, 3d May, 1811, 6 P.M.

'It does not appear as if the enemy intended to make any serious attack upon the position this evening. The troops will therefore send for their camp kettles, and make their arrangements for the night.

'The several divisions will throw out piquets along the ravine of the Dos Casas rivulet.

'These piquets are to communicate with each other, and are to form a connected chain along the whole line of the front of the army.

'Sir W. Erskine will push his look-out posts to a considerable distance beyond the left flank of the army; and he will put himself in communication, likewise, with Brig. Gen. Pack, through Val de la Mula.

'Major Gen. Houstoun will push forward strong piquets into the wood between Fuentes de Oñoro and Pozo Velho, which latter place he will occupy in considerable strength.

'Sir S. Cotton will support the infantry piquets by posts of cavalry, where the ground is open; and he will also put himself in communication with Don Julian Sanchez, who is at Nave d'Aver.

'A complete line of connected posts is to be established, likewise, along the whole of the ridge which forms the position now occupied by the troops, that orders may be passed with certainty and with rapidity, from one division to another, even during the night.

'The whole of the troops are to be under arms half an hour before daybreak to-morrow morning.'

cavalry in very good order; but we maintain our ground well, and they have as yet made no progress towards raising the blockade of Almeida.

I have received your letter of the 2d. If Gen. Blake does not positively agree to every thing proposed in my memorandum, and does not promise to carry it strictly into execution, I think that you ought not to be in a hurry with the siege of Badajoz. I must finish this blockade in one way or other in the course of a few days.

P.S. The enemy are still close to us. You will have heard that Joseph has quitted Madrid: one consequence of this will be to increase the disposable force of the French by the number of troops constantly kept at Madrid as guards to his person. This circumstance is worthy of attention.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 6th May, 1811.

We have been so close to the enemy since the 1st that I have not been able to write to you. We were warmly but partially engaged on the 3d and yesterday; and the enemy are still close to us; but they have made no progress in raising the blockade. Their loss has been very great in both affairs. They have again got a very superior cavalry, owing to my having believed that the Visconde de Barbacena's brigade was something.

I don't know well what to advise you respecting your seat in the Regency. The principle on which you accepted that situation was that you might be useful to your own government and to the general cause of the allies; and I should not think that you ought to resign it without the permission of your own government, if I had not received the other day the Prince's *Carta Regia*, in answer to my letter. In that he tells me that he shall write to inform the King that he shall dismiss Principal Sousa from his situation, provided His Majesty will recall you from Lisbon, and that no objection is made to his calling Dom M. Forjaz to his presence, to answer for the delays of which I complain; which delays, by the bye, he declares, in another part of the letter, that the Governors of the Kingdom had proved to him never existed. It may be said that you have no occasion to be acquainted with the contents of this letter, but being acquainted with it, I think there is no doubt whatever that you cannot continue for a moment a member of the Regency. I also think that, sooner or later, the King's ministers must consent to your withdrawing from the Regency; and as I don't see any advantage likely to result from your continuance, which will at all compensate for the loss of dignity in omitting to withdraw at the moment at which it may be supposed that you were aware of the Prince's objection to you, I should advise you to withdraw whenever your own feelings suggest to you that you ought to do so: you are therefore at liberty, if you think proper, to withdraw, and to make any use you please of this communication.

In respect to Dom M. Forjaz, his loss will be irreparable; and I think, from the contents of the *Carta Regia* to me, and the temper in which it is written, that the step which he proposes to take is the only one which can avert the storm; and, in my answer to the Prince, I shall take care to avoid saying any thing which can lead to a belief that I am at all acquainted with his intention to resign.

I learn that you and I are to be appointed to distribute the £100,000

voted by Parliament to the Portuguese nation. Lord Liverpool desires that we should give in kind rather than in money, of which I also approve. The question is, in what kind? And corn is, I fancy, now too late.

A Dom M. Forjaz.

À Villar Formoso, ce 7 Mai, 1811.

La lettre que vous m'avez écrite le 28 Avril, et que Monsieur Stuart m'a envoyée, m'a fait beaucoup de peine; et malgré que je trouve que vous avez grande raison de refuser à continuer vos services à un gouvernement qui ne vous traite pas même avec justice, les vœux sincères que j'ai formés pour le bien de votre pays, et l'intérêt que j'ai pris à le sauver, sont la cause que je vous demande, avec instance, de continuer de rester en place en attendant que les yeux du Prince puissent s'ouvrir sur les services que vous lui avez rendus, si je n'avais pas reçu une lettre de la part de son Altesse Royale, il y a quelques jours, dans laquelle il se montre si déterminé de vous appeler auprès de lui que je trouve que vous ne pouvez pas mieux faire que d'en faire la demande vous même.

Son Altesse Royale se trompe fort s'il croit qu'aucun intérêt hors celui de son Royaume, avec lequel celui des alliés est intimement lié, aurait pu me persuader de me mêler d'aucune manière de la nomination de ses ministres: pourvu qu'ils soient toujours loyaux et capables, cela n'est égal quels sont les ministres. Mais je ne vous flatte pas quand je vous assure que je ne connais personne en Portugal non seulement qui pourrait vous remplacer, mais qui pourrait d'aucune manière remplir les devoirs pénibles qu'avec des milliers de désavantages vous avez bien remplis depuis que j'ai eu le plaisir de vous connaître.

J'écris au Prince une lettre que M. Stuart vous montrera.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 7th May, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d inst.; and I have to inform you that Mr. Dunmore has orders to pay into the chest of the 'Aids' the sum of 100,000 dollars recently received from Cadiz.

It follows as a consequence of the arrangement of the 6th March, for supplying with provisions the greatest part of the Portuguese army, that the sum paid monthly as subsidy must be diminished. Under that ar-

G. O.

Villar Formoso, 7th May, 1811.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that when an officer makes a report of the movements of the enemy, he will specify whether consisting of cavalry, infantry, or artillery; the number, as far as he could judge; the time when seen, and the road on which moving; from what place, and towards what place, if the officer can state it; and if reference should be made to the right or the left, in the report, care should be taken to state whether to the right of our own army or that of the enemy.

2. A working party of 180 men of the 3d division to be paraded this evening at sunset, at the flèche, near the position of Col. Ashworth's brigade, to be employed under the engineers; this party to be relieved at the same place at 2 o'clock in the morning by a similar party of the 1st division.

3. A proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers are to be with the parties, and the engineers will take care to have persons at the flèche, at the appointed hours, to show the parties the places at which they are to relieve the others at work.

A. G. O.

Villar Formoso, 7th May, 1811.

The Commander of the Forces directs that all General officers and others with whom orderly dragoons may be detached from their regiments, and who are not entitled to them under the G. O. of the army, are forthwith to be sent to join their regiments.

rangement the expense of the provisions was to be deducted monthly from the amount of the subsidy. The expense of the British commissariat has been increased in consequence of the arrangement, and of course it is possible to allot only a diminished proportion of the monthly receipts to the chest of the 'Aids.' I see no mode, therefore, by which the distresses of the Portuguese government can be effectually relieved, and they can be enabled to transmit to Sir W. Beresford the money which he requires to pay for supplies in Spain, excepting only by the adoption of some of those measures so repeatedly recommended to them to increase their own resources.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Formoso, 7th May, 1811.

I had the honor of receiving yesterday morning, by the messenger, your Lordship's letter of the 11th April, to which I proceed to reply without loss of time.

Your Lordship will have observed in my recent reports of the state of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much reduced, and I don't know what measure to recommend which will have the effect of restoring them. All measures recommended to the existing government in Portugal are either rejected, or are neglected, or are so executed as to be of no value whatever; and the countenance which the Prince Regent of Portugal has given to the Governors of the Kingdom, who have uniformly manifested this spirit of opposition to every thing proposed for the increase of the resources of the government, and the amelioration of their military system, must tend to aggravate these evils.

The radical defect, both in Spain and Portugal, is want of money to carry on the ordinary operations of the government, much more to defray the expenses of such a war as that in which we are engaged. The increase of the subsidy by Great Britain will have no direct effect in increasing the pecuniary means of the Portuguese government, as the greatest part of the increase must necessarily be given in kind; and that which will be given will most probably be in lieu of what was irregularly plundered from the country heretofore.

On all these accounts I have urged the Portuguese government most earnestly to adopt every measure in their power to augment their own pecuniary resources, but hitherto without much effect. And yet until the amount of money at their command is increased, it will be impossible to apply an effectual remedy to the evils which have gradually decreased, and continue daily to decrease, the numbers of the army. However, I am decidedly of opinion that if the British government are determined to do no more in the Peninsula than to maintain themselves in Portugal, 30,000 effective British troops would be sufficient, to be aided by a reserve maintained in Great Britain or Ireland, and ready to sail at a moment's notice. But these troops ought to be effective; and I would beg to refer your Lordship to the first letter which I addressed to you upon the subject, on the 14th Nov. 1809.

In respect to the second question which your Lordship has referred for my consideration, viz., the use to be made of our existing force, in the present state of the Peninsula, for active operations, I will inform your

Lordship what plan I intended to follow under the existing instructions; and, indeed, however they may be enlarged, something of the same kind must be done.

The first object of our attention must be to regain Badajoz. This is very important, not only in respect to Portugal, but to the subsistence of Cadiz, the greatest part of which is, I understand, drawn from the Condado de Niebla. If Badajoz were not regained, it could not be expected that the war could be maintained at all in the Condado de Niebla. The loss of Badajoz is also very important in reference to the safety of Portugal. The siege of Elvas might be opened immediately.

Circumstances have enabled us to attempt to reduce Almeida by blockade, at the same time that we attempt to obtain possession of Badajoz by siege. A few days must bring the blockade to an issue; but I if find that I can neither maintain it, nor bring the enemy to a general action on terms which I shall think advantageous, I shall have no scruple in giving it up, as I undertook it not as a part of a plan, but as the consequence of our preceding operations during Massena's retreat, upon finding by intercepted letters and other intelligence that the place was but ill supplied with provisions.

If we should obtain possession of Badajoz, circumstances may render one or other of two lines of offensive operations expedient: viz., one directed to the south for the relief of Cadiz, remaining on the defensive in Beira; the other, supposing Almeida to have fallen by blockade, to undertake the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; or, if Almeida should not have fallen by the blockade, to undertake the siege of both places, and afterwards to push on our operations into the heart of Spain, and open the communication with Valencia. This latter plan, if practicable, would relieve Cadiz and the south of Spain as soon and as effectually as the first mentioned.

I consider myself authorised to undertake the first by the existing instructions: the instructions must be altered to enable me to undertake the second. Circumstances vary to such a degree in this extraordinary war every day, that it is impossible for me to say which plan would be best, at the moment at which I should have it in my power to execute either.

Just to give you a notion of the degree in which circumstances have altered within this last month, which ought to weigh in determining upon any of the operations which are now carrying on, or which must be carried on in future, I mention to you the detachment of a considerable body of Spanish troops under Gen. Blake from Cadiz; on the other hand, the removal of the King from Madrid, which will set at liberty a considerable force which always attended his person; the junction with Massena of all the French cavalry in Old Castille, Leon, &c., while the army in Galicia, which was kept in check by this cavalry, still remain inactive. Then all plans would be overturned by the defeat of one of the Spanish corps which must co-operate with us; or by the refusal of the Spanish government to co-operate with us according to any plan founded on the reasonable system of security, on which alone I can venture to act under your Lordship's instructions. All plans of offensive operation would also of course be destroyed by the arrival in Spain of fresh reinforcements to the enemy's armies.



From this statement your Lordship will see how difficult it is for me to lay down a plan of operations for the campaign. I have not yet received the consent of Castaños and Blake to the plan of co-operation which I proposed for the siege of Badajoz; and I have been obliged to write to Beresford to desire him to delay the siege till they shall positively promise to act as therein specified, or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from hence. All that I can say is, therefore, that I shall carry on offensive operations against the enemy as far as it may lie in my power, and as my instructions will allow me, on one or the other of the plans which I have above detailed to you, according to the best judgment which I may be able to form of the situation of affairs at the time. It will be necessary that you should continue to reinforce us, and that you should send out to us particularly good horses for the cavalry and artillery.

I earnestly recommend to you not to undertake any of the maritime operations on the coast of Spain upon which you have desired to have my opinion. Unless you should send a very large force, you would scarcely be able to effect a landing, and maintain the situation of which you might obtain possession. Then that large force would be unable to move, or to effect any object at all adequate to the expense or to the expectation which would be formed from its strength, owing to the want of those equipments and supplies in which an army landed from its ships must be deficient.

It is in vain to hope for any assistance, even in this way, much less military assistance, to such expeditions from the Spaniards. The first thing they would require uniformly would be money; then arms, ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, provisions, forage, horses, means of transport, and every thing which your expedition would have a right to require from them; and, after all, this extraordinary and perverse people would scarcely allow the commander of your expedition to have a voice in the decision on the plan of operations to be followed, when the whole should be ready to undertake one.

Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be; upon which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commanders must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish authorities; by which means alone they will be enabled to draw some resources from the country, and some assistance from the Spanish armies. While writing upon this subject I may as well reply to your Lordship's official dispatch of the 11th, No. 19.

Of course all operations of an offensive nature must cease if the battalions, mentioned in the memorandum, enclosed in that dispatch, are sent home before they shall be relieved. The plan which I would propose would be:

1st; To draft the 7 battalions of the K. G. L. into the 3 others, and send home the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 7 Line battalions.

2dly; To form into 6 companies the 2d batts. of the 24th, 31st, 38th, 42d, 53d, 58th, and 66th, and to send home to recruit, or to form the recruits, the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 4 companies drafted.

3dly; To send home entirely the 2d batts. of the 24th, 53d, and 66th, as soon as they shall be relieved; although, by the bye, the last two are two of the best 2d batts. we have.

According to this plan we should reduce in some degree our expense in this country. We should keep here officers inured to the climate, and accustomed to the service; at the same time that we should send to England officers and non-commissioned officers to raise and train recruits. Indeed it would be desirable if I were authorised from time to time to incorporate the 10 companies of a regiment into 8 or 6 companies, according to their numbers, and to send home to recruit, or train recruits, the officers and non commissioned officers of the drafted companies.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Formoso, 8th May, 1811.

The attention of the British government has been frequently drawn to the state of affairs in this country by the reports of Mr. Stuart and myself, particularly as that state affects the military departments and establishments; but as the success of the military operations has recently been much impeded by the defects of constitution, by the disobedience and neglect of those employed, and by the failure of all the departments of the Portuguese army, I consider it my duty to draw your Lordship's attention to the subject again in a particular manner.

The Portuguese troops with this part of the army don't produce in the field half of their effective strength, because the soldiers have been ill fed and taken care of; and vast numbers of them are in hospitals. Before I broke up from the cantonments on the Rio Maior river I took upon me to make an arrangement by which the troops serving in the same divisions with British troops should be fed by the British Commissaries, of which I enclose a copy; under which arrangement 5 brigades of infantry of 7 doing duty in this part of the army were taken charge of, and there remained but 2, and one brigade of cavalry, to be taken care of by the Portuguese departments. These 2 brigades of infantry have been starving ever since; and, whenever there is any call for the military service of the troops, they are obliged to call upon the British commissariat for subsistence, thus reducing the quantity for the consumption of the British divisions.

The Portuguese cavalry are so much reduced by want of food, that a regiment which I was desirous of employing in the recent affairs with the enemy could produce in the field only 60 men.

None of the Portuguese officers or troops are paid; and the consequence is that the officers are suffering the extremity of distress, and the soldiers desert in large numbers.

The mules attached to the artillery, not having been fed during the winter, were unable to perform service when the army broke up from the

G. O.

Villar Formoso, 8th May, 1811.

*Memorandum.* Officers commanding regiments are requested to send in to the Military Secretary, as soon as possible, the names of officers they may wish to have promoted in succession to those who have fallen in action.

The names of the officers commanding the light infantry battalions, in each brigade of the army, which were engaged in the village of Fuentes de Oñoro on the 3d and 5th inst., to be sent in immediately to the Military Secretary.

Rio Maior river. After having reduced the quantity of ammunition drawn with each brigade, I have lately been obliged to send away 2 pieces of cannon belonging to one Portuguese brigade of artillery.

In the actions of the 3d and 5th the quantity of ammunition expended by the Portuguese brigade of artillery engaged very nearly amounted to the whole quantity they carried with them; and I was obliged to have recourse to the expedient of picking up the enemy's shot which had been fired into our camp, and of making it up into ammunition with powder and materials drawn from the British artillery. The reserves of Portuguese ordnance and musket ammunition are at this moment not less than 6 marches from the army, owing to the want of means of transport to convey them; and I have been obliged to order the Commissary Gen. to use the means of transport destined to convey provisions for soldiers and forage for horses, to bring up the Portuguese ordnance and musket ammunition. The Portuguese wounded soldiers are taken care of in our hospitals, as they have none of their own.

These are facts affecting our existing situation which press upon me at the moment; and I state them to your Lordship as instances of the description of inconvenience, which might amount to risk and danger, resulting from the defects, the neglects, and the ignorance of the Portuguese departments. It is obvious that no officer can venture to conduct any military operation against an active enemy with such means; and I don't scruple to acknowledge that I have felt the greatest uneasiness respecting the success of the operations which I am now carrying on, on both sides of the Tagus, in consequence of the diminution of the numbers and of the efficiency of the Portuguese army, owing to the defects of all the departments attached to it.

These defects have not been unnoticed by me in my communications with the Portuguese government; and I enclose to your Lordship the extract of a private letter, of the 26th March, to Mr. Stuart, upon that subject; and the copy of a dispatch to that gentleman, of the 8th April. Nothing has yet been done in consequence of the recommendations contained in these letters; and the Portuguese Sec. of State, in answer to Mr. Stuart, tells him that the local government have not the power from the Prince Regent to make the alterations suggested.

My Lord, the state to which the enemy are reduced in the Peninsula may enable us to carry on our operations under all the disadvantages described in this and the enclosed letters; but your Lordship will judge for yourself of the consequences which might result from the facts which I have related. I think it proper, however, to inform your Lordship that, if the enemy should be enabled to increase his force again in the Peninsula, the difficulties, which are the consequence of the defects in the Portuguese departments, will be vastly aggravated, and the danger increased to such a degree, that it may become a question whether His Majesty's troops ought to be exposed to it.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Formoso, 8th May, 1811.

Some time ago, certain persons, with whom I have long been in correspondence, at Salamanca, informed me that ———, who commanded

the Irish Legion, was desirous of quitting the French service, and of returning to his own country, if he could be assured of being unmolested by the government in consequence of his having served the French government. After some remonstrances with these persons upon the imprudence of their giving information to any body of the existence of a correspondence between them and me, I stated to them that I could not promise that ——— should receive His Majesty's pardon without knowing the circumstances which had occasioned his departure from Ireland; but that, if he would make me acquainted with those circumstances, I would state them to your Lordship; and if he had been guilty of no act which would necessarily prevent the government from recommending that he should be pardoned, I would recommend him to your Lordship, that he might be permitted to return to his native country, with His Majesty's pardon for having served the French government.

——— was afterwards taken by a party of Don Julian's guerrillas, in consequence of an arrangement made by himself, and he came in here some days ago. I have had a conversation with him, in which I desired him to put in writing all the circumstances which had occurred to occasion his quitting Ireland after the year 1798; and to conceal nothing, as he might depend upon it that every circumstance respecting him was known, and that the attempt to conceal the share he had in the transactions of that period might have the effect of preventing the accomplishment of his wishes.

I have the honor to enclose the letter which I have received from ———, from which I should judge that he may have been informed of, and concerned in, the transactions in Ireland of that period; but that he was not guilty of any of those acts for which none of those who have been guilty have hitherto received a pardon.

Under these circumstances, that of which he has been guilty is, to have served the French government, a foreign Power at war with His Majesty; and as he has taken a most decided line upon that subject, as the manner in which he was taken prisoner is no secret, I hope that your Lordship will deem it proper to recommend him to H. R. H. the Prince Regent for a pardon for this act.

I entertain no doubt of the disgust which he and others feel at the system of fraud and robbery which prevails in the French service, nor of that which must have been occasioned in their minds by the contempt with which they have been treated by the French government, in the violation of all engagements to them. It appears to me that, besides the advantage of obtaining from the service of France one of His Majesty's subjects holding the rank of Colonel, it would not be disadvantageous to the government that there should be some person in Ireland, able and interested, to give his countrymen an account of the real state of affairs in France and in the armies; of the manner in which engagements entered into by the French government are performed, with foreign countries as well as individuals; and particularly of the manner in which those of the Irish nation, who have been so unfortunate as to have been obliged, or have chosen, to quit their own country, have been treated in France.

On these grounds I earnestly recommend to your Lordship that ——— should be pardoned, and that he should be allowed to return to his native country.

To T. Ross, Esq., Surgeon to the Forces.

Villar Formoso, 8th May, 1811.

I had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th Feb. by the last post, and I am much concerned that you should have lost your baggage in Portugal. I possess no authority to grant a warrant for the payment of compensation for the loss of any baggage, unless the claim for the payment should have been submitted to the consideration of, and passed by, a Board of Claims; and there is no such Board now sitting in Portugal.

I would also beg to observe that, your baggage having been lost in a transport, or in an army store, I doubt whether I could refer your claim for compensation to the consideration of a Board of Claims, as one of the rules for the guidance of those Boards (as well as I can recollect, for I have not the book by me) is that compensation shall not be given for baggage lost under these circumstances. I am much concerned that it is not in my power to comply with your wishes.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 8th May, 1811.

I enclose you a letter and a dispatch from my brother. The latter contains a copy of my dispatch on our affairs here, which I beg you to peruse.

I heard yesterday, from our friends at Salamanca, that the battalions of the 9th corps, belonging to regiments stationed in Andalusia, are to march to join their regiments under Drouet, who they say is to command the 5th corps: this must be a mistake, as it appears that Latour Maubourg commands it.

My book is locked up in one of my boxes, of which I have lost the keys, and I cannot therefore tell you how many battalions there were in the 9th corps belonging to regiments in Andalusia. I saw them the other day, and I think they don't exceed 4 battalions, very weak; they can scarcely be 2000 men. There is one of the 64th regt., and one of the 100th, I know, but forget of what other regiments; they are certainly not gone yet, and I will let you know when they do go. As the corps is broken up, you may depend upon their going, as Massena will have done with them. There is nothing particular this day: I think the French are going back; some are certainly gone.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villar Formoso, 8th May, 1811.

From the 5th to this day the two armies have been not only in sight, but literally within shot of each other. The French, however, withdrew in the night and this morning towards the Azava, and I cannot tell yet how far they are going, or what shape they will take. Almeida still holds out.

You cannot sign warrants for any extraordinaries, and the Commissary ought not to pay the veterinary surgeons' and farriers' bills without warrants.

If Gen. Hoghton chooses to come here without a brigade, I have no objection; but I cannot with propriety remove his brigade at present.

I will try to give you some money, but I am apprehensive that I shall find it difficult.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

Villar Formoso, 8th May, 1811.

The enemy commenced their retreat last night; and I propose to send you my dispatches for government to-morrow with the account of all the operations, and shall be obliged to you if you will detain the packet till they shall arrive.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Villar Formoso, 8th May, 1811.

The enemy's whole army, consisting of the 2d, 6th, and 8th corps, and all the cavalry which could be collected in Castille and Leon, including about 900 of the Imperial Guard,\* crossed the Agueda at Ciudad Rodrigo on the 2d inst. The battalions of the 9th corps had been joined to the regiments to which they belonged in the other 3 corps; excepting a division consisting of battalions belonging to regiments in the corps doing duty in Andalusia; which division likewise formed part of the army.

As my object in maintaining a position between the Coa and the Agueda, after the enemy had retired from the former, was to blockade Almeida, which place I had learned from intercepted letters, and other information, was ill supplied with provisions for its garrison, and as the enemy were infinitely superior to us in cavalry, I did not give any opposition to their march, and they passed the Azava on that evening, in the neighbourhood of Espeja, Carpio, and Gallegos. They continued their march on the 3d, in the morning, towards the Dos Casas, in 3 columns; 2 of them, consisting of the 2d and 8th corps, to the neighbourhood of Almeida and Fort Concepcion, and the 3d column, consisting of the whole of the cavalry, and the 6th and that part of the 9th corps which had not already been drafted into the other 3.

The allied army had been cantoned along the river Dos Casas, and on the sources of the Azava, the Light division at Gallegos and Espeja. This last fell back upon Fuentes de Oñoro, on the Dos Casas, with the British cavalry, in proportion as the enemy advanced, and the 1st, 3d, and 7th divisions were collected at that place; the 6th division, under Major Gen. Campbell, observed the bridge at Alameda; and Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine, with the 5th division, the passages of the Dos Casas at Fort Concepcion and Aldea del Obispo. Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade, with the Queen's regt. from the 6th division, kept the blockade of Almeida; and I had prevailed upon Don J. Sanchez to occupy Nave d'Aver with his corps of Spanish cavalry and infantry. The Light division were moved in the evening to join Major Gen. Campbell, upon finding that the enemy were in strength in that quarter; and they were brought back again to Fuentes de Oñoro on the morning of the 5th, when it was found that the 8th corps had joined the 6th on the enemy's left.

Shortly after the enemy had formed on the ground on the right of the Dos Casas, on the afternoon of the 3d, they attacked with a large force the village of Fuentes de Oñoro, which was defended in a most gallant manner by Lieut. Col. Williams, of the 5th batt. 60th regt., in command of the light infantry battalion belonging to Major Gen. Picton's division, sup-

\* See Appendix, No. XLVI. and No. XLVII.

ported by the light infantry battalion in Major Gen. Nightingall's brigade, commanded by Major Dick of the 42d regt., and the light infantry battalion in Major Gen. Howard's brigade, commanded by Major M'Donnell of the 92d, and the light infantry battalion of the King's German Legion, commanded by Major Aly, of the 5th batt. of the line, and by the 2d batt. 83d regt., under Major Carr.

The troops maintained their position : but having observed the repeated efforts which the enemy were making to obtain possession of the village, and being aware of the advantage which they would derive from the possession in their subsequent operations, I reinforced the village successively with the 71st regt. under Lieut. Col. the Hon. H. Cadogan, and the 79th under Lieut. Col. Cameron, and the 24th under Major Chamberlain. The former, at the head of the 71st regt., charged the enemy, and drove them from a part of the village of which they had obtained a momentary possession. Nearly at this time Lieut. Col. Williams was unfortunately wounded, but I hope not dangerously; and the command devolved upon Lieut. Col. Cameron of the 79th.

The contest continued till night, when our troops remained in possession of the whole. I then withdrew the light infantry battalions, and the 83d regt., leaving the 71st and 79th regts. only in the village, and the 2d batt. 24th regt. to support them.

On the 4th the enemy reconnoitred the position which we had occupied on the Dos Casas river; and during that night they moved the Duc d'Abrantes' corps from Alameda to the left of the position occupied by the 6th corps, opposite to Fuentes de Oñoro.

From the course of the reconnoissance on the 4th, I had imagined that the enemy would endeavor to obtain possession of Fuentes de Oñoro, and of the ground occupied by the troops behind that village, by crossing the Dos Casas at Pozo Velho; and in the evening I moved the 7th division, under Major Gen. Houstoun, to the right, in order, if possible, to protect that passage.

On the morning of the 5th the 8th corps appeared in 2 columns, with all the cavalry, on the opposite side of the valley of the Dos Casas and Pozo Velho; and as the 6th and 9th corps also made a movement to their left, the Light division, which had been brought back from the neighbourhood of Alameda, were sent with the cavalry, under Sir S. Cotton, to support Major Gen. Houstoun; while the 1st and 3d divisions made a movement to their right, along the ridge between the Turones and Dos Casas rivers, corresponding to that of the 6th and 9th corps, on the right of the Dos Casas.

The 8th corps attacked Major Gen. Houstoun's advanced guard, consisting of the 85th regt., under Major Macintosh, and the 2d Portuguese caçadores, under Lieut. Col. Nixon, and obliged them to retire; and they retired in good order, although with some loss. The 8th corps being thus established in Pozo Velho, the enemy's cavalry turned the right of the 7th division, between Pozo Velho and Nave d'Aver, from which last place Don J. Sanchez had been obliged to retire; and the cavalry charged.

The charge of the advanced guard of the enemy's cavalry was met by two or three squadrons of the different regiments of British dragoons, and the enemy were driven back; and Col. La Motte, of the 13th *chasseurs*

and some prisoners, taken. The main body were checked and obliged to retire by the fire of Major Gen. Houstoun's division; and I particularly observed the Chasseurs Britanniques, under Lieut. Col. Eustace, as behaving in the most steady manner; and Major Gen. Houstoun mentions in high terms the conduct of a detachment of the Duke of Brunswick's light infantry. Notwithstanding that this charge was repulsed, I determined to concentrate our force towards the left, and to move the 7th and Light divisions and the cavalry from Pozo Velho towards Fuentes de Oñoro, and the other two divisions.

I had occupied Pozo Velho and that neighbourhood, in hopes that I should be able to maintain the communication across the Coa by Sabugal, as well as provide for the blockade, which objects it was now obvious were incompatible with each other; and I therefore abandoned that which was the least important, and placed the Light division in reserve in the rear of the left of the 1st division, and the 7th division on some commanding ground beyond the Turones, which protected the right flank and rear of the 1st division, and covered the communication with the Coa, and prevented that of the enemy with Almeida by the roads between the Turones and that river.

The movement of the troops upon this occasion was well conducted, although under very critical circumstances, by Major Gen. Houstoun, Brig. Gen. Craufurd, and Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton. The 7th division was covered in its passage of the Turones by the Light division, under Brig. Gen. Craufurd; and this last, in its march to join the 1st division, by the British cavalry.

Our position thus extended on the high ground from the Turones to the Dos Casas. The 7th division, on the left of the Turones, covered the rear of the right; the 1st division, in 2 lines, were on the right; Col. Ashworth's brigade, in 2 lines, in the centre; and the 3d division, in 2 lines, on the left; the Light division and British artillery in reserve; and the village of Fuentes in front of the left. Don Julian's infantry joined the 7th division in Freneda; and I sent him with his cavalry to endeavor to intercept the enemy's communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.

The enemy's efforts on the right part of our position, after it was occupied as I have above described, were confined to a cannonade, and to some charges with his cavalry, upon the advanced posts. The piquets of the 1st division, under Lieut. Col. Hill of the 3d regt. of Guards, repulsed one of these; but as they were falling back they did not see the direction of another in sufficient time to form to oppose it, and Lieut. Col. Hill was taken prisoner, and many men were wounded, and some taken, before a detachment of the British cavalry could move up to their support. The 2d batt. 42d regt., under Lord Blantyre, also repulsed a charge of the cavalry directed against them.

They likewise attempted to push a body of light infantry upon the ravine of the Turones, to the right of the 1st division, which were repulsed by the light infantry of the Guards, under Lieut. Col. Guise, aided by 5 companies of the 95th under Capt. O'Hare.\* Major Gen. Nightingall was wounded in the course of the cannonade, but I hope not severely.

The enemy's principal effort was throughout this day again directed

\* Afterwards killed in the assault of Badajoz in 1812.



against Fuentes de Oñoro; and, notwithstanding that the whole of the 6th corps were at different periods of the day employed to attack this village, they could never gain more than a temporary possession of it. It was defended by the 24th, 71st, and 79th regts., under the command of Lieut. Col. Cameron; and these troops were supported by the light infantry battalions of the 3d division, commanded by Major Woodgate; the light infantry battalions of the 1st division, commanded by Major Dick, Major M'Donnell, and Major Aly; the 6th Portuguese caçadores, commanded by Major Pinto; by the light companies in Col. Champelmond's Portuguese brigade, under Col. Sutton; and those in Col. Ashworth's Portuguese brigade, under Lieut. Col. Pynn, and by the piquets of the 3d division, under the command of Col. the Hon. R. Trench. Lieut. Col. Cameron was severely \* wounded in the afternoon, and the command in the village devolved upon Lieut. Col. the Hon. H. Cadogan.

The troops in Fuentes were besides supported, when pressed by the enemy, by the 74th regt., under Major Russell Manners, and the 1st batt. 88th regt., under Lieut. Col. Wallace, belonging to Col. Mackinnon's brigade; and on one of these occasions the 88th, with the 71st and 79th, under the command of Col. Mackinnon, charged the enemy, and drove them through the village; and Col. Mackinnon has reported particularly the conduct of Lieut. Col. Wallace, Brigade Major Wilde, and Lieut. and Adj. Stewart. The contest again lasted in this quarter till night, when our troops still held their post; and from that time the enemy have made no fresh attempt on any part of our position.

The enemy manifested an intention to attack Major Gen. Sir W. Erskine's post at Aldea del Obispo on the same morning, with a part of the 2d corps; but the Major General sent the 2d batt. Lusitanian Legion across the ford of the Dos Casas, which obliged them to retire.

In the course of last night the enemy commenced retiring from their position on the Dos Casas; and this morning, at daylight, the whole was in motion. I cannot yet decide whether this movement is preparatory to some fresh attempt to raise the blockade of Almeida, or is one of decided retreat; but I have every reason to hope that they will not succeed in the first, and that they will be obliged to have recourse to the last. Their superiority in cavalry is very great, owing to the weak state of our horses, from recent fatigue and scarcity of forage, and the reduction of numbers in the Portuguese brigade of cavalry with this part of the army, in exchange for a British brigade sent into Estremadura with Marshal Sir W. Beresford, owing to the failure of the measures reported to have been adopted to supply horses and men with food on the service.

The result of a general action, brought on by an attack upon the enemy by us, might, under those circumstances, have been doubtful; and if the enemy had chosen to avoid it, or if they had met it, they would have taken advantage of the collection of our troops to fight this action, and throw relief into Almeida. From the great superiority of force to which we have been opposed upon this occasion, your Lordship will judge of the conduct of the officers and troops. The actions were partial, but very severe, and our loss has been great. The enemy's loss has also been very great, and they left 400 killed in the village of Fuentes, and we have

\* Mortally. (See vol. v., p. 17.)

many prisoners. I particularly request your attention to the conduct of Lieut. Col. Williams, and Lieut. Col. Cameron, and Lieut. Col. the Hon. H. Cadogan; and to that of Col. Mackinnon and Lieut. Col. Kelly, 24th regt.; of the several officers commanding battalions of the line and of light infantry, which supported the troops in Fuentes de Oñoro; likewise to that of Major Macintosh of the 85th, and of Lieut. Col. Nixon, of the 2d caçadores, and of Lieut. Col. Eustace, of the Chasseurs Britanniques, and of Lord Blantyre.

Throughout these operations I have received the greatest assistance from Lieut. Gen. Sir B. Spencer, and all the General officers of the army; and from the Adj. Gen. and Q. M. Gen., and the officers of their several departments, and those of my personal Staff.

By intelligence from Sir W. Beresford I learn that he has invested Badajoz, on the left of the Guadiana, and is moving stores there for the attack of the place.

I have the honor to inform you that the intelligence which I transmitted in my last dispatch has since been confirmed, and that King Joseph passed Valladolid, on his way to Paris, on the 27th April. It is not denied by the French officers that he is gone to Paris.\*

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing in the battle at Fuentes de Oñoro, on the 3d and 5th May, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers & drummers.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed . . . . .	11	16	208	49	235
Wounded . . . . .	81	72	1081	101	1234
Missing . . . . .	7	10	300	5	317

The Portuguese killed, wounded, and missing, are included in the above numbers.

To the Rt. Hon. H. Wellesley.

Villar Formoso, 8th May, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 27th April, and I now enclose my dispatches to government to the 8th inst.

We have had warm work in this quarter, but I hope we shall succeed in the end. The French, it is said, lost 5000 men, we 1200, in the affair of the 5th: on the 3d we lost about 250; the French left 400 dead in the village of Fuentes de Oñoro. We lost the prisoners by the usual dash and imprudence of the soldiers.

P.S. Pray let Gen. Graham know how we are going on.

To the Rt. Hon. the Commander in Chief.

Villar Formoso, 8th May, 1811.

I have the honor to enclose you the copy of a report which I have made to the Sec. of State, of actions in which a part of the troops under my command were engaged with the French army on the 3d and 5th inst., together with returns of killed and wounded upon those occasions.

\* See Appendix, No. XXXVIII.

# ADDENDA

TO

## THE FOURTH VOLUME.

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*[The following letters, the drafts of which were found too late for insertion in the order of their dates, are marked with the number of the page to which each in point of date should have been placed.]*

To the Earl of Liverpool (p. 7).

Viseu, 6th April, 1810.

Since I addressed my last official dispatch to you upon the subject of supplies of money, 500,000 dollars have arrived from England in the *Comus*; and about £50,000, half in specie and half in Portuguese paper, have been raised at Lisbon for bills upon England since the arrival of the packets. Your Lordship is aware of the state of the demands upon us, and will see how inadequate these sums are to answer them. We have received no money from Cadiz for some time, and none from Gibraltar; and even a sum of £70,000 has been detained at the former place, for which the Commissary Gen. had given his bills at Lisbon, and a vessel had been sent to Cadiz. It is impossible to get on without money, and I trust that your Lordship will continue to supply us from England, and will place matters at Cadiz upon such a footing as that all the supplies which that place and Gibraltar can afford will be applicable to the service in this country. It is useless to trouble you with more official dispatches upon this subject. I am convinced that you will do every thing in your power, and I write now only to show you how we stand since the arrival of the last sum which has been sent.

To the Earl of Liverpool (p. 32).

Viseu, 26th April, 1810.

I enclose the weekly state to the 15th, and you will be glad to see how healthy the army is becoming. Including the artillery, we are not much short of 28,000 R. and F. fit for duty. There are many men in the returns as 'sick absent' who will soon join, and there are but very few who are seriously ill, as you will observe by the weekly return of the sick. There are no men sick present with the regiments who cannot march.

I likewise enclose a state of the Portuguese army, R. and F., taken from the returns of March. The returns of April, which I have not yet received, will, I understand, give us a disposable force for the field of 30,000 men. This army is also becoming more healthy, and it has been much improved since the pay of the officers has been increased, and other measures have been adopted.

I am more afraid of the failure of our finance than of any thing else. We are much in debt to the Portuguese government, and are not able to perform our engagements. We are, however, better supplied than we were some time ago; and the regular arrival of the packets lately has had the usual effect of enabling us to get more money for bills upon Eng-

land. Have government yet come to any decision respecting the preparations to be made by the Portuguese government for evacuating the country eventually? If they have, it is desirable that the King's minister at Lisbon should receive his instructions upon that subject. I acknowledge that I don't expect that the necessity for the evacuation will exist for some time yet, if it ever should; but I have always been of opinion that it is impossible for any man to be certain what would be the state of this contest in a week from the time he should pretend to foretell its issue; and therefore we ought to be prepared, as far as possible, for every event.

To the Earl of Liverpool (p. 106).

Celorico, 6th June, 1810.

My dispatches of this date will give you an account of the state of affairs in our front. Gen. Mahy has sent me an abstract of a return of Junot's corps of the end of April, which has lately been intercepted at Irun, which makes it above 34,000 infantry and above 8000 cavalry, including men at the depôts and hospitals in France and Spain. I don't think that more than one third can be supposed to be absent, considering that this corps arrived from France only in January, and has not been engaged in any operation in which it could be supposed to have sustained any great loss. The whole of this corps and of Ney's are now in Castille.

The dispatch will also give you a more accurate view of our money concerns than you have yet had before you, and you shall have a paper of this description every month.

If I had money at my command and disposal, and if we had a depôt of arms and ammunition and clothing at Lisbon, we might put the whole of Galicia and Leon in movement upon the enemy's back; but I have nothing with which to assist these provinces, and without assistance it is vain to endeavor to move them. Indeed, I doubt whether the Portuguese government can subsist their militia when assembled, for want of money which we owe them.

I have often told your Lordship that money could be procured in England in large sums, if proper measures were adopted. No man who knows any thing of Portugal will believe that the trade of Lisbon would supply sums for the Commissary Gen.'s bills amounting to £144,000 *per mensem*, besides the sums for the bills of individuals, of the Navy Agents, and of the Agents of transports. The most intelligent Portuguese calculate that not less than 7 millions in specie have been imported from England since Sept. 1808, and you will observe that government pay from 16 to 20 *per cent.* for every shilling which is procured in this manner. I have been told repeatedly that a most profitable trade in money is carried on between England and Lisbon, which does not appear to be impossible; and I can only say that there never has been an instance of delay in the arrival of the packets that difficulty has not been experienced, and sometimes it has been impossible to raise money by bills. Not a ship of war or vessel of any description arrives that does not bring money. If individuals can purchase specie in the market in London and export it, I should think that government might do the same, more particularly as they would save about 20 *per cent.* by the transaction.

If, however, government are not able to export sufficient sums to defray their expenses here, I trust they will not put a stop to this traffic by individuals, unless, indeed, they should recall the army.

I am afraid that from the spirit and tone in which the letters from the Treasury are written, I have not given satisfaction to that department of the government, which I regret much. I have done every thing in my power to keep down the expenses, and it is not my fault if they have increased. The question is, are we at war with France for the existence and independence of the country? and is it advisable to maintain the contest as long as possible at a distance from home? If it be so, government must make up their mind to incur expense. It is impossible to carry on the war in the Peninsula, upon any great or advantageous scale, without having the means and the power of aiding the allies to put their troops in motion and in operation. I can easily confine my attention to the British army and the subsidiary Portuguese troops, but in doing so I throw up a great part of the game, which may be lost for want of attention to other means of resisting and annoying the enemy.

Besides Romana's army, there are no less than 3 Spanish detachments of considerable strength on the frontiers of Portugal, with which I am in communication. All these require assistance, and might have been made available. Without this assistance I can hardly expect they will do any thing. The war continues in all parts of the Peninsula, and does not appear to be nearer its end than it was a year ago. It will be rather disgraceful if we should be the first to withdraw from it, leaving all these Spanish armies and detachments on foot; and although it may be a very good argument in Parliament, it will not do *in foro conscientie*, to say that these people were unable to do any thing for themselves, when we know that the well applied assistance of Great Britain, which could and ought to be afforded to them, would have enabled them to co-operate with us. Depend upon it that the contest won't last a day after we shall withdraw from it, and we shall yet repent its conclusion.

What I have written may be inconsistent with the opinion of people in England, and with the politics of the government. I wish that the government were stronger, and that more pains were taken to inform and guide the opinion of people upon this as well as other important subjects. I see more and must know more of what is going on here than others, and I certainly have no prejudice in favor of the continuance of our exertions here, founded upon any partiality for the business of guiding them; but I sincerely feel what I write, that if the resources of Great Britain were fairly applied to this contest, as they have been to any other in which the country has been engaged, the French would yet repent the invasion of Spain.

To the Earl of Liverpool (p. 174).

Alverca, 18th July, 1810.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch of the 26th June.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a report from Lieut. Col. Fletcher, on the success of an attempt to procure water in the Berlingas.

I have desired him to persevere in his endeavors to obtain water in wells, without which it is impossible to be certain of a supply.

I wrote some days ago to His Majesty's minister at Cadiz, to request that he would apply to the Regency for permission to send an officer to survey the Bayona islands, with a view to secure the possession of them. I have not received an answer, but I learn from Adm. Berkeley that a Spanish ship of the line has been sent to Vigo with directions to take possession of the Bayona islands, and to fortify and erect storehouses upon them. I propose, however, to draw the attention of the King's minister at Cadiz again to this subject, as it cannot be expected that the Spanish government will effect what ought to be done at those islands, either so expeditiously or so well as it can be done by British officers

To the Earl of Liverpool (p. 238).

Celorio, 20th Aug. 1810.

I have received your Lordship's dispatch of the 19th July, in which you enclosed a letter from the Sec. to the Treasury, containing the instructions of the Treasury to Mr. Drummond for his guidance in the commission with which he is charged by their Lordships.

Nothing can be more satisfactory to me than that the Lords of the Treasury should have an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the objects referred to Mr. Drummond through a channel in which their Lordships place confidence, and every information and assistance that it is in my power to afford shall be given to Mr. Drummond; but as some points are referred to the consideration of Mr. Drummond, upon which it might be very inconvenient, if not injurious to the public service, to make any alteration in the system now in practice, such as the directions conveyed to him 'to point out any articles which he may think might be supplied from Great Britain or from any other part of the world either for the use of the British army, or in part payment of the subsidy to Portugal,' and in the directions to him to report any observations or suggestions which may occur to him for reducing the demand for money, and it may be desirable that your Lordship and the Lords of the Treasury should receive the opinion of the Commissary Gen. and myself upon Mr. Drummond's suggestions, as we have had some experience in the resources of this country, and the demands of different kinds of the army, I propose to desire Mr. Drummond to furnish the Commissary Gen. with copies of all his reports to the Treasury, in order that our observations upon them may reach their Lordships as soon as possible.

I also propose to direct Mr. Drummond not to make any alteration in the mode of raising supplies of money at Lisbon or at Cadiz without previous reference to me, of which directions, adverting to the evils which may result from any mistake of Mr. Drummond, I trust that His Majesty will approve.

To the Earl of Liverpool (p. 343).

Pero Negro, 19th Oct. 1810.

As it is possible that the army may be obliged to make marches during the winter, on which there will be a great consumption of shoes, I take the liberty of recommending to your Lordship to order to Lisbon,

without loss of time, 100,000 pairs of soldiers' shoes of the best quality; and that orders should continue to be given for the manufacture of them.

To Lieut. Gen. Mendizabal (p. 596).

Cartaxo, 12th Feb. 1811.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th inst., and to assure your Excellency that I am convinced of the importance of the preservation of Badajoz to the allies; and also that I am as certain that that fortress cannot be taken by the force which the enemy has actually before it, nor even with double that force, if the communication by the left of the Guadiana be preserved. I beg leave to refer to your Excellency the measures suggested to the late Marques de la Romana for the preservation of this communication, which, if adopted, must succeed. It will be necessary only that the troops should remain in the intrenched camp during the fine weather; and when the rains shall fill the Gevora, they may go into Badajoz, or return to their cantonments in the neighbourhood of Elvas.

With regard to your Excellency's expectations that I should be able to send reinforcements from the army under my command, it is only necessary that I should remind your Excellency of what I have already stated to you, that the enemy in my front has an army equal to that which I command; for since its occupation of its present position it has received reinforcements of not less than 13,000 men, whereas that which I command has been diminished by the separation from it of the Spanish troops, necessary to be employed elsewhere on a more important service. Under these circumstances your Excellency will see that it is impossible for me to detach any troops from this army to assist you, until I receive the reinforcements which I expect from England; and even when they shall arrive, the possibility of detaching any part to assist your Excellency must chiefly depend upon the movements of the enemy, who has also 10,000 men on the frontier not yet joined.

My opinion is that your Excellency has acted wisely in drawing out of Badajoz all the troops not absolutely necessary for the defence of that fortress.

I am responsible for preserving the communication between Elvas and Badajoz so long as your Excellency adopts the measures recommended to the Marques de la Romana, and directed by him to be observed. In order to insure these measures, the cavalry you have already supported by the infantry under your command is quite sufficient. But it is necessary that your Excellency should well consider that the object is the security of Badajoz, and to prepare means for that purpose, and to form an intrenched camp on the ground already pointed out.

Gen. Vives will have already informed your Excellency of the orders given that his troops shall be assisted with rations, &c., which will be continued so long as it is possible to furnish them.

It is very obvious that in the last extremity it will be very difficult, if not impossible, completely to raise the siege of Badajoz, if the allies possess no other passage of the Guadiana than that of the bridge of Badajoz. I hope, therefore, that your Excellency will carry into effect the direc-

tions pointed out by the late Marques de la Romana, who recommended that the bridge of boats should be taken to Elvas.

I felt much pleasure on hearing that the Spanish officers and soldiers employed in the late sortie from Badajoz conducted themselves to the satisfaction of your Excellency. For my part I have never doubted of their valor and conduct, when well and prudently commanded. I avail myself of this opportunity of expressing the assurances of my high consideration.

To Lieut. Gen. Mendizabal (p. 608).

Cartaxo, 18th Feb. 1811.

I have just had the honor to receive your Excellency's letter of the 15th, by which I am grieved to learn that your Excellency has thought it necessary to retire your troops from the heights of San Cristoval. Your Excellency, without doubt, is the best judge of the necessity of this movement. At all events it appears advisable that your Excellency should maintain your advanced posts on the Gevora as long as possible, maintaining thereby the communication with Badajoz. I beg leave to recommend that your Excellency should lose no time in removing the pontoon bridge from Badajoz, and to have ready all that may be necessary to repair the permanent stone bridge; for if the enemy should obtain possession of the heights of San Cristoval, and find means of destroying it, this being done, your Excellency will have the power of restoring the communication as soon as it is possible to assemble a sufficient force for that purpose.

As regards the other letter, requiring assistance, I do not exactly comprehend what your Excellency means. Gen. Leite has given you tents, and is ordered to furnish powder from Elvas, but not to supply provisions; but the British Commissaries Thompson and Routh, both in Elvas for the purpose of furnishing provisions to your Excellency and Gen. Leite, has been instructed to assist in procuring them. I know not what other assistance is required by your Excellency, with the exception of troops, and I have already written to your Excellency on this subject.

To Lieut. Gen. Mendizabal (p. 612).

Cartaxo, 22d Feb. 1811.

I had the honor to receive this morning your Excellency's letter of the 19th inst., and I sincerely deplore the late misfortune. It was unfortunate that your Excellency did not construct some works on the heights of San Cristoval, by which aid it would appear impossible that the enemy should have been able to force the position, and, at all events, they would have served to cover the retreat that your Excellency had determined upon. Your Excellency not having entered into detail of the extent of the late unfortunate occurrence, it is very difficult for me to point out what line of operations it is necessary to observe. If I were certain, as is generally reported, that only 500 infantry and 400 cavalry of the army under your Excellency's command can be assembled, having lost all its artillery and baggage, my advice would be very different to that formed under your Excellency's belief that you have from 10,000 to 12,000 men. Undoubtedly the principal object is that Badajoz should afford the greatest possible resistance, in order to give time to the arrival of troops



expected to arrive, and that measures adequate to present circumstances should be taken before assistance can be afforded. Consequently, if it be possible for your Excellency to communicate with the garrison, I request your Excellency strongly to recommend it to hold out until the last extremity, which may be of the greatest importance to the common cause.

To Lieut. Gen. Mendizabal (p. 614).

Cartaxo, 23d Feb. 1811.

Agreeably to the desire expressed last year by the late Marques de la Romana, I placed the fortress of Campo Maior under his protection and care. My opinion then was, not to place in that fortress either artillery or magazines, which might be made use of against Badajoz or Elvas; and that artillery and provisions should be left in it necessary only to save it from a *coup de main*, obliging the enemy to open trenches before it, if he wished to take it. The Marques informed me that he entirely agreed with my view.

Whilst your Excellency occupied the position of San Cristoval a very small force was necessary to prevent a *coup de main*; but after the occurrences of the 19th inst., in my opinion there ought not to be less than 500 good troops, under the orders of a Governor determined to do his duty, and place it à *couvert* to any *coup de main* which may be supposed to be tried to take it. I also beg leave to point out to your Excellency the importance of the defence of this fortress with regard to that of Badajoz. After the capture of Badajoz, if unfortunately it should happen (but which I hope to prevent), the circumstances relating to Campo Maior will be different. Its preservation, however useful, will not be of that importance, and not so easy of defence by a small garrison, now actually in it: the works might, therefore, be destroyed and the garrison entirely withdrawn.

I request your Excellency will consult with Gen. Leite on this point; and if he approves, and is of opinion, that not only after the fall of Badajoz, Campo Maior should not be of importance, but by its local position and defects in its works, should not be able, with any garrison, to resist a regular attack, and in no manner should be defensible with the garrison which circumstances permit your Excellency to place in it, I request your Excellency, in the event of Badajoz falling into the hands of the enemy, to blow up the works and withdraw the garrison. Notwithstanding, I am convinced your Excellency will appreciate the importance of placing in this fortress 500 good infantry, under the orders of a determined Governor, at the present moment.



# APPENDIX

TO

## THE FOURTH VOLUME.

No. I. (p. 61.)

### ORDRE DU JOUR.

Quartier général, à Valladolid, le 12 Mai, 1810.

Le 2<sup>e</sup>, 6<sup>e</sup>, et 8<sup>e</sup> corps sont prévenus que M. le Maréchal Masséna, Duc de Rivoli, Prince d'Essling, en prend le commandement en chef, par décret Impérial du 17 Avril dernier, sous le nom d'Armée de Portugal.

Le Prince a aussi le commandement des provinces du Nord de l'Espagne; savoir la Vieille Castille, la province de Soria, la province de Santander, les Asturies, la province de Leon, et celle de Valladolid, Palencia, Toro, Zamora, Salamanca, et Avila.

Le général de division Frivion est nommé Chef de l'Etat Major Général, et le général de division Eblé, du commandement de l'Artillerie de l'armée, par décret Impérial du 21 du même mois. Le quartier général de M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling est provisoirement établi à Valladolid.

Le général de division, Chef de l'Etat Major Général,      FRIVION.

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, à l'Armée de Portugal.

SOLDATS! Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi, en me confiant le commandement de son Armée de Portugal, a voulu m'associer à la gloire que vous allez acquérir dans la nouvelle expédition pour laquelle vous êtes destinés. Vous savez, Soldats, que la discipline et l'obéissance sont les premiers garants de la victoire; quels obstacles résisteront à votre valeur, quand une subordination rigoureuse aura préparé vos succès! Vous trouverez toujours dans ma conduite, et dans mes camarades, vos chefs, l'exemple de la persévérance dans les difficultés. Vos fatigues, vos privations, et vos périls nous seront communs, ainsi que le résultat glorieux que S. M. attend du dévouement de ses braves de l'Armée de Portugal.

No. II. Translated from the Spanish translation. (p. 149.)

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général, au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli.

Le Havre, 28th May, 1810.

It appears by the accounts of the strength of the English army in Portugal, extracted from the London journals, that it consists of 23,000 English and Germans and 22,000 Portuguese.

The Emperor has commanded me to acquaint you what you are to do with the troops which are more than necessary to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, and to defeat the English if they attempt to raise the siege. His Majesty's intention is, that you should direct these operations with the 6th and 8th corps, leaving 2000 dragoons of the 8th corps with Gen. Kellermann, and also 3000 or 4000 infantry of that corps. These, when joined by the 4 auxiliary battalions, which will proceed from Burgos, and the Swiss battalions, will form a corps of 12,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, sufficient to keep up communications. You, Prince, with the 6th corps and the remainder of the 8th corps, forming more than 50,000 men, ought to take Ciudad Rodrigo and beat the English if they advance. I have written to His Majesty the King of Spain, and to Marshal Duc de Dalmatie, to place under your orders Gen. Regnier and the 2d corps, which he commands; and an order has been sent to Gen. Regnier to proceed across the Tagus at Alcantara, and to manœuvre with you on the right of the Tagus.

## No. III. (pp 175, 176.)

L'Inspecteur aux Revues, officier de la Légion d'Honneur, Secrétaire Général du Ministère de la Guerre, à S. E. M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, Major Général de Sa Majesté Catholique le Roi d'Espagne. Paris, le 8 Juin, 1810.

Le Ministre me charge d'avoir l'honneur d'adresser ci joint à votre Excellence trois livrets de l'Emplacement des troupes à l'époque du 1<sup>er</sup> de ce mois.

Le Ministre vous prie, M. le Maréchal, de vouloir bien lui faire renvoyer les trois livrets du mois de Mai dernier.

Je prie votre Excellence d'agréer l'hommage de mon respect.

## No. IV. (p. 150.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Vice Connétable et Major Général.

Au bivouac devant Ciudad Rodrigo, 2 Juillet, 1810.

Nous avons affaire à des gens bien déterminés; je leur ferai encore une sommation, et s'ils se refusent à une capitulation, je les réduirai par la force. . . . . Les habitants sont les plus opiniâtres.

Les Anglais ont leurs avant postes sur la rive gauche de l'Azava; nous occupons la rive droite, et nos vedettes sont en présence. Le gén. Craufurd est à Gallegos avec 7000 ou 8000 hommes, et Lord Wellington, avec le reste de son armée, occupe les environs d'Almeida. Je bloque étroitement Ciudad Rodrigo, et je suis en mesure de recevoir les Anglais s'ils voulaient secourir cette place, ce que je ne crois pas qu'ils oseraient faire.

Le Duc d'Abrantes commande toutes les troupes qui sont sur la rive gauche de l'Aguada, où se trouve la cavalerie des 6<sup>e</sup> et 8<sup>e</sup> corps.

Nous éprouvons beaucoup de difficultés pour les subsistances, surtout à cause du manque de transports. Il n'y a ni chevaux ni voitures dans le pays; nous devons tout faire venir ici par nos propres moyens, et il faut trois jours pour que les convois nous arrivent de Salamannique.

## No. V. (p. 166.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major Général. Au bivouac sous Ciudad Rodrigo, le 12 Juillet, 1810.

La belle conduite de la 3<sup>me</sup> comp<sup>te</sup> de grenadiers du 22<sup>me</sup> de ligne, contre un parti Anglais, ne peut être passée sous silence. Cette compagnie envoyée, le 11 au matin, à Villar de Puerco pour soutenir une reconnaissance de dragons, avait à peine dépassé le village qu'un parti de cavalerie Anglaise, de plus de 400 chevaux, est sorti du bois à gauche de la route et a chargé la compagnie de grenadiers. Le capitaine de cette compagnie forma aussitôt un carré par demi-sections; il attendit de pied ferme l'ennemi; un feu de file bien nourri fait à 30 pas, a arrêté la cavalerie ennemie, qui sabrait déjà dans les rangs et dont les coups n'ont porté que sur les fusils et les baïonnettes. Une 2<sup>me</sup> charge a été reçue de la même manière; 12 baïonnettes attestent qu'elles ont été enfoncées dans le poitrail des chevaux. L'ennemi allait tenter une 3<sup>e</sup> charge; mais il se ravisa, et récapitulant les pertes qu'il venait de faire, il prit le parti de se retirer. Les 2 premières charges ont laissé autour de notre carré 24 cavaliers morts, parmi lesquels le chef de la troupe et 20 chevaux. Nous n'avons eu de notre côté ni blessés ni tués. La présence d'esprit et la fermeté du capitaine Gouache et le courage du sergent Patois ont servi d'exemple aux braves grenadiers de la 3<sup>e</sup> compagnie du 22<sup>me</sup> de ligne. Cet exemple mérite nos encouragements et une récompense. Je prie V. A. de proposer le premier pour le grade de chef de bataillon, qui a été demandé plusieurs fois pour lui; et pour le deuxième la décoration de Légionnaire.

## No. VI. (p. 185.)

Le gén. Craufurd fut resserré jusque sous le canon de la place; il y fut attaqué et repoussé au-delà de la Coa par la brigade du Gén. Ferey et la cavalerie légère

du 6<sup>e</sup> corps. Les Anglais perdirent dans cette journée environ 1200 hommes tués ou blessés; notre perte s'éleva à environ 500 hommes. *Journal historique de la Campagne de Portugal, par le général Baron Fririon, p. 25.*

## No. VII. (p. 208.)

Proclamation du Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling.

1 Août, 1810.

PORTUGAIS! Les armées du grand Napoléon sont sur vos frontières et vont entrer sur votre territoire en amis et non en vainqueurs. Elles ne viennent pas pour vous faire la guerre, mais pour combattre ceux qui vous portent à la faire. Portugais, ouvrez les yeux sur vos intérêts. Qu'a fait l'Angleterre pour que vous souffriez la présence de ses soldats sur votre sol? Elle a détruit vos fabriques, ruiné votre commerce, et paralysé votre industrie, dans la seule vue d'introduire chez vous des objets manufacturés dans ses ateliers et de vous rendre ses tributaires. Que fait-elle aujourd'hui pour que vous embrassiez la cause injuste qui a soulevé contre elle toutes les puissances du continent? Elle vous trompe sur les résultats d'une campagne où elle ne veut rien risquer; elle se fait un rempart de vos baïonnettes, comme si votre sang devait être compté pour rien; elle se tient en mesure de vous abandonner quand cela conviendra à ses intérêts, dût-il en résulter des dommages pour les vôtres. Et pour mettre le comble à vos maux et à son insatiable ambition, elle envoie ses vaisseaux dans vos ports pour emmener dans ses colonies ceux de vos enfants qui auront échappé aux dangers auxquels elle les aura exposés sur le continent. La conduite de son armée devant Ciudad Rodrigo ne vous dit-elle pas assez ce que vous devez attendre de semblables alliés? N'ont-ils pas excité la garnison et les malheureux habitants de cette place par des promesses trompeuses, et ont-ils brûlé une seule amorce pour les secourir? Plus récemment encore ont-ils jeté quelques uns des leurs dans Almeida, si ce n'est un gouverneur chargé de vous engager à une défense aussi mal entendue que celle de Ciudad Rodrigo? Eh! ne vous ont-ils pas fait outrage en mettant ainsi dans la balance un seul Anglais contre 6000 de vos compatriotes? Portugais, ne vous laissez pas abuser plus long-temps; le puissant souverain dont tant de peuples bénissent les lois, la force et le génie, va assurer votre prospérité. Mettez-vous sous sa protection, accueillez ses soldats en amis, et vous trouverez sûreté pour vos personnes et vos propriétés. Les maux qui résultent de l'état de guerre vous sont connus; vous savez qu'ils vous menacent dans tout ce que vous avez de plus cher, dans vos enfants, vos parents, vos amis, vos fortunes, et votre existence politique et privée. Prenez donc une résolution qui vous offre tous les avantages de la paix. Restez tranquilles dans vos habitations; livrez-vous à vos travaux domestiques, et ne regardez comme vos ennemis que ceux qui vous conseillent une guerre dont toutes les chances sont contre le bien de votre pays.

## No. VIII. (p. 231.)

ORDRE DU JOUR.

Au Fort de la Concepcion, le 14 Sept. 1810.

Le Maréchal Prince d'Essling, commandant en Chef l'armée de Portugal, rappelle à l'armée que le respect qu'elle portera aux personnes et aux propriétés sera pour la nation Portugaise le présage de la prospérité qu'elle devra à S. M. l'Empereur et Roi, et pour les soldats la garantie du bon accueil qui leur sera fait dans les contrées qu'ils vont parcourir. Une mission ne peut être plus belle que celle qui est confiée à l'armée de Portugal: vaincre à la fois les Anglais par les armes, et par la persuasion et l'estime d'un peuple entier qu'on a trompé sur ses intérêts et sur la générosité Française; car toute l'armée sait que ce n'est pas aux Portugais que Napoléon le Grand l'a envoyée faire la guerre: les triomphes qui l'attendent annonceront qu'il n'a signalé à la valeur des braves qui la composent que l'ennemi du Continent.

Tous les soldats ayant leurs vivres avec eux, ils n'auront aucun prétexte de quitter leurs rangs, et il est expressément recommandé à MM. les officiers généraux et officiers de veiller à ce qu'ils marchent toujours en masse et serrés. La

plus stricte surveillance à cet égard est d'autant plus importante que la bravoure ne peut assurer le succès si elle n'est pas accompagnée de la discipline et du bon ordre; que la conduite des habitants sera déterminée par les premiers sentiments que leur inspirera la nôtre; et qu'enfin le salut de l'armée en général et la sûreté de chaque militaire en particulier y sont intéressés.

Le Maréchal Prince d'Essling ordonne que le présent ordre du jour sera lu à la tête de chaque compagnie, et prévient MM. les chefs de corps et officiers qu'ils sont personnellement responsables de son exécution conformément à l'ordre du jour du 14 Août.

#### No. IX. (p. 295.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Vice Connétable, Major Général. Visen, ce 22 Sept. 1810.

L'armée est partie le 16 d'Almeida, comme j'ai eu l'honneur d'en rendre compte à V. A. Les trois corps d'armée sont arrivés le 19 à Visen, après avoir parcouru des chemins affreux. L'ennemi s'est retiré partout à notre approche, et il s'est réuni sur Coimbra. J'ai porté le 2<sup>me</sup> et 6<sup>me</sup> corps sur le pont du Criz.

Les Anglais qui occupaient ces points en ont été chassés; le 8<sup>me</sup> corps est encore à Visen. Le grand parc d'artillerie et les gros bagages sont encore en arrière, et n'arriveront que demain. Les bagages ont été attaqués par 2000 Portugais, que 200 hommes ont suffi pour repousser avec perte. Il est impossible de trouver de plus mauvais chemins: ils sont hérissés de rochers: notre artillerie et nos bagages ont considérablement souffert, et je suis obligé de les attendre. Je les laisserai deux jours à Visen, à leur arrivée, pour s'y reposer, et je continuerai ma marche sur Coimbra, où on m'assure que je trouverai les Anglais et les Portugais réunis.

Monseigneur, nous ne marchons qu'à travers un désert; pas une âme nulle part; tout est abandonné. Les Anglais poussent la barbarie jusqu'à faire fusiller le malheureux qui resterait chez lui; femmes, enfans, vieillards, tout fuit. Enfin on ne peut trouver nulle part un guide. Nos soldats trouvent des pommes de terre, et d'autres légumes; ils sont fort contents, et ne respirent qu'après le moment de rencontrer l'ennemi.

Les marches nous ont fort peu donné de malades.

#### No. X. (p. 362.)

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général, à M. le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli. Paris, le 19 Sept. 1810.

Prince, L'Empereur m'ordonne de vous expédier un officier pour vous faire connaître que son intention est que vous attaquiez et culbutiez les Anglais. Lord Wellington n'a pas plus de 18,000 hommes, dont seulement 15,000 d'infanterie et le reste de cavalerie et d'artillerie. Le général Hill n'a pas plus de 6000 hommes, infanterie et cavalerie. Sa Majesté pense qu'il serait ridicule que 25,000 Anglais tinssent en balance 60,000 Français, qu'en ne tâtonnant pas et en les attaquant franchement, après les avoir reconnus, on leur fera éprouver de grands échecs. Quant aux troupes que vous devez laisser sur vos derrières, l'intention de l'Empereur est que vous laissiez les régimens provisoires de cavalerie. Votre armée a 12,000 hommes de cavalerie: il n'y en aura pas besoin de plus de 6000 en Portugal; c'est donc 6000 à laisser entre Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, et Salamanca: vous laisseriez à cette cavalerie quelques pièces d'artillerie. L'artillerie est le complément de la cavalerie. L'Empereur trouve que vous avez 4 fois plus d'artillerie qu'il ne vous en faut contre l'armée ennemie. Sa Majesté est trop éloignée, et la position de l'ennemi change trop souvent pour qu'elle puisse donner des conseils sur la manière de mener l'attaque, mais il est certain que l'ennemi est hors d'état de résister. D'après les nouvelles les plus sûres que l'on tient de l'espionnage à Londres, si l'on joint à l'armée Anglaise dans la Péninsule 4000 hommes qui sont à Cadix, on trouvera qu'elle est de 28,000 hommes, ce qui est toute la force des Anglais, qui ont renforcé leur armée de Malte et de Sicile.

## No. XI. (pp. 362, 368.)

Le général de Division Comte Claparède à S. A. le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Commandant en Chef de l'Armée de Portugal. Bayonne, le 26 Sept. 1810.

Je vais prendre à Vitoria le commandement d'une division de 15 beaux bataillons qui étaient à Essling, à Wagram, &c., et avec lesquels j'ai combattu sous les ordres de V. A. pendant la dernière campagne. Cette division sera la première du 9<sup>me</sup> corps de l'armée d'Espagne. Je désire, Monseigneur, que les événements me fassent trouver encore avec elle sous le commandement de V. A., et je ferai tous mes efforts pour continuer à mériter la bienveillance dont elle veut bien m'honorer. Je suis, avec un profond respect, &c.

## No. XII. (p. 451.)

Rapport de l'Intendant Gén. Lambert à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général, sur la situation de l'Armée de Portugal. Viseu, le 23 Sept. 1810.

L'Armée de Portugal a fait son mouvement le 15 de ce mois par les défilés de Guarda, Celorico, et Pinhel, regardés toujours comme impraticables pour les voitures. La dernière de ces communications, indiquée comme la seule où il fût possible de risquer des voitures d'artillerie et de vivres, s'est trouvée la plus longue et la plus mauvaise.

Le quartier général a couché le 16 à Freixedas, le 17 à Celorico, le 18 à Mangualde, le 19 à Viseu, où il attend encore l'arrivée de l'artillerie du grand parc et de la réserve.

Les points occupés aujourd'hui par l'armée entre Viseu et Coïmbre sont S<sup>ts</sup> Comba-Dão et Pont de Criz par le 2<sup>me</sup> corps ; Sabugosa, Tondella, et Casal de Maria par le 6<sup>me</sup> corps ; Viseu et son rayon par le 8<sup>me</sup> corps ; la réserve de cavalerie, le grand parc, et tous les équipages sont à 2 lieues en arrière, mais hors de danger, après avoir causé de véritables inquiétudes et retardé les opérations.

Les routes ne pouvaient être plus détériorées ni plus obstruées. Les ponts de la Coa, du Mondégo, et de leurs affluents étaient intacts ; ce qui est d'une grande importance dans un pays où les rivières sont profondément encaissées, et où le moindre ruissseau devient au premier orage un torrent formidable.

Villes, villages, hameaux, tout était désert, au point que le Prince n'a jamais eu un seul guide. Partout, les habitants avaient fui dans des lieux d'un accès difficile, chassant devant eux leurs bestiaux, et emportant de leurs maisons ce qui pouvait nous être de quelque utilité. Cependant l'extrême fertilité du pays, l'abondance des vins, celle des fruits et des plantes potagères, ont offert beaucoup de facilité d'existence au soldat, qui d'ailleurs avait du biscuit et du riz dans son sac, et ses parcs de bœufs à sa suite.

Le Beira produit peu de blé ; mais ses vallées sont couvertes de maïs ; ses cotéaux, de vignes ; ses bois plantés d'oliviers, de châtaigniers, et d'une espèce de chêne dont le gland offre un aliment agréable. Toutes ces productions seront utilisées lorsque leur maturité aura permis de les recueillir.

Viseu était sans habitants, comme tous les lieux où nous avons passé. On y a vainement cherché des magasins ; tout avait été évacué par l'armée ennemie. Les maisons des particuliers étaient cependant approvisionnées, ce qui a tourné au profit des soldats, sans qu'on ait pu en faire de distribution régulière, la nécessité de forcer les portes pour se loger ayant livré la plupart des maisons à des dégâts inévitables.

L'hôpital de Viseu avait 300 fournitures en bon état ; mais le Prince n'ayant pas considéré cette ville comme située dans sa ligne future de communications, j'ai dû renoncer à l'idée d'y établir le petit nombre de malades que les corps ont à leur suite.

C'est à présent, Monseigneur, que j'apprécie l'extrême utilité des brigades de mulets, qui, sans perte aucune, ont exactement suivi nos mouvements, tandis que les équipages, qui les ont retardés, arrivent dans un état déplorable.

Quatorze caissons du 1<sup>er</sup> bat. provisoire et 5 caissons du 10<sup>me</sup> ont été délabrés et brûlés ; le 1<sup>er</sup> bat. a perdu 15 chevaux, et le 10<sup>me</sup> 4 mulets. 29,000 rations de biscuit contenues dans ces caissons, et dans quelques autres qu'il a fallu alléger, ont été distribuées à différents régiments qui suivaient cette route, et n'ont pu parvenir au 6<sup>me</sup> corps, auquel elles appartenaient.

J'ai acquis l'expérience que 4 mulets de bât, portant 8 quintaux, marchent aussi vite que les colonnes; tandis qu'un caisson chargé à 800 ne peut franchir aucun des obstacles des montagnes. Aussi désirai-je organiser de cette manière nos attelages de relais, parce qu'il serait désavantageux au gouvernement de faire construire de nouveaux caissons à Lisbonne, y trouvât-on le moyen de le faire économiquement.

Je dois désirer que les 2 nouvelles brigades formées à Bayonne, malheureusement 3 mois après la demande que j'en avais faite, puissent atteindre le grand quartier général, et que 6 autres brigades puissent y être formées en toute hâte, ce seul genre de transport étant le seul propre aux routes de ce pays.

Telle est, Monseigneur, la situation de l'armée, qui reprendra bientôt son mouvement sur Coimbre.

No. XIII. (pp. 308, 404.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Vice Connétable, Major Général. Coimbra, ce 4 Oct. 1810.

Nous nous sommes mis en marche le 16 pour entrer en Portugal, ainsi que j'en ai prévenu votre Altesse. Le 5<sup>m</sup> jour nous sommes arrivés à Viseu, après avoir trouvé de très mauvais chemins. Nous avons dû nous y arrêter 5 jours pour donner au parc d'artillerie et aux équipages le tems d'arriver, et celui de se reposer, comme j'ai eu l'honneur de vous en rendre compte de Viseu même. Je suis parti le 24 de cette dernière place. Le 3<sup>m</sup>e jour de marche, je me suis trouvé devant la position de Busaco, qui était occupée par les deux armées Anglaise et Portugaise réunies. J'ai reconnu cette position. Le lendemain, à la pointe du jour, j'ai fait attaquer, à la gauche par le 2<sup>m</sup>e corps, et au centre par le 6<sup>m</sup>e : le 8<sup>m</sup>e corps restait en réserve. La position est assurément la plus forte de tout le Portugal. Le général Regnier est parvenu cependant au haut de la crête et commençait à s'y établir, lorsque le général Hill, avec un corps de 20,000 hommes, a attaqué en colonne serrée les troupes, qui, excédées de fatigue, commençaient à se former sur la crête de la montagne, et les a forcées à en descendre. Ce mouvement de retraite, soutenu par une bonne réserve, s'est faite avec ordre, et le 2<sup>m</sup>e corps a repris sa première position.

Au centre se trouvaient les divisions Loison et Marchand. La première a attaqué sur la droite du chemin qui conduit au couvent de Busaco, et l'autre vers la gauche. Obligé de gravir une montagne très escarpée pour rejoindre la grande route, le général Loison parvint, après de grands efforts, à gagner cette route, mais il n'eut pas le tems de s'y former en colonne et de s'y établir : deux colonnes Anglaises, serrées en masse, protégées par une nombreuse artillerie, sont arrivées au pas de charge, et ont forcé cette division à rétrograder. Le général Marchand, qui devait soutenir cette attaque, a pris position pour arrêter l'ennemi. Les Anglais n'ont pas osé avancer à plus de 300 toises hors de leur ligne de bataille. Le reste de la journée s'est passé à tirailler.

Après avoir reconnu attentivement cette position, que Lord Wellington n'aurait pas osé tenir, si, comme moi, il ne l'avait pas jugé extrêmement forte, je pris tout de suite mon parti, et je cherchais à obtenir par mes manœuvres un avantage qui nous aurait coûté trop de braves. J'envoyais des reconnaissances de cavalerie sur ma droite et sur ma gauche pour examiner le pays, et pour tenir les ennemis dans l'incertitude sur la direction de mes manœuvres. D'après ces rapports je me décidais à tourner l'armée Anglaise par ma droite. La position de Ponte da Murcella, que l'ennemi avait retranchée, et sur laquelle il pouvait marcher de flanc par la crête de Penacova, lui facilitait les moyens d'y porter toutes ses forces, en moins de 2 heures; au lieu que le chemin de Sardoão, traversant le col de Caramula, me conduisait sur Boialvo, dans un pays ouvert et fertile. Ce mouvement tournait la gauche de l'ennemi, et me rendait maître de manœuvrer sur son flanc. Je quittais donc le 28 à 6 heures du soir la position de Moira, et je marchais sur Boialvo. Le 8<sup>m</sup>e corps, qui n'avait pas souffert, faisait l'avant garde. Le 6<sup>m</sup>e formait le corps de bataille, et le 2<sup>m</sup>e se trouvait en arrière garde. Tous mes blessés me suivaient sur des caissons et bêtes de somme. L'ennemi, s'apercevant après minuit de cette manœuvre sur la gauche, laissa à Busaco une forte arrière garde, et marcha dans un grand désordre vers Coimbra sur plusieurs colonnes, après avoir fait sauter toutes ses munitions et brûlé tous les magasins. Je suis arrivé le 1<sup>r</sup> dans Coimbre. L'ennemi avait laissé toute sa cavalerie, avec quelques régimens d'infanterie que



j'ai fait charger. Il s'en retirait sur Condeixa. Le 2 j'ai envoyé l'avant garde sur ce village, et l'ennemi en a encore été chassé. Elle est aujourd'hui à Redinha. Ma cavalerie couvre tous les chemins qui aboutissent sur la route de Lisbonne, et le général Montribun s'est porté sur Figueira.

Lord Wellington avec l'armée Anglo-Portugaise est en pleine retraite sur Lisbonne. Il annonce le projet de vouloir nous disputer toutes les positions. Je marche réuni, et je ferai tout ce que je pourrai pour le décider à livrer bataille, seul moyen de le détruire ou de le forcer à se rembarquer. On porte le nombre des deux armées Anglaise et Portugaise à 60,000 ou 70,000 hommes, parmi lesquels 25,000 Anglais. L'ennemi brûle et détruit tout en évacuant le pays; il force tous les habitans à abandonner leurs foyers. Coimbre, ville de 20,000 âmes, est désertée; nous ne trouvons aucunes subsistances. L'armée vit avec le blé de Turquie, et les légumes que nous trouvons encore sur plantes. Lord Wellington, n'osant nous attendre en rase campagne, cherche à nous activer en ruinant tout ce qui pourrait nous alimenter. Les habitans des villes et des villages sont très malheureux. Il les contraint à servir sous peine de la vie; enfin aucune époque de l'histoire n'offre d'exemple d'une aussi grande barbarie.

Notre perte en tués et blessés est d'environ 3000 hommes, parmi lesquels beaucoup d'officiers. Le général Simon, de la division Loison, dangereusement blessé, est resté au milieu des rangs de l'ennemi. Le général Graindorge est mort de ses blessures. Le général de division Merle est blessé. Les généraux Foy et Maucune le sont également. Ils ne pourront de quelque tems reprendre leur service. Les colonels du 26<sup>me</sup> de ligne, des 6<sup>me</sup> et 32<sup>me</sup> légère, ont été tués, et plusieurs autres blessés. Il manque dans les corps un grand nombre d'officiers qu'il serait nécessaire de remplacer. L'armée Anglo-Portugaise a avoué avoir perdu 4000 hommes, dont la moitié Anglais.

Je laisse les blessés et malades à Coimbre, où je fais restaurer deux couvens. Je ne pourrai y laisser qu'un petit nombre de troupes pour les garder. Battaie les Anglais, et les forcer à se rembarquer, est la meilleure défense que je puisse leur laisser. Le général Regnier mérite les plus grands éloges, et s'est conduit en général expérimenté. Le général Loison continue à justifier sa réputation. Enfin, officiers et soldats tous ont combattu avec bravoure et dévouement. Je vous enverrai l'état des récompenses à accorder à la brave armée de Portugal, animée du plus grand dévouement pour le service de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

#### No. XIV. (pp. 404, 484.)

Copy of a paper taken on a person of the name of Mascarenhas, a Portuguese, in the French service, and aide de camp to Junot.

#### *Demandes et Réponses.*

*Demande.* Où avez vous laissé l'armée? *Réponse.* Marchant sur Lisbonne. L'avant garde était à Redinha. Le Général en Chef est parti le même jour que moi.

*D.* Où avez vous laissé les blessés et malades? *R.* A Coimbre, avec une garde de police et les vivres nécessaires; ayant rendu le peu d'habitans qui s'y trouvaient, et ceux qui sont rentrés, responsables du sort des Français qu'on y laissait; le Prince ayant jugé que 300 à 400 hommes n'y feraient pas plus qu'un plus grand nombre.

*D.* Quel est l'esprit de l'armée? *R.* Bon; surtout d'après la manœuvre du Général en Chef qui a tourné la position de l'ennemi.

*D.* Quel est l'esprit des Portugais? *R.* Fanatisé; les principaux tous Anglais; le bas peuple terrorisé par l'ennemi.

*D.* Croyez vous qu'on ira à Lisbonne? *R.* Tout le fait espérer, les Anglais étant en pleine retraite, et les Français pleins de confiance au Général en Chef.

*D.* Trouve-t-on des ressources dans le pays? *R.* Aucune, moins les légumes qui sont encore dans les champs. Le soldat n'a pas souffert jusqu'à présent.

*D.* Les commandans des corps sont ils d'accord avec le Général en Chef? *R.* Je l'ignore, mais le caractère du Général en Chef en impose aux commandans des corps d'armée.

*D.* L'armée a-t-elle beaucoup de munitions? *R.* Je sais qu'elle a deux millions de cartouches à sa suite, sans compter ce qu'elle a dans les gibernes.

*D.* Avez vous eu beaucoup de blessés à la bataille de Busaco? *R.* J'ai oui

dire qu'il y en avait eu de 2500 à 3000, mais que de leur propre avec les Anglais en ont perdu 4000. L'armée aurait besoin d'un renfort pour se maintenir à Lisbonne, et elle n'a pas le sou en caisse.

D. A combien estimez vous les armées Anglaises et Portugaises? R. De 60,000 à 70,000 hommes, dont 25,000 à 30,000 Anglais, sans compter les milices et ordonnances.

D. Quels sont les projets des Anglais? R. De défendre Lisbonne et ses approches, et d'y faire sauter les édifices publics. Les Anglais inspirent une grande terreur dans le pays, et forcent tous les habitants d'abandonner leurs maisons, et sous peine de mort de brûler toutes leurs ressources. Le Portugal est un désert.

D. Avez vous beaucoup de malades dans l'armée? R. Pas beaucoup. Le soldat se porte fort bien, et ne respire que de rencontrer les Anglais.

#### No. XV. (p. 363.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, à M. le général Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major Général. Alemquer, le 25 Oct. 1810.

M. le général; partez au reçu de la présente pour vous rendre à Santarem. Je n'ai jamais douté de tout le zèle et de la bonne volonté du général Eblé; je crains seulement que les obstacles qu'il doit nécessairement rencontrer pour l'établissement du pont ne le rebutent. Notre position est difficile, c'est pour cela que nous devons redoubler de moyens pour la vaincre. Vous visiterez à Santarem tout ce qui a été fait et préparé pour la construction du pont de bateaux ou de radeaux. Vous mettrez tout en note pour m'en faire un rapport.

Vous verrez l'Intendant général; vous saurez par lui quels sont les moyens qu'on prend pour réunir toutes les subsistances à Santarem. Vous lui direz que je suis instruit que dans plusieurs villages il y a beaucoup de blé dont on ne s'est point occupé, et qui se trouve à la merci de ceux qui veulent en prendre. Voyez le général Lazowski pour savoir où en sont les moulins, et si les fours sont commencés; vous le presserez pour ces établissements importants.

Vous verrez par vous-même l'hôpital qui doit être établi. Vous m'apporterez un état de toutes les denrées qui se trouvent à Santarem.

Après avoir vu par vous-même tous les établissements de cette ville, si vous le jugez nécessaire, vous irez voir les généraux Loison et Monbrun. *Vous examinerez leur position avec la plus grande attention, et vous verrez si l'expédition d'Abrantes est faisable avec le nombre de troupes mises à leur disposition, et si vous croyez qu'il soit nécessaire d'y envoyer M. le Maréchal Duc d'Elchingen. Voyez tout, et notez tout.*

Il me paraît indispensable que tout le bataillon de marins soit chargé de l'enlèvement des barques pour les faire descendre à Santarem. Après que vous aurez jugé que cette mesure est nécessaire, vous vous concerterez avec le général Eblé, que les marins partent et soient remplacés par des travailleurs de la garnison.

Ayez soin de m'instruire souvent de tout ce que vous aurez appris, de tout ce qu'il y aura à faire pour que mes intentions soient remplies.

Emmenez avec vous vos aides de camp et des officiers de l'Etat Major.

Vous m'enverrez l'état des ouvriers arrivés à Santarem, en distinguant ceux de l'artillerie de ceux des régiments.

Chemin faisant, si vous trouvez encore des télégraphes Anglais à Azambuja et Santarem, ordonnez leur destruction.

#### No. XVI. (p. 368.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, à M. le général Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major Général. Ce 29 Oct. 1810.

M. le général; je me suis décidé à me rendre à Santarem pour voir par moi-même ce qu'on y fait et ce qu'on y peut faire pour l'établissement d'un pont. C'est avec regret que je m'éloigne du centre des opérations militaires; *mais ce qui me tranquillise c'est que je vous y laisse.*

Mon premier aide de camp, M. Pelet, reste à Alemquer avec l'ordre de déca-cheter toutes les lettres à mon adresse: il vous communiquera toutes celles qui

sont relatives au service. *Vous pourrez répondre aux demandes, et donner les solutions qui sont de votre ressort, comme du mien.*

Vous trouverez ci-incluses les dispositions que j'ai arrêtées dans le cas où l'armée serait obligée de changer de position. Chaque commandant de corps d'armée y a son affaire tracée. Vous n'aurez plus qu'à en suivre l'exécution, et me dépêcher de suite un de mes aides de camp pour m'en donner avis.

Je ne puis vous dire précisément le temps que je passerai à Santarem : il pourrait bien se faire qu'il fût de trois jours au plus ; je veux tout voir par moi-même et prendre telle résolution que les circonstances pourraient m'indiquer.

Veillez, M. le général, avoir quelque confiance en mon premier aide de camp ; il a la mienne et méritera la vôtre ; vous lui communiquerez ce que vous pourrez faire pour les décisions à prendre dans les cas d'urgence en attendant ma présence ou ma réponse. Je vous embrasse.

### *Dispositions.*

Le 2<sup>e</sup> corps abandonnant ses positions de Villa Franca viendrait se mettre en bataille sur la route de Villa Nova, et les troupes qui occupent Arruda suivraient le mouvement du 8<sup>e</sup> corps qui évacuerait Sobral pour ne pas découvrir son flanc gauche. Ce mouvement général fini, le 2<sup>e</sup> corps occuperait sa nouvelle position avec toutes ses troupes, la gauche à Villa Nova avec la cavalerie et sa droite sur les hauteurs vis-à-vis le moulin qui est sur le ruisseau d'Alemquer. Le 2<sup>e</sup> corps ne commencerait son mouvement de Carregado qu'après s'être assuré que le 8<sup>e</sup> aurait totalement évacué Alemquer, et qu'il est sur la grande route d'Alcoentre. Sa cavalerie observerait toujours l'ennemi. M. le général Reguié ferait des coupures sur la grande route et mettrait le feu à Villa Franca et Castanheira s'il le jugeait nécessaire pour arrêter la marche de l'ennemi.

Le 8<sup>e</sup> corps se retirerait, la 1<sup>re</sup> brigade sur la 2<sup>e</sup>, et successivement jusque sur la division Loison, en défendant tous les mamelons. Arrivé sur la hauteur d'Alemquer, il aurait soin de jeter des troupes dans les gorges de cette ville pour donner le temps à l'artillerie de se retirer par la grande route de Minho Novo. L'artillerie passée, ce corps se retirerait par les hauteurs en arrière d'Alemquer sur Minho Novo, et de là sur Minho de Cubo pour aller occuper les hauteurs d'Aveiras, sa gauche vis-à-vis le confluent des ruisseaux d'Ota et de Guerclino. M. le Duc d'Abrantès aurait soin, en commençant son mouvement rétrograde, d'envoyer l'ordre à son parc, qui est à Minho Novo, de se retirer en arrière de Minho de Cubo.

La division Marchand du 6<sup>e</sup> corps, qui est à Villa Nova, dès qu'elle apprendrait que le 2<sup>e</sup> corps fait un mouvement rétrograde, se porterait à Alcoentre par la grande route. La division Mermet, assurée que le 8<sup>e</sup> corps s'est retiré, et qu'il est à hauteur de Minho de Cubo, ferait son mouvement pour aller se placer à la Señora d'Amexeira. La division Loison tenant la tête du 8<sup>e</sup> corps, irait prendre sa position de bataille, sa droite à la gauche de la division Mermet.

La cavalerie du général Treillard resterait toujours en position à Alcoentre.

### No. XVII. (p. 391.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général. Alemquer, le 29 Oct. 1810.

J'envoie le général Foy à Paris, pour vous rendre compte de la position de l'armée.

Depuis 12 jours je suis devant les ouvrages de l'armée Anglo-Portugaise : elle est derrière 3 lignes de retranchements auxquels elle a fait travailler depuis 18 mois. Le croquis ci-joint vous indiquera ses positions et les nôtres.

Je n'ai pas cru devoir attaquer des retranchements garnis d'une artillerie formidable et un ennemi deux fois plus nombreux que nous : j'aurais été lui donner trop d'avantages, et j'aurais compromis l'armée de Sa Majesté l'Empereur. Je n'aurais pas balancé à livrer bataille en rase campagne ; mais dans l'état actuel des choses, je me borne à l'observer sur tous ses débouchés, et, dans le cas où il voudrait me la donner lui-même, je me replierais sur une ligne que j'ai reconnu nous être la plus avantageuse sur les coteaux d'Aveiras, ligne ayant sa gauche à

Villa Nova, et sa droite à Minho de Cubo, dans la direction d'Alcoentre, et en vrant les deux grandes routes de Leiria et de Thomar.

J'ai fait à Santarem mes principaux établissements; on y a formé un grand hôpital. J'y ai fait construire des fours, rétablir tous les moulins, réunir tous les grains qui sont assez abondants, et rassembler tous les matériaux que le pays peut offrir pour y jeter un pont de bateaux, et, à défaut, un pont de radeaux; mais l'ennemi a tellement détruit tous les moyens quelconques, que je ne sais si je pourrai parvenir à le faire construire. Nous n'avons aucun des outils dont on aurait besoin pour cet objet; je suis obligé d'en faire fabriquer. J'ai réuni tous les ouvriers de l'armée pour y travailler. Les généraux Eblé et Lazowski président à tous les ouvrages avec la plus grande activité; mais quelque grands que soient nos efforts, j'espère, et je n'ose rien assurer.

L'armée trouve encore assez de vivres dans les positions qu'elle occupe: tous les moulins du pays travaillent pour elle; on ne peut pas dire jusqu'à présent que l'armée ait éprouvé de besoins. Le beau temps a succédé à 10 jours de pluies abondantes et continues. Les officiers Portugais que j'ai avec moi, nous assurent qu'il pourra bien continuer pendant tout Novembre.

L'armée, depuis notre départ d'Almeida, a un déficit de 7000 à 8000 hommes, tant blessés, morts et prisonniers, qu'égarés, dont on ignore le sort; les malades ne pouvant faire le service sont aussi compris dans ce déficit, qui, pour cette raison, se trouve aussi considérable. Ci-join l'état de situation.

Nous n'avons pas trouvé un seul habitant dans tout le pays que l'armée a parcouru; et ce qu'on aura de la peine à croire, pas même dans les grandes villes, comme Coïmbre, d'une population ordinairement de 20,000 âmes. Depuis que je suis devant Lisbonne, je n'ai pas pu y envoyer un seul homme. La classe moins aisée du peuple s'est réfugiée dans les bois; les riches ont suivi l'armée Anglaise à Lisbonne. Ce n'est absolument qu'un désert, où les officiers Portugais que j'ai avec moi n'ont pu être d'aucune utilité à l'armée.

Les pluies nous ont considérablement avarié de cartouches; nous n'en avons pas beaucoup en partant d'Almeida, comme j'ai eu l'honneur d'en rendre compte à V. A., de manière que je suis obligé d'y apporter la plus grande économie, et de ne réprimer qu'avec la plus grande circonspection l'insolence des postes Anglais.

Je me tiens dans mes positions, dans l'espérance que les Portugais réfugiés à Lisbonne feront peut-être un mouvement contre les Anglais, qui les ont réduits à la plus affreuse misère, ou bien que Lord Wellington quittera ses retranchements pour venir recevoir ou me donner bataille. Si mes efforts pour l'établissement d'un pont sur le Tage ont un heureux succès, je pourrai alors manœuvrer sur les deux rives, et vivre avec les ressources de l'Alentejo, pays abondant en blé, et le plus riche du Portugal. Je puis aussi, dans la position où je me trouve, attendre la réserve que S. M. n'aura pas manqué de m'envoyer, suivant ce qui est dit dans les instructions de V. A. Je dois cependant la prévenir que je pars aujourd'hui pour aller visiter tout le cours du Tage jusqu'à Santarem, et même jusqu'au confluent du Zézere. Si l'établissement d'un pont de bateaux ou de radeaux était absolument impraticable, et qu'il me fût impossible de passer le fleuve, je me déciderais à faire un mouvement rétrograde avant les grandes pluies; mais ce ne serait qu'après m'être bien convaincu qu'il n'y aurait pas d'autre part à prendre. Je me dirigerais par la route de Ponte da Murrella et de Guarda, pour ne pas suivre le chemin que j'ai déjà fait, et pour trouver quelques ressources.

Ma position est difficile; mais, je le répète, attaquer 3 lignes de retranchements, et un ennemi qui a deux fois autant de forces que moi, et, derrière lui, tous les moyens nécessaires pour se rembarquer, ne m'a pas paru convenable pour le bien du service de S. M. J'ai donc pris le parti de me mettre sur la défensive, en attendant les ordres de S. M., et le résultat des dispositions que je fais.

Au reste, le général Foy donnera à S. M. et à V. A. tous les détails qu'elle pourra désirer. Ils la convaincront qu'en résumé nous avons besoin ici d'un renfort de troupes, de munitions, de souliers, et d'argent.

J'ai cherché tous les moyens possibles pour donner de mes nouvelles à V. A., je ne sais si elles lui seront parvenues. Je lui en ai envoyé de Visen, de Coïmbre, par un officier Portugais (M. Mascarenhas), de Leiria, et d'Alenquer. Je me suis enfin décidé à faire partir le général Foy avec un détachement.

## No. XVIII. (pp. 391, 445.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Vice Connétable et Major Général. Ce 3 Nov. 1810.

Votre Altesse a sans doute reçu les lettres que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui écrire de Viseu et de Coïmbre. Après avoir bien reconnu, les 13, 14, et 15, l'ennemi enfermé dans son camp retranché sur les hauteurs de Lisbonne, je vous ai écrit une longue lettre, mais j'ai lieu de penser qu'elle ne vous sera pas parvenue. J'offre tous les jours la bataille à l'ennemi; mais il se tient enfermé dans ses retranchements. Je fais partir le général Foy avec 200 hommes pour donner la direction à ma division d'arrière-garde que commande le général Gardanne et au 9<sup>e</sup> corps qui est en ce moment sur les frontières du Portugal. J'ordonne au général Foy, lorsqu'il sera arrivé à Almeida, de laisser son escorte et de se rendre en diligence à Paris pour donner à votre Altesse les détails qu'elle peut désirer sur la situation de l'armée, et des renseignements vrais sur les articles ridicules que nous voyons ici dans les papiers de Londres.

## No. XIX. (p. 425.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, à M. le général Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major Général. Santarém, 7 Nov. 1810.

Je désire, mon cher général, que vous alliez demain visiter la ligne du 8<sup>e</sup> corps : vous irez jusqu'à Sobral. Vous examinerez la position de l'ennemi, et vous saurez ce que M. le Duc pense, quelle est la confiance qu'il a sur sa ligne et sur ses troupes.

Le chef de bataillon Pelet se portera sur la ligne d'Arruda ; il l'examinera dans le plus grand détail, et m'en fera un rapport bien circonstancié.

P.S. Ne manquez pas de causer avec Solignac, avec Clausel et autres généraux.

## No. XX. (p. 425.)

Le général Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major Général, au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli. Alemquer, le 8 Novembre, à minuit.

J'arrive de Sobral, ayant visité avec attention la ligne du 8<sup>e</sup> corps depuis sa droite jusqu'à sa gauche. Comme je dois compte à V. A. de tout ce que je pense, je lui dirai avec franchise ce que j'ai remarqué.

Il m'a paru que l'ennemi, en abandonnant les points qu'il occupait lorsque j'eus l'honneur d'accompagner V. A., avait eu pour but de forcer le 8<sup>e</sup> corps à s'étendre et à multiplier ses postes ; ce qui me le fait croire, c'est que les positions laissées par l'ennemi et gardées par la division Clausel, sont dominées par les retranchements des Anglais, dont les canons portent leurs boulets au-delà de nos avant-postes.

Sobral est, comme le sait V. A., enfoncé entre plusieurs mamelons, défendus par la division Clausel. Ces mamelons sont à leur tour environnés de montagnes plus élevées et liées à une chaîne d'autres montagnes qui se prolongent dans la direction de Torres Vedras à Otta. L'ennemi occupe ces montagnes à notre droite ainsi que leur prolongement sur les derrières de Sobral, de telle sorte que ce village peut être considéré comme le centre d'un cercle, dont les Anglais occupent au-delà de la demi-circonférence.

Il semble que si, dans cet état de choses, les ennemis avaient des projets offensifs, ils pourraient, en occupant le front du 8<sup>e</sup> corps par des attaques simulées, ou manœuvrer sur le flanc droit de ce corps d'armée, et même sur ses derrières, par la route de Torres Vedras à Alemquer, ou manœuvrer sur son flanc gauche par la vallée d'Arruda, dont il est maître.

Il n'est pas présumable que le général Anglais songe à faire le premier de ces deux mouvements, parce qu'alors il s'éloignerait de sa forte position, et jusqu'à présent il s'est montré trop circonspect pour tenter une manœuvre qui placerait son armée et la nôtre dans une position égale ; mais si le général Anglais, partant d'Arruda, rassemblait sur ce point, pendant la nuit, 15,000 à 20,000 hommes, et

qu'en attaquant le général Ferey au point du jour, il parvint à s'établir sur les hauteurs d'Alemquer, il est probable que le 2<sup>e</sup> corps aurait beaucoup à faire pour les expulser, en supposant que l'ennemi l'occupât par de fausses attaques pour faire diversion. De son côté, le 8<sup>e</sup> corps aurait à combattre l'ennemi placé sur son point de retraite, et s'il ne parvenait pas à se faire jour, il faudrait qu'il se jetât sur Otta, étant exposé à perdre ses canons et ses caissons.

Le Duc d'Abrantes m'a paru avoir une grande confiance dans ses troupes et dans sa position; j'ai partagé son opinion relativement aux troupes, mais nullement sur la position. Je pense que si V. A. ne veut pas garder Sobral, il vaudrait mieux peut-être s'en éloigner volontairement, pour détacher l'ennemi de ses lignes et le combattre avec des chances égales, que de se retirer au moment où il nous attaquerait. Car les Anglais ne manqueraient pas de signaler comme une victoire la manœuvre que ferait V. A. en leur présence pour changer de position.

Le général Clausel fait observer que, dans le courant de la journée, on ne peut guère compter que sur les gardes, la plupart des soldats étant en course pour chercher du maïs et quelques bestiaux; le dernier détachement qui vient de rentrer est resté absent pendant 9 jours.

D'après le dire des généraux et l'assertion de plusieurs soldats, il résulte que l'on ne trouve qu'avec peine quelques sacs de froment; que depuis 8 jours la troupe vit de polenta, qu'elle n'en a que demi-ration. Depuis 4 jours la 1<sup>re</sup> division ne reçoit pour ration de viande que 6 onces de chèvre; elle réclame des caissons que l'intendant général a gardés. Si elle venait à faire un mouvement, elle serait obligée de laisser ses malades et quelques hommes grièvement blessés....

..... J'aurais désiré être plus laconique dans ce rapport; mais d'après la constante sollicitude dont V. A. est animée, j'ai cru ne devoir rien omettre de tout ce qui peut intéresser l'armée.

#### No. XXI. (p. 425.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, au général Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major Général.  
Ce 10 Nov. 1810.

Veillez à ce que les hôpitaux d'Alemquer et d'Azambuja s'évacuent, qu'il ne reste rien à Alemquer. Vous resterez dans cette ville pour suivre les mouvements des 8<sup>e</sup> et 2<sup>e</sup> corps, et vous viendrez ensuite me joindre à Santarem. .... Que mes dispositions ne soient connues de personne, couvrez d'un prétexte quelconque les ordres préparatoires que vous pourrez donner .....

Les dispositions générales pour un changement de position étaient ainsi conçues : La nouvelle position que l'armée devra occuper aura sa gauche à Santarem, son centre à Torres Novas, et sa droite à Thomar, s'appuyant sur le Zezere, dont la rive gauche sera occupée par la division Loison, qui appuiera elle-même sa droite à Punhete.

Les deux régiments de cavalerie du général Treillard se porteront à Leiria, où ils resteront jusqu'à nouvel ordre, communiquant avec Thomar par Ourém.

La division Mermet se rendra dans 3 ou 4 jours de marche sur Torres Novas et de là à Thomar, en passant par Alcoentre, Rio Maior, et Alcanhede.

Le 8<sup>e</sup> corps se repliera d'abord sur Alemquer, de là il prendra la route de Minho de Cubo, Aveiras de Cima et Cartaxo, pour se rendre à Santarem. M. le Duc d'Abrantes se dirigera, avec sa 1<sup>re</sup> division, sur Golegão, où il s'établira; sa 2<sup>e</sup> division et sa cavalerie s'établiront à Torres Novas. Le parc de ce corps d'armée prendra la route de Villa Nova avec les 6 bouches à feu qui en font partie et se rendra à Golegão; les 6 autres pièces qui sont en position suivront le mouvement de M. le Duc d'Abrantes.

La brigade Ferey du 6<sup>e</sup> corps d'armée suivra le mouvement du 8<sup>e</sup> corps jusqu'à Golegão, où elle prendra la route de Punhete, pour rejoindre sa division.

Le 2<sup>e</sup> corps devra d'abord se replier sur Carregado et Villa Nova, et de là sur Santarem; il sera le dernier à exécuter son mouvement, devant couvrir, après être arrivé à Carregado et Villa Nova, la marche du 8<sup>e</sup> corps, jusqu'à ce que ce dernier corps ait dépassé Minho de Cubo.

Ce mouvement devra commencer à 8 heures du soir sans confusion, dans le plus

grand ordre et silence. Les dispositions préparatoires ayant déjà en lieu, il sera facile d'empêcher qu'il y ait le moindre désordre et le moindre embarras.

Messieurs les commandants des corps d'armée doivent ordonner que tous blés, farines et autres denrées, soient emportés.

Les équipages doivent marcher après l'avant-garde, et l'arrière-garde doit être faite par la cavalerie. On marchera dans le plus grand ordre; les soldats ne quitteront pas leurs rangs, et on ne les laissera pas ignorer que les traillards ne manqueraient pas d'être assassinés, s'ils ne suivaient pas la colonne.

Dès leur arrivée, messieurs les commandants des corps d'armée doivent faire occuper toutes les routes qui aboutissent à leurs nouvelles positions, faire baraquar les troupes, et, s'ils n'y voient pas d'inconvénients, les faire cantonner.

A ces dispositions, il fut ajouté pour le Duc d'Abrantes :

Vous donnerez la veille de votre mouvement l'ordre à votre parc d'artillerie et aux bouches à feu qui s'y trouvent d'aller coucher à Villa Nova, et d'en partir le lendemain à la pointe du jour pour aller coucher à Cartaxo, et se rendre ensuite à Golegão. Vos équipages suivront le même mouvement. Vous préviendrez le général Ferey de votre mouvement; il tiendra la tête de votre colonne, marchant la gauche en tête, jusqu'à Golegão, où il vous quittera pour se rendre à Punhete, rejoindre sa division.

Au général Regnier.

Vous verrez que vous ne devez quitter Carregado et Villa Nova que quand le 8<sup>e</sup> corps aura dépassé Minho de Cubo; vous laisserez en vous retirant de l'infanterie et de la cavalerie à Porto de Mugem, pour conserver le blé qui s'y trouve.

#### No. XXII. (pp. 422, 425.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, au général Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major Général.  
Santarem, 13 Nov. 1810.

J'ai écrit hier à M. le Duc d'Abrantes que ce n'était pas par Minho de Cubo, mais par Minho Novo que devait passer son corps d'armée. C'est dans ce dernier lieu que ce corps d'armée s'arrêtera le 15. Le général Regnier est également prévenu de ne pas dépasser Villa Nova le 15, et de lier sa droite avec le 8<sup>e</sup> corps. Le 16, ce dernier doit coucher à Azambuja pour ne pas se trouver en même temps que le 8<sup>e</sup> à Santarem; il n'y arrivera donc lui-même que le 17 (à Santarem). Tous les ordres ont été donnés.

Vous aurez soin de m'écrire le 16 à la pointe du jour à Torres Novas, pour me dire si l'ennemi fait quelques mouvements.

#### No. XXIII. (p. 445.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Vice Connétable, Major Général.  
Ce — Déc. 1810.

Ma position est difficile, mais, je le répète, attaquer trois lignes de retranchements et un ennemi qui a deux fois autant de force que moi, et derrière lui tous les moyens nécessaires pour se rembarquer, ne m'a pas paru convenable pour le bien du service de S. M. J'ai donc pris le parti de me mettre sur la défensive, en attendant les ordres de l'Empereur et le résultat des dispositions que je fais.

#### No. XXIV. (pp. 412, 445.)

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major Général, au Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie.  
Paris, le 4 Déc. 1810.

J'ai mis sous les yeux de l'Empereur, M. le Duc, vos différentes dépêches. S. M. a été mécontente que lorsqu'il s'agit de dispositions aussi importantes que celles qui tiennent à la sûreté de son armée en Portugal, vous ayez laissé le général la Romana se porter sur le Tage, sans le faire suivre l'épée dans les reins. Si l'armée du Prince d'Essling était battue, M. le Duc, vous devez sentir de quelle impor-

tance cela serait pour les armées de l'Empereur en Andalousie, et combien elles seraient compromises. Le mouvement même de la Romana prouve que ce qui se passe en Portugal est la chose la plus importante pour les affaires d'Espagne.

La position des Anglais est toujours à Torres Vedras, et en arrière de Villa Franca. Le Prince d'Essling est en position vis-à-vis de la ligne des Anglais. Ces derniers ont environ 30,000 hommes de leurs troupes, 10,000 Espagnols, et 30,000 Portugais. Le Prince d'Essling a environ 50,000 hommes; mais, ayant jugé la position de l'ennemi trop forte, il n'a pas jugé à propos de l'attaquer, et s'est lui-même retranché. Le Prince d'Essling a isolé Abrantes du Tage, et a commencé le siège de cette place, défendue par 2000 hommes de milices Portugaises.

Le Comte d'Erlon, M. le Duc, était le 18 Nov. à Guarda, avec un corps de 20,000 hommes, et il aura vraisemblablement battu tous les corps de milices Portugaises qui interceptaient les communications de l'armée du Prince d'Essling.

Le Prince d'Essling, avec ses forces et dans sa position, ne craint aucune attaque de la part des Anglais. Il compte garder sa position, et il s'occupe d'organiser ses moyens de subsistances dans la vallée du Tage. Il a fait faire un pont sur le Zezere, couvert par de bonnes têtes de pont, et par des ouvrages avancés considérables. Cette rivière, par sa nature, est le véritable obstacle qui rend difficile une entreprise par Castello Branco; de sorte que si des circonstances imprévues obligeaient le Prince d'Essling à évacuer sa position, il garderait toujours son pont sur le Zezere, ainsi que les ouvrages qui le défendent.

L'Empereur, M. le Duc, me charge de vous faire connaître qu'il est indispensable qu'un corps de 10,000 hommes, tiré de l'armée d'Andalousie, et composé d'infanterie, de cavalerie, et d'artillerie, se porte, soit sur Montalvão, soit sur les hauteurs de Villa Velha, pour se mettre en communication avec le Prince d'Essling et avec le général Drouet, et puisse concourir et servir à forcer les Anglais de se rembarquer. Toutes considérations, M. le Duc, doivent disparaître devant le mouvement que je vous prescris. Il importe peu que le 4<sup>me</sup> corps occupe beaucoup de terrain. S. M. pense que le siège de Cadix ne peut être disputé par les misérables troupes qui se trouvent enfermées dans cette place.

Par mes lettres des 30 Sept., 26 Oct., 14, 21, et 28 Nov., je vous ai réitéré la volonté de l'Empereur, et S. M. ne doute pas que déjà un corps, tiré de l'armée d'Andalousie, égal à la force de la Romana, ne soit en ce moment sur le Tage, en communication avec le Prince d'Essling; car, je vous le répète, aucune opération en Andalousie ne peut avoir de résultat, si l'armée du Prince d'Essling avait du désavantage, ce qui a été si bien senti par la Romana. S. M. vous ordonne donc, M. le Duc, de faire marcher un corps sur le Tage, pour concourir à l'opération principale, qui est la destruction des Anglais.

Vous trouverez ci-joints plusieurs 'Moniteurs,' qui vous feront connaître les nouvelles de Portugal du 12 Nov., parvenues par la voie de l'Angleterre.

#### No. XXV. (p. 449.)

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général, au Maréchal Prince d'Essling, Paris, le 4 Déc. 1810.

Le général Foy, que vous avez expédié, est arrivé à Paris le 22 Nov.; il a fait connaître à Sa Majesté, et dans le plus grand détail, ce qui s'est passé et votre position.

Dès le 4 Nov., le général Gardanne était en avant d'Almeida, avec un corps de 6000 hommes. Le Comte d'Erlon, avec les divisions Claparède, Conroux, et la cavalerie du général Fournier, a dû se trouver à Guarda vers le 20 Nov.

L'Empereur, Prince, a vu par les journaux Anglais, que vous aviez établi des ponts sur le Tage, et que vous en avez un sur le Zezere, défendu sur les deux rives par de fortes têtes de pont. Sa Majesté pense que vous devez vous retrancher dans la position que vous occupez devant l'ennemi; qu'Abrantes se trouvant à 800 toises du Tage, vous l'aurez isolé de son pont, et bloqué pour en faire le siège. L'Empereur vous recommande d'établir 2 ponts sur le Zezere, de défendre ces ponts par des ouvrages considérables, comme ceux de Spitz devant Vienne. Votre ligne d'opérations et de communications devant être établie par la route de Guarda, partant du Zezere, passant par Cardigos, suivant la crête des montagnes



par Campinha et Belmonte, vous aurez toujours la route de Castello Branco et Salvaterra, pour faire des vivres.

Je viens de donner de nouveau, au Duc de Dalmatie, l'ordre, déjà réitéré plusieurs fois, d'envoyer le 5<sup>me</sup> corps sur le Tage, entre Montalvão et Villa Flor, pour faire sa jonction avec vous. L'Empereur croit qu'il serait nécessaire de s'emparer d'Alcantara, de fortifier et de consolider tous les ponts sur le Zezere et sur le Tage, d'assurer toutes vos communications en saisissant les points favorables que peuvent offrir les localités, pour fortifier de petites positions, des châteaux ou maisons, qui, occupés par peu de troupes, soient à l'abri des incursions des milices.

Vous sentirez, M. le Prince d'Essling, l'avantage de régulariser ainsi la guerre, ce qui vous mettra à même de profiter de la réunion de tous les corps qui vont vous renforcer, pour marcher sur Lord Wellington, et attaquer la gauche de sa position, soit pour l'obliger à se rembarquer, en marchant sur la rive gauche du Tage; ou enfin, si tous ces moyens ne réussissaient pas, vous serez en mesure de rester en position pendant les mois de Décembre et de Janvier, en vous occupant d'organiser vos vivres, et de bien établir vos communications avec Madrid et Almeida.

L'armée du centre, qui est à Madrid, ayant des détachements sur Plasencia, vos communications avec cette capitale ne sont pas difficiles.

2,500,000 francs, destinés à la solde de votre armée, sont déjà à Valladolid; 2 autres millions partent en ce moment de Bayonne; ainsi votre année sera dans une bonne situation.

Votre position deviendra très embarrassante pour les Anglais, qui, indépendamment d'une consommation énorme d'hommes et d'argent, se trouveront engagés dans une guerre de système, et ayant toujours une immensité de bâtiments à la mer pour leur rembarquement. Il faut donc, Prince, travailler sans cesse à vous fortifier vis-à-vis de la position des ennemis, et pouvoir garder la vôtre avec moins de monde, ce qui rendra une partie de votre année mobile, et vous mettra à même de faire des incursions dans le pays.

Vous trouverez ci-joints des '*Moniteurs*' qui donnent des nouvelles de Portugal, parvenues par la voie de l'Angleterre, datées du 12 Nov.

No. XXVI. (p. 484.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, à ———. Torres Novas, ce 11 Déc. 1810.

L'homme qui vous remettra le présent billet a ma confiance. Donnez moi de vos nouvelles. Donnez des miennes à Paris. L'armée est dans une bonne position. Nous attendons les renforts annoncés. Veuillez m'en donner des nouvelles par le retour du porteur.

No. XXVII. (pp. 140, 151, 367, 557.)

Don Josef Diez Vasconer to Don Miguel de Alava.

Cartaxo, 18 de Enero, 1811.

En contestación al oficio de V. S. en que me pregunta si como individuo de la Junta de Castilla y como amigo del General, Gobernador de la plaza de Ciudad Rodrigo, Don Andres Herrasti, sé si el General en Jefe del exercito Ingles, Milor Wellington, ofició terminantemente à la Junta y al Gobernador hacer levantar a toda costa y en qualquiera circunstancia el sitio de dicha plaza, segun los Franceses lo han publicado en sus papeles, añadiendo que el General Herrasti habia enseñado las cartas de esta ofuerta, devo decir, en honor de la verdad, que en ambos conceptos he visto los oficios parados, y de ellos resulta unicamente un deciso deseo de hacer, quanto estubiese de su parte, en favor de aquella plaza, segun se lo permitiesen las circunstancias. Ademas el Coronel Don Josef O'Lawlor, embiado por el General en Jefe Ingles, se presentó en la Junta, manifestó a su nombre esto mismo, y que no dudaba que la plaza hacia su deber, que asi lo esperaba y que S. E. auxiliaria en quanto pudiese y segun se lo permitiesen las circunstancias. Tampoco pudo el General Herrasti enseñar los oficios a Masséna, respecto aque asi todos los papeles del Gobierno, como los de la Junta, sin quedar un solo, fueron quemados dos dias antes de la capitulacion, ni menos decirle cosa alguna de palabra en este particular, porque la Junta, el Gobernador, y los demas defensores de dicha plaza, conociendo la difícil que era y aun expuesto a fatales conse-

quencias, levantar el sitio de la plaza formado por 60,000 infantes, 5000 caballos, 51 piezas de grueso calibre, 130 de campaña, y tomadas las alturas y demas posiciones ventajosas, quien conocia esto no podia quejarse que no se le socorriese con un exercito mucho mas pequeño y sin ventajas algunas, por todo lo que los Franceses no pueden haver leido, ni oido, quanto publician en sus papeles. En quanto en este particular puedo informar a V. S.

### No. XXVIII. (p. 551.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.  
Au camp devant Olivença, le 22 Jan. 1811.

Les estafettes ayant été retenues pendant plus de 15 jours à Manzanares, je n'ai reçu que depuis 2 jours, et au même instant, les lettres que V. A. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 28 Nov. et les 4 et 10 Déc.; les deux premières contenant l'ordre itératif de faire une diversion en faveur de l'armée de Portugal, et exprimant le mécontentement de S. M. l'Empereur sur mon apparente inactivité; la dernière paraissant détruire les dispositions précédentes, puisqu'il y est dit que, depuis le mouvement rétrograde de quelques marches que M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling a fait, *l'essentiel est de redoubler d'activité pour battre les brigands et les détruire partout où ils pourront se montrer.*

A l'époque où V. A. m'écrivait, elle ne pouvait avoir encore ma lettre du 1<sup>er</sup> Dec., où je lui rendais compte des préparatifs que je faisais pour opérer une grande diversion en faveur de l'armée de Portugal. Depuis, elle lui sera sûrement parvenue, ainsi que celle du 31 du même mois, que j'ai chargé M. le chef de bataillon Girard, officier d'Etat Major, d'avoir l'honneur de lui remettre. Dans celle-ci, j'ai annoncé mon départ de Séville et ma marche sur Badajoz.

*(Le rapport donne ici le détail des opérations qui ont précédé le siège d'Olivença.)* . . . . .

Tel est le rapport des opérations qui ont eu lieu depuis mon départ de Séville. V. A. y remarquera que j'avais prévu les intentions de S. M. l'Empereur avant que j'aie pu les connaître; elle observera même que j'avais beaucoup pris sur moi, si elle veut se donner la peine de lire la lettre de M. le Maréchal Duc de Bellune, en date du 5 de ce mois, dont elle trouvera ci-joint copie. C'est au point, qu'en pareille circonstance, bien d'autres auraient pu se borner à faire des représentations, et demander de nouveaux ordres. Les observations que ma lettre du 31 Déc. renferme sont encore pleines de force, et je dois m'y référer. J'ajouterai cependant que, pour le moment, il n'est tout à fait impossible de pousser des troupes jusqu'au Tage sans les compromettre, et sans compromettre également le salut de l'armée du midi, qui, dès lors, ne pourrait plus tenir en Andalousie. Il y a sur cette frontière 6 places de guerre: Badajoz, Olivença, Jurumenla, Elvas, Campo Maior, et Albuquerque, qui ensemble renferment plus de 20,000 hommes d'infanterie et 2500 de cavalerie. Il m'est démontré que si je portais un corps de 10,000 hommes sur le Tage, ainsi que c'était l'intention de S. M. l'Empereur avant que V. A. m'eût écrit sa lettre du 10 Déc., ce corps ne pourrait arriver à sa destination, et serait aussitôt enveloppé sans que je pusse aller à son secours. Il me paraît donc que, dans l'état actuel des choses, je remplirai mieux les intentions de S. M. l'Empereur, et je serai utile à l'armée de Portugal, en prenant Olivença, Badajoz, et Campo Maior, d'où probablement je pourrai communiquer avec M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling; ou, si les ennemis veulent m'en empêcher, ils seront obligés de faire un gros détachement qui donnera la supériorité au Prince et lui laissera l'avantage des opérations. Jusque là, il ne peut rien arriver de fâcheux à l'armée de Portugal, d'autant plus qu'elle est dans une bonne position où elle s'est approvisionnée, et qu'elle a retranchée. Elle tiendra certainement les ennemis en échec assez de temps pour laisser avancer les opérations dans cette partie, et me mettre à même de lui faciliter de nouveaux succès.

J'ai l'honneur de prier V. A. d'avoir la bonté de mettre mon rapport et la copie ci-jointe de la lettre de M. le Maréchal Duc de Bellune sous les yeux de S. M. l'Empereur, et de vouloir bien en même temps lui rendre compte que tous les avis indirects que j'ai reçus du Portugal confirment que les choses y sont toujours dans le même état, qu'on évalue à 20,000 hommes les renforts que M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling a reçus, et que depuis plusieurs mois il n'y a pas eu d'affaire.

## No. XXIX. (p. 551.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.  
Olivença, le 25 Jan. 1811.

Je viens de recevoir, par un aide de camp de S. M. Catholique, la lettre que V. A. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 22 Déc. dernier, laquelle contient l'ordre de S. M. l'Empereur d'envoyer le 5<sup>me</sup> corps sur le Tage, pour poursuivre la Romana, et de se mettre en communication avec M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling. V. A. me dit aussi que S. M. trouve que je n'ai pas adopté de système; elle me demande si on peut prendre Cadix; enfin, elle a la bonté de m'envoyer des *Motivations*.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à V. A. duplicata de mes lettres des 22 et 23 de ce mois, ainsi que copies des diverses pièces qui y étaient jointes, et la lettre que ce matin je lui ai écrite. V. A. y trouvera le détail de mes opérations depuis le 1<sup>er</sup> Jan., époque de mon départ de Séville. J'espère qu'elle aura reçu mes dépêches des 1 et 31 Déc. Cette dernière lui a été portée par M. le chef de bataillon Girard, officier d'état-major. L'une et l'autre l'instruisaient de la détermination que j'avais prise, sur de simples avis indirects, pour faire une diversion en faveur de l'armée Impériale de Portugal, et les dernières (celles des 31 Déc. 22 et 23 Jan.) lui rendaient compte des motifs qui s'opposent irrésistiblement à ce que le 5<sup>me</sup> corps se porte sur le Tage pour communiquer avec M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling, avant que la place de Badajoz soit prise.

En effet, comment ce corps d'armée pourrait-il arriver à cette destination sans être aussitôt enveloppé, puisqu'il laisserait à sa gauche et sur ses derrières 5 places fortes qui renferment au moins 20,000 hommes de garnison, qui bien certainement ne manqueraient pas de se réunir, et d'agir avec avantage contre lui, tandis qu'il serait arrêté par le Tage, où il ne pourrait jeter aucun pont, et aurait de plus à combattre le corps Anglais du général Hill qui est sous Abrantes?

Cette disposition est donc inexécutable. Elle perdrait le 5<sup>me</sup> corps, et ne serait d'aucune utilité à l'armée Impériale de Portugal, en même temps qu'elle ruinerait les affaires de S. M. l'Empereur en Andalousie. Je supplie V. A. de lire avec attention la lettre que M. le Maréchal Duc de Bellune m'a écrite le 5 Jan., dont je lui envoie copie.

Je viens de prendre Olivença et 4500 hommes de troupes Espagnoles, qui sont conduits en France comme prisonniers de guerre. Demain je ferai investir la place de Badajoz, et le siège commencera aussitôt. J'espère l'emporter, malgré 10,000 hommes de garnison qui s'y trouvent (30 déserteurs qui en sont partis hier assurent que telle est la force de la garnison). Si je réussis, je prendrai ensuite Campo Maior, et après ou même pendant le siège de ces deux places, je ferai en Portugal des incursions qui pourront être utiles à l'armée commandée par M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling. Je déclare sur mon honneur et par les devoirs que j'ai à remplir envers l'Empereur, que je ne crois pas qu'il soit possible de mieux faire, sans compromettre le sort des troupes Impériales que j'ai laissées en Andalousie.

Le 63<sup>me</sup> rég<sup>t</sup>. d'infanterie de ligne, la seule infanterie du 1<sup>er</sup> corps que j'aie amenée, est parti avant-hier pour conduire les prisonniers jusqu'à Cordoue; ensuite, il se rendra à Séville pour renforcer ce point important qui, d'après la lettre de M. le Maréchal Duc de Bellune, et d'après les mouvements des ennemis vers l'embouchure de la Guadiana, me donne des inquiétudes sérieuses. J'ai déjà dit à V. A. que la division du général Gazan était encore détachée contre les corps de Ballesteros et de Copons, qui s'étaient réunis dans le Condado de Niebla, et menaçaient Séville.

L'Empereur me fait la grâce de me demander si on prendra Cadix. Je réponds affirmativement; mais pour cela, il faut des moyens suffisants. Il y a à Cadix ou dans l'île de Léon 20,000 hommes de troupes, dont 5000 Anglais ou Portugais, et dans le port une escadre de 8 à 10 vaisseaux de ligne, des frégates et 100 canonnières. Pour arriver à l'île de Léon, il faut passer un bras de mer de 300 toises dans sa largeur la plus étroite; et cet espace ne peut être franchi sans moyens d'embarquement. Il faut aussi de l'artillerie pour répondre à 2000 bouches à feu qui sont contre nous en batterie. Nous n'avions rien quand l'armée se présentait devant Cadix; à présent il y a 280 pièces de canon de gros calibre, ou mortiers en batterie, pour l'armement desquels il a fallu tout créer.

Nous avons aussi construit une flottille. J'ai demandé une augmentation de 1000 canonnières et de 600 marins. J'ai aussi demandé avec instance que 8000 à 9000 hommes de troupes appartenant à l'armée du midi, qui se trouvent dans l'arrondissement de l'armée du centre, me fussent envoyés; je n'ai pu rien obtenir. Que puis-je faire avec les troupes présentes sous les armes? Car S. M. est trop juste pour comprendre sous mes ordres les 9000 hommes qu'on retient aux environs de Madrid. L'étendue que j'occupe en ce moment est de plus de 150 lieues de France, et il est impossible de la diminuer sans tout compromettre sur la gauche. J'ai à me défendre des rassemblements de Murcie, qui, tous les mois, se présentent en force pour faire une incursion. Au centre, j'ai à contenir la garnison Anglaise de Gibraltar, et à pousser les opérations contre Cadix, où se trouvent 20,000 hommes de troupes. Je maintiens dans le devoir le tiers de l'Espagne, et j'ai cependant entrepris une grande diversion en faveur de l'armée de Portugal, à 50 lieues de ma ligne d'opération.

Je supplie de nouveau S. M. l'Empereur d'envoyer un militaire digne de sa confiance pour examiner ce que j'ai fait, et même pour prendre ma place; je me soumetts d'avance à son jugement, et j'applaudirai à ses succès. Quant à moi, il m'est impossible d'en faire davantage, et je n'ai plus qu'une mort glorieuse à ambitionner.

J'ajouterai, à l'égard de Cadix, l'observation que j'ai faite depuis très-longtemps à V. A. S., que si S. M. l'Empereur jugeait à propos d'envoyer une de ses escadres pour agir contre cette place, la ville ne tiendrait pas 5 jours, et que l'escadre ennemie qui est dans le port serait infailliblement prise ou bien compromise.

De tout ce que j'ai dit, et de mes précédents rapports, V. A. tirera sûrement la conséquence que depuis que j'ai l'honneur de commander l'armée du midi en Espagne, j'ai en pour objet d'avancer les opérations contre Cadix, de pacifier le pays, de pourvoir aux besoins des troupes, et d'étendre aussi loin qu'il m'a été possible l'influence des armées Impériales. Il est vrai, je ne comptais pas être dans le cas de faire la diversion à laquelle je me livre, d'autant plus que le pays que je parcours n'était pas dans l'étendue de mon commandement; cependant j'y suis venu en personne, avant d'avoir reçu aucun ordre, aussitôt que j'ai pu présumer qu'une autre armée de S. M. pouvait avoir besoin de mon secours. Mais il n'était pas en mon pouvoir d'empêcher que la Romana marchât avec 6000 hommes sur Lisbonne: je crois l'avoir suffisamment démontré. Faisant son mouvement à couvert par 6 places de guerre, il était libre de l'opérer à volonté. Du reste, les opérations que j'exécute me paraissent les seules qui puissent favoriser celles de M. le Maréchal Prince d'Essling. Si j'avais de plus grands moyens, je les emploierais; et, en attendant que mes opérations soient plus avancées, je ne peuss pas que la situation de l'armée Impériale puisse empirer, attendu que la position retranchée de Santarem la rend inexpugnable, et qu'elle a la facilité de s'alimenter.

#### No. XXX. (p. 605.)

M. Richard, lieutenant au 22<sup>e</sup> de ligne, du 8<sup>e</sup> corps, étant allé à la découverte avec 10 voltigeurs sur la route de Fragoas à Rio Maior, surpris par un détachement ennemi de 200 chevaux, se retira sur un petit mamelon, où il se défendit avec la plus grande valeur. Il ne se rendit qu'après avoir reçu sept coups de sabre et avoir vu ses braves voltigeurs aussi maltraités que lui. Le général Clausel, en rendant compte de cette belle action, fit le plus bel éloge de cet officier. *Journal historique de la Campagne de Portugal, par le général Baron Fririon*, p. 133, 134.

#### No. XXXI. (p. 574.)

Le Maréchal Masséna présumant toujours que l'ennemi chercherait à profiter de la position difficile dans laquelle se trouvait l'armée pour faire une démonstration hostile, communiqua d'avance et confidentiellement, le 4 Février, au général Fririon, les dispositions suivantes dans le cas où il aurait à faire faire un mouvement rétrograde.

« Si l'ennemi faisait une attaque générale, l'armée se concentrerait comme » suit :

'Le 2<sup>e</sup> corps marcherait sur Golegão, où il appuierait sa gauche au Tage, en communiquant par sa droite avec Torres Novas.

'Le 8<sup>e</sup> corps, après avoir réuni ses troupes sur la gauche de l'Alviella, ferait sauter le pont de Pernès et se retirerait sur Torres Novas, où il prendrait position sur les coteaux en arrière de cette ville, la gauche vers Ponte Novo, gardant par des postes les passages de l'Almonda, et communiquant par sa gauche avec le Général Regnier.

'Les 2<sup>e</sup> et 8<sup>e</sup> corps concerteraient leurs mouvements et marcheraient à même hauteur, afin que leurs ailes ne puissent être entamées.

'Le 9<sup>e</sup> corps et la réserve de cavalerie se replieraient sur Ourem et de là sur Thomar.

'Le 6<sup>e</sup> corps se réunirait à Thomar. M. le Maréchal Duc d'Elchingen prendrait le commandement de ces deux corps d'armée et de la cavalerie ; il enverrait une division à Assinceira pour couvrir les ponts de Matrenas et Guerreira, et pour communiquer directement avec le 8<sup>e</sup> corps à Torres Novas. Cette division établirait un poste correspondant à cheval entre Assinceira et Atalaya.

'La division Loison resterait à Punhete pour la garde des ponts et des bateaux.

'Le grand quartier général serait provisoirement à Atalaya.

'Dans le cas où l'armée serait forcée sur cette ligne, elle se retirerait sur les hauteurs d'Atalaya et de Barquinha, et de là sur le Zézere.

'Il est bien entendu que l'armée n'effectuait les mouvements ci-dessus, quoique attaquée d'une manière sérieuse, qu'après avoir profité avec opiniâtreté de tous les moyens de défense que présentent ses positions actuelles, et qu'après que les corps d'armée qui sont sur la ligne se seraient entendus.' *Journal historique de la Campagne de Portugal, par le général Baron Fririon*, p. 130, 131.

#### No. XXXII. (p. 616.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.  
Au camp devant Badajoz, le 22 Fév. 1811.

Le 14 de ce mois, en rendant compte à V. A. de la prise d'assaut du fort de Pardaleras, je lui annonçai que j'allais prendre des dispositions pour faire repentir l'ennemi de la témérité qu'il avait eue, d'établir son camp sur les hauteurs de la rive droite, sous la protection du fort San Cristoval : malgré toute l'activité que l'on put mettre dans les préparatifs, les membrures des bacs que j'avais fait apporter de Séville ne purent être assemblées que dans la journée du 17. A cette époque la Guadiana était à-peu-près rentrée dans son lit, et les terres devenaient praticables ; mais l'ennemi se consolidait dans son camp, et il avait fait sauter le pont de la Gévora, tandis qu'à la rive gauche nous avançons nos ouvrages contre le corps de place, et qu'une nouvelle batterie de mortiers était établie à la gauche de l'attaque du centre.

Le 18 le général Bourgeat, commandant l'artillerie, reçut ordre de faire lancer des bombes et des obus de 8 pouces sur le camp ennemi par-dessus la ville et le fort San Cristoval, afin d'obliger les troupes qui s'y trouvaient à s'éloigner et de se mettre hors de la protection des feux du fort : cela réussit parfaitement, vers midi les Espagnols plièrent leurs tentes, et furent les porter à 1200 toises plus loin, où un nouveau camp fut aussitôt dressé.

Ayant fait part de mes dispositions à M. le Maréchal Duc de Trévise, S. E. donna ordre aux 34<sup>me</sup>, 88<sup>me</sup>, et 100<sup>me</sup> régiments de ligne, à une compagnie de sapeurs, et à la 2<sup>me</sup> compagnie du 3<sup>me</sup> régiment d'artillerie à cheval, de passer pendant la nuit la Guadiana au bac qui avait été établi au-dessus de Badajoz, et de se porter sur les bords du Gévora, tandis que M. le général de division Latour Maubourg, qui était avec sa cavalerie à Montijo, ne fournissant que des gardes sur la Gévora, reçut l'ordre de venir se former, aussi pendant la nuit, à la droite de l'infanterie.

Le 19, une heure avant le jour, la cavalerie de réserve passa la Gévora à un gué qu'elle avait reconnu au-dessous de l'hermitage de la Battoa, et elle se porta rapidement sur la route de Badajoz à Campo Maior, débordant ainsi l'aile gauche de la ligne ennemie, avec laquelle elle s'engagea aussitôt. Le 2<sup>me</sup> régiment d'hussards eut même occasion de faire une charge, et de pénétrer pendant un instant dans le camp, d'où il ramena des prisonniers. Pendant ce tems M. le Maréchal Duc de Trévise faisait repousser quelques postes que l'ennemi avait laissés près du pont

coupé; et l'infanterie sous les ordres de M. le général de division Girard, ainsi que l'artillerie légère, franchissaient la Gevora à deux autres gués à droite et à gauche du pont, malgré la rapidité du courant, et que la troupe eût de l'eau jusqu'à la ceinture. Cependant le passage s'effectua sans accident, et à 8 heures les régiments étaient formés en colonnes d'attaque sur la rive droite, ayant chacun un bataillon déployé.

Pendant que l'artillerie soutenait une vive canonnade contre celle de l'ennemi, qui s'était placée sur un mamelon en avant de son centre dans les anciennes lignes de Berwick, M. le Maréchal Duc de Trevis donnait ordre au général de division Girard de se porter avec l'infanterie sur le prolongement des hauteurs qui aboutissent au fort San Cristoval, et aussitôt qu'il y serait arrivé de changer de direction à droite, pour attaquer en flanc la droite de la ligne ennemie, lui coupant ainsi sa retraite sur la tête du pont, tandis que M. le général de division Latour Maubourg devait avec sa cavalerie renouveler son attaque par la gauche, et charger l'ennemi aussitôt qu'il en trouverait l'occasion.

Ce double mouvement s'exécuta avec la rapidité et la précision que l'on peut attendre de la troupe la mieux instruite. La victoire ne fut pas longtemps incisée. Deux grands carrés que l'ennemi avait formés firent successivement enfoncés, aux cris de '*Vive l'Empereur!*' Dès lors la déroute devint générale. Quelques généraux Espagnols et Portugais et leur cavalerie ainsi que 700 à 800 hommes d'infanterie se sauvèrent honteusement dans Elvas; 300 hommes qui étaient près du fort San Cristoval entrèrent dans Badajoz; tout le reste fut pris ou tué. 5200 prisonniers, parmi lesquels le général Virues, commandant la 2<sup>me</sup> division; 4 brigadiers généraux; 15 colonels ou lieutenant colonels; 350 autres officiers; 6 drapeaux, 7 pièces de canons attelés, 20 caissons, et un camp tendu, étaient au pouvoir de l'armée Impériale. L'ennemi avait en outre laissé sur la place plus de 600 morts et de 800 blessés; ainsi les deux divisions de troupes Espagnoles, formant 9000 hommes de l'ancienne armée de la Romana, qui avaient joint l'armée Anglaise, et étaient revenus de Villa Franca près Lisbonne le 6 de ce mois, dans l'objet de secourir Badajoz, n'existaient plus le 19 à 11 heures du matin; la garnison de cette place se trouvait réduite au même état qu'au commencement du siège, et le blocus sur la rive droite de la Guadiana fut rétabli. Sans se livrer à trop de confiance, il est permis d'espérer que le résultat de la bataille de la Gevora aura une très grande influence sur la prochaine prise de Badajoz, à moins d'un événement tellement extraordinaire qu'en ce moment je ne puis le prévoir.

La perte que nous avons éprouvée est de 3 officiers et 23 soldats tués, 5 officiers et 166 soldats blessés, 27 chevaux tués. Elle eût été plus considérable si les troupes avaient hésité un seul instant à aborder l'ennemi; mais leur ardeur était telle, et le feu qu'elles faisaient en avançant si meurtrier, que l'ennemi n'a pu profiter de la supériorité du sien, ni de la bonté de sa position.

Les généraux Mendizabal, Carrera, Virues, et Carlos de España étaient dans le second carré: un de nos obus tua quelques hommes de leur suite, et les fit partir. Lorsque Virues fut pris, les autres faillirent être atteints; ils ont été blessés. On a trouvé parmi les morts le brigadier général du génie Don Gabriel, et plusieurs autres officiers supérieurs. Les 1200 hommes de cavalerie Portugaise et Espagnole qui étaient à la bataille sous les ordres du général Butron et du général Anglais Madden se sont sauvés d'un trait jusqu'à Elvas: il n'a été possible d'en joindre qu'une centaine qui ont été sabrés.

On attendait à tout instant à Badajoz le général Castaños, que la Junte de Cadix a nommé pour remplacer la Romana; mais il est probable que ce chef, qui n'aurait plus d'autres troupes à commander que la garnison de Badajoz et le corps de Ballesteros actuellement du côté de Frejenas, ne se hâtera pas de joindre ces débris d'une armée qui, il y a un mois, avait encore 23,000 hommes sous les armes, et qui depuis la prise d'Olivenga en a perdu 12,000 de l'élite de ses troupes. J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à V. A. l'état de composition de cette armée, telle que Mendizabal l'avait arrêtée l'avant veille de la bataille. V. A. remarquera un ordre du jour donné par Virues, dans lequel ce chef exprime la crainte de ne pouvoir nous joindre: ses vœux ont été bientôt exaucés, et il est heureusement mis hors d'état de continuer à provoquer la sédition et le désordre ainsi qu'il faisait. Incessamment j'aurai l'honneur d'adresser à V. A. l'état nominatif des officiers prisonniers, que je vais faire imprimer pour qu'ils soient reconnus, et l'état sommaire des soldats. Je ne doute pas que cette brillante affaire ne produise de grands résultats; d'abord

elle rend la prise de Badajoz presque certaine, à moins d'un événement extraordinaire, ainsi que j'ai dit; et elle occasionnera probablement une seconde diversion en faveur de l'armée Impériale de Portugal; car les ennemis qui, après la prise d'Olivença, se hâtèrent d'envoyer 3 régimens Portugais de renfort à Elvas, et de faire porter les 2 divisions Espagnoles pour secourir Badajoz, croiront de nouveau devoir prendre des mesures pour se couvrir sur la rive gauche du Tage, et feront encore quelques détachemens: s'il s'en présente, je ferai ensuite de les bien recevoir.

J'ai l'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de V. A. S. copie de l'ordre du jour que j'ai donné à l'armée pour lui faire part des succès remportés par le 5<sup>me</sup> corps et par la cavalerie de réserve depuis le commencement du siège de Badajoz. J'aurais attendu la reddition de cette place pour signaler la valeur des militaires de tout grade, qui en plusieurs circonstances se sont distingués; mais l'occasion de la bataille de la Gevora est trop marquante pour que je retarde ces citations: en même tems je provoquerai les grâces de S. M. l'Empereur en faveur de plusieurs militaires qui en sont dignes. L'éloge du 5<sup>me</sup> corps d'armée, commandé par le Maréchal Duc de Treviso, et de la réserve de cavalerie aux ordres de M. le général Latour Maubourg, est fait en citant les troupes qui en font partie, &c.

*[Here follow the recommendations.]*

#### No. XXXIII. (p. 669.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général.  
Badajoz, le 12 Mars, 1811.

J'ai l'honneur de rendre compte à V. A. que la ville de Badajoz est soumise aux armes de S. M. l'Empereur et Roi. Le 10 de ce mois au soir la brèche étant praticable, et toutes les dispositions pour donner l'assaut ayant été faites, M. le Maréchal Duc de Treviso fit sommer le gouverneur, qui, après bien des difficultés, parvint à entendre raison, et à éviter une nouvelle effusion de sang. Dans la nuit la capitulation que j'ai l'honneur d'adresser à V. A. fut signée, et le 11 les troupes de S. M. sont entrées dans Badajoz.

La garnison est sortie de la place avec les honneurs militaires; elle a déposé les armes sur le glacis, et elle est conduite prisonnière de guerre en France. J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à V. A. l'état nominatif des officiers généraux et supérieurs, et un état sommaire des simples officiers et les soldats qui sont partis. Leur nombre s'élève à 7155, dont 512 officiers, y compris un lieutenant général, 2 maréchaux de camp, 4 brigadiers, 15 colonels, et 24 lieutenant colonels ou majors; mais indépendamment il y a dans la place 1100 hommes malades ou blessés; et j'ai fait renvoyer chez eux 320 individus mariés ou enfans que depuis 6 mois les chefs de l'insurrection avaient arrachés de leurs foyers, et forcés à servir. On a, en outre, ramassé dans la ville 300 soldats qui s'y étaient cachés. Ainsi le nombre total des prisonniers faits à Badajoz est au moins de 9000 hommes.

On a trouvé dans la place 170 pièces de canon, mortiers, ou obusiers, de divers calibres; 80,000 livres de poudre; 300,000 cartouches d'infanterie, et beaucoup de projectiles, et deux équipages de pont en très bon état. J'aurai l'honneur d'adresser à V. A. l'inventaire de tous ces objets lorsque le général commandant l'artillerie me l'aura remis.

Pendant le siège la garnison a consommé 230 milliers de poudre, et 2 millions de cartouches. Les soldats ont ramassé 8000 boulets de 24, et plus de 600 bombes, que notre artillerie a renvoyés dans la place. Les vivres ne manquaient pas. Les ennemis avaient le projet de faire de Badajoz une nouvelle Saragosse. La plupart des bastions et les issues de toutes les rues étaient retranchées, mais il paraît d'après même l'aveu des chefs, que trompés sur notre véritable point d'attaque jusqu'au moment où la batterie de brèche a été établie, ils se sont trouvés au dépourvu lorsque la brèche a été rendue praticable. Cependant le général Anglais Lord Wellington ne cessait de recommander de Lisbonne que l'on tint ferme, et qu'il enverrait des secours. Plusieurs lettres que l'on a interceptées portaient effectivement à croire que telle était son intention. Sans doute que le général Anglais a cru avoir rempli ses engagements après s'être défait des 2 divisions Espagnoles qui avaient rejoint son armée, et surtout lorsqu'il apprit que ces divisions avaient été entièrement détruites à la bataille de la Gevora.

Une circonstance a pu contribuer à prolonger le siège de quelques jours; lors

de la dernière sortie des ennemis pour empêcher le couronnement du chemin couvert, le général Menacho, gouverneur, fut tué. Le général Imaz, qui le remplaça, a voulu faire ses preuves, et a occasionné une plus longue résistance.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à V. A. copie du journal de siège qui a été tenu. Il contient le détail de nos pertes et de nos consommations. Je lui adresse également copie de l'ordre du jour qu'en cette circonstance j'ai donné à l'armée.

J'ai chargé l'adjudant commandant Ayy d'avoir l'honneur de remettre à V. A. mes dépêches et 25 drapeaux pris sur les ennemis de l'Empereur à Olivença, à la bataille de la Gévora, et à Badajoz, pour être déposés aux pieds de S. M. Je supplie V. A. de vouloir bien présenter ces honorables trophées.

La prise de la garnison de Badajoz complète la destruction de la ci-devant armée de la Rouma, qui, il y a deux mois, était de 22,000 combattans. Sur ce nombre 17,500 ont été faits prisonniers de guerre, et sont envoyés en France. Le surplus a été tué, ou est dispersé. Il y a aussi beaucoup de blessés dans les hôpitaux de Campo Maior et d'Alburquerque. Il ne reste en tout que le corps de Ballesteros, qui est dans le Condado de Niebla, et quelques débris de régimens échappés de la bataille de la Gévora, que Mendizabal s'efforce vainement de réunir en Portugal.

Ce résultat obtenu en peu de temps produire un grand effet dans les provinces méridionales de l'Espagne, et en Portugal.

Je dois faire remarquer à V. A. que parmi les prisonniers de Badajoz il en est un grand nombre qui, auparavant, ont été plusieurs fois faits prisonniers, même des officiers et des généraux. Le général Garcia est dans ce cas : il fut pris à Ferrol, où il prêta serment de fidélité.

Il me reste à provoquer les grâces de S. M. l'Empereur et Roi en faveur des militaires de divers grades qui se sont particulièrement distingués pendant le siège de Badajoz ; mais je regrette de ne pouvoir citer tous ceux qui ont droit à une mention honorable ; le nombre en est heureusement trop grand ; les armes ont rivalisé de valeur et de dévouement dans le service. Je dois surtout des éloges au, &c.

*[Here follow the recommendations.]*

Je supplie V. A. S. de vouloir bien mettre mon rapport sous les yeux de l'Empereur, et de solliciter des grâces de S. M. qu'elle daigne accorder les demandes qui sont présentées.

*[Here follow the capitulation, and Le Journal du siège de Badajoz.]*

#### No. XXXIV. (p. 656.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâteau, Major Général. Torres Novas, le 6 Mars, 1811.

Ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de l'annoncer à V. A., dans une dépêche du 20 Jan., j'employai les derniers jours de ce mois et les premiers de Février à terminer les préparatifs nécessaires pour mon passage du Tage. Je faisais élever des ouvrages sur les deux rives du confluent du Zezere, pour me préparer une triple tête de pont à Punhete ; et je portais à 120, le nombre de bateaux et pontons, afin de pouvoir établir trois ponts, dont l'un sur le Zezere, et les deux autres sur le Tage au-dessus et au-dessous du confluent. Comme l'ennemi avait en quelque sorte barré le débouché du Zezere par les batteries formidables et les retranchements qu'il avait construits en face, je faisais faire 50 haquets pour transporter une partie de mon équipage de pont au-dessus de Punhete, dans le seul endroit favorable à l'établissement d'un pont. On travaillait en même temps à un chemin à rampe douce au travers de la montagne, pour faciliter le passage des haquets. Mais ces dispositions n'ont pu être tellement cachées à l'ennemi qu'il n'en ait eu bientôt connaissance ; et, dès lors, il a construit vis-à-vis du point choisi pour le nouvel établissement, d'autres ouvrages qu'il a liés à ceux qui se trouvaient déjà vis-à-vis du Zezere. Pendant qu'il bordait d'épaulements la rive du Tage, il couronnait par des retranchements et des batteries les hauteurs peu éloignées dont nous devions nous emparer pour protéger le passage.

Il poussait avec une égale activité ses travaux sur le Rio Maior ; il renforçait ses troupes sur la rive gauche du fleuve, et les concentrait en face de Punhete. Il établissait des postes très-rapprochés, et divers signaux de correspondance. Enfin, il travaillait sans relâche à améliorer les communications sur sa ligne



Toute la population qu'il a emmenée des provinces que nous occupons, lui donnait la faculté de pousser tous ces travaux à la fois, avec une grande célérité. Le passage du Tage devenait de jour en jour plus difficile; il était même jugé très-hasardeux par une partie des officiers généraux de l'armée. J'étais cependant au moment de l'entreprendre, soit au-dessus de Punhete, au moyen des haquets, soit à Santarem, en faisant descendre mon équipage de pont sur le Tage, pour opérer contre le corps de Hill, qui était réuni vis-à-vis de Punhete, soit enfin en me servant de l'un de ces points pour une diversion, et de l'autre pour le véritable établissement. Mais plusieurs reconnaissances faites sur les rives du Tage, et sur ce fleuve même, m'ont fait connaître l'extrême difficulté d'une grande opération sur Santarem; et les débordements fréquents en face de cette ville la rendaient très-dangereuse.

Monseigneur, les choses étaient dans cet état, lorsque le général Foy est arrivé le 5 Fév., et m'a apporté la dépêche de V. A., en date du 22 Déc. D'après son contenu, et d'après ce que m'a dit le général Foy de la part de S. M., j'ai compté sur la prompte co-opération du 5<sup>me</sup> corps, que vous m'annonciez devoir se porter sur la rive gauche du Tage à Villafior. Ne recevant aucun ordre direct pour le passage de ce fleuve, et n'apercevant rien qui pût me faire juger qu'il fût commandé par les intentions de S. M., j'ai jugé convenable de suspendre cette opération, afin de ne pas exposer inutilement l'armée à une attaque de vive force, et à toutes les chances du hasard, lorsque je pouvais espérer d'obtenir les mêmes avantages par l'arrivée du 5<sup>me</sup> corps. Le général Foy ayant dépêché, le 27 Jan., de Ciudad Rodrigo, un courrier à M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, pour lui annoncer que l'armée de Portugal était en mesure de passer le Tage, mais que la co-opération de son armée, ordonnée par S. M., devenait absolument nécessaire, il semblait qu'un fort détachement devait être au moment d'arriver sur le fleuve. Ainsi, j'ai dû attendre que le 5<sup>me</sup> corps se présentât à Villafior, qu'il me donnât des renseignements exacts sur les ressources de l'Alentejo, et qu'il nous amenât quelques pièces de gros calibre, qui nous sont très-nécessaires, et que je n'ai pu conduire à travers les montagnes du Beira.

Ces espérances ont été vaines. Pendant que les rapports m'assuraient qu'il existait dans le haut Alentejo un corps Français, ni mes reconnaissances fréquentes, ni les espions, ni les mouvements de l'ennemi, rien ne m'a fait connaître que ce corps se soit approché du Tage. On a entendu pendant quelque temps des salves d'artillerie dans la direction de Badajoz; mais la cessation totale de ce bruit, depuis plus de 20 jours, me prouve que le siège a cessé, ou que la place est prise depuis lors; que par conséquent je n'ai plus de co-opération à attendre, et qu'en résultat, au lieu que l'armée de Portugal ait été secourue par celle du midi, elle a au contraire servi à protéger et couvrir les opérations sur la Guadiana.

J'ai employé le mois de Février à perfectionner et compléter nos moyens de passage et nos travaux. Depuis cette époque comme auparavant, je n'ai cessé de tourmenter l'ennemi par des démonstrations, des reconnaissances fréquentes, des expéditions sur le Tage et dans ses îles, et des opérations contre les rassemblements de paysans qui se formaient vers Pombal, Espinhal, Castello Branco, Pedregio, etc., dans lesquelles l'avantage nous est toujours resté, et qui procuraient quelques ressources en vivres et en bestiaux aux corps que en étaient chargés. Nos courses étaient surtout dirigées vers Villafior ou Montalvão, et plus haut sur le Tage, pour avoir des nouvelles du 5<sup>me</sup> corps, et nos démonstrations étaient multipliées sur le fleuve, pour empêcher l'ennemi de faire des détachements sur Badajoz. Enfin, pendant que sur la ligne et sur le Tage nous avons tenu dans des mouvements ou des bivouacs continuels l'armée Anglaise, nos troupes n'ont cessé de battre tout le pays situé entre Castello Branco, Ponte da Murcella, les faubourgs de Coimbre sur la rive gauche du Mondego, et la mer, par des détachements ou des maraudes organisées. C'est dans une de ces reconnaissances principales sur le Rio Maior que M. le Duc d'Abrantes a reçu à la joue une balle, qui lui a fait une blessure peu profonde, et dont il est parfaitement guéri. Dans cette petite campagne d'hiver, nos soldats, parfaitement aguerris, n'ont éprouvé d'autres pertes qu'une plus grande consommation d'effets, tandis que l'ennemi, peu accoutumé à tenir campagne, surtout dans cette saison, a ses hôpitaux remplis de malades.

Pendant que nous ne cessons de travailler à Punhete et sur les autres parties de la ligne, l'ennemi n'a pas perdu son temps: il s'est constamment occupé d'augmenter ses défenses. Il a réuni entre Punhete et Chamusca tout le corps de Hill

et de Beresford; et, profitant des ouvrages qu'il a élevés vis-à-vis de Santarem, il a pu faire passer sur la rive gauche du Tage une partie de la division Picton vers Alpiaga et Almeirim. Toutes ces troupes peuvent se réunir sur le point menacé en peu d'heures, au moyen des signaux. Ainsi l'opération du passage, qui était déjà très-difficile par rapport aux rives escarpées du Tage, à la largeur de son lit, à la rapidité de son cours, à ses terribles débordements et à la lenteur des débarquements, est devenue très-hasardeuse, puisqu'il faudrait enlever avec des forces inférieures des retranchements bien garnis de troupes, ou établir le pont sous le feu de l'ennemi, pour attaquer ensuite ses lignes. Veuillez observer aussi, Monseigneur, qu'afin de ne pas compromettre l'armée pendant l'opération, elle doit être placée sur la rive gauche du Zezere. Si le passage du Tage ne réussit pas, en outre des pertes de troupes, de l'effet moral produit sur les soldats des deux puissances, l'armée perd sa ligne d'opérations sur Coïmbre, elle est rejetée de suite sur l'Espagne, et n'ayant pour retraite qu'un pays stérile et affreux, des chemins à travers les rochers, les précipices et les torrents, elle doit perdre une partie de son artillerie; elle se trouve de plus hors d'état d'emporter les blessés, et réduite à les abandonner, ainsi que les trahards, ses malades, etc. Si l'opération réussit, l'armée aura perdu dans cette affaire une bonne partie de ses munitions qui sont déjà infiniment réduites; il lui en coûtera aussi beaucoup pour défendre ses têtes de pont; et à quoi se réduisent les avantages d'un tel succès, si on ne peut pas se tenir à cheval sur le Tage? A gagner quelques lieues de pays peu fertile et entièrement dévasté, dans lequel un petit corps de troupes ne trouverait pas des vivres pour 15 jours.

V. A. n'aura pas oublié qu'en m'occupant du passage du Tage, j'avais toujours pensé que les embarras des subsistances rendraient très-difficile l'occupation des deux rives, même avec des têtes de pont. Car un établissement permanent ne peut avoir lieu à Santarem, à cause de l'étendue de la position et de l'abaissement de la rive gauche, qui est si souvent couverte d'eau sur une lieue de largeur; et, en face de Pumlote, le pays où devaient s'établir les ponts, n'offre aucune ressource, même à une grande distance. Outre ces inconvénients, il s'en présentait de très-grands dans les dangers de la rupture des ponts par les débordements furieux qui ont eu lieu au printemps, ou par les machines que l'ennemi jeterait dans le Tage à Abrantes, et dans les suites de l'isolement des têtes de pont, où les troupes pourraient être enlevées ou affamées. En effet, trop de faiblesse les exposerait aux tentatives de l'ennemi; et si les garnisons étaient trop considérables, l'armée, dont la force numérique est déjà moindre de moitié que celle qui lui est opposée, se trouverait coupée en deux et très-compromise sur les deux rives. De tels inconvénients s'augmenteraient beaucoup à mesure que le grand corps de l'armée, placé sur la rive gauche du Tage, se verrait forcé à s'étendre pour faire des vivres et à s'éloigner davantage de ses ponts. Bientôt viendrait le moment où on serait forcé de se jeter sur l'une ou l'autre rive; et, alors, on pourrait trouver les têtes de pont entourées par une contrevallation de l'ennemi, ou bien l'armée se verrait forcée à recevoir bataille avec un fleuve à dos, en voulant se porter sur la rive droite du Tage. La nécessité de se tenir en même temps à cheval sur le Zezere accroît encore ces difficultés; car, si on n'a pas un débouché sur la rive droite de cette rivière, il faudra en faire le passage devant l'ennemi pour marcher sur Coïmbre ou sur Santarem; et si on n'occupe pas de têtes sur la rive gauche, on ne peut ni entreprendre des opérations contre Abrantes, ni avoir des communications avec Almeida.

J'ai eu à décider, Monseigneur, une nouvelle question d'après ce que le général Foy m'a rapporté des intentions de S. M. pour traîner la guerre en longueur, régulariser son système, tenir cependant l'ennemi toujours en échec. Est-il préférable que l'armée se porte tout entière dans l'Alentejo ou entre Pombal et Coïmbre?

J'ai pensé qu'en nous jetant dans l'Alentejo, et en mettant entre nous et l'ennemi un fleuve comme le Tage, sans pouvoir conserver notre équipage de pont, qu'il est impossible de transporter faute de chevaux, l'armée combinée ne serait plus en échec; qu'à l'abri de cette barrière et des retranchements de Setúval et d'Almada, Lord Wellington mettrait les Anglais dans des cantonnements pour les refaire, et enverrait en même temps quelques détachements Portugais et des milices, afin de contenir le 9<sup>me</sup> corps, d'empêcher ses progrès au delà de la frontière, de rassurer et de réorganiser les provinces du nord du Portugal. D'ailleurs

la destruction de vivres opérée dernièrement par les Anglais, et l'état malsain de la partie basse de l'Alentejo, forceraient bientôt notre armée à remonter vers Portalegre ou à se jeter sur la Guadiana, pays destinés probablement à être occupés un jour ou l'autre par le 5<sup>m</sup>e corps. L'armée, qui éprouve une multitude de besoins, s'éloignerait encore des ressources que le général Foy m'annonce avoir été accumulées à Ciudad Rodrigo et à Almeida, et de ses véritables lignes d'opérations ou de communication ; de nouveau, elle se trouverait pendant longtemps sans correspondance avec la France. Enfin, Monseigneur, les raisons pour lesquelles j'avais fait le projet de passer dans l'Alentejo n'existent plus, puisque l'armée du midi paraît devoir faire le siège des places.

J'ai cru reconnaître, au contraire, tous les avantages et une conformité entière aux intentions de S. M. dans le changement de positions que l'armée va opérer en pivotant sur Pombal pour se mettre en ligne entre la mer et le Zézere. Elle sera en face de l'ennemi, et n'aura plus ni ouvrages ni Tage à surmonter. Elle pourra sans cesse agir contre ses postes, contre ses détachements, contre les points faibles, si toutefois l'ennemi se rapproche de nous ; ce qui n'est pas supposable, à cause de la dévastation du pays, de la difficulté des vivres, et du système d'inertie qu'il a adopté. Si les Anglais restaient près de Lisbonne, je continuerais à agir par des détachements sur le Tage et sur le Zézere ; et, au moyen du pont de Pedregão ou de tout autre que j'établirais, on épuiserait la rive gauche de cette dernière rivière. Quand l'armée sera un peu organisée, qu'elle aura reçu quelques remplacements et quelques munitions, elle pourra, si S. M. l'ordonne, faire encore quelque pointe en avant ; et si, pendant la saison des gûes sur le Tage, il entrait dans les intentions de S. M. de pousser ces pointes au delà du fleuve, l'armée trouverait des ressources pour quelque temps dans l'Alentejo après les récoltes.

J'espère pouvoir faire vivre l'armée 50 ou 60 jours sur le Mondego, pour attendre l'organisation des secours en vivres que l'Espagne peut nous faire passer. En plaçant une division du 9<sup>m</sup>e corps à Trancoso et Guarda, une autre vers Pinhancos sur le Mondego, et à Viseu, de doubles communications avec la France et l'Espagne seront solidement et régulièrement établies ; ce corps d'armée gardera les débouchés de la tête de la vallée du Zézere, surveillera les partis ennemis qui pourraient menacer l'Elja, et trouvera de quoi vivre pendant quelque temps dans les vallons fertiles de la Cova de Beira. Enfin, si le 5<sup>m</sup>e corps occupe les frontières de l'Alentejo, ou fait les sièges des places, l'ennemi se trouvera inquiété sur les deux rives du Tage, obligé de se diviser ou d'abandonner totalement une des rives ; alors, au moyen d'un corps séparé qu'il serait, dans tous les cas, bien nécessaire d'établir à Alcantara, l'armée du midi et celle du Portugal pourraient concerter leurs mouvements, et celle-ci se trouverait encore en mesure de couvrir et de protéger les opérations de la première.

Monseigneur, je résume les observations que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de présenter à V. A. Le passage du Tage étant une opération très-hasardeuse dans ce moment ; la co-opération du 5<sup>m</sup>e corps n'ayant pas eu lieu depuis trois mois qu'elle m'est annoncée ; l'occupation des deux rives étant impossible, et la position de l'armée moins offensive au delà du Tage que sur sa rive droite ; la situation de l'Alentejo se trouvant changée par la dévastation des Anglais, et par les opérations de l'armée du midi ; je crois maintenant qu'il est plus conforme à ce que le général Foy m'a rapporté des intentions et de la politique de S. M., et aux intérêts de l'armée, de marcher sur Pombal, d'y prendre position, et de maintenir les troupes le plus longtemps possible sur les rives du Mondego. C'est le parti que je vais prendre, car il est impossible d'attendre plus longtemps dans nos positions. L'armée a tenu autant qu'il était physiquement possible de tenir ; elle a vécu pendant près de 6 mois, à force d'industrie, de soins et de privations, dans un pays où l'on ne croyait pas qu'elle pût vivre 15 jours, et sur lequel l'ennemi avait organisé la dévastation que la rapidité de nos marches n'a pas permis de porter à son comble. Maintenant le pays où nous sommes, et celui qui l'entoure à 5 ou 6 marches, sont totalement épuisés. Le peu d'habitants qui reste est réduit à vivre de racines, de glands, et d'herbages. Les corvées ne trouvent plus à de grandes distances le maïs qui fait depuis longtemps la nourriture de l'officier comme du soldat. La viande est épuisée, la paille entièrement consommée, et les chevaux sont au vert depuis plus d'un mois, dans cette saison où l'herbe est extrêmement courte : aussi en perd-on tous les

jours un certain nombre dans l'artillerie et la cavalerie. L'habillement est en mauvais état, et il est devenu si difficile de réparer ou remplacer les souliers, que beaucoup de soldats ont des chaussures faites avec des peaux fraîches. Les cartouches et la réserve de biscuits se détériorent journellement par le mauvais temps. Les munitions sont en petite quantité. Les voitures d'artillerie ont souffert des réductions considérables par les consommations journalières. Il a fallu les augmenter encore à cause des pertes de chevaux. Les transports, qui étaient déjà en petite quantité, ont dû être encore excessivement réduits par les diverses consommations, et par les secours qu'ils ont prêtés à l'artillerie. Enfin, tout s'use en raison du service, des corvées et de la fatigue continuelle, et tout est bien difficile à réparer ou à remplacer. Je ne dois pas laisser ignorer à S. M. que dans cet état de réduction et d'appauvrissement des armes et moyens accessoires de l'armée, j'ai cru devoir éviter tout ce qui pourrait tendre à compromettre la conservation d'aussi bonnes troupes.

Je dois de grands éloges à toute l'armée, pour sa persévérance et pour l'extrême dévouement qu'elle a montré. Les pluies qui sont tombées pendant les derniers mois ont augmenté ses souffrances, et je n'aurais pas exigé d'elle autant de sacrifices, si je n'avais pressenti, en quelque sorte, les intentions de S. M., et jugé que cette campagne n'ayant pu être terminée par un coup d'éclat, devait être une lutte de ténacité contre l'armée Anglaise et contre le Portugal entier, surtout dans la crise politique où se trouvait l'Angleterre. Mon équipage de pont et les travaux de Puihete n'ont pas peu favorisé mes dispositions. Ils m'ont valu un nouveau corps d'armée, en tenant devant eux un détachement considérable de l'ennemi, et m'ont mis à même de convrir de mes troupes une partie du Beira et de l'Estreina-dure, et d'en retirer les subsistances que nous avons consommées sur le Tage. J'ai tenu par là le corps du général Hill et du Maréchal Beresford sur une défensive perpétuelle, en les obligeant à de continuelles mouvements par les moindres démonstrations; et ces démonstrations ont puissamment secondé les opérations de l'armée de M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, puisqu'elles ont retenu constamment l'ennemi sur le Tage.

Le 6 Mars, l'armée exécutera son mouvement pour changer de positions. Les équipages, bagages, et réserves d'artillerie sont dirigés d'avance sur les points où doivent se rendre les corps d'armée. Les 2<sup>me</sup> et 6<sup>me</sup> corps prendront position le lendemain sur les hauteurs de Golegão et Torres Novas. L'artillerie faisant des dispositions démonstratives de passage à Puihete, et des préparatifs pour jeter comme pour détruire le pont, l'ennemi restera pendant 2 jours dans l'incertitude sur le véritable objet du mouvement jusqu'à la destruction de l'équipage de pont. Leiria est le pivot de la conversion et le centre de résistance. J'y réunirai, sous le commandement de M. le Maréchal Duc d'Elchingen, la 1<sup>re</sup> division du 9<sup>me</sup> corps, 2 divisions du 6<sup>me</sup>, et la cavalerie de l'armée. Le 3<sup>me</sup> jour, avant que l'ennemi ait pu déceler mes intentions, l'armée se trouvera en ligne de Leiria à Thomar, et se mettra en marche; le 2<sup>me</sup> corps, de Thomar vers Espinhal; la 3<sup>me</sup> division du 6<sup>me</sup> corps, de Chão de Maçans sur Ancião; le 8<sup>me</sup> corps, du même village sur Pombal et Redinha; les 6<sup>me</sup> et 9<sup>me</sup> corps formeront l'arrière-garde, de Leiria sur Pombal. L'armée s'arrêtera dans ses nouvelles positions, s'occupera du passage du Mondego, et le 9<sup>me</sup> corps marchera sur Celorico. D'après ces dispositions, l'ennemi ne peut rien entreprendre contre les diverses colonnes de l'armée, et il reste dans l'indécision jusqu'au moment où le changement de position est terminé. Ci-joint un croquis et copie des instructions pour ce mouvement.

J'attendrai dans ces nouvelles positions les ordres de S. M., pour savoir si je dois me borner à inquiéter l'ennemi, en faisant vivre l'armée le plus longtemps possible entre le Mondego et le Douro, ou si je dois porter la guerre au delà de ce dernier fleuve, opération assez difficile par la nature de ces pays montagneux. Il serait peut-être préférable, lorsque le pays entre le Douro et le Mondego sera épuisé, de revenir sur le Tage, vers le Beira bas et le haut Alentejo, en occupant Alcantara, de profiter de son pont de pierre et de quelques autres qu'on pourrait établir plus bas avec des bateaux, pour se tenir à cheval sur le fleuve, maîtriser son cours, menacer l'ennemi sur ses deux rives, parcourir et manger celle de ces deux provinces qui serait moins gardée. Alors, au moyen de quelques vivres qu'on tirerait de l'Espagne, on pourrait régulariser cette guerre, et réorganiser l'armée, dont l'esprit a un peu souffert dans les marandes et les corvées auxquelles elle a été réduite pour pouvoir subsister.

Monseigneur, je dois encore observer à V. A. que pendant mon séjour sur les bords du Tage, je n'ai pu entreprendre rien de sérieux contre Abrantes, et que j'ai dû me borner à bloquer cette place, ou plutôt à resserrer ses postes, et à empêcher ses communications avec les pays de la rive droite du Tage. Sa garnison a toujours été de 5 régiments, dont 2 de ligne et 3 de milices. Son armement était considérable, et on le portait à 100 pièces. Mais quel qu'en soit le nombre, je n'avais ni canons ni munitions pour diriger la moindre attaque contre cette place, car je n'ai pu conduire avec moi que des pièces de 8, à travers les montagnes du Beira. J'attendais, pour attaquer Abrantes, d'être maître des deux rives du Tage, pour pouvoir bloquer régulièrement cette place, et d'avoir reçu par l'Alentejo quelques pièces capables d'ouvrir ses murailles. Il est bon d'observer d'ailleurs qu'Abrantes est loin d'être un poste aussi important qu'on le dit, à cause de la distance où il se trouve du Tage, de son éloignement du Zézere, et des deux routes de Castello Branco et Guarda. Le pont de bateaux a été replié sur la rive gauche depuis notre arrivée.

Je vois s'approcher avec beaucoup de satisfaction, Monseigneur, le moment où il me sera permis de reprendre avec V. A. une correspondance réglée. L'éloignement dans lequel je me suis trouvé, les difficultés du pays qui était derrière moi, l'insurrection des paysans organisés au loin, l'inconvénient d'affaiblir par des détachements trop fréquents une armée déjà faible en raison de celle qui lui est opposée, des opérations qu'elle devait entreprendre, et des corvées qu'elle envoyait journellement pour les vivres : telles sont les raisons qui m'avaient porté à préférer la voie des émissaires secrets, pour donner les nouvelles de la position de l'armée ; mais il paraît que sur un grand nombre que j'ai expédiés, il en est arrivé bien peu à Almeida et Ciudad Rodrigo.

Monseigneur, je ne finirai pas sans prier V. A. d'observer que l'armée de Portugal manque de chevaux d'artillerie, de transports, d'habillemens et de chaus-sures, et qu'elle a besoin d'être recrutée ; enfin qu'il serait utile qu'elle fût placée pendant quelque temps dans un pays où l'on pût réunir les divisions pour y rétablir l'ordre et la discipline que les circonstances ont dû nécessairement affaiblir. M. le général Foy entrera avec V. A. dans beaucoup de détails que je ne peux écrire. Ma tâche a été et est difficile. Mon dévouement absolu au service de S. M. m'a fait surmonter bien des obstacles.

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joints différents états qui indiqueront à V. A. la situation de l'armée de Portugal.

J'attendrai avec impatience des instructions que je prie V. A. de m'adresser bientôt, puisque, comme je l'ai dit, nous ne pourrions vivre que 50 jours dans nos nouvelles positions, à partir du jour où le mouvement commencera à se faire, et puisqu'il importe qu'avant l'expiration de ce terme je connaisse les ordres de S. M., afin que je puisse m'occuper en temps utile des moyens d'exécution qui exigent des dispositions préparatoires.

P.S. Le général Foy devait me quitter le 7. Je l'ai retenu jusqu'au 8. Il a été témoin de la partie la plus difficile du mouvement. Tout s'est passé pour le mieux, ainsi qu'il en rendra compte à V. A.

#### No. XXXV. (p. 698.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Bellune à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major Général.  
Puerto Real, le 7 Mars, 1811.

Vers les premiers jours de Février, et pendant tout le courant de ce mois, on remarqua un grand mouvement dans la rade de Cadix. Les Anglais étaient sans doute prêts depuis long tems pour l'expédition qu'ils voulaient faire ; mais ils furent contrariés par les pluies fortes et continuëles qui eurent lieu sur la fin de Janvier et pendant une grande partie du mois de Février. Ces pluies rendaient impraticables tous les chemins par lesquels ils voulaient venir à nous.

Le 27 Janvier une forte colonne Espagnole, sortie des montagnes, tenta un coup de main sur Medina Sidonia : elle fut repoussée. Les ennemis paraissaient attacher de l'importance à s'emparer de cette position, dont l'occupation leur eût donné la facilité de manœuvrer sur nos derrières, en nous dérobant tous leurs mouvemens, et de communiquer librement par les montagnes avec les partis qu'ils auraient pu jeter dans le pays entre Xerez et Séville.

Dans les derniers jours de Février un convoi de 200 bâtimens de transport que les

vents contraires retenaient dans la rade depuis long tems mit à la voile et se dirigea sur Tarifa.

Le général Cassagne, qui occupait Medina Sidonia avec 3 bataillons et le 5<sup>me</sup> régt. de chasseurs, me donna connaissance le 2 Mars de la marche de l'armée combinée Anglo-Espagnole pour la vallée de la Barbatte, sur Casa Vieja et Medina. Le 4<sup>me</sup> corps, qui n'est pas sérieusement occupé, aurait pu m'envoyer une partie de ses forces. J'ai fait prier le général Sebastiani de manœuvrer par Estepona pour inquiéter l'ennemi et le compromettre s'il exécutait son mouvement sur moi : ce corps, si nombreux et si beau, ne m'a été d'aucun secours. Je fis venir de Moron un bataillon de voltigeurs que M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie y avait fait placer en le dirigeant par Arcos sur Medina, où il devait rejoindre le général Cassagne.

Un fort parti de l'armée alliée força un piquet du 2<sup>me</sup> de dragons, qui était à Vejer, à évacuer cette position, et à se replier sur Conil.

Le mouvement de l'armée alliée étant tout à fait prononcé, je pris du mienx qu'il me fut possible avec les faibles moyens dont je disposais directement des dispositions pour m'opposer à l'effort que l'ennemi était prêt à faire.

Après avoir laissé les troupes nécessaires à la garde des lignes, qui sont si étendues, je réunis 10 bataillons des 1<sup>re</sup> et 2<sup>me</sup> divisions, avec lesquels j'allai prendre position, le 3 Mars, à la ferme de Guerra, point intermédiaire entre Medina et Chiclana, et d'où j'étais à même de me porter sur l'ennemi, en cas qu'il voulait déboucher par un de ces deux points.

Du 2 au 4 il y eut de l'indécision dans les mouvements de l'armée alliée.

Le 4, au soir, j'ordonnai au général Cassagne de faire une forte reconnaissance sur Casa Vieja, point où l'ennemi s'était fortement établi dès son arrivée.

Le 5, à 3 heures du matin, le général Cassagne me donna avis que l'ennemi avait évacué Casa Vieja, et qu'il paraissait s'être concentré à Vejer.

Le 2 Mars les Espagnols avaient fait passer de l'île de Léon quelques troupes de ce côté du canal S<sup>t</sup> Petri. J'ordonnai au général Villatte de profiter de la nuit pour attaquer ces troupes et les jeter dans la mer. Deux compagnies de voltigeurs du 95<sup>me</sup> régt. furent commandées pour cette expédition : elles sortirent à minuit des lignes de S<sup>t</sup> Petri. Après avoir culbuté les premières gardes, elles arrivent, sans tirer un coup de fusil, à la tête de pont à laquelle l'ennemi travaillait. Nos voltigeurs, escaladant l'ouvrage, tombent à la baïonnette sur un millier de travailleurs, portant le fusil en bandoulière, y mettant le désordre. Cette nuit même l'ennemi avait tendu un pont de radeaux ; quelques voltigeurs pénétrèrent de l'autre côté du pont, et repassent avec les troupes Espagnoles qui accoururent au secours des leurs.

Ces deux compagnies, à la tête desquelles se trouvait le colonel du 95<sup>me</sup>, sont rentrées dans leur camp avec beaucoup de prisonniers. Les Espagnols ont eu à leur avis 150 hommes tués et 200 noyés.

Ce combat, qui a eu lieu sous le feu continu du fort de S<sup>t</sup> Petri et des batteries de l'île de Léon, illustre les voltigeurs du 95<sup>me</sup> régt. : ils ont montré dans cette occasion autant de sang froid que de bravoure.

Ce ne fut que par la relation de cette affaire que le général Villatte m'adressa le 4, que j'eus connaissance de l'établissement de ce pont de radeaux, qui permettait aux ennemis de lier les opérations des troupes restées dans l'île avec celle de leur armée.

L'établissement du pont de S<sup>t</sup> Petri, et le rapport du général Cassagne qui m'instruisit que l'ennemi ne paraissait pas du côté d'Alcala et de Medina, me firent présumer que son intention était de marcher par sa gauche pour surprendre et culbuter les troupes de la 3<sup>me</sup> division qui étaient dans les lignes de S<sup>t</sup> Petri, se réunir à ce qui sortirait de Cadix, et marcher dans cette direction sur Chiclana.

Je fis mes dispositions pour surprendre l'ennemi dans sa marche et tromper son espoir.

Le 5, à 5 heures du matin, les 10 bataillons des 1<sup>re</sup> et 2<sup>me</sup> divisions partent de la ferme de Guerra et se dirigent sur Chiclana.

Le général Cassagne reçoit l'ordre de marcher à nous.

A mon arrivée à Chiclana j'ordonne au général Villatte de retirer de nos lignes de S<sup>t</sup> Petri 2 bataillons qui auraient pu être compromis, et de les réunir au reste de sa division destinée à attaquer les têtes de colonne de l'armée alliée au moment où elles se présenteraient.

J'étais dans la croyance, d'après tous les renseignemens que j'avais pu me procurer, que cette armée était forte de 8000 Espagnols et de 4000 Anglais. C'était le double de ce que je pouvais lui opposer : néanmoins j'avais conçu l'espérance non seulement de faire échouer ses projets, mais de la détruire : c'est dans ce sens que j'avais manœuvré.

L'armée ennemie était en pleine marche ; ses têtes de colonne arrivaient près de nos lignes de S<sup>te</sup> Petri ; et son arrière garde était sur un mamelon près du bord de la mer, à peu près à une lieue de nos lignes, lorsque je débouchai par les bois qui sont en avant de Chiclana sur son flanc droit, et presque sur ses derrières avec les 10 bataillons des 1<sup>re</sup> et 2<sup>me</sup> divisions. Les troupes du général Cassagne ne paraissaient pas encore, un grand quart de lieue me séparait de l'ennemi, et ne l'attaquant pas, je lui donnais le tems de se serrer, et d'arriver sur la division Villatte. Je ne crus pas devoir perdre une occasion si belle, et je marchai à lui.

La division Ruffin, tenant la gauche avec le 1<sup>er</sup> rég<sup>t</sup>. de dragons, se dirigea par l'extrémité du mamelon, du côté de Conil ; et la division Leval marcha droit à ce mamelon, sur lequel l'ennemi paraissait vouloir nous attendre. Il s'y maintint pendant quelques instans ; il fut culbuté, et le général Ruffin prit possession de la hauteur. Je me portai alors sur ce mamelon, d'où je vis les dispositions de l'armée ennemie. Les Espagnols sous les ordres de La Peña étaient en tête, et fortement engagés avec le général Villatte. La canonnade et la fusillade étaient extrêmement vives. Je reconnus à la vue de leurs lignes qu'ils étaient au moins 15,000 hommes. Les Anglais faisaient l'arrière-garde, et selon leur usage ils voulaient compromettre les Espagnols, et s'exposer le moins possible. Par le mouvement que j'avais fait, je me portais sur eux. Le général Anglais faisait ses dispositions ; et je pus voir qu'au lieu d'être forts de 4000 hommes, comme je l'avais supposé, ils étaient au moins 8000 ; c'est-à-dire qu'à eux seuls, et non compris les Espagnols, ils étaient plus forts que moi. J'eus donc lieu de me convaincre que l'armée que j'avais à combattre s'élevait aux moins à 22,000 hommes. Je me décidai alors à envoyer l'ordre au général Villatte de ne pas s'opposer au passage de l'ennemi, de l'empêcher de se porter sur Chiclana, et de le contenir à la gauche du ruisseau.

Du mamelon d'où j'avais chassé l'ennemi à S<sup>te</sup> Petri et à Chiclana, le pays est entièrement couvert de bois de sapin, à l'exception de quelques centaines de toises.

Je me portai à la division Leval ; je la fis former, et quelques instans furent employés à attendre l'artillerie. Aussitôt que les ennemis avaient eu connaissance de ma marche, ils avaient fait halte, et s'étaient placés, les Espagnols à gauche, la moitié des Anglais à droite, et l'autre moitié, faisant l'équerre, était opposée au général Ruffin. Les Anglais touchaient à la mer. Cette ligne était presque continue.

Aussitôt que mon artillerie fut arrivée, je dirigeai le général Leval sur la gauche du corps Anglais, et sur la droite des Espagnols, ayant à ma droite le général Villatte, qui était vivement engagé avec la gauche des Espagnols, et à ma gauche le général Ruffin, qui occupait la hauteur : sa gauche était appuyée à la mer, et sa droite était séparée par un intervalle de 500 à 600 toises de pays coupé de la gauche du général Leval. Le feu s'engagea successivement sur toute la ligne. L'ennemi, sentant qu'il n'était pas question de combattre pour la victoire, mais pour son salut, se battit avec courage, supportant un feu qui lui renversait des hommes par centaine. Mais il était si nombreux qu'aussitôt qu'une ligne était culbutée, elle était remplacée par une autre. Nos soldats se battaient en lions. Un corps Espagnol gagnait sur la droite du général Leval, ce qui me déterminait à faire un mouvement sur sa droite, et à ordonner au général Ruffin de se rapprocher de sa gauche. Après 2½ heures d'une action extrêmement vive, il était 3 heures après midi, le feu cessa de part et d'autre ; l'ennemi renonça au projet pour lequel il était en mouvement depuis 2 mois, et qui était de prendre Chiclana et de tourner nos lignes. De notre côté, je renonçai à l'espérance de le détruire, espérance qui aurait été insensée, du moment où j'avais reconnu que sa force montait à 22,000 hommes, parmi lesquels était au moins 8000 hommes des meilleures troupes des Anglais, au nombre desquelles étaient plusieurs corps des Gardes.

Je le répète, l'armée ennemie était de 22,000 hommes, y compris 8000 hommes d'infanterie Anglaise, 700 hommes de cavalerie Espagnole, et 500 cavaliers

Anglais. Les renseignemens des prisonniers, des habitans du pays, et tous mes rapports, ne laissent aucun doute sur ce nombre. Si j'avais seulement été aidé par le quart du 4<sup>me</sup> corps, toute cette armée était perdue.

Nous avons pris 3 pièces de canon, 3 colonels, 100 officiers, et 600 soldats, pour la plupart Espagnols. Les Espagnols ont beaucoup souffert; on évalue leur perte à 2000 hommes, mais la perte éprouvée par les Anglais a aussi été très forte. Les calculs les plus modérés la portent à 2500 hommes tués et blessés.

Le général Ruffin, blessé avec ses tirailleurs, a été fait prisonnier. Les 8<sup>me</sup>, 21<sup>me</sup>, 54<sup>me</sup>, et 96<sup>me</sup> régimens se sont distingués. Le général Ronsean, officier du plus grand mérite, et le colonel Antié, ont été tués. Notre perte est très sensible, vu le petit nombre de nos combattans. Nous avons eu 300 hommes tués et 1400 blessés. L'ennemi ne nous a pas fait de prisonniers, si ce n'est d'une soixantaine d'hommes qui étaient grièvement blessés. Un bataillon du 8<sup>me</sup> avait chargé dans un pays convert, et son porte-aigle ayant été tué, nous n'avons pas retrouvé son aigle.

Pendant que l'ennemi marchait sur Chiclana, les insurgés des montagnes se jetaient sur nos derrières par Arcos et Medina. Tous les points de notre ligne ont été attaqués. Mais la valeur du 1<sup>er</sup> corps l'a emporté sur le grand nombre de nos ennemis. Cette affaire a porté au dernier point l'admiration des habitans de l'Andalousie. Ils ont peine à concevoir comment si peu de monde a résisté à tant d'efforts combinés.

J'ai beaucoup à me louer de mes aides de camp, et surtout de mon premier aide de camp le colonel Chataux. Je ne puis d'ailleurs citer personne. Officiers et soldats, tout le monde a fait son devoir. Le général Cassagne avec la garnison de Medina n'est arrivé que 2 heures après l'action.

#### No. XXXVI. (pp. 669, 687.)

Le Maréchal Prince d'Esling à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Major Général.  
Maceira, le 19 Mars, 1811.

Dans les dépêches dont était porteur le général Foy, j'ai eu l'honneur de rendre compte dernièrement à V. A. du changement de position auquel je me trouvais forcé par l'épuisement du pays que j'occupais, par le manque total des vivres et des fourrages, et par les réductions considérables que l'armée avait souffertes dans ses moyens et armemens accessoires. J'avais fait pour ce mouvement des dispositions telles qu'il s'est exécuté fort tranquillement pendant les premières journées en présence de l'ennemi, que j'ai tenu dans une entière incertitude sur le but de mes opérations. L'armée s'est trouvée réunie à Pombal, Anciao, et Espinhal; mais l'ennemi, qui avait un trajet bien moins considérable à parcourir pour se porter sur notre ligne d'opérations, à cause du détour auquel nous obligeait la chaîne des montagnes d'Ourem, a pu nous présenter des forces supérieures, le 10 Mars, devant Pombal, où se trouvait le 6<sup>me</sup> corps, formant notre arrière-garde. Il a attaqué les troupes légères placées en avant, les a repoussées, et a pénétré dans le milieu de la ville. La 1<sup>re</sup> brigade de la 1<sup>re</sup> division chassa bientôt les Anglais à la baïonnette, et en tua un grand nombre dans les rues ou dans les maisons; ils furent poussés dans un grand désordre, et laissèrent la ville pleine de morts ou de blessés, qui ont été brûlés par l'incendie qui s'est manifesté peu après. L'arrière-garde est restée devant Pombal, et l'armée se trouvait sur Redinha. Déjà, pendant cette journée, la majeure partie de l'armée combinée était devant nous, et Lord Wellington s'y trouvait en personne. Le 2<sup>me</sup> corps et la division Loison n'avaient à leur suite que quelques régimens ennemis.

Le 11 Mars, l'arrière-garde a pris position sur les hauteurs en avant de Redinha. L'ennemi a déployé dans l'après-midi 25,000 Anglais sous le feu de notre artillerie, qui n'a cessé de tirer sur leurs masses avec le plus grand avantage, sans être contre-battue, Lord Wellington n'ayant montré de l'artillerie qu'après avoir terminé son déploiement. Alors, il a fait marcher une forte colonne vers la gauche par la vallée de Redinha. Aussitôt que la tête de cette infanterie s'est mise à tirailler, elle a été chargée et culbutée à la baïonnette: l'officier Anglais qui la commandait a été tué. Le colonel Laferrière a été blessé en chargeant à la tête du 13<sup>me</sup> rég. de hussards. Lord Wellington continuait à faire filer des troupes sur la montagne à gauche de la ville; l'arrière-garde, qui avait contenu l'ennemi au delà de toute



espérance et lui avait fait éprouver une perte considérable, s'est retirée, dans le plus grand ordre et sans être poursuivie, sur le revers de la vallée, où elle a pris position. L'armée s'est trouvée en partie échelonnée entre Redinha et Condeixa; le reste était en position en avant de ce dernier village : le 2<sup>me</sup> corps occupait Espinhel et Corvo. La colonne du général Cole, qui avait suivi jusqu'à ce moment le général Regnier, était venue rejoindre Lord Wellington : celui-ci avait dans cette journée 5 divisions Anglaises avec lui et les troupes Portugaises, montant ensemble à 50,000 ou 60,000 hommes, sans compter les milices qui se trouvaient sur la rive droite du Mondego et les paysans armés. D'après les rapports, le général Hill se portait avec sa division et un gros détachement de Portugais à travers les montagnes du haut Zezere, se dirigeant sur la rive gauche du Mondego. Dès ce moment, j'ai abandonné l'espoir de garder cette rive sans risquer une bataille, et j'ai tourné toutes mes attentions sur la rive droite de ce fleuve et sur l'Alva. D'ailleurs l'ennemi a exécuté dans ce malheureux pays son système de dévastation avec une telle rigueur qu'on n'y trouvait plus un grain de maïs.

J'avais envoyé le général Montbrun avec une partie de sa cavalerie, et le colonel du génie Valazé, pour reconnaître l'état du Mondego et les dispositions de l'ennemi devant Coïmbre. Ils me firent le rapport que ce fleuve était prodigieusement enflé par la pluie, qui ne cessait de tomber depuis notre départ; que le pont de Coïmbre avait deux arches ruinées et quelques-unes minées; enfin, que la rive droite était garnie par les troupes de Trant et de Silveira, et défendue par du canon. Il fallait plusieurs jours pour raccommoder le pont du Mondego, et une attaque de vive force pour emporter Coïmbre; les bateaux me manquaient pour effectuer un passage, parce que je ne pouvais amener aucun équipage de pontons, et que l'ennemi avait détruit tous les bateaux qui se trouvaient sur le Mondego. A ces difficultés se joignaient le voisinage de l'armée combinée, et la certitude d'être attaqué pendant qu'une partie de nos troupes serait employée à ce passage. J'ai dû alors renoncer à une opération devenue si difficile, et pendant quelques moments j'ai voulu arrêter l'ennemi par une bataille dans les belles positions de Condeixa. Mais mon entier dévouement pour S. M. et la considération des intérêts de l'armée m'ont détourné de ce projet, et m'ont déterminé à bien peser les raisons majeures qui devaient m'y faire renoncer. Voici, Monseigneur, les raisons qui me paraissent propres à convaincre entièrement V. A. : la force de l'armée qui se trouve réduite à près de la moitié de celle qui m'est opposée; le départ de la division Conroux du 9<sup>me</sup> corps; l'épuisement de l'armée par de longues privations et la réduction de ses vivres; la quantité considérable de malades, d'équipages, bagages, dont une partie est traînée par des bœufs; le peu de munitions qui nous restent; l'état de l'artillerie, dont les attelages sont excessivement réduits et dans le plus mauvais état; enfin, le désir que les chefs ont manifesté depuis longtemps de quitter le Portugal et de rentrer en France, et qui ne contribue pas peu au défaut d'harmonie qui devrait régner à l'armée. A ces considérations se réunissent encore l'éloignement de nos moyens, que nous ne pouvions trouver que dans nos places, tandis que l'ennemi avait ses derrières assurés par Peniche et par les lignes, et les dangers de perdre l'artillerie, les équipages, les trainards, les blessés, etc., si l'armée était repoussée; car nous sommes au milieu de toute une population armée contre nous, et exaspérée par les pertes que lui ont fait éprouver la disette dans laquelle nous nous trouvons, et la nature de cette guerre. Ces puissantes raisons, dont j'avais eu l'honneur de présenter une partie à V. A. dans ma dépêche précédente, m'ont déterminé alors et depuis à éviter soigneusement toute affaire générale, qui d'ailleurs ne pourrait avoir aucune suite avantageuse pour nous, puisque nous nous trouvons forcés d'abandonner un pays entièrement dévasté, et où il est impossible de vivre. Je me suis décidé à ne combattre qu'autant qu'il le fallait pour l'honneur et pour la sûreté de l'armée, en disputant le terrain pas à pas à l'ennemi. Ainsi, j'ai dû renoncer au passage du Mondego, et j'ai dû me déterminer à rapprocher peu à peu l'armée de la frontière, où elle doit se ravitailler de tout ce qui lui manque.

Lord Wellington manœuvrant le 12 sur la gauche de Condeixa vers Fonte Cuberta, où était la division Loison, j'ai renforcé ce poste, qui couvrait tous nos mouvements, avec la division Clausel, et je m'y suis porté. Pendant ce temps, l'ennemi ayant montré quelques troupes sur les flancs de l'arrière-garde, M. le Maréchal Duc d'Elchingen, qui la commandait, abandonna la position de Condeixa plutôt que je ne le croyais, et se porta au delà de la division Loison. Le

poste de Fonte Cuberta était découvert, et l'artillerie qui s'y trouvait compromise ; j'ai gagné avec elle la grande route par une marche de flanc à portée de canon de la ligne ennemie et par un beau clair de lune. Les deux armées n'ont exécuté que de grandes manœuvres dans cette journée ; il n'y a pas en un coup de fusil de tiré.

L'armée était réunie en avant de Miranda de Corvo, et l'arrière-garde se trouvait à Lamas : elle a été attaquée dans l'après-midi par l'armée Anglaise, qui continuait ses mêmes manœuvres sur les flancs. Après avoir défendu vivement sa position par de grands feux d'artillerie et de mousqueterie, l'arrière-garde est venue se placer en avant de Miranda de Corvo ; et l'armée, par une marche de nuit, s'est portée sur Foz d'Arouce, où elle a pris position sur les hauteurs de la rive droite de la Ceira. Le 2<sup>me</sup> corps, qui se trouvait la veille à Corvo, tenait la tête de la colonne, et s'est établi à la gauche de la nouvelle position ; le 8<sup>me</sup> à la droite ; le 6<sup>me</sup> et l'arrière-garde devaient occuper le centre. Pendant ce temps, nos équipages et nos malades ne cessaient de filer, et rien absolument n'est resté en arrière. Cependant une partie de ces équipages et même quelques voitures d'artillerie étaient traînées par des bœufs, et les malades ou blessés portés sur des ânes. Dans l'attaque de Lamas, mon aide de camp, le chef d'escadron Marcelin Marbot, a été blessé de plusieurs coups de sabre.

La position sur la rive droite de la Ceira était forte et respectable ; mais un partie du 6<sup>me</sup> corps était restée sur la rive gauche. Le 15 de ce mois au soir, elle a été attaquée vivement par plusieurs colonnes d'infanterie Anglaise, tandis que d'autres colonnes manœuvraient selon leur coutume sur nos flancs. Le village de Foz d'Arouce a été pris et repris. L'infanterie de l'armée combinée a encore beaucoup souffert du feu de toute l'artillerie de la rive droite qui la dominait et la fondroyait, tandis que 5 pièces que l'ennemi a montrées, étaient tenues hors de portée par la domination de nos batteries. Le colonel Lamour a été tué à la tête du 39<sup>me</sup> rég<sup>t</sup>, ce qui a occasionné quelque confusion dans nos troupes ; mais elles ont été réunies par une vigoureuse charge du 69<sup>me</sup> rég<sup>t</sup>, et par quelques compagnies de voltigeurs qui s'étaient lancées sur l'extrême droite. Les Anglais qui attaquaient le village ont été mis dans le plus grand désordre, et ce désordre s'est communiqué sur toute la ligne ennemie. Dans ce combat très opiniâtre, où nos troupes ont lutté contre un ennemi supérieur et contre les défauts de leur position sur la rive gauche, notre perte ne s'élève pas à 200 hommes ; celle de l'ennemi, qui a eu un officier général de tué, est infiniment plus forte. On a remarqué le même avantage dans tous les combats où les Anglais ont presque toujours reçu un feu supérieur, et où ils ont été vivement attaqués à la baïonnette.

Cependant le pont de Murcella, où se trouvait la seule communication de l'armée, était détruit, et il fallait plusieurs jours de travaux pour le raccommoder ; le 9<sup>me</sup> corps, qui avait quitté l'armée à Pombal le 16, faisait rétablir ce pont. Je l'ai fait terminer, et il l'a été totalement dans la journée du 19. Pour contenir l'ennemi, les 2<sup>me</sup> et 8<sup>me</sup> corps avaient été mis en position sur les hauteurs de la rive gauche de l'Alva, tandis que le 6<sup>me</sup> corps était échelonné entre cette position et la Ceira, dont le pont avait été complètement ruiné ; la division Marchand formait la tête vers l'ennemi, sur la belle position de la Ceira, et conservait au milieu des bois la ligne des feux de l'armée. L'ennemi est resté toute la journée en position, et n'a pas fait vers le soir son attaque ordinaire. Les bagages et l'artillerie, dont une partie avait filé à travers les gués de l'Alva, sont passés en totalité au delà de cette rivière, et, le 17, l'armée se trouva réunie dans les positions de la rive droite de l'Alva, avec une avant-garde sur les hauteurs de la rive gauche. L'ennemi a dégarni sa ligne au milieu de la nuit, et a fait un mouvement sur un de nos flancs ; mes reconnaissances n'ont pu m'indiquer encore le point sur lequel il s'est porté : elles ne peuvent s'étendre un peu loin qu'en très grande force, parce que tous les habitants sans exception sont sous les armes, ainsi que j'ai en l'honneur de le dire déjà à V. A. Je pense que l'ennemi a fait un détachement sur la rive droite du Mondego, afin de nous en disputer le passage, attendu que les eaux de cette rivière sont écoulées en partie par le retour du beau temps, et que d'ailleurs, dans ces pays élevés, elle a beaucoup moins d'eau que vers Coimbre.

Je crois que, dans l'état actuel des choses, et d'après les mouvements que l'ennemi peut faire sur mes flancs, par le Mondego ou par les montagnes de Guarda, où s'est dirigé le corps du général Hill, il est nécessaire pour les intérêts de S. M. de rapprocher encore l'armée de notre base d'opération sur nos places,

afin de la remettre un peu de ses fatigues et de ses longues privations, de la réorganiser et de pourvoir au remplacement de tant d'objets qui lui manquent totalement. Il me paraît d'ailleurs impossible de faire vivre nos troupes dans des pays resserrés et montagneux qui ont été épuisés par les deux armées, et dernièrement ravagés avec la plus grande barbarie par les Anglais, qui punissaient tous ceux qui conservaient quelques grains, et n'abandonnaient pas leurs foyers à notre approche. Nous trouvons tout détruit : usines, moulins, maisons, et beaucoup de villages brûlés. Ci-joint une des dernières proclamations de l'ennemi à ce sujet. Je marcherai le plus lentement possible ; je disputerai encore à l'ennemi le terrain pas à pas, en évitant cependant, autant que possible, ces combats qui nous coûtent des braves, mais dans lesquels la perte est toujours du côté de l'ennemi par le nombre réel, et surtout par le rapport des forces des deux puissances. Aussitôt que j'aurai trouvé une position convenable à portée de ces places, je l'occuperai et j'y attendrai, s'il le faut, l'armée combinée ; j'y attendrai également les ordres que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous demander par ma dépêche du 6 de ce mois.

Notre mouvement de retraite s'est fait avec le plus grand ordre ; nous n'avons pas laissé en arrière un malade, un blessé, ni la moindre voiture d'artillerie ou de bagages ; l'ennemi a été repoussé toutes les fois qu'il a attaqué, et toujours avec perte. Enfin, depuis que l'armée a été réunie à Pombal, elle n'a fait que 2 lieues par jour, et n'a jamais été poussée par les Anglais.

Je m'estimerai très-heureux, Monseigneur, qu'après avoir mis en usage tout le dévouement dont je suis capable, je puisse apprendre que S. M. est bien persuadée qu'aucun genre d'efforts n'est ménagé de ma part pour répondre à la confiance dont elle a daigné m'honorer. J'ai déjà rendu compte à V. A. que MM. les officiers généraux montraient le plus grand zèle pour le bien du service. Comme j'ai lieu de remarquer plus particulièrement celui du général de division Fririon, que ses fonctions de chef d'état-major tiennent en rapport continué avec moi, je lui dois la justice de vous témoigner aussi, Monseigneur, que, par son habileté, ses talents, et son activité, il a acquis de nouveaux droits aux bontés de S. M. dans le cours de cette campagne.

J'aurai l'honneur de vous présenter bientôt un rapport plus détaillé des opérations et de l'état de l'armée. Je n'avais pas pu trouver encore un moment pour présenter à V. A. ce rapport sommaire.

## RAPPORT.

Un aide de camp du Maréchal Prince d'Essling est arrivé à Paris. Il est parti le 23 Mars de Celorico, où était le quartier général. Tous les magasins que l'armée avait formés se trouvaient entièrement épuisés au 28 Février. Les fourrageurs que l'on envoyait jusqu'à 20 lieues du quartier général ne rapportaient plus rien.

Le 1<sup>er</sup> Mars l'on était réduit à entamer la réserve de biscuit, qui pouvait tout au plus fournir pour 15 jours de vivres, et il n'y avait aucune possibilité d'attendre la récolte, puisqu'on ne pouvait espérer aucune ressource avant Juin. Il ne restait donc au Prince d'Essling que trois partis à prendre :

1. Ou d'attaquer les Anglais dans les lignes de Lisbonne ; mais les principes de la guerre lui défendaient de le faire tant que sa grosse artillerie ne serait pas arrivée.

2. Ou de passer le Tage pour faire sa jonction avec l'armée d'Andalousie, et par-là se trouver en communication par la grande route avec Séville et Madrid, trouver ses moyens d'artillerie dans Badajoz, tirer ses vivres de l'Alentejo, changer sa ligne d'opération, et tenir la double tête de pont que l'armée avait construite sur la rive droite et sur la rive gauche du Zézere à Punhete.

Le général Eblé, par une activité et une vraie connaissance de toutes les ressources de son métier qui lui fait le plus grand honneur, ainsi qu'à l'artillerie de l'armée, était parvenu à construire 200 bateaux. On pouvait donc jeter à-la-fois deux ponts sur le Tage, menacer d'un passage devant Punhete, l'effectuer plus bas vis à-vis de Santarem, en se portant ensuite sur les derrières de la division du général Hill que les Anglais tenaient devant Punhete, ou rejeter l'armée Anglaise dans Lisbonne par un mouvement par Leiria, et par-là l'obliger à rappeler la division Hill afin de venir au secours de Lisbonne : enfin profiter de ce mouvement pour jeter un pont aux environs de Punhete. Le Tage passé au moyen de l'une

ou de l'autre de ces opérations, on se trouvait en communication avec Séville et Madrid, et on pouvait se renforcer de toutes les ressources de l'armée de l'Audalousie.

3. Le troisième parti qui se présentait était de repasser le Mondego, se reportant sur Guarda, et se mettant en communication avec Ciudad Rodrigo, où étaient les souliers, les effets d'habillemens, les munitions, les ressources de l'artillerie, les magasins, et le trésor de l'armée, qui n'était pas payé depuis 6 mois.

Le 3 Mars le Prince d'Essling se décida pour ce dernier parti.

Le 4, tous les bagages et les malades, chargés sur la grande quantité de mulets et de bourriques qu'avait l'armée, se mirent en route et gagnèrent deux marches. L'arrière-garde fut confiée au Duc d'Elchingen, qui de Leiria s'avancant jusqu'à Moliano, menaça de tourner la position de Cartaxo.

Le 10, l'arrière-garde se trouvait à Pombal. Nos tirailleurs qui étaient restés en avant de la ville et l'avant-garde Anglaise s'engagèrent, ce qui donna lieu au combat de Pombal. Nos avant-postes se replièrent ; l'avant-garde Anglaise entra dans la ville. La 1<sup>re</sup> brigade de la 1<sup>re</sup> division du Duc d'Elchingen marcha sur l'ennemi la baïonnette en avant, la chargea, et tua ou blessa 400 à 500 hommes. Notre perte dans ce combat se monte à 5 hommes tués et 18 blessés. L'avant-garde Anglaise n'avait pas d'artillerie : l'artillerie de notre arrière-garde était en batterie, et jouait constamment contre elle.

Le 11, l'arrière-garde Française était sur les hauteurs de Redinha. Le général Anglais s'avança avec toute son armée : à 2 heures après midi il déploya environ 25,000 hommes, sous le feu de 40 de nos pièces, qui tiraient avec une grande activité. Tous les coups portaient dans la masse des ennemis, sans qu'ils eussent démasqué aucune batterie. Le désordre se manifesta plusieurs fois dans leurs colonnes. Vers 5 heures leur artillerie arriva, et ils montèrent quelques batteries. On vit avec plaisir qu'une de leurs divisions manœuvrait sur leur droite pour tourner notre gauche par la vallée de Redinha. On la laissa faire. Aussitôt qu'elle fut suffisamment engagée, le 50<sup>me</sup> et le 27<sup>me</sup> de ligne marchèrent sur elle à la baïonnette, et la mirent dans une parfaite déroute. L'officier Anglais qui commandait fut tué. Le 3<sup>me</sup> hussards fit une fort belle charge. La perte des Anglais, qui se sont trouvés plusieurs heures sous le feu de notre artillerie, a été considérable. Notre perte s'est montée à 80 hommes tués ou blessés.

Le 15 l'avant-garde s'est trouvée à Foz d'Arouce. Notre artillerie était en position sur la rive droite de la Ceira, qui domine de beaucoup la rive gauche. On engagea fort adroitement l'ennemi dans une affaire d'avant-garde qui lui fut funeste. On l'attira sous le feu de l'artillerie de la rive droite : en même tems, le 39<sup>me</sup> et le 69<sup>me</sup> le chargèrent, et tandis que le village était pris et repris plusieurs fois, les colonnes Anglaises étaient en butte à tout le feu de nos batteries. Le désordre se mit dans leurs rangs, et se communiqua bientôt à toute la ligne ennemie, fatiguée du désavantage d'une pareille position. Quelques fuyards Anglais arrivèrent jusqu'à Louzão et Pinheiro. Le village de Foz d'Arouce resta à l'arrière-garde Française. Notre perte se monte à 200 hommes ; celle de l'ennemi à 1200. Un officier général a été tué. C'était le moment alors de marcher contre l'armée Anglaise et de l'écraser. Cette résolution fut un instant agitée dans l'armée Française ; mais nous étions au 15 ; la retraite avait commencé le 5. On n'avait fait qu'une lieue et demie ou 2 lieues par jour ; il ne restait de vivres que pour 2 à 3 jours à demi-ration. Il n'y avait donc impossibilité de s'arrêter ; on n'avait pas un jour à perdre ; l'armée continua son mouvement.

Le 17 l'arrière-garde est entièrement passée l'Alva.

Instruit par les combats de Pombal, de Redinha, et de Foz d'Arouce, l'ennemi ne se montra plus.

Ces trois combats ont été avantageux à l'armée Française. Pas un seul caisson, pas une voiture de bagage, pas un malade n'est resté en arrière. On a mis 12 jours pour aller de Santarém aux rives de l'Alva. Tous les mouvemens de retraite ont été calculés, non sur les mouvemens des Anglais, mais sur la nécessité des subsistances.

Enfin, le 22 l'armée était dans la meilleure position, et le soldat dans le meilleur esprit. Les convois portaient de Salamanque et de Ciudad Rodrigo, et chaque jour l'armée recevait des effets d'habillement, des souliers, et de tout ce qui lui était nécessaire pour se refaire.

Ainsi l'armée de Portugal a vécu 6 mois avec les ressources du pays ; elle a changé de place lorsque toutes les ressources ont été épuisées, et que les difficul-

des transports et des chemins ne laissaient aucun espoir de rien tirer des dépôts. Les mois qui précèdent la récolte sont, en général, les plus difficiles pour les subsistances, parcequ'alors les greniers sont vides; mais à plus forte raison, ces difficultés ont-elles dû exister dans un pays ennemi et déjà dévasté.

## No. XXXVII. (p. 736.)

Le Maréchal Ney, Duc d'Elchingen, au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli.  
Cortigó, 22 Mars, 2 heures de l'après midi.

Prince, Par les dispositions que votre Excellence vient d'arrêter pour diriger sur Guarda tout le matériel de l'artillerie et envoyer en Espagne tous les hommes blessés et malades, il semblerait que votre Excellence est disposée à marcher par sa gauche pour s'approcher du Tage vers Alcantara. Cette manœuvre, qui ouvrirait les communications de la Castille et abandonnerait à leurs faibles ressources les places d'Almeida et de Ciudad Rodrigo, me paraîtrait bien extraordinaire dans les circonstances actuelles, où nous ne savons pas si Lord Wellington continuera sa marche offensive jusque sur les frontières de l'Espagne. Je prie votre Excellence de me dire si elle a reçu des ordres particuliers de l'Empereur sur une disposition semblable qui compromet de nouveau l'armée, l'éloigne de tout moyen de renouveler son habilement et sa chaussure, et expose gratuitement, je le répète, les frontières de l'Espagne et de la Castille sans atteindre aucun but essentiel; il me semble qu'il serait bien préférable d'attendre à proximité des places d'Almeida et de Ciudad Rodrigo de nouveaux ordres de l'Empereur, qui ne peuvent être plus de 15 à 20 jours à nous parvenir. D'ici à cette époque on saurait sans doute aussi d'une manière positive les intentions de Lord Wellington; et si l'armée Anglaise osait s'avancer jusqu'en Espagne, les réserves que l'Empereur a placées dans les environs de Salamanque pourraient se joindre à nous, et nous permettre de livrer à l'ennemi une bataille décisive, qui, sans contredit, serait à notre avantage; tandis que si votre Excellence s'éloigne de la Castille, elle va pour ainsi dire border la haie sur un développement immense, sans autre motif, du moins que je suppose, que d'occuper bien vite le terrain sur lequel nous aurions dû nous diriger en partant du Zezere, ce qui n'aurait occasionné aucune perte à l'armée dans cette marche rétrograde, et ce qui nous aurait même permis d'étendre notre droite pour couvrir les deux places que nous n'avons plus raisonnablement le droit de quitter avant que votre Excellence y ait été autorisée par de nouvelles instructions. Qu'arriverait-il si l'ennemi marchait entre Almeida et Ciudad Rodrigo, pour se diriger sur Salamanque ou Valladolid, car il lui faudrait peu de monde pour bloquer ces deux premières places, et elles ne l'arrêteraient pas un seul moment? C'est que toutes les troupes Françaises employées dans le nord de l'Espagne seraient obligées de se concentrer à Valladolid, ou même en arrière de ce point, et que si l'ennemi parvenait à se rendre maître de cette position importante et centrale, il se trouverait dès lors libre d'opérer sur tel ou tel corps qu'il jugerait convenable, sans que les armées Françaises pussent se concentrer nulle part et manœuvrer de concert pour le chasser. L'ennemi pourrait aussi fermer avec peu de troupes le passage du Col de Baños, ce qui obligerait votre Excellence à remonter le Tage jusqu'à Talavera pour vous diriger sur Madrid; et si en même temps il s'emparait du passage de Guadarama, il paralyserait l'Armée du Centre et deviendrait maître d'accabler avec toutes ses forces l'armée du Maréchal Duc d'Istrie. Cependant je dois faire remarquer à votre Excellence que dans toutes ces hypothèses l'ennemi n'a rien à risquer; car en supposant même qu'il ne puisse plus revenir sur ses pas, n'a-t-il pas derrière lui, et sur sa gauche, la grande route de la Galice? Toutes ces observations me sont suggérées par le bien du service de l'Empereur, et j'espère que votre Excellence ne les envisagera pas sous d'autres rapports. Je la prie de vouloir bien me faire part de ce qu'elle est dans l'intention de faire avant d'avoir reçu de nouveaux ordres; l'infanterie Anglaise, ainsi que je l'ai marqué ce matin à votre Excellence, occupe Villa Cortes; il est probable que demain l'ennemi fera des démonstrations d'attaque, et ce serait, je l'avoue, une chose vraiment inconcevable que d'entreprendre de nouveau une marche de flanc qui pût entraîner la ruine entière de nos affaires en Espagne.

Recevez, Prince, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Le Prince d'Essling répondit à cette lettre par l'ordre positif au 6<sup>e</sup> corps de se préparer au nouveau mouvement qu'il avait arrêté. Il reçut à 4 heures du soir la dépêche suivante :

Le Maréchal Ney, Duc d'Elchingen, au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli.  
' Cortigó, le 22 Mars, 1811, 4 heures après midi.

' Prince, Je reçois à l'instant la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date de ce jour, par laquelle elle me fait part du plan qu'elle a arrêté de diriger l'armée de Portugal sur Coria et Plasencia. Quoique ce matin je ne connusse qu'indirectement ses intentions à cet égard, je suis entré en matière contre cette manœuvre dans la lettre que je lui ai adressée il y a quelques heures : actuellement qu'elles me sont connues d'une manière positive, je proteste formellement contre, et je déclare à votre Excellence qu'à moins que l'Empereur lui ait fait parvenir de nouvelles instructions relatives à un mouvement à opérer vers le Tage, ce que je ne puis croire dans les circonstances actuelles, le 6<sup>e</sup> corps n'exécutera point celui dont elle me parle dans sa lettre de ce jour. L'armée a besoin de se reposer en arrière des places d'Almeida et de Ciudad Rodrigo, de faire arriver ses effets d'habillement et de chaussure dont elle manque absolument, et qui se trouvent entassés dans les magasins de Valladolid. Il faut que votre Excellence se désabuse si elle pense trouver des vivres en abondance à Coria et Plasencia. J'ai parcouru ce pays, et rien n'approche de sa stérilité ni du mauvais état de ses communications. Votre Excellence ne conduira jamais une pièce de canon jusque là, avec les attelages que nous venons de ramener de Portugal. D'ailleurs, cette manœuvre, si singulière dans ce moment, découvrirait entièrement la Vieille Castille, et pourrait, ainsi que je l'ai dit ce matin à votre Excellence, compromettre toutes nos opérations en Espagne. Je sais qu'en m'opposant ainsi formellement à vos intentions, je me charge d'une grande responsabilité ; mais dussé-je être destitué ou y perdre ma tête, je ne suivrai pas le mouvement dont votre Excellence me parle sur Coria et Plasencia, à moins, je le répète, qu'il ne soit ordonné par l'Empereur.

' Recevez, Prince, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Le Maréchal Ney, Duc d'Elchingen, au Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli.  
' Cortigó, le 22 Mars, 1811, 6 heures après midi.

' Prince, Plusieurs renseignements annoncent que l'ennemi se renforce considérablement près de Foruós, sur la droite du Mondego, et il paraît même que les forces de Lord Wellington ont passé le Mondego à Mangualde pour se diriger sur Celorico ; cette manœuvre pouvant s'exécuter demain, et par conséquent me couper toute retraite sur Almeida et m'obliger à me jeter sur Guarda. Comme votre Excellence ne veut prendre aucune détermination pour le départ des troupes, et qu'elle attend toujours jusqu'au moment du danger le plus imminent, je prévient votre Excellence que je pars demain de ma position de Carrapichana et de Cortigó pour aller échelonner mes troupes depuis Celorico jusqu'à Freixédas, et le jour suivant en arrière de Freixédas et Almeida. Cette disposition est forcée pour que le soldat ne se débende pas entièrement, sous le prétexte de chercher des vivres si nécessaires à sa subsistance, et dont il manque totalement.

' Je vous renouvelle, Prince, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Le Prince d'Essling, à la suite de cette correspondance, qui annonçait l'intention formelle de ne pas exécuter ses ordres, dut ôter le commandement du 6<sup>e</sup> corps au Maréchal Ney, qu'il remplaça provisoirement par le plus ancien Général de division, le général Loison ; il chargea son premier aide de camp, M. le chef de bataillon Polet, de se rendre incontinent à Paris, porteur de ses instructions confidentielles et de la lettre suivante :

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Vice Connétable, Major Général.

' Celorico, le 22 Mars, 1811, à 11 heures du soir.

' Monseigneur, Je me suis vu réduit à une extrémité que j'ai constamment cherché à éviter. M. le Maréchal Duc d'Elchingen a mis le comble à ses désor-

béissances, ainsi que votre Altesse le verra par la copie des lettres ci-jointes. Comme elles pouvaient avoir des suites fâcheuses pour la sûreté des armées de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, j'ai ordonné aux généraux de division de son corps d'armée de ne plus obéir qu'à mes ordres directs, et j'ai donné le commandement du 6<sup>e</sup> corps à M. le Comte Loison, comme au plus ancien général de division.

Monseigneur, il est bien douloureux pour un vieux militaire qui commande les armées depuis long-temps, et qui a été honoré de la confiance de Sa Majesté, d'en venir à une telle extrémité vis-à-vis de l'un de ses camarades. M. le Maréchal Duc d'Elchingen, depuis mon arrivée à l'armée, n'a cessé de me contrarier dans mes opérations militaires. J'y ai peut-être mis trop de patience; mais j'étais loin de m'attendre qu'il en abuserait au point de porter le scandale aussi loin. Le caractère du Duc d'Elchingen est connu: je n'en dirai pas davantage. Je lui ai ordonné de se rendre en Espagne et d'y attendre les ordres de sa Majesté. Mon premier aide de camp, qui aura l'honneur de vous remettre la présente, entrera avec vous dans de plus grands détails, et il rendra compte à votre Altesse des mouvements rétrogrades et de la position de l'armée.

Je compte aller prendre position entre Gnarra, Belmonte, et Alfaiates. L'armée n'a pas perdu une seule pièce de canon, ni un seul bagage. Certes, ce n'est pas par les Anglais, mais par la disette, que l'armée a été forcée à se retirer dans les positions actuelles, qu'elle ne sera forcée de quitter que par les mêmes raisons.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec un respectueux dévouement, etc.

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, Vice Connétable, Major Général. Alfaiates, le 31 Mars, 1811.

Monseigneur, Des circonstances impérieuses que je ne dois plus taire à V. A. m'ont forcé à renoncer au projet de manœuvrer en Portugal. J'ai fait tout ce qui dépendait de moi pour retenir le plus long-temps possible l'armée hors de l'Espagne, ainsi que j'ai toujours cru qu'il était dans l'intérêt de Sa Majesté de le faire; mais j'ai toujours été contrarié, j'ose le dire, par les commandants des corps d'armée qui ont tellement monté l'esprit des officiers et des soldats, qu'il serait nuisible de tenir plus long-temps dans les positions actuelles.

Depuis notre départ de Santarem, l'arrière-garde a été confiée au Maréchal Duc d'Elchingen, commandant le meilleur et le plus fort des trois corps d'armée. Comme ce corps avait été constamment en réserve, j'ai cru que c'était à lui qu'il fallait confier une opération qui exigeait de la vigueur. A peine arrivé à Pombal, M. le Maréchal manifesta hautement que c'était derrière Salamanque qu'il fallait se retirer, et que, pour faciliter la marche rétrograde et qu'elle fût plus rapide, il fallait détruire tous les caissons et équipages; cette opinion fut aussitôt propagée dans ce corps d'armée, et bientôt connue des autres qui ne tardèrent pas à la partager. Je dois dire à votre Altesse qu'il y a une grande lassitude dans l'armée de Portugal; que plusieurs des régiments qui la composent ont déjà été de l'expédition du Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie et du Duc d'Abrantes. Les officiers se plaignent; et, je le répète encore, il faut deux ou trois mois de repos à l'armée pour la refaire. J'ai été le seul, je puis le dire, qui aie voulu tenir en Portugal, et sans une volonté bien prononcée nous n'y aurions pas tenu quinze jours. Depuis que je fais la guerre, je n'ai été autant tourmenté, et jamais je n'ai éprouvé d'aussi grandes contrariétés; heureux si j'ai pu remplir les intentions de Sa Majesté.

No. XXXVIII. (pp. 782, 798.)

S. M. le Roi d'Espagne à Sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon. Madrid, le 24 Mars, 1811.

Ma santé délabrée en 10 jours me force à quitter ce pays pour chercher dans le sein de ma famille mon rétablissement. L'air modéré de Morfontaine et la tranquillité d'esprit me rendrait peut-être ma première vigueur. Ma présence est ici aujourd'hui complètement inutile. Je me conformerai à Paris aux desirs de votre Majesté, et je la supplie de croire qu'en bonne ou en mauvaise santé, en bonne ou mauvaise fortune, votre Majesté n'aura jamais personne qui lui soit plus sincèrement attaché, Roi ou sujet. Je serai toujours de votre Majesté le meilleur ami, le plus fidèle serviteur, et le plus affectionné frère; et je me soumetts comme votre Majesté le veut, à l'aimer tout bas et à ne pas l'importuner de sentimens qu'elle nie ou qu'elle repousse peut-être.

## No. XXXIX. (pp. 675, 741, 777.)

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général, au Maréchal Prince d'Essling.  
Paris, le 29 Mars, 1811.

Je vous écris particulièrement : l'Empereur aurait désiré que la campagne de Portugal eût mieux tourné. Vous avez mis trop d'audace à attaquer la position de Busaco, qui était défendue par de bonnes troupes. Si vous aviez réussi, il est à croire que les Anglais eussent été culbutés dans leurs lignes, sans avoir le temps de s'y défendre ; mais la force de la position de l'ennemi vous ayant fait perdre la bataille, l'Empereur, dans une pareille position, se serait arrêté à Coïmbre, s'y serait fortifié, y aurait fait des magasins, anrait remonté le moral des troupes, qui diminué toujours après un non-succès.

Votre tâche était difficile. Elle le sera encore ; mais aussi il y a plus de gloire pour vous. C'est dans votre situation actuelle qu'il est très-important de déployer une grande énergie. Des affaires continues avec les Anglais les affaiblissent, les tiennent en alarme, et surtout les empêchent de faire des détachements dans l'Andalousie. Nous pensons que Badajoz est pris. L'intention bien formelle de l'Empereur est, au mois de Septembre, après la récolte, de combiner un mouvement avec l'armée du midi, un corps de l'armée du centre et votre armée, pour culbuter les Anglais ; et c'est jusqu'à cette époque que vous devez agir de manière à ce qu'aucun corps ennemi ne puisse tenir la campagne, soit pour se porter en Andalousie, soit pour s'éloigner de plus d'une marche ou deux de Lisbonne. Nous sommes parfaitement instruits par les Anglais, et beaucoup mieux que vous ne l'êtes. L'Empereur lit les journaux de Londres, et chaque jour un grand nombre de lettres de l'opposition, dont quelques-unes accusent Lord Wellington et parlent en détail de vos opérations. L'Angleterre tremble pour son armée d'Espagne, et Lord Wellington a toujours été en grande crainte de vos opérations. La gloire de la France, la vôtre, mon cher Prince, sont dans vos mains. Si l'issue d'une grande bataille donnée sagement nous était contraire, ce qui ne paraît pas probable, en faisant de bonnes reconnaissances et en attaquant dans les règles, le résultat d'un grand nombre d'hommes tués à l'ennemi serait énorme pour l'Angleterre, et équivaldrait pour elle à une défaite. Car, certes, après une grande bataille dont le succès ne serait pas tout entier à notre avantage, les Anglais auraient un tiers de leur monde tué ou blessé. Je vous dis cela, mon cher Prince, pour vous faire sentir combien les Anglais tiennent à la conservation de leur armée. Je vous écrirai tous les jours. Quand je vous envoie quelques-uns de mes aides de camp, gardez-les un mois près de vous ; faites-leur faire la guerre. C'est me rendre service que de les tenir en haleine et de les garder à votre école.

Dans quelques jours, il vous sera envoyé 1,000,000 de francs en petites traites, pour donner aux officiers la facilité de faire passer de l'argent en France.

## No. XL. (pp. 724, 741.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel,  
Major Général. Alfaiates, le 31 Mars, 1811.

Monsieur, Dans ma dernière lettre, je disais à V. A. que je ferais reconnaître Coria, Plasencia, et Alcantara, pour m'assurer si le pays offrait quelques ressources et pouvait nourrir l'armée. Je n'ai pas eu le temps de recueillir ces renseignements. L'ennemi ayant fait des mouvements sur Guardal, l'armée a pris position à Sabugal, Alfaiates, Ponte de Sequeiros, et Rapoula de la Coa. La réserve de cavalerie est placée aux environs d'Alfaiates.

Monsieur, je vous dois la vérité : l'armée a besoin de quelques mois de repos ; les officiers généraux et autres en ont parlé trop souvent aux soldats, et cette opinion est prédominante à l'armée. Je tiendrai tant que je pourrai mes nouvelles positions. Il est vrai de dire qu'elles offrent bien peu de ressources ; mais on pourrait y tenir quelques jours, si je ne suis pas contrarié comme je l'ai été jusqu'à présent. Il suffit que l'ennemi montre quelques têtes de colonne, pour intimider les officiers, et leur faire dire hautement que c'est toute l'armée de



Wellington qui se présente. Il faut quelque temps à l'armée de Portugal pour se reposer, et pour profiter des effets d'habillement appartenant aux corps, et qui sont à Valladolid et à Salamanque. Je crois que quand l'armée aura pris du repos, et qu'elle se sera un peu habillée, S. M. pourra la faire agir.

Il y a 27 jours aujourd'hui que nous sommes en marche : tout est usé, et on a besoin de beaucoup de choses. Comme je l'ai déjà dit à V. A., nous n'avons perdu ni artillerie, ni caissons ; et nos chevaux sont absolument exténués. Les équipages militaires n'existent plus ; nous n'avons donc aucun transport.

Tout le matériel des équipages militaires et de l'artillerie est à recréer.

J'ai prescrit au général Comte d'Erlon de se placer, avec ses 2 divisions, à Val de la Mula, Aldea del Obispo et environs, pour protéger l'évacuation d'Almeida, et pour se porter, au besoin, au secours des deux places, si l'ennemi les menaçait. Si je suis obligé de passer l'Aguada, j'échelonnerai l'armée entre San Felices el Chico, Ledesma, Zamora, Toro et environs, de manière à pouvoir la réunir en peu de temps, pour marcher, s'il le fallait, sur Almeida ou Ciudad Rodrigo.

Je ne crois pas que l'ennemi puisse tenter rien de sérieux contre ces deux places, les ponts sur la Coa étant détruits et les abords de la première étant difficiles. Si je passe l'Aguada, que V. A. soit bien convaincue que je n'ai pas laissé de développer la plus grande résistance, et que ce n'a été qu'à la dernière extrémité que ce mouvement aura été exécuté. Le désir que l'armée a manifesté depuis longtemps d'aller se reposer, ne me laisse aucun doute qu'il serait dangereux d'attendre l'ennemi pour recevoir bataille, ou pour la lui donner. Les troupes sont bonnes, mais elles ont besoin de repos. Les maraudes, quoique organisées, et qu'on a été obligé d'y permettre, n'ont pas peu contribué à atténuer la discipline, qui a le plus grand besoin d'être rétablie.

J'aurai soin de rendre compte à V. A., tous les deux jours, de ce qui se sera passé.

#### ORDRE DU JOUR.

Alfaiates, le 3 Avril, 1811.

Le Maréchal Prince d'Esling, Commandant en Chef l'armée de Portugal, considérant que si la fuite des habitants du Portugal a exigé que des maraudes fussent organisées pour qu'elle pût y vivre, il n'en est pas de même dans un pays où elle trouvera des habitants paisibles, vivant sous la protection de Sa Majesté l'Empereur et sous les lois d'un souverain allié, arrête ce qui suit :

Art. 1. L'armée vivra sur le territoire d'Espagne au moyen des distributions qui lui seront faites régulièrement ; en conséquence la maraude est expressément défendue, et les maraudeurs seront punis suivant toute la rigueur des lois.

Art. 2. Il sera fait matin et soir dans les régiments les appels prescrits par les ordonnances et règlements ; personne ne pourra être dispensé d'assister à ces appels hors les cas prévus.

Art. 3. Messieurs les commandants de troupes ne souffriront pas qu'aucun sous-officier ou soldat s'éloigne à plus d'une demi-lieue de leurs cantonnements sans une permission expresse et par écrit.

Art. 4. Pour que la discipline soit assurée d'une manière stable, il sera formé dans la journée de demain des conseils de guerre dans chaque division, par les soins de MM. les commandants des corps d'armée ; ces conseils de guerre seront chargés de punir, dans les 24 heures, les délits de maraudage, d'insubordination et d'indiscipline.

Art. 5. Les officiers de tous grades qui n'auront pas empêché les excès prévus par le présent ordre, lorsque les moyens de police et d'autorité qui leur appartiennent le leur auront permis, en seront personnellement responsables ; et cette responsabilité encourra les assujettira, suivant le cas, à l'action des mêmes conseils de guerre, ou à une suspension qui sera publiée par des ordres du jour, et dont il sera rendu compte à Sa Majesté.

Art. 6. MM. les officiers-généraux sont appelés à stimuler particulièrement la surveillance des officiers de tous grades des régiments, à l'exercer eux-mêmes et à faire exécuter le plus rigoureusement possible les dispositions ci-dessus.

Art. 7. Le présent ordre sera lu 5 jours de suite à chaque appel du matin et du soir, et MM. les commandants des corps d'armée seront chargés de le faire mettre à exécution.

No. XLI. (pp. 741, 758, 781.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâteau, Major Général. Salamanque, le 17 Avril, 1811.

Dans ma dernière dépêche, j'ai eu l'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de V. A. les motifs qui avaient fait rentrer en Espagne l'armée dont S. M. m'a confié le commandement. Je vous ai fait connaître les positions qu'elle avait occupées depuis lors; que, pour couvrir les deux places, une division du 6<sup>me</sup> corps était placée à Ciudad Rodrigo, communiquant avec Salamanque par une autre division échelonnée sur la route, et que le 9<sup>me</sup> corps était placé à San Felices el Grande et Vitigudino, où il était appuyé par le 2<sup>me</sup>, occupant Ledesma. La même dépêche vous a informé, en outre, que le 8<sup>me</sup> corps était à Toro, et la réserve de cavalerie à Benavente.

Aujourd'hui, Monseigneur, je dois vous exposer avec la même exactitude la situation dans laquelle l'armée se trouve, et les difficultés qu'elle a rencontrées depuis qu'elle est revenue sur la frontière.

Lorsqu'en arrivant à Guarda et Belmonte, j'eus reconnu les faibles ressources que le pays nous offrait pour vivre, je vis que nous ne pouvions pas nous dispenser de repasser la Coa et l'Aguada. J'écrivis le 25 Mars à M. le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie, pour le prévenir que dans 8 jours nous serions en Espagne, et pour le prier de nous faire préparer un approvisionnement de 500,000 à 600,000 rations de biseuit à Salamanque. Le 31, je lui fis apercevoir combien il serait avantageux qu'on pût déjà en trouver 300,000 à 400,000 à Ciudad Rodrigo, pour donner au premier secours à des troupes qui n'avaient pas eu de pain depuis 15 jours, et les mettre à même d'y rester pour faire face aux Anglais qui paraîtraient entre les deux places.

A mon arrivée à Ciudad Rodrigo, je ne trouvais que l'approvisionnement de siège, consistant en 250,000 rations de biseuit et en farines suffisantes pour 160,000 rations: j'appris que celui d'Almeida ne pouvait nourrir la garnison de cette place que pendant 35 jours, à partir du 4 Avril. La circonstance dans laquelle nous nous trouvions me fit beaucoup regretter que les approvisionnements considérables versés dans les deux places, par suite des dispositions que nous avions faites avant notre entrée en Portugal, eussent été consommés avec peu d'économie par le 9<sup>me</sup> corps, et sans qu'il eût pris des mesures pour pourvoir à leur remplacement. Mais ce n'est pas le cas d'examiner ici ni ce que fit le 9<sup>me</sup> corps, ni les dispositions de l'administration qui nous a succédé. Je sentis qu'il fallait cependant tenir, au moins quelques jours, entre les deux places, pour voir quels seraient les projets de l'ennemi, afin d'empêcher que, par une prompte apparition sur ce point, il ne portât la terreur dans le nord de l'Espagne, et de donner le temps d'arriver aux approvisionnements que j'avais demandés. Je fis donc prendre sur ceux de Ciudad Rodrigo une double ration de biseuit par homme, pour 3 jours; mais, au lieu de secours réels que j'espérais, ne recevant qu'un avis de M. le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie, que plus de 10,000 fanègues de blé existaient à Salamanque, que 6000 allaient encore y être envoyées, que 2000 fanègues partaient pour Ciudad Rodrigo, où il devait diriger aussi 200,000 rations de biseuit, pour remplacer ce que j'avais emprunté des magasins, je dus m'éloigner de cette place, en me bornant à représenter à M. le Maréchal, qu'il serait convenable aux intérêts de S. M. qu'il y envoyât un corps d'observation pourvu de vivres, pendant que les troupes de l'armée de Portugal iraient en chercher dans les cantons qui présentaient des ressources. V. A. peut juger, par ce que je lui ai déjà dit, combien il était à désirer que les assurances de M. le Maréchal et mes représentations eussent été suivies de quelque effet. J'arrivai cependant avec le 6<sup>me</sup> corps à Salamanque, et, loin d'y trouver ce qui m'avait été annoncé, je ne pus compter que sur 6000 fanègues et 39,000 rations de biseuit, sur lesquelles il nous a fallu prendre ensuite pour remplacer ce que nous avions consommé des approvisionnements de Ciudad Rodrigo, où 20,000 rations seulement avaient été envoyées par M. le Maréchal, sans qu'un convoi de 100,000, qu'il avait dit expédier pour la même destination, soit plus arrivé que les deux autres convois annoncés, l'un de 6000 fanègues, et l'autre de 2000. Ne voyant venir à notre secours ni corps d'observation de l'armée du nord, ni les moyens de subsistances qu'on nous avait promis, et l'importance de couvrir les places

étant toujours aussi grande, j'ai ordonné à 2 divisions du 6<sup>me</sup> corps et au 9<sup>me</sup> d'emmener une partie des 6000 fanègues trouvées ici, et d'aller s'établir dans les positions que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous désigner au commencement de ma lettre.

Si je n'ai pas vu arriver ce qui m'avait été annoncé, du moins j'espérais que les marchés pour lesquels 1,000,000 de francs des fonds destinés à la solde a été retenu à Valladolid, ainsi qu'une de mes dépêches du 12 en a informé V. A., produiraient des versements considérables pour l'époque du 15, qui m'avait été indiquée. Mais nous sommes au 17, et rien n'a paru. Hier, j'ai exposé de nouveau à M. le Maréchal l'état pénible dans lequel nous nous trouvions, et que, si des secours efficaces ne nous parvenaient pas incessamment, nous serions contraints de renoncer à couvrir les places. Ce que je lui disais hier, Monseigneur, je ne puis que le dire à V. A., pour vous faire connaître le véritable état des choses. Les 6<sup>me</sup> et 9<sup>me</sup> corps vont se trouver sans vivres : le 2<sup>me</sup> se plaint déjà de sa position, et il n'y a que le 8<sup>me</sup> qui puisse tenir où il est. La cavalerie, quoique cantonnée, perd journellement un grand nombre de chevaux qui ont été épuisés par le manque de nourriture et leurs fatigues en Portugal. Les trains d'équipages et d'artillerie sont, par les mêmes motifs, dans un état de nullité aussi absolu. Le pays n'a plus de moyens de transport. La plus grande apathie règne dans toutes les autorités, dont le zèle devrait se développer dans la position où nous nous trouvons.

Le résumé de ma lettre est que, de toutes les promesses que M. le Duc d'Istrie m'a faites, aucune ne s'est effectuée; que je ne vois qu'un avenir extrêmement fâcheux; que j'ai fait et que je fais tout ce qui est en mon pouvoir; que je ne puis que faire des représentations, écrire, et exposer la véritable situation des choses, sans en être jusqu'à présent plus avancé. Etant sans autorité dans le pays, je désespère de pouvoir faire vivre plus longtemps les troupes que j'ai à San Felices el Grande et Vitigudino, ainsi que les 2 divisions, dont une est à Ciudad Rodrigo, et l'autre placée en échelons. C'est la vérité que je vous soumetts, Monseigneur; il est vraiment instant qu'on prenne d'autres mesures, qu'on réponde à mes lettres, et qu'on y fasse droit.

No. XLII. (pp. 747, 781.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, Duc de Rivoli, au général Fririon, Chef d'Etat Major Général. Salamanque, 17 Avril, 1811.

M. le général Fririon partira demain, 18 Avril, pour se porter à Rodrigo; arrivé dans cette place, il enverra des émissaires, s'il croit ne pas pouvoir envoyer des reconnaissances, pour avoir des nouvelles de l'ennemi. Si, d'après les rapports qu'il recevra, il croit pouvoir faire parvenir à Almeida un convoi de 100,000 rations de biscuit, et autant qu'il pourra de farines sous l'escorte de la division Marchand, il en ordonnera de suite les dispositions en y employant les dragons du 10<sup>e</sup> régt. Si, par les rapports qu'il aura pu recueillir, l'ennemi était trop en forces, il y emploierait une division du 9<sup>e</sup> corps, et les deux s'il le fallait pour plus de sûreté. Il écrirait au général Regnier pour qu'il appuyât ce mouvement avec quatre de ses meilleurs régiments et toute la cavalerie du général Fournier; il pourrait de plus y employer le nombre d'artillerie qu'il croirait nécessaire.

M. le général Fririon ordonnera toutes les dispositions en mon nom.

Il faut jeter dans la place d'Almeida au moins pour deux mois de vivres, ce qui obligerait à toucher aux approvisionnements de Rodrigo, qui seraient remplacés de suite.

M. le général Fririon sentira la nécessité d'accélérer le plus qu'il sera possible le départ du convoi, par l'impossibilité où les bêtes de transport se trouveraient de vivre aux environs de Rodrigo et d'Almeida.

M. le général Fririon est autorisé à faire toutes les dispositions qu'il croira convenables pour l'entrée du convoi à Almeida. Il me donnera souvent de ses nouvelles par la voie des paysans, s'il ne le peut autrement.

Le général Fririon, qui s'était transporté à Rodrigo, rendit compte au Prince que l'ennemi s'étant jeté entre Rodrigo et Almeida, il était nécessaire de livrer bataille pour ravitailler cette dernière place. Le Maréchal Masséna, après duquel il était retourné, lui dicta les instructions suivantes pour le général Regnier :

Salamanque, 21 Avril, 1811.

Général, Les vivres d'Almeida touchent à leur fin, et il serait honteux pour l'armée de Portugal de laisser prendre par famine une place qui lui a tant coûté. En conséquence, vous ferez partir la plus forte division de votre corps d'armée avec dix à douze jours de vivres et quatre pièces d'artillerie. Vous ferez un choix dans les chevaux pour les atteler le mieux qu'il sera possible. Vous réimerez 300 à 400 hommes de cavalerie les mieux en état, vous leur ferez donner pour dix à douze jours d'orge. Les régiments ont des transports à leur suite, ils s'en serviront; s'ils ne peuvent avoir avec eux suffisamment de pain et de biscuit, ils emporteront de la farine.

Six divisions doivent se réunir sur le même point; il n'y a pas un instant à perdre pour ravitailler Almeida.' *Journal historique de la Campagne de Portugal, par le général Baron Fririon, p. 196.*

No. XLIII. (p. 781.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, au Maréchal Bessières, Duc d'Istrie.

Salamanque, le 22 Avril, 1811.

J'ai reçu votre dépêche. Toutes vos promesses de vous réunir à moi s'évanouissent donc dans le moment où j'en ai besoin? Ravitailler Almeida et Rodrigo est la première opération, et la seule qui puisse nous donner la faculté de rendre l'armée de Portugal disponible, lorsqu'on n'aura plus rien à craindre sur le sort des places. En y jetant pour 3 ou 4 mois de vivres, on peut ensuite établir plusieurs colonnes mobiles; on peut envoyer des troupes à Avila et Ségovie; on peut au besoin appuyer le mouvement de l'armée d'Andalousie; mais ne serait-il pas honteux de laisser rendre une place, faute de vivres, en présence de deux maréchaux de l'empire? Je vous ai déjà prévenu de la nullité de ma cavalerie, de l'impossibilité où se trouvent les chevaux d'artillerie de rendre aucun service. Vous savez encore que je dois envoyer le 9<sup>me</sup> corps en Andalousie; je voulais aussi le faire concourir avant son départ au ravitaillement des places. Pouvez-vous, mon cher maréchal, balancer un seul instant à m'envoyer de la cavalerie et des attelages d'artillerie? Si vous voulez, gardez votre matériel. Ne vous ai-je pas prévenu que je commençais mon mouvement le 26? et vous paraissiez attendre, le 22, une seconde demande de ma part! Vous le savez aussi bien que moi: perdre un ou deux jours à la guerre est beaucoup, et ce délai peut avoir des suites fâcheuses qu'on ne répare plus.

Quand je vous ai dit que je ne réunirais que 6 divisions, c'était pour ne pas dégarner des points importants occupés par les corps d'armée; mais de la cavalerie et de l'artillerie sont un secours dont je ne puis me passer. Je vous prie en conséquence, mon cher maréchal, de me faire arriver, à marches forcées, de la cavalerie et des attelages d'artillerie. Réfléchissez qu'une fois les places approvisionnées, je pourrai disposer des deux tiers de l'armée, et que cette opération passe avant tout.

En m'offrant de nous envoyer les attelages pour 16 pièces, vous avez bien entendu, sans doute, mon cher maréchal, y comprendre ceux nécessaires pour les caissons des pièces?

No. XLIV. (p. 781.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, au Maréchal Bessières, Duc d'Istrie.

Ciudad Rodrigo, le 29 Avril, 1811.

Vos lettres sont inconcevables. Dans celle du 20, vous me dites que vous ne pouvez me donner aucun secours. Par celle du 22, vous me dites que, le 26, vous me joindrez partout où je serai, et que la tête de votre colonne arrivera à Salamanque le 26. Par celle que je reçois à l'instant, vous me dites que votre cavalerie et votre artillerie se trouvent encore, le 27, à une journée en arrière de Salamanque, et vous concluez que mon mouvement doit être fini, et vous me témoignez vos regrets de n'avoir pu y co-opérer. Convenez, mon cher maréchal, que si l'armée de Portugal recevait un échec, vous auriez bien des reproches à vous faire. Je vous ai demandé de l'artillerie et des attelages, et

encore plus positivement de la cavalerie; vous avez, sous différents prétextes, éludé ma demande. Toutes les troupes qui sont en Espagne sont de la même famille. Vous êtes, jusqu'à ce qu'il y ait de nouveaux ordres, chargé de la défense et de l'approvisionnement des places d'Almeida et de Rodrigo. Je n'aurais pas mieux demandé que d'employer l'armée de Portugal sous mes ordres à défendre ces places, à marcher au secours de l'armée du midi, mais comment puis-je le faire sans vivres?

Je compte faire mon mouvement demain matin. J'ignore quelle pourra être l'issue de ce mouvement. Si ma lettre vous arrive dans la journée de demain, votre cavalerie et votre artillerie pourraient toujours se mettre en mouvement dans la nuit pour arriver après-demain, 1<sup>er</sup> Mai, à Cabrillas. Je vous prie de faire filer, sans s'arrêter, le biscuit, la farine, le grain, que vous n'aurez pas manqué de réunir à la suite de vos troupes. Il est instant que ces ressources, comme beaucoup d'autres, arrivent à Ciudad Rodrigo. Cette place n'aura pas 15 jours de vivres. A mon départ d'ici, il faudra que des convois considérables y soient envoyés.

No. XLV. (pp. 781, 794.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel,  
Major Général. Ciudad Rodrigo, le 30 Avril, 1811.

Ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous en prévenir par ma dépêche du 24, je me suis rendu à Ciudad Rodrigo dans le dessein de ravitailler Almeida. L'armée n'a pu être réunie qu'hier, au lieu du 26, comme j'avais cru pouvoir le faire. Je l'ai passée en revue eu grande partie; et, ce matin, j'aurais commencé mon mouvement sur Almeida, si, prévenu que M. le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie était arrivé à Salamanque avec de la cavalerie et des attelages d'artillerie, je ne lui avais pas écrit de faire arriver ces secours qui nous sont si utiles. Je les attends ce soir, et demain je compte marcher à l'ennemi. Suivant les rapports des déserteurs et des paysans, il existe autour d'Almeida 7 divisions commandées par Lord Wellington qu'on dit revenu de l'Estramadoure. Je m'empresserai de faire connaître à V. A. le résultat de notre expédition; d'après les différents rapports que je vous ai faits, vous concevrez facilement les embarras que nous aurons eus pour l'entreprendre. Vous dire que chaque corps d'armée n'a pas de chevaux en état de faire manœuvrer 3 pièces d'artillerie; que la cavalerie de l'armée présente à peine 2000 chevaux en état de marcher, y compris la brigade Fournier; et que les versements de subsistances qui devaient être faits sur Ciudad Rodrigo n'arrivent pas, ou n'y sont rendus que trop tard, diminués de plus de moitié, c'est vous répéter, Monseigneur, les plaintes qui remplissent mes précédentes lettres. Cependant ce sont là les inconvénients que nous rencontrons à la veille d'une bataille, et au moment où nous devons jeter des vivres dans une place forte. Je dois assurer V. A. que rien ne sera ménagé pour que ces difficultés ne nous empêchent pas d'obtenir un succès qui réponde aux vues de S. M., et je n'aurai point de repos que les 120,000 rations de biscuit, les 100 quintaux de farine, les 80 quintaux de légumes, les 80 quintaux de viande salée, et les 100,000 rations d'eau-de-vie, formant le convoi destiné pour Almeida, n'y soient entrés en entier.

L'ennemi a été toujours obligé d'avoir sur ce point 7 divisions, qu'on dit fortes ensemble de 50,000 hommes, et beaucoup de cavalerie, ce qui l'a empêché de porter ses forces ailleurs, circonstance qui rentre parfaitement dans le plan de S. M. l'Empereur. Je ne puis marcher à lui qu'avec 35,000 hommes de toutes armes, mais qui sont bien disposés.

No. XLVI. (pp. 746, 794.)

Le Maréchal Masséna, Prince d'Essling, à S. A. le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel,  
Major Général. Au camp de Fuentes de Oñoro, le 7 Mai, 1811.

J'attendais avec la plus vive impatience l'arrivée de M. le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie avec la cavalerie, l'artillerie, et les attelages qu'il devait amener, et qui nous étaient devenus si nécessaires, d'après les pertes que l'armée avait éprouvées pendant les derniers mois. Le 30 Avril, ainsi que ma lettre de cette date en a informé V. A., je passai en revue les troupes du 6<sup>me</sup> corps et celles du 8<sup>me</sup>, à l'exception de la division Clausel, laissée en échelons sur la route de Salamanque à Ciudad Rodrigo, pour

la sûreté des communications et de la marche des convois. Le 1 Mai, M. le Duc d'Istrie arriva, pendant que je passais en revue les 2<sup>me</sup> et 9<sup>me</sup> corps; mais la tête de ses renforts, qui consistaient de la brigade de cavalerie légère du général Wathier, forte de 700 à 800 hommes, d'un détachement de grenadiers, chasseurs, et lanciers de la cavalerie de la Garde de la même force, de 6 pièces d'artillerie de la Garde, et de 30 attelages d'artillerie, était encore à 7 lieues de Rodrigo. Je hâtai leur marche, et j'ordonnai à l'armée de passer l'Aguada sur le pont de Rodrigo, le 2, à la pointe du jour, et de se diriger, le 2<sup>me</sup> corps sur Marialva, les 8<sup>me</sup> et 9<sup>me</sup> sur Carpio avec la réserve de cavalerie, le 6<sup>me</sup> sur Espeja avec le reste de la cavalerie. Ce mouvement s'effectua avec beaucoup d'ordre. Les avant-postes de l'ennemi furent ramenés, et les préparatifs qu'il avait faits pour défendre les défilés de Marialva se trouvèrent déjoués par le passage de l'Azava à Carpio. Cette opération s'exécuta sans de grandes contrariétés de la part de l'ennemi; et son avant-garde, de 14 escadrons de cavalerie soutenue par quelques milliers de fantassins avec de l'artillerie, fut menée vivement jusqu'au delà de Gallegos. L'armée prit position ainsi qu'il suit: le 2<sup>me</sup> corps en arrière et à droite de Gallegos, le 8<sup>me</sup>, c'est-à-dire, la division Solignac, à gauche de ce village qui fut occupé par les avant-postes, le 6<sup>me</sup> en arrière d'Espeja, et le 9<sup>me</sup> en réserve en avant de Carpio.

Les renseignements que j'avais sur l'ennemi portaient qu'il s'était considérablement renforcé de toutes les troupes qu'il avait pu tirer à lui; qu'il avait rappelé les Anglais dirigés précédemment sur Badajoz; enfin, qu'il occupait avec plus de 50,000 hommes une belle ligne de bataille en arrière du ruisseau d'Oñoro, sur un coteau dont la gauche, d'assez difficile accès, était appuyée au fort de la Concepcion; la droite, plus accessible, se trouvait à Nava de Aver, et le quartier général à Villar Formoso. Cependant cette position de l'ennemi n'était pas sans dangers pour lui, puisqu'il avait derrière sa ligne le lit rocailleux de la Coa, et une seule communication voiturable assez difficile par Castello Bom.

Le 3, au matin, l'armée marcha en avant, le 2<sup>me</sup> corps formant toujours la droite, et se dirigeant sur Alameda, la division Solignac du 8<sup>me</sup> à gauche de ce village, et le 6<sup>me</sup> avec la cavalerie alla d'Espeja sur Fuentes de Oñoro. Le convoi que j'avais intention de jeter dans Almeida suivait le centre de l'armée, et arrivait à Gallegos, où devait se rendre aussi la cavalerie de la Garde Impériale qu'avait amenée M. le Duc d'Istrie. Mon projet était de me porter en force sur la droite de l'ennemi, de le déborder, et de le renverser s'il m'était possible, afin de m'emparer de la communication de Castello Bom et de le jeter vers la basse Coa, dans le cul-de-sac formé par ce torrent, le Douro, et l'Aguada, où il se trouverait très embarrassé, à cause des difficultés dont sont hérissées les berges de ces rivières. En conséquence, et pendant que les 2<sup>me</sup> et 9<sup>me</sup> corps et la division Solignac du 8<sup>me</sup> tenaient en respect le centre de l'ennemi, je me portai vers sa droite avec le 6<sup>me</sup> corps, en poursuivant son arrière-garde, dont la plus grande partie fut repoussée vivement dans Fuentes de Oñoro. Ce village était caché par les accidents du terrain, et placé en partie sur le pied du coteau que tenait l'ennemi. J'espérais l'enlever et m'y maintenir. Je le fis attaquer, et il fut bientôt occupé. Lord Wellington, qui voyait une partie de sa ligne coupée par l'occupation de ce poste important, ne cessa d'y jeter de nouvelles forces, et s'en empara. La division Ferey, qui fut seule employée à cette attaque, eut bientôt élassé l'ennemi du village; elle le perdit à son tour. Enfin, après l'avoir vu pris et repris, je fis soutenir le général Ferey par 4 bataillons de réserve de la division Marchand, du 6<sup>me</sup> corps, et la majeure partie du village nous resta pendant la nuit. En même temps on échangeait au centre quelques coups de canon, et on se disputait faiblement quelques petits postes: le village d'Alameda nous resta.

Le 4, à la pointe du jour, l'ennemi, très-inquiet de l'occupation de Fuentes de Oñoro, qui nous ouvrait un débouché au milieu de sa ligne, chercha en vain à le reprendre; il fut repoussé vivement. Alors il remplit de troupes les avenues de ce village, les murs et les rochers qui le flanquaient, et, par toutes sortes de moyens, nous rendit l'occupation entière de la partie supérieure du village très-difficile. Dès lors je vis que cet avantage coûterait trop cher à l'armée, et je m'occupai des dispositions nécessaires pour une nouvelle attaque. Je reconnus avec soin les flancs de l'ennemi qui étaient gardés par de la cavalerie, par les bandes Espagnoles, et les milices du pays. Je trouvais un terrain accessible entre Nava de Aver et Pozovelho, et je résolus d'y porter l'armée. Les ordres furent expédiés le soir, et les mouvements s'exécutèrent pendant la nuit.

Le 5, à la pointe du jour, l'armée se trouva ainsi placée: les 1<sup>re</sup> et 2<sup>me</sup> divisions du

6<sup>me</sup> corps en face de Pozovelho, ayant la 2<sup>me</sup> division du 8<sup>me</sup> en réserve. Toute la cavalerie de l'armée fut réunie sous les ordres du général Montbrun à la gauche de cette infanterie. Ces troupes placées vis-à-vis de la droite de l'ennemi étaient destinées à la tourner et à la renverser. La 3<sup>me</sup> division du 6<sup>me</sup> corps occupait une partie du village de Fuentes de Oñoro; elle était destinée à l'attaquer encore, et formait le centre avec le 9<sup>me</sup> corps, qui se trouvait en arrière et en réserve. A la droite était le 2<sup>me</sup> corps, dont la 1<sup>re</sup> division s'appuyait à Alameda; la 2<sup>me</sup> avait été placée intermédiairement entre ce village et Fuentes de Oñoro. Ces corps avaient ordre de favoriser par de petites attaques le grand mouvement de l'armée, et de manœuvrer de manière à se réunir à elle à mesure qu'elle gagnerait du terrain sur l'ennemi. Le village de Pozobello et les bois qui le flanquaient étaient pleins d'infanterie Anglaise; ils furent vigoureusement attaqués par la 1<sup>re</sup> division du 6<sup>me</sup> corps, et enlevés à la baïonnette. L'ennemi y perdit beaucoup de morts et quelques prisonniers. Les 3 divisions marchaient en colonnes serrées par échelons sur le village et sur ses flancs. En arrière, l'ennemi développait une ligne de 20 escadrons soutenus par plusieurs bataillons d'infanterie et par 12 pièces de canon. Le général Montbrun, avec la cavalerie, manœuvra sur notre gauche de manière à gagner la crête des hauteurs et la droite de l'ennemi. Il eut à essayer plusieurs charges avant d'avoir pu y parvenir. Dès qu'il eut atteint la crête et que j'eus pu lui fournir 4 pièces d'artillerie, il chargea en colonne par régiment la cavalerie ennemie avec le plus grand succès et une vigueur sans pareille. Malgré la protection de l'artillerie et de l'infanterie cachée dans les rochers, il culbuta successivement les 20 escadrons Anglais, et les chassa devant lui pendant plus d'une lieue. Cependant les 1<sup>re</sup> et 2<sup>me</sup> divisions du 6<sup>me</sup> corps suivaient, autant qu'il est possible à de l'infanterie, le mouvement de la cavalerie en colonne; et la division Solignac marchait en réserve. Le 9<sup>me</sup> corps avançait sa gauche pour se lier avec la grande attaque. La 3<sup>me</sup> division du 6<sup>me</sup> corps attaquait vivement le village de Fuentes de Oñoro, où l'ennemi jeta encore des forces considérables pour occuper ce débouché et empêcher la communication de notre centre avec la gauche. L'ennemi avait son aile droite en déroute; et les corps qui la composaient s'enfuyaient dispersés vers le centre, où ils purent se réunir derrière les régiments que Lord Wellington faisait venir en toute hâte de sa gauche. Le plateau où nous venions de manœuvrer se rétrécissait dans cette partie. Du sommet descendaient deux ravins très-rocailloux et très-difficiles, où se trouvaient les villages de Fuentes de Oñoro et de Villar Formoso. Lord Wellington farcit ces ravins de tirailleurs, garnit les revers de beaucoup d'artillerie, et occupa le sommet par 3 grands carrés. Notre cavalerie, parvenue sur ce point, tomba vigoureusement sur les carrés et les enfonça tous trois; mais elle arriva en même temps sous le feu de l'artillerie ennemie et de ses tirailleurs. L'artillerie qui la suivait eut beaucoup de chevaux tués par un feu très-supérieur, et ce superbe mouvement se trouva arrêté. Avant que notre infanterie pût arriver, l'ennemi eut le temps de couvrir le sommet du plateau de plusieurs lignes d'infanterie Anglaise et d'une formidable artillerie; il jeta de nouvelles troupes dans Fuentes de Oñoro, et en garnit aussi Villar Formoso à sa droite. Les divisions Ferey et Claparède attaquèrent vigoureusement Fuentes de Oñoro, et en chassèrent plusieurs fois l'ennemi; mais aussitôt qu'elles arrivaient au sommet du village, elles étaient foudroyées par l'artillerie; et Lord Wellington n'a cessé d'y jeter des renforts considérables de ses meilleures troupes. Il y a perdu 500 prisonniers et plus de 700 à 800 morts, parmi lesquels beaucoup d'officiers et d'Ecossais.

Le général Anglais avait réuni sur son centre de très grandes forces et beaucoup d'artillerie. La bataille dégénérait en tirillerie vers le front et vers Fuentes de Oñoro. Je voulus tenter un effort pour percer le centre et culbuter l'armée Anglaise vers la basse Coa: l'ardeur du soldat était sans pareille. Je dus m'occuper, avant ce coup de vigueur, de l'état de mes approvisionnements, car, dans tout le cours de cette campagne, je me suis vu arrêté à chaque instant par des difficultés insurmontables. Il est résulté de l'état que m'a remis le commandant d'artillerie, qu'il ne restait en réserve que 4 cartouches par homme, ce qui faisait une trentaine en comptant ce qui pouvait se trouver dans les gibernes. Je ne me crus pas en mesure de recommencer une attaque avec un tel approvisionnement, et je me décidai à envoyer tous les caissons vides à Rodrigo, afin d'en rapporter des munitions, en prenant les mesures nécessaires pour conserver les avantages remportés sur l'ennemi.

L'armée, dans cette journée où tout l'honneur des armes lui est resté, a pris un

millier d'hommes, parmi lesquels un lieutenant colonel et un grand nombre d'officiers, et en a tué ou blessé plus de 2000. Elle a renversé toute l'aile droite de l'ennemi, et a gagné plus d'une lieue de terrain sur lui. Il a passé la nuit qui a suivi la bataille à retrancher fortement le sommet du plateau qu'il occupe, par 5 grands ouvrages, beaucoup d'artillerie, et des tranchées pour les tirailleurs. Il a disposé également des épaulements dans les ravins et derrière les rochers. Enfin, il a barricadé le sommet des villages de Fuentes de Oforo et de Villar Formoso, appelant ainsi à son secours toutes les ressources de la fortification contre une attaque de vive force.

Afin de pouvoir profiter des avantages de cette journée et de nourrir l'armée, qui, faute de vivres, aurait été obligée de se retirer, j'ai fait venir au camp le convoi destiné à approvisionner Almeida. Mon intention est de m'approcher de cette place, d'en retirer la garnison, et de la faire sauter d'après l'autorisation de S. M.

Notre perte a été peu de chose en comparaison de celle de l'ennemi. Officiers généraux, officiers et soldats, tous ont rempli leurs devoirs avec dévouement et bravoure. M. le général de division Comte de Montbrun, commandant la cavalerie de l'armée, a déployé dans la journée du 5 une extrême habileté dans les manœuvres faites pour tirer le plus beau parti de l'intrépidité des régiments qu'il a sous ses ordres. MM. les généraux de brigade Fourrier et Wathier l'ont parfaitement secondé; ils ont exécuté et fait exécuter des charges qui leur font un honneur infini. Le général Loreet, commandant une brigade de dragons, a été blessé. Le colonel Ornano, du 25<sup>me</sup> de dragons, a conduit des escadrons d'élite en chef extrêmement dévoué et méritant. Le général Maucune a reçu deux blessures légères, et n'a pas quitté le champ de bataille. Le général Vichery, les colonels Fririon du 69<sup>me</sup> régt., et Langeron de la 2<sup>me</sup> demi-brigade légère, ont aussi été blessés légèrement.

J'aurai l'honneur de vous faire connaître particulièrement les belles actions qui auront signalé la journée du 5, et de vous désigner les autres officiers de marque que le fer de l'ennemi aura atteints. M. Septeuil, aide de camp de V. A., a eu une jambe emportée d'un boulet de canon. Ce brave et intéressant jeune officier avait accompagné M. le Duc d'Istrie, et se trouvait dans une charge de dragons. Il a supporté l'amputation avec un sang froid rare. Il se trouve hors de tout danger. Je prie V. A. d'être persuadée que j'éprouve autant de peine à lui parler de ce malheureux accident, qu'elle en éprouvera elle-même à l'apprendre.

Par ma lettre du 30 Avril, j'avais l'honneur de dire à V. A. que chaque corps d'armée pouvait à peine faire atteler 3 pièces d'artillerie. Au moyen des attelages amenés par M. le Duc d'Istrie, nous avons 30 pièces pour toute l'armée, non compris les 6 de la Garde Impériale, quantité bien inférieure à celle qui nous serait nécessaire pour faire face à celle de l'ennemi.

#### No. XLVII. (pp. 781, 794.)

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général, au Maréchal Bessièrès, Duc d'Istrie.  
Rambouillet, le 19 Mai, 1811.

L'Empereur, M. le Duc, a été mécontent que vous n'ayez pas fourni au Prince d'Essling les secours qui lui étaient nécessaires. Vous deviez mener avec vous une masse de troupes capable d'appuyer efficacement le Prince d'Essling, et décider d'une manière éclatante la victoire. S. M. a vu avec peine que vous vous soyez porté à Ciudad Rodrigo avec seulement 1500 à 1600 chevaux, 6 pièces de canon, et quelques attelages. S. M. avait pensé, d'après les lettres qui vous avaient été écrites, que vous marchiez avec toutes vos forces afin de battre et de détruire l'armée Anglaise. Dans une circonstance si importante, vous étiez même autorisé à faire venir le général Bonet dans le cas où vous auriez jugé cette grande mesure indispensable. L'Empereur, M. le Maréchal, trouve que vous avez été inutile à l'armée de Portugal, et que vous n'avez pas rempli ses intentions. Vous avez 12 pièces d'artillerie légère de la Garde; leurs boulets peuvent-ils être mieux employés que contre les Anglais? Vous pouviez disposer de 12 autres pièces d'artillerie. Pourquoi n'avez-vous pas fait marcher 2 régiments de voltigeurs, 2 de tirailleurs, et 2 de fusiliers? peut-être même aurait-on pu en faire marcher trois de chaque corps. Avec l'artillerie, cela vous aurait fait une dizaine de 1000 hommes qui auraient été d'un résultat immense. Que signi-



fient ces ménagements à réunir et à employer ses forces (dit l'Empereur), quand on est en présence des Anglais, nos implacables ennemis? Qu'importe-t-il de garder Palencia, Lerma, et tous ces autres postes, qui disséminent l'armée? Il était important d'occuper Valladolid et Burgos, de laisser le général Seras en observation où il se trouve, et de marcher avec le reste de vos troupes. S. M. aurait vu dans cette disposition une nouvelle preuve de votre attachement à sa personne et de la haine que vous portez aux Anglais. L'Empereur observe que vous avez connu le mouvement de retraite du Prince d'Essling le 1<sup>er</sup> Avril, qu'alors Almeida allait se trouver exposé, et enfin que ce n'est que le 1<sup>er</sup> Mai que vous arrivez à Ciudad Rodrigo. L'Empereur observe que si les Anglais vous battaient dans la position actuelle, à quoi vous serviraient les nombreuses et belles troupes qui restent disséminées sur vos derrières?

L'Empereur, M. le Maréchal, espère que vous réparerez la faute énorme que vous venez de commettre en ce moment. Vous avez sous votre commandement environ 50,000 hommes; quelle belle occasion de les réunir en masse le plus possible pour soutenir le Prince d'Essling et écraser les Anglais!

END OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.

FOR CIRCULATION ONLY

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